Chapter Five
Moral Panic: the Role of the Press

Introduction

‘Ku Klux Klan Methods’ ran the heading of an article in The Guardian in January 1946.¹ So began the media’s role in propelling a moral panic over the ‘eendstert euwel’ (ducktail evil) which would continue for much of the 1950’s (see Appendix, Table H for a chronological breakdown of the evolution of the panic). Moral panics arise from a ‘societal response’ to what is viewed as ‘deviant’ behaviour which more often than not is considered to pose a threat to the values and norms upheld by wider society. Often they are generated and encouraged by the mass media and in particular the press.

To date, Stanley Cohen’s Folk Devils and Moral Panics² is the most detailed account of subcultural moral panics. His work popularised the concept of moral panic. However, the term itself was first used by Jock Young in his participant observation study of drug-taking in Notting Hill between 1967-1969.³ The notion itself can be traced back even earlier to sociologist and anthropologist Edwin M. Lemert and more especially Howard Becker’s work on ‘societal panics’. Moral panics⁴ over the behaviour of youths have received scant attention in South African subcultural and youth studies. Elsewhere, however, they have been the focus of a number of investigations. For example, Geoffrey Pearson traces the first moral panic concerning youths to the ‘garrotting’ panic in the Victorian era⁵ whilst Christine Griffin refers to the moral panic about female sexuality associated with the roaring twenties⁶. Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s study provides an excellent introduction into theories on moral panics and the moral panic around youth drug use in Israel and the United States in the 1980s. Kenneth Thompson makes another contribution in his overview of moral panics on the subjects of club cultures and the Rave scene, mugging, sex and HIV/AIDS, female gangs and sex on the screen.⁷ More recently, Jayne Mooney has analysed moral panics and the new right in the context of the James Bulger killing that quickly spiralled into a panic relating to single mothers in the United Kingdom in 1993.⁸ Cohen’s research, however, still stands out as the
most comprehensive account of the emergence and evolution of moral panics connected with youth subcultures.

Cohen plots the development of the moral panic and social typing associated with the Mods and Rockers phenomenon in England in the mid-1960s with a particular focus on the nature and effect of what he terms ‘societal reaction’. He unravels the interplay between deviance and ‘societal reaction’ and suggests that more social control leads to further deviance or rather less conformity. Drawing on Becker’s notion of ‘moral entrepreneurs’ Cohen maintains that moral panics are formulated by moral authorities such as editors, police and government officials to what they perceive as delinquent and deviant behaviour. However, Hebdige warns

Although this type of analysis can often provide an extremely sophisticated explanation of why spectacular subcultures consistently provoke such hysterical outbursts, it tends to overlook the subtler mechanisms through which potentially threatening phenomena are handled and contained. As the use of the term ‘folk devil’ suggests, rather too much weight tends to be given to the sensational excesses of the tabloid press at the expense of the ambiguous reactions which are, after all, more typical. The way in which subcultures are represented in the media makes them both more and less exotic than they actually are. They are seen to contain both dangerous aliens and boisterous kids, wild animals and wayward pets.

This part of the thesis attempts to avoid the trap identified by Hebdige by interrogating ‘the complexities of societal reactions,’ and reveals that there were diverse types of moral guardians involved in propelling the panic. Becker’s work on moral entrepreneurs – among whom he includes judges, the police and various categories of administrators – is illuminating in this instance. He observes that

The prototype of the rule creator, but not the only variety... is the crusading reformer... the moral crusader is a meddling busybody, interested in forcing his own morals on others. But this is a one sided view. Many moral crusades have strong humanitarian overtones. The crusader is not only interested in seeing to it that other people do what he thinks right. He believes that if they do what is right it will be good for them.

The next three chapters are devoted to moral crusaders who carried out their moral missions from three different platforms: the press, research units and government commissions of enquiry. Robert E. Park’s 1915 study of the city and public opinion alerts us to the diverse nature of the moral crusade. He contends that:
In any attempt to understand the nature of public opinion and its relation to social control it is important to investigate first of all the agencies and devices which have come into practical use in the effort to control, enlighten and exploit it. The first and most important of these is the press, that is, the daily newspaper...After the newspaper, the bureaus of research which are now springing up in all the large cities are the most interesting and most promising devices for using publicity as a means of control."\(^{14}\)

Thompson similarly suggests that ‘the discourses of popular culture, politics and professional agencies are often combined in the spiral that creates a moral panic.’\(^{15}\)

The specific focus of this chapter is the influence of the South African press in creating and sustaining a moral panic over ducktails. At the time, the press’ activities were closely monitored by the government which was eager to enforce political and moral censorship. This chapter argues firstly that forms of moral censorship have a deep history in South Africa. Secondly, that pressures towards further moral censorship grew (alongside political censorship) in the 1950’s, partly because of political polarisation between English and Afrikaners and partly because of broader, more diffuse but at the same time more widely seated threat to white supremacy apparently posed by ducktailism. Thirdly, the chapter contends that even though political censorship was fended off to some extent by the English language press (in contrast to the Afrikaans language press), moral censorship was not, and the same values, prejudices and judgements pervaded both sectors of the press especially in discussions on juvenile delinquency. The result was the raising of the moral panic to new heights of hysteria which spurred government commissions of enquiry.

**Moral panics, deviancy and social control**

Investigations into moral panics are related to the labelling process and the study of social control and deviancy.\(^{16}\) Allen Liska isolates six deviancy paradigms: the structural functionalist, Chicago, deterrence, ethnomethodology, labelling and conflict perspectives.\(^{17}\) The most influential of these views in studies on moral panics has been the labelling perspective which is the common thread in most moral panics. Generally, deviance is understood as behaviour which violates or contradicts accepted norms and values. However, for labelling theorists and moral panic scholars, deviance is behaviour that has been labelled so by moral guardians. Lemert and Becker’s research is instructive in this regard.
Becker’s study, elaborates on the work of Frank Tannenbaum and more specifically on Lemert. Lemert believes that ‘social control leads to deviance’. This contradicts earlier analyses which proposed the reverse. Lemert – cited here in Cohen – suggests that older sociology tended to rest heavily upon the idea that deviance leads to social control. I have come to believe that the reverse idea, i.e. social control leads to deviance, is equally tenable and the potentially richer premise for studying deviance in modern society.18

Lemert places primary and secondary deviance at the centre of his analysis. He proposes that secondary deviance does not automatically follow primary deviance but rather that secondary deviance occurs in ‘response to the problems created by the reaction to primary deviance’.19 Within the same paradigm, Becker is interested in unravelling the process by which labelling transforms a subject into a deviant. Becker contends that the ‘deviant is one to whom that label has been successfully applied; deviant behaviour is behaviour that people so label.’20 He argues further that deviance, ‘is not the quality that lies in the behaviour itself, but in the interaction between the person who commits an act and those who respond to it.’21 Therefore, deviance, according to Becker, is the result of a process of labelling by moral entrepreneurs. He cautions, if we: are to achieve a full understanding of deviant behaviour, we must get these two possible foci of inquiry into balance. We must see deviance, and the outsiders who personify the abstract conception, as a consequence of a process of interaction between people, some of whom in the service of their own interests, have committed acts which are labelled deviant.22

Becker’s social deviation theory combined with disaster theory, and in particular the sequential models that these scholars have developed to understand the phases in a typical disaster, influenced Cohen’s work. Disaster studies identify seven phases in a disaster namely: warning, threat, impact, inventory, rescue, remedy and recovery. Cohen modifies this and condenses them into four phases for understanding the creation of a moral panic: ‘warning’; ‘impact’; ‘inventory’ and ‘reaction’.23 The panic commences with a series of warnings of the pending ‘moral’ threat (catastrophe). Immediately after the catastrophe has struck
(impact), the mass media present their view of the events (inventory). Usually ‘its nature’ is presented ‘in a stylised and stereotypical fashion’24 which serves to ‘alienate them [deviants] from conventional society’.25 Alongside this, exaggerated and distorted information cloaked in symbolism is used (symbolisation) to describe the ‘offending’ event or phenomenon. The inventory provides the basis for the reaction that follows. The inventory resembles a catalogue listing of what the media feels has happened to society. Simultaneously the catastrophe is given more press coverage initiating a process of sensitisation to similar events. The overall result is the formation of a group of moral guardians who through their united opposition to the phenomenon (catastrophe) formulate measures to curtail the outbreak of similar catastrophes. The entire process is guided and propelled by the media (see below for a diagrammatic representation).26

**Diagram 1: Cohen’s Moral panic Theory**27

- **Initial Problem**: (stemming from structural and cultural position of working class adolescent)
- **Initial Solution**: (deviant action and style)
- **Societal Reaction**: (involving elements of misperception, e.g. in inventory and subsequent distortion in terms of long term values and interests)
- **Operation of Control**: (sensitization, dramatization, escalation)
- Culture, Exploitation And Creation of Stereotypes
- **Increased deviance**
Building on Cohen’s theory of moral panics, Goode and Ben-Yehuda isolate five ‘crucial elements or criteria’ which define the concept moral panic, namely: concern; hostility; consensus; disproportionality and volatility. They contend that moral panics occur when four distinct territories overlap - deviance; social problems; collective behaviour, and social movements. They explain:

The territory occupied by deviance accounts for the moral part of the moral panic: behaviour regarded as immoral is more likely to generate public concern and fear than is more traditional, conventional behaviour. The territory that is occupied by social problems accounts for the public concern part of the moral panic: when much of the public is aware of and concerned about a given condition, regardless of its objective status, sociologically, it must be regarded as a social problem – and certainly the panic represents an extremely heightened form of awareness and concern. The territory occupied by collective behaviour accounts for the volatility of moral panics: the fact that, much like fads, they erupt suddenly and usually unexpectedly, and, in a like manner, fairly swiftly subside and disappear – or lose their fervid quality in the process of becoming institutionalized. The territory occupied by social movements addresses the issue of the organization and mobilization of concerned segments of the population to address and change specific social conditions.

In much the same manner described above, the ducktail folk devil suddenly appeared in the press and vanished almost unexpectedly, this will be discussed in more detail a little later.

Recently, Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s work (as well as Cohen’s) has come under attack. The major criticism is their use of the term ‘moral panic’. Waddington calls for abandoning such terminology because of its value laden character. He insists that ‘the notion of a ‘moral panic’ lacks any criteria of proportionality without which it is impossible to determine whether concern about any…problem is justified or not.’ Goode and Ben-Yehuda retaliate:
Contrary to Waddington, the concept has objective validity; it is not a value judgement, but a phenomenon in the material world that can be located, measured, and analyzed. If we define the concept out of existence, we will fail to notice major social processes that have had an impact on human societies…Given the ubiquity and influence of the moral panic, it demands attention.32

Supporting Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s perspective the following three chapters will show that in the South African case moral panics are not abstract notions without any bases in reality. They unfold from a number of institutional settings sparking a series of debates between different authorities over a period of time. Alongside government officials (such as members of the Department of Social Welfare and the South African Police), the press played a key part in the making of a moral panic. This role is widely recognised. As Cohen notes:

The media have long operated as agents of moral indignation in their own right: even if they are not self-consciously engaged in crusading or muck-raking, their very reporting of certain ‘facts’ can be sufficient to generate concern, anxiety, indignation or panic. When such feelings coincide with a perception that particular values need to be protected, the preconditions for new rule creation or social problem definition are present.33

Some points about the structure and suppressed atmosphere in which the South African press operated will now be discussed to sketch the background that the moral panic unfolded from.

The Press & Public Opinion

In the 1950’s the newspaper was the most powerful tool informing the South African public about current affairs because it was widely available and accessible and television had not yet reached South African shores.34 Park remarks ‘the newspaper is the great medium of communication within the city, and it is on the basis of the information which it supplies that public opinion rests.’35 Stories that appear in the press are based on the perceptions and understandings of journalists and editors and are not always accurate accounts of what actually took place. The public receives information second hand. Cohen explains:

the body of information from which such ideas [those which underpin moral panics] are built, is invariably received at second hand. That is, it arrives
already processed by the mass media and this means that the information has been subject to alternative definitions of what constitutes ‘news’ and how it should be gathered and presented. The information is further structured by the various commercial and political constraints in which newspapers, radio and television operate.  

These political constraints, as embodied among other things, in censorship legislation, clearly apply to the South African press to which the discussion now turns.

The press and political censorship in particular are well researched themes within South African historiography. Three major studies that have been useful for this case study include A. Hepple’s *Censorship and Press Control in South Africa*, W.A. Hachten and A.C. Giffard’s *Total Onslaught: The South African Press Under Attack* and E. Potter’s *The Press as Opposition: The Political Role of South African Newspapers*. The first is purely descriptive and confines itself to outlining political censorship legislation in the 1950s. The second describes the measures introduced by the government to control the press and journalists’ resistance to these constraints. Potter’s investigation is the most detailed and focuses on the relationship that the colonial, segregationist and apartheid governments had with the press between 1823 and 1968.

Historically the South African Press has been sub-divided into English and Afrikaans sections. In one sense, the ‘English press’ simply refers to the medium of publication. They were not ‘English’ as such; rather they were South African and many who worked for the English press were Afrikaans speaking. In another sense however it connoted a different constellation of values particularly in the Apartheid era. Potter contends,

on the one hand there was a Press which was a co-ordinated body of a centralised party and Government, and part of the Government's extensive communication network; on the other hand, there was a Press which was independent of Government and which as a matter of general principle believed its independence to be a necessary prerequisite for its functioning.
In other words, between 1948 and 1968 the English language press functioned in opposition to the government while the Afrikaans language press served as a channel for political propaganda. Potter believes that this was as a result of the emergence of a single dominant party that weakened political opposition and diminished the role of parliament as a debating platform. That may have been true in regard to race relations, party politics and apartheid policies but the same did not apply to coverage of youths and in particular the ‘eendstert euwel’ [ducktail evil] of the 1950s. Articles devoted to ducktailism, in both the English and Afrikaans language press, are strikingly similar, most notably in the symbolism and discourses that were utilised. The reason for this was firstly, moral guardians who responded to ducktails were predominantly adults and their response cut across ethnic, linguistic and political divides. Their reaction took the form of generational conflict over a perceived crisis in generational authority. Secondly, government censorship laws structured, confined and dictated how and what information could be reproduced in the press.

Access to information in South Africa has been severely curtailed by the operation of censorship laws. The South African government, since colonial rule, has always been concerned at the amount of freedom given in the dissemination of information both in the local press and in the circulation of literature and films. The 1950s can be isolated as a period in which this concern grew and political and moral censorship was intensified. Four influences restricted the freedom of the press in this period: the 1950 Press Commission of Inquiry, the 1954 Commission of Enquiry into Undesirable Publications, the vociferous MP’s that condemned the press and existing censorship legislation – both moral and political. The outcome was self-censorship especially after the National Press Union (a publishers’ union) drafted its own Code of Conduct and formed a Board of Reference. Not all were in support of self-censorship and a rift developed between the Newspaper Press Union (NPU) and the Society for South African Journalists (SSAJ). Opposition to the government’s attempts at curtailing the freedom of the press was dependant on proprietor affiliation.
Structural Control: Afrikaans & English Language Press

Competition between newspapers was restricted in South Africa because newspapers were controlled by a handful of people (see Table I in Appendix I) and newspaper groups - the Argus, South African Association of Newspapers and the Nationale Pers. This led the SSAJ to complain in 1946 of a tendency towards ‘the monopolistic control of the gathering, printing and publication of news’.47 The Argus and the South African Newspaper Groups (Bailey Group and Robinson Group) for example – (all of which had close ties with the mining industry) held a monopoly over the English press while the National Party controlled the Afrikaans press. Three companies – the South African Associated Newspapers Ltd, Rand Daily Mail Ltd, and the Sunday Times Syndicate – owned and managed the following papers – The Rand Daily Mail en Oosrandse Nuus, the Sunday Times, Sunday Express, Evening Post and the Eastern Province Herald. In 1938 the Reuter South African Press Agency was superseded by the South African Press Association. All but two of the daily English newspapers in the Union and Southern Rhodesia and the entire daily Afrikaans Press along with a few other tri-weekly and bi-weekly newspapers became members of the Association.48 Originally, the Association was registered in accordance with Section 21 of the Companies Act of 1926 and was a non-profit making organisation whereby:

all news supplied by or to the Association shall be independent, unbiased and impartial…In particular all such services shall be free from all political, social, financial, commercial and regional propaganda.49

Despite such commitments, many of the newspapers affiliated to the Association were organs of political parties and therefore could not function without rallying support for their respective political interests. Two Afrikaans language newspapers – Die Landstem and the Weekblad supported the United Party. Other Afrikaans language newspapers such as Die Vaderland, Die Transvaaler, Die Burger, Die Oosterlig, Volksblad and Dagbreek, appointed leading NP members to their Boards of Directors. From its inception Die Vaderland for example, (like most Afrikaans language newspapers) registered its support for the National Party. According to the assistant editor of Die Vaderland,
In its policy, the organ will support the National Party but the paper is not going to be lopsided due to politics being the only note. In fact, politics will be the chief note. Moreover, the political attitude will be decidedly moderate. The editorial policy will point to the future, convinced of the ultimate hearty cooperation of the white races of this country. Petty racial bickering will not only be banned, but actively discouraged.50

Hachten and Gifford contend

The Afrikaner press was a creation of Afrikaner political aspirations, established by the National Party to spread its message and strengthen its power base. Unlike virtually all the English papers, not a single Nationalist newspaper began as a commercial venture. They were intended not to sell news so much as a party line.51

The choice of editors reflects the political influence that was exerted on the Afrikaans press. For example, before taking up editorship of Die Vaderland, Dr D.F. Malan was a rural minister of religion. After his editorship he became leader of the National Party in the Cape, then a cabinet minister and then Prime Minister in 1948. Similarly, Dr H.F. Verwoerd was a university professor before becoming editor of Die Transvaler, then a cabinet minister and then premier.52 Between 1948 and 1967, Nationalist Prime Ministers also had close ties with Afrikaans press companies. Strijdom and Verwoerd, for example, acted as chairs of ‘the Perskor Company ex officio during their terms as Prime Minister.’53 Other cabinet members who occupied positions on the Board included, M.C. de Wet Nel, T.E. Donges, and F.C. Erasmus.54 The political influence on the press continued in the 1950s and extended well beyond the Afrikaans press to grapple with the question of freedom of the press. Pressures to enquire, into the press, came from above and commonly from MPs.

Pressures of Political Censorship: Towards Self-Censorship

It was National Party MP Mr. A.J.R. van Rhyn who made the first call, in January 1950, for an enquiry into the press and specifically the ‘monopolistic tendencies in the press; into internal and external reporting – and the advisability of “control over such reporting”’.55 Two months later the National Party government commissioned an inquiry into the press under the chairmanship of J.W. van Zyl (a Cape Supreme Court judge) and seven other members.56
It was instructed to identify the control and ownership of the press, to evaluate foreign and local journalism and press reports on South Africa whilst measuring the ‘adequacy or otherwise of existing means of self-control and discipline by the press.’\textsuperscript{57} To ascertain this the Commission was requested to investigate the: accuracy and presentation of news (the mixing of facts and opinions, the use of unverified facts or rumours, and the fabrication and distortion of facts); tendencies towards monopoly in the supply, collection and distribution of news; restraints on the establishment of newspapers; discipline over editors and journalists; the incidence of both sensationalism and triviality in the Press and finally to judge whether or not a Press Control Bill should be introduced to control the South African press.\textsuperscript{58}

It would be fourteen years before the \textit{Press Commission} published its two volume report. Meanwhile as it collected evidence,\textsuperscript{59} the Argus company (then under the directorship of D.H. Ollemans) responded in 1951 by formulating plans to establish its own voluntary press council.\textsuperscript{60} This suggestion was not widely supported. In 1955, the Argus group and the National Press Union (a newspaper publishers’ union)\textsuperscript{61} met to discuss Ollemans’ Code of Conduct but to no avail. His proposal would lie dormant for ten years before it was accepted and institutionalised. However the serious consideration given to the proposal suggests that members of the press clearly felt threatened by the interfering presence of the \textit{Press Commission}.

It was not only the \textit{Press Commission’s} investigations that prompted the newspaper groups to consider adopting a Code of Conduct. Government criticism and the 1957 \textit{Commission of Enquiry into Undesirable Publications} also had an influence. The 1957 \textit{Undesirable Publications Commission’s} primary mandate was to determine undesirability in literary works and films. However some of its attention diverted to undesirability in the press. A total of 46 press articles from the 1 550 issues of daily newspapers that were analysed were deemed undesirable (3.0 per 100).\textsuperscript{62} In addition 6 out of a total of 300 articles from weekly newspapers were designated undesirable.\textsuperscript{63} The Commission stressed that the number of
undesirable reports was low and noted that when undesirability occurred it mainly appeared in articles on court proceedings and crime. It believed that:

the undesirable details which are published in these reports, cannot but cause any civilized community to feel grave concern about the irresponsible and unscrupulous manner of reporting which is sometimes encountered.°64

The Commission recommended that newspaper articles be scrutinised by a Publications Board before publication. At a parliamentary debate in 1960 the Minister of Interior Mr. P.W. Botha rejected this suggestion. After further investigation by a Select Committee the Undesirable Publications Bill was reintroduced in 1961 shorn of the pre-publication clause. If all the recommendations had been accepted then newspapers would have underwent

a blanket pre-publication censorship of the political content of newspapers…Instead, the government used the extensive and intimidating recommendations of the Commission as a weapon with which it eventually persuaded members of the Newspaper Press Union (NPU), the Presses’ proprietors, to set up their own press board.°65

Another motivating factor for self-censorship was government officials’ harsh criticism of the press and the English language press in particular. For example, in 1957 Minister J.G. Strijdom (then Minister of Lands) declared that the English-language press was ‘South Africa’s greatest enemy.’°66 Four years later, in 1961, Prime Minister Dr. H.F. Verwoerd urged the press to co-operate and strive for self-discipline:

I would like to see members of the press coming together..to ensure that they apply self-control and discipline themselves, and to ensure that their patriotism also serves as a background for them…the press in South Africa is not, like other professions, organized to apply self-discipline…South Africa cannot be allowed to suffer continuously…as the result of inaccurate reports and distorted interpretations of policy and motive…I therefore insist that the press, in the interests of South Africa, particularly in the times in which we live, should exercise care and that they should keep an eye on each other.°67

This was a forthright warning to the South African press that if it did not exercise self-censorship, the government would introduce statutory press control to silence them. The warning was not taken lightly and in April 1962, after ten years of prevarication, Ollemans’ calls for a Code of Conduct was realised. The National Press Union – was comprised of the Press’ proprietors°68 - drew up a Constitution
for the Board of Reference and three years later with the financial backing of the NPU, it was established. The Board of Reference consisted of a chairperson and an alternate chairperson along with two members and two alternate members who would be appointed by the Executive Council of the NPU. However the powers of the Board were very limited. Hachten and Giffard note these flaws:

It could impose no sanctions; the code of conduct it administered comprised little more than a series of platitudinous statements no self-respecting journalists could object to. Some of course did.

The shortcomings of the NPU’s Board of Reference were criticised by the Press Commission in the second volume of its report published in 1964. The Commission complained about its voluntary membership and its lack of disciplinary power. It therefore pleaded for the formation of a Press Council which would enforce compulsory membership on all journalists. It would also be able to impose fines, reprimand newspapers and decide which articles would be published. The government rejected the Commission’s recommendations. The Minster of Information opposed them strongly advising that new legislation would,

give the anti-South African elements another opportunity of diverting attention from the chaos of Africa to that of what they would describe as another sinister development taking place in South Africa against ‘a free democratic press’ by ‘a totalitarian dictatorship’.

There was in fact no need for a statutory Press Council at this stage because the presence of two commissions of enquiry and government denouncement of the press encouraged most to endorse a policy of self-censorship. The South African Associated Newspapers (The Rand Daily Mail) and the South African Association of Journalists (SAAJ) however did not. On 14 March 1962, for example, the Rand Daily Mail argued:

Some of our colleagues have managed to rationalise acceptance of the code by considering its merits unrelated to the background of political pressure…others are franker and say it is preferable to statutory press control. But we have come to regard the ‘lesser of the two evils’ approach as surrender by instalment.

The SAAJ was excluded from discussions with the NPU over the drafting of a Code of Conduct and wholeheartedly ‘refused to subscribe to the Constitution or to accept the jurisdiction of the Press Board.’ They contended that the NPU ‘did
not emerge as a defender of the independent Presses’ freedom. The Argus group (The Star for example) and the Afrikaans language press were viewed by the SAAJ and the NPU in a similar light because of its support of political censorship and embrace of self-censorship. Hachten and Giffard contend

The Afrikaans editors had stood squarely behind the government in its early attempts to curb newspapers. Their papers, after all, were not those threatened. The editors supported the establishment of the original Press Commission. They backed the Newspaper Press Union in setting up its Press Council. And they made little objection when the government intimidated the NPU into increasing the council’s powers. Cries of outrage from the English were seen as a hysterical overreaction to a doom they had brought upon themselves, and an attempt to tarnish the country’s image abroad.

The National party government had therefore achieved precisely what it set out to do namely political censorship even though it was in the form of self-censorship. Potter sums up the impact of impending political censorship, and of the Press Commission in particular, as follows:

For fourteen years it [The Commission] hung over the Press, constituting an ever-present threat: in itself, it acted as a kind of censorship, making every English-language journalist more cautious of what he wrote. Quite apart from laws and regulations governing the day-to-day activities of journalists, they felt themselves ‘…exposed to the ill-will of the Government, which accuses them of maliciously distorting the facts and running down the country in the eyes of foreigners.’ And Government Ministers were themselves quite willing to use the threat of the Commission to silence opposition. Throughout the fourteen years, Ministers made constant reference to the sanctions that would be imposed once the Commission’s findings were made public.

Government attempts at political censorship did not, however, stop here. In 1967, the NPU and the Commissioner of Police entered into an agreement whereby editors were required to consult the police before the publication of articles on crime and state security. The question of freedom of the press and political censorship would surface again in the 1977 Newspaper Press Bill.

Contrary to the press’ policy of self-imposed political censorship the press did not resist moral censorship. This was especially so with the Press’ and proprietors’ lack of opposition to the Commission of Enquiry into Undesirable and Objectionable Literature.
Undesirability and Support for Moral Censorship

In the 1950s, moral censorship was enforced as a result of two developments: firstly, amendments to existing legislation and secondly because of the findings of the Cronjè Commission of Enquiry into Objectionable and Undesirable Literature. This drift towards moral censorship was prompted, so Hepple argues, by the ‘advent of “ducktailism”, “horror” comics and new devices for the commercial exploitation of sex through indecent and pornographic literature in the post war years’. Another motivation for the enquiry was South Africa’s changing political climate (the enforcement of apartheid policies) combined with earlier international steps to tighten censorship.

Legislation that was already on the statute books took three forms: namely, Provincial, Union, and miscellaneous legislation. The Provincial legislation (in all four provinces), dating back to the 1890’s, were strikingly similar in its definition of what constituted ‘undesirability’ and ‘obscenity’ (see Table J and K in Appendix I). Additional central government legislation was passed to curtail the ‘evil of undesirable publications’, the first of which was the Post Office Administration and Shipping Combinations Discouragement Act, (No. 10) of 1911. A more widely implemented law was the Customs Act (No.35) of 1944. The Entertainment’s (Censorship) Act was amended in 1931 and led to the formation of a Board of Censors. The Board was responsible for viewing films intended for public exhibition. Four years later the Newspaper and Imprint Act (No 14) of 1934 was passed. Through this act the procedure allowing the publication of newspapers was specified. Applicants had to write to the Minister for a registration certificate coupled with the proprietor, printer, publisher, manager and editor/s full details. The publication of advertisements was regulated in the Lotteries Prohibition Act (No 9) of 1889 of the Cape of Good Hope and The Public Health Act. The former prohibited the publication and advertisement of lotteries; the latter the advertising of particular medicines and other articles.

The most restrictive piece of legislation that enforced moral censorship in this period was the amendment of the Customs Act (Act 55) in 1955. The amendment
made it compulsory for all imported publications to pass through South African Customs and the Board of Censors. It was the Board of Censors’ responsibility to determine undesirability. Banning would result if the publication contained descriptions of murder ‘of the ill-treatment of women, intimate descriptions of women’s bodies, sexual relations’, ‘loose morals’, ‘traffic in drugs, the drug habit, prostitution and inter-racial mixing’.85 The types of books that were banned were classified into three categories namely: pornography and horror, politics, and sociology. Books such as a *Streetcar Named Desire* by Tennessee Williams, *Aaron’s Rod* by D.H. Lawrence and *Across the River and into the Trees* by Ernest Hemingway were declared undesirable under the Customs Act.86 In 1958, Mr I.J.F. Naudé (the Minister of Interior) judged that 179 publications were indecent, objectionable and obscene.87 All books from communist countries were banned. John Dugard explains the ‘rooi gevaar’ [red fear] as follows

Literary and artistic expression, where it is politically uncoloured, is restricted to protect the Afrikaner oligarchy from the permissiveness of the second half of the twentieth century. A common theme running through statements is that permissiveness leads to communism but as no communist society is renowned for its permissiveness, such claims cannot be taken seriously. The real objection to the social and cultural freedom of the twentieth century is that, if exported to South Africa, it might release the average Afrikaner from the tenacious grasp of those institutions which at present control both his mind and his voting habits: the Dutch Reformed Church, Afrikaner cultural organisations, the Afrikaans language press and the National Party. In order to ensure isolation from the views and lifestyles of the modern world there is a comprehensive system of censorship covering both literary works and entertainment.88

The amended Customs Act extended the powers of the Board of Censors to reject scenes and make cuts in films. Offensive scenes now included those depicting controversial politics, strained relations between labour and capital; physical fighting and inter-racial mixing.89 *The Joe Louis Story* and the *Jackie Robinson Story* were not screened in South Africa. Later, in 1970, the film *Hells Angels 1969* was banned because the Publications Control Board declared

the action takes place on motorcycles instead of horses. Unfortunately the cowboys on horses belong to the realms of the past, whereas cowboys on motorcycles are very much with us in the form of ducktails and hippies whose deeds…have brought nothing but dismay and disastrous results to the inhabitants of our country.90
The decision of the Board was final and its plenipotentiary powers could not be contested. At this stage, moral censorship on literature only applied to imported publications. This would soon change after the government accepted the 1957 Cronjé Commission’s recommendation to extend this legislation with regard to local publications.

Notwithstanding the plethora of regulations monitoring literature and film the government’s anxiety over the supposed lack of moral censorship mounted and ultimately led to the appointment of the Cronjé *Commission of Enquiry into Undesirable Publications* in March 1953. As mentioned earlier, its mandate was to review existing legislation and measure the degree of ‘undesirability’ in literature (and press reports) with a view to extending censorship of a moral nature.

The report of the Commission defined ‘undesirability’ in vague terms and classified material as ‘undesirable’ if the content was,

- deemed indecent, offensive or harmful by the ordinary, civilised, decent, reasonable and responsible inhabitants of the Union. In particular, printed matter...shall be deemed undesirable if they-
  a) are blasphemous
  b) are subversive of...the morals or moral conceptions cherished and respected by the ordinary, civilised, decent, reasonable and responsible inhabitants of the Union

The Commission relied on numerous sources of evidence. Primary sources included questionnaires, written evidence (received from 250 different respondents); verbal evidence (which was compiled into a 2 000 page report), the examination of a range of reading matter (submitted by those who had answered the general questionnaire and from a review that was obtained from the Minister of the Interior’s collection of books that had previously been declared obscene, indecent, or objectionable); the investigation of both local and international legislation, an analysis of undesirable details in local magazines (both monthly and weekly) and finally an assessment of English and Afrikaans literary works (3 746 Afrikaans and 784 English works) which had circulated in South Africa between 1935-1954. In its analysis of published works, the
Commission found that one in twenty-five Afrikaans books in circulation were undesirable. The Commission commented:

The nature of undesirability encountered in Afrikaans novels and other stories is in most cases simply sexuality in one form or another which has been interlarded with savagery, cruelty, coarse forms of gambling, blackmail, gangsterism, and criminality, and invariably in such a manner that its undesirability is immediately conspicuous.94

Between 1951 and 1954 there was a four per cent rise in literature classified as undesirable.95 Little opposition was manifested to this or to the Commission itself. After four year’s research the Commission published its report. Its main recommendation was the formation of a Central Publications Board (consisting of seven South Africans) which would function alongside the courts as the official monitor on undesirability. The Central Publications Board (CPB) as envisioned by the Commission would be able to pass judgement on literature and films and have the power to ban any of them as ‘undesirable’ and impose severe penalties such as fines or imprisonment.

After much debate in parliament, the Publications and Entertainment’s Bill was promulgated in 1963 and moral censorship was systematised. The Act created the Publications Control Board which was instructed to:

determine the acceptability of publications (except NPU newspapers), films, objects, and public entertainment according to standards of decency and obscenity provided in the act. The act included a right of appeal to the courts except for motion pictures where the only appeal was to the Minister of Interior.96

The Board examined books, periodicals, and films. It could approve or reject a book or periodical indefinitely or subject to a condition, that indecent or objectionable sections contained within them was excluded. If the publication disturbed the peace and order, prejudiced the welfare of the state, gave offence to religious convictions, harmed relations between different sections of the population or promoted crime it was deemed undesirable. A film was classified as ‘undesirable’ if any of the following were depicted in an offensive manner: the head of state, the Union’s armed forces, death, human figures, love scenes, controversial or international politics, public characters, juvenile crime,
Opposition to the Publications and Entertainment Bill of 1963 and moral censorship was weak. Among the few groups that voiced discontent was the English Academy of Southern Africa (EASA). The EASA was formed on the 27 of May 1960 after a year of campaigning by Dr. Gwen Knowles-Williams, who was elected as chairperson for the Academy. The EASA strongly opposed the Publications and Entertainment’s Bill and its definition of what constituted ‘undesirability’. The term ‘undesirable’ was, according to the EASA, indistinctly defined. In the words of Dr. Knowles-Williams,

‘Undesirable’ then becomes synonymous with ‘unpalatable to the members of the Board’ - for reasons which may be either aesthetic, moral or political. The Board will therefore have the effect of stifling the publication of any matter which may happen to be out of step with the opinions of a handful of people selected by the Minister, he himself having been appointed to his position on a party political platform.

The Academy’s resistance was articulated again in its memorandum submitted to the Interdepartmental Committee, set up in 1963, to enquire into the application of the Publications and Entertainment’s Act. The Committee was requested to report on and make recommendations on the composition of the Publications Control Board, the possible extension of prohibition of undesirable publications (books and films) and the registration of cinematographic films. The Academy was of the opinion that the Board of Publication’s judgements were ill founded because of the unclear definition of ‘obscenity’ and ‘indecency’ that it adopted. It claimed
member’s prejudices and cultural values underpinned the CPB’s definition of ‘undesirability’. The Academy’s objections were to no avail and in 1973 the EASA, then under M.C. O’Dowd, re-iterated its concern about the lack of freedom in the press and other forms of media.

The Press, on the other hand, very much supported moral censorship and of closely monitoring literature and films aimed at youths. For example, after a discussion with the chief prosecutor of the Pretoria Juvenile Court, *The Pretoria News* reported that ‘crimes were not for material gain but rather the emulation of gangster methods shown in the cinemas.’ Similarly, in an article for the *Natal Mercury*, Rabbi Harris Swift isolated literature and film as a major cause for delinquency:

> The alleged cheaper trend in literature, the increasing popularity of the cinema, the cheapening of human life consequent upon the war, and at once the higher and lower standard of living are all blamed for the sins of modern youth.

Mrs W. Eybers (President of the Johannesburg Branch of the National Council of Women) believed that the influence of the cinema was partly responsible for the rise in delinquency. She informed the *Pretoria News* that:

> all was not right with cinemas, and the type of film that was being produced could be considerably improved. Condemning cinema clubs, Mrs. Eybers said they were habit forming and failed to teach children to discriminate between good and bad films. She advised parents to keep children from ‘automatic attendance’ at the cinema.

Condemnation of such entertainment continued and members of the public expressed their support for tighter moral censorship. For example, in a letter to the *Cape Argus* in 1956 ‘Vigilant from Constantia’ complained

> juveniles suffer because adults overindulge in leisure: The moral atmosphere of the home is lacking in this world of turmoil. Too many attractions have been offered to the public, cocktail parties, dances and entertainment generally, cinemas, motoring etc.; in fact life is full at week-ends and most nights, and too many get drawn into the vortex.

Dr E.L. Fisher (of the United Party, Rosettenville) informed the *Daily Mail* that ‘literature, films and radio’ had a ‘detrimental influence’ on youths. He argued further that ‘some magazines with pretty covers but filth inside should be thrown
into the gutter. Shooting and excitement on the film and radio incite youngsters to crime.' In a similar vein the Rand Daily Mail blamed ‘‘brazen, cheap novels’ for sale at 2s.6d in cafes and fish-and-chip shops for delinquency’ and alleged that youths and café owners were ‘doing a trade in cheap, lurid novels which are invariably adorned with vivid covers depicting partly-clad women in various postures.’ Members of parliament, the public and the press were in full support of moral censorship.

In its opposition to political censorship the press adhered to limited self-censorship and suppressed many of its reports on racial conflict, apartheid policy and its effects on the black majority. In contrast, it supported moral censorship condemning films and literature it deemed ‘undesirable’ and ‘offensive’. Its opprobrium went well beyond media forms and collapsed into lambasting certain sections of the white population in particular youths thereby sowing the seeds of paranoia which germinated into a moral panic over ducktail youth.

### The Seeds of Paranoia: Eendsterte [Ducktails] & the local press

Press coverage ineluctably accompanies the emergence of subcultures – especially ones as visible and widespread as the ducktails. Hebdige posits that

> The emergence of a spectacular subculture is invariably accompanied by a wave of hysteria in the press. This hysteria is typically ambivalent: it fluctuates between dread and fascination, outrage and amusement. Shock and horror headlines dominate the front page...while, inside, the editorials positively bristle with ‘serious’ commentary and the centre spreads or supplements contain delirious accounts of the fads and rituals.

Most scholars would agree that moral panics unfold sequentially commencing with an early ‘warning’ phase followed by a process of intensification where specious information is deployed leading to certain phenomena, individuals and objects acquiring a type of symbolic power. Through intensified press coverage the word ‘ducktail’ gained a symbolic status. Three stages in the process of symbolisation can be isolated, Cohen points out that:

> A word [in this case ducktail] becomes symbolic of a certain status (delinquent or deviant); objects (hairstyle, clothing) symbolise the word; the objects themselves become symbolic of the status (and the emotions attached to the
The effect of these processes as they appeared in the inventory was that the term [Ducktail] was torn from any previously neutral contexts (for example: the denotation of different consumer styles) and acquired wholly negative meanings.111

The term ducktail initially referred to a hairstyle. Thereafter it became associated with discussions on ‘white tsotsi’112 Within a couple of years, it was used by the press to characterise juvenile delinquency, deviance and misbehaviour.113 Between the 1940s and the early 1960s, a range of divergent representations of white youths appeared in the press. In the early and late 1940s, discussions centred on ‘gangsterism’ (mostly in Johannesburg’s African community).114 These shifted to white Ducktails in the mid 1950s and to juvenile delinquency and crime in the late 1950s and early 1960s. At the same time – as will be shown in the following chapter – the moral panic spiralled and spread to other institutional platforms and unfolded with different levels of intensity. The fluid nature of the ducktail moral panic was not unusual. Goode and Ben-Yehuda note moral panics are volatile; they erupt fairly suddenly (although they may lie dormant or latent for long periods of time, and may repeat from time to time) and, nearly as suddenly, subside…But whether it has a long-term impact or not, the degree of hostility generated during a moral panic tends to be fairly limited temporally; the fever pitch that characterises a society during the moral panic during its course is not typically sustainable over a long stretch of time. In that respect, it is similar to fashion, the fad, and the craze; the moral panic is, therefore…a form of collective behaviour.115

The ducktail moral panic was buoyed up by the press for approximately a decade. By the early 1960’s articles on white juvenile delinquency and ducktails had disappeared. Cohen believes that ‘the attention waned when other phenomena, that were both new and newsworthy, forced themselves into the public areas.’116 Ducktails were no longer newsworthy, new youth policies were in place and were being widely enforced. What follows is an account of some aspects of the moral panic as it appeared in the local press. Attention will be paid to the literary tools (such as imagery, stereotyping and rumourmongering) and recurrent themes (delinquency and violence for example) that the press employed to generate the ducktail moral panic.
The language adopted by the press to describe the ducktail phenomenon was emotional and drew on malignant forms of imagery. Disease was a regular motif; ‘Ducktailism’ was compared to a ‘social cancer’ which was going to ‘infect’ youths throughout the country. As Rabbi Harris Swift told the *Natal Mercury* in 1953: ‘no one reason can be found for this startling social cancer, but it is more than strange that the growth of juvenile delinquency is in inverse ratio to the modern decrease in home life and the minimisation of morals and religion.’ Likewise, the *Rand Daily Mail* described youth crime as,

an evil which infects society at its weakest spot for if the young in any number fall into criminal habits, they create for the authorities an altogether new task in maintaining public order and morality

Inaccurate statistics reinforced this message. In 1953, Rev H.P. Junod expressed concern at the rising rates of ‘delinquency’. He claimed that about 10 000 youths were sent to prison annually. In reality, white youths were only sent to prison in rare cases. According to the Children’s Act of 1937:

The Act sets its face against sending children of various age groups (particularly under 19 years and generally in respect of the group 19-20 years) to gaol to associate with hardened criminals…

Dr. Bain made similar claims in 1957 when he announced that between 1945-1953, convictions of delinquents under the age of twenty had jumped to 60 per cent and those for the age group seventeen to twenty-three had soared to at least 90 per cent. These figures were reproduced by most newspapers in the country and cited extensively. However, in the age group seven to sixteen years, the rise in the number of convictions in respect of all offences over the same period was only 26.9 per cent. The corresponding figure for the age group seventeen to twenty was 23.2 per cent. The only category of convictions that did increase was that of offences against the Driver’s License Legislation (code 087). This constituted 50 per cent of all crime committed by white ‘juvenile adults’ in this period. The relative importance of Bain or the press in purveying these inaccuracies is hard to judge. What is clear however is that these garbled data suited the press’s agenda, at the time, and that they made no effort to correct false
impressions. Ducktails, delinquency and youth crime were unambiguously portrayed in a distorted manner.

Jock Young convincingly argues that the ‘mass media by fanning up moral panics contribute to the misperception of deviants, the intensity of social reaction, and the extent to which deviance amplification occurs.’ The way in which the press expatiated on deviance is related to its tendency to manufacture news. This amplification process is similar to Cohen’s account of the impact of the ‘inventory’ or manufactured news:

(i) the putative deviation had been assigned from which further stereotyping, myth making and labelling could proceed; (ii) the expectation was created that this form of deviation would certainly recur; (iii) a wholly negative symbolization in regard to the Mods and Rockers and objects associated with them had been created; (iv) all the elements in the situation had been made clear enough to allow for full-scale demonology and hagiology to develop: the information had been made available for placing the Mods and Rockers in the gallery of contemporary folk devils…the inventory is not, of course a simple sort of stock-taking into which some errors might accidentally creep…The inventory is not reflective stock taking but manufactured news.

This manufactured news collapsed the subculture into criminal activities and juvenile delinquency and resulted in the press presenting the Ducktail youth subculture as a monolithic, problematic and violent entity that was part of a criminal movement. Distorted, exaggerated information, written in melodramatic language, featured prominently. Headlines such as ‘What is Wrong with Modern Youth’, ‘Hooliganism in the Transvaal’; ‘Brutality Near City Hall’; ‘Clean up the City's Jackals’; ‘Hooligans Terrorise Dancers’; ‘Youth Gangs are a Grave Threat to the City’; ‘S. Suburbs Gangsterism’; ‘Gangs of White Youths Beat up People’; ‘Youth Crisis in Union’; ‘Eendsterbendes Anti-Christelik’ [Ducktail gangs Anti-Christian] reflect this predisposition.

In South Africa the press chose to highlight certain issues (such as unemployment, hedonism, overt sexuality, violence and crime) which were contrary to the hegemonic orders norms and values (hard working and economically stable for example) – hence heightening the ensuing hysteria. For example, in 1954, the Rand Daily Mail conducted a survey of juvenile crime. It stressed that these
youths lived in ‘squalid rooms’, and gained their money ‘through thieving, housebreaking, dagga running and robbery’. It claimed that ‘assaulting people is one of their favourite pastimes, especially at night when they are full of liquor and dagga.’

Ducktail violence and ‘hooliganism’ also became equated with ‘delinquency’ and youth crime. The explosion of headlines such as ‘Competitive Thieving by White Tsotsis’, ‘Alarming Rise in Johannesburg’s Juvenile Crime’; Wartime Increase of Crime Among Boys and Girls; ‘Juvenile Crime is Serious and Increasing’ indicate this. The adoption of ducktail style was seen as symptomatic of criminal activities. Issues of The Star and the Benoni City Times were littered with accounts of crimes including assault and theft. Organised gangs featured heavily in press articles in this period. This was accompanied by a series of articles on the effectiveness of the SAP. Headlines such as ‘Alleged Gang of Thieves broken up’, ‘Hundreds of Police Seek Armed Gang’; ‘Police Dragnet Hauls in Marauders,’ cluttered the columns of the press.

This type of journalism was enabled by the use of stereotyping. In this case, negative stereotyping based on erroneous assumptions and generalisations was utilised. The process of stereotyping not only serves to homogenise the individual or group that is being stereotyped but is also ‘one of the major discursive strategies that ensure that differences between people are recognised.’ Leyens et al believe that, ‘stereotypes are shared beliefs about person attributes, usually personality traits but often also behaviours of a group of people.’ For them stereotypes are ‘category-based judgement[s]’ as well as ‘generalisations based on the membership of a category, i.e. beliefs that derive from the inference that all members of a given category share the same properties and are, therefore interchangeable.’ The presentation of particular phenomena in a stereotypical fashion is a common feature of the press and makes everyday experiences more newsworthy. This process of selecting events and stereotypically representing them that has been underplayed in literature on the press. Young is one exception. He maintains that the mass media:
selects events which are *atypical*, presents them in a *stereotypical* fashion and contrasts them against a backcloth of normality which is *overtypical*. The atypical is selected because the everyday or humdrum is not interesting to read or watch, it has little news. As a result of this, if one has little face-to-face contact with young people, one’s total information about them would be in terms of extremes: drug taking, sex, and wanton violence…news is out there; it has an objective high rating in human interest, topicality, and unusualness which the invisible hand of the news market merely gathers in. This contradicts the essentially creative nature of news. Namely, that only certain events, however unusual, are deemed to be of public interest and that these events are cast into certain moulds by the journalist…The atypical is thus portrayed in a stereotypical fashion with both causes and consequences derivative from consensual theory. The net effect is accentuation (to increase news value) and distortion (to fit consensual premises). Given the commercial grounding of moral indignation, events which warrant interest and demand neutralising are atypical pleasure unlinked to productivity….A morality play demands giant size symbolic actors and this the media provide.”

Members of the ducktail subculture were isolated and stereotyped as a specific and ‘distinguishable social type’ that became equated with idleness, misbehaviour, pernicious ‘delinquency’ and youth crime. Although some ducktails fell into these categories the majority did not. Stereotyping set up bipolar oppositions between us [wider society and values such as morality] and them [ducktails and their immorality] and between good and evil. The *Daily Mail* contended that ‘frustrated youths are being driven to a life of evil’. Goode and Ben-Yehuda, note that this bifurcation between good and evil sets in motion a process where a

division is made between “us” – good, decent, respectable folk – and “them” – deviants, bad guys, undesirables, outsiders, criminals, the underworld, disreputable folk – between “we” and “they”. This dicotomization includes *stereotyping*: generating “folk devils” or villains and folk heroes in this morality play of evil versus good.

Stereotypes reveal much about those involved in creating the stereotype. Another misleading stereotype purveyed was about home life and moral guardians critiqued South African parenting to the extent that calls were made for ways to improve parenting skills. Articles and letters on ‘bad parenting’ filled the press. Headlines such as ‘Parents Blamed for acts of hooliganism by their Children’, ‘Delinquency Begins at Home’, ‘More Parents Tell of Uncontrollable Children’, ‘Action against Delinquents would bring home the responsibility to Parents’,
‘When Adults live in a Whirl of Excitement Juvenes Suffer’; *Baie Verkeerd met Jeug; Meestal Ouers se Skuld* [Lots Wrong with Youth: Mostly the Parents Fault], Ducktails: Heat to be Put on Parents’ and ‘Wealthy Mothers are Blamed for ‘Ducktailism’’ reflect this judgement. In a letter, to the *Rand Daily Mail*, Henry Luckhoff insisted that ‘juvenile crime is not curable only by State action. It is not merely the State’s responsibility but the responsibility of every individual, and especially the parent. It is in the home that the answer must be found.’ In this way, a stereotype was created in which delinquents were the product of unstable homes lacking appropriate parental guidance and generational control.

Through these stereotypical lenses, the adoption of the style of the Ducktails was viewed as a ‘symptom’ and catalyst for criminal activities, unemployability and immorality. As Cohen explains once the phenomenon has been labelled the ‘devils shape can be identified.’ The press gave the impression that through the adoption of Ducktail style the road to ‘delinquency’ commenced. In a report to the *Rand Daily Mail*, Mr J.A.B. van Zyl (magistrate of the Johannesburg juvenile court) maintained that a ‘juvenile delinquent’, is a ‘youngster who won’t stay at home at night’. This was based on his observations of three youths ‘who stood before him in court writhing uncomfortably in their padded jackets, creeper shoes and bright socks’.

Ducktail’s unique dress code, and their visible and at times disruptive public presence, rendered them vulnerable to criticism from wider society, the press and moral guardians. Their visibility was one factor which sustained the moral panic for a decade. In Cohen’s view societal reactions are proportional to degrees of visibility. He contends that

conflicts of interests – at community and societal levels – and the presence of power differentials which leave some groups vulnerable to such attacks. The manipulation of appropriate symbols – the process which sustains moral campaigns, panics and crusades – is made much easier when the object of attack is both highly visible and structurally weak.

Rumour, both generally and in the South African case also sustained moral panics. Rosnow and Fine believe rumours ‘in retrospect can reveal much about the culture
where it flourished and about the nature of truth in that culture. Goode and Ben-Yehuda isolate four factors which direct the rumour-mongering process, namely: topical importance or outcome-relevant involvement; uncertainty or ambiguity; personal anxiety; and credulity. When these four factors are strongly present, many rumours are likely to fly about. When they are relatively absent ‘rumours are unlikely to be circulated.’ How does this relate to moral panics? As Goode and Ben-Yehuda point out:

A moral panic sets the stage and provides a context for rumormongering; when rumours take place, they provide the justification for fears, exaggeration, and a sense of threat. Rumor is a vital element in the moral panic. It is one of the reasons why the moral panic must be regarded as a form of collective behaviour.

Most of the rumours surrounding ducktails were initially opinions that later became ‘facts’. As Cohen notes,

Magistrates, leader writers and politicians do not react like laboratory creatures being presented a series of random stimuli, but in terms of positions, statuses, interests, ideologies and values. Their responsiveness to rumours, for example, is not just related to the internal dynamics of the rumour process, but whether the rumours support their particular interests.

In this case, moral guardians’ political interests were to sustain white dominance, in the name of apartheid and to devise ways in which these recalcitrant youths and their threatening behaviour could be prevented from subverting this. Societal responses (and the stereotyping which accompanied this reaction) which involved formulating methods and policies can be seen as a form of social control. Kai Erikson – cited in Young – contends that the

deviant act creates a sense of mutuality among the people of a community by supplying a focus for group feeling. Like a war, a flood, or some other emergency, deviancy makes people more alert to the interests they share in common and draws attention to those values which constitute the ‘collective conscience’ of the community. Unless the rhythm of group life is punctuated by occasional moments of deviant behaviour, presumably, social organization would be impossible.

Societal reaction was not uniform and not all supported the press’ calls for additional social control. South Africans and moral guardians responded in a variety of ways. A number of letters written to editors of the South African local press make clear that the panic was questioned by certain members of the
community and government officials. According to *The Guardian* (a left wing newspaper), ‘hooliganism is being encouraged by the extremist Press, which recommends such methods to check the “wave of crime.”’ 

In a letter to Dr Steenkamp (of the Department of Social Welfare), Julian Phillips (who completed a survey of cases tried in the juvenile court in 1955) pointed out that the *Rand Daily Mail* reported inaccurate information which was giving Hillbrow youth a bad reputation. He wrote:

> The amazing thing is that your constituency has been represented as such a shocking area of delinquency. This is being completely overdone by the press.

In a statement made to the *Star*, Mr G.F. Olivier (Chief Social Welfare Officer for Johannesburg and Southern Transvaal), maintained that:

> There is no evidence to suggest that youths and girls who adopt a certain mode of dress or who wear their hair in a certain manner – for instance, the so-called ‘ducktail’ style – belong to any gang responsible for illegal activities. Certain styles and crazes simply tend to become fashionable.

In an article for the *Cape Times*, journalist John Howland Beaumont criticised the negative publicity and hostile judgements visited on the youths:

> …when they make a little noise with open exhausts to their motorcycles or do a little jiving or rock-'n rolling we point indignant and accusing fingers. Is that we point from a guilty conscience or see our own depravity in the natural healthy spirits of youth? Do we now want quiet from popping exhausts after the hideous thing we made of night? As for jiving and rock-'n rolling, we danced other dances…Nor were our morals to be commended. So now do we expect youth to sit with folded hands by the fireside and find a sedate and celibate pillow at nine o’clock in the evening – in our overcrowded, underfed, trade-spawned, industry-rich, money-rich, land-forgotten and godforsaken cities of the mid-Twentieth century?

This uneven response to the press’ calls for control was not unique to South Africa. Lemert observes:

> The socially visible deviations within a group, community, or society, stir its members to a wide variety of expressive reactions and attitudes, depending on the nature of the deviations and the expectancies of the conforming majority. Admiration, awe, envy, sympathy, fear, repulsion, disgust, hate, and anger are felt by those confronted by departures from their sanctioned ways of behaving. These are the elemental stuff from which societal reaction is compounded.
Pearson notes a similar situation in his account of press coverage on Victorian boys. He cites examples of press articles that:

> cast doubt on the Hooligan panic, accusing newspapers of being in their ‘silly season’ and of taking the matter up merely ‘as a suitable means of filling columns at the present moment’.¹⁵³

Determining the extent to which the view of ‘Ducktails as demons’ was supported by the public is a difficult task because of the absence of a public opinion survey. Newspapers were widely circulated in this period and 74.8 per cent of the white adult population read newspapers (see Table M and N in Appendix I) in 1962. The press influenced what Hepple terms a mass public and a political public. The latter comprises those ‘members of society who are, through their membership of particular institutions, in a position to have effect on political policies’. The former consists ‘primarily [of] recipients of political information rather than being directly concerned with the creation of government policies.’¹⁵⁴ Members of the political public would, as will be discussed in the next chapter, sit on government commissions of enquiry established to deal with the problem of youth.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has investigated how members of the press collaborated with the government in promoting its vision of moral apartheid. Concerns with problems such as ducktailism, pornographic literature and undesirable publications were the prime reasons for the passage of the Customs Act of 1955 to deal with imported media and the formation of the Central Publications Board to monitor local media. The media’s collaboration is most visible in its promotion of a moral panic over ducktailism. For the most part, the representation of ducktails - based as it was on specious information, rumours and stereotypes - was not refuted but was rather considered to represent the ‘truth’ as it was legitimised by ‘experts’ from official platforms such as government commissions and universities.

Through these commissions the government was embarking on a project, which would institutionalise and set the boundaries between ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ behaviour not only of white youths but also of whites in general. This
project was supported by the press in the context of its calls for moral censorship of media forms and of the conduct of certain members of the white community. Moral guardians and the press did not express any concern at the violence that permeated the subculture in the form of inter-gang fighting and assaults of African and homosexual men. The institutions that ‘organise[d] ideological practices’\textsuperscript{155} took the form of commissions of inquiry and government initiated research institutes which is the subject of the following chapter. What started out as research into youths collapsed into an exploration of wider social concerns where the family, child-rearing, parenting, marriage, working mothers, religion, morality, leisure and the state of the nation itself came into question. This set in motion what Cohen calls the second labelling process where judgements and suggestions for the containment of behaviour are made by the ‘societal control culture’ which includes

the laws, procedures, programs and organizations which in the name of a collectivity help, rehabilitate, punish or otherwise manipulate ‘deviants’ contains not just official institutions and personnel but also typical modes and models of understanding and explaining the deviance.\textsuperscript{156}

The platforms from which the ‘societal control culture’ operated is the focus of the next chapter. This provides a backdrop for the final chapter where through an analysis of the discourses invoked to understand ducktailism the ‘snowballing effect’ which is ‘characteristic of moral panics at their height’,\textsuperscript{157} will be revealed.
ENDNOTES

4 Moral panics relating to a wide range of issues from marijuana use (see H. Becker) and pornography to witchcraft and drug use have received attention. Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s publication provides an excellent account of theories on moral panics and on its application to earlier (such as the Canudos massacre in Brazil 1893-7) and more recent moral panics (like the persecution of gay men in Boise, Idaho in the 1950s and the alleged slave trade of young women in Orleans France 1969). They make a useful distinction between a moral crusade and a moral panic. They classify the Prohibition Movement (1900-1920); Anti-Marijuana Legislation (1930s) and the Sexual Psychopath Laws (1930s to 1950s) as moral crusades. For an account of these panics see E. Goode and N. Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance (Massachusetts, Blackwell Publishers, 1996).
9 Deviance has been given attention by criminologists and sociologists. Traces of deviancy theory can be found in the works of both Durkheim and Marx. Since then, a range of paradigms for the study of deviancy have been established. These include: structural-functional, deterrence, labelling, ethnomethodological, conflict and socio-ecological perspectives. For an overview of these views see A.E. Liska, Perspectives on Deviance (USA, Prentice Hall, 1987). Also see P. Rock and M. McIntosh (eds), Deviance and Social Control (London, Tavistock Publications, 1974). For an account of criminology and deviance studies in particular see S. Cohen, ‘Criminology and the Sociology of Deviance in Britain’ in P. Rock and M. McIntosh, Deviance.
10 Howard Becker draws on labelling theory to understand deviance. His work stands alongside that of Frank Tannenbaum, Edwin Lemert, John Kitsuse and Kai Erikson. For a discussion of these studies and labelling theory see H. S. Becker, ‘Labelling Theory Reconsidered’ in P. Rock and M. McIntosh, Deviance.
15 Thompson, Moral Panics, p. 7.
16 For a detailed account of these theories see Chapter I in Cohen, Folk Devils.
It is not within the scope of this dissertation to offer an outline or critique of these perspectives. For a detailed overview see Liska, *Perspectives on Deviance*.

Cited in Cohen, *Folk Devils*, p. 15.

Cited in Liska, *Perspectives on Deviance*, p. 118.


Cohen, *Folk Devils*, p. 22-23.


There are therefore five stages in the creation and disappearance of moral panic. Firstly, the phenomenon is categorised as a threat to society. Thereafter this threat is identified in the media. As a result of this media coverage, public concern builds. The authorities take action, in this case in the form of government Commissions of Enquiry. Finally the panic either disappears or policy changes are introduced. Cohen, *Folk Devils*, p. 199.


Cited in *ibid.*, p. 42.


Cohen, *Folk Devils*, p. 16.

Compared to other countries television was introduced late into South Africa. Radio broadcasts date back to 1927 after I.W. Schlesinger established the African Broadcasting Corporation (ABC). Initially radio was predominately an English service however after the passing of the Broadcast Act in 1936 which replaced ABC with the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) Afrikaans received priority. Finally in January 1976 television was introduced. W. Hachten and C. Giffard, *Total Onslaught: The South African Press Under Attack* (USA, University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), p. 206.

Cohen, *Folk Devils*, p. 25.


The South African press dates back to the early nineteenth century. In 1823 the first newspaper the *South African Advertiser*, was established. See Potter, Hepple and the *Press Commission* for a detailed account.


Generational authority, as noted by Phil Bonner and other members of the Wits History Workshop in informal discussions, is an under researched area within South African historiography. Besides the work of Glaser, Delius and more recently Carton, relations between generations have been pushed to the margins by South African scholars. B.
There was a battery of legislation which controlled censorship in South Africa. The 1892 Cape - Obscene Publications Act No 31) is the earliest. See A. Hepple, *Censorship* and Tables I and J in Appendix I.

Originally the only publication in the Cape Colony was the government sponsored *Cape Town Gazette*. It was only in 1823 that the first newspaper - the bilingual *South African Commercial Advertiser* (SACA) - was introduced. Lord Charles Somerset (Governor of the Cape) banned the paper twice. Thereafter the 1828 Press ordinance was introduced. See Potter *The Press as Opposition*, and Hepple, *Censorship and Press Control in South Africa*.

The NPU was established in Grahamstown after a 1882 Press Conference. It was formed to promote ‘all objects of common interest to the South African Press, and for the protection of its members in the proper discharge of their public duty.’ Newspaper Association of South Africa, ‘The History of the Newspaper Press Union’, p. 1.

The SASJ was a voluntary trade union formed in 1920 by a group of journalists. Historical and Literary Papers, University of the Witwatersrand, K132, 364, Annexure IX, p. 1.


NASA, CAD, GG, 247, 3/5558, Letter from H. Dunn (General Manager of the South African Press Association) to the Governor General, 25/07/1938.

NASA, CAD, GG, 2036, 64/2098, Letter from the assistant editor of *Die Vaderland* to his Excellency the Governor-General, 3/3/1932.

The Commission’s conclusions were drawn from responses to questionnaires (1006 replies to 1 323 questionnaires) distributed to editors, owners of newspapers and journalists affiliated to the SASJ. From reviewing local and foreign press cuttings and oral testimony from local journalists. NASA, CAD, URU, 2815, 3280, *Commission of Enquiry into the Press*, 10/1/1950, pp. 1-4.

The weekly papers scrutinised were the *Sunday Times* (1935-1954); *Sunday Express* (1935-1954); *Sunday Tribune* (1935-54), *Die Suid-Wes Afrikaner* (1939-1954), *Dagbreek*

64 Ibid, p. 57.
66 Hachten and Giffard, Total Onslaught, p. 56.
67 Hansard, April 14, 1961 cited in Ibid., p. 60.
70 Ibid., p. 50.
71 NASA, CAD, TES, 140, F1/170/20 Cabinet Memorandum on Press Control Legislation distributed by the Ministry of Information, 7/06/1965, p 2
72 Hachten and Giffard, Total Onslaught, p. 61.
73 Ibid.
74 Potter, Press as Opposition, p. 111.
75 Ibid., p. 189.
76 Ibid., p. 108.
77 Ibid., p. 72.
78 E.G. Jansen (Governor General) set up this commission on the 11th of November 1954. Other members included D.F Albernethy, Mrs D. Enslin De La Bat, Dr E. Greyling and G.F. Laurence, see NASA, CAD, UG42-1957, SRP, 6/497, Report of the Commission of Inquiry with Regard to Undesirable Publications.
79 Hepple, Censorship, p. 3.
80 For example in 1942 the American government established the Commission on the Freedom of the Press. Seven years later in 1949 the Royal Commission to Inquire into the Press published its report in the United Kingdom, NASA, CAD, URU, 2815, 3280, Commission of Enquiry into the Press, 10/1/1950.
81 It stipulated that any obscene literature received in the post was punishable by the withdrawal of further postal services and the payment of a fine not exceeding fifty pounds or imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months or to both a fine and imprisonment. In this case post will automatically be returned to the sender or detained see NASA, CAD, LDB, 4465, U127/2, Objectionable Literature, Annexure B, p. 5.
82 Section 21 (1) (f) prohibited indecent or obscene goods unless they were imported for the purposes of research under a permit that had been issued by the Minister of the Interior. Section 21 (2) stipulated that when establishing whether or not goods were ‘decent’ the Minister of Interior’s decision was final. In the case of printed, engraved lithographic and photographic material such a decision would be made only after consultation with the Board of Censors appointed in terms of the Entertainment's (Censorship) Act (No 28) of 1931. The Board’s decision would be published in the Government Gazette and thereafter all further issues would be prohibited. Any person found in possession of obscene goods would be subject to a ‘fine not exceeding treble the value of the goods or one thousand pounds, whichever is the greater, or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years, or to both such fine and imprisonment.’ NASA, CAD, LDB, 4465, U127/2, Objectionable Publications, Annexure B, p. 6.
83 Section 1 stipulated that no organisation might exhibit or publish a film or advertisement that had not been approved by the Board of Censors. It was the Minister’s duty to appoint the board consisting of a chairperson, deputy chairperson and at least five other members. Permission for the public release of a film would only be granted if the Minister was satisfied that, a) it is not calculated to give offence to the religious convictions or feelings of any section of the public; or b) is not calculated to bring any section of the public into ridicule or contempt; or c) is not contrary to the public interest or good morals Ibid., p7
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84 Hepple, Censorship, pp. 39-40.
85 Cape Depot (CD), L19609-19637, Circular from chairperson to part-time readers and members of the Board of censors.
86 Hepple, Censorship, p. 40.
89 Hepple, Censorship, p. 13.
90 NASA, CAD, PR, 2/110/50, 2/72, Hell’s Angels, 15/05/1970.
93 Ibid., p. 4.
94 Ibid, p. 32.
95 Ibid, p. 52.
96 Hachten and Giffard, Total Onslaught, p. 160.
98 Ibid., p. 13.
99 Membership to the academy was extended to people (from all racial backgrounds) over the age of twenty-five who held a degree or an equivalent qualification or to writers who had published work. Membership could be either full or associate. The number of full members was not allowed to exceed four hundred. Some of the members of the Academy included A. Paton, A. Delius, N.G. Garson, J. Duminy and L. Gander see Historical and Literary Papers, University of the Witwatersrand, AF1998, A 1.7, "The English Academy of Southern Africa".
100 Historical and Literary Papers, University of the Witwatersrand, AF1998, L1.1, "Memorandum on the Undesirable Publications Bill" by Dr. G. Knowles-Williams, 25/05/1962, p. 1.
101 Ibid., p. 2.
102 Historical and Literary Papers, University of the Witwatersrand, AF1998, L1.1, Terms of reference for the Interdepartmental Committee of Enquiry into the Press.
103 Historical and Literary Papers, University of the Witwatersrand, AF1998, L1.4, "Memorandum to the Committee of Enquiry into the Operation of the Publications Control Board" by M.C. O'Dowd, 11/07/1972.
105 Natal Mercury, Juvenile Delinquency – Its Proximate Cause’ by Rabbi Harris Swift, 30/01/1953.
111 Cohen, Folk Devils, 40.
112 Pretoria News, ‘Competitive Thieving by White Tsotsis’, 8/7/1950
In the late 1940’s there was a series of articles which pointed out that juvenile crime had decreased amongst Europeans. See for example, RDM, ‘Juvenile Crime Increases Among Non-Europeans; Decreases Among Europeans’, 12/06/1947, Eastern Province Herald, ‘Less Crime by Juveniles’, 4/7/1947.


This was also a feature of the Mods and Rockers panic. Ibid.; p. 62


Rand Daily Mail, “This is Crime”, 2/03/1956.


Young, ‘Mass Media’ in P. Rock and M McIntosh, Deviance, p. 256.

Cohen, Folk Devils, p. 44.


Rand Daily Mail, ‘The Kindergarden of Crime: Teenagers roam streets at night; often drunk or dazed by dagga’, 25/03/1954.


The Star, 11/3/48; Rand Daily Mail, 3/11/47; Benoni City Times, 2/01/1948.

Stereotype analysis is closely linked with research in ‘person perception which has been conducted most notably by social psychologists’. For more information on this field see J. Leyens, V. Yzerbyt and G. Schadron (eds), Stereotypes and Social Cognition, (London, Sage, 1994).


Their emphasis, J. Leyens, V. Yzerbyt and G. Schadron (eds), Stereotypes, p. 3.

Ibid., p. 17.


Goode & Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics, p. 34.


Cohen, *Folk Devils*, p. 198.


Ibid., p. 108.


Lemert, *Social Pathology*, p. 54.

G. Pearson, ‘Victorian Boys, We are Here!’ in Gelder and Thornton, (eds.), *The Subcultures Reader*, p. 283.

Ibid., p. 10.


Cohen, *Folk Devils*, p. 74.

Ibid., p. 82.