THE IMPACT OF AGRICULTURAL RESSETLEMENT IN ZIMBABWE: THE SOTI SOURCE MODEL A INTENSIVE RESSETLEMENT SCHEME

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THE IMPACT OF AGRICULTURAL RESETTLEMENT IN ZIMBABWE: THE SOTI SOURCE MODEL A INTENSIVE RESETTLEMENT SCHEME

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DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF ARTS UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

JOHANNESBURG, 1991
THIS DISSERTATION IS ENTIRELY MY OWN WORK AND HAS NOT BEEN SUBMITTED AS A DISSERTATION FOR ANY OTHER DEGREE IN ANY OTHER UNIVERSITY

UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, 1991
This dissertation is concerned with an empirical analysis of a resettlement scheme in post-independent Zimbabwe. The study explores the methods and manner in which the present government gave attention to the question of land redistribution whereby former commercial farmland would be made available to (black) peasant farmers. The government had planned to resettle some 182 000 families under the Normal Intensive, and later the Accelerated Intensive, Resettlement Programmes. Resettlement would occur under one of five settlement models, depending on tenure and land arrangements. The dissertation focuses on the establishment and operation of one such scheme based on Model A, the most popular of the resettlement models. The first decade of independence in Zimbabwe witnessed the first attempts at redressing the racial bias of land distribution. Whilst the initial targets of resettlement have not been met, nor have the fundamental spatial relations changed in Zimbabwe, the study nevertheless addresses the progress made and problems faced in dealing with this issue within the context of rural development in Zimbabwe.
The issue of the redistribution of land must undoubtedly be one of the most emotive to have confronted Zimbabwe and its peoples over the first decade of independence. It has given rise to debate, discussion, argument, concern, distress, and conflict throughout the community. The distribution of land on a racial basis had its origins in the colonial penetration and European conquest of the country at the turn of the 20th Century, reaching its most defined form through the Land Apportionment Act in 1930. Cited as an important *raison d'etre* for the liberation war during the 1970s, land reform was central to the economic policies of the new government which came to power in 1980. The approach adopted and the resettlement programme which followed, however, have not fundamentally altered the nature of the Zimbabwean space economy. The core of this dissertation is the study of the land reform and resettlement programme and its impact on agrarian structure and spatial relations in post-independence Zimbabwe.

As a Zimbabwean, my interest in this topic developed along with the general debate on the land issue, in tandem with the social and economic transformation strategies which were being discussed during the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe. Research for this dissertation was initiated whilst I held the position of development planner at the Development Bank of Southern Africa.

I wish to use this opportunity to record my appreciation to the Development Bank of Southern Africa for their financial assistance in the initial stages of the research, and for the generous time allowances awarded for travelling, researching and the writing-up of this thesis. All opinions expressed, and conclusions drawn, are those of the author and are not to be attributed to the Bank. Other individuals and organizations to which I am indebted for their assistance include the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement in the Government of Zimbabwe, from whom permission was granted to conduct the
research in June 1986. In particular, Mr J Nyoni of that Ministry's Department of Rural Development deserves special mention for his help and interest. A full list of the numerous institutions who were called on to assist in my search for information and documentary material is provided in Annexure H.

I also wish to thank the numerous individuals who assisted me with the presentation of this dissertation. They include Mariana Booysen of the Cartographic Unit and Tracey Richards, both of the Development Bank of Southern Africa for assistance in the preparation of maps and figures. Special thanks are also due to Marijke Telfer for the many hours spent typing and retyping the drafts of this dissertation. Thanks also to my wife, Rhoda, for her patience and helpful advice during preparation and for the time spent proof-reading and correcting the numerous split infinitives, and to Mrs E Naude, Librarian at the Development Bank who entertained my numerous queries for books and articles. Finally, mention must be made of my supervisor, Professor CM Rogerson for his kind and willing supervision of my research and oft sought after guidance during the development of this dissertation.
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<td>AFC</td>
<td>Agricultural Finance Corporation</td>
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<td>AGRITEX</td>
<td>Agricultural Technical and Extension Services</td>
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<td>APA</td>
<td>African Purchase Area (now SSCF)</td>
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<td>ARDA</td>
<td>Agricultural and Rural Development Authority</td>
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<td>BSA Co.</td>
<td>British South Africa Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Communal Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARD</td>
<td>Co-ordinated Agricultural and Rural Development concept</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPU</td>
<td>Commercial Farmers' Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONEX</td>
<td>Department of Conservation and Extension (within Ministry of Agriculture) (now AGRITEX)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>District Commissioner</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Front for the Liberation of Mozambique</td>
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<td>GMB</td>
<td>Grain Marketing Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>ha</td>
<td>Hectare</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRR</td>
<td>Internal Rate of Return</td>
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<td>JPAC</td>
<td>Joint Presidents' Agricultural Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kg</td>
<td>Kilogramme</td>
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<tr>
<td>Km</td>
<td>Kilometre</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSCF</td>
<td>Large Scale Commercial Farming sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>LU</td>
<td>Livestock Units</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLRRD</td>
<td>Ministry of Lands Resettlement and Rural Development</td>
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<td>NLHA</td>
<td>Native Land Husbandry Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMS</td>
<td>(Railways) Road Motor Service</td>
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<td>SSCF</td>
<td>Small Scale Commercial Farming sector</td>
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<td>TANU</td>
<td>Tanganyika Africa National Union</td>
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<td>TILCOR</td>
<td>Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation</td>
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<td>TTL</td>
<td>Tribal Trust Land (now Communal Areas)</td>
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<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unilateral Declaration of Independence</td>
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<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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VIP LATRINES  Ventilation Improved Pit Latrines

ZANU  Zimbabwe African National Union

ZANU(PP)  Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)

ZAPU  Zimbabwe African People's Union

ZIDS  Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies

NOTE:  $ refers to either Rhodesian (prior to 1980) or Zimbabwean (post 1980) dollars, unless otherwise specified (i.e. US $).
INTRODUCTION

"The ultimate possessors of the land will be the people who can make the best use of it" (Sir Godfrey Huggins, Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1952).

"... the primary development challenge in Africa is the small peasant" (Hyden, 1980, p6).

The influence of agrarian policy and reform has increasingly come to dominate any efforts at rural development within the so-called developing countries. This is particularly true in Black Africa where most economies are based on primary production located in the rural areas. Significant changes to agricultural policy and production have been made in most African countries following political independence. Zimbabwe is no exception and the aim of this dissertation is to document an experience of changes occurring in the rural sector with particular reference to the distribution and subsequent utilization of land by peasant farmers.

Although Zimbabwe's land redistribution and resettlement programme has been widely debated, little empirical research has been undertaken on the workings of the individual resettlement schemes. As argued recently by Zinyama et al (1990, p360), although the Zimbabwe Government has conducted in-house surveys on the resettlement schemes, "there are no readily available empirical studies". The objective of this dissertation is to contribute to filling this void and to provide an insight into the workings of the land redistribution programs. More specifically, an examination is undertaken of the workings and progress of one so-called Model A type resettlement scheme, namely Soli Source.
The dissertation is located within the broader field of research on African agricultural policy and production, particularly in those countries where attempts have been made to reorganize agricultural production following their independence. A critical literature review of agricultural development is provided in Chapter Two. A central theme in agricultural development in Africa is land reform, which is examined in further detail, particularly as it affects agricultural policies in such countries where attempts to re-organize agricultural production has, or in part, been based on land reforms.

The Zimbabwe material unfolds through six chapters. In Chapter Three an analysis and review of colonial Rhodesia land policies is undertaken to furnish the essential historical background to the question of land reform and resettlement. The unequal racial and spatial division of land inherited at independence by the new government prompted debates over the land question which is outlined in Chapter Four.

A broad overview of the development of land redistribution and resettlement in post-independence Zimbabwe is then provided in Chapter Five. The core of the dissertation is constituted by the research presented in Chapters Six and Seven. These two chapters analyze and evaluate the establishment and resettlement at the Soti Source Model A Resettlement Scheme. In Chapter Six the original planning proposals for the implementation of the scheme and its anticipated agricultural performance is provided. Against this background, the assessed impact of resettlement for the settlers, changes in agrarian structure, spatial impact and the organization of the scheme are detailed in Chapter Seven. In Chapter Eight an assessment of the overall land redistribution and resettlement policy in terms of meeting its original objectives and the desire to move to a more
egalitarian rural structure is considered. Finally, in the concluding chapter, a comparative evaluation of the Zimbabwean experience of resettlement with other similar experiences in Africa is undertaken.

This dissertation combines the use of both primary and secondary research sources. Secondary sources are used to locate the research within the broader context of agricultural development and land reform issues in Africa. Such sources are also used in considering the historical emergence of the unequal distribution of land in Zimbabwe. Primary research in the form of interviews with resettled farmers and officials involved in the process and implementation of resettlement constitute the basis of the Soti Source case study.
"The purpose of land and agrarian reform is to integrate everyone, and particularly the increasing numbers who are becoming marginalized in the evolution of the present system, into the development process" (quoted by Sibanda, 1983, p102).

"the aim of land reform is not simply to change the rural structure of man and land, it is also a total revolutionary movement..." (quoted by Sibanda, 1983, p103).

INTRODUCTION

The objective of this chapter is to contextualize this study within the ambit of agricultural development. The themes of agrarian change and land reform are explained, with particular reference to the African situation. These themes are further developed when the post-colonial experiences of Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique are discussed. These widely different efforts to achieve rural transformation based on different methods of organization and land use, illustrate the variety of policy options available to Zimbabwe at the time of its independence.

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT - ISSUES AND TRENDS

Agricultural commodity production continues to be one of the most pervasive and fundamental forces affecting economic and social life in the developing world. Agricultural development remains a priority in these areas and in many instances this involves some kind of land or tenure reform - or both. Mosher (1971) regards agricultural development as involving six related but separate concepts:
i) agricultural expansion - when additional land is brought into agricultural production;

ii) increased production per hectare of cropland or per head of livestock;

iii) agricultural growth in aggregate terms as a result of expansion or increased production per unit;

iv) rising value of agricultural products per farm worker;

v) rising income per person employed; and

vi) agricultural transformation as reflected by a decline in, and the ultimate disappearance of, the predominance of agriculture in an economy.

In pursuit of efforts to modernize agricultural production and to make the sector more efficient, the following choices are available to governments (Fenyes, 1981, 1982):

i) to establish state farms and/or projects;

ii) to organize collective farms with various degrees of co-operative organization;

iii) to encourage capitalist farming by the more enterprising members of the farming community; and

iv) to find a suitable combination of (i), (ii) and (iii), so as to use the advantages of each system without destroying those aspects of the social structure which do not necessarily hamper the development process.

In understanding the economic development of agriculture and the choices given above, the role of agriculture in overall economic development, the economic nature of traditional agriculture and the economic process of the "modernization" of agriculture need to be investigated (Keillor, 1955; Mosher, 1971; Henshaw, 1974; Hilbert, 1970; Kates, 1981a; Gleave, 1982; Levi and Kemeny, 1965; Wyler, 1969; Barkar, 1984).

General economic development theories that have agriculture as a special concern have been formulated either as growth
or dualism models. Morgan (in Gleave, 1982) points out that growth stage models have posited the growth of agricultural production as a pre-condition for industrial development or have suggested that industrial development is the chief generator of agricultural progress. Such ideas have been developed mainly on the basis of experience in Western countries and have been transposed to the Third World in one form or another (the so-called Modernization theory) as for instance in the notion of a development continuum (Rostow, 1960; Slater, 1974). This postulates an 'agricultural—industrial continuum' related to different systems of agriculture as well as population density. At the one end of the continuum is shifting cultivation and at the other industrial agriculture, with a stage of indigenous permanent agriculture lying somewhere in-between. Gleave (1982) argues that in the first part of the continuum the chief agent of change is rising population density, but in the second it is technological feedback from industry.

Gleave (1982) contends that dualism models contrast a declining or stagnating traditional sector with a dynamic, growing one — usually setting traditional agriculture against modern industry. Accordingly, in agriculture, a backward peasant sector is contrasted with a modern plantation sector and development seen as the growth of the modern sector at the expense of the traditional (or indigenous) sector. An increasing proportion of the peasantry is drawn into the exchange economy with a consequent increase in cash cropping. The impetus for this change can come from a variety of sources, including changes in prices, but as the process of development proceeds local markets are created for industrial and food crops to draw upon, expanding non-agricultural labour force. Consequently, changes in production techniques are introduced and specialization encouraged, leading to further production and change (Rostow and Klein, 1986; Clark and Riddell, 1982; Hirst, 1987).
Within this framework, traditional agriculture is idealized as being small in scale, organized mainly for subsistence on a household basis and using extensive techniques to produce low yields (whether measured in terms of area or labour input). Nevertheless, peasant agriculture is not static, having absorbed new crops, adjusted to increasing population density levels and responded to the growth of the market. Bundy (1972) describes such a situation in South Africa during the nineteenth century, as do both Phimister (1974) and Palmer (1977a, 1977b) when describing African peasant agriculture in Rhodesia prior to settler ascendency.

The classification of the agricultural system into "modern" and traditional categories has been criticized in that it uncritically applies the standard economy theory of the firm to peasant agriculture, without appropriately modifying its assumptions. Beckford (1966) has, in particular, severely criticized the conclusions drawn from this typology since he argues a peasant cultivator might forego extra profits that could be earned by cash crops specialisation because risks might increase disproportionately. Thus, any meaningful typology of world agriculture should recognize the influence of particular economic, social and political factors on farmer behaviour and as a result, on the agricultural adjustment process.

It has therefore been argued that agriculture is more developed where it has evolved from the traditional ideal under the influence of various stimuli and remains least developed where the converse is true. If this proposition is accepted, then three underlying dimensions can be considered as diagnostic of agricultural development, namely:

1) the extent of agricultural commercialisation;
ii) yields or productivity levels; and

iii) techniques indicative of greater intensity (Gleave, 1982).

The expansion of the cultivated area for food and cash crop production, the improvement in yields per hectare and the production for external markets indicates a growing commercialisation of agriculture, which Saul and Woods (1971), Leys (1975), Cliffe (1976), Vengroff and Farah (1985) and Hinderink and Sterkenberg (1987) argue is central to any understanding of agricultural development in the developing world.

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

"Planned agricultural development projects have frequently been seen as a practical means by which to transform agricultural production from an essentially subsistence situation to an essentially cash-crop system" (Briggs, 1978, p464). Much documentation is available on the processes of agricultural change (for example, de Wilde, 1967; Bernard, 1972; Dorner, 1972; Lehmann, 1973; Barnett, 1981; Harriss, 1982; Levi and Hvidsten, 1982) and specifically on the impact of large-scale agricultural development schemes (for example Gaitskell, 1959; Chambers and Moris, 1973; Hoyer et al, 1981; Clarke et al, 1985; Ghose, 1985).

Traditional African agriculture is characterized by being "pre-scientific" with the African cultivator using organic materials and power. In African cosmology such an important natural endowment as land does not have a marketable value. Rather, land is regarded as a common asset for all, being held in trust by the King or Chief for past, present and future generations (Sibanda, 1983; Moyana, 1984). "In this organic environment, there is little understanding and
tolerance of experimentation and limited scope for problem-solving of the kind that we associate with the inorganic environment" (Hyden, 1983, p5). Production is generally at a subsistence level, to maintain a family and the village/tribe at large through to the following season. The influence of the community and extended family are common features. In general, a symbiotic relationship exists between cultivators and the natural environment.

Certain changes have upset this relationship, and in many cases this has led to a crisis in modern agriculture in Africa. Traditional agriculture has disintegrated following colonial penetration. This can be attributed to the introduction of cash crops, increases in population, the creation of non-agricultural (off-farm) employment opportunities, improvements in communication and the exposure to formal education. Hyden (1983, p5) points out that "ever since the early days of colonial rule, there have been attempts to modernize African agriculture by introducing scientific methods and encouraging the use of inorganic material and energy in production." In addition he asserts that: "The rapidity with which modernization of peasant agriculture has taken place in some parts of Africa is impressive but it is important to acknowledge that where this change has taken place it has normally been associated with specific circumstances supporting such a change, for example, land scarcity forcing producers to intensify methods of cultivation, availability of good soils and accessibility to reliable market outlets".

As a result the traditional kinship and social security relations have been seriously weakened over time, with the trend increasingly towards unequal income distributions at the village level. The relationship between production and the distribution of that production is important in assessing the interlinkage between poverty and hunger facing
some regions of contemporary Africa. It is against this background of decreasing agricultural output per capita, growing food deficits, food shortages and rising food imports, soil erosion, environment degradation, famine and even mass starvation that state intervention in contemporary African agriculture must be seen (Bates, 1981a; Lofchie and Commins, 1982; Hinderink and Sterkenburg, 1983; Vengroff and Farah, 1985).

Agricultural development in Africa is thus a response of both the pre- and post-independence government's attempts to integrate traditional Africans - peasants in the broader sense - into the market economy. The pattern of this development has varied according to the interests and ideology of 'the developer', ranging from such classical examples as the Gezira scheme in colonial Sudan (Gaitskell, 1959; Barnett, 1975, 1981) to the Swynnerton Plan for the White Highlands of Kenya (Swynnerton, 1955; Leys, 1975; Heyer et al., 1976; Hazelwood, 1979; Hunt, 1984) and Ujamaa in Tanzania (Kim et al., 1979; Mwansasu and Pratt, 1979; von Freyhold, 1979; Hyden, 1980); the more localised attempts in Swaziland (Daniel, 1966) and Botswana (Reynolds, 1977; Colclough and McCarthy, 1980) to more radical transformations as attempted in Mozambique (Almeyra, 1978; Hanlon, 1984; Roesch, 1984; de Araujo, 1985; Dolny, 1985) and Ethiopia (Ottoway, 1978; Rahmato, 1984; Ghose, 1985; Wood, 1985) and more recently the land reform and resettlement programme in Zimbabwe (Gaidzanwa, 1981; Zimbabwe, 1981b; Kinsey, 1982; Mada, 1982; Chivilya, 1983; Sibanda, 1983; Whitsun Foundation, 1983; Zimbabwe, 1983; World Bank, 1983, 1985; Moyo, 1984; Munslow, 1985; Whitlow, 1985; Cliff, 1986; Hinyama, 1986a; Bratton, 1987; Skanes, 1989; Amin and Chipika, 1990; Cousins, 1990; Lowenson, 1990; Moyo and Skaines, 1990).
A central theme in agricultural development in Africa, and indeed in much of the developing world, is that of land reform. Land reform is a very complex issue, with as many varieties on the theme as there are countries which have attempted to tackle the issue. King (1973, p2) states that "above all land reform is a political issue" and as such is a concept which defies narrow definition.

LAND REFORM

Land reform necessarily implies many different kinds of adjustment in an array of situations in which there are a great many variations in individual equity and agricultural productivity. Problems in defining land reform arise from the fact that countries differ in their land tenure systems, methods of farming, population pressures and general level of economic development. There are many different perspectives in looking at the subject and land reform has become a term of many meanings.

The World Bank (1975) argues that, in the broader view, land reform is concerned with changing the institutional structure governing human relationships with the land. The concept of land reform, apart from suffering from the problems mentioned above, also suffers from the different ideological positions adopted by its progenitors. Some have defined land reform more narrowly to mean the provision of land to the landless, while others contend that land reform is a comprehensive programme for the total transformation of the entire agricultural economy. Marriner (1969, p xiii) supported by Atkins (1980), argues that "land reform means the redistribution of property rights... for the benefit of small farmers and agricultural labourers".

This redistributive land reform would not only improve individual access to land and income opportunities but
would also improve the social efficiency of agricultural production (Dorner, 1964, 1972; Warriner, 1969; Cline, 1970; Lipton 1973). Atkins (1988) points out this thesis develops from social and political concerns over equity and quotes empirical evidence of an inverse correlation between size of farm and output. The conclusions drawn are that agricultural production does not show economies of scale and in fact, small farms appear to be more productive per unit of land capital. In these circumstances, a redistribution of land involving a reduction in holding size and land concentration could simultaneously promote equity and production efficiency by maximizing returns on scarce resources. Therefore, Atkins (1988) concludes that while the neoclassical theory of land reform has avoided redefining land rights and the nature of ownership, a safer option would be to focus on the redistribution and reinstatement of a competitive land market once the source of the earlier failure has been removed.

Other researchers, including Jacoby (1971), King (1973), Tai (1974) and Riddell (1978a, 1978b) argue for a broader definition embracing various public programmes to correct defective tenure systems and ownership rights; the improvement in the institutional framework within which agriculture is practised to achieve increased productivity; and the achievement of a more equitable distribution of income. Such programmes include the "redistribution of land, improvement in existing tenure legislation and systems of land tenure, resettlement schemes for defective settlement patterns, land taxation and land consolidation operations for the re-organisation of farm units" (Jacoby, 1971, p270). The use of a broad definition of land reform is thus intended to widen the concept of a land reform policy. King (1973, p3) presents the following schematic framework:
Land reform should not, therefore, be regarded as merely a redistribution policy, but rather as a series of measures to support both agrarian and rural reform. Warrin - (1969, p xv) cautions that such broad definitions are an expression of "what land reform ought to be rather than what it generally is". More comprehensively, the World Bank (1975, p5) provides the following explanation to incorporate the major issues of land reform:

Land reform involves the intervention in the prevailing pattern of land ownership, control and usage in order to change the structure of holdings, improve land productivity and broaden the distribution of benefits. In practice, land reform is pursued in response to political pressures for socio-economic change arising from factors such as increased population, pressure on a limited land base or an ideology of egalitarianism based on a more even distribution of land or income. Land reform, by its very context, has interlinked political, economic and social dimensions which in turn have significant implications for development.

Atkine (1988) discusses the failure of neoclassical theory regarding land reform, in which land is treated simply as a factor of production and any inefficiency in allocation is said to arise from market imperfections or failures. Furthermore, it is argued, the justification for state attacks on landed property without the necessary implications for other forms of wealth has been achieved by oscillating between, and exploiting confusion, over conceptions of land and rent.
The issue of property relations and economic development is further developed by Bromley (1989). Specifically, the issue of non-private land needs further investigation. He argues that a large proportion of the population in South East Asia and Africa depend on obtaining their daily sustenance from lands that are not held in freehold, while the focus previously has been on private property. "A fuller understanding of the institutional arrangements that define property seems necessary to a more careful assessment of the resource regimes in the developing countries" (Bromley, 1989, p874).

Two concepts closely allied to land reform need clarity - agrarian reform and rural development. Although agrarian reform is often used synonymously and interchangeably with land reform, both are distinct concepts which differ in terms of their scope. The World Bank (1975) argues that agrarian reform is a much more comprehensive concept since it involves the modification of a wide range of conditions that affect the agricultural sector. These modifications might include determination of price policies; investment to expand training, research and extension services; construction of infrastructural facilities such as dams, roads, storage facilities and marketing depots; the creation of institutions for the supply of inputs such as fertiliser, seed and equipment and the provision of agricultural credit. In short, agrarian reform is aimed at providing the necessary support services to facilitate agricultural production. Agrarian reform, therefore, may or may not include land reform. Accordingly, while land reform may be a necessary condition for agrarian reform, it is seldom a guarantee for increasing agricultural output, given that land is only one factor of production (King, 1973; World Bank, 1975; Chiviya, 1982).
Broader still is the concept of rural development, since it encompasses all dimensions of the rural sector (both agricultural and non-agricultural) and is more concerned with the total well-being of the rural people than with agricultural output or productivity as an end in itself. Rural development involves a wider range of activities designed to improve the living conditions of people in rural areas. Such activities might include public works programmes to construct roads, bridges, cattle dips and dams, building rural health centres and schools; establishing rural-orientated agricultural research centres, the setting up of agricultural marketing and input-supply institutions to serve the rural populace; formation of agricultural co-operatives, providing agricultural extension services, and the setting up of rural-based industries to broaden employment opportunities for the rural population. As an agrarian reform, land reform remains one of the most significant weapons in the arsenal of rural development, depending on the existing patterns of land ownership and control (World Bank, 1975).

LAND REFORM AND AGRARIAN CHANGE IN AFRICA

The debate concerning the causes of agricultural underdevelopment in Africa is a complex one, of which only the broader issues will be highlighted here. In recent years the debate has shifted from sociological barriers to efficient resource allocation through an emphasis on risk aversion and the persistence of survival algorithms, to the political and economic burden on traditional peasant agriculture by competition from capitalist farmers (Mosley, 1983). On the one hand, it is argued, population pressure can be a stimulus for the need for agricultural development. This is in contrast with the underdevelopment theory which sees that pressure imposed by the land policies of colonial
governments almost squeezed the traditional African agricultural sector out of existence. With special reference to African agriculture in settler economies (particularly Kenya and Southern Rhodesia), Mosley (1983) indicates five factors important in understanding the nature of African agriculture:

i) the plough was often an instrument of extending the cultivated area and not of production intensification;

ii) capital shortage barriers often intervened between Africans and their desired responses to land shortages;

iii) also intervening in areas with European population, was a fear of land conflict which made the traditional farmer unresponsive to the advice of agricultural demonstrators;

iv) partly because of this, African farm families were often forced into an alternative response, such as migration into off-farm employment which, it is held by contemporary observers, damaged the African agricultural economy by the 1950s;

v) the relative intensity of African cash-cropping by region, which was partly a political and partly a climatic variable, had come to exert a dominant influence on the inter-regional pattern of agricultural prosperity by the 1960s.

Accordingly, the transformation of traditional African agriculture is a central concern of most African countries, with land reform and rural development being considered a pre-requisite for national development (Hunter, 1969; Mosher, 1971; Smith et al., 1978; Mabogunje, 1980; Geophart, 1986; Mazur, 1986/7; Hinderink and Sterkenberg, 1987). The agricultural sector has a growing importance for stimulating economic development through commercialisation of cash crop cultivation both for domestic markets and export.

The immediate post-independence period in Africa has become characterized by an intensified intervention and control
over the agricultural sector by national governments and parastatal institutions. Hinderink and Sterkenburg (1985, 1987) comment that in spite of differences in development ideology between the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, all have experienced to a greater or lesser extent a continuing process of agricultural commercialization. Government intervention, they argue, has been of considerable importance for the increase and diversification of marketable agricultural produce. However, the nature of government involvement and the intensity of intervention have not been uniform, but have varied from one country to another (and sometimes considerably between regions within a country) and, in addition, changed over time in many countries.

In a number of African countries, post-independence governments have adopted development policies that pursue a radical transformation of agricultural production, with a varying degree of government control. This intervention, more intensive by comparison with the improvement of agriculture on existing farms, implies the creation of new production units, a radical change in technology, and the organization of production in new ways with consequently altered social production relations (Hinderink and Sterkenburg, 1985).

As a consequence of the colonial era, many African governments inherited agricultural systems based on the supply for an overseas market of each crop production which was used as a method to integrate the indigenous African farmer into the market economy. Such economies were monocultural and often lacked indigenous supporting services and institutions. Following independence, the call was made to diversify agricultural production in order to become more self-sufficient and to promote rural development as a basis for subsequent industrialization.
Using the view that the intensity of government involvement is the over-riding impact on production relations and land tenure conditions, Hinderink and Sterkenburg (1985, 1987) have proposed a classification of types of production organization in present-day Africa. Their typology of production organization includes:

1. Increasing commercialization as a spontaneous process:

(a) *Agro-Industrial complexes* -

Commercial production through the development of a type of agriculture dominated by industry and related to urban growth (eg. Malawi).

(b) *Private estates* -

Expansion of market production on increasing numbers of private estates owned by wealthy Africans (and public officials) and worked by poorly paid labour in countries with a liberal attitude to private enterprise (eg. Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Kenya).

(c) *Commercial peasant farms* -

Flexibility and adaptiveness of peasants responding to new economic opportunities both within (cash cropping) and outside agriculture (eg. cotton in Swaziland and more recently in Zimbabwe).

2. Increasing commercialization through an "improvement approach":

Commercialization of the subsistence sector is generally seen as an obvious way to promote overall development. While government intervention is a vague concept,
common to all intervention policies is the objective of raising production on existing farming enterprises. Generally, production increases are pursued through agricultural extension, input supply, credit and marketing support. Usually one form or another of co-operative activity is stimulated.

3. Increasing commercialization through transformation approach:

The adoption of development policies that pursue a radical transformation of agricultural production, implying the creation of new production units, a radical change of technology and the organization of production in new ways with altered social production relations.

(a) Large scale schemes -

The need to resettle displaced persons such as refugees or squatters etc., or a transformation approach where national development objectives are the causative factor for resettlement (eg. Khaam el Ghirba scheme in Sudan).

(b) Collective production units -

Production collectives on village level exemplifying a new departure in transforming agriculture and rural character following independence (eg. Ujamaa Vijiji in Tanzania).

4. Increasing commercialization through state production:

Use of state farms to increase crop production for domestic and overseas markets (eg. Ghana and Mozambique).

Most of the agricultural development initiatives and land reform programmes in Africa, including the Land Reform and
settlement Programme in Zimbabwe, can be located within this typology. The increasing commercialization through an improvement approach corresponds with the policy adopted by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Settlement in Zimbabwe for resettlement and rural development as outlined in the Government's "Growth with Equity" policy paper (Zimbabwe, 1981a).

LAND REFORM AND AGRARIAN CHANGE IN AFRICA - COMPARATIVE EXAMPLES

The transformation of traditional African agriculture is a central concern of many African countries, with land reform and rural development being considered a pre-requisite for national development. The three examples of Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique are discussed below. The examples are chosen because they provide an insight to certain options available to Zimbabwe at independence. Moreover, they can be compared with Zimbabwe on a number of issues, particularly in relation to their colonial histories of settler occupation, land inequality and the position of the peasants in relation to the dominant social classes and the duality of the economies (particularly in the agricultural sector).

All the examples are colonial creations and were subjected to a period of colonial rule. Kenya and Mozambique are distinguishable by the presence of a relatively large European settler bourgeoisie, while all the countries mentioned below were characterized by settler domination in politics and the economy. "The dominance of this class was based on privileged access to land resources, the monopolistic control of major social and political institutions in society and the exploitation of peasant labour" (Sibanda, 1983, p439).
All the country examples shared something in common with Zimbabwe as far as land ownership and distribution was concerned. In the political economy of colonial domination (see Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique), the land tenure systems were reorganised by the colonisers and led to the unequal distribution of the factors of production.

Despite these similar experiences, different responses to the legacies in the agrarian structures occurred at the time of independence. At independence, Kenya chose a development pathway that emphasized accommodation with the colonial political economy as opposed to the radical transformation of the inherited legacy. Change incorporated market mechanisms and individual enterprise. By contrast, Tanzania and Mozambique sought to consolidate their independence through the radical transformation of their inherited legacies. Tanzania sought comfort in the nationalistic populist type of socialism, with Mozambique espousing socialism that is based on class struggle in the Marxist Leninist sense (Sibanda, 1983).

What follows are examinations and comparisons of approaches to land reform and rural transformation in Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique. The Zimbabwe approach can be compared in terms of the option followed and evaluated accordingly.
two kinds of change; one was the transfer of land from European ownership and the settlement of African farmers upon it, and the other was the "commercialization" of African-occupied land by means of consolidation, adjudication and registration of title. Both measures were advocated by the 1955 East African Royal Commission. The Royal Commission advocated the abandonment of the "tribal approach" to land, including the "racial approach" to the Highlands, and prescribed the individualization of land ownership and mobility in the transfer of land (Hazelwood, 1979).

The "Plan to intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya" (the so-called Swynnerton Plan) had as its basic philosophy that "sound agricultural development is dependent upon a system of land tenure which will make available to the African farmer a unit of land and a system of farming whose production will support his family at a level ... comparable with other occupations" (Smith, 1976, p126). Swynnerton argued that consolidation, enclosure and the registration of title would make credit available for farm improvements and enable progressive farmers to acquire more land. Thus, African lands would be enabled to move away from being overwhelmingly devoted to subsistence production towards commercial agriculture.

Swynnerton (1955) saw that some landlessness would occur as a consequence of his plan since, once registered, farmers would be able to buy and sell land and this would lead to a situation where able, energetic or rich Africans would be able to acquire more land than less successful farmers, thereby creating a landed and a landless class. To Swynnerton this seemed a "normal" step in the evolution of the country and he appeared confident that this farming development would provide substantial employment for African labour. The wealth created would create employment for large numbers of people in a variety of occupations (Smith,
Until 1959, 7.5 million acres (representing 20 per cent of the arable and 6 per cent of the total land area) were reserved for the exclusive use of the white settlers in Kenya (Bratton, 1977). Funds for the implementation of the Swynnerton Plan were raised from the World Bank, the Colonial (now Commonwealth) Development Corporation and the British Government, in order to finance the transfer of the "White Highlands" to the Kenya Government. The process began in 1960 with US$21 million for the piecemeal settlement of peasant farmers, but the core of the Kenya land transfer scheme was the "Million Acre Scheme" of 1963, for which US$ 42 million was provided. By independence in 1963, some 236 000 hectares had been purchased and 10 000 families settled under the "Million Acre Scheme" and a further 1000 families settled on low density schemes.

The "Million Acre Scheme" was the culmination of the process of transfer which began before independence and which continued until 1972. This was not the end of the planned sub-division of European farms because the "Harambee" scheme provided for the establishment of low-density settlements on 20 000 acres over a four year period, but was never completed. The main focus after 1965 was the transfer of land for continued large-scale farming. Under the "Shinka" schemes, the landless and unemployed were settled on large farms along with the original employees. Households were allocated 2.5 acres, while the rest of the farm continued to operate on a large scale basis with a manager supplied by the Settlement Fund Trustees. The target monetary income was 60 pounds per annum, to be earned partly from work on the large farm and partly from the small holding which was to provide crops for subsistence.

1. A catchword coined by President Kenyatta meaning roughly "all put together".
While large-scale farming remained the focus, sub-divisions could not be entirely ignored - because of the political conflict generated by the land issue - nor prevented. A Special Commission for Squatters was appointed for the task of registering and settling squatters on European farms which had been mismanaged or abandoned. Such "Barake" settlements were established rapidly and cheaply with plots of about 10 acres. Hazelwood (1985) comments that being unplanned and technically inadequate, these plots were unpopular.

The resettlement schemes in Kenya attracted special attention throughout the 1960s, not only because they were incomplete but because of what Leys (1975) calls the myth of importance of large-scale mixed farming. "From this point of view any drop in marketed production from the settlement scheme represented a "retrograde" effect, even if gross production had been maintained or even increased. This view seems to have rested partly on the cherished but erroneous belief that the European mixed farmers made a net contribution to the balance of payments" (Leys, 1975, p77).

A further reason why the schemes attracted special attention was financial. In 1965 the Stamp Mission arrived in Kenya from Britain to advise on British aid for further land transfer programmes, and was horrified by the financial position of the schemes. The Mission firmly recommended that there should be no more aid until the Kenya Government undertook economic surveys to "reassess the economics of settlement and to initiate measures to avoid any possible collapse" (Leys, 1975, p78). It also recommended further technical assistance to determine what adjustments in settlement planning and policy were necessary and what measures needed to be taken to secure existing programmes. This led to the Van Arkadie Mission of 1966 which concluded that the settlement schemes had been a success, since
without them the whole colonial structure would have been destroyed. They also saw the dilemma presented by the failure of the settlers to repay their loans. By 1970, 44 per cent of the settlers were in arrears with their debt service and repayment charges.

Leys (1975) argues that following President Kenyatta's August 1964 "Two Million Acre Scheme", a major policy reversal took place. The 1966 - 70 Development Plan declared that the objectives of settlement had largely been attained and no more settlement was provided for in it. It was argued that the pressure of the landless had largely been relieved and no longer represented an immediate political danger. Yet, by 1970, the pressure of landlessness made a further programme politically inescapable and the Kenya Government sought further British aid.

Unlike earlier schemes, the new programme consisted of state-supervised collective farms, with two or three acres allocated to each family for private cultivation. The total area involved was quite modest, at about 150,000 acres. In the meantime, some 1.6 million acres, or about three-quarters of the mixed farm area remaining outside the earlier schemes, had passed into African hands as intact large farms (Leys, 1975).

The land reform initiative in Kenya has been of two distinct types:

1) the transfer of land from European to African ownership. By 1976 some 1,25 million hectares had been transferred, with the average holding on the low-density schemes amounting to 12ha and being less than 1ha on the high-density schemes. This large scale reform has been accompanied "by a significant growth in production rather than by the stagnation that might reasonably have been expected" (Hazelwood, 1979, p34);
ii) the introduction of individual tenure to replace communal tenure. Swynnerton (1955) had argued that it would be worthless to introduce cash crops or balanced mixed farming without encouraging the evolution of a satisfactory system of land tenure. Odingo (1972) observes that while the advantage of the new land tenure system is the improvement of arable agriculture leading to a marketable surplus, a landless class has been created where population growth has outstripped land availability. Thus ownership has only been established in theory because of the large landless element which may still be supported on the same land by those retaining some traditional claim to it.

The land reform and resettlement schemes in Kenya have had the effect that by 1980 most cultivated land is held under freehold tenure and that unequal access to land has been consolidated, and even increased within traditional small holder areas (Hunt, 1984). In addition, Bratton (1977) argues that the introduction of individual tenure in favour of large farmers was a consistent feature of the entire land redistribution process. Security of title and the resettlement process amounted to a policy by which the colonial economic structure was not challenged. While new class patterns replaced the racial stratification of the colonial era in Kenya, the acceptance of the British formula for de-colonisation and subsequent economic development ensured the incorporation of Kenya as a client-state of the West. Furthermore, the psychological impact to the landless African in political terms cannot be underestimated (Smith, 1976).

The Kenya land reform initiative is important not only because it was the most publicized and implemented with the assistance of the colonial power, but also because of significant comparisons that can be made with the later Zimbabwean programs. Another African land reform and rural development initiative involving mass resettlement which has received considerable publicity, is that of Violet in Tanzania - initially hailed as the African "solution" to an
TANZANIA

Ujamaa was first formally articulated in the Arusha Declaration of February 1967. At independence in 1961, the rural population was generally dispersed throughout the countryside and villages were rare. This dispersed nature of the Tanzanian population was regarded as a fundamental constraint to rural development. Thus ujamaa had a clear emphasis on the development of the rural sector and the then President, Julius Nyerere, regarded the key to any socio-economic progress of the rural population as depending on the need to have peasants living in villages. Ujamaa involved bringing the dispersed rural dwellers of Tanzania into nucleated village communities where they would be able to engage in communal agricultural production, taking full advantage of the economics of scale for labour and machinery requirements which could be gained by living together in groups, for as Nyerere (1966, p184) put it, "...if we do not start living together in proper village communities then all attempts to develop the economy will be just so much wasted effort". The Arusha Declaration therefore committed Tanzania to building socialism and transforming its economy on socialist lines, with rural and agricultural development forming the basis of the economy. Nyerere argued that Africans were, by tradition, socialists. "Their socialism, or ujamaa, was governed by three fundamental principles: first, people lived and worked together; second, all the basic goods were held together in common - no one could go hungry while others hoarded food, or be denied shelter if others had some to spare; third, everyone (even guests) had an obligation to work" (Tamu, 1979, p197).

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2 Ujamaa literally translated means "familyhood" or "socialism" but in its wider context implies some form of co-operative endeavour.
The three main features of the ujamaa policy were the relocation of the rural population into nucleated settlements, the introduction of communal production in agriculture and the voluntary nature of ujamaa settlement - a move towards a more communal, more egalitarian and more participatory society (Mwansasu and Pratt, 1979; Briggs, 1980).

During the first phase (1967-70) decision-making was firmly in the hands of the peasants, from the first basic decision as to whether to establish a ujamaa village at all, to decisions about choice of crops and methods of satisfying communal labour requirements. The emphasis was on freedom of choice and peasant responsibility (Briggs, 1980). However, Briggs (1980) continues, once established, a village could expect help and encouragement from the government and the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), although little investment capital was available. During this period considerable debate on the benefits of ujamaa occurred in the rural areas. Von Freyhold (1979) reports on Mkinga Leo village (Tanga region) for example, where extensive debate took place as to its future with implications for land holding and labour re-organization. Finally, a group of 40 peasants agreed to pool their land and labour, resulting in a spatial and social split at Mkinga Leo into ujamaa and non-ujamaa components.

Because of the voluntary nature of ujamaa development during this phase, the growth of ujamaa villages was slow, totalling only 1900 by 1970 and accounting for about 500,000 people (approximately 4 per cent of the total population). This rate of growth was too slow for both the government and TANU, and Briggs (1980) reports, at the end of 1969 TANU was charged with the task of organizing ujamaa villages, laying particular stress on the ideological basis of ujamaa. As
the Regional Commission of Tanga put it in 1967, "the time of persuading citizens to work for their own benefit is finished. It is necessary from now to force them to work hard" (Von Freyhold, 1969, p36).

The second phase of ujamaa development (1970 - 73) was characterized by much greater official involvement and compulsion was increasingly used to move peasants. The Dodoma region became a prime area for forced ujamaaization during this period. A government directive issued in March 1970 required that the entire population of the region (about 800,000) were to be living in ujamaa villages within 14 months. A minimum of 250 families per village was established. This meant that existing villages had to be moved and amalgamated. Not surprisingly, resistance was met in many districts. By 1973, still only a little over two million peasants were living in ujamaa villages, a rate still considered too slow by government and party. Furthermore, communal production had become increasingly unpopular during this phase, and by 1973 numerous villages practised little or no communal cultivation (Briggs, 1980).

The third phase of ujamaaization followed the 1973 TANU conference, when it was decided that the entire rural population should be resettled into nucleated villages by the end of 1976. The Conference proposed a three-stage approach to rural transformation through firstly villagizing the population with no attempt to reorganize the mode of production, followed by a second stage in which some communal production was introduced on a small scale, although private plots would still predominate. These would then evolve into the final stage of full-fledged communal production with a minimum of private production, so communal production would follow after village life had become established and not simultaneously, as had been the case during 1967 - 73.
Each of the 800 designated villages would range in size between 250 and 650 families. The policy was to be implemented in all regions and movement was compulsory. Compulsory villagisation between 1973 and 1976 saw that nearly 90 per cent of Tanzania's population were established in ujamaa villages (Table 2.1). This was a result of a considerable amount of coercion, ranging from verbal threats to crop-burning, house-destruction and forced movements by enthusiastic members of the People's Militia. Furthermore, because of the haste at which villagisation was undertaken, resource surveys, carrying-capacity calculations and general planning were largely overlooked, with the result that many sites proved to be unsuitable for resettlement. Rarely were peasants incorporated by the authorities in the decision-making process, and there were few effective flows of information to the peasants to explain the rationale of ujamaa (Briggs, 1983). The final phase, McCall (1985) argues, has left a legacy of peasant alienation, mistrust and antagonism towards state rural development programmes, and of superiority and paternalism from the bureaucrats. Accordingly, by the end of 1976, the rural population of Tanzania had been transformed from that of a dispersed pattern to a series of population clusters in only nine years.

**TABLE 2.1**  

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of people living in villages (in '000's)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>1548</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2028</td>
<td>2560</td>
<td>9140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total rural population</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>80</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total number of villages</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>4464</td>
<td>5556</td>
<td>5628</td>
<td>5008</td>
<td>814</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source : McCall, 1985, p125)
The wider effects of ujamaa on the Tanzanian economy have been serious. Villagization had a dramatic negative effect on agricultural production with food production suffering a spectacular decline which has yet to be recovered (Mohamed, 1988). Food imports reached 18.9 per cent by value of all imports in 1975, resulting in a large deficit which brought the country to near bankruptcy (Briggs, 1983). There have also been associated social and cultural impacts such as declining child health, an increase in juvenile delinquency, an increase in witchcraft and diminishing respect for customary laws, property and property-rights. On the positive side, McCall (1985, p127) writes that "the most successful aspect of villagization is the provision of services to formerly isolated populations". The emphasis remains on service, rather than productive, infrastructure; stores, workshops and the like receive less attention than roads or schools. There have also been problems with the operation and maintenance of village services, the corruption of bureaucrats and their involvement in illegal economic activities.

It is clear that ujamaa as a concept has become increasingly less popular and it has been discouraging for those wishing to see ujamaa as a blueprint for Third World development. Emphasis within agriculture has shifted to the development of state farms and large-scale irrigation projects at the expense of villages in an effort to restore food self-sufficiency. African leaders embarking on land reform and resettlement programmes have the Kenyan and Tanzanian experiences — small private plots or communal fields from which lessons may be learnt. State farms have been the cornerstone of some land reform initiatives, an issue which is now considered in more detail.
Since winning political independence from Portugal in 1975, after a 10 year guerilla war under its leadership, the Frelimo for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), has pursued a far reaching, nationwide programme of voluntary agricultural collectivisation. Prior to independence, the peasant economy directly produced about 70 per cent of the total agricultural output, of which 55 per cent was for own consumption and the remaining 15 per cent was cash crops (Wuyts, 1985). The organization of the African rural economy was not dissimilar to that found in neighbouring Tanzania at independence, including some 280,000 Portuguese settlers who owned nearly 4 million acres, of which 800,000 acres were cultivated. Approximately 200,000 Portuguese fled the country at independence, their abandoned farms and estates falling into the hands of the post-colonial state.

Some 85 per cent of Mozambicans are rural dwellers. The agrarian reform programme aimed to gather the dispersed peasant population into concentrated "communal villages" and to re-organise their productive activities along collective lines through the formation of state farms and co-operatives (Roesch, 1984; Dolny, 1985). One of the first measures taken by FRELIMO was "...the Nationalisation of land, in order to do away with the disparities in the countryside, and to allow planning which followed the objectives of the country's economic development. As a result of this measure, the land now belongs to the working people; it cannot be taken over or sold. The land belongs to the man or woman who works it for as long as he or she works it" (da Araujo, 1985).

Wuyts (1985) argues that the nationalisation of land and the emigration of settler farmers did not lead to the redistribution of land to the peasantry. This was to occur
following the Third Congress of FRELIMO where Marxist-Leninist principles and a socialist programme for economic development were adopted as the basic policy framework. The socialization of the countryside manifested itself in three forms - state farms, co-operative farms and communal villages (Hanlon, 1984).

The state sector expanded at a rapid rate, with the emphasis on expansion rather than consolidation of the already established farms. By 1978, 100 000 hectares had been put under state farm cultivation, increasing to 140 000 hectares by 1982. Investment concentrated on this sector. Its share of agricultural investment was over 90 per cent, with co-operatives receiving only 2 per cent and family agriculture, nil (Wuyts, 1985). Wuyts (1985) continues, that while the statefarm sector has become dominant, it remains untransformed, with family agriculture paying the costs of adjustment. Hanlon (1984) supports this view, maintaining that state farms in Mozambique are largely run in the same way as their predecessors, the only difference being that the new managers have less experience than the colonial ones. Thus, state farms have manifestly failed to change the relationship between the state and the peasant and to build a rural working class, which was one of the central justifications of state farms. Not surprising, therefore, is the admission in 1982 by the Council of Ministers that Mozambique did not yet fully understand how to put into practice the policy links between the state and co-operative sectors.

The 8th Session of the FRELIMO Central Committee in February 1976 concluded that Communal Villages should constitute the social framework of future development of the Mozambiquan peasant. "The Communal Village was seen not just as a new habitational arrangement, nor simply as a means for collectivising peasant agricultural production, but rather
as an integrated economic, social, political and cultural totality to be organized according to "the principles of collective life" and free from "the exploitation of man by man" (Roesch, 1984). The Communal Village thus emerges as a means of attaining collective production and a balanced development of mechanization, agricultural specialization and the conservation of natural resources. In January 1977 there were 75 communal villages in various phases of development, and by 1979 over 1 000 communal villages incorporating over one million peasants had been created. The percentage of the rural population living in Communal Villages reached 36 per cent in 1980 (Almeyra, 1978; de Araujo, 1985).

Several factors facilitated the implementation of Communal Villages without resort to coercion. Firstly, during the guerilla struggle FRELIMO had organized a number of liberated zones in the north of the country in which such alternative societies were created, and at independence this framework was extended to other areas. Secondly, in Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Tete provinces, the colonial government resettled one million peasants for strategic reasons into rural settlements (Aldeamentos). After independence these aldeamentos were transformed into Communal Villages - the post-colonial state superimposing its structures on that which was inherited. And finally, as a result of heavy flooding in 1977, peasants were regrouped from the devastated river valleys into Communal Villages in higher areas so as to be protected from future floods. It was in this type of village that there occurred population concentration followed by collective production (Sibanda, 1983; de Araujo, 1985).

The Mozambique Communal Village approach differs from the Tanzanian village strategy in that the village settlements were seen not only as service centers, but also as community
units where interaction and discussion was to increase political consciousness. Political mobilization did not have the coercive elements of the Tanzanian approach. Furthermore, co-operatives and state farms were defined as having complementary roles as the economic counterpart of the peasant-worker alliance.

In the liberated zones, prior to independence, peasants farmed collective plots to grow food for the guerillas. Following independence, FRELIMO urged that similar collective plots be established throughout the country as a basis for future co-operatives. Similarly, many abandoned settler farms were spontaneously taken over as co-operatives. Yet, Hanlon (1984) writes, the co-operative movement never took off. Interest in collective plots flagged and they were largely abandoned. There were 180 co-operatives in 1977, but this number only grew to 375 (37,000 members) in 1981. No more than 30,000 acres were cultivated in this way. Cultivation began to fall in 1982, while production fell by half between 1979 and 1981.

Problems facing Mozambique since the proclamation of radical land reforms relate mainly to implementation. The State farm sector has suffered from the lack of capital, equipment and skilled manpower since independence, while the preference for such large-scale farms was necessary to alleviate the impending food shortages immediately after independence. The State had little option but to resuscitate the abandoned settler farms and estates to avert a crisis, while at the same time being under the misconception that such methods of production were capable of producing the required agricultural surplus for the urban sector and for export. Co-operative and collective agriculture also suffered from problems of implementation, particularly a lack of cadres to mobilise communities. As a result, by 1980 only a minority of Communal Villages had a
co-operative as their main production unit and few were linked to state farms. Apathy and lack of discipline have resulted from political decisions and actions not being understood by the peasantry. Thus, while the co-operatives and Communal Villages were supposed to be self-reliant, the majority are not. It remains for the state sector to organize itself so as to constitute a powerful instrument to create the favourable conditions necessary for the socialization of agricultural production of the peasantry.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter has provided an overview of the issues involved with agrarian change, particularly focussing on the options within the African experience. An overview of the various agrarian and land reform programmes undertaken in Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique indicates various options available to the state in pursuing agricultural development. These countries have been selected as representing post-colonial situations in Africa in which the policy responses have varied greatly. In Kenya land was transferred from Europeans to Africans on the basis of individual tenure, whereas in Tanzania and Mozambique moves towards more co-operative and socialist forms of production have been encouraged. These approaches are described as comparative examples of agricultural development in Africa.

In subsequent chapters the history of land division in Zimbabwe is described, after which the land question debate is discussed as it existed at the time of independence. The policy response of the new Zimbabwe Government is then outlined and a resettlement scheme discussed in depth. The Zimbabwean response is then compared to those discussed in this chapter in order to obtain a comparative understanding of various examples of post-colonial agricultural development in Africa.
CHAPTER 3

LAND ISSUES IN RHODESIA* (1890 - 1980)

"The cry is for land yet more land" Native Commissioner for Essexvale, 1947 (quoted by Phimister, 1988, p281).

"To the south of us we have a country which practises a thing called apartheid. Here in Southern Rhodesia we do not speak Afrikaans, so we pronounce it 'Land Apportionment Act'" Humphrey Wightwick, Dominion Party candidate for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Parliament in 1958.

"In coming to the heart of the matter - the history of Southern Rhodesia is the history of land seizure and settlement, alienation and anger, helpless resentment followed at last by a sanguinary harvest..." (Verrier, 1986, p18).

INTRODUCTION

This chapter attempts to illustrate that "land policy has played a major role in shaping the social, economic and political development of Rhodesia from the earliest days of European settlement to the present day" (Palmer, 1968, p6). The objective in this chapter is to draw attention to the land issue in Rhodesia, providing a review of the initial division and subsequent patterns of distribution based on race.

The chapter is organized in terms of 5 historical sections, in which the origins of land division according to race are

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* The different names of the country -
  Southern Rhodesia (1897 - 1964)
  Rhodesia (1964 - 1979)
  Zimbabwe Rhodesia (1979 - 1980)
  Zimbabwe (1980 to date)

- will be used when historically applicable to avoid confusion.
outlined and the subsequent legal enforcements of this racial division until the late 1970s are described. The chapter concludes with a description of the land situation immediately prior to Zimbabwean independence as the backdrop to the post-independence land policy. A review of the literature on the land issue in Rhodesia emphasizes that the inequalities in land distribution are rooted in the colonial past and are the product of deliberate colonial land allocation policies (Brown, 1959; Floyd, 1962; Rodger, 1964; Yudelman, 1964; Arrighi, 1967; Palmer, 1968, 1977a, 1977b; Rifkind, 1968; Kay, 1970; Christopher, 1971; Rifkind, 1972; Weinrich, 1975; Palmer, 1977a, 1977b; Riddell, 1978a, 1978b; Whcson Foundation, 1978; Riddell, 1980; Made, 1982; Chiviya, 1983; Zibanda, 1983; Moyana, 1984; Phimister, 1988).

INITIAL EXPROPRIATION (1890 - 1923)

The history of European occupation of what is now Zimbabwe begins with the arrival in Mashonaland of the Pioneer Column, organized by Cecil John Rhodes. This led to the establishment of Salisbury (now Harare) in 1890. The Column heralded the establishment of British colonial rule under the British South Africa Company (BSA Co.) which was granted a Royal Charter by the British Government in 1889. Land was regarded as a consolation prize for those who participated in the 1890 occupation. Although an initial attempt was made to prevent European occupation on African occupied lands, this did take place and the selection of desirable areas by the European settlers proceeded rapidly (Palmer, 1968). The settlers were entitled to a free farm of 1500 morgen. Furthermore, Chiviya (1983) comments, the commandment of company administration and the failure to find sufficient gold in Mashonaland led to a process of land confiscation by the settlers. In this initial phase of colonial capitalist penetration large land holdings were alienated by the settlers, companies and syndicates "at a
time when there was no clear definition of the rights of Africans to hold or dispose of land" (Southern Rhodesia, 1960, para. 9).

The conquest and subjugation of the Matabele followed in 1893. Those involved in the conquest were each entitled to farms of 3000 morgen (2500 ha) anywhere in Matabeleland free of occupation (Palmer, 1968). Thus owners did not have to be physically present on their farms, and many settlers lacked the resources to develop their newly acquired property. Land was sold off and granted as substantial estates to commercial concerns. In this manner, extensive tracts of land were alienated by the BSA Co. without due regard to the original African inhabitants (Christopher, 1971).

As a result of the expropriation of tribal lands, misunderstandings and resentment arose, leading the Imperial Government (which possessed supervisory powers over Rhodesia) to appoint a Land Commission in 1894. The Commission recommended the establishment of two "reserves" - Shangani (9000Km²) and Gwai (7800Km²) - for the exclusive use of the African population according to tribal customs (Figure 3.1). This reduction to 2 480 000 acres from the 10 million acres which the Matabeles previously occupied, represented a severe reduction of domain (Floyd, 1962; Christopher, 1971; Moyana, 1984).

The failure to make suitable provision for African lands led directly to the Matabele Rebellion in 1896, and thus indirectly, to the Mashona Rebellion later in the same year. This protest against white occupation and administration, Chiviyu (1982) argues, was of crucial significance in interpreting the land confiscation process. In order to achieve security of life and property, the settlers adopted the policy of racial separation, of which land segregation was a crucial aspect.
The 1896 Rebellions made the Imperial Government aware of the consequences of the uncontrolled activities of the BSA Co. and the European settlers. As a result, the 1898 Southern Rhodesia Order-in-Council was promulgated. The British Government believed that this Order would enable it to protect the land and political rights of the Africans. Thus the Order stated:

The Company shall from time to time assign to the natives inhabiting Southern Rhodesia, land sufficient for their occupation, whether as tribes or portions of tribes, and suitable for their agricultural and pastoral requirements, including in all cases a fair and equitable proportion of springs and permanent water (Great Britain, 1917, p9 quoted in Christopher, 1971, p41).
Sibanda (1983) argues that this Order was not really different in substance from the 1894 one. As in 1894, the British Government took no action in 1898 and by so doing deprived the Africans of their land rights and resources. Furthermore, African communal tenure customs were rejected in favour of private ownership. Severe limitations were therefore placed on Africans rights and ability to acquire, hold, encumber and dispose of land on the same conditions as Europeans, although there was no legal limitation to this on land outside the reserves. The concept of land as "possession" was foreign to the African social, economic and political milieu.

The consequence of the 1898 Order-in-Council was that European District Commissioners (DC's) were given the responsibility to demarcate African reserves. They proceeded without adequate directives or uniform policy, lacking adequate geographic and demographic knowledge and with inaccurate maps, to lay the basis of what Chiviya (1982, p56) calls "...a chaotic pattern of land distribution which has remained fundamentally unaltered up to today".

Frequent alterations to reserve boundaries occurred in the following years with improved surveys and the elimination of inconveniences. Figure 3.2 shows the situation in 1910 when some twenty-three per cent of the area of Southern Rhodesia had been set aside for African use. The lack of uniformity over the demarcation of the reserves led to a number of investigations such as the 1910 Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry, which made only minor changes in the disposition of African land, and the 1915 Southern Rhodesia Native Reserves Commission. The former's estimate of land apportionment in 1911 is given in Table 3.1 while the latter attempted to provide a more permanent pattern of reserves. Although Africans were never consulted, the Commission recommended that 5 610 595 acres be added and 6 673 035 acres be
subtracted from the African reserves, giving a net reduction of just over one million acres (Palmer, 1968, p26). This was done despite the fact that of the 5 002 surveyed farms owned by Europeans in 1914, some 2 082 were unoccupied (Moyana, 1975, p21). Most of the recommendations of the Commissioner were adopted and African reserves were given finality by the 1920 Southern Rhodesia Order-in-Council. By 1921 the land distribution in Southern Rhodesia was that as shown in Table 3.1.

SELF-GOVERNMENT AND EVENTS UP TO 1930

During the period of the BSA Co. administration (1890 - 1923) land had been set aside for African use on a tribal basis, but elsewhere both Europeans and Africans could acquire and dispose of land freely, although few Africans had the means with which to purchase land (Bannerman, 1982).

The Company administration ended in 1923 and Southern Rhodesia became a self-governing colony with "responsible government", thereby transferring substantive political power from London to Salisbury. The colony now became responsible for its own administration and day-to-day operation of the government, with the Imperial Government retaining responsibility for foreign policy, currency and property rights of non-resident British subjects. Importantly, the Imperial Government also retained the right to be consulted over any important legislation. Gann (1965) points out that the Constitution made provision for the importance of African interests. Thus, the Imperial Government, in theory, retained its veto power over African rights, although, in fact, this veto power was never effectively used to defend African rights.
FIGURE 3.2: NATIVE RESERVES, 1910

(Source: Christopher, 1971, p41)

TABLE 3.1: LAND APPORTIONMENT IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA, 1911

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>ACRES</th>
<th>% OF LAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Area</td>
<td>19 012 320</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Reserves</td>
<td>21 390 080</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unassigned Land</td>
<td>51 528 800</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>92 051 200</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Hoyana, 1973, p20
Hoyana, 1984, p48)
TABLE 3.2 : LAND APPORTIONMENT IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA, 1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>AREA (Acres)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assigned Land (European)</td>
<td>31,484,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Reserves (African)</td>
<td>21,203,498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unassigned Land</td>
<td>43,529,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>96,217,473</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Based on Moyana, 1975, p21)

The period between 1914 and 1930 witnessed a second wave of increased European immigration, while the 1922 Empire Settlement Scheme promised prospective settlers cheap land and other benefits. Holdings of over 100 acres were promised depending on the quality and position of the land, the land coming from either the State (Crown land) or from private individuals and companies. Following the advent of Responsible Government, the settler farmers had become a very powerful interest group.

While Africans had bought only 19 farms with a total of 46,957 acres by 1925, compared to the European acquisition of over 31 million acres, the settlers feared that the Africans would exercise their rights granted under the 1898 Order-in-Council more extensively in the future. Should there be an influx of Africans into "European" land, this would pose a serious economic threat to the European farmer. The majority of settlers therefore favoured complete racial segregation. "The basic driving force behind the movement towards segregation, and it is worth emphasising in view of the complexity of motivating factors, was the intense hatred displayed by the overwhelming majority of European farmers at the idea of Africans buying land in their midst" (Palmer, 1988, p261). Thus even prior to the appointment of the 1925 (Morris Carter) Land Commission, the disparity in land holdings among the races was evident. By 1925, the African population (Table 3.3) reached 813,947, having more than doubled since initial European occupation in the 1890s.
TABLE 3.3: GROWTH IN AFRICAN POPULATION (1915 - 1925)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AFRICAN POPULATION</th>
<th>1915</th>
<th>1925</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the Reserves</td>
<td>405 376</td>
<td>516 335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside the Reserves</td>
<td>327 777</td>
<td>297 612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>733 153</strong></td>
<td><strong>813 947</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Palmer, 1968, p296)

The Morris Carter Commission was appointed in 1925 to investigate the practicability of dividing the country into European and African areas and had the following terms of reference:

(1) To inquire and report on the expediency and practicability of setting apart defined areas outside the boundaries of the Native Reserves, (a) within which Natives only shall be permitted to acquire ownership of or interest in land, and (b) within which only Europeans shall be permitted to acquire ownership of or interest in land (Southern Rhodesia, 1975, p1).

The Commission claimed to find virtual unanimity among all classes of Southern Rhodesians - farmers, and town dwellers, missionaries, Native Department Officials, and the Africans themselves (so far as they could grasp the subject) - for complete separation of races with respect to landholdings. The Commissioners came to the conclusion that racial tension was increasing as result of contact between the races and that it could only be diminished by rigid territorial separation (Floyd, 1962). Chiviya (1982) argues that African protest at this time was not aimed at overthrowing the existing political and economic system established by the European settlers, rather what the Africans wanted was equal opportunity to participate in the system through the extension of the reserves, communal land purchases and open competition between wealthy African farmers and Europeans.
The Commission recommended a policy of "possessory segregation" through the apportionment of the country into European and African areas aimed at reducing points of contact between European and African landholders to a minimum.

The right to purchase land was to be confined to the areas specified for each racial category. The Commission recommended the retention of the Reserves as already constituted. The Undetermined Area was recommended and the disposal of which was to depend on future circumstances. There was also a small Neutral Area in which Europeans could sell their property to Africans, but once sold, this land had to become part of the Native Purchase Area. Certain areas were declared Forest Areas and National Parks (Sibanda, 1983, p78).

The number of reserves was increased to 98, but the gross area was little changed (Figure 3.3). The Recommendations of the Commission were embodied in the Land Apportionment Act of 1930. Under the terms of the Act, the rights of Africans to land ownership anywhere in the colony were rescinded (Moyana, 1984).

THE LAND APPORTIONMENT ACT OF 1930

"With the 1930 Land Apportionment Act, Southern Rhodesia embarked upon a policy of rigid segregation. Before that date racial separation was a social and political fact but the innovation of this Act was the legal enshrinement of this policy and the consequent increase in rigidity. Throughout the 1930's and 1940's the Land Apportionment Act became embedded in the political consciousness of Rhodesian society. Variouslly described as the "bulwark of white civilization" and "the cornerstone of our native policy", the Act transcended a mere piece of legislation. Minor amendments were acceptable but the fundamental principle of land segregation went unchallenged" (Rifkind, 1972, p65).
FIGURE 3.3: LAND APPORTIONMENT IN 1930

The significance of the Land Appportionment Act of 1930 is that it formally divided the country's population into two "non-communicating" racial groups and in effect, was a rationalisation of all that had gone before it, becoming the cornerstone of land policy in Southern Rhodesia. More specifically, the Act enabled the land into various categories (see Table 3.1).
### Table 3.4: Land Apportionment in 1930

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Acres (a)</th>
<th>% of Country (b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Area</td>
<td>49,149,174</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Reserves</td>
<td>21,127,040</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Purchase Area</td>
<td>7,464,566</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unassigned Area</td>
<td>17,793,300</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undetermined Area</td>
<td>88,540</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Area</td>
<td>5,905,500</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total for African Use</strong></td>
<td><strong>28,591,606</strong></td>
<td><strong>30.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: (a) Moyana, 1975, p24  
          (b) Ray, 1970, p51*

Bannermann (1982) argues that the proponents of the Act felt that it protected African interests in the reserves until such time as the African could be assimilated into the more modern, capitalist society that it was envisaged would emerge. Gann (1963) suggests that Premier Moffat's main reason for supporting the Act was to prevent the formulation of a landless African proletariat. Furthermore, he thought that the Act would avoid the land problems evident in South Africa where most of the land had been brought into European ownership prior to legislation concerning the reserves in that country was bought into operation.

Phimister (1988) contends that the Land Apportionment Act in fact originated as much from European confidence as it did from fears of African competition. The Act followed a boom in European agriculture which saw an expansion in the production of such crops as cotton and tobacco. "As well as strengthening the imperatives of accumulation, it would underpin the exigencies of white survival in the countryside." (Phimister, 1988, p193).
It is also important to see the Act in terms of the political philosophy favoured at the time. The so-called two-pyramid policy envisaged two separate societies. On the one hand there was to be a European pyramid representing the European population in which all the jobs would be held by whites. The exception would be the lowest grades of labour, which would be open to Africans until a white artisan class evolved (or immigrated). The other pyramid represented the African population, and within their society all trades and professions would be open only to blacks, except for ultimate supervision which would remain permanently in European hands (Rifkind, 1968). Rifkind (1968) continues, that this policy was almost identical to what later generations have called separate development or "apartheid", with the one exception that the two-pyramid policy was never seriously implemented in Rhodesia.

As part of the two-pyramid policy and to protect Europeans from African competition, the Land Apportionment Act was accompanied by various market discrimination measures, such as the Maize Control Acts (1931 and 1934) which were designed to undermine the ability of Africans to effectively compete with Europeans in the economic sphere. The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934 imposed the colour bar in the towns and so placed yet another obstacle in the path of African advancement. Palmer (1977a) concludes that the white farmers and workers, having obtained this position of strength, concentrated thereafter on maintaining it at all costs. Chiviya (1962) argues, that with the prevention of the emergence of a class of viable African commercial farmers and a middle-class in the urban areas, the Africans remained in the position of providing labour to the European sector where in most development now occurred.

The Land Apportionment Act also had political ramifications. The 1933 Constitution gave the right to vote to whoever had
the necessary education, income and property. On the last two requirements, the Act and other discriminatory measures mentioned above, worked against the Africans in favour of the Europeans. It is argued, furthermore, that Europeans had access to the most fertile, well-watered land which was, in the most part, tsetse-fly free.

The Act also became the basis of residential segregation in the urban areas. Separate townships were built for Africans, and it was illegal for unemployed Africans to reside in these areas. Europeans, Coloureds and Asians had their own residential areas, so that there was little contract between the races outside of the work place. The Act also put restrictions on the movement of Africans from the reserves to the urban areas. Bannerman (1982) takes up this point when he argues that the Act failed to foresee the inevitable drift of Africans towards the towns and thus to provide the urban African with some sort of security. It was only with the Urban African Affairs Commission (the Plewman Commission) of 1957 that the condition of the urban African was investigated and official recognition given of his permanent existence (Rifkind, 1968).

Although Bannerman (1982) argues that the Land Apportionment Act's importance has been greatly exaggerated, the Act provided the approximately 1 081 000 Africans in 1930 with 30 per cent of the land area, compared to 51 per cent to some 50 000 Europeans (Moyana, 1984). Furthermore, the Act became, in different forms, symbolic to both the Europeans and Africans in (Southern) Rhodesia. To the European, it became a symbol of "civilization, the maintenance of standards, the cornerstone of white rule: To the African it seemed to be the embodiment of all their ills, their loss of land, their inferior status in Rhodesia society and in general the symbol of all that was wrong to them under European rule" (Bannerman, 1982, p105). The Act was, Palmer
(1968, p354) asserts, "...the most contentious piece of legislation ever passed by a Rhodesian Government".

LAND APPORTIONMENT - IMPLEMENTATION AND CONSEQUENCES (1930 - 1959)

Various amendments were made to the Land Apportionment Act during this period, relating specifically to political and economic pressures. Sibanda (1983) argues that during the Premiership of Buggins (1933 - 1953) the main effect was the introduction of tighter conditions regarding the African presence on European lands. These legislation changes were not only to appease the European settler demands but also to accommodate the post-World II immigrant influx. The Land Settlement Act of 1944 made provision for the leasing or alienation of Crown Land for both returning ex-servicemen and the European civilian population (including new immigrants). Furthermore, Sibanda (1983) continues, European and Coloured ex-servicemen benefited from the sale of nominally priced Crown land and were also assisted through generous loans and grants for land purchase and land improvements.

Following a relaxation of the restrictive provisions of the Act during the war years, a slow but steady stream of compulsory evictions saw some four thousand Africans moved to the already overcrowded reserves by 1955. The mounting pressures in the African areas resulting from the rapidly rising population led to the Max Danzier Commission (1949) into "The Question of Additional Land for Native Occupation". The committee found that a further 8 958 660 acres were needed for communal settlement by Africans and recommended that areas be set aside to meet this need. The new land category was to be defined as the special (African) area. In this category, individual alienation was not allowed and in consequence tribal land customs were to
prevail. The land was taken from the Unassigned Area, European and Native Purchase Areas (Christopher, 1971). Other amendments at this time included the creation of National Parks and Forests under the 1949 National Parks Act. As a result some 1.7 million hectares were set aside as National Parks. Although included within the European Area, their use was to be on a non-racial basis. In addition, 1.3 million hectares were reserved for forestry and placed in a separate non-racial category.

The next major piece of legislation was the Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) of 1951. Discussed in detail by several authors, among them Brown (1959), Floyd (1959), Yudelman (1964), Rifkind (1972), Moyana (1975) and Duggan (1980), the Act was designed to rectify problems created by the Land Apportionment Act of 1930. In that the 1930 Act curtailed the amount of land available for African use, it initiated (as already mentioned) an eviction process and subsequent overpopulation (both human and livestock) in the reserves. This led to declining productivity, ecological and environmental degradation. Phimister (1988) reports that by 1943, of the 98 Reserves 62 were considered overpopulated (with 19 being more than 100 per cent overpopulated) and 50 were overstocked. The major thrust of the NLHA was therefore to improve conservation measures, regulate livestock herd sizes, and divide communal holdings in the reserves into individual family plots. A further important key aspect of the NLHA was to transfer land allocation authority from the traditional chiefs to White District Commissioners (DCs).

Although passed in 1951, the Act was only implemented after 1955. The reason for the delay in implementation, this, Duggan (1980) argues, was that the NLHA was studied by the progenitors of the Kenyan Swynnerton Plan, which had quickly fulfilled its promise of creating a loyal middle class in
the Kikuyu reserves. One view of the NLHA is that it was
designed to create a loyal urban and African middle class,
at the same time satisfying the needs of Southern Rhodesia's
rapidly expanding secondary industry by denying urban
workers access to farmland.

The preamble of the NLHA stated that its objectives were "to
provide for the control of the utilization and allocation of
land occupied by natives and to ensure its efficient use for
agricultural purposes, to require natives to perform labour
for conserving natural resources and for promoting good
husbandry" (Southern Rhodesia, 1952, p893). The purpose of
the NLHA was stated as:

1) to provide for a reasonable standard of good husbandry
   and for the protection of natural resources by all
   Africans using the land. The Act contains powers to
   enforce these provisions;

2) to limit the number of stock in any area to its
   carrying capacity and, as far as is practicable, to
   relate stock holding to arable land holding as a means
   of improving farming practice;

3) to allocate individual rights in the arable land and in
   the communal grazing as far as possible in terms of
   economic units and where this is not possible due to
   over-population, to prevent further fragmentation and
   to provide for the aggregation of fragmentary holdings
   into economic units;

4) to provide individual security of tenure of arable land
   and individual security of grazing rights in the
   communal grazings;

5) to provide for the setting aside of land for towns and
   business centres in the reserves (Southern Rhodesia,
   1955).

Yudelman (1964, p119) observes that in attempting to abolish
traditional tribal tenure, the NLHA was revolutionary. "In
one fell swoop, it proposed to replace the tribal-communalistic system of allocating land according to need with a hybrid-tribal capitalistic system of individual holdings and communal grazing. ... It was the intent of the Act that the intricate network of social and tribal customs regarding land use and land transfer would give way to the market place.

In their review of the NLHA, both Floyd (1959) and Duggan (1980) reveal that in implementation the Act was designed more to stabilize labour than to create a rural middle class or even resuscitate Reserve agriculture. Each farmer cultivating land was to be granted a "standard area", varying according to rainfall regime, sufficient to support a family of one man, one woman and three children, and to provide a crop and livestock surplus for sale when the full programme of agricultural practices ordained by the Department of Native Agriculture was followed. Absentee males were forced at the time of implementation to decide whether or not they would return to the Reserves to become permanent cultivators. Men received more land per wife above one, up to three times the standard area. No plot could be sub-divided below the standard area. Men could buy the titles of others, but no-one could hold more than three times the standard area. Widows with dependent children were eligible for one-third to a full share of a standard area, while other women were not eligible at all for land.

Overcrowding in the Reserves rendered the aggregation of plots impossible without drastic depopulation, which the NLHA was certainly not intended to effect. The question of de-stocking was also to lead to resentment, the Act being insensitive to African cultural beliefs regarding livestock, particularly cattle. Thus Duggan (1980) asserts, the provision of the NLHA would tend to bring everyone below subsistence level, rather than elevate further those few
with enough land and other resources to make a living exclusively by farming.

The NLBA was never implemented as intended. By 1959, more than one-quarter of reserve families entitled to land were landless. Those families already in control entrenched their control through the mechanism of registration. Weinrich (1975) shows how a more equal, but still very unequal distribution of land was accomplished without the land transfer mechanism embodied in the NLBA. By 1963 less than 0.15 per cent of reserve land rights and less than 1.08 per cent of grazing rights had changed hands.

The general picture left by the NLBA is one of failure and mounting racial tension. The Chiefs denounced the Act as it undermined their authority to allocate land. The Reserve Africans denounced the Act, which to them did not make sense when large areas of European allocated land lay un-utilized. Educated Africans and the more vocal voice of African nationalists attacked the Act as being at the core of inequality in the country. Furthermore, ever-increasing population numbers within the rigid boundaries set by the Land Apportionment Act meant individual holdings were too small for sound agricultural practices. Staff recruited to demarcate holdings were inadequate and failed to execute their duties satisfactorily, while the absence of extension services resulted in a decline in production and further soil degradation. The NLBA was finally abandoned in 1962, after some 17 million pounds had been spent on its implementation because, as Riffkin (1972) states, trying to modernize the Reserves under conditions of land segregation were two irreconcilable objectives.

After the establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953, there followed a comparatively liberal period in Southern Rhodesia under the Premierships of
Garfield Todd and Sir Edgar Whitehead, during which time some cosmetic changes were made in the political economy of colonial domination. During this period, the Land Apportionment Act was amended to allow for the establishment of a multi-racial university and African lawyers were allowed to open chambers in the urban areas.

By 1958, the Unassigned Area ceased to exist and all the land in Southern Rhodesia was apportioned to a definite category, mostly on a racial basis (Figure 3.4). The Unassigned Area was gradually allocated to the Special Native Area, Forest, European and Native Purchase Areas. The European category had the highest proportion allocated it at this stage.

FIGURE 3.4 : LAND APPORTIONMENT IN 1961

(Source : Christopher, 1971, p43)
In 1957, the Secretary of Native Affairs reported that 160,000 Africans were living communally on land set aside for individual acquisition in the Purchase Areas, 31,414 Africans were living on Crown Land in the European Area and over 63,000 unauthorized Africans resided on European owned farms (Sibanda, 1983). A Select Committee of Parliament was appointed in July 1958 to consider the land problems faced by Africans. The Committee investigated both the urban and rural situations, arguing that Urban African Purchase Areas with freehold tenure be established for the former. The second report of the Select Committee on the Resettlement of Natives (1960) (The Quinton Report) dealt with the question of land shortages of 111,261 African families without adequate access to land. The Committee felt that the answer to the problem was not how or where to find more land, but how to ensure that the best use was made of land available. The Committee also felt that it was essential to raise the standard of living of all rural Africans above mere subsistence. Furthermore, the Committee recognized that "land" held powerful emotional appeal and was often one of the organizing slogans of the revolutionary movements. It argued "that the position must be achieved where agricultural land anywhere in Southern Rhodesia may be purchased by anyone of any race. Once it is generally appreciated that land is a commercial asset, that it can be bought or sold by anyone, that the return derived from it is commensurate with what is put into it by the owner in capital, skill and labour, be he black or white, then many of the emotional pressures will disappear" (Southern Rhodesia, 1960, p39). But while the Committee advocated the repeal of the Land Apportionment Act, it called for caution and careful timing.

To give effect to its recommendations, the Committee recommended the abolition of the three land categories in
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To give effect to its recommendations, the Committee recommended the abolition of the three land categories in
African areas to be replaced with a single "African Land" category, with the remaining areas being occupied by Africans on the basis set out under the NLHA. In recommending the improvement of the African situation within the existing legislative framework, the Committee did not challenge the European's right to prime agricultural land. The repeal of the Land Apportionment Act was only recommended in so far as this was going to create an integrated "African Land" category to the exclusion of European land. The property and social relations in agrarian structure were excluded (Sibanda, 1983).

Between the 1961 and the 1962 general elections in Southern Rhodesia, a number of "liberal" changes took place as a result of the 1960 Committee on the Resettlement of Africans. The Government became convinced that the rigidity of land laws had to be softened if a multi-racial society was to develop. The first of these changes involved the introduction of a new land category of Unreserved Land in which ownership was open to all races. The remaining Crown Land in the European Area was assigned to this category, while furthermore, any land owner in the European Area or Native Purchase Area could apply to have his land transferred to the Unreserved Category (Christopher, 1971). About 100,000 acres of European owned land became Unreserved in the first year after this category was created (Kay, 1970).

Second, there was a transfer of nearly two million acres (600,000 hectares) of Crown Land in the European Area which was already heavily populated by Africans, to the Special Native Area. The Special Native Area was also augmented by the transfer of part of the Native Purchase Area, where that Area was occupied by tribal Africans. Third, all Forest Areas were grouped together and placed outside racial restrictions. This excluded National Parks which remained a separate category until 1963 when National Parks and Forests were amalgamated to form a category known as National Land.
Finally, the 1961 Constitution in Southern Rhodesia merged the Native Reserves and Special Native Areas to form Tribal Trust Land (TTL), which became subject to the provision of the constitution. The new government under Sir Edgar Whitehead had now become convinced that the complete repeal of the Land Apportionment Act was now desirable. Had this occurred, the country would have been divided into three areas, viz:

- Tribal Trust Land (37%)
- Land open to all races (52%)
- National Land (11%)

The detailed distribution pattern as proposed by Sir Edgar Whitehead is given in Table 3.5.

**TABLE 3.5: SIR EDGAR WHITEHEAD'S LAND DIVISION PROPOSAL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Acres</th>
<th>Total Acres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Area</td>
<td>36,784,000</td>
<td>36,784,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal Trust Land</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Reserves</td>
<td>21,020,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special African Area</td>
<td>15,017,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Communally Occupied African Purchase Area)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be transferred to Special African area</td>
<td>3,694,000</td>
<td>39,731,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Purchase area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Excluding Communally Occupied land proposed to the Special area but including Kariba Lake Shore area–660,000 acres)</td>
<td>4,043,000</td>
<td>4,043,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Land</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Parks</td>
<td>4,208,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest area</td>
<td>1,830,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest reserves</td>
<td>478,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-hunting reserves</td>
<td>4,276,000</td>
<td>10,792,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unreserved Land</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,269,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>96,618,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: After Bibanda, 1983, p107)
The 1962 general election was fought on the premise of repealing the Land Apportionment Act. The government of Sir Edgar Whitehead lost the election and was replaced by the Rhodesian Front party, which opposed the repeal of the Land Apportionment Act and promised to slow down the process of change. Rikind (1968, p136) notes, "The tragedy of the situation was, however, that while commissions and committees reviled segregation and while countless efforts were made to convert party leaders to repealing the Act, the broad mass of white electorate remained unconverted...".

The Rhodesian Front demonstrated its commitment to land segregation and the maintenance of the status quo by rejecting the repeal of the Land Apportionment Act and moving towards a more rigid land classification system. In 1964, the land category occupied by propertied Africans was renamed the African Purchase Area, and as in the past this could only be alienated by African on a freehold basis.

The 1967 Tribal Trust Land Act brought about modifications in the administration of African land. Whereas under the NLHA, land allocation authority in the Reserves had been given to the white District Commissioners, the 1967 Act recognized the traditional tenurial system and returned to the Chiefs and other traditional leaders a large measure of control over the land. Weinrich (1975) continues that the Act provided for the establishment of tribal land authorities and each land authority had to consist of a local chief and his advisors. However, these Chiefs were subordinate to the authority and power of the (European settler) State. Chiviya (1982) asserts that the reason for returning the land allocation authority back to the Chiefs in 1967 was to win their support for the 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) declared by the Rhodesian Front from Britain, and also for the 1969 proposals for a Republican Constitution.
THE LAND TENURE ACT OF 1969

The middle and late 1960s saw a movement towards more rigid racial segregation in Rhodesia, and Africans in occupation of European owned land were once more moved. Government dislike of the Unreserved category was made known, and Christopher (1971) comments that the arguments used in the 1920s for Land Apportionment were resurrected and refurbished. Furthermore, he avers, the Government believed that unrestricted competition for land between the races would create an atmosphere of insecurity and slow down the rate of European immigration. The disadvantages of living next to African farmers were emphasized.

In 1966, a Constitutional Commission was appointed to consider, inter alia, the system of land tenure in relation to the country's economic development. The 1969 Republican Constitutional proposals enacted in 1970 provided for eventual parity of representation between European and Africans in parliament (Rhodesia, 1969). This concept of parity was also introduced into the Land Tenure Act of 1969. The Land Tenure Act replaced the 1930 Land Apportionment Act and its amendments, and divided all land into one of three categories - a European Area, an African Area and a National Area. The Act stipulated that the total amount of European Land and African Land "will at all times be equal" (Rhodesia, 1969, p19). A variation of two per cent from the average of the European and African Areas was permitted. The new land tenure map (Figure 3.5), implemented following the proclamation of Republican status in Rhodesia in 1970, achieved almost perfect arithmetic parity between the European and African areas (Table 3.6).

Sibanda (1983) comments that the Land Tenure Act was the extreme representation of the doctrine of European supremacy
and ideology of segregation touching all aspects of life. The Europeans, who made up approximately 5 per cent of the total population, now had access to 50 per cent of the total land area, while Africans, who made up 95 per cent of the population, had access to the remaining 50 per cent. Moreover, Chivya (1982) argues that the Europeans had access to the most fertile and productive land while African land was poor and infertile.

FIGURE 3.5: LAND TENURE IN 1970

(SOURCE: Christopher, 1971, p48)

The Land Tenure Act extended constitutional protection, formerly enjoyed only by the Tribal Trust Lands, to the European and African Purchase Areas. This meant that the hypothetical danger of segregation being abolished by a simple vote of Parliament was eliminated. All fundamental rights relating to the land were now subject to ministerial
direction, regulation and permission. The Act empowered the
Minister to authorize or prohibit the occupation of land by
anyone in the country. Ownership, leasing and occupation of
land was limited in each area to that racial group only.
Occupation included attendance at a school or institution as
a teacher or pupil, at a clinic or hospital as a doctor or
patient. The Act replaced the Tribal Trust Lands Act by
incorporating the latter (Weinrich, 1975).

**TABLE 3.6 : LAND TENURE IN RHODESIA, 1970**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESIGNATION</th>
<th>AREA (ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Forest Land</td>
<td>738 229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parks and Wild Life Reserves</td>
<td>1 794 682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Area</td>
<td>15 663 712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specially designated</td>
<td>9 201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL EUROPEAN AREA</strong></td>
<td>18 205 924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Forest Land</td>
<td>177 795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parks and Wild Life Reserves</td>
<td>255 335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Purchase Area</td>
<td>1 486 416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal Trust Land</td>
<td>16 161 314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specially designated</td>
<td>121 663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL AFRICAN AREA</strong></td>
<td>18 202 523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATIONAL AREA</strong></td>
<td>2 680 047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RHODESIA TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>39 088 494</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source : Christopher, 1971, p49)

The Land Tenure Act represented a consolidation of the Land
Apportionment Act, establishing two separate and distinct
areas within which the interests of the respective races
were paramount. The Act reinforced European morale for an
everlasting white supremacy and came to symbolize settler
domination in Rhodesia. African opposition to this land policy was a major cause for the intensification of the armed struggle against European domination in the country during the 1970s leading, inter alia, to the repeal of the racial division of land and the establishment of a new black government.

EVENTS BETWEEN 1970 AND 1979

In the early 1970s there were attempts to legitimize the 1969 Constitution through the Smith-Home Settlement Proposals between the British and Rhodesian Governments. Acceptance of the Anglo-Rhodesia Settlement Proposals by the Africans would have given the Land Tenure Act some modicum of respectability and legitimacy. In dealing with progress made towards the ending of racial discrimination, the responsibility of examining the provisions of the Land Tenure Act was to be left to an independent commission to be appointed by the British Government.

The 1972 Lord Pearce Commission was sent to Rhodesia to canvass all sections of opinion and report on the acceptability of the proposals. It found that the African population overwhelmingly rejected the Anglo-Rhodesia Settlement Proposals, which they believed only sought to modify the entrenched system of European domination (Great Britain, 1972).

The proposals introduced only minor and insignificant changes to the 1969 Constitution, with the Pearce Commission recommending that any additional land for African use come from unoccupied land in the African areas and not from the European Area (Great Britain, 1971).

Following the failure of the Anglo-Rhodesian Settlement
and Coloureds to the Land Tenure Act, the Electoral Law, the educational system, opportunities for African women and the Declaration of Rights. Regarding the Land Tenure Act, the Quenet Commission concluded that

... the time has come to abandon the two main land classifications - the European Area and the African Area. In their place we recommend the adoption of these classifications - Private Land and State Land. Private land would include European residential, urban and agricultural land, African Purchase Land, African townships and the existing multi-racial areas. State Land would include Tribal Trust Land, the National Parks and Wild Life Land, Forest Land, Unzienated Land and Unreserved Land (Rhodesia, 1976, pp14-15).

The Commission felt that "Private Land" had to be opened to the African, with certain safeguards being observed in the urban areas. The Commission felt that home ownership had to be extended beyond simple leasehold for Africans, while it felt that European residential areas had to remain as they were "... because we consider that there are many Europeans who could not accept a departure from the existing position" (Rhodesia, 1976, p15). In addition, the Commission felt that the Africans had to be protected from European speculators and insisted that the Tribal Trust Lands remain closed to European economic interests.

Following the recommendations of the Quenet Commission, the Land Tenure Amendment Act was passed in 1977, removing racial restrictions on the use of all agricultural land, including the European farming areas and the African Purchase Areas, but excluding the Tribal Trust Lands. Racial restrictions on the use of National Parks, urban commercial and industrial areas were also similarly removed. However, European residential areas remained inviolable. The significance of the Land Tenure Amendment Act is that it finally removed the classification of land by race in Rhodesia. Land was now classified as Tribal Trust Land, Forest Estate, Forest Land and Other Land.
These changes in land law, however, made little impact on the distribution of land by race. Although Africans were now legally entitled to buy land in the former European Area, few did so because of their inability to afford such land and their general inability to qualify for loans. The average price of European farms in 1976 and 1977 was $35,562, while average African income from African Purchase Areas was about $800 per annum, only $145 per annum on TTL farms and $589 per annum in wage employment (Riddell, 1979). As a result only two European farms were bought by Africans, UNCTAD (1980, p40) asserting that "the (Land Tenure Amendment) Act was never intended to redistribute land or expand the TTLs".

Following the failure of the Anglo-American (Kissinger) settlement initiative in 1976, discussions were held between the Rhodesian Front government and the so-called internal African Nationalist Leaders. The result of these discussions was the establishment of a Transitional Government following the 3 March 1978 Accord. The establishment of the first multi-racial government led the way for universal adult suffrage elections in February 1979 and the creation of Zimbabwe Rhodesia with Bishop Abel Muzorewa as Prime Minister in June 1979. Unrecognized by the external African nationalists waging the guerilla struggle or the international community, the political impasse remained. The Land Tenure Amendment Act was finally repealed by the Transitional Government in February 1979, and later racial restrictions on land ownership were removed altogether. However, it was not until following the Lancaster House Conference and the birth of Zimbabwe in April 1980, that attention would be given to redressing the question of the racial imbalance in land distribution and problems of African agriculture in general.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter has outlined the evolution of the emergence of the unequal spatial distribution of land amongst the races in Zimbabwe. The "Land Question", it has been argued, is central to the spatial inequalities which existed in the country at the time of independence. The historical origins of land distribution according to race have been described, together with some of the more important policy responses of various times which were causal factors of the state of both European and African agriculture at the time of independence. In the following chapter the inequalities in agricultural production in Zimbabwe are outlined and attention is given to the debate on the land question. The Zimbabwean government's response to this debate and its policy for dealing with land distribution and the attendant spatial inequalities are then described.
CHAPTER 4

THE LAND QUESTION AT INDEPENDENCE

"Land, land, land," said Robert Mugabe during one Lancaster House interview in 1979, "Land is the deepest grievance of the people of Zimbabwe."


INTRODUCTION

In order to understand the newly elected government's response to questions and issues relating to land and agrarian reform, it is necessary to outline the land question as it was debated at the time of independence. This chapter will focus on the land question and the various debates surrounding this issue at the time government was formulating its policy. Information is presented to highlight the disparity between European and African agriculture, which was a consequence of the racial division of land as discussed in the previous chapter.

The quality of land in Zimbabwe is shown in the discussion of the various agro-ecological regions which have been demarcated, as this has an impact on the levels of productivity which can be achieved. Finally, after the policy options for dealing with the land question, the new terminology for Land Classification in Zimbabwe is given. This chapter provides an important background to understanding the Resettlement Programme which is presented in Chapter 5.
AGRICULTURAL ISSUES AND THE SITUATION AT INDEPENDENCE (1980)

At independence Zimbabwe inherited a dual economy, and, as in almost every other African country, land is important because a large majority of the population is directly dependent upon it for their livelihood. Particularly stark were the contrasts between the commercial (European) agricultural sector and the traditional (African) sector. Numerous pre- and immediate post-independence studies (Hughes, 1974; Cross, 1977; Stubbs, 1977; Hume, 1978; Riddell, 1978a, 1978b, 1979, 1980; Whitsun Foundation, 1978; UNCTAD, 1980) highlighted the disparity in land utilization and the consequent effects on agricultural production.

Of major concern was the problem of overcrowding in the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs), which reached crisis proportions during the 1970s. Theoretically, there was land capable of carrying between 156,000 and 275,000 family farming units under a system of mixed farming in the TTLs. In the 1960s there were already 359,000 farming family units, and Riddell (1978b) reports that by 1977 there were 675,000 cultivators in the TTLs, already three times the maximum that could be safely carried. Stubbs (1977) shows that over the period 1961/62 to 1976/77 there was an 88 per cent increase in the number of subsistence cultivators, and the gross hectarage under cultivation increased from 1.15 million to 2.2 million, an increase of 91 per cent. Cross (1977) writes that the TTLs absorbed 64 per cent of the population growth between 1969 and 1977, such that by 1977 seventeen times more land in the TTLs was being cultivated than was ecologically desirable. This situation led to a severe over-use of grazing land. In 1969, 50 per cent of the grazing land in the TTLs was classified as either bare or over-grazed. Cattle numbers increased by 70 per cent between 1961 to 1977 to 3.4 million head, resulting in further
overstocking of the reduced grazing area (Shumba, 1984). The Rhodesian government admitted that there was an excess of 455,000 farming family units in the TTLs. At independence it was estimated that the TTLs were accommodating 3.6 million people, that is, 2.6 million in excess of the safe carrying capacity of 1 million people (Riddell, 1979).

The disparity between the European and African agricultural sectors is highlighted in the difference in population density (Table 4.1), while the Report of the Controller and Auditor-General (1974-76) shows that between 1973 and 1975, $55.2 million was paid in subsidies, losses and assistance to European agriculture, whereas only $8.4 million was paid to African agriculture in the same period (in Gaidzanwa, 1981). Moreover, some $111 million in credit was made available to European farmers in 1975, compared to a meagre $1 million for Africans. The ratio of extension staff to farmers was 1:35 in European areas and was 1:6000 in the African areas in 1975 (Riddell, 1978a).

| Land Type          | Area ('000ha) | % | Population       | Total Population | Density per | ha
|--------------------|---------------|---|------------------|------------------|-------------|---|
|                    |               |   | European (000)   | African (000)    |             | RM²
| Commercial Land    |               |   |                  |                  |             |   |
| 1) European        | 16,194.2      | 39| 28.9             | 1,191.0          | 1,229.9     | 8.4 |
| 2) African Purchase Area | 1,477.1 | 4 | 0.1              | 170.0            | 170.1       | 11.5 |
| Total Commercial   | 16,671.5      | 43| 35.4             | 1,661.0          | 1,707.4     | 8.4 |
| Tribal Trust Land  | 16,209.3      | 42| 2.2              | 3,735.0          | 3,737.2     | 22.9 |
| National           | 5,852.9       | 15| 21.8             | 115.0            | 115.8       | 2.0 |
| Urban              | 185.3         | 1 | 26.0             | 1,020.0          | 1,046.0     | 661.1 |
| **Total Rhodesia** | **32,027.3**  | 100| 308.5            | 6,220.0          | 6,528.0     | 16.7 |

(Compiled: Riddell, 1979, p81).
Furthermore, African agriculture was discriminated against in terms of the provision of marketing facilities and transport services. Africans depended on merchants, traders and individual European commercial farmers for the sale of their produce. Marketing difficulties were compounded by the imposition of such measures as the Maize Control Act of 1931 and the Cattle Levy and Beef Bounty Act of 1934 (see Chapter 3). These measures resulted in lower prices being paid for African produce.

These marketing difficulties were further exacerbated by differential investments in roads, railways, electricity, irrigation and water supplies. According to Arrighi and Saul (1973) only 30 per cent of African land was within 25 miles (40.2 km) of a railway line (and therefore also of mines and town centres) as opposed to 75 per cent of European land. The Rhodesia Railways Road Motor Service (RMS) linked all the outlying European farming areas with the railway system, but it did not operate within the African areas.

These inequalities in favour of Europeans — in land distribution, access to infrastructural facilities and agricultural services and state agricultural policies — all contributed to the dominant role played by European commercial agriculture in the national economy. In 1965, 6,266 European farmers had a gross output of $148.6 million, which despite the imposition of United Nations sanctions following UDI, had risen to $391.6 million by 1976. According to Riddell (1978a) the value of European agricultural production expanded at the rate of 10.4 per cent per annum between 1967 and 1976, while African agriculture grew at a rate of only 4.4 per cent. The share of European agricultural production increased from 54.7 per cent in 1967 to 67 per cent in 1976, while the share of African agriculture production fell from 45.3 per cent to
32.3 per cent during the same period (UNCTAD, 1980). Table 4.2 highlights these changes.

Table 4.2: African and European Agricultural Share of Total Production (1967 - 1976) (Percentage of Marketed Output)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europeans</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>67.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: UNCTAD, 1980, p45).

At independence, the new Government was confronted with enormous popular demands for an immediate and rapid improvement in the living conditions of the African population, the foremost among these being calls for a more equitable land distribution pattern. Land issues had been at the core of conflict in Zimbabwe since 1890, and it was certainly the inspiration of peasants who rallied behind the liberation struggle. "Land, land, land" said Robert Mugabe during one Lancaster House interview in 1979, "land is the deepest grievance of the people of Zimbabwe". The effort to restructure the inherited agrarian structure in post-colonial Zimbabwe must therefore be seen as a balancing act among unequal actors and among conflicting and sometimes not easily reconcilable positions and interests. In terms of agriculture, the immediate problem at independence was how the State was to wrest control of the modern (essentially European) agricultural sub-sector from the European farmers and multi-national corporations without impairing the economy as a whole. The first post-independence Economic Policy statement, "Growth with Equity" in 1981 outlined the
Zimbabwe government's policy (Zimbabwe, 1981a). The primary economic objective was to achieve a sustained high rate of economic growth. This objective was to be accomplished through the use of the proven productive strength and capacity of the manufacturing, mining and commercial agricultural industries. Recognition was given to the role of private enterprise in the economy and the government embarked on the pursuit of a prudent and democratic approach to economic development, and the selective approach of socialism (the new official ideology) to the economy (Zimbabwe, 1981a). Most commentators (Ballance, 1981; Harbeson, 1981; Cliffe, 1986; Due, 1986; Zinyama, 1986a; Skalnes, 1989) agree that this was a pragmatic policy recognizing the realities of the Zimbabwean situation and attempting to work towards devising an appropriate development strategy for the country.

THE LAND QUESTION - THE DEBATE AND OPTIONS

With the crisis in the TTLs becoming increasingly evident, the "land question" in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe increasingly began to draw the attention of both local and foreign organizations, academics, political parties, farmers' organizations and, finally, the pre-independence Zimbabwe Rhodesia government before the new Zimbabwe government made it a national issue at independence. Table 4.3 provides an overview of those involved in the debate on the land question and the policy options for the new government.

Although land has been viewed in rather narrow terms as the critical issue in an independent Zimbabwe, the land question debate has also included the merits and demerits of land redistribution - not just that some land should be redistributed, but how much and which land should be redistributed. The cost of this redistribution to the nation, in terms of output, foreign exchange earnings, land
productivity, agricultural employment and the loss of agricultural expertise (and white farmers) has also been a central theme in the debate. The discussions have not so much focused on the disadvantages of not redistributing land (the continued land hunger, food shortages and ecological deterioration in certain areas) but more on the demerits related to losses of national output and financial flows (Moyo, 1986).

They have also concentrated on the costs of maintaining the productivity of the approximately 5,000 white commercial farmers, in terms of income distribution. While the land question agenda contains the redistribution of land, the quantity, quality and location of that land are the major policy issues affecting the pace and form of redistribution.

Munslow and Cliffs (1980, pl) are among those who take exception to the conceptualization that land is the basic issue, instead, they argue,

... it has become commonplace to say that the basic issue in Rhodesia has always been one of land: it has been the root of conflicts between black and white throughout the colonial period, and it is the core problem whose solution will shape the path of future development. Our contention, however, is that the key to understanding lies in people, not things, in the whole complex of relations of production rather than just property relations.

This thinking is carried further by Bush and Cliffe (1984), who see the root of the issue being how to provide for people and not what to do or how to use land - except as a means of changing the nature of society.

Rifkind (1972, p62), arguing from a different perspective states, "it can be said that the politics of land in Rhodesia have been to a large extent nothing to do with land at all. Rather land has been a symbol, as it is in most societies, of a greater conflict between different philosophies, interests and ways of life."
Figure 4.1: ZIMBABWE: POLARIZATION OF THE SPACE ECONOMY

(Source: Simon, 1986, p3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agricultural &amp; Rural Development Issues</th>
<th>Land Issues &amp; Land Reform Options</th>
<th>Resettlement in Zimbabwe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hughes, 1974</td>
<td>Manyana, 1975</td>
<td>Zimbabwe, 1981b</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rhodesia, 1979</td>
<td>Riddell, 1978b</td>
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<td>Harbeson, 1981</td>
<td>Riddell, 1979</td>
<td>Chinyuku, 1984</td>
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<td>Made, 1982</td>
<td>Riddell, 1980</td>
<td>Hywel Davies, 1984</td>
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<td>Mhlanga, 1982</td>
<td>Ballance, 1981</td>
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<td>Zimbabwe, 1982a</td>
<td>Galdzanwa, 1981</td>
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<td>World Bank, 1983</td>
<td>Chivlyo, 1982</td>
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<td>Bush &amp; Cliffe, 1984</td>
<td>Harbeson, 1982</td>
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<td>Chester, 1984</td>
<td>Mapowose &amp; Chengu, 1982</td>
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<td>Moyana, 1984</td>
<td>Sibanda, 1983</td>
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<td>Myers &amp; Ames, 1984</td>
<td>Whitsun Foundation, 1983</td>
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<td>Shumba, 1984</td>
<td>Chester, 1984</td>
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<td>Butcher, 1985</td>
<td>Moyana, 1984</td>
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<tr>
<td>Munslow, 1985</td>
<td>Myers &amp; Ames, 1984</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weiner et al, 1985</td>
<td>World Bank, 1985</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Whitlow, 1988</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

General Development Issues

| Rhodesia, 1979                                                               | Yates, 1980                                                        |
| Unctad, 1980                                                                | Bratton, 1981                                                      |
| Stoneman, 1981                                                              | Zimbabwe, 1981a                                                   |
| Zimbabwe, 1981a                                                             | Seldman, 1982                                                     |
| Zimbabwe, 1981a                                                             | Zimbabwe, 1982b                                                   |
| Gordon, 1984                                                                |
The land question is increasingly surrounded by counter-solutions to the land-hunger problem: those solutions which do not require land redistribution but instead promote rural development of the communal lands in situ. This type of counter-solution brings to the fore a wide range of very specific technical questions of a multi-disciplinary nature, far removed from the initial political issues surrounding the land question. These technical questions have brought into play a wide range of different rural development initiatives at a local level (see for example Stilz and Weyl (1986) and Co-ordinated Agricultural and Rural Development concept-CARD) which are intended to find an appropriate model for the development of the Communal Areas (formerly TTLs). It is also in this realm that various agricultural policies on pricing, credit, research, marketing and so, have evolved with the explicit aim of increasing support for peasant production and rural incomes within the Communal Areas (CAs).

Moyo (1986) argues that the land question has been disaggregated topically (for example, land tenure, population control) and spatially (different experiments in different regions) resulting in a rather diffuse problematic. In essence, he argues, the major issue becomes that of integrating the CAs into the national agricultural sector's "mainstream".

The question of differences in land-use between the Large-Scale Commercial Farmers and the peasantry is also a dominant issue. Typically, this issue is viewed in two respects: one is the question of full or under-utilisation of arable land and the other is their productivity capabilities. Land reform proponents suggest that the commercial farmers under-utilise the prime arable land, while the antagonists refute this. The counter-claims on this issue are numerous.
The land question debate has also focused the ideological alternatives for development in post-colonial Zimbabwe. The Integrated Plan for Rural Development (Rhodesia, 1979) saw the need for a limited redistribution of land, and that more resources should be directed towards the African areas. It recommended that redistributed land could be re-classified and held under freehold title, sentiments echoing the earlier NLHA policy of the 1950s. The capitalist status quo would be unaffected.

The Whitsun Foundation, a multiservice think-tank in Salisbury, offered detailed blueprint for a distinct separation of rural and urban populations in Zimbabwe. Their strategy was dependent upon bolstering and further encouraging a class of African commercial farmers with a permanent stake in the land through security of tenure. These aspirant commercial farmers would be drawn from the TLLs and would emulate the successful African Purchase Area (APA) farmers (Whitsun Foundation, 1978). A two-pronged rural development strategy, involving the shift of labour from low productivity peasant farming into higher income wage employment, and the development of a programme to transform farming methods and so improve conditions within the residual peasant sector, was proposed. Only limited redistribution of unused white-owned land was considered for the resettlement of only the most productive African farmer. This thinking is also found in the so-called "Chidzero Report" prepared for the incoming Government by the United Nations (UNCTAD, 1979).

Riddell (1978b) however, puts forward an alternative land strategy on the premise that it must be carried out within a socialist economic framework in order to be successful. This strategy included massive resettlement of Africans into a system of co-operatives and communes following the nationalisation of all land by the State. Without going
Into specific details of numbers to be resettled, he argues that the size of communes would depend upon the quality of the land and the felt-needs of particular localities. "The size of communes would depend upon the harmonisation of a national socialist strategy and local interest and the quality of land in each area. Eventually all rural land would consist of relatively self-contained communes with the rural population distributed throughout the country but with the majority living in the central watershed area" (Riddell, 1978a, p112).

A socialist land policy was also advocated by the liberation movements. As early as 1974 the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU) of Joshua Nkomo made it clear that it would only nationalize land owned by absentee land-owners, and such land would be freely redistributed to the peasants at independence. Nkomo saw the possibility of compensation for European farmers and multi-national corporations should total nationalisation take place (Sibanda, 1983). Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) saw a gradual nationalisation due to the practical difficulties of carrying out such an exercise. However, he pointed out that what ZANU "... would like to see established is a system which brings land to the ownership of the people as a whole. This means that the State will act as the custodian for the whole people. ... Such land whose owners are absent must come into the first category of land that is taken over almost immediately" (Zimbabwe News, 1978, p3).

Interestingly, the ZANU (PF) election manifesto and post-independence policy documents were devoid of such concepts and ideas as the "nationalisation" of land or that of land belonging to absentee landlords. Furthermore, arguments in favour of the "free" redistribution of land and "forcibly dismantling" of the European owned farms have disappeared. The manifesto pledged swift collectivization of peasant
agriculture and establishment of state farms, while at the same time retaining the efficient core of large-scale, commercial agriculture (Kinsey, 1983). Sibanda (1983) points out that the land policy outlined by the ZANU (PF) election manifesto was devoid of rhetorical radical statements that used to characterize the mobilizational phases of "the war of national liberation.

POST-INDEPENDENCE POLICY RESPONSES

The post-independence land policy was enunciated in the "Growth with Equity" Economic Policy Document, in which strategies are outlined to achieve "an acceptable and fair distribution of land ownership, use and increased production and productivity in all forms of agriculture..." (Zimbabwe, 1981a). Nationalization as a strategy was absent and was not mentioned even as a distant possibility. The document stated that land reform would be carried out and that this reform would be financed through both internal and external funds. Only unused and under-utilized land would be purchased, a position not too dissimilar from the liberation movements' response in the 1970s.

Post-independence thinking on the land question includes that by the Whitsun Foundation (1983), which supported a reduction in the Government's resettlement proposals in the interests of maintaining production. The Foundation modified its proposal for individualised land tenure in the Communal Areas, recognizing the problem of absorbing those who would be disrupted by such a measure.

The most comprehensive assessment of post-independence development problems and specifically those of the rural areas, was the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Income, Prices and Conditions of Services (the Riddell Commission) (Zimbabwe, 1981a). One basic conclusion drawn
was that as much land should be made available for African farming as possible. The Report argued that this resettlement must, and indeed need, in no way affect the level of productivity of the commercial farmers, and as much it differed from most pre-independence option statements. Significantly, a more extensive redistribution of land is envisaged than in other liberal proposals. Co-operatives in resettlement and peasant farming areas are identified as the most desirable forms of production, these being envisaged as self-governing rather than government-promoted. The Report urged that peasants themselves should have a greater say in the allocation of land and farming practices and that this could only be done with the development of village committees which involve villagers in the planning of their own lives (Zimbabwe, 1981c; Bush and Cliffe, 1984).

The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Agricultural Industry (the Chavunduka Commission)(Zimbabwe, 1982a) recommended that resettlement be linked to improvements in agricultural productivity in order to alleviate the built-up frustration and resentment in a large proportion of the nation's people. The Commission underscored the Government's intention to effect a rehabilitation of the entire agricultural industry, in particular the Communal Lands sector.

AGRO-ECOLOGICAL REGIONS

While the Land Tenure Act achieved almost perfect arithmetic parity in land distribution between the European and African areas in Rhodesia, this parity in land distribution was not matched with parity in the quality of land owned by each group. In considering the land question, the inequality of resource endowment and quality of land available to each race group during the colonial period had significance when considering the policy options regarding land and agrarian reform during the Zimbabwe government.
Zimbabwe can be sub-divided into six agro-ecological zones (Figure 4.2) based on a survey of natural factors governing land use conducted by Vincent and Thomas (1960). Based primarily on average quantities of rainfall and their variability, these "Natural Regions" provide a broad framework for evaluating potential land use. The characteristics of each region are as follows:

**NATURAL REGION I - SPECIALIZED AND DIVERSIFIED FARMING REGION:**

The rainfall in this region is high (above 1000mm rainfall per annum in areas of below 1700m altitude, and above 900mm per annum in areas above 1700m), with precipitation in all months of the year. Temperatures are highly effective enabling afforestation, fruit and intensive livestock production to be practised in frost-free areas. Plantation crops (e.g., tea, coffee and macadamia nuts) can be grown.

**NATURAL REGION II - INTENSIVE FARMING REGION:**

Rainfall is confined to summer and is moderately high (750 - 1000mm). Two sub-regions have been defined. Sub-region IIA receives an average of at least 18 pentads per season. This region is suitable for intensive farming based on crop production (maize, tobacco, cotton, wheat and other grains) and livestock production. Sub-region IIB receives an average of 16 - 18 rainy pentads per season and is subject to more severe spells during the rainy season or to the occurrence of relatively short rainy seasons, either of which affect crop yields.

**NATURAL REGION III - SEMI-INTENSIVE FARMING REGION:**

The rainfall in this region is moderate (650 - 800mm) with much of it falling in infrequent heavy falls, although temperatures are high thus reducing its effectiveness. This region receives on average 14 - 16 pentads per season. The region is also subject to fairly severe mid-season dry-spells and is therefore marginal for maize, tobacco and cotton. The farming systems, in conformity with the natural conditioning factors, should therefore be based on both livestock (assisted by the production of fodder crops) and cash crops under good management on soils of high available moisture potential.

---

3 A rainy pentad is defined as the centre of one of three 5 day periods (pentads) which together receive more than 40mm of rainfall and two of which receive at least 60mm of rainfall.
NATURAL REGION IV - SEMI-EXTENSIVE FARMING REGION :

This region experiences fairly low rainfall (450 - 600mm) and is subject to periodic seasonal droughts and severe dry spells during the rainy season. Generally, the rainfall is too low and unpredictable except in certain very favourable localities where some drought resistant crops can be produced. Livestock is the only sound basis of farming in this region.

NATURAL REGION V - EXTENSIVE FARMING REGION :

The rainfall in this region (Zambezi and Save-Limpopo Valleys) is too low and erratic for the reliable production of even drought-resistant fodder and grain crops and farming has to be based on the utilization of the veld potential alone. Cattle ranching or game farming are the only sound farming systems in this region.

NATURAL REGION VI - UNSUITABLE FOR FARMING :

This region covers 3.1 per cent of the country and consists of excessively broken country where steep slopes and skeletal soils preclude any farming (regardless of climatic conditions) and of other localities (such as floodplains, swamps, etc) which are physically unsuited for agriculture. (Vincent and Thomas, 1960, Kay, 1970, Whitsun Foundation, 1978; Weiner et al, 1985).

Weiner et al (1985) shows that only 16.8 per cent of the total area of Zimbabwe has the potential for intensive crop and animal production. Riddell (1979) estimates that 54 per cent of all European farming land and only 27 per cent of African farming land falls within Regions II and III; and that 69 per cent of all African farming land and only 27 per cent of European farming lands falls within Regions IV and V.

Table 4.4 demonstrates the inequality in land quality and distribution.
Figure 4.2: NATURAL REGIONS AND RELATED FARMING SYSTEMS

I: Specialised and diversified Farming
II: Intensive Farming
III: Semi - Intensive Farming
IV: Semi - extensive Farming
V: Extensive Farming
VI: Unsuitable for Farming

(Source: Kat, 1979, p 90)
TABLE 4.4: RACIAL DISTRIBUTION OF LAND BY NATURAL REGION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATURAL REGION</th>
<th>HECTARES (000)</th>
<th>% WHITE</th>
<th>% BLACK</th>
<th>NATIONAL LAND %</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>7 350</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>6 860</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>13 000</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>1 220</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: After Riddell (1978a) and Stoneman (1981)).

TERMINOLOGY WITH RESPECT TO LAND USE AREAS

Nomenclature used prior to Independence to describe the agricultural sub-sectors was based on that incorporated in the Land Apportionment and Land Tenure Acts. This terminology based on race was not acceptable to the new government. Consequently, one of the immediate policy responses of the new government following independence was the adoption of more politically acceptable terminology to describe the agrarian structure in Zimbabwe. It is important to understand the new terminology when considering other policy responses regarding the rural/agriculture sector which is provided in the following chapters.

Land Classification, based on agrarian structure rather than race, is now used as follows:

1) Communal Areas (CA's) - formerly the Tribal Trust Lands, the CA's accommodate 37 per cent of the population. Environmental degradation is reaching alarming proportions and threatens the long-term economic viability of the CA's.
2) Large-Scale Commercial Farms (LSCF) — formerly European Farmland. This sub-sector produced 75 per cent of the agricultural output (1981) of which 90 per cent was marketed. This sub-sector provides permanent employment for 165,000 workers, seasonal employment for another 56,000 and has strong linkages with the industrial and service sectors of the economy.

3) Resettlement Areas — This is former commercial farmland which has been purchased by Government and under a number of schemes, landless Africans have been resettled. This will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

4) Small-Scale Commercial Farms (SSCF) — Formerly the African Purchase Areas, established during the Colonial Period to provide freehold tenure to African farmers. This sub-sector covers 1.5 million hectares.

5) State Farms — Originally established by the Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation (TILCOR), the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority is responsible for a number of large-scale highly mechanized farms, a number of them irrigated. This sub-sector is likely to expand, given the Government's ideological support and emphasis on co-operatives.

6) National Land — As previously, this is land set aside for National Parks, Game Reserves, Recreational and Safari Areas, and land otherwise set aside for environmental conservation purposes.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The situation as it existed in the agrarian sector at the time of independence is described in this chapter. The quality and quantity of land in Zimbabwe has been shown as not being uniform, and that this distribution has resulted in the majority of people living in the more marginal areas of the country. This was one of the most fundamental problems facing the policy-makers of the new government at independence.

The information presented in this chapter provides the immediate backdrop against which decisions regarding
agrarian and land reform were taken by the Zimbabwean Government. The Government's response to the land issues it inherited at independence and the subsequent Resettlement Programme adopted will be considered in detail in Chapter Five.
CHAPTER 5

LAND REFORM AND RESETTLEMENT IN POST-INDEPENDENCE ZIMBABWE

"Land is perhaps the most fundamental issue that has to be confronted in the whole Rhodesia impasse" (Riddell, 1978a, pl).

"The underutilization of former white farm areas is thus the real scandal of land-use in Zimbabwe" (Cliffe, 1988c, p57).

"Land is a delicate commodity - misuse it briefly and you will live with the results of that misuse for many years" Dr Sidney Sekeramayi, Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, 29/08/1980.

INTRODUCTION

On coming to power at independence in April 1980, the new Government of Zimbabwe led by Robert Mugabe was confronted with demands for the immediate improvement in the living conditions of the majority of Africans. Among these demands has been the call for land redistribution and resettlement to benefit the landless and poor in the rural areas. In response to the land hunger amongst the African peasants, the post-colonial State launched a variety of programmes with regard to land acquisition, redistribution and resettlement, which will form the focus of this chapter.

At independence, the Government declared a commitment to rationalize land policies in Zimbabwe and redress the imbalances of a colonial system founded on the inequitable division and occupation of land on a racial basis, which has resulted in the emergence of a dual economy. Land, as has been described in Chapter 3, was historically divided between Africans and Europeans and reached almost perfect
arithmetic parity with the Land Tenure Act of 1970, even though Europeans at no time constituted more than 5.5 per cent of the total population (Bratton, 1979).

The consequence of this basically inequitable distribution of land has been further exacerbated by the underlying differences in land quality, as elaborated upon in the last chapter. At independence, more than half of the large-scale commercial farming land was found in the more favourable areas, viz. Natural Regions I, II and III. In contrast, three-quarters of the Communal Areas (former TTEs) are in Natural Regions IV and V, which are considered marginal or unsuitable for cropping. "There is thus an absolute and natural shortage of good land which does not reflect the relative shortage caused by distribution on racial lines. Land in the CA's is under serious population pressure, and in 1981 these areas were estimated to be accommodating some 219 000 households in excess of their carrying capacity" (Zimbabwe, 1981c p147). Rural landlessness continues therefore to be not an uncommon phenomenon, although national statistics on this problem are not available.

At independence, the Government also inherited the problem of the importance and influence of the 6300 commercial farms which were responsible for between 70 - 80 per cent of gross agricultural output. Some 700 000 communal area farms produced up to 30 per cent of output, of which only a quarter was marketed and the balance produced for subsistence. Commercial agriculture was also responsible for a third of all formal wage employment in the country and is the largest single employer (Stoneman, 1981). The Riddell Commission (see Chapter 4) states that some 230 000 families depended on commercial agriculture for a livelihood (Zimbabwe, 1981c).
The Riddell Commission recommended that "New areas of land be acquired to absorb the population that is in excess of the safe carrying capacity of the present-day peasant sector while assuming that commercial farming land is able to continue to provide the bulk of the nation's basic food requirements, a surplus for export and for the provision of inputs for industrial production" (Zimbabwe, 1981c, p88). This recommendation is the most concise statement of the land question facing Zimbabwe at independence (as discussed in the previous chapter), being one of the dilemmas facing the new government. The programmes for the acquisition and resettlement of land outlined below was the policy response to the land question by the Zimbabwe Government.

**INTENSIVE RESettleMENT PROGRAMME**

In September 1980, the Government launched the Intensive Resettlement Programme, which had the overall objective of resettling 18,000 families from the overcrowded Communal Areas onto 1,1 million hectares of formerly commercial farming land over a period of three years (Kinsey, 1982, 1983). Total cost of the programme was to be $60 million, shared equally between Zimbabwe and Britain. The resettlement programme was a corollary to the land acquisition programme - the latter not being spelt out in any formal detailed programme.

The specific objectives of the Intensive Resettlement Programme can be summarized as follows:

a) to provide some relief of the pressures on over-populated land;

b) to extend and improve the base for productive agriculture in the peasant farming sector;

c) to improve the standard of living of the largest and poorest sector of the population of Zimbabwe;
d) to ameliorate the plight of people who have been adversely affected by the war and to rehabilitate them;

e) to provide, at the lower end of the scale, opportunities for people who have no land and who are without employment and may, therefore, be classed as destitute;

f) to bring abandoned or under-utilized land into full production as one facet of implementing an equitable policy of land distribution;

g) to expand or improve the infrastructure and services that are needed to promote the growth of people and of economic production;

h) to achieve national stability and progress in a country that has only recently emerged from the turmoil of war (Zimbabwe, 1981b, p2).

The Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development (MLRRD) became responsible for the organization, co-ordination and operation of the intensive resettlement programme, having the following functions:

a) Overall policy;

b) ensuring the implementation of the programme by -
   i) harnessing the services and resources of specialist agencies, and
   ii) employing development teams;

c) co-ordinating the activities of specialist agencies through the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) sub-committees for Resettlement;

d) initiating the purchase of land required for this programme on the recommendations of the Ministerial Committee for Land Selection and the ARDA sub-committee for Resettlement;

e) through the employment of a Resettlement Officer, looking after the needs of the people moving into the area so that they may quickly settle into the new environment and utilize their new opportunities;

f) monitoring the progress of the resettlement programme;
overall control and disbursement of the funds for the programme, utilizing the ARDA accounting services (Zimbabwe, 1981b, p3).

At the national level eight government ministries were involved in the co-ordination for the programme, while eight different provincial development teams were responsible for co-ordination at the provincial level.

At the Resettlement Scheme level, the key personnel are the Resettlement Team, which consists of a Resettlement Officer (normally one for every 500 families) supported by a clerical assistant and a field orderly. They are responsible for the registration of potential settlers, final selection of qualifying registrants, issuing and enforcing the conditions of various permits, maintaining infrastructure, supervising communal activities (such as dipping and grazing) and providing interim overall administration since resettlement areas do not yet fall under any existing administrative branches of government (Zimbabwe, 1983).

Land Acquisition for resettlement is the responsibility of the MLRRD through the Land Selection Committee, which acts on the advice of Government land valuation and extension officers. The land is purchased from existing owners on a willing-seller/willing-buyer basis, in accordance with the conditions laid down at the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference, which was agreed to by all parties.

While there has been no uncompensated seizure of private land, in a few instances owners of actively occupied farms have been encouraged to sell when the land was in a particularly suitable area for resettlement. It should be noted that under the provisions of the Lancaster House Constitution, if land was acquired under a compulsory purchase order, it must be paid for in foreign exchange - a
factor promoting the continuation of willing-seller/willing-buyer arrangements (Kinsey, 1983).

Land acquisition for the resettlement programme was governed by the Zimbabwe Constitution's section on "Protection from Deprivation of Property" contained in the Declaration of Rights. This section stipulates that private property cannot be compulsorily acquired except in cases where it is deemed to be in the public interest to do so. When private property is acquired, its acquisition will be lawful on condition that payment for compensation is adequate, prompt and within reasonable time. The vagueness of these definitions (prompt payment, adequate compensation, etc) has been criticized, but the consequence is that the requirement that all resettlement land be promptly and adequately paid for has been a major constraint due to the lack of funds for the programme. President (then Prime Minister) Mugabe criticized the British and American governments for not providing financial support for the land acquisition programme, as revealed in the following interview; "We committed ourselves to the Lancaster House position because the British and Americans gave promises - those promises haven't been fulfilled" (The Herald, 22/01/1981).

Additional funding for land acquisition was secured from the international community at the Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD) in March 1981. The Conference succeeded in securing US$1,2 billion earmarked for rural reconstruction, and about US$160 million was set aside for land acquisition for the resettlement programme (Ballance, 1981).

In acquiring land for the resettlement programme, the Land Selection Committee of the MLRRD sought land which was:
a) suitable for resettlement purposes;
b) near or adjacent to tribal trust lands (communal areas), particularly those which have been identified as being under heavy population pressures;
c) not at present actively farmed and preferably on offer to Government;
d) in a block available for purchase, sufficiently large to allow for economic provision of schools, clinics, marketing facilities, etc (if even this means the purchase of some occupied farms on a willing seller basis);
e) in an area adequately served with basic infrastructure such as roads and water supplies;
f) in an area where basic planning is available (Zimbabwe, 1981b, p 12).

e an area was identified for resettlement the Department of Agricultural Technical and Extension of Services (Agritex) (formerly the Department of Conservation and Extension (Conex) prepared a "preliminary assessment" of the land, and this is submitted to the ARDAs Sub-committee for Resettlement. The recommendations are then passed onto the Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, where a final decision was taken.

Where land has been abandoned, or has no conventional market value, the Valuation Officers consult Agritex (formerly Conex) on the value of such land for resettlement, taking into account the following factors:

a) the percentage of potential arable;
b) the availability and quality of grazing land;
c) the climatic/ecological zone;
d) land classification within the farm;
e) the availability of service facilities (fencing, roads, water, electricity, etc);
f) accessibility;
g) the value of existing buildings (Zimbabwe 1981b, p12).
On the implementation of the Intensive Resettlement Programme in September 1980, the Government (Zimbabwe, 1981b) anticipated that the purchase costs would range between $35 per hectare in Natural Region II to under $10 per hectare in Natural Region V. These prices have been confirmed by Harbeson (1981) and were comparable with the prevailing land prices in 1976.

Once land has been acquired, it is surveyed, planned, demarcated and its carrying capacity assessed by Agritex. A Project Report is prepared giving these details, together with information on the villages, service centres and the project budget relating to resettlement. Once this has been completed, work can begin on the construction of essential infrastructure (Zimbabwe, 1983). The Project Report makes provision for access roads, dip tanks, boreholes, staff housing, clinics and schools. Figure 5.1 shows the steps taken in the planning and development of a particular resettlement area and the authorities responsible. The large number of both Implementing Agents and Consultative Agencies involved in the implementation of resettlement schemes, highlights the necessity for effective coordination in overseeing the whole process of scheme establishment. The process of settler selection then takes place, and in many cases resettlement has actually begun before such initial infrastructure has been provided.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASK</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTING AGENCY</th>
<th>CONSULTATIVE AGENCY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Recommissioning or re-establishing and positioning of roads, boreholes, surface water, slips, buildings, orable tanks and plantations</td>
<td>Consst</td>
<td>Water Development, Valuation Officer, Landowner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Investigate and report on underground and surface water supplies</td>
<td>Water Development</td>
<td>Development Officer, Water Development, Veterinary Services, Land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Production of initial reports and detailed plans based on water report, reommission reports, photosynthesis and field survey. Report to be in the format set out by Appendix A.</td>
<td>Consst</td>
<td>Land on the recommendation of the consultative agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Identify the site of the administrative office on the basis of:</td>
<td>ARDA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) number and distribution of services;</td>
<td>Water Development</td>
<td>Land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) water quality;</td>
<td>Development Supervisor</td>
<td>Consst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) non-compliance;</td>
<td>Development Supervisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) site accessibility</td>
<td>Development Supervisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Prepare a separate budget for the implementation of scale project covering the items:</td>
<td>ARDA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) site and access roads as identified by Consst and approved by the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development on the recommendation of the 4.5. A self-committee for Resettlement. Then, through the project co-ordinator or, a site staff, ensure that the expenditure under each budget sub-head is monitored.</td>
<td>Water Development</td>
<td>Land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Village to be supplied by hand pumps on boreholes where possible;</td>
<td>Development Supervisor</td>
<td>Consst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Additional works to be supplied by engineer either open or boreholes if feasible, otherwise from surface water via treatment plant.</td>
<td>Development Supervisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Re瑶, construct, repair water supplies on the following levels:</td>
<td>Development Supervisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Village to be supplied by hand pumps on boreholes where possible;</td>
<td>Development Supervisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Additional works to be supplied by engineer either open or boreholes if feasible, otherwise from surface water via treatment plant.</td>
<td>Development Supervisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Re瑶, construct or repair roads as required for the village site and administrative centre</td>
<td>Development Supervisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Construct resettlement office’s housing and offices at administrative centre</td>
<td>Development Supervisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Appoint and deliver resettlement officer in liaison with levels and Breathman's on the principles of registering all potential victims (diagnosis forms not set out in Appendix D) must be compiled by all as soon as possible.</td>
<td>Development Supervisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Install telephone</td>
<td>Development Supervisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Digitize village fixed, pex and carnets</td>
<td>Development Supervisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Produce, compile and locate emergency relief distributions</td>
<td>Development Supervisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Digitize permanent relief allocations</td>
<td>Resettlement Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Select sites and move them on to holdings</td>
<td>Development Supervisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Repair or reconstruct slip lanes</td>
<td>Development Supervisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Construct temporary services’ buildings</td>
<td>Development Supervisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Construct offices</td>
<td>Development Supervisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Construct schools</td>
<td>Development Supervisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Compare houses to the standards laid down in the approved project report, as noted in paragraph 4.4. (b)</td>
<td>Development Supervisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Plant permanent seed mix</td>
<td>Development Supervisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Construct permanent existing structures</td>
<td>Development Supervisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Zimbabwe, 1981b, pp25-26)
The first step in the implementation of resettlement is the distribution of Registration Forms (see Annexure A) by Government officials in liaison with local political organizations or tribal authorities in order to attract potential settlers. Settler selection is made on the basis of three criteria relating to need, which in order of priority are:

a) Refugees and people displaced by the war: this category includes extra-territorial refugees, urban refugees and former inhabitants of protected villages;  

b) The landless: although in theory, tribal trust land residents should always have some land, population pressures in some tribal trust lands are so great that, for all practical purposes, some have no land;  

c) Those with insufficient land to maintain themselves and their families (Zimbabwe, 1981b, p10).  

Additional criteria which are applied include the applicant's general ability to sustain himself as indicated by possession of cattle, stocks of food and feed and farming equipment, although as Kinsey (1982) points out, how this criterion is reconciled with those listed above is unclear. Furthermore, settlers were to be selected from the 25 - 50 year age group, be married or widowed with dependants and have no formal employment.  

Kinsey (1983) notes that there was a departure from these criteria by allowing relatively well-off Master Farmers and others to be selected for resettlement. This was evidently a deliberate attempt to compensate for the shortfall in extension personnel to service resettlement schemes by creating more heterogeneous farming communities. Those selected for resettlement "...must also be prepared to

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4 For further information on protected villages, see Weinrich, 1977.
renounce all rights to land in the communal areas from which they come" (Kinsey, 1983, pl17).

MODELS FOR INTENSIVE RESETTLEMENT

Initially three (later increased to five) models were proposed in order to implement the resettlement programme. While these models differ in approach and detail, they all aimed at settling farmers more densely than would be the case on individual farms, and the settlers are expected to live in close proximity to one another in order to provide economies of scale (Kinsey, 1982). It was also envisaged that, through the planned siting of Government administrative centres, schools and clinics, it was intended to provide the nucleus from which rural service centres and growth points may develop (Zimbabwe, 1981b). Furthermore, the objective of resettlement was to provide arable land and/or grazing rights sufficient to sustain an acceptable standard of living for the farmer and his immediate dependants" (Zimbabwe, 1981b, p20). The target minimum income level has been set at $400 per annum (net of production costs and excluding subsistence consumption). It was also assumed by the resettlement planners that the settler farmers would attain full production and income target levels in the third year of farming.

MODELA

This model is described as "intensive village settlements with individual arable allocations and communal grazing areas" (Zimbabwe, 1981b, p20). On such a scheme settlers are allocated a residential plot within a communal village, where amenities such as social services, schools, etc. will be provided. Each settler will be allocated about 5 hectares of arable land, within a two or three kilometre radius of the village if possible. All land and grazing rights are allocated initially on a permit basis (see Annexure B - 3) which covers occupancy, cultivation and keepstaging of livestock. Farmer committees will be elected by the settlers to plan and co-ordinate all the activities
of the community, other than production from the arable
lands. Communal woodlots are to be encouraged in order to
maintain a supply of firewood and building timber.

MODEL B

This model is based upon communal living and co-operative
farming. "In this model all activity is based on the
community, with co-operative structures and management" (Zimbabwe, 1981b, p21). While livestock may be privately
owned, all other property, land and equipment are to be held
collectively, and the settlers are required to reside
together on the co-operative, which must be established as a
legal entity. The profits of the co-operative are to be
shared according to a formula devised by the settler
farmers. This model has added significance in that it shall
"...become the basis of implementing the Government's policy
of the socialist transformation of peasant agriculture" (Mupawose and Chengu, 1982, p16).

MODEL C

This model envisages intensive resettlement (such as in
Model A), but being combined with a centralized estate farm.
The central core estate will provide certain services to
farmers and to which farmers will contribute labour. As in
Model A, arable land and livestock are individually owned,
while grazing is communal. The estate is to be run by a
manager who will also co-ordinate the contribution of labour
to the estate, be responsible for large-scale production and
for the provision and for the provision of infrastructure
and services. Individual farmers will finance their own
operations and retain their own profits (Zimbabwe, 1981b).

These three models were formulated, discussed and approved
during the latter half of 1980, with an additional two
models being approved in 1982 and 1983.

MODEL D

This model is strictly speaking not a resettlement model,
but a rural development model which utilizes potential
resettlement land (Zimbabwe, 1983). This model is to be
applied mainly in Matabeleland, and Natural Regions IV and V
where recurrent drought is common. It is based on group
ranching of both cattle and small stock on commercial ranch
units and, wherever possible, is to include a commercial
game-management component. Each family will receive a
residential plot in a nucleated village, a 1 hectare dryland arable plot and an irrigated vegetable garden of a tenth of a hectare. Group-based activities, such as irrigation, fodder crops, village and pen-feeding of stock is to be encouraged. Kinsey (1983) points out that a significant departure from the standard intensive resettlement pattern is that short-term, off-farm employment will be considered provided permission is obtained from the local group committees and the MLRRD. It is also hoped that Model D schemes will develop into formally registered co-operatives.

MODEL E

This is the latest model to be considered and involves commercial grazing areas for selected Communal Areas. It is envisaged that former commercial ranching units in Matabeleland, or other areas such as Natural Region V where climate or lack of arable land precludes Model A, would graze livestock purchased from families in the adjacent communal areas. These would be fattened and sold by the estate. Those Communal Area families from whom the livestock had been purchased would promise to reduce grazing on their own land in order to allow fertility to return (Zimbabwe, 1983). Model E plans to include livestock from four Communal Areas on one ranch. At the time of research (1986), this model had not been implemented, but plans were being discussed with local councils and funding agencies (Due, 1986).

PROGRESS WITH THE INTENSIVE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMME

Initially the resettlement programme was the focus of much public attention and debate, the programme being one of the most visible means to redress the racial imbalances of the former colonial era. Specific attention to the issues and trends emerging from resettlement is given by Kinsey (1982, 1983). Resettlement in terms of agricultural productivity has been the focus of a paper by Weiner et al (1985) and in terms of the transition towards socialist agriculture by Munsiow (1985). Policy issues, while discussed in all of the above, receive special attention by Hambengwe (1986) and in a commissioned investigation by Cliffe (1986). Other resettlement updates include those by Hywel Davies (1984, 1988), Whitelow (1985), Hamb(PP)(1985), Due (1985),
Zimbabwe (1986a, 1986b), Weiner (1988a, 1988b), Zinyama et al. (1990) and Palmer (1990). Resettlement has also been the subject of a seminar by the Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies (ZIDS) as well as being the exhibit of the MLRBD at the Zimbabwe International Trade Fair, both in May 1983. Renewed interest in the land question prior to the expiry of the Lancaster House entrenched constitutional clauses in 1990 also saw the holding of a conference in Harare in February 1990 entitled "Land Policy in Zimbabwe after Lancaster".

Original Government proposals as outlined in the Transitional National Development Plan (1982/83 to 1984/85), indicated the intention to resettle 162 000 families at a capital cost of $260 million during the Plan period (Zimbabwe, 1982b). However, this figure has not been reached. By the middle of 1984, only 28 600 families had been resettled on some 1,78 million hectares, or 43 per cent of the land estimated in 1982 as under-utilized (Zinyama, 1986a). Financing was to come from a variety of sources, via the Overseas Development Aid programme (British Government), the African Development Fund, and the European Economic Community. The Kuwait and the Dutch Governments also committed funds.

Between November 1980 and June 1982 some 15 000 families were resettled, the majority on Model A schemes. Table 5.1 shows that 5 282 families had been accommodated on 12 Model A schemes covering 363 000 ha by March 1982 (Kinsley, 1982). Kinsley (1982) comments that these figures suggest that roughly 10 families - day had been resettled during the first 18 months of the programme, representing approximately 25 000 people. The average holding size has been increased from 63ha to 69ha after implementation. This gives rise to concern over the amount of land that will ultimately be needed to fulfil the requirements of the government's full programme for resettlement.
The number of Model B schemes has not kept pace with that of Model A's, and there were only 26 registered agricultural producer co-operatives which had been resettled on some 40 000ha by the middle of 1984. The combined membership of these groups was much less than the planned figure of 280. (Zinyama, 1986a). More recent emphasis on producer co-operatives, which the government views as part of the socialist transformation of peasant agriculture, has seen the number of Model B schemes increase to 41 on 34 425ha accommodating 1786 families (ZANU(PF),1985). By the end of 1985 only one Model C scheme involving 155 families was in operation at Nyamasura near Mutare, growing flue-cured tobacco under the auspices of Agritex. Zinyama (1986a) indicates that another Model C scheme is being planned for the Rusitu valley in southern Manicaland and is expected to support 647 families involved with commercial dairying and coffee production.

The only progress with Model D is the initiation of a pilot scheme at Doddieburn—Manyoli in southern Matabeleland, and it is upon the lessons obtained from these schemes that the eventual adoption of the model will depend (Zimbabwe, 1983). As mentioned earlier, no Model E's have been implemented.

THE ACCELERATED RESETTLEMENT SCHEME

The accelerated resettlement programme was launched towards the end of 1981 on an "emergency basis" following a directive from the then Prime Minister in order that the resettlement programme would make some impact on the estimated 375 000 "excess" families in the Communal Areas (Mupawose and Chengu, 1982). Kinsey (1983) also notes that in essence, the accelerated resettlement is aimed at
tackling very quickly some of the serious instances of squatting. "The basic objective is to resettle as many people as possible in the shortest possible period by minimizing planning and postponing indefinitely building of all but minimum infrastructure. It is assumed that settlers will make use of the admittedly inadequate infrastructure in the adjacent communal areas" (Kinsey, 1983, p177).

Table 5.1: Model A - Intensive Resettlement Schemes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Total area (ha.)</th>
<th>Number of settlers</th>
<th>Average holding size (ha.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Planned</td>
<td>Allocated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sengwe</td>
<td>Wedza</td>
<td>9,20</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sof Source</td>
<td>Gutu</td>
<td>33,608</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umfurundu</td>
<td>Sharma</td>
<td>34,513</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukurudzi</td>
<td>Umshandwe</td>
<td>44,326</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teirwe</td>
<td>Selukwe</td>
<td>65,503</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayo/Rudza</td>
<td>Makoni</td>
<td>73,650</td>
<td>1,257</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpudzi</td>
<td>Umtali South</td>
<td>14,700</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyagundi</td>
<td>Odzi</td>
<td>7,829</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyasa</td>
<td>Inyangwa</td>
<td>11,999</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inyanga</td>
<td>Mloko</td>
<td>27,537</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vhumvu</td>
<td>Gutu</td>
<td>5,157</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urugwaza</td>
<td>Nyazandidlovu</td>
<td>36,010</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td>363,194</td>
<td>5,670</td>
<td>5,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average per scheme</td>
<td></td>
<td>30,266</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean holding size (ha.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Due, 1986, p40, after Government of Zimbabwe)

The accelerated resettlement programme is less orderly and less well-planned than the intensive resettlement programme, and makes use of scattered and often isolated commercial farms which the government has been able to purchase quickly. Funding would come essentially from the Government
of Zimbabwe (Munslow, 1985). Where farms are not adjacent to CA's, it is assumed that the settlers will be without economic services as well.

Unlike the intensive programme, the Project Report under the accelerated programme consists of little more than a standard 2-page assessment, a recommendation as to the suitability of the farm unit for resettlement and an outline plan. Once land is purchased, settlers are put on to it along the same lines as Model A or if they are already there (as in the case of squatters), the "settlers" are loosely re-organized along Model A lines. No facilities, infrastructure or other services are provided. It is intended, when time and finance permits, to later upgrade the schemes to "normal" Model A schemes.

Data in Table 5.2 shows the number of accelerated resettlement schemes completed during the first 4 months to March 1982, the average holding size of 53ha being slightly smaller than that for normal Model A's. The number of families resettled under this programme had reached 5100 by April 1983 (Kinsay, 1983).

Table 5.3 indicates the progress with settler emplacement from the inception of the Resettlement Programme to December 1984. Some 2 478 692ha of land has been purchased at a cost of $50 517 192. Of this, 2 040 068ha have been occupied by nearly 32 000 families. Figure 5.2 shows the spatial distribution of resettlement schemes.

The first half of the 1980's saw the inception and initial progress with the resettlement programme as Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 illustrate. Progress in meeting the numbers targeted for resettlement slowed after this initial "boom", with only a few farms or blocks of land becoming available for resettlement in the latter half of the decade.
TABLE 5.2: ACCELERATED RESettleMENT SCHEMES
(COMPLETED BY MARCH 1982)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Total area (ha.)</th>
<th>Number of settler-families</th>
<th>Average holding size (ha.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senyati</td>
<td>Ocçãoma</td>
<td>27,200</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyaral</td>
<td>Ocçãoma</td>
<td>9,190</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vuba</td>
<td>Uramgwe</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiware</td>
<td>Winna</td>
<td>1,273</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngamweerus</td>
<td>Chiul</td>
<td>3,575</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pehama</td>
<td>Selule</td>
<td>26,677</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sviwea</td>
<td>MZandale</td>
<td>9,489</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senyatoe</td>
<td>Inyange</td>
<td>9,165</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshipaeters</td>
<td>Mswinge</td>
<td>1,549</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bubli</td>
<td>Bubli</td>
<td>31,099</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>137,078</td>
<td>2,593</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Averages</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>13,708</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(See 'The Herald (Government), 19 March 1982.)

*The total for the individual schemes differs with the total of 128,683 given in the source.
*The total for the number of settler-families differs with the total of 2,684 given in the source.
*Based on the totals as indicated in the table.

(Source: Due, 1986, p42. After The Herald 19/03/82)

By the end of the decade the resettlement programme had resulted in 52,000 families being resettled on nearly 3 million hectares. There are a number of inter-related factors which help to explain this pattern and why the whole process slackened in the mid-1980s such that the target of resettling 152,000 families by 1984 was not reached. These are discussed in detail in the assessment of the land reform and resettlement policy provided in Chapters 7 and 8.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODEL</th>
<th>NO OF SCh. 4ES</th>
<th>PLANNED NO. OF SETTLERS</th>
<th>NO. OF FAMILIES SETTLED</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>TOTAL HECTARES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A (NORMAL INTENSIVE)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22 909</td>
<td>21 485</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1361</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>370 608 102 664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A (ACCELERATED)</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>7 687</td>
<td>7 356</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>77 624 105 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>5 243</td>
<td>2 500</td>
<td>14 618</td>
<td>44 899</td>
<td>35 023</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>94 534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 439</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>36 194</td>
<td>31 506</td>
<td>14 618</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>448 732</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Sources: ZANU(PF) 1985, p7, Zimbabwe, 1986a, p1270)
Figure 5.2: SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF RESETTLEMENT SCHEMES
The uneven progress in land purchase and resettlement is highlighted in Table 5.4.

### Table 5.4: Land Purchased for Resettlement in Zimbabwe (1980/81-1987/88)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Year</th>
<th>Land Hectares</th>
<th>Gross Purchase Price in Zimbabwe $</th>
<th>Average Price per Hectare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980/81</td>
<td>223,196</td>
<td>3,517,198</td>
<td>15.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981/82</td>
<td>900,196</td>
<td>18,803,158</td>
<td>20.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982/83</td>
<td>939,925</td>
<td>22,009,187</td>
<td>23.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983/84</td>
<td>159,866</td>
<td>4,536,166</td>
<td>28.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984/85</td>
<td>75,058</td>
<td>2,966,849</td>
<td>39.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985/86</td>
<td>86,187</td>
<td>4,444,610</td>
<td>51.57</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986/87</td>
<td>133,515</td>
<td>3,898,335</td>
<td>29.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987/88</td>
<td>20,319</td>
<td>1,874,200</td>
<td>92.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,538,262</strong></td>
<td><strong>62,049,705</strong></td>
<td><strong>24.45</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Palmer, 1990, p170)

### Summary and Conclusion

Land is a precious commodity for the vast majority of Zimbabwe's population, and was a particularly emotive issue during the Liberation Struggle. It was not surprising therefore that the redistribution of land was at the forefront of the new Government's attempts to transform Zimbabwean society. Kinsey (1982) comments that in the first eighteen months of the Resettlement Programme, Zimbabwe transferred from white to black control only 10 per cent less land than Kenya had transferred under its small-holder resettlement schemes during 15 years of independence. Indeed, by December 1984, Zimbabwe had redistributed 693 568ha more land than that which had been achieved in Kenya over 15 years (described in Chapter 2).
In this chapter an overview of both the Intensive and Accelerated Resettlement Programmes has been given, and an outline of the progress made with each. The various models under which resettlement could occur have also been described. The Intensive and Accelerated Resettlement Programmes were the initial Zimbabwe government response to the land question which it inherited at independence.

A closer and more in-depth look at how the resettlement programme has been put into practice is provided by considering a case study. The case study was chosen to highlight details of the implementation of what had been enunciated in the policy documents, and finally to ascertain what impact this had both for the resettled farmer and the economy of Zimbabwe as a whole.
CHAPTER 6

CASE STUDY - THE SOVI SOURCE MODEL A RESSETLEMENT SCHEME

"The African landscape is littered with the remnants of failed agricultural schemes" (Hill, 1978, p25).

"He who controls the countryside, controls the country" (Huntington, 1968, p292).

INTRODUCTION

As outlined in the previous Chapter, one of the responses of the newly elected Zimbabwe Government to the land question, together with the overcrowding and continued deterioration of the FTLs, was the Intensive Resettlement and Accelerated Resettlement Programmes of 1980 and 1981 respectively.

The resettlement programme incorporated a number of design models which relate to the different types of agricultural production systems being utilized. Detailed descriptions of these models are contained in the previous chapter. The decision to utilise more than one option for the resettlement process reflects the need for flexibility and diversity in the agricultural production systems to suit the different ecological regions of Zimbabwe. The general approach has been that the government would not coerce people to support any one of the model options. However, in practice Model A has the support of the British Government (perhaps for ideological reasons) and because of its familiarity with the settlers, Model A (intensive village settlements with individual arable allotments and communal grazing areas) enjoys the widest support and has been applied on the widest scale.
This Chapter will focus on a discussion of a Model A resettlement scheme in the centre of the country onto which some 661 families have been resettled since 1981, making this scheme not only the oldest, but also one of the largest schemes in the country. The objective of the case study is to determine the impact of the resettlement scheme on land-use planning within the Natural Region III in Zimbabwe, concentrating on the changes in agrarian structure from extensive farming to a more semi-intensive, mixed system of agriculture. The spatial impact and the organizational structures of the scheme, together with the transition to more "socialist" forms of agricultural production will also be examined. The options and perceptions of both the settlers and those of the implementing agents are investigated. Finally, the scheme is evaluated against the original criteria for the Resettlement Programmes, including political, economic and social factors in order to determine the relative merits the scheme itself, and the Resettlement Programme as a whole.

THE STUDY AREA

The Soti Source Resettlement Scheme is located in the Gutu District, and lies 75Km north east of Masvingo (formerly Fort Victoria) and 20Km north east of Gutu in Masvingo (formerly Victoria) province (see Figure 6.1). It was originally the intention to resettle 530 families into 38 villages and two collective farm groups. The families intended for resettlement were from the Gutu District and included some former farm labourers. The area lies on granite sandveld with adequate, but variable rainfall and was already partially cleared for cultivation. Sotl Source consists largely of Model A resettlement, each family being given a permit to utilize 5 hectares of demarcated State Land for arable use, 8 livestock units on a communal grazing area and a 0,5 hectare government ploughed initial arable
area to produce their subsistence needs. The net expected income of a resettled family was approximately $400 per annum. Schools, clinics and service centres were planned. The total cost of establishing the scheme was $1 448 000 or $2 732 per resettler. The land acquisition cost amounted to $710 150 and original development costs were estimated at $737 000 (Conex, 1981). The study area together with some aspects of the planned developments following resettlement, is shown in Figure 6.2.

Adjacent to the Soti Source Resettlement Scheme is the Vimvi Resettlement Scheme. Developed somewhat later than Soti Source, this scheme comprises 6 former commercial farms of 5 210 hectares and it was planned to resettle 80 families on the scheme. For the purposes of this discussion, Vimvi will be included as part of the Soti Source Resettlement Scheme. New recurrent costs were minimal as these were already provided by the main scheme. The land acquisition cost was $109 410 with development costs estimated at $43 200. The total costs amounted to $178 570 or $2 232 per family (Conex, 1982).

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

Soti Source lies at an altitude varying between 1200 metres above sea level in the south to 1480 metres in the north. The topography is characterized by the undulating granite sandveld with open vleis with the occasional outcrops in the south becoming more dissected in the north and west. The geology is composed almost entirely of granite, with small areas of schist and dolerite. Despite four current mining claims, there are no known deposits of any economic value. The soils are almost all granite derived sandveld types, being paraferrallitic, with some dolerite and metavolcanics. The soils are moderately shallow to moderately deep overlying loamy sand and sandy loam subsoils. At Vimvi
Figure 6.1: LOCATION OF SOTI SOURCE RESETTLEMENT SCHEME

(Source: After Department of Conservation and Extension, 1981 and Stitz and Weyl, 1988, p9)
there is a belt of heavy textured contact soils on Donodzo. With an average depth of 0.5 to 1.0 metres, with common quartz and lateritic gravel layers, permeability is rapid but poor drainage frequently occurs in the lower profile. Slopes are between 2 and 6 per cent. Dendritic drainage occurs outwards from the central watershed by the Devure, Soti and Nyamaturi rivers. At Vimvi the rivers drain north-easterly to the Sebakwe and Nyaswidzi Rivers. Rivers are perennial and surface water can be found in pools.

The soils are highly erodible when exposed by cultivation or overgrazing and sheetwash is evident even on the flattest areas. Serious gully erosion occurs in the steeper riverine slopes of the Devure and Matsai Rivers.

The average summer temperature in summer is 24°C, with a minimum of 14°C. This falls to 7°C in July, with an average of 11 frost occurrences per annum at a minimum of -2°C. Evaporation exceeds precipitation in all months except December, January and February. The average annual precipitation varies from 744mm at Soti Source to 800mm at Vimvi, but at 35% the co-efficient of variability is high. The average season length of only 120 days with 9 dry and 15 rainy periods reflects the high risk of mid-season dry spells especially in late January.

Ironically, in spite of the dry spell tendencies, cloud cover is high from January to March, and these months average four or five two-day spells of guti5 a month. The chances of hail occurring in the area are lower than in many other parts of the country.

5 guti - continuous drizzle
The dominant vegetation is indigenous Brachystegia/Julbernardia woodland, much of which had already been cut down prior to resettlement. Ridges with Parinari curatellifolia are common and Uapaca Kirkiana and Montea glaber characterize areas of gravelly soil. Small secondary regrowth occurs with sparse grass beneath the trees being slow to recover. The apparently open vleis between the wooded ridges are seasonally waterlogged, have been cropped in the past, heavily grazed and frequently burnt.

The Resettlement area lies in Natural Region III towards the border with Natural Region IV. The area is suited to semi-extensive livestock production supported by drought resistant (fodder) crops rather than to arable production (Conex, 1981 and 1982).

AVAILABLE INFRASTRUCTURE PRIOR TO RESETTLEMENT

Soti Source Resettlement Scheme has been developed on an open area previously occupied by 33 commercial farms (see Figure 6.2). As far as Vimvi is concerned, the total area was formerly run as one ranch which was divided into 6 farming units. All these areas had been purchased for resettlement in terms of the conditions which prevailed in the Lancaster House Constitution (see Chapter 5). At the time of purchase, all the farms had been vacant for some time and the available infrastructure either derelict or in varying degrees of disrepair.

The former farmsteads consisted of homesteads, barns, workshops and ancillary buildings. In most cases only the shells remain, in some cases with door and window frames, or roof timbers, but the majority consist of standing walls only. The same condition applies to the stores which formerly served these areas. Some of the buildings are repairable, but most are being used as a source of bricks by the new settlers.
Figure 6.2: Soti Source Resettlement Scheme - Planned Development
There are approximately 100km of former council roads constructed and formerly maintained by the Gutu-Chatsworth Rural Council. At the time of resettlement these were in a reasonable condition with bridges and culverts intact. These are earth and gravel roads providing access to all former farms. They are subject to short periods of flooding after heavy rains. In addition there are a number of internal roads and tracks. The main Gutu - Buhera road crosses the south-eastern portion of the resettlement area. The area lies 80km from the nearest railhead at Chatsworth. There is no eastern access, but a track leads from Vimvi to the adjacent communal area.

All the former farms were demarcated by surveyed beacons and boundary fences. A large amount of internal fencing did exist, but little remained at the time of resettlement, although most fence lines were visible (Connex, 1981).

Water was supplied by means of boreholes and surface water. Boreholes supplied domestic water on some farms. Yields were low, of the order of 500 - 1500 litres per hour, which is characteristic of granite country. There are at least 28 small dams or weirs, some requiring attention. Nine of the dams are in excess of 100 000m³ capacity, the largest being 2093 000m³ at Uithoek on Vimvi. Water rights are known to exist, although some have since lapsed. Some 25ha of tobacco had been irrigated on sandy soils at Uithoek.

There are seventeen dips at Soti Source and one on Vimvi. Varying degrees of damage had been sustained, but most were repairable. Contour ridges, storm drains and waterways previously existed on arable lands but lack of maintenance has caused erosion in some cases.

Telephone party lines previously served the areas but were destroyed prior to resettlement. Most of the poles remain,
with some being being twisted or pulled out. The area was never served by reticulated electricity, the nearest connection being at Felixburg, about 50km away. The farm diesel generators which served the area had been removed or destroyed.

Marketing and services in the area were formally provided at Gutu, where district commercial and government services are available. Higher order services are provided at Masvingo, which is also the provincial capital. Prior to the establishment of the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) at Gutu, grain was sent to Masvingo. Cattle were sent to the Chatsworth sale pens.

**TECHNICAL APPRAISAL**

In terms of normal commercial farming, the total arable land available at Soti Source (excluding roads, conservation works, etc.) would be 13 100ha and an Annual Cropping Area of 5 800ha. However, for resettlement purposes, Class IVw (see Annexure F for a detailed outline of Land Classification Classes) is regarded as grazing land, and each settler would thus have 7 hectares gross arable within which to obtain his 5 hectares net arable allotment. The arable requirement is therefore 3 710 hectares (530 x 7ha), which leaves 10 400 potentially arable hectares available for grazing. Together with the remaining grazing area, this gives a potential carrying capacity of 4 250 livestock units (1 livestock unit equals 500 Kg liveweight, or approximately one full grown beast or 5 small stock).

The cropping potential of the area is a function of the environmental characteristics, combined with the requirement of possible crops and the level of management. At Soti Source the variability of rainfall, short season length, mid-season dry spells, guti, daily temperatures below
optimum and leached soils with low waterholding capacity are examples of physical factors which restrict the overall cropping potential.

The crops for this area need to be short-seasoned, drought-resistant varieties, such as the maize R201 hybrid (135 days to maturity). Maize yields are affected by dry spells, especially at the tasselling and filling out periods. Sorghum is conversely affected by guti and cloudy spells, which leads to leaf disease. Traditional crops such as millet and rapoko (finger millet) can do well. Groundnuts are suited by soil texture but adversely affected by the low soil pH, trace elements and guti weather. While oriental tobacco, as a cash crop, is well suited by the physical and cultural conditions, the marketing constraints affects potential.

The level of management, with related levels of financial inputs, also has a major effect on cropping potentials. This is highlighted by Conex (1981) in Table 6.1, which compares various yields for the Gutu area under different forms of management.

**TABLE 6.1: AVERAGE YIELDS IN THE GUTU AREA (Kg/1ha)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Makaholi Research Station</th>
<th>Gutu-Large Scale</th>
<th>Nyaswidi-Small-Scale Commercial</th>
<th>Gutu-TTL</th>
<th>Resettlement Budget Yields</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>1 950</td>
<td>1 275</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Nuts</td>
<td>750 (Shelled)</td>
<td>1 500</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>250 ?</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>4 000</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>500 ?</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapoko</td>
<td>2 500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>400 ?</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Grasslands)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oriental</td>
<td>2 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* 3 year AIP average for Region III
Research yields from trial plots are rarely attainable under farm conditions, as the above table illustrates. The large-scale commercial, small-scale commercial and TTL (now CA) yields illustrate the differences resulting from management and financing, rather than physical conditions. This has a significant bearing on the expectations and viability of farmers following resettlement. The resettlement budget yields, based on local Purchase Area (now SSIF) averages, are deliberately conservative and realistic. Conex (1981) felt that the better farmers would be able to exceed them. In addition to the major crops Conex (1981) feels that traditional crops such as rice, nyimbo beans, sweet potatoes and wheat could be grown at Soti Source.

The livestock potential results from the characteristics of the physical environment, combined with those of possible livestock types and the level of management. Vegetation can generally be described as sour- veld with adequate but poor winter grazing. The predominant trees provide little in the way of browse, while the grasses are fast-growing but are of moderate palatability to stock. Some winter grazing is available according to the land classification type and crop residues will be available. The area is well supplied with widely distributed perennial water sources, enabling the grazing to be fully utilized. The sand soils are, however, highly susceptible to erosion by stock concentration along fence lines at water points and dips.

The area is suited to cattle for the production of beef, and for resettlement farmers, of draught animals, manure and small quantities of milk and meat for home consumption. It is not suited for dairy cattle by either location or physical conditions. The area is not particularly favourable for small stock, although sheep are better suited than goats, for whom little palatable browse exists. The level of veld and stock management will be critical to a sustained level of livestock production.
The individual ownership of stock in combination with communally managed grazing on state-owned land raises the critical issue of control. According to the Soti Source Resettlement Scheme Project Report (Conex, 1981), the excess animals would be marketed. Should this not take place, action by the Lands Inspectorate may be required to prevent the loss of the basic resources of soil and water on which the scheme depends.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

In planning for the development of the resettlement scheme, a financial evaluation is prepared for the Project Report and undertaken by the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA). In the case of Soti Source, a financial evaluation was compiled for crop production, livestock production, a cash-flow summary of farmers and a return on labour.

In terms of the crop production, a build-up of beans, maize and groundnuts was forecast over three years. Only three out of the five hectare arable allocation should be utilized for cropping in any one year, with two hectares assumed to be fallow. Maize was forecast to be the dominant crop, utilizing 2,0ha with the remaining hectare being equally divided between beans and groundnuts (Conex, 1981, p10). The Gross Margins per hectare were calculated as shown in Table 6.2.

In addition to the above, the target cropping income levels for the three crops in question were calculated in which the value of production, variable costs and the net value of crops sales are determined for the initial three year period.
TABLE 6.2 : GROSS MARGINS PER HECTARE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Maize</th>
<th>Groundnuts</th>
<th>Beans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yield Price</td>
<td>$118/t</td>
<td>$0.378/Kg</td>
<td>$0.4/Kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.5t</td>
<td>400Kg</td>
<td>550Kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROSS INCOME</td>
<td>$117</td>
<td>$151</td>
<td>$220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable Costs:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertilizer</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecticide</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seasonal Credit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inoculation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROSS MARGIN</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Per HA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Conex, 1981, p10)

For livestock production, each settler is allocated grazing rights for eight livestock units (LU). Assuming that each settler has 5 head of cattle in the first year, ARDA projects that target herd numbers should be reached after nine years and target cattle production after ten years, by which time the value of having a capital appreciation of $776 (Conex, 1981, p13). The build-up to reaching the target cattle income is shown in Table 6.3.

TABLE 6.3 : BUILD-UP TO TARGET CATTLE INCOME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Number of Cattle</th>
<th>Value of Sales</th>
<th>Variable Costs ($)</th>
<th>Net Value of Cattle Production ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The value of labour inputs is calculated on a 6 hour working day. This was assumed to be $1.63. If an eight hour day was worked the return per labour day would be $2.17. ARDA based the allocation of labour according to the following breakdown:

1) arable: maize 86 labour days per annum
groundnuts 42
beans 30
Total 158

2) livestock 171 labour days per annum

3) miscellaneous 1000

**TOTAL LABOUR DAYS-PER ANNUM** 1329 on all activities (Conex, 1981, p14).

Finally a summary of farmers' expected cashflow is prepared, utilizing all the components mentioned above. This forecast is based on ARDA projections and is modified according to the particular natural and physical circumstances in which the scheme is situated. The summary of the resettled farmers cash flow (Table 6.3) provides an indication of the expected financial inputs and income derived from agricultural activities on the scheme and is important in ascertaining the viability of the scheme as a whole.

From Table 6.4 it can be seen that the target total income (year 10) from all sources, and including overhead costs, is expected to be $534.

**PLANNED PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT**

As part of the planning and siting of initial developments on a resettlement scheme the proposals for the development of villages, service centres, and physical infrastructure development are contained in the project report prepared by Conex. This section is based on the "Recommendations for siting and initial development of villages on land intended for resettlement" as prepared by Conex and subsequently approved by the Department of Physical Planning within the
Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement. This section of the project report provides an overview of the intended development on the resettlement scheme, as well as providing a detailed cost break-down of the anticipated expenditure. Together with the Technical Appraisal and the Financial Aspects, the Physical Planning Section combines to provide the Department of Physical Planning with an overview of the proposed developments on any particular resettlement scheme.

In the recommendations proposed by Conex (1930) for the development of villages at resettlement schemes, it is outlined that these villages are at the bottom of the settlement hierarchy. The so-called farm village does not have any commercial or government functions, though in some cases it may be adjacent to a Business Centre. Ideally these villages should have no less than 20 families in order to allow for the provision of basic services at present and allow for their improvement later. Villages may have to be smaller where, for example, arable land is scattered or where physical barriers intervene. An upper limit of 50 families is set by distance to available arable land and by potential water supply. The village population should therefore be about 150 to 350 people.

The recommendations for the siting of these villages include a distance of not more than 3km from arable lands, which should be accessible at all seasons. The village should be on a crest or spur on well drained soils and should be not less than 500m from any dam or weir. Where possible, the site should be large enough for contiguous layout, undivided by streams, outcrops or through roads. Furthermore, the proposed site should not be situated on any mining claim, be within 200m of a main road or within 150m of a communal water point. Schools or centres of business activity should be close by. Provision is also made in the recommendations
for drainage and slope variances. It is recognized that not all of these criteria can be met at all possible sites, but they are intended as practical guidelines. It is the intention that the majority of the settlers on the schemes will be concentrated in such villages, allowing for the rationalisation of land holdings and provision of basic services to the widest number most efficiently.

In terms of services provided, the water supply point should not be within 150m of the village until full reticulation to all sites is available, although in most cases this is not envisaged over the short-term. A hand-pump should deliver up to 500 litres an hour on a shallow well but only 250 litres on a deep borehole. In order to maintain fuel supplies, communal woodlots should be established at the rate of 0.5ha per family. In the short term timber from land clearance and collecting will be available in most cases.

With regard to sanitation, each settler will be responsible for digging a pit latrine on his residential site. This will be to a design accepted by the Ministry of Health. At the time of writing the Blair VIP latrines had been recommended although still in the experimental stage, and have subsequently been frequently used.

In terms of government policy, communal toilets are unacceptable and septic tanks are too expensive, hence the preference for pit latrines.

---

Ventilation Improved Pit Latrines of the type designed by the Blair Research Institute near Harare.
### TABLE 6.4: SUMMARY OF FARMERS' CASH FLOW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cropping Income ($)</th>
<th>Cattle Income ($)</th>
<th>Less Overheads ($)</th>
<th>Net Cash Income ($)</th>
<th>Value of Retentions ($)</th>
<th>Value of Livestock Appreciation ($)</th>
<th>TOTAL INCOME ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>534</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Conex, 1981, p15)
The residential farm villages should be clearly distinguished in form and function from:

i) A Growth Point: usually a large (Grade 1 or 2 urban centre) established Business Centre, planned to grow into a small town. In terms of the National Five Year Development Plan (Zimbabwe, 1986b) there are approximately 20 growth points in Zimbabwe, of which Gutu itself is the nearest example to Soti Source.

ii) A Rural Service Centre: this is usually a Grade I Business Centre which has been serving an area of 300 - 500Km² and a population of 5 000 to 15 000 people over a radius of 8 to 15Km. The Whitsun Foundation (Whitsun Foundation, 1978) recommended 250 such centers in the country, of which Soti Source will have access to one at Gabi, which is to be built from scratch.

iii) A Business Centre: this is the usual former TTL business centre serving 5 000 people and unlikely to grow much from the present dozen or so functions it provides, such as a general dealer, mill, etc. There are approximately 3 000 in Zimbabwe. At Soti Source, there could be probably two such centres at Riverside (old Jernje store), and at Trafalgar, with the possibility of a third at Airlies to be developed in the future.

The Soti Source Project Report (Conex, 1981) points out that at the time of planning the physical infrastructure there were no stores in the resettlement area. It was felt that with the provision of government services on the scheme, the core would be created for the development of a Rural Service Centre. In addition to the school, clinic, government offices of the settlement extension officer, veterinary and consequent housing, the following functions are identified by Conex to be provided for in the development of the scheme, inter alia, general dealer, mill, butcher, eating house, carpenter, GMB buyer, credit agency, public telephone, postal agency, beerhall, sportsfield, political party office. These initial functions imply approximately 50 residential families, or a base population of 250 people.
The provision of a physical layout, stands for lease or purchase and the location of basic services is necessary in order to prevent the individual elements from becoming scattered and losing the advantage of being located together. In terms of the Project Report (Conex, 1981), neither the commercial nor government services should be allowed to locate outside the Rural Service Centre or Business Centres. The physical advantages in providing services will be increased, as will the economic and social advantages in terms of agglomeration. In short, a hub of rural life with an effect far greater than its apparent size is envisaged to contribute to the general success of the resettlement scheme. The Business Centre at Trafalgar and Riverside will provide lower order services only, such as the general dealer, mill and single stream school. Higher order services should only be allowed to locate at them in the early stages and then later at the Rural Service Centre. It is envisaged that once a social and commercial pattern has become apparent, more flexibility can then be allowed (Conex, 1980). Land tenure within these centres should be either long lease or freehold.

INITIAL PROJECT BUDGET

In drawing up the Soti Source Project Report, a project budget is calculated. Within this budget all the financial estimates for the costs of the physical development of the resettlement scheme and the provision of services are compiled into a total project budget. This budget provides an overall estimation of the expenditure involved, recurrent costs, an internal rate of return and finally the average cost per settler on the scheme.

The initial project budget for Soti Source (including Vimvi extension) as prepared by ARDA for the Project Report (Conex, 1981) was as follows:

- 128 -
SOTI SOURCE PROJECT BUDGET

- Physical developments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land acquisition at $21/ha (actual cost)</td>
<td>$710 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vimvi extension</td>
<td>109 410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads (157 km at $250/Km)</td>
<td>8 750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Water supplies in terms of priorities was required for domestic uses, stock-watering and agricultural uses. Initially an average figure of $3000 per borehole is used, but repairs to existing sources and the provision of new supplies requires detailed on-site costing of individual cases. 126 000

Fencing is required to restore boundary fences and provide basic internal paddocking. Labour is to be provided by the settlers. Average cost is $400 per kilometre. 138 000

Dips. Repairs to existing dips at $3000 a dip for 6 dips on Sotì and one at Vimvi. 21 000

Demarcation and survey of the residential and arable sites for each village. 18 400

Land Preparation: 0.5ha initial arable per family to be ploughed under government contract for the first season only at $50 per ha. 15 000

- Services

Government housing and offices are required in the initial stages for

1 Land Settlement Officer | 18 000
1 Land Settlement Clerk | 8 000
1 Land Settlement Orderly | 4 000
1 Veterinary Attendant | 8 000
3 Extension Assistants | 24 000
1 Co-ops Officer | 8 000

Most of these are planned to be located at the Rural Service Centre in the centre of the scheme. 70 000

Crop sheds, storage facilities, etc. 10 000

Telephone Restoration (One party line from Gatu and extension to Vimvi) 123
Schools - on the basis of 2,4 school age children per family (1270 children), 1 two-stream school and 2 single-stream schools are required. With the incorporation of Vimvi, a further single-stream school is planned at Uithoek. Assistance is required for

28 Classrooms  56 000
28 Teachers houses  28 000
3 Headmasters houses  3 000
School at Uithoek  12 000  82 000

Clinic at Gabi with Village Health Workers at Trafalgar and Riverside  40 000

Rural Service Centre and Business Centres. Although much of the development at the Rural Service Centre at Gabi is costed under government buildings or is the responsibility of the private sector, certain costs for the outlay of sites, survey etc. must be provided for.  45 000

Electricity is not planned or costed.

In compiling the total project budget, cognizance is also taken of recurrent costs. Recurrent costs for the scheme include those for maintenance (of roads, hand pumps, dips and building, etc.) and also for remuneration of the government employees on the scheme. The hard and soft recurrent costs for the scheme are shown in Table 6.5. There were no new soft recurrent costs with the inclusion of Vimvi in the scheme.

A summary of the total development costs for the Scheme is given in Table 6.5.
### TABLE 6.5: SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENT COSTS - 1981 PRICES IN ZIMBABWE DOLLARS ($)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Soti Source</th>
<th>Vim'vi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land acquisition</td>
<td>$710,150</td>
<td>$109,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>$35,000</td>
<td>$3,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Supplies</td>
<td>$114,000</td>
<td>$12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fencing</td>
<td>$120,000</td>
<td>$18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dips</td>
<td>$18,000</td>
<td>$3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demarcation and Survey</td>
<td>$16,000</td>
<td>$2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Preparation</td>
<td>$13,000</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>$87,000</td>
<td>$12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinic</td>
<td>$40,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing and Offices</td>
<td>$70,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Service Centre</td>
<td>$45,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>$125</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Implementation Consultancy (20%)</td>
<td>$113,000</td>
<td>$10,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingencies (10%)</td>
<td>$57,000</td>
<td>$5,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL DEVELOPMENT COSTS</strong></td>
<td><strong>737,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>53,200</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL COST</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,448,273</strong></td>
<td><strong>178,570</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COST PER RESETTLER</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,732</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,232</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SCHEME TOTALS (SOTI SOURCE PLUS VIMVI)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Costs</th>
<th>$790,200</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Costs</td>
<td>$1,626,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COST PER RESETTLER</strong></td>
<td><strong>$2,666</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Sources: Conex, 1981, p23 and Conex, 1982, p6)
TABLE 5.6 : HARD AND SOFT RECURRENT COSTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HARD (PHYSICAL) COSTS (not applicable year 1)</th>
<th>TOTAL COST</th>
<th>MAINTENANCE COST PER ANNUM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings - Co-operative</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>7 020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Settlement Officer House</td>
<td>18 000</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Extension Assistance Houses</td>
<td>24 000</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical Assistant's House</td>
<td>8 000</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Health Assistant's House</td>
<td>8 000</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-op Assistant's House</td>
<td>8 000</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Orderly's House</td>
<td>4 000</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL HARD RECURRENT COSTS                    |            | 8 620                     |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOFT RECURRENT COSTS</th>
<th>SALARY</th>
<th>BONDS</th>
<th>MEDICAL AID</th>
<th>TRANSPORT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land Settlement Officer (X1)</td>
<td>9 168</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>2 124</td>
<td>12 317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical Assistant (X1)</td>
<td>1 980</td>
<td>178</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Orderly (X1)</td>
<td>1 080</td>
<td>97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension Assistants (X3)</td>
<td>7 452</td>
<td>672</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 334</td>
<td>10 458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Health Assistant (X1)</td>
<td>2 484</td>
<td>224</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 720</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL SOFT RECURRENT COSTS                   | 22 164     | 1 971 | 225         | 4 482     | 28 842  |

TOTAL RECURRENT COSTS                        |            |       |             |           | $37 462 |

(Sources : Conex, 1981, p26-27; Conex, 1982, p8)
The final portion of the project budget is devoted to the Economic Sensitivity Analysis and determining the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) based on a number of assumptions. These assumptions are based on labour costs, yields and infrastructure cost increases, such that costs and benefits may increase or decrease according to different scenarios. A summary of the sensitivity analysis for Soti Source and Vimvi is given below:

**Sensitivity Analysis - Soti Source**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumption</th>
<th>IRR (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Costs increase 10%</td>
<td>12.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits decrease 10%</td>
<td>11.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs up 10% and benefits down 10%</td>
<td>9.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sensitivity Analysis - Vimvi**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumption</th>
<th>IRR (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour shadow prices at 50% of minimum wage for 24 working days/month</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four year yield build-up to 100%</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs up 10% and benefits down 10%</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A sensitivity analysis is an approach which uses alternative assumptions, one at a time, to demonstrate that all the alternative assumptions lead to essentially the same inference(s), in this instance the IRR (Eatwell *et al.*, 1987). The IRR gives an indication of the economic value of the project in terms of the potential returns for the investment made. In terms of the IRRs obtained for the various assumptions made above, the higher the IRR the greater the potential return, and therefore project feasibility, in the long term.

**CONCLUSION**

The Project Report for resettlement at Soti Source, as outlined above, indicates the resettlement model for the
scheme. The physical conditions at the scheme are described together with the infrastructure available at the time of resettlement. The remainder of the Project Report is devoted to appraising the technical and financial aspects of the envisaged resettlement.

The pre-implementation project reports, like that for Soti Source just discussed, were often not representative of reality and the progress with actual resettlement at Soti Source and the Case Study investigation results are provided in the next Chapter. The results of this investigation are then assessed against the objectives and aspirations as enunciated in the Resettlement Policy, as described in Chapter 3.
CHAPTER 7

CASE STUDY SURVEY RESULTS

"One major impact of Zimbabwe's agricultural strategy has been to intensify historical processes of uneven regional development" (Weiner, 1989, p406).

"Resettlement is in fact leading to more intensive and quite productive land use" (Stoneman and Cliffe, 1989, p133).

INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 6 an overview of the Project Report for the resettlement scheme at Soti Source giving indications of the conditions prevailing at Soti Source at the time of resettlement was provided, together with an overview of the natural potential, projected crop yields and the anticipated financial viability of the resettled farmers. In this chapter, the historical development, implementation, functioning and assessment of the resettlement scheme at Soti Source is examined. The discussion is organized into four sections. In the first section the survey methodology is described. This is followed by an overview of the process of resettlement and the actual implementation and establishment of the scheme. Details of the agricultural activities of the settlers are then discussed. In the final section an evaluation for Soti Source is undertaken, comparing the performance of the scheme against the goals outlined in the Project Report and against the broader development objectives of resettlement in Zimbabwe.

METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

As indicated in Chapter 6, some 661 families have been resettled at Soti Source since 1981. The majority of the settlers were resettled during 1981 according to the Model A
Resettlement Scheme proposals as outlined in the Zimbabwe Government policy paper, "Resettlement Programme: policies and procedures" (Zimbabwe, 1981b). In addition, the following criteria were also used in the process of settler selection for Soti Source:

a) The applicant for resettlement is effectively landless (i.e. has too little land to support him/herself and dependents);

b) Is unemployed (including spouse);

c) Is poor. The intention is to reach the rural poor and not, as other development programmes have done, benefit the rural rich. This is a subjective criteria and no empirical basis is given to describing what is meant by "poor";

d) Is aged between 20 to 55 years in order to make productive use of the land made available;

e) Is married or widowed with dependants. Widows or unmarried women with dependents are allocated land in their own right as there is no sexual discrimination;

f) The settler must be prepared to give up all claims to possible land rights in the Communal Areas;

g) Returned Zimbabwean refugees are to be accorded special consideration (Zimbabwe, 1983).

The case study investigation at Soti Source was undertaken during July 1987 when a total of 65 respondents were interviewed as part of a random sample of the resettled farmers on the scheme. The interviews were carried out utilizing a questionnaire survey. This method was chosen as being the most effective means to obtain responses relating to specific (pre-determined) variables. The interviews were carried out by the author, with the assistance of the Resettlement Officer, Mr SMB Manhivi and the resettlement Health Officer. These two officials were involved in order to assist with explaining the purpose of the interview and to assist with translation where necessary.
The questionnaire (Annexure G) was compiled with the assistance of rural development researchers at the Development Bank of Southern Africa, based on investigation: being carried out in similar situations elsewhere in Southern Africa. Since there was no opportunity to carry out a control investigation to test the questionnaire, the initial 5 respondents interviewed at Soti Source were viewed as the control and the questionnaire evaluated accordingly. As a result a number of questions contained in the original questionnaire were not asked in subsequent interviews.

The 65 respondents who were subsequently interviewed were all permit holders (ie. the land had been allocated in their names and they can be regarded as household heads) and represented a 10 per cent sample of the 661 resettled families. Respondents from both Soti Source and Vimvi schemes were interviewed. Prior to the individual interviews, a lengthy interview was held with the Resettlement Officer responsible for the overall administration of the scheme.

These questions related to the role of women in decision-making (question 3a and 3b on page 3) and those questions relating to the type of land holding and land use (first half of question 4 on page 5). The reason for this decision is that the answers to these questions would all be the same. Traditional influences are important with regard to women, and in a homogeneous, traditional society the answers would be similar. In terms of the land holdings question, the settlers have to renounce all claims to other land holdings once they have been accepted for resettlement and consequently the question becomes irrelevant.
Resettlement Schemes do not fall under any existing local government system in Zimbabwe since they are on State Land under the jurisdiction of the Rural Land Act (hence the Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development). The Government realizes they are special cases which require more direct central government control than those areas where a local authority system already exists. The Resettlement Officer is the government's primary representative on a scheme. For Model A schemes such as Soti Source, there should be one Resettlement Officer for every 50 families. The Resettlement Officer in turn is responsible to the Chief Resettlement Officer in the Department of Rural Development, through a Senior Resettlement Officer at provincial level (Zimbabwe, 1981b and Interview with Resettlement Officer).

The discussion in this chapter deals with the survey and interview results of the investigation at the Sotu Source Model A Resettlement Scheme in the Gutu District of Zimbabwe. An attempt will be made to ascertain the benefits and progress of resettlement in Zimbabwe at both a local and national level. This will be linked to questions of agricultural development in post-Independence Zimbabwe.

In addition to interviews with the settlers and the Resettlement Officer on the scheme itself, discussions were held with a number of other officials regarding the performance of Sotu Source. These officials included Mr J Nyoni of the Department of Rural Development, within the Ministry of Agriculture, Lands and Rural Development, in Harare; Mr Mukivimbra of the AFC and Mr Vengesa of Agritex in Masvingo. Furthermore, informal discussions were held with representatives of a number of non-government organisations working in Masvingo province and Gutu district in particular (a full list of officials visited during the study is given in Annexure H).
Supporting documentation such as the Annual Reports of the AFRC and Agri teased, Agricultural Census of Resettlement Schemes, and other evaluations of resettlement schemes (such as Zimbabwe, 1985b; Stils and Weyl, 1986, Zimbabwe, 1986c; Zinyama et al, 1990) have also been used.

THE PROCESS OF RESETTLEMENT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SCHEME

Settler selection and administration of the resettlement process is the responsibility of the Chief Resettlement Officer. Selection is determined according to the objectives of the Intensive Resettlement Programme as described at the beginning of this section. The resettlement process began with the distribution of Resettlement Forms to potential settlers via District Councils. The Resettlement Officer then travelled through the area to explain the Resettlement Policy and to assist potential settlers in completing the forms. These forms were then returned to the District Councils. At implementation, the Resettlement Officer and District Councillor were responsible for selecting the settlers for the scheme from the previously prepared list of qualified applicants.

In the selection process for resettlement at Soti Source, 1000 forms were initially made available to the District Council. Initially only 528 applicants were settled at Soti Source (1980/81) with the remainder being settled in 1985, making a total of 661 families being resettled on the scheme. An additional two farms were set aside for a Model B scheme, although due to local resistance this has not been implemented. Once it has been confirmed that an applicant is eligible for resettlement, it is the responsibility of the Resettlement Officer to allocate a site and to physically show the applicant the village site and arable
lands. A date was then nominated by which the settlers were to have moved onto their stands. A period of time was given to allow the settlers time to wind up their affairs in the CAs while simultaneously establishing him/herself in their new environment.

The Resettlement Officer pointed out that the land allocations are made for life. Although the land is owned by the Government and no title deeds are involved, the permit (see Annexure A) entitles the holder to utilize the 5 hectare allocation, together with the communal grazing allocation, for life. The permit can be inherited in the event of the death of the present incumbent. In this event, normally the widow or eldest son would inherit the permit. Should the family choose not to inherit the permit, the State would then be responsible for the re-allocation of the holding to a new permit holder.

In establishing a profile of the settlers who had actually been resettled at Sotli Source, 65 settlers were interviewed at random in June 1987. Of the respondents, 86 per cent were male and 14 per cent female. The actual number of female permit holders on the scheme is not known because no differentiation based on gender is noted in the scheme's records. The average age of the respondents was 44 years, with the youngest being 24 and the oldest, 68 years old. The majority of the respondents were in the 36 - 45 year age group. At Sotli Source the majority of the settlers were from the adjacent CAs or former farm labourers (see Table 7.1). Some of the former commercial farm labourers were originally from Malawi, but had subsequently taken out Zimbabwean citizenship. Only two permit holders were returning refugees who had been displaced during the liberation war prior to independence. With the exception of the Malawians, all the settlers are Shona speaking. Although having allegiance to one or other of a number of
affiliates or sub-groups, all can be considered as belonging to the Mashona tribal group. As the Resettlement Officer pointed out, "Masvingo is a one-party province" - a direct relationship to the ethnic and tribal division of the major political parties in Zimbabwe at the time of interview. The political party in question is the ruling ZANU (PF) of President Mugabe.

At the time of resettlement all applicants were destitute and without any formal means of livelihood. The government assisted the settlers in moving; they were given transport to the scheme, and in the first agricultural season the settlers were given a crop pack, ploughs and fertilizers. There was no obligation on the part of the settlers to repay any of these costs, as they are considered part of the initial development costs. However, after their first agricultural season, the farmers were considered to be "resettled" and had to rely on their own resources to make a living. Nonetheless, credit is available through the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) and extension assistance and advice from Agritex.

The origins of the respondents interviewed is shown in Table 7.1. The majority are from the Gutu District in which the Scheme is situated, with the second highest number originating in the adjacent Chivu District. Of all those interviewed, only 6 per cent were not from Masvingo Province.

In determining the backgrounds from which the settlers originated, an attempt was made to determine what facilities were available to the permit holder prior to the move to Soti Source. An indication was sought also of the land holding which the settler and his family would have had access to. This analysis was undertaken in order to ascertain whether the primary objective of resettlement -
improving access to land of the rural poor - has been achieved. Tables 7.2 and 7.3 indicate the responses to questions relating to the previous facilities and land holdings available to Soti Source permit holders.

**TABLE 7.1: ORIGINS OF RESPONDENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Origin</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
<th>Percentage of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gaju District</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soti Sources (former farm labourers)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaju (village)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhevidershi Purchase Area</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chivi District</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madicaland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadongu District (Mashonaland)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nkama District</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>65</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 7.2: PREVIOUS FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO RESPONDENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schools (primary and secondary)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dipping Tanks</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinic</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shops</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 7.3: PREVIOUS LAND HOLDINGS AVAILABLE TO RESPONDENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Holding</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
<th>Percentage of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No access to land</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to 1 - 1,Sha</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - 2,Sha</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - 3,Sha</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - 4,Sha</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>above 5,Sha</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>65</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The average previous land holding available to respondents was 1.84 hectares. The interviews revealed that the highest land holding available was 7 hectares, with access to no land being the response of nearly one-third of the respondents.

The survey revealed that the decision to resettle was overwhelmingly a family decision (57 per cent) which was taken in order to improve the socio-economic status of the family. Males as the household heads made the decision to move in 35 per cent of cases, and females as the household head in 9 per cent of cases. The reasons given for deciding to resettle are provided in Table 7.4.

**TABLE 7.4 : REASONS GIVEN FOR DECIDING TO RESETTLE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons Indicated</th>
<th>Response Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Previous land arrangements</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous land size</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overcrowding</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor quality of life</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor Grazing</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overwhelmingly, the reasons given for deciding to resettle centred around previous land arrangements and allocation, with the consequent impact on the standard of living of the respondents.

The survey indicated that the high number of children per respondent was a handicap to the immediate improvement in the quality of life of the settlers. While the Resettlement Officer indicated that the extended family kinship pattern was operating at Soti Source, the results revealed that this was not the norm and that most households (74 per cent) contained only members of the immediate family of the permit holder. The composition of households at Soti Source is shown in Table 7.5.
TABLE 7.5: COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Children*</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more than 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Relatives</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>48</th>
<th>74</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more than 2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Children being of school going age and dependent on adults for subsistence and a livelihood.

92 per cent of respondents had one spouse with the remainder having more than one (wife). No respondent indicated having more than two wives. The average number of children per household is calculated to be 5.79, a high level of dependency which is characteristic of Zimbabwe as a whole where 47.3 per cent of the total population is under the age of 15 years (Zimbabwe, 1985a).

The infrastructure and facilities available at the time of resettlement have been described in Chapter 6. Following initial resettlement, government assistance became directed towards the implementation of the project report as compiled by Conex (see Chapter 6). Attention was given to upgrading and improving the infrastructure at Soti Source, together with more direct assistance being given to the settlers in terms of loans and credit.
In this regard, the Resettlement Loan Fund was established by the AFC in 1982. After receiving a crop pack, settlers are eligible to receive credit from the Resettlement Loan Fund from their second agricultural season. The Fund is administered by the AFC on behalf of the government (Agricultural Finance Corporation, 1982). After four years, established settlers who are credit-worthy will become eligible for assistance from the AFC under the Small Farm Credit Scheme. Further details on credit available for agriculture are discussed in the next section.

In the first two years following resettlement two primary schools were reconstructed, 6 cattle dips were reconstructed and 32 new wells dug with protection and hand pumps. A new clinic was opened and the 100Km gravel road network on Soti Source graded. Blair VIP latrines were provided by the government on each plot.

At the time of interviews in June 1987, there were 4 primary schools on the scheme with a total of 2011 pupils. The one secondary school had 350 pupils. According to the Resettlement Officer, the government's commitment to providing education for all was the reason for the emphasis given to the upgrading and building of schools. The Ministry of Community Development and Women's Affairs utilizes the school buildings for literacy classes and other Adult Education courses.

The clinic is staffed by 2 medical assistants, a voluntary Red Cross worker and five young helpers. Doctors from the nearby Gutu hospital and adjacent mission stations visit the clinic on a regular basis; once a month in the case of those from Gutu hospital. The health facilities are augmented by the Traditional Healers, both registered and unregistered, living at Soti Source or in the adjacent CAs.
The Traditional Healers (nyangas) are particularly well utilized, especially for minor complaints and ailments.

Other facilities which have been established on the scheme include the Soti Source Service Centre. The Service Centre is intended to cater for the immediate primary commercial needs of the residents on the scheme within a planned layout, and to provide a focus for various activities. The Soti Source Service Centre Development Plan is given in Figure 7.1. At the time of field work there were 5 stores in operation at Soti Source, with a carpentry and welding workshop and a bottle store under construction. The development and expansion of the Soti Source Service Centre according to the Development Plan (as shown in Figure 7.1) will take place, as and when funds are available or when warranted by demand. Sites are available for private sector involvement, although they receive no direct financial assistance from the government.

Banking facilities are provided by an agency service provided twice weekly by Standard Chartered Bank Zimbabwe Limited to the scheme from its Masvingo Branch, while the Zimbabwe Banking Corporation (Zimbank) has a branch in nearby Gutu. Transportation is by means of the daily bus services to Masvingo and Harare via Gutu. There were no private taxis on the scheme and in 1987 there were 4 private vehicles at Soti Source.

The Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing is involved with the provision of loans for housing construction for the resettled farmers on resettlement schemes. The loan is for $1058 (including transport) to be repaid over 30 years. The repayment costs are adjusted annually for inflation. The assistance provided is in the form of the materials required and includes doors and frames, windows and frames, keys, and cement. The settlers
Figure 7.1: SOTI SOURCE DEVELOPMENT PLAN
do not receive any money and are responsible for the labour, maintenance and the erection of the houses using the materials provided by the Ministry. The houses are to be constructed according to plans approved by the Ministry, the most popular being a 4 roomed H-shape construction. It was stressed that only the permit holder is eligible for the loan, while the national shortage of building materials does affect delivery and hence the building programme of the settler.

The Resettlement Officer indicated that while there were 661 permit holders on the scheme, there was no limit on the number of people a permit holder could allow to live on his residential allotment. The extended family network of the Africans means that a number of relatives are living with the permit holders and their families (see Table 7.5) and the Resettlement Officer estimated that the total population of the Scheme was 6 000 in mid-1987.

Facilities absent from the Scheme include a police station, post office (the nearest being at Gutu) and public telephones. It was, however, the intention of the Posts and Telecommunications Corporation to provide public telephones to the Scheme as part of its programme to provide telecommunications access to the rural areas. This is dependent on finances and the overall nationwide need for such facilities. There were 5 private telephones at Suci Source for the Resettlement Officer (home and office), the clinic and co-operative Department; one settler had a private telephone.

Finally, in terms of infrastructural provision, at the time of the research survey, there were no Church buildings on the Scheme although a number of church organisations were operating. Nevertheless, provision is made in the Service Centre Development Plan for the building of a Church.
The Resettlement officer underlined the government's commitment to resettlement and its determination to provide settlers with a "competitive base" from which they could participate in the national economy. Problems at the scheme in relation to the implementation of the Project Report were mainly of a financial nature, with the provision of certain infrastructure being inhibited by a lack of funding. The limited involvement of the private sector was also evident, placing further pressure on the government. Nevertheless, in regard to infrastructure development, there has been progress at Soti Source and considerable effort has been put into the establishment of the scheme as interviews with the settlers reveal.

The organization-orientated questions revealed that most households participate in community activities and clubs which have been established at Soti Source. A number of the clubs and organizations draw their members from the adjacent CA, particularly the agricultural based activities. Table 7.6 shows the type and involvement in various organizations as elicited from the questionnaire survey.

Table 7.6 reveals the influence of the ruling political party at Soti Source. As previously mentioned in the interview with the Resettlement Officer, the dominance of ZANU(PF) in village institutional structures is unquestioned.

It has been suggested that this predominance is as a result of the grass-roots mobilization that the party undertook during the pre-independence guerrilla war which later became incorporated into legitimate administrative institutional structures (cf. Martin and Johnson, 1985; Lenn, 1985; Ranger, 1985). The ZANU(PF) party structure is shown in Figure 7.2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
<th>Percentage of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women's League ((ZANU(PF))</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Development Comm.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU(PF) District/Village Ward</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Committee</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Chairman</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serving Club</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Farmers Association</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School Committee</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Committee</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers Social Club</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Committee</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Health Worker</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presiding Officer Village Court</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle Fattening Committee</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU(PF) Welfare Committee</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resources Board</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Commissar (ZANU(PF))</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Court Assessor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operative Union</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The existing management structure at Soti Source during the period of interviews comprised a Scheme Development Committee which is responsible for the administration of the scheme, management and planning. All government ministries are involved and the Resettlement Officer acts as Chairman. The Village Development Committee is elected by the settlers from candidates from the Scheme. The Village Development Committee undertakes the implementation of a number of development activities, co-ordination of activities as well as dealing with the day-to-day problems of the Scheme. The Resettlement Officer is responsible for liaison between the Scheme and Village Development Committees. Other committees existing on the Scheme include an Education (Schools) Committee, a Health Committee, an Agricultural Committee, a Natural Resources Committee (dealing with conservation) and a number of Church committees. The Resettlement Officer sits on all committees.
FIGURE 7.2  ZANU (PF) PARTY STRUCTURE

VILLAGE COMMITTEE

BRANCH COMMITTEE

DISTRICT COMMITTEE

PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE

NATIONAL (CENTRAL) COMMITTEE

POLITBÜRO

---

Village Groupings

District Level

Provincial Level

National Level

(Source: Resettlement Officer)
In addition to the various committees mentioned above, a number of organizations also operate on the scheme. These organizations include Agritex, the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA), AFC, various government ministries such as Health, Education, Home Affairs, Housing and Construction together with Women's Affairs and Cooperatives. Links are encouraged with other Resettlement Schemes and the Resettlement Officers from other schemes in the province meet regularly.

On the Scheme there are 3 village courts, each having a presiding officer with Assessors. These are elected by the villagers and are then formally appointed by the Ministry of Justice. These courts deal with local disputes and marital issues. More serious offences are transferred to the Magistrate in Gutu.

The respondents indicated an interest in the various education and self-improvement courses which are available. This is understandable when considering the level of education of the respondents, all of whom had some form of primary education but no secondary education. The level of education of respondents is given in Table 7.7 and participation in other courses available at Soti Source in Table 7.8.

### TABLE 7.7 : EDUCATION LEVEL OF RESPONDENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grade 1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 +</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Certificate</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 7.8 : PARTICIPATION IN EDUCATIONAL AND SELF-IMPROVEMENT COURSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
<th>Percentage of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Master Farmer Certificate</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dress Making</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Literacy</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health (Red Cross)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cookery</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Improvement</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needlework</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scouts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Respondents indicated that their first choice for shopping was the Soti Source Service Centre, Gutu and Masvingo. Their second choice if the goods required were not available anywhere at their first choice, was the nearby towns of Chivu and Mvuma and their last resort was either (in order of preference) Gweru, Bulawayo or Harare. The indication is that opportunities for entrepreneurial development and small business development at the Soti Source Service Centre would be supported by the settlers on the scheme.

In an attempt to ascertain the settlers' perception of the scheme and what was perceived to require improvement, the respondents were asked if their nutritional requirements were met through their farming activities and whether they were satisfied with conditions at Soti Source. All the respondents replied that they were satisfied with their decision to move. While 35 per cent felt that they and their families had enough food, 35 per cent felt they had more than enough food while only 10 per cent felt that they
did not have enough food. The problems outlined by the respondents will be discussed at the end of this section.

AGRICULTURAL PERFORMANCE OF THE SCHEME

Of particular concern are the agricultural activities at Soti Source, since it is on farming that the livelihood of the settlers depends and on which ultimately the success or failure of the scheme depends. The survey provided information, inter alia, on the type and amount of crops produced and the organization of agricultural production (ie. ploughing techniques, labour inputs). In addition, there were also questions related to livestock and extension. Supplementary information on the agricultural production was obtained variously from the Census of Resettlement Schemes, from the Resettlement Officer and from the Provincial Officers for Agritex (Mr Vengesai) and the AFC, (Mr Mukivimbra) in Masvingo.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>No. of Growers</th>
<th>Percentage of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapoko*</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunflowers</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyimo**</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Finger Millet
* Monkey Nuts

From Table 7.9 it can be seen that all the respondents grew maize. The most popular other crops indicated were groundnuts and rapoko. The immediate concern of the settlers was to produce enough food for the immediate family, with any surplus being sold to the Grain Marketing
Board (GMB). Maize is the staple food in Zimbabwe and consequently it is not surprising that all settlers grow the crop. Maize is also a cash crop under the control of the parastatal GMB. In Zimbabwe maize, along with wheat and sorghum, is a "controlled" product that is marketed under the single channel marketing system by the GMB. There are 5 grinding mills at Soti Source and the nearest storage depot is in Gutu. Transport to the GMB depot is the responsibility of the farmer. The respondents indicated that surpluses of crops such as nyimo and groundnuts were sold to other settlers on the scheme, or to informal traders (hawkers) for sale in the adjacent CAs.

Production levels determined from the questionnaire responses showed that each land holding produces on average 115.64 bags of maize (25 - 30 bags per ha), 8.3 bags of rapoko, 5.33 bags of groundnuts, 3.25 bags of sunflower seeds and 2.6 bags of nyimo. These figures indicate that the settlers at Soti Source are capable of earning a sustained livelihood from agriculture.

Most respondents keep small livestock (See Table 7.10) and the majority keep cattle. Cattle has a traditional significance amongst the rural people of Zimbabwe and are a measure of wealth. The settlers are allowed a maximum of 8 livestock units (LUs) each. In order to prevent over-grazing and conserve the natural environment, this maximum is adhered to and controlled although in practice some settlers do exceed the limit. This is tolerated only if the total livestock numbers on the scheme are not in excess of grazing capacity.
TABLE 7.10 : LIVESTOCK OWNED BY RESPONDENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Livestock</th>
<th>Average Number of LDs</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
<th>Percentage Of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poultry</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goats</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donkeys</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabbits</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigeons</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Responsibility for tending livestock and tilling the fields rests overwhelmingly within the family. Only 3 per cent of the respondents interviewed indicated that they utilized employed labour, and in most cases this was during harvesting only. This labour was obtained from the adjacent Communal Areas.

This labour is paid according to the type of labour provided and varies from between $4 to $10 daily or $10 to $25 weekly. This payment could also be made in bags of maize instead of cash.

The individual is responsible for his own tools and implements on a Model A Scheme, unlike on a Model B Scheme where these would be collectively owned and shared by the participants. At Boti Source very few individuals have collectively pooled their resources to share in the ownership and use of implements. A number of respondents indicated the use of a co-operative plough, wheel-barrow and tractor, but these were very much in the minority. The situation with regard to the ownership and use of equipment is given in Table 7.11.
TABLE 7.11: OWNERSHIP OF AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implement</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
<th>Percentage of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hoe</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plough (Hand)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sickle</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Axe</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotch Cart</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spade</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rake</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivator</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheel Barrow</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fork</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saw (hand)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrow</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operative plough</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operative wheel barrow</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operative tractor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to supplement their incomes, many respondents indicated that either they, or members of their families, were involved in other forms of economic activity. As Table 7.12 indicates the most common of these was vegetable growing, followed by sewing and dress-making. The survey indicated that an average of $55-98 was earned monthly from these activities.

TABLE 7.12: OTHER ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF RESPONDENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>No of Respondents</th>
<th>Percentage of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewing/dressmaking</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Builder</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knitting</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brick-making</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpentry</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well-digging</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacksmith</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the interpretation of the survey results from Soti Source, it must be borne in mind that the research was undertaken in 1987, only 5 agricultural seasons after the scheme was first established. In the interim there had been 3 drought years which have had a negative impact on agricultural output, and consequently an effect on the financial viability on the Scheme as a whole, compared to that as proposed in the Project Report (see Chapter 6).

The agricultural performance of Soti Source was discussed with the AFC in Masvingo where the financial assistance made available to the settlers was discussed. The type of financial assistance made available by the AFC encompasses short term loans, which include seeds, labour and fertilizer, and medium term loans for draught power, ploughs and cultivators. It was emphasised that the AFC does not advance cash to the farmer, rather the credit is provided to the supplier (e.g. Masvingo Crop Suppliers and the Zimbabwe Fertilizer Corporation). Short-term loans are for one year only while medium-term loans are repayable over 2 to 5 years. Table 7.13 shows the amount and type of loans provided by the AFC to farmers at Soti Source. The AFC then issues a guarantee to the supplier that on delivery to the named farmer, the AFC will cover the amount stipulated.
## Table 7.13: Financial Assistance Provided by APC to Farmers at

### Soti Source

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Year</th>
<th>Number and Type of Loans</th>
<th>Total Amount of Loans ($)</th>
<th>Average Per Recovery ($)</th>
<th>Crop Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982/83</td>
<td>Short Term 500</td>
<td>262 031</td>
<td>445-90</td>
<td>1170 ha under maize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium Term 4</td>
<td>1 400</td>
<td>350-00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983/84</td>
<td>Short Term 505</td>
<td>450 248</td>
<td>795-90</td>
<td>1130 ha under maize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium Term 400</td>
<td>619 410</td>
<td>1 548-52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984/85</td>
<td>Short Term 538</td>
<td>226 628</td>
<td>422-90</td>
<td>1072 ha under maize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium Term 525</td>
<td>102 295</td>
<td>401-00</td>
<td>1218 ha under g/nuts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985/86</td>
<td>Short Term 473</td>
<td>222 480</td>
<td>470-25</td>
<td>1946 ha under maize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium Term 5</td>
<td>3 050</td>
<td>606-00</td>
<td>473 ha under g/nuts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Short Term 270</td>
<td>222 562</td>
<td>824-30</td>
<td>1540 ha under maize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium Term 61</td>
<td>32 975</td>
<td>540-54</td>
<td>271 ha under g/nuts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Loans had to be repaid by 01/01/1986 (full installment plus interest) otherwise no further loans would be made available.

(Source: Interview with APC)
The Provincial Officer of the AFC indicated that loans were only made for the planting of maize during the initial two seasons. This policy was pursued in order for the settlers to establish themselves and build up food reserves for their consumption. Subsequent loans were made for maize and groundnut production. Initially nearly 600 loans from the AFC were made available in 1982/83 and this total increased to over 900 short and medium term loans made available by the AFC in 1983/84. The number of loans has subsequently declined. The number of loans is related to the recovery rate, with the initial years being poor seasons requiring farmers to seek financial assistance which they might not otherwise have done. The recovery rate improved dramatically in 1984/85 in response to a good rainy season and an AFC deadline on 1st January 1986 that no new loans would be made available if previous commitments were not met. The number of defaulters has declined to around 60 per cent, again due to below average rainfall and poor crop returns.

In cases of default, the AFC must investigate each case and in certain circumstances, the loan can be rescheduled (i.e. short term loan extended to 3 - 5 years). Once a loan is issued, the AFC registers a stop-order with the GMB depot in Gutu in the farmers name. The AFC recovers the loan on what produce the farmer sells to the GMB. The GMB deducts the AFC repayment from what is paid to the farmer. Although this is the legal means through which the crop should be disposed of, a great deal of "side-marketing" is occurring, whereby the farmer sells his crop to other buyers such as CA inhabitants and local stores.

Recovery assistants of the AFC operate throughout the country on a provincial basis. It is the task of the recovery assistants to collect debts from farmers direct. In order to overcome being denied repayment through the
effects of "side-marketing", the recovery assistants have reached agreement with a number of unofficial buyers, so as to recover loan debts in the same manner as the from the GMB. Recovery assistants recovered $492,506.75 in Gutu from the period 1 April 1986 to 30 March 1987.

The criteria for issuing loans is that, in the case of resettlement schemes, or y permit holders are eligible. The viability of the farming programme submitted by the farmer is evaluated by the AFC and the loan amount determined. No guarantees are required, since the AFC is backed by the government and in the case of default and unrecoverable debt, the AFC then draws on the backing of the government. This applies to resettlement and Communal Area farmers only. Small-scale commercial farmers (formerly African Purchase Areas) do require a guarantee based on their freehold tenure.

The AFC noted in its 1985 Annual Report (Agricultural Finance Corporation, 1985, p.12) that "... in order to ensure the best possible allocation of limited funds, and conscious of its obligation to maintain its credibility and integrity as a financial institution, the Corporation considers applications for assistance in terms of the following criteria:

a) The Corporation must be satisfied that the proposed farming enterprise or programme is viable and will enable the borrower to meet his obligation to repay the loan and interest thereon. Furthermore, the Corporation must be reasonably satisfied that the borrower has the managerial capacity to carry out the proposed programme.

b) Where the applicant has a previous credit record with the Corporation, his past performance will be taken into account in assessing his ability to use credit effectively. If the applicant's previous record shows that he has been in default the Corporation will normally refuse further assistance unless it is
satisfied that the default was due to circumstance beyond the borrower's control, such as drought.

c) The Corporation will normally take adequate securities where these are available. Where these are not available, such as in the Communal Areas, the Corporation will closely monitor loan repayment.

d) The Corporation normally expects the borrower to make a reasonable contribution to the farming programme being applied for."

The amount of the loan provided varies between the resettlement schemes and the individual farmer programmes as submitted and is related to the prevailing cost of inputs required (such as fertilizer or seed) and the crop package (quantity of inputs as determined by Agritex). The average yield per hectare is also considered. A standard crop pack for maize in 1983/84 included 4 x 50kg compound D fertilizer per hectare and 2 x 50Kg ammonia nitrate per hectare. The rate of interest is 13 per cent per annum plus 0,9 per cent insurance for those farmers under 65 years old. The insurance covers the death of the farmer and as a result the relatives or next-of-kin of the deceased are not liable.

The Provincial Offer of the AFC at the time of interview, the recovery rate was still too low. This hampered the fulfillment of the government's objective of ensuring that viable and self-sustaining commercial farmers were established on resettlement schemes. The resettled farmers themselves still had not accepted the responsibility of credit. An education initiative from both the AFC and Agritex is needed to inform the farmers of the responsibility of accepting loans.

In an interview with the Provincial Officer of Agritex in Masvingo, it was pointed out that resettlement farmers suffer from problems of adjustment to their new environment, particularly in their initial agricultural season. The extension officers provided by Agritex offer technical
advice with regard to crop types, planting times, fertilizer usage, pest control and harvesting. In addition, livestock management principles, dehorning, castration, immunization and general good veld management were offered. Once established, the problems of the resettled farmers are similar to those of the adjacent CA and relate to credit, transport, marketing and of course, the vagaries of the weather.

At Soti Source, there is one Extension Officer (who also covers the adjacent area of Belima), one Supervisor and 4 Extension Workers. The Extension Workers, who live on the Scheme and use motorcycles to visit the farmers, are an integral part of the community. These Extension Workers have an agricultural certificate and the Extension Officers have an agricultural diploma. The Extension Supervisor is a promotion post, filled by a former Extension Worker.

Agritex is responsible for the training of farmers leading to qualification for a Master Farmers' Certificate. This qualification involves a two year period of training wherein all aspects of farming receive attention. The farmers volunteer for this course and numbers are limited to 25 per annum. There is no selection of criteria or basis for acceptance. Once the training is complete, the Master Farmer is eligible for membership of the National Farmers Club.

The agricultural performance of Soti Source is illustrated in Tables 7.14, 7.15 and 7.16, which deal respectively with crop production, livestock and utilisation of agricultural implements. The poor seasons, as mentioned by the Provincial Officer of the APC are apparent in the amount of maize reaped and sold in 1982 and particularly 1983 (see Table 7.14). The best season was 1985, and again, this record correlates with the 77 per cent recovery rate indicated by APC.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>MAIZE (TONNES)</th>
<th>GROUNDNUTS (TONNES)</th>
<th>RAPOKO (TONNES)</th>
<th>NYIMO (TONNES)</th>
<th>RICE (TONNES)</th>
<th>ORIENTAL TOBACCO (KGS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>598</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Notes: In all figures except 1982 which is prior to the first season harvest.

(Source: Agricultural Census of Resettlement Schemes, 1989 and 1994; Interview with Resettlement Officer)
TABLE 7.15: LIVESTOCK CENSUS AT SOTI SOURCE* (1982 - 1986)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CATTLE</th>
<th>SHEEP</th>
<th>GOATS</th>
<th>DONKEYS</th>
<th>CHICKENS</th>
<th>DUCKS</th>
<th>PIGS</th>
<th>PIGEONS &amp; RABBITS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>2,964</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>4,201</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>3,692</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>4,395</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>4,455</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>2,071</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>6,334</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>5,715</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>2,266</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>7,271</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>5,967</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>2,579</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>8,029</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>551</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Vinvi is included in all figures

(Source: Agricultural Census of Resettlement Schemes, 1983 and 1984; Interview with Resettlement Officer)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>PLOUGH</th>
<th>HARROWS AND CULTIVATORS</th>
<th>SCOTCH CARRIERS</th>
<th>PLANTERS</th>
<th>MAIZE SHELLERS</th>
<th>TRACTORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures included in all figures except 1982

**Note:** Interview with Settlement Officer.
Poor rains and the drought conditions appear to have had little or no impact on livestock numbers, with the total number of livestock units\(^8\) increasing every year (see Table 7.15). During the period under review, the livestock population increased by 46.6 per cent. The number of agricultural implements also increased (see Table 7.16) during the period under review, although no tractors were to be found at Soti Source. The co-operative tractor indicated as being used by some respondents originated outside the scheme. It is interesting to note that the number of ploughs reached a total of 661 by 1986, a level of one per family on the scheme.

There is a slight discrepancy here as only 97 per cent of the respondents indicated ownership of a plough. One explanation of this discrepancy is that some families have more than one plough, while others have none. Tables 7.14, 7.15 and 7.16 show that, in general, there was an overall improvement in production, livestock numbers and implement ownership at Soti Source from 1982 to 1986, although the APC only had a recovery rate on its loans of 42\% for 1986/87. The trend disclosed here is that the settlers were concentrating on expansion of production whilst neglecting to repay their loans, although it would seem that many would have been able to. The official producer prices for selected crops produced at Soti Source are given in Table 7.17.

\(^8\) Derivation of Livestock Units (LU's): average head of cattle = 0.54 LU, bull = 1.2 LU, ox = 1.0 LU, heifer = 0.4 LU, sheep/goat = 0.1 LU, donkey = 0.5 LU. See also Zimbabwe, 1985b.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CROP</th>
<th>BAG WEIGHT</th>
<th>PRICE/TONNE ($)</th>
<th>PRICE/Bag ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nafza</td>
<td>91kg</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>16.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11 bags = 1 tonne)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>77kg</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>69.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(unshelled)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32kg</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>14.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(shelled)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapoko</td>
<td>91kg</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>27.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11 bags = 1 tonne)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunflower</td>
<td>60kg</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>19.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(20 bags = 1 tonne)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Personal Interview at Agritex, 1987)
From Tables 7.14 and 7.17, together with the results of the questionnaire survey, the average yield per plot at Soti Source and estimates of earning per crop can be determined (See Table 7.18).

TABLE 7.18: RESPONDENTS INDICATION OF YIELDS AT SOTI SOURCE* (1986/87 SEASON)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>AV Yield/Plot (bags)</th>
<th>Price Per Bag ($)</th>
<th>AV Earning Per Plot p.a ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>106,54</td>
<td>16,36</td>
<td>1,740,70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts**</td>
<td>5,55</td>
<td>69,23</td>
<td>384,22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapoko</td>
<td>9,30</td>
<td>27,27</td>
<td>226,34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunflowers</td>
<td>3,25</td>
<td>19,50</td>
<td>63,37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See analysis below to quantify there figures.
** Unshelled
(Source: Questionnaire interviews; Agritek interview, 1987)

When considering the yields given in Table 7.18 it is important to note that these are for the plot in total and not per hectare, and by themselves are misleading. If these results are broken down and analyzed, the maize yield of 106,54 bags per plot provides a yield of approximately 21 bags per hectare. It must be further borne in mind that the entire plot is not devoted to maize. Based on the Agricultural Census of Resettlement Schemes over various years, the average farmer devoted 66 per cent of his plot to maize, a finding confirmed by Stilz and Wayl (1986, p.14), the remainder is devoted to crops such as rapoko or nyimo.

A further assumption has to be considered, namely that the bags indicated by the respondents are not always filled to the 91kg as specified by the GBM. The yield per hectare indicated in Table 7.18, taking into account these factors, can then be calculated to be 18 bags per hectare, using 75
per cent of a full bag as an average. Converting this to the standard 91kg bag used in other statistics, the average maize yield of a farmer at Soti Source is calculated to be 13.5 bags (1228.5kg) per hectare. The average earning from maize can therefore be calculated to be $220.86 per hectare, including that portion of the harvest which is retained for home consumption and not sold to the GMB.

Once qualified, the productivity at Soti Source compares favourably with that indicated by Zinyama (1988, p157) for small scale commercial farmers in Masvingo province, where an average 7 bags of maize per household was sold in 1985. The Communal Areas maize yield is given as averaging 7.6 bags per hectare (World Bank, 1983). In the adjacent Bikita District, maize yields varied from 1 bag per hectare in 1982/83, to 9.6 bags per hectare in 1983/84 (Zimbabwe, 1996c), while Stils and Weyl (1986) give an estimate of 8.7 bags per hectare of maize as an average to be expected from communal areas in Natural Region III.

Weiner et al (1985, p.280) show that maize yields on Model A schemes in National Region III can be as high as 19 bags per hectare when only 60 per cent of normal rainfall was measured, as was the case for the Nyagundi Scheme in the 1981/82 season. Other schemes in better agro-ecological regions provided yields as high as 44 bags per hectare.

In an evaluation of the Dewre Resettlement Scheme, which lies approximately 100km east of Soti Source within Natural Regions IV and V, Zinyama, et al (1990) report on the maize yields from two villages. A yield of 109Kg (1.19 bags) from 0.7ha was obtained from a village in Natural Region V and a yield of 737Kg (8.09 bags) from 1.5ha was obtained from a village in Natural Region IV. These yields, together with that achieved at Soti Source, are indicative of the limitations imposed on crop production by climatic and soil conditions as classified by the Natural Regions.
While it is accepted that yields are extremely difficult to establish and that estimates vary widely, the figures provided for Soti Source indicate that maize is the dominant crop, with average yields achieving a conservative estimate of 13.5 bags per hectare. This figure compares favourably to the gross margins per hectare outlined for the Scheme as described in the Project Report (see Chapter 6), and supports the claim by Cliffe (1988a) that resettlement in Natural Region III is likely to result in an increase in output.

The yields indicated above, together with the marketed output from Soti Source (Table 7.14), suggest that in average to good agricultural seasons, a sizeable marketable surplus is produced. The status and economic standing of the farmers can also be seen from the inputs and implements that are utilized (Tables 7.13 and 7.16). Given the vagaries of the weather and the prevailing agro-ecological conditions, the resettled farmers at Soti Source have demonstrated clearly that they are self-sustaining and can produce a surplus for sale.

It is nevertheless a source of concern that the recovery rate for AFC loans is below 50 per cent. The whole issue of "side-marketing" within the adjacent CA needs further investigation albeit beyond the scope of the present study. This question, together with the continued improvement in terms of new implements and additional livestock purchases could, in part, explain the continued low recovery rate. The criteria used by the AFC and the possibility of over-exposure on its part to the Resettlement farmers could also be a possible explanation. Only using a nationwide comparison of all loan recovery rates of the AFC would any such trend become visible.
PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF THE SCHEME

The degree to which resettlement at Soti Source has achieved government objectives varies from one objective to another. The scheme needs to be evaluated at a number of levels, viz., the scheme level, at a policy level and at the national level. The organization of the scheme and its agricultural performance needs to be compared to the Project Report in order to determine if Soti Source has been successful.

The quality of life of the resettled farmers has improved since their relocation to the Scheme. Evidence of this was found in the response to questions concerning expectations of individuals once resettled. All 65 respondents interviewed indicated that their expectations had been fulfilled at Soti Source. The 5ha arable plot, access to credit and the general improvement in their well-being were cited as reasons for this response. As indicated earlier, 92 per cent of respondents opted for resettlement because of unfavourable land arrangements they were previously subjected to, and 93 per cent (Table 7.3) previously had access to less than 5ha of arable land.

The allocation of land for both cultivation and grazing on the scheme represents a significant improvement in access to resources for the settlers. On the scheme the settlers cultivate an average of 5ha and have access to grazing land which is of better quality than that in the adjacent CA.

Other social variables which have contributed to an improvement in the quality of life of the resettlers include the provision of schools, clinics and shopping facilities. Basic needs in terms of housing and water are being met or are being attended to, while local institutional structures have been established. A social and economic base is discernible at Soti Source.
At the scheme level the constraints to further development can be seen in terms of the lack of resources, government co-ordination, manpower and funds. Some of the planned infrastructural developments have been delayed due to lack of building materials and funds. The general shortage of skilled manpower has had a negative impact on staff requirements at the schools and clinics on the scheme, whilst veterinary surgeons are in critically short supply in the rural areas. Government inputs and the expansion of the infrastructural base, particularly at Vimbai where the settlers are expected to utilize the resources at Soti Source, are constrained by the overwhelming demand for services and funds through the entire rural agricultural sector. Nevertheless, the limited infrastructural base on the Scheme has been improved upon and the settlers themselves can make a contribution in areas where government cannot. There is a case for a devolution of power to Village and Ward Committees, to enable the settlers to become more involved and thereby reduce pressure on government ministries. Areas where this is particularly evident at Soti Source are with respect to the maintenance of boreholes and hand pumps, and the purchase and erection of fencing.

Evaluations of the political objectives of the scheme are more subjective. At independence, the ZANU(PF) made a commitment to redressing the racial inequality in land distribution, and the Resettlement Programmes subsequently implemented were a response to this inheritance. Land has been made available through the Programmes of resettlement, of which Soti Source is one such scheme. The Scheme therefore owes its existence to the political commitment of the government to overcoming the issues of the unequal distribution of land between the races in Zimbabwe, the overcrowding and continuing degradation of the CAs and to
attempt to provide black farmers with a foundation on which they could become involved in the market economy. These issues have been satisfied in varying degrees at Soti Source, whilst the overall problem of the Communal Areas and unequal land distribution remains.

The national criteria for the resettlement of previously (white) commercial farmland were outlined in Chapter 5. Resettlement at Soti Source has provided limited relief of the population pressure on overcrowded land, while extending and improving the productive agricultural base of the peasant farming sector. Rural infrastructure has been expanded and the standard of living of the resettled families has shown signs of improvement. The longer term objective of reducing the country's dependence on a relatively small number of commercial farmers has only been successful in so far as resettlement has occurred, although not to the envisaged scale.

In terms of the performance of the scheme with that envisaged in the Project Report described in Chapter 6, agricultural production has been affected by the period of drought and this has had a negative impact on the projected viability of the scheme. The level of indebtedness of the settlers provides evidence of this. However, that provides both arable and grazing land to those who would otherwise have little or no land as well as making government services available, does represent the achievement of part of the major objective for the establishment of the scheme. In addition, Kinyama et al. (1990) point out that areas which formerly made little or no contribution to the national economy are being brought under production and, when there is sufficient rainfall, the initial fertility of the soils holds promise of reasonable levels of production for a short while. The production levels achieved at Soti Source does support this view, although the long-term sustainability of
CONCLUSION

This chapter has provided an insight into the process of resettlement at the Soti Source Model A Resettlement Scheme. Furthermore, a profile of the settlers, the facilities available and the agricultural performance of the scheme have also been investigated.

Whereas the resettlement programme was the response to dealing with the inherited unequal distribution of land at independence (as discussed in Chapter 5), a decade after independence this response is once again the subject of debate. The rethinking of the land reform and resettlement process in Zimbabwe is discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 8

RETHINKING RESETTLEMENT AND LAND REFORM

"The conciliatory and accommodationist policies pursued to date, particularly on the land issue hardly approximate to a solution" (Sibanda, 1983, p1009).

"A successful land policy will have to be part of an integrated economic or industrialisation programme. It must be a programme that strikes a balance between what the urban sector needs and can supply to the population, including the rural population, and what support the rural sector can render and get from the urban sector. The scale has to be balanced" (The Financial Gazette editorial, 19/10/1990).

INTRODUCTION

In the decade since independence in Zimbabwe, the resettlement policy of the post-colonial state has seen the resettlement of 52 000 families (about 416 000 people) on 2 958 082 hectares of land, of which 2 416 312 hectares had been purchased from the commercial farming sector and the balance of 541 770 hectares was from State land. The numbers resettled represents 32 per cent of the envisaged target, whereas it was the government's intention to resettle 162 000 families by the end of 1989. The total amount of land purchased for resettlement as of 30 June, 1989 was 2 713 718 hectares, which is only 16 per cent of the commercial farming area in 1980 (Financial Gazette, 08/09/1989).

This chapter will review and assess the progress made with the implementation of the resettlement policy during the 1980s. Attention will then focus on the wider debate and new thinking on the land question in Zimbabwe, (the sources of which are outlined in Table 3.1) culminating in an assessment and reflection to the 1990 National Land Policy
Since the inception of the resettlement programme in 1980, a number of constraints have been identified which have affected both the pace and progress with implementation. The most obvious of these constraints has been financial. As discussed in Chapter 5, the Lancaster House constitution, through which the country attained independence in 1980, effectively tied the hands of the government by entrenching property rights so that only under-utilized land could be compulsorily purchased and only then by immediate payment of the full value, in foreign exchange. As Cliffe (1988) points out, given the balance of payments problems and the scarcity of foreign exchange, government was forced to comply with the clause of "willing buyer - willing seller" whose transactions could be handled in local currency. A consequence of this has been that half of the $50 million cost of the resettlement programme has been for land purchase as opposed to land development. Cliffe (1988) continues, that if the cost of obtaining the land could be reduced, then more people could be resettled for the same budget.

The "willing buyer - willing seller" basis has further constrained the government from acquiring blocks of farms. Because this clause inhibits forward planning, since no-one is able to anticipate where the next land will become available, the state introduced in 1986 the Land Acquisition Bill (Zimbabwe, 1986a). The Act gives the State first refusal on all land sales, defines for the first time what constitutes "under-utilized" land, and indicates some procedures for compulsorily acquiring that land.

While initially the British Government assisted in the financing of land acquisition and development costs, a
programme guided by strict economic feasibility/cost recovery criteria was adopted. This policy favoured Model A schemes (such as Gedi Source) to the exclusion of other models, despite the Zimbabwean government's preference for more socialist forms of rural production. Finance availability has also acted as a major constraint as the inflow of development funds has not been as much as anticipated.

One of the stated goals of the Resettlement Programme is to assist in the socialist transformation of the economy. While there have been a number of constraints to achieving this aim, Drakakis-Smith (1987) points to a number of fundamental contradictions facing the transition to socialism in Zimbabwe as a whole, and in restructuring the rural economy in particular. Firstly, the government is faced with an entrenched, vigorous capitalist sector on which the economy very heavily depends, and despite one-third of the workforce being in the urban areas, the government remains committed to its rural base and as such to rural development policies. With specific regard to the resettlement programme, Drakakis-Smith (1987) argues that there is little evidence of socialist planning, with only one of the 5 resettlement models being structured around cooperative farming. This could be due, as Weiner (1988b) asserts, to the fact that the Resettlement programme was actually conceived prior to independence within Rhodesia's Ministry of Agriculture, being based on the conservative use of potentially arable land along with extensive livestock grazing. Hence, there has been little progress in reorientating rural production towards a more socialist mode.

The initial indiscriminate buying policy has resulted in the land acquired for resettlement being in areas marginal for crop production, being disjointed self-contained units and not
being integrated with the CAs. In order to speed up the resettlement programme, the Accelerated Intensive Resettlement Programme was launched, whereby less attention was paid to planning and the provision of initial infrastructure (i.e. Vimvi Scheme). The then Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, Mr David Karimanzira commented that, "Between 1981 and 1984 people were just put on the land with no infrastructure whatsoever, such as schools and clinics. This did not work and these areas are currently under reorganization and upgrading which is sponsored by the EEC. Therefore it is necessary that everything is there before resettling the land" (Financial Gazette, 04/08/1989).

The mode of land acquisition and the consequent lack of forward planning has resulted in land being made available to government, but not being purchased due to lack of funds, or being purchased but not being resettled due to lack of implementing capacity. Minister Karimanzira reported that 203,020 hectares had not been resettled in 1989, as planning for the resettlement of this land had not been completed by the Ministry of Local Government.

On the planning aspect, the government had now realized the "... need to plan for the resettlement areas as an integral part of an overall development strategy rather than in isolation" (Zimbabwe, 1986a, p126). However, the geographical fragmentation of the schemes (See Figure 5.2), their location on the periphery of the development core in Zimbabwe and the lack of development funds has created immense difficulties in planning and controlling the individual schemes (Whittle, 1983).

Butcher (1985) argues that the resettlement programme has fallen short in terms of the number of people to be resettled because of the unrealistically large size of the
programme envisaged. This can be attributed to the initial exceptional growth of the economy in 1980/81 and 1981/82 following its re-entry into international markets after the lifting of sanctions, and the extremely successful agricultural season of 1980/81. To this can be added the prevailing air of post-independence euphoria. It was also at this time that the unrealistically high growth rate of 8 per cent was set down in the Transitional National Development Plan (Zimbabwe, 1982b). Palmer (1990) adds that the British Government was also of the opinion that the target numbers for resettlement were "impracticable" and "unrealistic".

Further to the unrealistic goals of the resettlement programme, Butcher (1985) highlights a number of goal conflicts within the implementation of policy. Not only was the ideological difference between the British and Zimbabwe governments present, as mentioned earlier, but within the Zimbabwe government itself a number of conflicting goals emerge. The rationale for the programme is to redress the land question that was at the heart of the liberation war, whilst simultaneously alleviate population pressure in the CAs, improve the conditions of black peasant farmers, reduce dependence on a small group of (white) commercial farmers and create co-operation and other socialist modes of production in rural areas. The resettlement programme is highly populist and directed towards satisfying primarily political goals.

In reality, however, the financial constraints and the implementation of the programme has seen government policy undergo a noticeable shift towards the economic realities of the situation. Model A schemes are the most numerous to be implemented while the co-operative movement received historical, but little in the way of managerial, support (Mazlov, 1983; Hayton, 1986; Nursery-Bray, 1987; Brown
et al., 1988; Mumbengegwi, 1988). Chinyuku, (1984) adds that under Model B schemes the ratio for land cost development is about three times that for Model A schemes. Hence Model B schemes cost $2,336 per settler compared to $778.66 to settle one farmer on a Model A scheme. While the overall resettlement targets have been under fulfilled by 78 per cent, the most severe under-fulfillment, asserts Mumbengegwi (1988, p.161), is in co-operative resettlement whereby "... producer co-operatives constitute only 8 per cent of the entire resettlement programme." Munslow (1985) concludes that while the government of Zimbabwe has decided to proclaim its socialist goals, it has not taken any precipitate action which might destroy production in the existing capitalist base - what Moyo (1986) calls a "bimodal" agricultural policy.

The involvement and co-ordination of government ministries involved with implementation of the resettlement policy has also been problematic. No less than eight different ministries are involved from the time of land purchase to the selection and resettlement of settlers and the provision of infrastructure. Within Ministries, various Departments are involved and rivalry between these various Ministries and Departments has emerged.

Compounding this problem is the lack of administrative structure on the schemes themselves. On establishment, the schemes are under the control of the Resettlement Officer, within the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement. Kinsey (1982) comments that the settlers are in fact disenfranchised since no local government body has jurisdiction over them. The settlers are the direct constituents of the Minister through the Resettlement Officer. There have been criticisms of the Resettlement Officers establishing "their own domains" and not liaising
issue of the incorporation or amalgamation of the resettlement schemes and the district administrations remains unresolved, and requires attention in any reformulation of rural development policy in Zimbabwe.

A related issue is that of tenure on the schemes. The settlers occupy land, plant crops and graze their livestock on the basis of permits (Annexures A - E). As Kinsey (1983) points out, these permits are neither leases nor title deeds, and as such convey no real sense of security and appear to be open to abuse and political pressure. Should a permit to reside be revoked, the holder is entitled to no compensation for any improvements made, yet to be eligible for resettlement applicants must renounce all claims to land rights in the Communal Areas. "A comprehensive policy on land utilization and tenure is an essential but missing ingredient not only of resettlement but also of agricultural and rural development in general" (Kinsey, 1983, p.191).

Furthermore, Kinsey (1982, 1983) indicates that initially the main concern was on the numbers to be resettled, rather than the importance of the community in terms of people and their families. The remarks made by the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement in 1989 and quoted earlier, would seem to verify this.

Initial planning was superficial, consultation virtually non-existent and post-resettlement follow-up and support were weak. However, after the initial resettlement, more attention was given to implementation and to the motivation of the settlers. The implementation of the programme reached its peak in the 1981/82 and 1982/83 financial years when priority in name of Kinsey, vehicles and staff
numerous other development programmes also had to be
considered. As a result the programme slowed quite
dramatically. Kinsey (1983) argues that this time should be
utilized to consider lessons of experience and devote more
time and energy to improving the quality of planning and
implementation.

The slackening of the pace of resettlement is as much a
consequence of the constraints mentioned above, namely the
deteriorating economic climate and poor weather conditions
in the country in the mid-1980s, as to a change in political
considerations. As alternative development strategies are
now being considered for the CAs and the general successful
response of the entire agricultural sector, particularly in
the CAs, to improved inputs and access to markets, the whole
context of the resettlement programme needs to be reviewed.

The whole question of the evaluation and monitoring of
schemes has also received criticism. The Ministry of Lands,
Agriculture and Rural Resettlement admits to a chronic
shortage of skilled manpower within Agritex, while Cliffe
(1986, p49) comments that "there is far too little in the
way of systematic evaluation of the implementation and
performance of the resettlement schemes". The generally
held view is that more widespread monitoring and evaluation
of the national consequences and impact of resettlement is
essential as Zimbabwe considers its rural and agricultural
policy options after a decade of independence.

The agricultural sector in Zimbabwe has generally performed
well during the 1980s, with the government praised for
keeping farm production above the rate of population growth
and indeed, for producing a noteworthy surplus of maize. In
particular, Zimbabwe is often referred to as an African
agricultural "success", and it was in recognition of this
that President Mugabe was awarded the Africa Prize for
TABLE 8.1. "THE LAND QUESTION IN ZIMBABWE"

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Agrarian Reform &amp; Rural Development</th>
<th>Land Reform</th>
<th>Resettlement Reconsidered</th>
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<tr>
<td>Cliffe, 1986</td>
<td>Moyo, 1986</td>
<td>Due, 1986</td>
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<td>Stilz &amp; Weyl, 1986</td>
<td>Amin &amp; Chipika, 1990</td>
<td>Cliffe, 1988a</td>
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<td>Hywel Davies, 1988</td>
<td>Loewenson, 1990</td>
<td>Cliffe, 1988b</td>
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<td>Hywel Davies, 1990</td>
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This praise is based on the fact that at the time of independence peasant farmers contributed only 3.6 per cent of total maize deliveries to the GMB in 1979/80 and that this has increased to 56 per cent in 1988/89 (Moyo, 1986; Financial Gazette, 22/12/1989). Apart from the three successive drought years between 1982 and 1984 which seriously affected crop production and forced Zimbabwe to import maize in 1984, the country is self-sufficient in most foodstuffs under normal conditions. Following the drought the country has built up maize reserves of 1.6 million tons and by mid-1990 this is expected to reach 2.4 million tons, which equates to three years requirements.

This success, it is argued, is due to the dramatic increases in production from the (black) peasant farmers whose output of maize and cotton has doubled between 1980-1986 (Weiner, 1989). With access to inputs, credit and markets which were previously restricted to them, the peasant farmers have responded well and produced higher yields. These production figures, however, mask the spatial and social inequalities within the agricultural sector (Weiner et al, 1985; Zinyama, 1987; Cliffe, 1988a, 1989b; Weiner 1988a, 1988b).

It is within this context that the resettlement policy must be evaluated. The resettlement schemes accounted for 11 per cent of total agricultural output in 1987/88 (Weiner, 1989). The targeted income of $400 from the sale of agricultural produce on the schemes can be realized, with Masur (1986-7) commenting that some families can earn at least that amount from maize, while those growing cotton and tobacco generally earn twice that amount. The survey undertaken at Soti Source indicated that for an average of 13.5 bags per hectare, $862 could be realized from having 3 hectares under maize (including that which would normally be withheld for household consumption). Furthermore, asserts Masur (1986-7), these results are clearly linked to ownership of all means of production.
A study by the British Overseas Development Administration completed in 1988 (Cusworth and Walker, 1988) claims that the resettlement schemes (Model A being supported by the British Government) have contributed to postwar reconstruction and stability in Zimbabwe, and now achieve an economic rate of return of 21 per cent. This makes the resettlement programme one of the most successful aid schemes in Africa. The study says that the new settler households have seen their living standards improve, particularly because the schemes offer better access to health and education. Furthermore, British experts feel that there may be room for more resettlement without adversely affecting the commercial farms, believing that the return of investment in the CAs would be even greater once the high cost of buying commercial farmland is avoided. However, the study warns, the resettlement programme cannot solve the long-term problem of unemployment as there is not sufficient land to cater for the 250,000 school leavers annually. Furthermore, peasant farming is not attractive to young people with good school qualifications (Cusworth and Walker, 1988; The Economist, 28/10/1989; The Financial Gazette, 10/11/1989).

Cusworth and Walker (1988) report that the orderly resettlement of so many families in a relatively short time must rank as an impressive achievement for a new regime. Further, the programme has made impressive strides towards achieving its principal objectives. In particular, the resettlement programme has achieved its immediate political objective of contributing towards post-war reconstruction and stability. Cusworth and Walker (1988, p13) conclude that "the whole exercise has been a very worthwhile investment from the perspective of the national economy as well as the settler".
The "success" of the resettlement schemes indicated above does not vindicate the policy itself. Resettlement has not yet had a significant impact on the overall distribution of population (Zinyana and Whitlow, 1986) with the fundamental problems of the CAs remaining unaltered. With the current population growth rate resulting in an annual increase of 30,000 to 50,000 families in the CAs, the resettlement programme can at best only provide a partial alleviation of the problem. Bywal Davies (1988) points to the need for an urbanization strategy, whilst Brown et al (1988) note that Zimbabwe has not resolved the land question and that coherent land policy is now, more than ever, desperately needed. Hence, the observation by Weiner et al (1985) that "the land question has still to be resolved" in Zimbabwe. The need for such a policy has been identified and highlighted earlier. Kinsey (1983) concludes his analysis of policy issues emerging from the resettlement programmes by noting that the arithmetic population growth will raise the number of inhabitants in the CAs above the crisis levels of 1980 when resettlement began, and as such the government will have to confront the intractable challenge of achieving an agrarian transformation within the Communal Areas. The central issue, he argues, is not land but rather people and productivity.

While Cliffe (1988b) disagrees with the basic premise of Kinsey's argument that the net effect of resettlement will be a decline in output due to poor levels of productivity, he asserts that the need is to farm high potential land intensively and speed up resettlement on lands previously designated for LCCP grazing, thereby leading to an increase in national output. He notes that "a detailed land use strategy, a detailed land use strategy, a detailed land use strategy...". Stephenson et al (1990) make the point that no explicit provision is made in the current policy for the future land needs of the settlers' children. In their view the schemes
will only support their populations for one generation, after which problems of landlessness and environmental degradation are likely to become as commonplace within the resettlement areas as they are within the CA's today. The view that increasing land degradation is threatening Zimbabwe's ability to increase food production to match population growth is supported by an Africa Press Service report which indicated that soil losses in the CA's are so severe that productive arable land may not sustain good yields in the next 35 - 50 years. The average annual soil from loss is between five and 100 tonnes and is likely to increase unless strict conservation measures are introduced (The Financial Gazette, 27/04/1990). By excluding lands of a higher agricultural potential in the resettlement process, Zinyama et al (1990) conclude that resettlement schemes in low-rainfall areas are becoming the loci of long-term dependence on government assistance - contrary to the objectives of the overall programme. There is therefore a need to explore the wider question of agrarian reform which might reduce such dependence on the state, a view shared by Zinyama (1986a), Hywel Davies (1988), Reynolds (1989), Mayo and Skalnes (1990), and Palmer (1990).

NEW THINKING ON THE LAND ISSUE

While land hunger remains a pressing concern, there nevertheless remains unused and under-utilised land which could become available for resettlement. As Zimbabwe's first decade of independence closes the entrenched provisions of the Lancaster House constitution, such as the clauses relating to land, have been removed. To assist government in formulating a post-Lancaster House agrarian strategy, a detailed land use inventory is therefore required.
The need for a comprehensive land policy to deal with the continuing land controversy and problems with the CAs has been recognized by the government. This issue began to receive considerable media attention, particularly with the expiry of the Lancaster House restrictions in April 1990. During the latter half of 1989, press reports indicated that government had returned land to the political agenda with an eye on both the expiry of the Lancaster House restrictions and the general election in 1990. The Senior Minister in the President's Office, Dr Joshua Nkomo said that 400,000 people in the CAs needed access to land and as such the government had to act. Dr Nkomo, addressing the Commercial Farmers' Union annual congress emphasized that the government was aware that resettlement alone could not solve the Communal Area problem and that the government, with UNDP assistance, would examine the possibilities of Communal Area re-organization as part of a wider agrarian reform policy (The Financial Gazette, 10/08/1989). During his election campaign, President Mugabe said that the government would not accept a situation where 4,000 white commercial farmers held most of the productive land in a country of 10 million people (The Financial Gazette, 23/03/1990).

President Mugabe, meanwhile, said that the government might soon be left with no alternative but to acquire farmland compulsorily for resettlement purposes. He added that while utilized land would not be affected, under-utilized land kept for speculative purposes could not be tolerated, and legislation would be enacted to allow the government to acquire such land (The Financial Gazette, 04/08/1989 and 27/04/1990). Furthermore, said President Mugabe, if finance was not available to purchase such land then the government would acquire it on credit. The President indicated that the government and MANSIPPF were unhappy that the pace of resettlement had slowed and that "... he wanted to see a completely new, comprehensive and aggressive resettlement
programme undertaken to benefit the landless" (The Financial Gazette, 25/08/89). The tenure aspect of the Communal Areas also needed to be addressed he said.

This political posturing on the part of the government leaders raised concern not only amongst the commercial farmers but in academic and diplomatic circles as well. The British High Commissioner in Harare expressed "concern" at the government's attitude while other diplomats feared that "rushed" agrarian reforms would harm Zimbabwe's reputation as a Third World food exporter. The Commercial Farmers' Union returned to its old arguments about agricultural efficiency and the need to improve productivity in all areas, particularly the CAs.

With the land debate once again a major policy issue, the need for closer scrutiny of the resettlement process became apparent. Reynolds (1988) pointed out that it must be accepted that not everyone can have a right to land. Land cannot remain a birthright as it is under tribal systems. Furthermore, the weaknesses of the resettlement policy had to be corrected before embarking on further programmes (Reynolds, 1989).

The Government announced a new land policy in January 1990, a draft of which was considered by the Cabinet. According to press reports, following the expiry of the Lancaster House restrictions, the state would expropriate commercial farmland and pay the owners in local currency where necessary. While the willing seller - willing buyer provision would remain, the government would reserve the right to purchase any land for public purposes. In addition, it was reported, the government intended to purchase an additional 6 million hectares (compared to 2.7 ha purchased between 1980 and 1990) which would be apportioned to communal and resettled farmers and displaced labourers (The Financial Gazette, 05/01/1990).
It was reported that the government should control agricultural land prices in Zimbabwe. The options on how this might be achieved include fixing prices per hectare by Natural Region or fixing prices on the basis of the original price, with an additional value for permanent improvements. The issue of a land tax is under review, with the existing rural land tax being replaced by a levy to be collected by rural councils from both the resettlement and communal farming sectors (The Financial Gazette, 05/01/1990).

The policy recommends that government legislate to limit ownership to no more than one farm unit by individuals or companies, with excess farms being placed on the market. Absentee land owners would not be allowed except in cases where the land was fully utilized. Foreign investment in the agricultural sector would only be allowed in activities where government felt that local technology and expertise was lacking, it is claimed (The Financial Gazette, 05/01/1990).

The hints provided by politicians and the press during the first half of 1990, on the contents of a National Land Policy for Zimbabwe, proved to be reasonably accurate. The National Land Policy was announced by the new Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, Dr W Mangwende, in parliament in August 1990. The salient features of this new policy as outlined by the Minister are:

1. Constitutional Amendments: the government intends to amend some provisions of the Constitution to enable it to acquire land and compensate the owner in local currency. (This was subsequently ameliorated with the coming of the Constitutional Amendments Bill in December 1990).

2. Land Legislation Act (1990): amendments to the legislation i.e. to amend article 26(1)(a) and (b) of the Act to allow all land owners to acquire institutional diversity.
Government will also amend Section 7(2) of the Act in order to increase the period in which the Minister has to state his interest in the land being offered for sale. This will allow time for adequate investigation by the relevant ministries prior to a decision being taken on whether to purchase the land or to issue a Certificate of No Present Interest. A Bill to amend the Land Acquisition Act to allow government to acquire land for resettlement on a planned basis is also envisaged in order to alleviate the current haphazard policy of acquiring land. The Minister indicated that 5 million hectares to resettle an additional 110 000 families was needed.

3. Control of land prices - government has decided to control land prices, with prices fixed at a realistic average per hectare by natural region and with the addition of the value of permanent improvements. The Minister indicated that the average price of land in Natural Region II had increased from $25 per hectare in 1980 to between $400 and $700 in 1990. This was making it increasingly difficult for the Government to purchase adequate land for resettlement.

4. Capital Gains Tax - once a fair price had been agreed upon, government will consider the removal of Capital Gains Tax for a farmer who sells a farm in order to buy another one, or to invest in the agricultural industry.

5. Land Tax - government has also decided to impose a land tax on the LSC farmer. This is to encourage the proper utilization of land and to avoid the habit of land purchases for speculative purposes only.

6. Land Inspection - in order to monitor the problems of both under utilization of land and absentee landlords, government has decided to strengthen both the Rural State Land Office and the Farm Management Section of the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement so that land inspections can be done more effectively.

7. The State farming sector (ADA) - it is recognised that the State farm sector should continue to intensify its agricultural operations and also to manage farms as an interim measure prior to actual resettlement.

8. Limiting farm ownership - government has decided to legislate against the ownership of more than one farm by an individual or company except in cases where examples are justifiable. In order to achieve efficiency and equity, this provision will consider the size and area of the farm, as indicated in paragraph 19.
9. Ownership by Zimbabwean absentee landlords - the government has decided that absentee landlords should not own agricultural land. Exemptions will be granted only where it has been demonstrated that the farm in question is not being under-utilized.

10. Maximum farm sizes - government will stipulate maximum and minimum farm sizes taking into account the different agro-ecological regions and types of farming practiced.

11. Land Sub-division - government has decided that land subdivision should only be allowed on the rationale of viable production systems based on established farming patterns.

12. Land ownership by foreigners - government has decided to enforce the principle contained in the foreign investment guidelines that foreigners should not own land in Zimbabwe. In cases where foreigners already own land, they should be encouraged to sell the land to government on the understanding that they be granted a long term lease with agreement by government to compensate for permanent improvements on the farm henceforth. Foreigners should only be involved in joint ventures, particularly in those areas where Zimbabweans lack the necessary skills and capital equipment.

13. Land Tenure System - the government intends to appoint a commission of land tenure experts to review the existing land tenure system in Zimbabwe and to submit recommendations to the government for consideration.

14. Settler selection - the government has decided to change the current settler selection system to give more emphasis to Master Farmers or to farmers with the potential to fully utilize land. Further, the government will emphasize the need to undertake concurrently both aspects of land resettlement and the Communal Area Re-organization Programme in order to ensure the productive utilization of all vacated land and land in the CAs. Government has made provision to fund projects on Communal Area Re-organization in the same way as resettlement schemes have been funded.

15. Structure of the agricultural industry - the government has decided to maintain for the time being the existing farming systems (see Chapter 4) and has further decided that the resettlement sector will be retained in a different form. In this regard, some form of security of land holding for resettlement is considered necessary. It is in the government's intention that in
future all the communal, resettlement and small-scale commercial farmers should become commercial farmers.

16. Promotion of the emergent black large-scale commercial farmers - the government has decided to promote emergent black large-scale commercial farmers in order to ensure continuity in production as well as the establishment of a more balanced racial compensation of the LSCF sector (The Financial Gazette, 03/08/1990).

In response to these new policy directions the Joint Presidents' Agricultural Committee (JPAC) (comprising the Commercial Farmers’ Union, the Zimbabwe National Farmers' Union and the National Farmers' Association) indicated that it believed the acquisition by the government of additional commercial farmland in Natural Regions II and III should be made under conditions which ensure that neither the continuity and production nor the levels of production will increase on the transfer of the land for resettlement. Agricultural land must be utilised on a sustainable, productive basis and as such, it argued, only people who prove competency as farmers should qualify for resettlement. Furthermore, the JPAC recommended that the government should adopt a National Livestock Policy and develop production and marketing strategies for all crops to efficiently stimulate the agrarian sector in Zimbabwe (The Financial Gazette, 03/08/1990 and 10/08/1990). On the New National Land Policy, the JPAC recommended that the government maintain the willing-seller willing-buyer approach and not to discriminate based on the status of landowners in terms of either the number of properties they own or the size of the properties. The basis for land acquisition should be whether the land is under productive utilisation or not. Further financial and human resources should be committed to the CA rehabilitation programme, and a programme be implemented to grant title to communal farmers who have proved that their operations are productive and sustainable. Future models of resettlement, the JPAC recommends, should grant title to farmers who can demonstrate their suitability
and repay Government over 40 years at no interest to defray costs (The Financial Gazette, 03/08/1990). In short, the JPAC felt that the New National Land Policy is more a set of principles than a policy, and fails to deal with the more fundamental issues facing Zimbabwean agriculture.

Under the New National Land Policy the government hoped to acquire 6 million hectares at an estimated book value of $3 billion and resettle 110 000 families. This would achieve the 162 000 families target for resettlement of the First Five Year National Development Plan. The Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Settlement, Dr Witness Mangwende, said that at the end of the resettlement programme the agricultural sector would compromise the following five major sectors:

i) resettlement areas - 8.3 million ha
ii) LSCF areas - 5 million ha
iii) SSCF areas - 1.3 million ha
iv) communal areas - 16.4 million ha
v) state farming sector - 2.4 million ha

The minister also pointed out that in recognition of the need to increase agricultural production, the selection criteria for people to be accommodated on resettlement schemes had been changed to focus on farmers who can efficiently utilise the land. In accordance with this requirement, more emphasis will be given to master farmers or those farmers with a demonstrated potential to fully utilise the land (The Financial Gazette, 12/10/1990, 01/11/1990).

This emphasis marks a departure from the resettlement of refugees and the landless in general which characterised the earlier resettlement policy. This confirms the view of Sinyema et al (1988) who point towards the political
marginalization of the rural population in Zimbabwe during the first decade of independence.

Financing the new land redistribution programme remains a major constraint. The government indicated that donor funding up to 55 percent of that required had been secured. The major donors to the resettlement programme are the British Overseas Development and Administration, the African Development Bank, the African Development Fund, the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development and the European Economic Community. However, according to an article in The Financial Gazette (19/10/1990) some major donors were reluctant to commit funds for the implementation of the programme because they felt the government would not be able to effectively implement it. The British Government, which had been a major donor to the initial programme, stated it was prepared to continue to assist resettlement in Zimbabwe on two conditions. These are that the willing seller—willing buyer provision, formerly entrenched in the constitution, be retained and that arrangements should be in hand for the timely efficient development of land to ensure that economic and social benefits are attained for those to be resettled (Palmer, 1990; The Financial Gazette, 19/10/1990).

Whilst the Zimbabwe government acknowledged that it does not have the capacity to implement the programme, attention has been given to personnel requirements in Agritex and the Department of Rural Development. Nevertheless, further attention to the institutional capacity within Zimbabwe and the need to secure additional funding is required if the redistribution programme is to have any meaningful impact. These issues are still to be resolved at the time of writing and no timetable has been put forward by the government for the implementation of the programme. However, with the passing of the Constitutional Amendment Act in December
1990, the government indicated that it was making $540 million available for the purchase of some six million hectares of arable farm land. This is well below the $3 billion market value of the land and has been criticized as being tantamount to "nationalization". The effect of this on Zimbabwe's resettlement programme and long term agricultural performance is still a matter of conjecture.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The redistribution and resettlement of commercial farmland in Zimbabwe remains at the centre of the government's attempts to transform Zimbabwean society. Despite the failure to reach the original targets of the Intensive and Accelerated Resettlement Programmes, the New National Land Policy announced in 1990 again emphasizes the importance attached to land redistribution by the ruling political hierarchy.

The pronouncements on land issues and the government's policy response indicate that resettlement and land redistribution will remain at the heart of agrarian reform in Zimbabwe. This is so despite suggestions that agrarian reform cannot take place without complementary efforts being made in the urban sector. Still lacking in these more recent developments is a comprehensive strategy dealing with the fundamental development issues facing the country, the focus remaining on the land per se.
"Zimbabwe has not resolved the land question that fuelled the liberation war; it has only postponed it" (Brown et al., 1988, p41).

"This constitutional amendment does not just cover nationalization of land, but all property" (Mr. H Elsworth, MP, commenting on the Constitutional Amendment Act, December 1990).

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation has been concerned with the issue of land reform and its subsequent impact on agricultural development in a developing country. The situation in Zimbabwe has been described with an overview provided of the historical context in which land division and alienation occurred. The situation at independence, when a dual economy was inherited, has also been discussed. This consequence of the earlier land legislation resulted in a highly unequal and disparate access to land and facilities amongst the Africans and Europeans in Zimbabwe.

With regard to land access and distribution, the response of the new majority-ruled government was to embark on a resettlement programme whereby members of the disadvantaged and destitute peasantry could acquire land and be assisted in the transformation of the means of production. The resettlement policy adopted after independence in Zimbabwe was discussed in detail, and the progress and problems of a particular resettlement scheme considered. An assessment of the resettlement policy and subsequent programme is undertaken, with suggestions provided on how to tackle the identified problems.
The problems in Zimbabwe relating to land distribution and the subsequent issues regarding agrarian transformation provide insight to some of the problems of agricultural transition and rural development in a post-colonial situation in Africa. This chapter will summarize the main findings and locate this research in the ongoing debate about land in Zimbabwe.

WHETHER ZIMBABWE?

This dissertation has revealed that the issues concerning land ownership and distribution have been at the core of attempts to organize the nature of society in Zimbabwe. This was true of the early settler attempts at land expropriation and division at the turn of the century. Successive governments during the colonial period used the Land Appointment Act and its successors to structure the colonial society based on the racial division of land. In this way the country became almost equally divided into European and African areas.

This research has endeavoured to illustrate the response to this burning issue of land, concentrating on the policy responses of the new government to the land question. The issue of land reform in Zimbabwe is considered in the context of rural development and contrasted to other similar efforts tried in Africa. The central theme is land and the manner in which it is utilized.

The main conclusion drawn is that during the decade of independence in Zimbabwe, the debate on the land controversy has gone full circle. The policy options acted upon in 1980 have been realised in the Intensive and Accelerated Resettlement Schemes of 1981 and 1982. The Soti Source Model A Resettlement Scheme is one of the oldest and largest
schemes, and investigations show that at the scheme level, progress has been made with the provision of infrastructure and the establishment of a viable small-scale farming community.

While the Scheme suffers from problems of co-ordination, disjointed government intervention and a scarcity of some inputs, these are problems general to the country's development, and the rural agricultural sector in particular. In the face of these constraints, the farmers at Soti Source are producing a surplus for sale, although the need for more careful utilization and repayment of credit is highlighted.

Against the national criteria for the establishment of resettlement schemes, Soti Source has benefited from adequate initial planning, location in a reasonable agro-ecological area and proximity to Gutu and the newly established Mapundawana growth point (see Zinyama, 1987). The Scheme has relatively good access to Masvingo, the provincial centre. The scheme provides a livelihood to a population in excess of 6 000, all of whom were considered destitute at the time of resettlement. Their improvement in standard of living is unquestioned, as is their entry into the cash economy.

However, Soti Source and the resettlement programme in general has not provided a solution to the fundamental issues which faced Zimbabwe at independence. In fact, some of the schemes are in danger of becoming elitist islands in a sea of rural poverty. Moyo (1986) confirms this by estimating that at most only 20 per cent of the peasantry gained from the reforms which he concludes is leading to the emergence of "kulakisation" in some areas, suggesting further polarisation of the existing agrarian structure. In fact, Drakakis-Smith (1987) asserts that rural poverty has
increased since independence, a finding which is supported by other observers.

The Resettlement Programme per se has not reduced Zimbabwe's dependence on a small group of commercial farmers, although agrarian policy in general has stimulated the peasant farmers - of which those on resettlement schemes are a very small portion. As has been highlighted in the discussion the resettlement schemes have to be considered as part of a national agrarian strategy which embraces all aspects of rural development in Zimbabwe. There are no signs that government is moving in this direction.

The Resettlement Programme has not solved the unequal distribution of land in Zimbabwe or alleviated landlessness in the Communal Areas. Indeed, there are still 4 400 commercial farmers (predominantly white although there are estimated to be 400 black commercial farmers now) on 15 million hectares, against seven million peasant farmers and their families on some 19 million hectares of Communal Land. Despite the efforts of the Resettlement Programme and government emphasis towards the peasant sector, spatial development patterns in Zimbabwe remain remarkably uneven.

Another objective of the original policy was the transformation towards a more socialist mode of commodity production within the rural areas. The resettlement models designed to achieve this, notably Model B and Model C schemes are, however, in the minority.

With the government's declared policy of moving Zimbabwe towards socialism being hindered by a number of constraining factors both internal and external in nature, Steynmann and Cliffe (1987) contend that government planning initially placed heavy emphasis on reconstruction rather than transformation and that despite its commitment to Marxist -
Leninism, ZANU(PF) presides over an unequivocally capitalist economy. Munslow (1985, p.49) points out that "land reform without the socialization of agricultural production clearly does not herald a socialist transition in the rural sector".

Nevertheless, despite the resettlement policy's failure to achieve a national transformation in both the mode of production and redistribution of land, some success has been achieved at the local level. Schemes, such as highlighted by Soti Source, do achieve a favourable economic rate of return and the production capacity of the rural sector has in general exceeded expectations. Furthermore, the redistribution of land in Zimbabwe has been the most ambitious of its type anywhere in Africa.

Despite problems encountered in the implementation of resettlement, Zimbabwe has made significant achievements. The resettlement of 52,000 families on 2,458,082 hectares is the largest exercise of its kind to be undertaken in independent Africa. The only comparable exercise is that which occurred in Kenya (see Chapter 2), where one third of this amount of land was transferred over a period of ten years. Abrams (1979) hailed the Kenyan exercise as a "mammoth undertaking", and most economists agree that the Kenyan experience was fairly successful (Dua, 1986). The state farm models tried elsewhere in Africa have generally proved to be uneconomic, over-capitalised and very expensive (Dua, 1989).
transforming the agrarian sector have been discussed. The issues raised point to the need for a national agrarian strategy, which will encompass both the Communal Areas and the question of under-utilization of land in the large scale commercial farming areas. The recently announced new National Land Policy (Chapter 8) can be seen as a move in this direction.

The concern now appears to be land redistribution at the expense of the Commercial Areas, while no attempt at a national agrarian strategy or linkage with an urban development strategy has been made. In dealing with the under-utilization of land in the LSCF areas, a complete inventory of land use, as proposed by Munslow (1985), needs to be carried within a national development framework dealing with agrarian and rural development issues. The weaknesses of the existing schemes need correcting and issues such as land tenure and methods of production need to be further clarified. "No solution to the problems of "over-population" and "over-utilisation" of land in the Communal Areas should be considered in isolation from an agrarian reform strategy that includes major land distribution" (Cliffe, 1988c, p57).

The New National Land Policy is yet another attempt by government to overcome the problems in the agricultural sector. But little attention is given to the specific problems of the SSA as the policy deals only with land issues in the LSCF sector. The question of an agrarian reform strategy to deal with issues pertinent to the agricultural sector as a whole should needs to receive urgent attention at higher levels of government.
LESSONS FROM COMPARATIVE EXPERIENCE

The land policy pursued in Zimbabwe has followed the direction taken in Kenya. In Tanzania the government was able to implement policies that concurred with its ideological direction without any of the external constraints, such as those which faced Zimbabwe. In Tanzania, tenure and the methods of productivity were revolutionized and a relatively dispersed population brought into nucleated village communities in order to benefit from communal production, with the emphasis on large-scale agricultural projects and state farms.

The Zimbabwean response also differs substantially from that in Mozambique, which was also reviewed in Chapter 2. In Mozambique the exodus of the Portuguese settlers following independence led to the de facto nationalization of land. The nationalization of land without compensation was made possible by what Binda (1983) calls the concept of "replacement." The Lancaster House constitution pre-empted wholesale nationalization in Zimbabwe, while there was no major exodus of white farmers.

Thus, given the land tenure and African responses have had a dramatic, directly negative impact on agricultural production in these countries. The altered means of production were not met with adequate capital, equipment and trained manpower and hence the poor response. The characteristic of the subsistence systems and poor performance by their practitioners also had an effect on the national land reform. Furthermore, the large-group use of land brought about by the large-scale expropriation meant that the peasants were not able to maintain their pre-expropriation enterprising and enterprising nature. The rural sector in Zimbabwe was to be following the experiences in Kenya.
The Zimbabwean experience has parallels with Kenya, and as such has received the attention of numerous authors, among them Bratton (1977) who notes that one of the most significant aspects of land transfer in Kenya was the extent to which the mode and relations of agricultural production established under colonialism were not fundamentally altered, in part because the nature of the resettlement schemes did not challenge the colonial economic structure. The Zimbabwean situation is similar with the Lancaster House conditions, as elaborated upon in Chapter 5, preventing any major thrust to challenge the prevailing economic order.

The Kenyan programme created 49 400 holdings averaging 12 hectares. The size of the holdings in Zimbabwe is much larger, averaging between 55 and 65 hectares (Hazelwood, 1985; Due, 1986). The difference is attributed to the large area set aside for communal grazing in Zimbabwe. Hazelwood (1985) argues that the plot sizes in Zimbabwe are above the optimum size and that smaller plots would be more appropriate for the supply of household labour. Due (1986) nonetheless, contends that the Zimbabwean size may be more viable in the longer term. However, in the short to medium term, given the land hunger and income inequality, it may be better to resettle more families on smaller hectarages and as employment opportunities in other sectors increase, allow the amalgamation of the smaller plots into more viable sizes.

In contrast to the Zimbabwean schemes, Kenya charged each family for land (repayable over 30 years) and for other development assets (cattle, ploughs). And in contrast to the leases in Zimbabwe, the Kenya government surveyed, demarcated and gave individual title to its smallholder-settlers (Due, 1986). The continuing, and increasing, differentiation amongst the rural sector in Zimbabwe also seems to be following the experience in Kenya, where
agricultural growth enhanced social and economic differentiation and generated some very negative social impacts (i.e., increased landlessness, malnutrition and urban squatting). Weiner (1988b) concludes that having been successful in stimulating agricultural growth, the challenge now facing Zimbabwe is to ensure that concerns for equity are not overlooked.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

As Zimbabwe ends its first decade of independence, a critical evaluation is being made of the progress made in agricultural development and the redressing of the problems of the Communal Areas and the unequal distribution of land. The New National Land Policy and the passing of the Constitutional Amendment Act in December 1990 following the lapse of the guarantees of the Lancaster House constitutional clauses, appears to indicate that the government is considering large scale land redistribution and resettlement as the solution to rural landlessness (particularly in the CAS) and the persisting inequality in land holdings in Zimbabwe. No clear agrarian strategy however has been spelt out.

These moves are in spite of the earlier Intensive and Accelerated Resettlement Programmes having been only partially successful in fulfilling their objectives. The Resettlement Programme in Zimbabwe has not challenged the existing methods of production to any significant degree and the question now is whether the latest attempt by the government will result in the fundamental restructuring of the rural economy. Currently, resettlement schemes in Zimbabwe contribute 11 per cent towards total agricultural production. The danger remains that the existing problems within the Communal Areas could be replicated on both the existing and proposed resettlement schemes and so fail to
overcome the problem of rural differentiation. The land issues remains crucial in any proposed agrarian strategy and resettlement should be tackled in this context. It has been shown that resettlement per se will not alleviate the pressures of the Communal Areas. The need, therefore, is for a comprehensive land reform and redistribution policy to be formulated as part of an on-going agrarian transformation and rural development strategy, of which the New National Land Policy could become an integral part. The need for specific attention to be given to an urbanization strategy has also been identified in order to complement progress made in the rural areas of the country.

Investigations into the socio-economic conditions at Soti Source have shown that despite the constraints, the resettled farmers have responded well in their new environment and are participating in the market economy. The distribution of the scheme is a key factor to their overall potential success. While progress has been achieved with both land reform and rural development in Zimbabwe, the State nevertheless remains constrained by financial, administrative and implementing constraints despite the removal of the Lancaster House restrictions on property acquisition. The manner in which the State chooses to implement these impediments, and in what overall policy and strategy context, will determine the nature and progress of agrarian reform in Zimbabwe in the 1990s. A bold and decisive approach is required if Zimbabwe is to continue to move away from thetagnosis inherited from her past.
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MINISTRY OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

RESETTLEMENT REGISTRATION FORM

This form must be returned to your Resettlement Officer by

1. Name and RC/ID card number

   District ..............................................................
   Chief ..............................................................
   Kral ..............................................................

2. Are you married? ................. If so, how many wives?

3. How many children and other dependants do you have living with you?

4. Are you currently employed?

5. (a) Are you a returned refugee from Mozambique

         or Zambia ..................................................... or Botswana?

         (b) If you are, when did you leave Zimbabwe?

         (c) When did you return to Zimbabwe?

6. (a) Have you lived in a protected village or keep?

         (b) If you have, where?

         (c) When did you enter?  When did you leave?

7. Do you have any land in a Tribal Trust Land?

       If so, which Tribal Trust Land?

       and the approximate number of hectares?

8. Do you own any livestock? 

       If so, how many:

       cattle .......... goats .......... sheep .......... donkeys?

9. Do you have a house in the Tribal Trust Land?

10. Do you own any of the following — plough ........ scotch cart ....

      harrows .......... cultivator .......... other implements (details)?

11. How many bags do you keep of maize .... mealie meal .... other grain?

12. How old are you?

I UNDERSTAND THAT IF AM ALLOCATED A LAND HOLDING IN A

   SETTLEMENT SCHEME IT MUST BE PERSONALLY OCCUPIED BY ME

   AND THAT I WILL BE REQUIRED TO GIVE UP ALL RIGHTS TO LAND

   IN THE TRIBAL TRUST LAND.

I certify that the information I have given is true and correct.

Date: .................................................. Signed: ..................................

TO BE COMPLETED BY A PERSON OF STANDING WHO KNOWS THE

APPLICANT

I certify that I know the applicant personally and that to the best of my knowledge

and belief the information he has given is true and correct.

Signed: .................................................. Name and address:
MINISTRY OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

RESETTLEMENT REGISTRATION FORM

This form must be returned to your Resettlement Office by...

1. Name and RC/ID card number

   District

   Chief

   Kraal

2. Are you married? If so, how many wives?

3. How many children and other dependants do you have living with you?

4. Are you currently employed?

5. (a) Are you a returned refugee from Mozambique or Zambia or Botswana?
     or
   (b) if so, when did you leave Zimbabwe?
   (c) When did you return to Zimbabwe and how did you return?

6. (a) Have you lived in a protected village or keep?
   (b) If so, where?
   (c) At what date did you leave?

7. Do you have any land in a Tribal Trust Land?
   If so, which Tribal Trust Land?
   and the approximate number of hectares?

8. Do you own any livestock? If so, how many:
   cattle
   goats
   sheep
   donkeys?

9. Do you have a house in the Tribal Trust Land?

10. Do you own any of the following — plough, scotch cart, harrows, cultivator, other implements (details)?

11. How many bags do you have of maize, mealie meal, other grain?

12. How old are you?

I UNDERSTAND THAT IF AN ALLOCATED A LAND HOLDING IN A SETTLEMENT SCHEME IT MUST BE PERSONALLY OCCUPIED BY ME AND THAT I WILL BE REQUIRED TO GIVE UP ALL RIGHTS TO LAND IN THE TRIBAL TRUST LAND.

I certify that the information I have given is true and correct.

Date: Signed:

TO BE COMPLETED BY A PERSON OF STANDING WHO KNOWS THE APPLICANT

I know the applicant personally and that to the best of my knowledge and belief the information he has given is true and complete.

Signed: Name and office:
ANNEXURE B

GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE

MINISTRY OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

TEMPORARY PERMIT TO CULTIVATE

Issued by the MINISTRY OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT (hereinafter referred to as "the MINISTER"), in terms of section 6 of the Rural Land Act [Chapter 155], to:

........................................... (hereinafter referred to as "the HOLDER").

The MINISTER hereby permits the HOLDER to cultivate an area of State Land, approximately ....... hectares in area, known as ................................................................. and as indicated on the sketch plan attached hereto for a period of one year commencing on .................................................................

This permit is subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. In the event of there arising any dispute as to the boundaries or location of the land which may be cultivated in terms of this permit the decision of the MINISTER shall be final.

2. The MINISTER may at any time replace this permit with some other form of agreement under such terms and conditions as he may determine.

3. This permit may be revoked if, at his sole discretion, the MINISTER decides that the HOLDER has failed to comply with any of its terms or conditions or has failed to make proper use of the holding.

4. The MINISTER may, for any public purpose, revoke this permit at any time and under such conditions as he thinks fit on payment to the HOLDER of such compensation as the MINISTER may determine.

5. The holding shall be used solely for agricultural purposes for the HOLDER'S exclusive benefit.

6. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall—
   (i) personally, actively and continuously carry on agricultural activities on the holding to the satisfaction of the MINISTER;
   (ii) comply in all respects with the provisions of, and regulations made under, the Natural Resources Act [Chapter 130], the Animal Health Act [Chapter 127], the Noxious Weeds Act [Chapter 127] and all other laws relating to soil husbandry, farming practices and livestock management and shall further comply with all instructions which the MINISTER may issue for—
      (a) the prevention of damage to the sources and courses of streams;
      (b) the prevention and control of plant and animal pests and diseases;
      (c) the control or eradication of any plants harmful to crops and livestock;
      (d) the protection of the holding against soil erosion.

7. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall permanently and personally reside on the residential site allocated to him by the MINISTER.

8. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall renounce and forgo all rights to cultivate any land or pasture cattle in any tribal trust land.

9. The HOLDER shall not construct or erect, nor permit nor cause to be constructed or erected, any building or other structure on the holding.

10. The HOLDER shall pay all rates, taxes or other charges which are levied upon the holding by competent authority.

11. The HOLDER shall not, without the prior written consent of the MINISTER, engage in any other occupation or employment during the currency of this permit.
ZIMBABWE

MINISTRY OF LANDS, RESSETLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Permit number ........................................

PERMIT TO RESIDE

Issued by the MINISTRY OF LANDS, RESSETLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT (hereinafter referred to as "the MINISTER"), in terms of section 6 of the Rural Land Act [Chapter 155], to:

..................................................

(hereinafter referred to as "the HOLDER").

The MINISTER hereby permits the HOLDER to reside on the residential site ................................

..................................................

(hereinafter referred to as "the said site").

This permit is subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. The MINISTER may renew this permit and, at any time during the currency thereof, including any renewal, may, without notice, replace it with some other form of agreement on such terms and conditions as he may determine.

2. This permit may be revoked if, at his sole discretion, the MINISTER decides that the holder has failed to comply with any of its terms and conditions.

3. The MINISTER may, for any public purpose, revoke this permit at any time and under such conditions as he thinks fit on payment to the HOLDER of such compensation as the MINISTER may determine.

4. The said site shall be used for residential purposes for the accommodation of the HOLDER and his immediate family only.

5. The HOLDER shall maintain the said site in a clean, sanitary and tidy condition and shall comply with any instructions that the MINISTER may issue for the upkeep of the said site and the provision of services and the maintenance of sanitary conditions.

6. The HOLDER shall pay all rates, taxes or other charges which may be levied on the said site by competent authority.

7. The HOLDER shall not carry on or allow any other person to carry on any trading, commercial or industrial operations on the said site.

8. The MINISTER, or any person authorised by him, shall have the right, free of charge and without compensation, to lay, construct and maintain roads, bore-holes, pipelines, electric lines, sewers, drains and ancillary works upon or under the said site.

9. On the expiry or revocation of this permit no compensation shall be payable to the HOLDER for any improvements effected by him on the said site:

Provided that the HOLDER shall be entitled, within a period of three months after the expiry or revocation of the permit, to remove any buildings and improvements constructed or affected by him on the said site.

Any buildings or improvements that are not removed by the HOLDER within the said period of three months shall become the property of the MINISTER, who may deal with them as he thinks fit.

10. Any act required or permitted to be performed by the MINISTER in terms of this permit may be performed on behalf of the MINISTER by such officer in the public service as he may designate.

11. If any permit issued to the HOLDER by the MINISTER, permitting the HOLDER to cultivate or pasture stock on State land, is revoked, the MINISTER may, in his sole discretion, immediately revoke this permit.

Issued at ........................................... this ........ day of ............................................., 19... .

..................................................

(Designated Official) ..................................................

..................................................

on behalf of the Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, in terms of Statutory Instrument 347 of 1980.
ZIMBABWE

MINISTRY OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

PERMIT TO CULTIVATE

Issued by the MINISTRY OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT (hereinafter referred to as “the MINISTER”), in terms of section 6 of the Rural Land Act [Chapter 155] to:

(Designated Official) on behalf of the Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, in terms of Statutory Instrument 247 of 1980.

APPENDIX H (2) (Paragraph 8.2.)

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This permit is subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. In the event of there arising any dispute as to the boundaries or location of the land which may be cultivated in terms of this permit the decision of the MINISTER shall be final.

2. The MINISTER may renew this permit and, at any time during the currency thereof, including any renewal, may, without notice, impose or vary any conditions or restrictions as he may determine.

3. This permit may be revoked if, at his sole discretion, the MINISTER decides that the HOLDER has failed to comply with any of its terms or conditions or has failed to make proper use of the holding.

4. The MINISTER may, for any public purpose, revoke this permit at any time and under such conditions as he thinks fit on payment to the HOLDER of such compensation as the MINISTER may determine.

5. The HOLDER shall be used solely for agricultural purposes for the HOLDER'S exclusive benefit.

6. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall:

   (i) personally, actively and continuously carry on agricultural activities on the holding to the satisfaction of the MINISTER;

   (ii) comply in all respects with the provisions of, and regulations made under, the Natural Resources Act [Chapter 159], the Animal Health Act [Chapter 156], the Noxious Weeds Act [Chapter 127] and all other laws relating to soil husbandry, farming practices and livestock management and shall further comply with all instructions which the MINISTER may issue for:

      (a) the prevention of damage to the courses and courses of streams;

      (b) the prevention and control of plant and animal pests and diseases;

      (c) the control or eradication of any plants harmful to crops and livestock;

      (d) the protection of the holding against soil erosion;

      (e) the carrying out of any other measure that may be determined to be reasonably necessary to ensure that the holder complies with clause 6 (i) herein.

7. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall permanently and personally reside on the residential site allocated to him by the MINISTER.

8. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall not cause or permit to be caused any building or other structure on the holding.

9. The HOLDER shall not construct or erect, or permit not to be constructed or erected, any building or other structure on the holding.

10. The HOLDER shall not cause or permit to be constructed or erected on the holding any building or other structure on the holding.

11. The HOLDER shall not, without the prior written consent of the MINISTER, engage in any occupation or employment during the currency of this permit.

12. The HOLDER shall not carry on or allow any other person to carry on any trading, commercial or industrial operations on the holding.

13. The HOLDER shall not in any way carry on or cause to be carried on any business or other occupation or employment which the MINISTER considers to be inimical to the interests of the holder.

14. The MINISTER, or any person authorized by him, shall have the right, free of charge and without compensation, to lay, construct and maintain roads, bore-holes, pipelines, electric lines, sewerage, drains and ancillary works upon or under the holding.

15. Any act required or permitted to be performed by the MINISTER in terms of this permit may be performed on behalf of the MINISTER by such officer in the public service as he may designate.

16. If any permit issued to the HOLDER by the MINISTER, permitting the HOLDER to reside or depasture stock on State land, is revoked, the MINISTER may in his sole discretion immediately revoke this permit.

Issued at ...................... this ........... day of .............. 19......
ZIMBABWE

MINISTRY OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

PERMIT TO DEPASTURE STOCK

Issued by the MINISTER OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT (hereinafter referred to as "the MINISTER"), in terms of section 6 of the Rural Land Act [Chapter 15:5], to:

The MINISTER hereby permits the HOLDER to depasture stock, not exceeding in number the equivalent of ........... livestock units on the State land known as .............. (hereinafter referred to as "the said State Land").

For the purposes of this permit the categories of stock shown in the first column shall be equal to the number of livestock units shown in the second column:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First column</th>
<th>Second column</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle under the age of 2 years</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle over the age of 2 years</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep and goats under the age of 1 year</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep and goats over the age of 1 year</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This permit is subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. In case there being any dispute as to the total number of livestock units equivalent to the stock being depastured in terms of this permit the decision of the MINISTER shall be final.

2. The MINISTER may renew this permit and, at any time during the currency thereof, including any renewal, may, without notice, replace it with some other form of agreement on such terms and conditions as he may determine.

3. This permit may be revoked at any time if, at his sole discretion, the MINISTER decides that the HOLDER has failed to comply with any of its terms or conditions or has depastured stock in excess of the number permitted.

4. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall comply in all respects with the provisions of, and regulations made under, the Natural Resources Act [Chapter 15:0], the Animal Health Act [Chapter 12:7] and all other laws relating to soil husbandry, farming practices and livestock management and shall further comply with all instructions in respect of the said State Land which the MINISTER may issue for:
   (a) the prevention of damage to the sources or courses of public streams;
   (b) the prevention and control of animal pests and diseases;
   (c) the control or eradication of plants harmful to livestock;
   (d) the maintenance of livestock carrying capacity through grazing and livestock management;
   (e) the protection of the soil against erosion.

5. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall permanently and personally reside on the residential site allocated to him by the MINISTER.

6. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall renounce and forgo all rights to cultivate land or depasture stock in any communal land.

7. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall not, without the prior written consent of the MINISTER, engage in any other employment or occupation.

8. The HOLDER shall not without the prior written consent of the MINISTER, construct or erect any building or other structure on the said State Land.

9. The HOLDER shall not carry on any trading, commercial or industrial operation on the said State Land.

10. The HOLDER shall not by any act prevent or attempt to prevent any other person from exercising any right to depasture stock on the said State Land.

11. The HOLDER shall not, without the prior written permission of the MINISTER, cultivate, cut any trees on, or remove any timber, grass or other vegetation from, the said State Land.

12. Any act required or permitted to be performed by the MINISTER in terms of this permit may be performed on behalf of the MINISTER by such officer in the public service as he may designate.

13. If any permit issued to the HOLDER by the MINISTER, permitting the holder to cultivate or reside on State Land, is revoked, the MINISTER may in his sole discretion immediately revoke this permit.

Issued at ........................................ (Designation of Official) ........................................

........................................ (Designation of Official) ........................................

........................................, on behalf of the Minister of Lands, Resettlement and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LAND CLASS</th>
<th>MAJOR USE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>% of scheme area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Arable</td>
<td>Few limitations. Suitable for long continued cropping</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Arable</td>
<td>Moderate hazards. Cropping with adequate protection</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Arable</td>
<td>Severe hazards. Cropping only with elaborate protection or short periods in rotation.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Arable</td>
<td>V. Severe hazards. Keep mainly under perennial vegetation. Only occasional careful cropping.</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vw (incl. V)</td>
<td>Arable</td>
<td>Seasonally waterlogged. Cropping only with special practices.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vw (incl. V)</td>
<td>Grazing</td>
<td>Permanent grazing or afforestation due to severe slope or soil limits.</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Grazing</td>
<td>Hill; rough grazing or afforestation. V. susceptible to deterioration.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>Grazing</td>
<td>TOTAL GRAZING</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>Wildlife</td>
<td>Excessive limitations</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL | 100
1. **INTRODUCTION**

This questionnaire is being carried out as part of a Master of Arts thesis which is investigating the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme in Zimbabwe, with particular reference to the Soti Source Model A Resettlement Scheme.

All information gathered in this survey will be regarded as strictly confidential and will only be used for empirical and study purposes.

2. **GENERAL INFORMATION**

DATE : ..........

NAME OF INTERVIEWER : ................................

NAME OF PARTICIPANT : ...................................

SEX : ............

AGE : ............

IS THE RESPONDENT A DECISION-MAKER? YES NO
3. ORIGIN AND SELECTION OF SETTLERS

ORIGIN OF PARTICIPANT: ................................................

WHERE DID YOU (AND YOUR FAMILY) LIVE PRIOR TO RESETTLEMENT?

................................................

WAS THAT YOUR TRADITIONAL HOME? YES NO

IF NO. ELABORATE (eg. effects of the war, refugee camps, etc.) ................................................

................................................

................................................

................................................

MUCH OF THE FOLLOWING FACILITIES WERE AVAILABLE? WHICH?

1) Dptanks YES NO

2) Schools YES NO

3) Clinics YES NO

4) Shops YES NO

5) Amount of land - arable ...........................................

- grazing ................................................

6) Churches YES NO

7) Other facilities (specify) ...........................................

WERE YOU RESPONSIBLE FOR YOUR OWN LAND, CROPS, ETC., AND ABLE TO MAKE DECISIONS EFFECTING THESE? (SPECIFY) YES NO

................................................

................................................
ROLE AND STATUS OF WOMEN WITH REGARD TO
DECISION-MAKING

a) WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD

b) FOOD PRODUCTION AND OTHER MATTERS

WHY DID YOU "VOLUNTEER" FOR RESettlement?
GIVE REASONS:

DID YOU CHOOSE
a) Any resettlement scheme
b) Gofi Source

WHO MADE THE DECISION TO RESettle WITHIN THE
HOUSEHOLD?

a) Males
b) Females
c) Family/group discussion
### How Many People Live Permanently in Your Household?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELATIONSHIP TO HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD</th>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>SEX</th>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>WAGE EARNER (YES/NO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Have You (And Your Family's) Expectations About Resettlement Been Met by Participating in the Scheme?

Yes | No

**If No**, Give Reasons

- [ ]
- [ ]
- [ ]

### Benefits of Being on the Scheme

- **Amount of land available**: Yes | No
- **Soil type**: Yes | No
- **Housing available**: Yes | No
- **Financial assistance**: Yes | No
- **Inputs/extension**: Yes | No
- **Schools**: Yes | No
- **Clinics**: Yes | No
- **Services** - (Specify)
  - eg. shops, bus services, etc.
  - [ ]
  - [ ]
- **Others** - (Specify)
  - [ ]
  - [ ]
4. TYPE OF LAND HOLDING AND LAND-USE

HOW MUCH LAND DO YOU HAVE ACCESS TO?

a) Within the scheme
b) Outside the Scheme

(State how much and where)

WHY ARE YOU ELIGIBLE TO USE THIS LAND?

ON THE SCHEME, WHAT TYPE (AND SIZE) OF LAND DO YOU HAVE ACCESS TO?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>SIZE (m²/ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Garden/homestead plots</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arable land</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grazing land</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Specify)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DO YOU AND YOUR FAMILY HAVE ACCESS TO ENOUGH LAND? YES NO

WHO PLOUGHED

a) Your lands (eg. self, family, etc.)
b) How was it ploughed?
   (eg. oxen, tractor, etc.)
c) Who owns the oxen, tractor, etc?.
d) How much did it cost? $

CROPS

WHAT TYPE OF CROPS WERE PRODUCED?

TO WHOM DO YOU SELL ANY PRODUCE?

a) Own (family) consumption
b) Scheme management
c) Other participants on the scheme
d) Earners
e) Other (Specify)
LIVESTOCK

HOW MUCH LIVESTOCK DO YOU KEEP?
(state numbers)

a) Poultry

b) Goats

c) Cattle

d) Sheep

e) Others (Specify)

WHERE IS THE LIVESTOCK GRAZED?
DISTANCE FROM HOMESTEAD?

WHO TENDS (LOOKS AFTER) THE LIVESTOCK?

IS THERE ENOUGH GRAZING LAND

WHAT MAJOR PROBLEMS DO YOU HAVE WITH YOUR LIVESTOCK?

EXTENSION

DO YOU FEEL YOU RECEIVE ADEQUATE/ENOUGH ADVICE FROM EXTENSION OFFICERS?

WHAT TYPE OF ADVICE DO YOU RECEIVE (SPECIFY)?

OTHER

IS THE HOUSEHOLD ENGAGED IN PRODUCING OTHER GOODS OR SERVICES (eg. Selling firewood, sewing, renting, animals, etc.)

IF YES, SPECIFY

APPROXIMATE AMOUNT EARNED IN THIS WAY $
TECHNOLOGY

WHAT TOOLS/EQUIPMENT DO YOU
[ ] a) Own
[ ] b) Have access to

LIST TYPE AND QUANTITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tool</th>
<th>(A) Own</th>
<th>(B) Access To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hoe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plough (hand)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plough (tractor drawn)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft animal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheel barrow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garden fork</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rake</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sickle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saw</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Axe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do you use hired labour (other than household/family members) on your plot? Yes No

Are you satisfied with the living you make as a farmer? Yes No

Would you say you are better off since joining this scheme? Yes No

State reasons for your answer

..................................................

..................................................
5. CONSUMPTION RELATED QUESTIONS

DO YOU HAVE ANY PROBLEMS IN OBTAINING YOUR FUEL REQUIREMENTS?          YES    NO

IF YES, GIVE REASONS
..................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................

APPROXIMATE COST (MONTHLY) $ ............

DO YOU HAVE ANY PROBLEMS WITH WATER SUPPLY?          YES    NO

IF YES, GIVE REASONS
..................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................

ARE ALL YOUR CHILDREN OF SCHOOL-GOING AGE ATTENDING SCHOOLS?          YES    NO

IF NO, WHY NOT?
..................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................

HAVE YOU (OR MEMBERS OF THE HOUSEHOLD) TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF OTHER EDUCATION COURSES AVAILABLE ON THE SCHEME?          YES    NO
(eg. Literacy Classes)

IF YES, STATE WHICH
..................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................

HOW MANY MEMBERS OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD HAVE PASSED?

- STANDARD I .................................
- JUNIOR CERTIFICATE ...............
- OTHER (SPECIFY) ...............
WHY HAVE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSEHOLD NOT COMPLETED THEIR SCHOOLING?

DO YOU (OR MEMBERS OF THE HOUSEHOLD) MAKE USE OF THE HEALTH FACILITIES AVAILABLE ON THE SCHEME? YES NO

DO YOU (OR MEMBERS OF THE HOUSEHOLD) EVER VISIT A TRADITIONAL HEALER? YES NO

IF YES, FOR WHAT TYPE OF COMPLAINTS? YES NO

ARE THERE ANY PROBLEMS RELATED TO HOUSING, PROCURING BUILDING MATERIALS, ETC? YES NO

ARE THERE ANY MAJOR PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED WITH TRANSPORT? YES NO

WHERE DO YOU (OR MEMBERS OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD) DO MOST OF YOUR SHOPPING?
DO YOU EVER GO SHOPPING IN THE LARGER TOWNS? YES NO
IF YES, WHERE AND WHY?

ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE
- Postal Services YES NO
- Telephone Services YES NO
- Banking Services YES NO

AVAILABLE ON THE SCHEME?

6. FOOD AND NUTRITION

FOOD ITEMS WITH FREQUENCY OF CONSUMPTION
(eg. daily, weekly, etc.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAIZE/BADZA</td>
<td>.........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BREAD</td>
<td>.........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEANS</td>
<td>.........</td>
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<tr>
<td>CABBAGE</td>
<td>.........</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPINACH</td>
<td>.........</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOMATOES</td>
<td>.........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROUNDNUTS</td>
<td>.........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILK (FRESH/SOUR)</td>
<td>.........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGGS</td>
<td>.........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEAT/CHICKEN/FISH</td>
<td>.........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUGAR</td>
<td>.........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRUIT</td>
<td>.........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BREAD (OR HOME BROWN)</td>
<td>.........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>.........</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Is there a time in "normal years" when food is short?  
   Yes  No

If yes, which months (Mark with an X)
JAN  FEB  MAR  APR  MAY  JUN  JUL  AUG  SEPT  OCT  NOV  DEC

2. Where do you get extra food when it is required?

3. Do you and your family get
   a) More than enough food
   b) Enough food
   c) Not enough food
   d) Very little food

7. Organization-orientated questions

Please complete the following table on you and your family's involvement in community organizations, clubs, churches, etc. on the scheme.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of club/organization</th>
<th>Major activity</th>
<th>Benefits to household</th>
<th>Who in H/H is involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

What type of projects, if any, do you feel are needed on the scheme? (Specify and give reasons)

******************************************************************************
ARE YOU AWARE OF ANY PROPOSED PROJECT OR DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY WHICH IS GOING TO TAKE PLACE ON THE SCHEME IN THE NEAR FUTURE?  

YES  NO

IF YES, SPECIFY WHAT PROJECT AND YOUR OPINION THEREOF?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

DO YOU THINK THE SETTLERS ARE ABLE TO UNDERTAKE PROJECTS AND IMPLEMENT THEM SUCCESSFULLY?  

YES  NO

IF YES, WHICH TYPE OF PROJECT?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

8. CONCLUSIONS

PLEASE INDICATE WHAT YOU SEE AS BEING THE MAJOR PROBLEMS OF THE SCHEME?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

WHO DO YOU THINK IS/ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR SOLVING THESE PROBLEMS?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

ARE YOU HAPPY/SATISFIED WITH LIVING ON THE SCHEME?  

YES  NO

GIVE REASONS

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------
WOULD YOU PREFER TO LIVE ELSEWHERE?

IF YES, WHERE

a) On another scheme A
b) In a communal area B
c) In town C
d) Elsewhere (Specify) D

GIVE REASONS

------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------

WHO DO YOU THINK IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CREATING THIS SCHEME AND OTHERS LIKE IT?

------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------

WHY WAS THE SCHEME, AND OTHERS LIKE IT, CREATED?

------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------

DO YOU THINK THE SCHEME IS BENEFICIAL?

a) To you and your family YES NO
b) To Zimbabwe YES NO

GIVE REASONS WHY?

------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------

SUGGESTIONS (IF ANY) FOR IMPROVEMENTS TO THE SCHEME?

------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENTS OTHER NOTES

THANK YOU
ANNEXURE H

INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS CONSULTED FOR INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL

Agricultural Finance Corporation: Harare and Masvingo

Agricultural and Rural Development Authority: Harare and Masvingo

Agritex:
- Chief Planning Officer Masvingo and Gutu

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH: Harare
(German Agency for Technical Co-operation in Zimbabwe)

Development Bank of Southern Africa: Sandton
- Department of Agricultural Development
- Department of Rural and Community Development
- Research and Specialist Services Division

Government of Zimbabwe:
- Ministry of Community Development and Women's Affairs Harare
- Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Harare
- Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement Harare
  - Central Planning Unit Harare
  - Department of Rural Development Harare and Gutu
- Land Acquisition Section Harare
- Monitoring and Evaluation Section Harare
- Resettlement Officer Soti Source

Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development:
- Department of Physical Planning Harare
- District Administrator Gutu

Ministry of Construction and National Housing: Masvingo

Lutheran World Foundation: Masvingo
Small Enterprises Development Corporation: Harare
Standard Chartered Bank Zimbabwe Limited: Masvingo
University of Zimbabwe:
  - Department of Geography
  - Department of Sociology
  - Library
  - School of Social Work
Zanu (PF):
Zimbabwe Banking Corporation Limited: Masvingo
Zimbabwe Development Bank: Harare
Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies: Harare