THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN THE PROVISION OF URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Engineering, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of doctor of Philosophy.

Johannesburg 1993
DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.

[Signature]

19th day of April, 1993
ABSTRACT

The thesis develops a new approach to community participation, for application to infrastructure provision projects in developing countries, based upon social surveys and case studies of negotiations in five South African communities. Existing approaches to community participation are analysed and shown to be unsuitable for infrastructure provision. The thesis compares the characteristics of infrastructure projects with those of other types of development projects and demonstrates how these characteristics can be used to situate a given project within a project environment defined in terms of two variables: the openness of government to community involvement in decision-making, and project complexity.

Social surveys carried out in Soweto and KwaThandeka showed the centrality of infrastructure to social change in South Africa. Existing urban management systems were unable to cope with the stresses placed upon them. Four facets of urban management were identified as being under stress: institutional capacity, legitimacy, affordability, and user convenience. These stresses change the nature of infrastructure provision from the supply of end products into a complex process. Central to this process are: an increased number of actors influencing decisions, the enhanced role of technical professionals, and the social implications of different levels of service.

The case-study of KwaThandeka included a study of the negotiation process with the provincial administration. This research led to the development of a performance specification for comparing social, economic and technical measures of value. A new conceptual framework for community participation was derived, based upon the different actors involved in the decision-making process and the different needs of each of those actors. Three case studies from Natal identified different implementation strategies for community participation. Communities were found to have three distinct needs: involvement in the political process; involvement in technical decision-making; and representation as consumers of services. An analytical tool was developed to assist project managers in understanding the relationships between actors in a project. The thesis shows how technical project management can be integrated into the participation process. The success of community participation can be evaluated by assessing the degree of consensus achieved between actors, and the intensity of community involvement.
DEDICATION

To my wife

Ania Maria Wanda Grobicki

with all my love
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost I wish to thank my wife Ania for her support during a difficult period. To cope with my PhD while having a baby showed a special kind of love and courage. My thanks go to her also for helping me, over many hours and days, to understand a complex topic and to work through the mass of contradictions and false trails. Her insight often ensured that idealism did not substitute for logic. Without her support and patience I could not have completed this thesis. I also wish to express my heartfelt thanks to the following people.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Community Participation has become a pivotal concept in the provision of services to low-income communities in South Africa, and accepted in theory by all the major parties involved with the development process. Unfortunately these parties do not share a common vision of what such participation actually means. Thus civil engineers and planners working in developing countries see community participation simply as a way of mobilising community support for projects; non-governmental organisations in the field, as well as community based organisations, see it as a vehicle through which local communities can take control of the development process and bring about sweeping political change; development agencies see it a method of improving project performance; while government departments view it as threatening and subversive.

If community participation is open to different interpretations, the focus of that participation (e.g. land tenure, rural health care) will, generally, be considered to be more straightforward and have only one interpretation. Infrastructure provision has certainly been viewed in this way. For example Gerricke, quoting an interview with a “specialist” in community participation at the Development Bank of Southern Africa, states that “... the provision of [physical
services to the community... is relatively straightforward” (Gerricke, 1991:116). Engineers (and other actors) view services as a static product, so that the core of the debate to date has been viewed as a problem in which the development of a process (community participation) has to be reconciled with the supply of a product (infrastructure).

This is not the case since the issue is more complex than any of the above parties assume. There are different levels of services, each of which has social, political and economic implications. There is a severe shortage of money to fund the provision and management of infrastructure services in newly developing urban areas. Finally, there is a major lack of technical, financial and administrative expertise. Under these circumstances the correct choice of infrastructure becomes a process in itself. Hence community participation in urban infrastructure provision should be seen as a complex interaction between two dynamic processes.

Over the past eight years the author has undertaken a number of projects which have had a major community participation component. This research has led to the “unpacking” of community participation in the context of infrastructure provision. None of the existing approaches to community participation currently cited in the literature are appropriate in this context, either in South Africa or in the rest of anglophone Africa.

In this light the role and attitude of civil engineers and urban planners, as the main professionals in the provision of urban infrastructure, become critical factors in the development of a successful community participation strategy for urban infrastructure provision. It is around these issues that this thesis on community participation in infrastructure provision will be developed.
1.1 Background

In the field of community participation South Africa is unique, making it extremely valuable from a research perspective. On the one hand it has similarities to many countries in Latin America, with a mass-based urban movement leading the struggle against an illegitimate regime. On the other hand there is a major difference in that, whereas in Latin America the focus of the urban struggle was land tenure and shelter, in South Africa it was physical infrastructure. At the same time South Africa is an African country and shows many of the features associated with urban development in Africa, in terms of resource differentials (in money and skills) and development patterns. It also has the same local government structure as many anglophone African countries and, like them, is suffering from a crisis which centres around the lack of adequate urban infrastructure.

This central role that technology (in the form of physical infrastructure) plays in the participation process in South Africa is evident from an analysis of the mass urban struggles which have dominated South Africa's internal politics since the early 1980s. In 1984 a boycott of rents began in the Vaal area south of Johannesburg (Jochelson, 1986:15), which rapidly spread through the country and which continues sporadically to the present time. This boycott in turn provided the seeds of an urban mass movement and an alternative civil structure of authority and control, while the resulting antagonism to the apartheid state was an important factor in the government's liberalising process of 1990. This boycott, which became such a powerful political tool, was driven by a strong dissatisfaction against the deterioration of infrastructure services.

The resulting "pressure to negotiate on service provision to entire communities" (Collinge, 1998) on the part of community based organisations has given prominence on the political agenda to an issue which has, to date, been considered a purely technical issue; the preserve of technical professionals, specifically civil engineers, planners and economists. This in turn has raised questions about how decision-making on such a technical issue can take place in a
wider forum, which leads to a series of further questions on the nature of the participation process; who should participate; what the roles of the different actors should be; and, ultimately, who should control the process.

At this point similarities begin to emerge with debates on the nature and purpose of participation (called variously community, public or people's participation) in other parts of the world. However, in terms of infrastructure provision in South Africa, the role of technology introduces a variable which has not been debated in depth elsewhere.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the issue of community participation in decision-making in a situation in which technology features prominently, namely urban physical infrastructure provision. This introduction broadly outlines the South African context within which community participation is becoming increasingly important. It then looks at some international experience of participation, following which it sets out the objectives, and outlines the scope, of the thesis.

1.2 Development needs in South Africa

In 1980 the total population of South Africa was 29.1 million; by the year 2000 this figure is predicted to be 47.6 million and by the year 2010, 59.7 million (Urban Foundation, 1991a:13). The policies of apartheid, and in particular the creation of homelands, have produced distorted settlement patterns, with demographic statistics being gathered separately in the South African core, the "Independent" homelands (the so-called TBVC states), and the "non-independent" homelands. In producing their aggregated statistics the Urban Foundation used Dewar's concept (see for example Dewar, 1967) of homeland/non-homeland, within which there are four basic categories: metropolitan; cities and towns; dense or closer settlements; and rural (Urban Foundation, 1991a:16).
The first two comprise urban areas, functionally defined. Dense, or closer settlements, occur in rural homelands only and are agglomerations of mainly informal dwellings. The majority of people in these areas commute to work in urban or metropolitan centres and people generally do not derive significant income from agriculture. Rural areas comprise those areas in which there are relatively lower population densities and relatively high proportions of income derived from agriculture. Although this latter category includes smaller towns and villages, the great bulk of the population of such areas is settled on the land (Urban Foundation, 1991a:16).

A second major demographic characteristic specific to South Africa is the difference in urbanisation between people classified into separate population categories by Apartheid legislation. The aggregate level of urbanisation in South Africa (in 1986) was 57%. However, while urbanisation among white and Indian people was in excess of 90% and that of coloured people over 80% (Urban Foundation, 1990a:6), that of black people (Africans) was only 53%, 35% of which was in metropolitan areas, 10% in towns and 8% in dense settlements (Urban Foundation, 1991a:13).

By the year 2010 the urbanisation of Africans is projected to increase to 69% (Urban Foundation, 1990a:13). Although all types of areas will have increased populations in absolute terms the increase will be far larger in urban areas. Thus while the population of rural areas is projected to increase from 11.4 million in 1985 to 15.3 million in 2010, that of urban areas is projected to increase from 13.0 to 33.2 million (Urban Foundation, 1991a:13).

The infrastructure and housing needs in this situation are significant. There is already a major deficit in housing, where the net housing backlog is estimated at 1,366 million housing units (Urban Foundation, 1992). Similarly for services it is estimated that 4 million people do not have access to an adequate water supply, while 7.67 million people do not have access to adequate sanitation (Fowler, 1992:11). To overcome this problem and to cater for new family formation the Urban Foundation estimates that there will need to be 181 000
housing units per year (Urban Foundation, 1992). Based upon a figure of R20 000 for a serviced house and dwelling (which itself is extremely conservative) this would represent a capital requirement of approximately R3 600 million per annum.

Whilst capital sums of this magnitude can be borrowed the real question is whether these loans can be repaid, i.e. are they affordable. Here the outlook is poor. The total number of people below the minimum living level (MLL) (regarded as the minimum income required for subsistence in the short term for a black household of average size) was estimated at 15.5 million in 1985, of which 14.6 million were Africans, and these figures are projected to increase to 18.4 million and 17.6 million respectively in 1995 (Urban Foundation, 1991b:12). These estimates are calculated on a zero real rate of growth in personal income between 1990 and 1991, followed by a 2.5% real growth in personal income each year from 1991 to 1995 (Urban Foundation, 1991b:4).

Given this scenario there has been a move away from conventional housing supported by a government subsidy on mortgage repayments to first time home buyers towards site and service schemes in new (greenfield) areas and in-situ service provision (upgrading) in existing informal settlements. In terms of policy these concepts were first proposed by the Urban Foundation (1988:25). In addition the same report proposed the introduction of a capital subsidy scheme (Urban Foundation, 1988:41) to overcome the affordability problem. This concept of a capital subsidy was adopted by the Independent Development Trust in 1990, when R750 million was allocated for the provision of 100 000 serviced sites with a subsidy of R7 500 per site (IDT, 1991a).

At a national policy level the De Loor Commission on housing in South Africa (De Loor, 1992), appointed by the Government to prepare a national housing policy and strategy for implementation, also recommended the concept of a capital subsidy for poorer sections of the population. In this case four categories of beneficiaries were defined within the wider group of people requiring enabling support for housing assistance. In this scheme, category 1 would be those
families with a maximum cash income less than R1 000 per month (at 1992 prices). This group would be given a serviced site but on a non-ownership basis, albeit with security of tenure. The household income of category 2 to 4 households would be in the range R500 to R3 000 per month (with the concept of regular employment being used to differentiate between category 1 and 2 beneficiaries earning less than R1 000 per month). Those in category 2 would be given a serviced site and a loan of up to R5 000, but would be expected to contribute up to 10% of monthly income towards repayment of the loan over a five year period. Those in categories 3 and 4 would be given a reduced interest loan of a fixed amount (de Looer, 1992:306-314).

The African National Congress, presently the major opposition power grouping in South Africa, also supports "the provision of subsidies to facilitate access to basic and essential services . . . to target those in most need of assistance" (ANC, 1992:32), although the way in which this might be done is not detailed. Thus, although different parties might have different views about mechanisms for the operation of housing support, there is consensus on the need to provide infrastructure for the urban poor on a significant scale.

Given this consensus, together with the recognition that available funding is limited, three sets of issues arise: the way in which the subsidy is utilised (e.g. a private coupon system, as recommended by the World Bank (1991:9-10), or through collective development, as proposed in the IDT scheme (IDT, 1991a); the extent of the subsidy; and levels of service. The latter two are closely linked. It is around these issues, together with associated factors such as the costing structures applicable for the operation and maintenance of services, that the community based organisations are negotiating:

1.3 Current approaches to community participation

It is not the phrase "community participation" per se which causes a problem. Rather it is the philosophy (i.e. the differing concepts behind the phrase) which
require scrutiny, since virtually every party involved with the urban development process has made statements supportive of the principle of community participation in urban infrastructure and housing provision. Thus:

- The Nationalist Government, in its 1986 White Paper on Urbanisation stated that "... as much recognition as possible should be given to community involvement in housing matters ..." (Republic of South Africa, 1986).

- The ANC stated that "Community participation in and control over the housing delivery process is critical to the successful implementation of our housing strategies" (ANC, 1992:30).

- The IDT, in its explanation to applicants of its capital subsidy scheme stated that "The IDT recognises the fundamental importance of community participation in development projects ..." (IDT, 1991a:9).

- The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) states that "(Community) Participation is inherent in the DBSA's approach to development, its Mission and Articles of Agreement" (DBSA, 1992:2).

- The Urban Foundation states that "... The issue of CP [community participation] in development projects is firmly on the South African policy agenda of the nineties" and that "CP is essential to the successful consolidation and development of informal settlements" (Urban Foundation, 1991c:4).

Where the problem begins is in reaching agreement on what is actually meant by community participation, and how it will be implemented. Thus while the government talks of community involvement, the ANC and the Urban Foundation (Urban Foundation, 1991d:4) speak of community control. Other organisations in turn talk of community enablement (see for example IDT, 1991a:10 and DBSA, 1991:1). The terms themselves are confusing, although all but the
government statement do imply a greater or lesser degree of community control. However, if they are interpreted in this light then some of them, particularly the ones from financial institutions, contain in-built contradictions. In a critique of the IDT it is argued "... that the IDT is not committed to community based development but imposes its own view of how black people should live on communities" (Reconstruct 1992:1). This critique then goes on to list basic contradictions in the IDT’s approach whereby it highlights specific components of the IDT policy which mitigate against community participation (Reconstruct, 1992:2).

The IDT response to this type of criticism is that there is a need to achieve a high coverage of basic services rapidly (IDT, 1991b:18-19) and that the type of participation envisaged by Reconstruct would be counter productive in terms of actual service provision. This argument also has support in communities, where criticism has been levelled at IDT consultants whose insistence on participation is seen to be delaying a project.

This type of debate is mirrored by overseas experience. For example Paul, in researching forty World Bank Projects, found only three which had as an objective what is commonly known as empowerment (a concept which reflects the dominance of community control over the project and which will be discussed in greater detail later in the thesis) (Paul, 1987:15). Ten had no participation component and the other 27 utilised a form of participation which aimed in some way to improve project performance while providing various benefits to the community. In two of the projects where empowerment was the objective (both components of a housing provision project in El Salvador), Paul references the fact that in these projects community participation was instrumental in forging solidarity among beneficiaries and strengthening their ability to deal with a variety of public agencies effectively (Paul, 1987:15, quoting Deneke and Bamberger).

While this statement appears to support the idea that projects can be used for empowerment, a closer examination reveals a more complex situation. Thus
Stein (1990), in an analysis of the same El Salvador housing project, comments that the house building programme was used as the vehicle to develop community empowerment, while the services were constructed using conventional methods. The non-governmental organisation (NGO), FUNDASAL, was thus selective and used only one component of the total project (which was not the provision of physical infrastructure) to achieve its stated objective of empowerment. Thus it is clear that, as Moser, a strong proponent of empowerment who has written extensively on community participation, states "(there are) fundamental contradictions inherent in the incorporation of community participation in urban projects" (Moser, 1989:79).

1.4 The contradictions of community participation in urban infrastructure provision

In developed countries, physical infrastructure is seen as a collection of products (i.e. facilities for the provision of roads, water, sanitation etc.). The reason for this is related to the concept of user convenience. Each individual service provides maximum user convenience, i.e. it minimises the input that a user is required to make for the service to perform its function. An example of this is the waterborne sewerage system, where the only input from the user is the flushing of the lavatory cistern. When services were originally developed in their crude form, they often required user input to achieve their basic social or economic goals. For example, water had to be boiled to prevent disease prior to the development of water treatment plants. Better and more sophisticated technology led to improvements over time. Finally a point was reached in developed countries where basic social needs were fully satisfied. Services are now seen purely in terms of their technology, and this is the fundamental assumption around which civil engineering education develops.

When civil engineers working in developing countries are faced with a need to design a service which provides less user convenience, this technology-dominated thinking remains. (This discussion relates to service provision in
urban areas. The provision of services in rural areas where no services exist, and which adopts a basic needs approach, is different. Civil engineers begin with the "norm", i.e. the service levels which provide maximum user convenience in developed countries, and look at how these might be lowered in order to reduce costs. This leads to a technicist perception of infrastructure, in which services are viewed solely in terms of cost, which is then linked to the issue of affordability, i.e. the amount that individuals can afford to pay.

This approach is typified in South Africa by a document providing guidelines for service provision in "developing communities" (CSIR, 1986). The document concerns itself with examining specific technical criteria, namely design objectives and principles, design criteria, materials and construction (CSIR, 1986:3). While the objectives and needs of the community are also mentioned, there is no indication of what these are or how they might be incorporated into service provision. A second document then grew from this work, a "matrix of levels of service" (SAHAC, 1988), which quantifies the cost of the different levels of all services. These two documents have become the basis for government-funded design of infrastructure services in South Africa.

However this approach has run into serious problems. On a political level the provision of lower levels of service to poorer (which means predominantly African) sectors of the urban population is seen by community and political organisations as an extension of the apartheid philosophy. The associated lowering of the levels of user convenience requires that users must put in more of their own time and effort (e.g. carrying water from a communal standpipe). Increasingly in recent years civil engineers have seen community participation as the means by which communities can be persuaded to accept lower levels of service.

This in turn has led to opposition from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs), who have adopted the empowerment approach to participation. This view is simplistic. Technically infrastructure provision is a complex task, which has to operate within time and cost.
1.5 International experience of community participation in development projects

There have been two major reviews of community participation in development projects. The first is that of Paul (1987) described above, which centres around an evaluation of World Bank projects. Paul analyses the different roles that communities play in development projects. Specifically he quantifies what he terms “levels of intensity” of input, i.e. the varying degrees of community involvement in the decision-making process. He also makes a significant contribution to understanding community participation by quantifying a range of clearly defined objectives for community participation (Paul, 1987:3-4).

The second review is that of Moser, entitled “Community Participation in Urban Projects in the Third World” (1989). Moser states that the intention of her paper is “... to compare and contrast the experience of community participation in urban projects designed and implemented by a diversity of organisations and project agencies ...” and “to identify and analyse some of the fundamental contradictions inherent in the incorporation of community participation in urban projects” (Moser, 1989:79). In Moser’s analysis these contradictions “are identified in terms of the type and scale of intervening organisation, in the form of financial support provided for the project, in the internal structure of project agencies and finally in the structure of local communities ...” (Moser, 1989:80). For Moser the issue of empowerment, raised earlier, is central to the debate about community participation (Moser, 1989:83-84). She has
1.6 Chronology

This thesis is based on extensive practical and theoretical research. The practical interest arose from work done by the author in a peri-urban area of the PWV, the Winterveld, in the period 1984 to 1988 (Abbott, 1989). The context was that of a non-directive community development project (see chapter 2.3 for an explanation of directive and non-directive community development) and the type of participation process did not appear to be described adequately by any of the models currently available. Since this work is not included in the case studies presented in the main body of the thesis it is described briefly below.

The project took place in a settled but unserviced tribal area of 5 000 inhabitants outside Ga-Rankuwa near Pretoria where water was identified by a community development worker as the major need. Water was being provided at that time by water sellers at a cost of R2 per 220 litre (l) drum and residents wanted a cheaper but more regular supply of water. In the ensuing community-driven process, representatives of residents and professionals worked together to develop and provide an affordable water supply (Abbott, 1989). This process took place in a relatively stable political environment so that the issue of power was not a key issue. What was identified as the key issue was user convenience.

Residents of the Winterveld compared their situation to that of adjacent Ga-Rankuwa, where water was supplied to every house at a cheaper cost. At the same time they recognised that if they were to obtain a better supply they would have to provide it for themselves. Thus the debate revolved around a trade-off between cost, affordability and user convenience. Residents viewed the water supply as a service and judged it according to the way in which it met their needs and aspirations. Effectively they were behaving as consumers.

Other work done by the author in different political and economic circumstances identified different community needs. In one, the need was to develop leadership capacity to enable local leadership to negotiate service levels and service charges with Government bodies (see chapter 5 for details). In others, the problem
developed a method of measuring empowerment by distinguishing between participation as a means and participation as an end in itself (Moser, 1989:84). Here the former is seen as a form of mobilisation to get things done, while the latter is seen as a process whose outcome is an increasingly "meaningful" participation in the development process (Moser, 1983:3).

By placing empowerment in this central role Moser has created a "means and end" duality, which she acknowledges. Within the context of community participation in urban development she makes two key statements about this. The first is that "as with any dualistic division, this one between participation as a means and an end is mechanistic and limited in its applicability ... In reality it is not the evaluation of participation either as a means or as an end which is important, but the identification of the process whereby participation as a means has the capacity to develop into participation as an end" (Moser, 1989:84). The second is where she says that the question of what empowerment actually entails is still problematic in a number of respects. She then comments that Paul does not elaborate whether the objective of empowerment is strictly limited to practical empowering within the project, or whether it is assumed to extend beyond the project itself.

These two statements of Moser's are central to the debate on community participation. Firstly, they provide the theoretical basis for the concept of empowerment, with its "means and end" duality. This has been uncritically adopted as the objective of community participation by the NGOs and CBOs in South Africa, as indicated in the previous section. Secondly, the term empowerment is used without being clearly defined as to its conceptual scope. Moser refers to it as a framework without defining what is meant by a framework. Oakley and Marsden (1984) describe empowerment as both a paradigm and a conceptual framework without defining either. It is important to define a conceptual hierarchy, and this issue is addressed in the thesis. This may also contribute to eliminating some of the confusion arising from applying international experience directly to the South African situation.
became how to strengthen the technological capability of the community (details of these projects are given in chapter 8). Thus the work that developed over a period of time began to concretise different needs to be satisfied by community perspectives of, and participation in, projects.

At the same time a review and evaluation of the international literature on community participation, commissioned by the Urban Foundation and carried out by the author, indicated that there might be other roots to community participation, allied to the aspects mentioned above (Abbott, 1988). This work indicated that there may be an alternative way of viewing community participation to that of empowerment, with its associated dualistic "means and end" measurement criterion. This study led the author to do further research both theoretically, in examining the origins of community participation more thoroughly, and practically, in case study work, where particular attention was paid to the roles and relationships of different parties to the development process.

1.7 Scope of the thesis

This thesis concentrates on community participation in physical infrastructure provision in the urban sector in South Africa. There are several reasons for this particular focus. Firstly the distinction is made between urban and rural projects. From the literature survey carried out, there are indications that the structure of the participation process is different in the two areas, for reasons which are argued in chapters 2 and 3. The problematic in this thesis is developed within an urban context. The applicability of the conclusions to rural projects would make an interesting subject for further research.

Secondly it is recognised that there are several components which make up the urban environment, of which physical infrastructure is only one (others, for example, would be land usage, housing and social services). There is an extensive body of literature detailing community participation in certain of these
areas, specifically housing and health, but very little on community participation in infrastructure provision. The thesis has concentrated on this latter area because there is so little research and because of its growing importance in terms of urban budgetary demand. To examine all of the components of the urban environment would have been too long and complicated a task, but there remains a need for research to relate these components to each other and look more closely at the way in which they interact, both internally and with the wider community.

All existing approaches to community participation have serious shortcomings when applied to participation in urban infrastructure provision. The research presented here has led to the development of a theory of community participation to overcome this problem. It is anticipated that this theory and many of the findings may be applicable to other areas of the development process. Within this theory a conceptual framework is developed which is specific to urban infrastructure provision. Finally the issue of implementation strategies is addressed using first-hand field experience and case study material.

1.8 Outline of the thesis

The body of the thesis can be divided into three parts. The first part (chapters 2 and 3), looks at community participation from an international perspective. The second part (chapters 4 to 8 inclusive) examines the South African situation, but from several different perspectives. Thus chapters 4 and 5 highlight the political struggle around urbanisation in South Africa, presenting research done in Soweto. Chapters 6 and 7 look at the relationship between different actors in the development process and the similarities with problems of urbanisation in other parts of Africa, using research done in KwaThandeka. In addition these four chapters also develop the theme of infrastructure provision as a process. Chapter 8 then presents three case studies which illustrate different implementation strategies. The third part of the thesis, represented by chapter 9, develops a theory of community participation and an appropriate conceptual
framework for urban infrastructure provision. Chapter 10 summarises the conclusions drawn.

Chapter 2 begins by examining the historical and geo-political context of community participation. There have been two broad approaches to community participation, community development and empowerment. The research in this chapter shows how the bulk of international work on participation, while recognising the two approaches, places them within paradigms. These paradigms are based upon two different theories of development, modernisation theory and dependency theory. The shift from community development to empowerment is then seen within the context of a paradigm shift. The validity of this relationship between paradigms and approaches to community participation is questioned. Selected case studies from the literature are used to illustrate the theoretical argument.

Chapter 3 provides a literature review of conceptual work on community participation. The chapter begins by analysing various definitions and interpretations of the term community participation and placing them in chronological sequence. From this work different conceptual frameworks are identified. The work of two authors, Paul (1987) and Moser (1989), who have carried out the most recent detailed reviews of the topic, are shown to be the most valuable. Key results of Paul's work are a categorisation of objectives, the differentiation between objectives and intensity of participation (which Paul terms dimensions of development), and the creation of the first meaningful conceptual framework. Moser's contribution lies in her motivation of empowerment as the dominant approach to community participation. Drawing upon the research of other authors, in particular Goulet (1986, 1989), other important components of participation are identified which have not been incorporated into any of the existing conceptual frameworks.

The second part of the thesis examines the South African situation. Chapter 4 is a literature review, which looks at the historical development of urban areas in South Africa as they affected African people, in particular the effects of
legislation and the increasing resistance to that legislation. This culminated in the 1980s with the growth of the "civic" movement and the imposition of a state of emergency on the country. Two important points arise from this review. The first is that a parallel can be drawn between the rise of the civic movement in South Africa and that of the urban mass movements of Latin America. This has influenced the thinking of the civic movement and their supporting NGOs in favour of the empowerment approach to community participation. However the second point is that the dominant issue which sustained the mass movements in the two places was different. In Latin America the focus of the urban struggle was land tenure and shelter, while in South Africa it was physical infrastructure. This difference is shown to be of critical importance in showing (later in the thesis) why empowerment is unsuitable as an approach to community participation in a South African context.

Chapter 5 is a case study of infrastructure levels in Soweto, based upon the author’s work. The chapter begins by giving a brief history of Soweto which shows the decay in the level of service provision over time. The results of a random survey of services carried out in 1989 is then presented. This demonstrates the critical role that infrastructure provision played in mobilising the struggle against the state. This use of a technical issue as a vehicle for community mobilisation further reinforces the weaknesses of the empowerment frameworks which were identified in chapters 2, 3 and 4.

Chapter 6 lays the basis for the alternative structure for community participation, through a second South African case study carried out by the author. The location is a small township, KwaThandeka, in the Eastern Transvaal. While the Soweto study described in chapter 5 looks at the relationship between the community and the various government authorities, the KwaThandeka study concentrates on the relationship between the community and technical professionals, and examines this in detail. The failure of professionals to identify and understand the wider needs of the community, if left unchecked, may lead to development which is actually detrimental to those wider needs. The study highlights the importance of the role of technology in development, as well
as the difference in perceptions of the role of services which exists between professionals and community members.

Chapter 7 looks at the way in which third tier municipal government operates in South Africa and shows the relationship between the different parties and the increased power of the technocracy in a situation of serious resource constraints. It is demonstrated that the increased power of the technocratic group actually changes the power relationships around infrastructure provision significantly, to the extent that this group introduces a force which has to be recognised as independent of the controlling authority. The lack of control over knowledge and skills is dis-empowering to the community, albeit in a different sense to that of lack of control over socio-political decision-making. The chapter highlights the importance of including social, political and wider economic needs as inputs when levels of service are decided, as well as long-term operation and maintenance capability.

Chapter 8 presents three South African case studies, out of a number of such projects undertaken. In these projects the implementation of community participation strategies was managed and monitored by the author. The three studies are taken from different socio-political environments and show how the community has different, and sometimes contradictory, needs which cannot be accounted for by treating the community as an homogeneous entity.

Finally chapter 9 draws together the findings of the earlier chapters and develops a comprehensive general theory of community participation. Together with the conclusions summarised in chapter 10, this closing section resolves the contradictions between existing approaches to community participation and their application to infrastructure provision. The conceptual tools which result from this research are designed to be of use to civil engineers and planners in their interaction with communities. The understanding of community participation developed in this research shows that it is possible to predict, for a given development scenario, the type of community participation which has the highest
chance of success in providing acceptable, affordable and sustainable infrastructure.

Endnotes

1. Where the term infrastructure is used in this thesis it refers specifically to physical infrastructure (i.e., water supply, waste water disposal, roads, stormwater, electricity). Unless otherwise stated it will refer to urban areas.

2. In this thesis the terms economic and financial are both used. Financial refers purely to the direct cost implications of an action, e.g., the recovery of capital costs. It is important because many technical professionals see this as the only economic factor in infrastructure provision. The term economic is used in a broader sense, where there are other longer term economic implications arising from a specific decision. The case study of KwaThandeka in chapter 6 illustrates the difference between the two terms in respect of infrastructure provision.

3. The use of the terms white, coloured, Indian and black reflect South African apartheid terminology for describing different people inhabiting South Africa. They are used here when quoting official statistics where the terms have been used. Their use here does not reflect in any way an acceptance of such racist terms. The term African is used in this thesis to mean black South Africans.

4. This percentage is calculated from the data provided in “Urban Debate 2010 No. 1 - Population Trends: Demographic projection model” (Urban Foundation, 1990a).

5. In this work as a social consultant for the IDT in Natal (see chapter 8), this accusation was levelled at the author on two projects.
CHAPTER 2

A REVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL AND GEOPOLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

2.1 Introduction

Several papers on community participation refer to its historical development. However these reviews are generally short and cursory in nature. Only one author places any significance on the fact that community participation as it is practised in developing countries at the present time has evolved from different roots (De Kadt, 1982:573), but even he does not elaborate in any detail. In general there is no recognition that these differing roots might be important in gaining a wider understanding of community participation.

Instead a review of the literature gives the impression that there is a clear genealogy to community participation in the sense that, over time, different approaches have dominated and then been superseded. Thus the community development approach was dominant in the 1950s and 1960s and was then superseded by empowerment¹. Unfortunately this simplified view is full of
contradictions. Far from being superseded, community development continues to flourish in many parts of the world (see section 2.3). The real problem is that there is really no rigorous academic foundation for the whole topic of community participation, a viewpoint supported by Midgely (1987) (see section 3.8). There is "certainly no emerging universal model [of community participation]" (Oakley and Marsden, 1984:65) and no cohesive structures underpinning the various arguments. There are broad approaches which are situated within theoretical paradigms but to date these have been inadequately discussed in the literature.

This chapter begins the process of creating a cohesive structure or theory by examining community participation from an historical and geopolitical perspective. After looking briefly at some preconceptions which authors bring to the field, two dominant approaches are examined: (i) community development; and (ii) empowerment. The differences between them are analysed. It is found that, rather than the latter superseding the former, each has specific characteristics which make it suitable for specific situations.

But what defines these situations, and is there a structure within which the approaches can themselves be defined? Some authors link participation to specific development theories (section 2.2). Davis explores the relationship between development and what he terms the "Dependency Paradigm" (Davis, 1985:14), justifying the use of the latter in a study of urbanisation in developing countries through the work of researchers such as Munoz (1985). In this context both empowerment and conscientizacion (section 2.2) become the means through which a specific form of economic development and social change take place within the guiding paradigm of dependency theory. This linkage between approaches and paradigms is explored in greater detail in section 2.2 below and returned to in chapter 9, when an alternative structure is proposed. This alternative views different community participation approaches in terms of their relationship to the wider project environment.
2.2 Preconceptions of community participation

The starting point for many authors is that community participation is not only desirable but has become a necessary precondition for project implementation. References to this can be found covering various types of projects, from first world urban renewal (Soen, 1981:105), through health (Jones, 1982) and rural development (Bah, 1982; Okafor, 1982) to the large body of literature on low income housing provision (see for example Gilbert and Gugler, 1982, and *"untied et al. 1990, for bibliographies). Justification for this viewpoint is only occasionally given, while the historical background is rarely discussed.

Where this background is mentioned, it is often related to economic development. For instance, Marsden and Oakley place participation within the context of economic development theory, stating that “[the need for] community participation, as it is applied to developing countries, stems from the failure of conventional economic models of post-war years to benefit the majority of the third world’s population” (Marsden and Oakley, 1982:187). Moser too indicates that “the growing pre-occupation in recent years with the more specific questions of popular participation must be seen within the more recent context of increasing discontent with established ‘modernisation’ economic development strategies . . . to provide for adequate redistribution of resources, sufficient employment or basic needs” (Moser, 1983:3). Finally Lee states that the glaring discrepancy between the predictions of the growth strategy and the reality of persistent mass poverty forced a re-evaluation to a kind of development which addressed both poverty and growth (Lee, quoted in Nkunika, 1987:18).

Oakley and Marsden state that “the search for more appropriate styles of development is fundamentally linked to what has been termed “dependency theory” and that this “reflects a shifting paradigm in which explanations of poverty were seen in a new light” (Oakley and Marsden, 1984:7). One outcome of this rethink was the development of the “basic needs” approach (see for example Streeten, 1982 for a wider discussion) whereby, in order to satisfy
these basic needs, it was necessary for the beneficiaries themselves to become involved in prioritising their needs.

Parallel with this economic movement was a major political re-alignment in the developing world, epitomised by new leaders such as Nkrumah of Ghana and Nyerere of Tanzania. Within this context community participation took on an added dimension. Thus Stohr for example (quoted in Nkunika, 1987:18) states that the term participation is frequently used with connotations of a long socio-historic tradition, and that it was understood to be civil involvement in political life. Gilbert and Ward state that "in preparation for the eventual independence of its African and Indian colonies the British employed community development as a method of encouraging the growth of political democracy and local initiative" (Gilbert and Ward, 1984:771).

With independence the two roots of community participation (economic and socio-political) appear to have fused. However, whilst the basis of participation in basic needs has always been (at least theoretically) strong involvement by beneficiaries, Mayo argues that community development in the colonies was "quite explicitly an attempt to create plausibly democratic institutions without serious dislocation to the vested interests of the status quo" (Mayo, 1975:131).

The work described above relates almost exclusively to the colonial countries of Africa and Asia. However, this was not the only arena in which participation was being practiced. Gilbert and Ward, drawing upon work by Rodgers (1967) and the United Nations (1970) state that "in Latin America 25 years have elapsed since the Alliance for Progress began to pour money into community participation and self-help projects. Here too, the primary motivation was to promote political democracy and the integration of the poor into society in order to counteract the spread of communism" (Gilbert and Ward, 1984:771).

Although the community action programmes discussed by Gilbert and Ward are situated in Latin America, the authors do not place any particular stress on geographical location. Instead they place the development of community
participation in an ideological political context (Gilbert and Ward, 1984:769-775). Implicit in this approach is the concept that community participation can be viewed globally as a single homogenous model. For example Gilbert and Ward quote the United Nations again in stating that “The major weakness of community participation lay in its emphasis on mobilisation rather than participation... Community groups have rarely been given the power to choose how they should be involved...” (Gilbert and Ward, 1984:771). There is an implication that this United Nations statement is equally applicable to Africa, Asia and Latin America.

De Kadt (1982) takes a different view. He argues that “Two main strands (of community participation) can be distinguished: (1) the community development movement, with its heyday in the 1950s and early 1960s; and (2) the concern with community involvement through conscientisation, a mainly Latin American phenomenon of the 1960s and early 1970s” (De Kadt, 1982:573). After drawing this distinction, De Kadt infers that the second strand, having identified and corrected the problems and shortcomings of the first, effectively superseded it. The net result is that although de Kadt begins his paper by recognising the different historical roots, his conclusion about the current situation is identical to that of Gilbert and Ward, namely that the one strand (conscientisation) is now the dominant, and effectively the only, approach.

The work described above, which was carried out ten years ago, has not been challenged in the literature. Yet there have been significant changes in that period, particularly in Latin America where much of this work was done, which suggests that a re-evaluation is necessary. There has been a rapid shift towards democracy in many countries in the region and the dependency theory of development, to which this work is inextricably linked, no longer has the same degree of support. In addition there has been a change in the type of issues being addressed, with a shift towards physical projects. This thesis will therefore begin with an new evaluation of this historical development of community participation, focussing on the two dominant approaches of community
development and empowerment/consentización, but taking into account the developments which have taken place over the past decade.

2.3 The Community Development approach to participation

2.3.1 Community development theory

The debate on community development which took place in the 1950s and 1960s foreshadowed that of community participation ten years later, and the two show strong similarities. FitzGerald makes the statement, often repeated in the literature on community participation, that community development has different meanings for different people (FitzGerald, 1980:27). Sanders, in an attempt to cut through the variety of meanings, notes that there are four ways in which those involved with community development appeared to view it, namely as a process, a method, a programme, or a movement (Sanders, 1970:19). He then describes these in the following way:

"COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS A PROCESS.
. . . a new scientific term subject to a fairly precise definition and measurement expressed chiefly in social relations: changes from a state where one or two people in a small elite within or without the local community make decisions for the rest of the people to a state where people themselves make these decisions about matters of common concern; change from a state of minimum to one of maximum cooperation; change from a state where a few participate to one where many participate; change from a state where all resources and specialists come from outside to one where local people devise methods for maximum use of their own resources.

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS A METHOD.
. . . community development as a means to an end, a way of working so that some goal is attained. . . . The emphasis is on some (specific) end. Central
planners, economic developers, and those representing one professional field may look upon community development in terms of whether it will or will not help them achieve the concrete . . . goals they have in mind.

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS A PROGRAMME.
When one adds to the method, which is a set of procedures, some content - such as a list of activities - one moves towards community development as a program. By carrying out the procedures the activities are supposedly accomplished. [FitzGerald places self-help projects in this category (FitzGerald, 1980:29)].

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS A MOVEMENT.
For some, community development becomes a crusade, a cause to which they become deeply committed. It is not neutral, like process, but carries an emotional charge. It is dedicated to progress as a philosophical, and not a scientific concept, since progress must be viewed with reference to values and goals that differ under different political and social systems" (Sanders, 1970:19-27).

There are strong parallels between the above four ways of viewing community development and the four categories of community participation described by Oakley and Marsden (Chapter 3.3.3). Similarly the concepts that community participation researchers such as Moser (1983) use, such as “means and end” (Chapter 3.3.4), are addressed in this earlier work, albeit in a different way. Thus the definition of community development as a method actually uses the term means to an end twelve years before Moser’s paper (which placed the same phrase in a community participation context) was published. The view of community development as a process is grappling with the concept of community participation as an end in itself. In fact the roots of this distinction (between means and end) can be found even earlier. Batten (1967) draws a distinction between the directive and non-directive approaches to community development. The former approach is one where a community development agency adopts “whatever it thinks people need . . . for their own good” (Batten, 1967:5) -
namely, a "means" approach. The latter is one where a worker tries to get people "to decide for themselves what their needs are . . . and how they can best organise, plan, and act to carry their project through" (Batten, 1967:11). The aim here is the development and growth of the self - namely, an "end" approach. Thus the similarities between community development and community participation are very strong, at least superficially, to the extent that "in 1955, the United Nations identified community participation as synonymous with community development when it stated in broad and generalised terms that "Community development is a process designed to create conditions of economic and social progress for the whole community with its active participation!" (Moser, 1989:81). However, from the way in which participation progressed, the two are not synonymous and community development is felt to be inadequate. The reasons for this are in fact more complex than is indicated by the statements in section 2.2. To understand why this is so it is necessary to look more closely at the history and geo-political roots of community development.

2.3.2 Community development in developed countries

Stohr (1981) states that community development had its roots in the United Kingdom and the United States, where there was a need to assist with the social needs of the urban poor in the industrialising cities. These roots were in community work which "in its modern sense in Britain was begun in the nineteenth century by upper- and middle-class idealists and reformers who sought to ameliorate the often appalling conditions under which working-class people lived in the new industrial towns" (Batten, 1967:9). Batten goes on to say that "Such people's material needs at that time were obvious and specific, and many of them were too poor, too ignorant, and too disorganized to do very much to help themselves. In this context the newly-formed social agencies necessarily took the initiative in planning and providing for people . . ." (Batten, 1967:9-10).

In developed countries community development has evolved and retains not only its identity but also its relevance as a primary vehicle through which social
change is enacted at a local level. The strength of community development in this regard can be seen from the wide range of papers on the topic, which debate this relevance (e.g. Vasoo, 1991 and Wells, 1991, on community development in the United States and Taylor, 1991, on community development and the European Community); the fact that academic departments of community development continue to exist in many developed countries; and that both institutions and programmes are expanding in countries such as diverse as Australia (e.g. Jones, 1992) and Hungary (e.g. Varga and Vecseg, 1992).

It is useful to look at what makes a successful community development project. A review of the literature indicates several characteristics which can be associated with community development work in these countries. These characteristics are described briefly below. The word characteristics is used here to mean traits which can give a conceptual identity to community development, allowing it to be compared with other approaches to community participation. These characteristics will be followed through to other case studies quoted later in the chapter, and also used for the purpose of comparing community development and empowerment. Further discussion of these different characteristics, which is necessary to the construction of a detailed community participation theory, is given in Chapter 9.3.

In using the word characteristic with respect to community development it should be noted that this term has a meaning which is different from other, more commonly used indicators, such as, for example, the six elements of community development defined by Cary, which provide a generally accepted definition of community development as a process (Cary, 1970:2). The characteristics described below are broader indicators which have been developed in the course of carrying out this literature review.

The first characteristic of the community development approach to community participation relates to the openness of government. The government is open to the involvement of people in the decision-making process at a local, project level. This is a separate issue to government being representative or legitimate.
Among other things this permits a distinction to be drawn between social change at a national level, which can take place through the democratic process, and at local level. Community development is concerned with the latter, but such local initiatives and developments are taking place within a broad socio-economic national plan (see Lackey and Dersham, 1992 for a discussion on this, as well as Warren, 1970:32-56). In community development projects the degree of openness can vary (see chapter 3.3.3 for a full range of options) but the decision on the degree of community involvement is taken by the government.

The second characteristic is that traditionally community development has concerned itself with predominantly social issues and social needs. Biddle and Biddle (1965) summarise this clearly when they state that "Community development makes available to people the experiences that create the social skills needed to deal with each other, with neighbours, with experts, and with the powers that be" (Biddle and Biddle, 1965:78). Arnstein (1969) also illustrates this when she describes community development as "the strategy by which the have-nots join in determining how information is shared, goals and policies set, tax resources are allocated, programs are operated..." (Arnstein: 1969:216).

The third characteristic is that, while there may be a broader national framework defining the objectives of community development, the community development projects themselves tend to be local, clearly identifiable undertakings operating within a fairly homogeneous base (see Jones and Wiggle (1987) for a wider discussion on this. Worthington also provides a strong argument in support of this statement (Worthington, 1982:147-162)).

Finally, the fourth characteristic is the very specific nature of what Paul (1985) calls the "instrument of participation", namely the community development worker. This type of worker is based within a strong professional discipline which itself forms a specialist branch of social work. The dependence of community development on community development workers is indicated by much of the early literature on community development (see for example Batten,
1957, 1967 and Morris, 1970), as well as current writing on the subject (e.g. Jones, 1992). In developed countries many community development workers are employed by the local authorities or, if independent, work closely with the local authority. Thus they are linked to the broader institutional framework.

These characteristics contextualise community development and define the parameters within which it can be shown to operate successfully. Thus community development operates within national political, economic and social structures and forms a part of those structures. Implicit in this is an acceptance of the structures on the part of the beneficiary group. It is this national social, political and economic surround, its acceptance, and its implied values, which together define the successful working environment for community development. In making the change to a developing country it is necessary therefore to examine the surround and the value system which exists in order to predict whether community development is equally appropriate.

2.3.3 Community development in developing countries

In making the transfer to developing countries the assumption was made that community development could be applied to a wide variety of projects, without consideration of context. For example Warren states that "As a method of bringing about social change, community development serves alike in situations that are predominantly rural and preindustrial and in situations that are urban and industrialised" (Warren, 1970:32). Furthermore "... community development is a widely applied method of bringing about social change that extends beyond the United States" (Warren, 1970:32). This is an historical misconception. There is clear evidence, in many developing countries, that "the community development process itself was open to abuse, either through co-option by privileged groups, or through destruction by those same groups, to whom it posed a threat" (Allibrand, 1982:141, quoting Holdcroft). Alternatively it was used, in the words of Marsden and Oakley "as a tool for neocolonial expansion" (Marsden and Oakley, 1982:186).
However there is a strong need to differentiate between the idea that community development somehow failed the communities in developing countries, as implied by de Kadt (1982) and Oakley and Marsden (1984), and that it was inappropriate in specific situations. Based upon their work in India, for example, Jones and Wiggle strongly support the community development approach, but within a specific context, in this case a rural/village situation. Here, they argue that “with a high level of political support, it [community development] could become the major agency for social and economic development” (Jones and Wiggle, 1987:107). This optimistic view is itself based upon firm evidence of success, clearly illustrated by Midwinter when he states that “Community development has a superb record globally of highly successful projects, and a frail record of these pioneer achievements being adopted on a national or wider scale” (Midwinter, 1992:285).

From the above analysis community development can be seen to have a very distinctive identity and a potential future role which, whilst stronger in developed countries, also exists in developing countries. To understand why its support is less in the latter environment it is necessary to look at the situation in comparison with other approaches. This is done initially in section 2.5, and then more comprehensively in chapter 9.

2.4 *Conscientisacion* and empowerment

The basis of *conscientisacion*, according to De Kadt, started from “the existence of socio-economic inequalities, the generation of these by the economic system, and their underpinning by the state” (De Kadt, 1982:574), from which “the poor and exploited needed to be helped to become conscious of their situation” (De Kadt, 1982:574). Empowerment (whose origins and development are discussed in detail in Chapter 3.3.4) is similar, representing “the organised efforts of disempowered groups to increase control over resources and regulative institutions” (UNRISD, 1979:8). The primary difference is that, whereas *conscientisacion* is indigenous to Latin America, where it is firmly grounded in
social theory, empowerment is a concept created by external agencies and researchers. The former can be classified as a paradigm, whereas the latter is more difficult to classify categorically. The early work on empowerment led to its being classified more as a framework, in that it defined the way in which the process (of community participation) should occur. Oakley and Marsden (1984) describe empowerment both as a conceptual framework and as a paradigm. More recently however the move has been back to that of a paradigm, within which developed conceptual frameworks, such as Paul’s (1987), can function. There is an implicit acceptance of this thinking in the work of people such as Sheng (chapter 3.6.2). Unfortunately Paul himself refers to it as something which exists within his conceptual framework, stating that “In the context of development CP may be viewed as a process that serves... in the broadest sense, as an instrument as empowerment” (Paul 1987:3).

This confusion arises because empowerment is neither a paradigm, as described in endnote 2, nor a conceptual framework. In practice all community participation which increases the capacity of communities to influence the decision-making process “empowers” those communities. However, through its strong association with dependency theory the term has become synonymous with control over the political decision-making process. In this context it can best be described as an approach, in the same way that community development is an approach (see Chapter 3.2 for a detailed description of this term). This is the interpretation given to the term “empowerment” in this thesis. In a community participation context the term conscientisacion is rarely used whereas the use of the term empowerment is widespread. Furthermore empowerment as a concept is more specific to community participation than is conscientisacion. To avoid confusion therefore, only the term empowerment will be used in this thesis from this point onwards.

To place empowerment in context three case studies are examined, each of which concentrates on a different issue, but having in common that each in its own way formed the basis of a community struggle which was associated with the concept of empowerment. Although there is some overlap the three studies follow a
broadly chronological sequence. It will be demonstrated that they represent three stages in the development of the empowerment approach. The first of these is Villa el Salvador, Lima (Peru), which traces the history of a state sponsored informal settlement which was founded on the principle of "participatory mobilisation" (Peattie, 1990:24). The second is a grassroots-driven land invasion of an area in Greater Buenos Aires (Argentina) and the third is a major site and service project in San Salvador (El Salvador), conceptualised and managed by an NGO.

These three case studies are all well documented in the literature, and summaries are provided in Appendix A. What follows is an analysis of these case studies which highlights the issue underlying the characteristics of community development which were developed in section 2.3.2. The issues themselves will be discussed in section 2.5.

2.4.1 Case study 1: Villa el Salvador, Peru (1971-1980)

Villa el Salvador was founded in May 1971 and became an integral component of a national strategy of the revolutionary military government, aimed at restructuring the social, political and economic framework of the Peru. Thus it was essentially part of an experiment into alternative forms of democracy. This was effected by the formation of two organisational structures.

The first organisation, SINAMOS, was vertical, linking the development of Villa el Salvador directly with the President of Peru, and intended to transform Peruvian institutions into structures characterised by participatory decision making. The core of the linkage was development, with this vertical relationship having a specific role within the wider socio-political framework of the country. In the view of the government the democratic processes evolved for development could be de-linked from political and macroeconomic decision-making. The second structure was CUAVES, a co-operative seeing itself involved in all aspects and functions of local government. This structure could be described as horizontal, and built up from a grassroots level.
The potential contradictions between these two systems are apparent. The growth of grassroots structures of this kind, covering all aspects of local government, could not be constrained within a narrow development framework as required by the government (which basically defined development as physical development of the environment). The concept of the empowerment framework, and indeed the entire empowerment approach, is clearly illustrated by this case study, and encapsulated by Skinner when he states that “Initially there were shared common views on development and it would appear that the need for community participation was shared by community leaders, SINAMOS, and government, embracing local development needs and national political and economic changes and therefore satisfying the aims both of the masses and of the state. However with time a divergence in the military-community alliance later appeared which can be traced to latent differences in the perception of the purpose of participation, and the way in which decision making in development took place” (Skinner, 1983a:36).

The point is made strongly in all the references to this project that the community were succeeding in developing Villa el Salvador. The fact that the project was perceived to have failed is attributed primarily to government power over local decision-making. This reinforces the perception that “communities” need greater support. It also provides backing to the more radical interpretation of empowerment, which places the community and the state in different and opposing camps. This project, and others like it, provide the early theoretical justification for the empowerment approach.

2.4.2 Case study 2 - Buenos Aires (1980-1984)

This case study falls midway between a “project” in the narrow sense of the word, and the wider development described in the previous case study. The study is of a land invasion covering the period 1980 to 1984. This period was characterised in Argentina by a changing political climate in which there was increasing democratisation which permitted both the settlement of the land and recognition of tenure by the government. The paper of Cuenya et al (1990a)
argues that the mass nature of popular demands for goods (such as land) requires that the dispossessed act through neighbourhood organisations, pressure on the public authorities and public mobilisation, i.e. the radical empowerment approach.

However the paper also places this argument within the context of de facto governments such as dictatorships. Once this political environment changes the same approach can lead to "the internal break-up and fragmentation in the settlers organization" (Cuenya et al, 1990a:71). The authors go on to state that, under a democratic system, the direct channels of communication used for expressing demands "under de facto governments (such as dictatorships) . . . become inadequate and break down as open political conflict is usually combined with the possibility of the return to conventional urban policies" (Cuenya et al, 1990a:71). This is confirmed by other research. Thus Ward and Gilbert (1983) show how, whilst land invasions may be acceptable to many governments in providing land tenure to the poor, the ratification of such tenure, as well as the provision of services, is part of a complex system of patronage politics. This is part of a wider political structure in which key officials controlling the different sectors of local government are political appointees.

In spite of these difficulties the Buenos Aires project could be considered successful, in the sense that permanent tenure was granted to the squatters. As such this case study represents a second phase in the development of the empowerment approach, namely its successful application to achieve meaningful change and improvements in people's lives. However the potential weaknesses of the approach for longer term development are already beginning to appear. The case study which follows is concerned with an example of empowerment in such a development context.

2.4.3 Case study 3 - FUNDASAL, El Salvador (1968-1985)

The most well documented and recognisably "successful" example of community participation for empowerment, in a project context, is that of the NGO
FUNDASAL, and its associated involvement with site-and-service projects in El Salvador. The approach taken by this NGO is used to justify the political empowerment approach to participation at a project level. This is illustrated by Stein's analysis which argues that "it is possible to achieve efficient and effective post-project maintenance if participation is conceived as a means to empower participants" (Stein, 1990:21). Stein then defines empowerment clearly as the achievement of political goals (Stein, 1990:21).

While Stein identifies constraints to the process of community participation (Stein, 1990:23-25), the overall conclusions are positive, with the most successful outcome considered to be that the work by FUNDASAL contributed to social change (Stein, 1990:26). What emerges from Stein's analysis is a researcher's view of what constitutes successful community participation. This is similar in many respects to the government defining what constitutes a successful community development project. Each of these external parties is viewing participation from within their own paradigm. Thus in analysing the FUNDASAL project Stein perceived problems more as issues needing to be addressed and thence overcome if the wider goal of political empowerment is to be achieved, i.e. the solution of these problems is subservient to the wider goal of achieving empowerment. To adopt this attitude is to underestimate the importance, and overlook the relevance, of these problems in leading to a wider understanding of what constitutes community participation.

In this regard three underlying issues of importance can be identified within the FUNDASAL project which were not addressed satisfactorily. The first concerns the differing agendas (i.e. objectives and means of achieving those objectives) of the two parties to the process (FUNDASAL and the participants). Stein states that participants viewed their participation in the project as a means to an end initially (i.e. their aim was to provide homes) while the agency viewed it in a wider context as an end in itself (a concept discussed fully in Chapter 3.3.4). Stein argues that as the work went on the people realised the importance of working in groups for the solution of problems, and in general felt the need to continue working in groups. The basic education process was one concerned with
achieving this compatibility and transformation. Having said this, Stein also recognizes that the implementation methodology required finding a balance between (1) short term improvement of living conditions versus long term empowerment; (2) developing models addressing popular housing problems while assuming responsibility for problem of housing the poor, and (3) building beneficiary capacity versus paternalism and dependency. This approach on the part of FUNDASAL assumes (implicitly) that the NGO is in tune with the needs of the community.

This belief in a beneficial symbiotic relationship between NGO and community contrasts strongly with the NGO's perceptions of the agendas of other parties concerned. Thus Stein defines the agendas of the World Bank and the State as constraints which impede the project. There is a lack of recognition of the validity of other parties to hold and pursue their own agendas. The NGO's agenda is not questioned, for the reason described above, yet Stein's analysis indicates that the NGO itself is practicing a form of manipulation of the community. Thus he states that "empowerment was confused with the ability of the communal organisation to handle resources and to efficiently execute the building timetables . . ." (Stein, 1990:26) and that "the process of transforming the participants' ends into means (for long term empowerment) became the real challenge of the whole education process . . . the fact that objectives of empowerment were enunciated were not enough" (Stein, 1990:26).

The second issue is that of "product" versus "process", i.e. finding a balance between the contradictions implicit in providing a product (in this case housing) against developing a process (of community growth) using that same product as the primary vehicle for the process. This is identified in the differing initial perceptions of the objectives of the project (between NGO and beneficiary group) raised above, but runs much deeper. Thus Stein states that, of the 22 communities involved in FUNDASAL projects, only 5 were well consolidated (in 1986) and 17 showed regressive symptoms (Stein, 1990:26-27). This is not atypical. In describing irregular settlement growth in Mexico, Columbia and Venezuela, studied over a 4 to 5 year period, Ward and Gilbert (1983) return to
the issue of organisations collapsing once their initial objectives have been met. This is the same problem that was raised with the Buenos Aires project in the previous section. In El Salvador Stein puts this down to an education problem, but overlooks the different needs of people in communities, and the fact that these needs are not always synonymous, either temporally or spatially. In other words the debate on product versus process questions two fundamental assumptions which are central to the empowerment approach. The first is the achievement of commonality of purpose in communities. The question needs to be asked as to when and how this is achieved. The second is an assumption that projects do in fact represent the provision of clearly defined products.

This leads to the third issue, which is that of project complexity and the issue of housing provision as opposed to infrastructure provision. In this project FUNDASAL identified sites, defined projects, and used private construction companies for the initial stages. Finally, together with the families, participants were selected and formed groups for the mutual-help stage. In other words the participation process itself began with the shelter provision programme and avoided the more technically complex stage of infrastructure provision.

This case study illustrates the third stage in the evolution of the of the empowerment approach, namely its application to the implementation of specific projects. The case study was considered a successful example of empowerment (Paul, 1987:15). However this success is of a limited nature. The decisions were policy decisions related to the socio-political environment. However there were important technical decisions to be made, illustrated by the three issues raised above, of which none were taken by the community. From these three case studies and the other literature referenced in their analysis it would appear that empowerment, like community development, does have successes, which appear to be suited to specific types of environment. However there are also situations for which empowerment is unsuited. This idea is explored further in the section which follows.
2.5 A comparison of the characteristics of community development and empowerment

Section 2.3.2 identified four characteristics of successful community development projects in developed countries as:

1. Community development is a component of government strategy, but there is an openness of government to community involvement in the decision-making process at a local level.
2. Traditionally community development has concerned itself with predominantly social issues and social needs. In this type of decision-making there is a long time frame, and the resources available to explain the issues in question to the community.
3. While there may be a broader national framework defining the objectives of community development, the community development projects themselves tend to be local, clearly identifiable undertakings operating within a fairly homogeneous community base.
4. There is a very specific "instrument of participation", namely the community development worker.

In respect of the first characteristic several authors (see for example Jones, 1982; and Waseem, 1982) highlight the dominant role of government in community development. The latter argues that "government sponsored programmes contain in-built mechanisms which enhance the cooption of initiatives and further the interests of members of the bureaucracy who support them" (Waseem, 1982:233). Waseem maintains that change only takes place if the centre of community action is located outside the state system (Waseem, 1982:233). Other authors, coming from different backgrounds and experiences, totally disagree. Constantino-David (1982) and Ekong and Sekoya (1982) both argue that certain forms of dependency on government are necessary for successful community development. In fact Ekong and Sekoya go further than this and state that "the central government must intervene in the face of appalling conditions of poverty in many villages in Nigeria" (Ekong and Sekoya, 1982).
1982:223). They argue for joint action (between government and NGOs) in community development, as does Kalowale (1982) who stresses the involvement and importance of traditional institutions as well (Kalowale, 1982:123-127).

These Nigerian, and other similar, case studies, reflect the success of community development, as an approach to improving quality of life, in meeting specific, clearly defined goals. Predominantly in these successful situations there is a stable political structure which is broadly acceptable to the communities involved, even though this cannot be defined as democratic in the Western sense. It would appear therefore that traditional structures (e.g. tribal authorities) are capable of satisfying the legitimacy and acceptability criteria, specifically in rural areas.

In this type of situation community development often forms part of a national plan and there is also a specific socio-economic purpose. In many of the rural areas this would be the satisfaction of basic needs. This satisfaction of basic needs within the context of a national plan would then constitute the surround within which community development would function.

Turning now to characteristics 2, 3 and 4 above, these are similar (on successful projects) to those for community development in developed countries. The projects tend to be small and situated within homogeneous communities. Typical examples would be rural health or rural water supply projects. Here again (as with community development in developed countries) the thrust tends to be social upliftment using or emphasising self-help techniques. What differs is the role of technology, which plays a more dominant role than in conventional community development projects in developed countries. The way in which technology is handled will often be to adapt it to match the capacity of the community to operate and maintain that technology (the "appropriate technology" concept). There is a recognised homogeneity within the beneficiary group. And finally the involvement and performance of community development workers is often crucial to the success of the projects. These workers become a critical component of the institutional framework of the area.
Having established the characteristics pertaining to successful community development projects in (predominantly) rural areas of Africa and Asia this can be compared to the appropriateness of community development in the urban environment in Latin America. De Kadt (1982) argues that “CD [community development] hardly ever faced up to the differences in interest that could exist between different members of the ‘community’ that was to be ‘developed’, notably in terms of their control over opportunities to make a living” (De Kadt, 1982:574). He further states that “The community developers achieved little because they disregarded inequality, conflict and power relations” (De Kadt, 1982:572).

From this work of de Kadt (1982) and other authors who discuss the needs of the urban poor in Latin America, a set of characteristics emerge which are different from those in which successful community development has been practiced. Community development is clearly not a suitable vehicle for participation in an environment characterised by confrontation between state and community. Thus there is a strong case to be made for a different approach, and empowerment appears to fulfil this need.

Latin America in the period from 1960 to the mid 1980s is the case study arena used to support and debate the empowerment paradigm. De Kadt (1982) is quoted above as linking inequality, conflict and power relations, and it is clear from the three case studies described in sections 2.4.1 to 2.4.3 that development in these areas during that period was intimately bound up with the political process. Governments in the countries involved were, at that time, predominantly authoritarian and had little perceived legitimacy. There was neither an established democratic tradition nor a widely supported traditional base of the type found in Africa and India. Further, the strong relationships between political, social and economic issues already existed. There is much support for the concept that political struggle and power is at the centre of the community participation debate and hence the sole criterion for empowerment, in a Latin American context. Thus Gilbert and Ward for example state that land allocation "is an integral part of the political process" (Gilbert and Ward,
1985:127), and that the allocation of land is most often used as a political bargaining point. This is a context-based statement.

The lack of perceived legitimacy is reinforced by the political nature of the local authority structure. This follows the United States model, where all key local government appointments are political. Thus there is very little distinction between government at different levels. All are seen as part of the same monolithic structure. This close inter-relationship between national politics and local development at a “Barrio” level is a critical factor which runs through not just these case studies but virtually all writing on development in Latin America. Thus Ward and Gilbert state that in Bogota “The National Front and later administrations have continued to prescribe the terms on which they are prepared to negotiate with the poor” (Ward and Gilbert, 1983:52), while in Mexico City “channels of community participation were tailored to government needs” (Ward and Gilbert, 1983:55). In other words the government is closed to the involvement of the community in the decision-making process. This is the first characteristic.

In the above analysis the political situation dominates the debate, but this obscures other issues which are important and which define the other characteristics of successful empowerment projects. The first of these is the concentration on very specific targets within the context of an urban struggle. These issues, while predominantly social, have a political component. Typical of these are land tenure (often by land invasion) and shelter. This is the second characteristic.

Within these struggles there is the question of community cohesion. De Kadt criticises the community development approach for its inability to handle heterogeneity in communities (De Kadt, 1982:574). But community development was never intended to function in this type of environment. The action required by communities in this situation (of urban mass struggle) is not self-help in a developmental sense (which is a characteristic of community development) but the assertion of fundamental political and social rights. What
de Kadt fails to state is that the empowerment approach and its associated conceptual frameworks do not address this issue conceptually either. What the empowerment approach does is to mobilise people around specific issues. This generates a very strong commonality of purpose around these issues. This is the third characteristic. This commonality of purpose is not the same as community homogeneity, but the outcome is similar. In terms of their specific projects both develop a powerful sense of community cohesion. However, as was mentioned earlier, once this specific issue has been addressed, this community cohesion often collapses.

Finally there is a very specific instrument of participation, the fourth characteristic. In community development the community development worker plays a key role. In the empowerment linked approaches the instrument is either a mass based movement (Buenos Aires) or, increasingly as there is a move across to specific projects, a multi-disciplinary NGO.

In summary then, the equivalent characteristics of successful empowerment projects may be defined as:

1. They operate outside of government structures in an environment where the government is closed to the involvement of the community.
2. They concern themselves with specific issues with a strong political connotation.
3. Although the community itself might represent a heterogeneous base, the projects themselves are such that they generate a strong commonality of purpose among the group.
4. The primary instrument of participation is a non-governmental organisation.

Hence the whole structure of the empowerment based approach is different to that of community development. Empowerment has not “superseded” community development. Each is suited to a specific “arena” and to the associated problems that lie within that arena.
2.6 Infrastructure provision in urban areas

The purpose of this chapter to date has been to show that community development projects continue to operate successfully and that successful community development and empowerment projects can each be defined by a set of characteristics. This is considered an important pre-requisite to a wider and more open discussion on paradigms and frameworks of participation, since such an open debate remains difficult whilst the concept of empowerment is perceived to have sole legitimacy. Having identified differing successful approaches to community participation in developing countries, attention can now be turned on the question of community participation in infrastructure provision and how this fits, or does not fit, into these existing approaches.

Because of the dominance of dependency theory and the empowerment approach, community participation in various urbanisation activities, including infrastructure provision, has been judged in terms of the degree to which people have been empowered in the political sense, i.e. the empowerment approach. This is apparent in the evaluation of the Lusaka upgrade (section 2.6.1), as well as from literature on development in South Africa (see chapter 1.3 and chapter 4). However this thesis argues that, although strong similarities did exist in the 1970s and early 1980s, the current situation in South Africa can no longer be judged in these terms. The crisis of urbanisation (discussed in Chapter 7) is creating a new situation, which differs from the Latin American situation predominantly because of the role and nature of infrastructure provision, and South Africa is caught up in this crisis. What makes South Africa particularly valuable as a case study is the unique way in which it bridges the Latin American experience and the experience of major African urban centres.

Economic growth and transformation of the economy involves a permanent reallocation of resources (Dosi, 1982:159). In developing countries an increasing percentage of this allocation is being made to physical urban infrastructure provision (see for example Stren, 1991:11 for details of World Bank investment), which by its nature has a high technical component.
There are several ways of dealing with this technical component. The first is effectively to ignore it, by omitting it from any debate on urban housing and development (e.g. Rakodi, 1992). A second is to assume that it is simply a service whose provision is the function of a technical department answerable to democratic local government structures, with the latter being the more important (e.g. Environment and Urbanisation, 1991). Both of these approaches are indicative of thinking within the empowerment approach to community participation. A third way is the conventional technocratic approach, which is to treat the problem purely from a technical perspective, regardless of social consequences. This is a common approach in South Africa, illustrated by current case studies of upgrading (see for example Abbott, 1992).

An alternative to all of the above is to view participation as operating within a different surround, in which technology is perceived differently and its role in participation reassessed. While urban infrastructure spending in developing countries is increasing, as mentioned above, the evaluation of these projects, particularly with respect to community participation, is extremely limited, with the only major work of this kind being the Lusaka upgrade. The next section will look briefly at this project (Lusaka), using the study to raise some critical issues and draw comparisons with the empowerment approach in terms of relevance. Chapters 4 to 8 will then examine the specific issue of community involvement in infrastructure provision in greater detail, drawing upon specific South African case studies carried out by the author.

2.6.1 The Lusaka upgrade (1974-1981)

As with the case studies quoted in section 3.4 the Lusaka upgrade is well documented. A summary has been provided in Appendix 1, drawn primarily from the work of Rakodi (1983). This section highlights the key issues.

Community participation was always intended to be a key component of this upgrading project. The project appraisal report envisaged infrastructure installation as being preceded by *a programme to promote an understanding of
upgrading and to mobilise community support and participation essential to progressive improvement, with the intent of consulting residents regarding servicing layouts and assisting them in organising self-help labour for water pipe excavation and standpipe construction" (Rakodi, 1983:19, quoting the World Bank). The plan envisaged local development committees, comprising community representatives chaired by a local councillor, which would participate in overspill plot allocation, help mobilise self-help labour, and be responsible for promoting long term development programmes promoting continuous improvements to dwellings, infrastructure and community services.

This approach highlights the difference between this project and those discussed earlier in section 2.4. The Latin American studies can be seen in a broad socio-political framework. The Lusaka project on the other hand is seen to operate within a technical framework of the project cycle, that linear model which quantifies a project in terms of a progression from conception, through planning, design and construction, to project completion.

The evaluation described by Rakodi makes clear the contradictions inherent in this approach. Thus the goals (of participation) could be divided into two parts, the first being general statements of principle regarding the role of, and the benefits to the community; and the second specific target objectives. In the latter what was required was community involvement in the early stages of the project cycle (which centred around decision making), but this did not happen (with the exception of two minor areas) because of the perceived dangers of raised expectations. Instead there was involvement in the later part of the cycle, where the community was expected to contribute materially. Rakodi states that this type of involvement was not satisfactory.

In terms of achieving wider social goals (of enhancing community involvement in local level decision making), Rakodi cites the United Nations concept of information giving, which is intended to be either a persuasive activity, aiming to influence attitudes, or an open activity, aimed at achieving participation or interaction between the citizens and the authorities. Rakodi claims that in the
Lusaka case the information-giving was persuasive in nature, aimed at creating awareness (of proposals, options and financial responsibilities); counteracting potential opposition; and ensuring active cooperation with and support of with the implementing agency. This exercise was partially successful, in that the overall scheme was generally accepted, but it failed in certain areas also, particularly the collection of service fees. Rakodi g., as as a major reason a lack of tradition of repayment for services and utilities in areas regarded until recently as illegal settlements. This is also linked back to the absence of community participation in community planning.

Regarding benefits to the community, these involve additional responsibility being taken by the community, in areas such as maintenance, service charge collection and ongoing development initiatives. At no point however were the residents given the opportunity to take responsibility. This need for building up experience in decision-making, starting first at a local level, is strongly made both by Rakodi and also by Skinner in the Villa el Salvador project.

From a political perspective Rakodi notes that there is only limited scope for participation at a level beyond the immediate project, yet this did not, per se, prevent community participation at the project level. The two would therefore appear to be independent.

2.6.2 The Lusaka upgrade in the context of empowerment

From an empowerment perspective it is easy to dismiss the Lusaka upgrade as an exercise in manipulative participation. Yet the situation is in fact far more complex than that. The Lusaka project raises many key issues about community needs and expectations, and the wider issue of community homogeneity, which are only touched upon in the empowerment case studies. Some, like the in-built contradictions inherent in trying to balance the completion of an engineering project with maximised participation, were highlighted in section 2.4.3, but the empowerment approach is, almost by definition, a major constraint in exploring different ways of exploring this contradiction.
Another major difference, important in comparing projects in anglophone Africa and Latin American countries, lies in the local government structure, with the African countries having adopted the British form of municipal (third tier) government. This is linked to wider issues such as the relevance of local government structures and the relationship between national and local government, key components of the first characteristic of legitimacy. These issues are covered in Chapter 7 but even at this stage they begin to show different characteristics for participation in urban upgrading projects to those associated with the empowerment approach.

A third key difference is the emphasis which is placed upon technology, in the form of physical infrastructure, in the Lusaka upgrade, as compared to, say, the FUNDASAL project. In the description of the latter, Stein states that “Communities were built on undeveloped land, according to plans made by FUNDASAL, using private construction companies for the initial stages. The core housing units were completed using the mutual-help process” (Stein, 1990:22). Thus the emphasis is on a shelter programme as the vehicle for participation, while infrastructure is constructed conventionally and with no participation. Yet this does not prevent the NGO, and the World Bank, viewing the project as one driven by empowerment. There is clearly a contradiction here. that an external party, in the form of the NGO, FUNDASAL, is deciding what constitutes empowerment and how this will be achieved.

In the Lusaka (Zambia) upgrading project the emphasis is on infrastructure provision as the vehicle for participation, illustrated by the statement of objectives quoted in section 2.6.1 above. This is the key issue. Between 1972 and 1981 the World Bank spent two thousand million dollars on urban projects, of which site and service and informal settlement upgrading constituted a major portion (Stren, 1991:11). Physical infrastructure represents by far the greatest cost of these projects. It is also the most (sometimes the only) capital rich component. Yet it hardly features in the literature on community participation. There is a clear need to place technology and its component parts, i.e. its role, degree of sophistication, affordability, acceptability, and supportive
technical capacity, within a participation framework and to address the problem issues raised above. Following a review of the literature dealing with community participation at a conceptual level (chapter 3), the thesis will return to these problem issues and look at South African case studies which explore the role of technology, and at some of the differences which exist in the African urban environment, which support, and elaborate on, these case studies.

**Endnotes**

1. Empowerment is a vague term, although its use in association with community participation implies control over the political decision-making process. Thus Paul for example states that, where community participation is an instrument of empowerment “development should lead to an equitable of power and a higher level of . . . political awareness” (Paul, 1985:3). However, the mechanisms by which this is achieved are not clear. In the wider literature different authors have treated it as an objective, a paradigm, a principle or a conceptual framework. This thesis has attempted to resolve some of the contradictions which surround the term but this has not always proved possible. This section will motivate for its use as an approach (a term defined in section 9.2) to community participation, and will attempt to standardise on this use. In some situations however, such as for example the debate in chapter 3.5, the term has to be used in the context of another author’s work. This practice may prove confusing but cannot be avoided altogether, given the multiplicity of interpretations which exist in the literature.

2. The term paradigm is used in this thesis to mean a conceptual mode (sometimes unacknowledged) within which workers in the field view their work, and within which researchers develop their analyses.

3. The philosophy of conscientisation can be found in works by Freire (see for example Freire, 1972).
CHAPTER 3

THE THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

3.1 Introduction to the literature survey

Moser states that "An extensive, if not overwhelming literature exists, which defines, surveys and analyses the experience of community participation in a diversity of projects in different sectors in developing countries" (Moser, 1989:79). Much of this work however is detailed case study material (see for example UNCHS (1984) for an overview) which describes how various communities and beneficiary groups are becoming involved in participation from a practical point of view. Whilst useful the problem is that this work tends to be descriptive rather than analytical. Thus, when inconsistencies arise, the lack of a sound academic foundation, as discussed in section 3.8, limits the potential for meaningful evaluation and improvement.

In urban projects relating to developing countries Nentied et al (1990:42) state, and this survey has confirmed, that literature on community participation
can be broadly classified into two categories. The first category contains case studies of participation in low-income housing projects. The second category contains writings that take community participation from a general or conceptual angle, dealing with, among other issues, the meaning and scope, potential benefits, practical obstacles and shared responsibilities of participation. The bulk of the literature relates to the first category and there is remarkably little written which examines community participation from a conceptual perspective.

Literature relating to community participation in the provision of infrastructure is even more limited. In fact the only major project is the Lusaka upgrade, carried out with funding from the World Bank (discussed in Chapter 2.6.1). Two other authors (Paul, 1987a, and Finterbusch and Van Wicklin, 1989) report on the evaluation of 40 World Bank and 53 USAID projects respectively which, although general in nature, have some relevance to urban infrastructure provision. Because of this lack of relevant material this thesis uses wider literature sources to trace the development of conceptual models in community participation and then evaluates these from the perspective of urban infrastructure.

Following the discussion on terminology in section 3.2, section 3.3 presents the findings of the literature survey. This is done by discussing community participation as it was constituted by key authors, in such a way as to trace the progression of thinking on the topic over time. The remainder of the Chapter then discusses the various concepts, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses, and identifies the shortcomings which will be addressed in the following chapters of the thesis.

3.2 Terminology

The term "community participation" is vague and requires clarification (Gilbert and Ward, 1984:770). The literature survey indicates that the reasons
why community participation creates a problem conceptually are twofold. One reason arises from an ideological debate. Thus Moser contends that the diversity of definitions reflect the ideological range of interpretations of development and the different approaches to planning (Moser, 1983:3). Gilbert and Ward agree that ideological differences between observers add to the confusion, but they do not see this as the major problem. They state that “although left and right appear to agree that community action should be encouraged, they understand very different things from this term and hope for very divergent outcomes” (Gilbert and Ward, 1984:769). Thus, while ideological disagreements do exist they can be defined and quantified.

The second reason why community participation poses a conceptual problem is the confusion over terminology. While Moser (1983:3) cites the range of different definitions as the primary reason for this confusion, the problem is more complex. In making this statement (about different definitions) there is an implicit assumption that a definition should capture the essence of what is central to community participation. However community participation as a notion is itself multi-faceted, and various authors have used different terms to focus on diverse aspects of it. These key terms range widely and include: definitions (Paul, 1987a:2); objectives/goals (Paul, 1987b:20); purposes/objectives (Batley, 1983:7); kinds of participation (Goulet, 1989:167); methodology (Kidd & Byram, 1982:97); and working statement (Oakley and Marsden, 1984:19).

The most precise, albeit limited, terminology was that of Paul (1987a) who differentiated between, and also gave meaning to, the terms definition, objective, intensity (the degree of community input) and instrument (of participation) and placed these in context (see section 3.3.5). Even with this work however community participation still lacks a comprehensive, rigorously-defined terminology and a coherent structure. To achieve both of these the thesis looks first at the major conceptual work carried out to date, in order to quantify the existing situation. The intent is to produce a conceptual framework for community participation, though the individual authors may not use this term...
specifically. The term conceptual framework will be discussed in detail in section 3.4.

3.3 Findings of the literature review: Major authors

3.3.1 Arnstein (1969)

The first conceptual framework of note is that of Arnstein. In 1969 she produced a typology of eight levels of participation which, for illustration purposes, she arranges in a ladder pattern which is illustrated in figure 3-1 below.

Figure 3.1: Eight rungs on a Ladder of Citizen Participation
(Arnstein, 1969:217)

8. Citizen control
7. Delegated power
6. Partnership
5. Placation
4. Consultation
3. Informing
2. Therapy
1. Manipulation

Arnstein describes participation in terms of a series of increasingly meaningful inputs into the decision making process, with each rung corresponding to the extent of citizens’ power in determining what she called the “end product” (Arnstein, 1969:217).
There are two significant points arising from Arnstein's paper. The first is the recognition of the importance of power. Arnstein states that citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen power. Further "It is the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the economic process, to be deliberately included in the future" (Arnstein, 1969:216).

Within this context of power there are significant gradations of citizen participation. Thus she states for example that, while she has shown eight rungs on the ladder "in the real world of people and programs there might be 150 rungs with less sharp and 'pure' distinctions among them" (Arnstein, 1969:217). Implicit in these statements is the concept that participation is project specific and variable; with the key issue being not so much power for its own sake but "enough power to make the target institutions responsive to their [the 'have-nots'] views, aspirations, and needs" (Arnstein, 1969:217). This concept of power is important in relation to the concept of empowerment which is discussed later in this section.

The second point of significance for community participation theory is the concept of the ladder itself. Unfortunately the terms that Arnstein uses to describe the eight rungs are themselves vague, oscillating between what Paul (1987a) terms objectives and intensity. However the dominant trend is towards increasing involvement of the beneficiary group, i.e. a form of intensity. This leads to the concept of a model based upon a continuum of increasing intensity which tends towards some form of control.

Apart from these two points the wider value of the ladder is questionable. Some authors consider the model to be replicable. In South Africa an Urban Foundation report uses the model, in a slightly modified form, as the basis for a "Spectrum of Community Participation" (Human Awareness Programme, 1984:19), whilst a report on "Public Participation in Land Use/Transport Planning" (CUTA, 1990) also draws on this paper. However the research on which these reports base their work is limited.
In a Nigerian context, Fakolade and Coblentz state that "Arnstein's typology is germane [to Nigeria] and that there can be no genuine participation without partnership, delegated power and effective citizen control over a range of issues" (1981:128). However, the recommendations they suggest would correspond more to degrees of tokenism than degrees of citizen power, being of the consultation and placation type. This indicates a lack of understanding of, and familiarity with, the underlying concepts of participation.

An alternative view, which is also widely supported, is that Arnstein's model is not replicable. Thus Moser, in a major study of community participation in urban projects in the Third World (Moser, 1989) does not even mention Arnstein, while Peattie comments that "this (ladder of citizen participation) is not a helpful way to try to understand citizen participation in the Third World" (Peattie, 1990:19) and that "citizen power is more complicated than a simple transfer of power from top to bottom" (Peattie, 1990:19).

What all the comments on Arnstein's paper fail to mention is the context within which she operated. This context was very specific, namely the urban poor in America, and the typology used examples from federal programmes such as urban renewal, anti-poverty, and Model Cities. The model fits clearly into the context of a community development approach as described in Chapter 2, and thus it is expected that its applicability in a different context, such as those described above, might be limited. This issue of context is an important one which is returned to in section 3.7.

3.3.2 Batley (1983) and the ILGS (1980)

A second major attempt to explain community participation is that of the University of Birmingham (1980) which is summarised by Batley (1983) within the context of a government administration. Batley explores two categories of meaning: "firstly, participation as an agent of government action, and secondly, (participation as a way in which the community might) influence decision-making in policy formulation/implementation" (Batley, 1983:7).
Batley begins by highlighting the contradictory assumptions about the meaning of participation and provides 11 diverse statements in support of this. In fact these statements represent a mixture of objectives on the one hand e.g. “community organisation to collect repayments” (Batley, 1983:7) and descriptions of what community participation might entail when viewed from the perspective of project implementation on the other, e.g. “the consultation of settlement organisations to undertake settlement, house-building and service works . . .” (Batley, 1983:7). Batley then provides a list of what he calls purposes/objectives, drawing upon the work of Curtis et al (1978) and Verba (1961), which can be supplemented by similar lists from Skinner (Skinner, 1983b). This combined list essentially describes the needs and/or reasons for community participation from two perspectives, that of the community and that of the administration.

Batley does not attempt to encapsulate the diverse meanings and definitions within a specific framework. Nonetheless three important points arise from Batley’s work. The first is that this work, together with that of Verba, Curtis et al, and Skinner, provides a comprehensive review of perceptions of community participation by different parties. Whilst the importance of this review has been recognised by other researchers, the way in which they have used it has been to attempt to define a single, dominant objective. This thesis will explore a different way of accommodating these different perceptions (chapter 9). The second point is that the list does provide a strong justification for the use of participation. The third point, which is reinforced by other authors (e.g. Ward and Gilbert, 1983:64), is the power of government in the community development process. The concern at the power of government was influential in shaping the thinking which led to the empowerment approach, but again this thesis explores an alternative path which accommodates this dominance of government (chapter 9).
3.3.3 Oakley and Marsden (1984)

The first attempt to draw together the different concepts of community participation in a formal and coherent manner, and in a form which was relevant to developing countries, is that of Oakley and Marsden (1984). Their study was carried out for the ILO and is concerned with rural participation. However the literature that it draws upon was more wide ranging and the work itself has wider application because it is working at a conceptual level.

Oakley and Marsden bring together what they term working statements from a number of sources. They comment that the quotations that they have used "emphasize the conflicting range of interpretations, which themselves reflect the dominant paradigms of development thinking internationally" (Oakley and Marsden, 1984:19). These working statements are:

"(a) Participation is considered a voluntary contribution by the people to one or another of the public programmes supposed to contribute to national development but the people are not expected to take part in shaping the programme or criticising its content [....].

(b) Participation means ... in its broadest sense, to sensitize people and, thus, to increase the receptivity and ability of rural people to respond to development programmes, as well as to encourage local initiatives [....].

(c) With regard to rural development ... participation includes peoples involvement in decision making processes, in implementing programmes ... their sharing in the benefits of development programmes, and their involvement in efforts to evaluate such programmes [....].

(d) Popular participation in development should be broadly understood as the active involvement of people in the decision making process in so far as it affects them [....].
(e) Community involvement means that people, who have both the right and the duty to participate in solving their own health problems, have greater responsibilities in assessing the health needs, mobilising local resources and suggesting new solutions, as well as creating and maintaining local organisations [...].

(f) Participation is considered to be an active process, meaning that the person or group in question takes initiatives and asserts his/her or its autonomy to do so [...].

(g) ... the organised efforts to increase control over resources and regulative institutions in given social situations, on the part of groups and movements of those hitherto excluded from such control [...]." (Oakley and Marsden, 1984:19).

In developing an understanding of community participation this study (of Oakley and Marsden) is valuable in several ways. Firstly, it brings together a diversity of interpretations of participation. Unlike those of Batley et al, which are random and wide ranging, these working statements are focused and, as the authors point out, each represents a dominant paradigm (Oakley and Marsden, 1984:19). At the same time, the study highlights the disparate nature of the attributable quotations and, specifically, the difficulties experienced with terminology and meaning. Thus, although they are termed working statements, they actually intermingle the concepts of decision making, goals, definition and scope; and aptly illustrate the confusion of thought on participation which was dominant as late as 1984.

The second point of interest is the relationship to Arnstein’s thinking. Superficially the statements themselves are different to those of Arnstein. With Arnstein: (i) the ladder is focused; (ii) all the steps have a linkage; and (iii) there is a direction of thought towards a specific goal (namely increased involvement in the decision making process) in a specific environment (urban United States) for a specific target group (the urban poor). The statements
quoted by Oakley and Marsden are diverse and each is self-contained. Yet the way in which Oakley and Marsden have ordered them reflects a similar sense of a continuum, with the statements reflecting an increasing involvement by the community in the control of the project.

In their study Oakley and Marsden "present them [the working statements] as though on a continuum" (Oakley and Marsden, 1984:19), but do not relate this continuum to one of intensity. Instead they take a totally different approach. From the working statements quoted above, plus a range of other, unspecified definitions, they develop a range of key terms or expressions which they feel essentially characterises the nature of the participation process (Oakley and Marsden, 1984:19-20). They then group these terms into four broad categories (Oakley and Marsden, 1984:20-27), which they label as follows:

"1. Collaboration-input-sponsorship."

Oakley and Marsden argue that working statements (a), (b) and (c) fall into this category, which is taken to mean informing and mobilising the population.

"2. Community Development."

This category Oakley and Marsden consider specific to certain rural situations. However in their view it does not form part of the mainstream conceptual debate on community participation.

"3. Organisation."

Oakley and Marsden state that the argument justifying organisation as a meaningful form of participation is that organisations are a prerequisite to participation and that, once they are formed, participation is assured.
4. Empowering.

The basis of empowerment as a mechanism for participation is that the achievement of power is an essential pre-requisite to achieving meaningful participation. In this sense empowerment supersedes organisation as a dominant paradigm. Oakley and Marsden argue that, while (1) to (3) dominated until recently, "The more common interpretation equates 'participation' with achieving power: that is power in terms of access to, and control of, the resources necessary to protect livelihood" (Oakley and Marsden, 1984:25).

In the terminology of this thesis Oakley and Marsden have defined four approaches to community participation, the first two of which are government controlled and the second two controlled by the community. Oakley and Marsden view participation as existing within development paradigms, as discussed in chapter 2.1 and are proponents of the concept of a paradigm shift in development thinking shaping new approaches to community participation. Thus the first two approaches described above are sited within the paradigm of modernisation theory and the second two in the paradigm of dependency theory. In line with the paradigm shift Oakley and Marsden perceive empowerment as the approach which is becoming increasingly dominant. However the way in which empowerment functions in practice is not clear from their work. What emerges is the concept of empowerment as an all-embracing philosophy which encapsulates all aspects of the community participation process; a vehicle through which other objectives of community participation can be achieved, similar to the way in which the concept of citizen power is used by Arnstein. It is left to other authors to explore the specific meaning of empowerment.

3.3.4 Moser (1983) and "Empowerment"

Empowerment as an objective of community participation developed its conceptual form in the late 1970s, driven by world bodies such as the ILO, UNICEF, UNCHS and UNRISD, on the basis that such action would encourage
meaningful change in society (see for example the UNESCO objective quoted by
Nturibl, 1982:108) and enhance the satisfaction of basic needs (the ILO
objective, which is quoted by Shepherd, 1983:12).

In the latter paper Shepherd states that the ILO encourages the use of the term, to
allow it to confront questions of power both ideologically and in its dealings with
governments. He then states that "decision making processes are the most
obvious instances of the exercise of power. Therefore if participation in
decisions can be broadened or made effectively representative, this means that
power is being shared and that groups formerly excluded from the exercise of
power are included" (Shepherd, 1983:12, quoting from an ILO commissioned
made this statement however the ILGS report goes on to say that "at government
level too much participation may be considered to undermine the capacity for
development by putting too much strain on national resources or institutions"
(ILGS, 1978:para 19). This raises for the first time the idea that there might
be "too much" participation, i.e. a point beyond which community participation
becomes self-defeating.

In an attempt to clarify the meaning of the term empowerment, the UNRISD
(United Nations Research Institute for Social Development) defines
empowerment as "the organised efforts to increase control over resources and
regulative institutions in given social situations, on the part of groups and
movements hitherto excluded from such control" (UNRISD, 1979:8). The
framing of this definition provides a focus, namely control as an objective in its
own right, which had been missing previously. This makes the concept of
empowerment more tangible.

At the point when this definition was formulated (1979) empowerment did not
have any structured form, e.g. as a framework or a paradigm, but was simply a
concept which challenged other forms of participation. However, this situation
changed in 1983 with the introduction of the concept of "means" and "end".
In a workshop presentation on evaluating community participation in urban development projects, held at the Development Planning Unit of University College, London in January 1983, Moser argued that “the extent to which participation can be inserted into development strategies depends upon what is meant by the term and that it is apparent that no clear consensus exists” (Moser, 1983:3). However she then goes on to say that, while it was not useful to provide a list of definitions in the abstract “an important distinction can be made, within the spectrum that exists, between those which identify participation as a means and those which identify participation as an end” (Moser, 1983:3).

Moser then clarifies this statement with the following description:

“This distinction between means and end clearly has important implications for the way in which community participation is evaluated in projects and programmes. Where participation is interpreted as a means, it generally becomes a form of mobilisation to get things done. This equally can be state directed, top down mobilisation (sometimes enforced) to achieve specific development objectives, or bottom up ‘voluntary’ community based mobilisation to obtain a larger immediate share of resources. The most frequent constraints of participation as a means are operational obstacles such as inadequate delivery mechanisms, lack of local structures of local coordination, while evaluation is concerned with the measurement of quantitative results of specific development objectives, rather than the extent of real participation. Where participation is identified as an end the objective is not a fixed quantifiable development goal but a process whose outcome is an increasingly ‘meaningful’ participation in the development process. Where the real objective of participation is ‘to increase control over resources and regulative institutions in given social situations, on the part of groups and movements of those hitherto excluded from such control’ [as per the UNRISD definition quoted above], there is an inevitable sharing and then transfer of power involved as social groups
deliberately attempt to control their own lives and improve their living conditions. In this context tensions can develop between the state, trying to 'promote' participation to achieve centrally decided objectives, and the "hitherto excluded" groups who in the process of participation are trying to increase their control over resources. Where participation is identified as an end, the constraints on participation are structural—national and local institutional opposition which most frequently react oppressively if any real transfer of power occurs, and in reality determine the limits of participation. Evaluation of participation as an end is complex, since it is essentially the evaluation of a non-material and non-quantifiable process. Ultimately it is an evaluation of the transfer of power and poses the question as to whether authentic participation can only occur when there is a redistribution of power" (Möser, 1983:3-4).

Because of its simplicity this definition of "means" and "end" gives form to the more diffuse concept of empowerment and can be classified as a conceptual framework. This framework changes the way in which participation is viewed significantly. For example, the concept of a continuum is effectively dismissed as being irrelevant to the main debate on participation, which now centres around power. The dualistic nature of the means and end framework implies that all objectives of participation which do not have this as a goal are grouped as manipulative, including technical objectives, complexity of project and so on. There is even a moral judgement attached to such a framework in the sense that, since participation as an end is "right" then all other objectives of participation must be "wrong". This provides a very strong base from which the empowerment approach can refute criticism of its validity or appropriateness in different situations.

3.3.5 Paul (1987a)

The debate to this point, and through to the mid-1980s, failed to address a critical issue in that no author produced a cohesive and concise terminology on
which to base his or her work. The “means and ends” duality avoids this issue by saying that there is only one issue of importance, namely the degree to which community participation leads to community empowerment and control. However even this point cannot be debated in a vacuum. There remained a clear need to separate out, and more clearly define, specific components of the community participation process, i.e. what exactly is meant by the terms objective, definition, scope, etc., and how do they interact.

This need was partially addressed in 1987 by Paul, in a study for the World Bank study (Paul, 1987a). This study is the first real attempt to define a comprehensive conceptual framework for community participation. Paul states that this is intentional and argues that “the multiplicity of approaches to an interpretation of CP [community participation] in the literature and the world of practice can be better understood within this analytical framework” (Paul, 1987a:v).

The study itself is a review of World Bank experience with community participation in a fifty projects selected from the sectors of urban housing (18 projects), health and nutrition (15) and irrigation (17)(Paul, 1987a:1) and Paul approaches the subject from a strongly analytical perspective. Paul’s first major contribution (and all of Paul’s contributions are significant due to the lucidity with which he defines his terms) is to draw a clear distinction between the terms “definition” and “objective”. The interchangeability of these two terms has been an ongoing source of confusion and unfortunately still continues in spite of Paul’s work (e.g. Moser, 1989:83).

Firstly Paul defines participation, within the context of development, as “an active process by which beneficiary/client groups influence the direction and execution of a development project with a view to enhancing their well being in terms of income, personal growth, self-reliance or other values they cherish” (Paul, 1987a:2).
The important points that are being made here are (a) that a definition is a statement which encapsulates everything that goes to make up the community participation process; ie. it is a broad value statement; and (b) that notwithstanding this breadth, the definition may still be area specific (in this case the area would be development) and, thus, is not necessarily universal in its applicability. However, once such a value statement has been made it then becomes possible to define the objectives of community participation within that chosen area. In this respect Paul states that:

"In the context of development CP may be viewed as a process that serves one or more of the following objectives:

(a) in the broadest sense, as an instrument of empowerment.

(b) CP may serve a more limited objective of building beneficiary capacity in relation to a project.

(c) CP may contribute to increased project effectiveness. Effectiveness refers to the degree to which a given objective is achieved. It is useful to distinguish effectiveness from efficiency [objective (d) below] which measures the relationship between a given output and its cost (inputs).

(d) CP may improve project efficiency.

(e) Yet a fifth objective of CP is the desire to share the costs of a project with the people it serves" (Paul, 1987a:3-4).

Paul's second major contribution in clarifying terminology is the desegregation of intensity from objectives. He argues that "While CP can be used for any or all of these (sic) objectives, it may vary in the intensity with which it is sought in a particular project or at a particular stage of the project" (Paul, 1987a:4). Here the term intensity defines the type and extent of the input of the beneficiaries into the project. Paul then distinguishes between four levels of
Intensity: (1) Information sharing; (2) Consultation; (3) Decision making; and (4) Initiating action. These levels are listed in ascending order of beneficiary involvement.

Finally, Paul defines a third component of participation which he identifies as important, namely "Instruments of community participation". This term refers to the institutional devices used by a project to organise and sustain community participation. These instruments Paul then groups into three categories: (1) Field workers of the project agency; (2) Community workers/committees; and (3) User groups (Paul, 1987a:25-26).

Having defined the terminology, and drawn the distinction between the components of objectives, intensity and instruments (which he calls dimensions of participation), Paul then places these within a three dimensional matrix (Paul, 1987a:8), stating that "the three dimensions are inter-related and that there are certain combinations of these dimensions which are more likely to be consistent and hence more effective than others in a given project context" (Paul, 1987a:7). He then goes on to say that "Generally speaking, the more complex the objective of CP, the greater the need for a higher level of intensity and more powerful instruments. By the same token, if CP has a less demanding objective, starting out from a lower order of intensity and a simpler instrument will be in order. Projects with different CP objectives may thus position themselves differently in terms of the configuration of objectives" (Paul, 1987a:7).

Paul's distinction between objectives and intensity is critically important to the community participation debate, in that it attempts to separate out the reasons why participation is applied from the degree of input from the community. At the same time this distinction begs the question of who decides the level of intensity. Thus while Paul shows that different levels of intensity may co-exist within the same project, what his framework does not do is to state how, and by whom, the levels of intensity and the objectives would be determined initially.
For example, on decision making Paul states “A still higher level of intensity may be said to occur when beneficiaries have a decision making role in matters of project design and implementation. Thus slum dwellers may decide jointly with project staff on the design for upgrading their housing. Farmers may decide for themselves on a program for the distribution of water for irrigation” (Paul, 1987a:5). Again on initiating action Paul says “When beneficiaries are able to take the initiative in terms of actions/decisions pertaining to a project, the intensity of CP may be said to have reached its peak. Initiative implies a proactive capacity and the confidence to get going on one’s own. When beneficiary groups engaged in a health project identify a new need and decide to respond to it on their own, they are taking the initiative for their development. This is qualitatively different from their capacity to act or decide on issues or tasks proposed or assigned to them” (Paul, 1987a:5).

These examples highlight the problem of who decides the level of intensity. For example the ability of a community to be proactive in a health project, as quoted above, is dependent upon their having the power to act in this way; whilst the ability of farmers to decide on a programme for the distribution of water is dependent upon the support of the donor agency and controlling authority. In other words, the community must interact with other parties, but the nature of this interaction is not specified by Paul. This thesis argues in sections 3.7 and 3.8 that this issue, concerning the roles and relationships between the different parties to the development process, is an essential component of a conceptual framework for community participation.

3.4 Conceptual frameworks

Paul describes his concept of the community participation process as a conceptual framework. As the name implies this is a framework within which the various components of community participation can be linked to each other. The relationship between a conceptual framework and an approach will be discussed in detail in chapter 9.
From the literature review described in section 3.3 three conceptual frameworks emerge. The first derives from the concept of a one dimensional continuum, based upon Arnstein’s ladder. Although Arnstein herself does not differentiate between objectives and intensity but (whether purposely or unwittingly) merges them, levels of intensity dominate. Thus the first conceptual framework is one based solely upon a continuum of increasing levels of intensity. Community participation is then seen to take place at a specific point on this continuum which moves from minimal involvement on the part of the affected community through to control over the project. For discussion purposes this framework will be referred to as the “intensity” conceptual framework.

The second conceptual framework is that of Paul, which is a three dimensional model of objectives, intensity and instruments. In Paul’s conceptual framework intensity remains and the levels of intensity are defined along a continuum. However, because there are now five distinct objectives, the framework is far more flexible and can be applied to a wider range of projects. It is thus far more sophisticated than the previous framework. It also incorporates instruments of participation. This framework will be referred to in future discussion as Paul’s conceptual framework.

The third framework will be referred to as the “objectives” conceptual framework. Because it is founded upon the issue of community control there is only one level of intensity which is considered, and this is the level of total control. In focussing on objectives, however, the means-end duality of Moser (1983) simplifies the situation further and reduces the list of objectives, placing them in one of two categories: those which support community empowerment and control (the “end” component of the framework) and those which do not (the “means” component). This simple dualistic concept is thus a specific case of the wider “objectives” conceptual framework which will be referred to as the “means and end” duality.
3.5 Strengthening the concept of empowerment

Although widely supported by international development agencies as a policy objective, Paul finds that, in practice, empowerment and capacity building emerge as relatively less important when it comes to actual projects supported by the World Bank. Thus, for example, only 3 (8%) of the projects he evaluates have empowerment as an objective (Paul, 1987a:v-vi). A major study of USAID projects also demonstrates the low priority of empowerment in a project context (Finsterbusch and Van Wicklin, 1989).

This lack of follow through of the principle of empowerment into projects has led to a re-evaluation of the concept of empowerment, taking into account Paul's findings and his wider conceptual framework. This re-evaluation is described in a monograph by Moser (1989) and is particularly important because of the strategy that is adopted. Rather than evaluating empowerment in its own right, the work seeks, instead, to use Paul's findings to support and justify first the objectives framework and then, ultimately, the "means and end" duality. There is an interesting rationale to this strategy. Paul's conceptual framework is the most comprehensive to date. If it can be shown to be supportive of, rather than to supersede, the "objectives" conceptual framework, then the latter becomes the primary conceptual framework. Since it is the latter which is the conceptual framework for empowerment, then once this linkage is demonstrated empowerment is justified, and the causes of failure to implement empowerment-based strategies must lie elsewhere (i.e. the problems are not with empowerment per se).

Moser begins from the premise that the importance of understanding community participation is widely recognised (Moser, 1989:79). She states that "The purpose of [her] review is to identify some of the fundamental contradictions inherent in the incorporation of community participation in urban projects" (Moser, 1989:79). Moser has been one of the strongest proponents of the concept that empowerment is the raison d'être of participation and she begin her
In this monogram Moser begins by going back to basic principles and asking the questions why, when, whose and how in respect of community participation, with special emphasis placed upon the first. Thus, in answering the question “why participation?” Moser firstly looks at the UNCHS introductory document to their Participation Programme which outlines three arguments employed to advocate the incorporation of participation in the execution of the project, namely:

"1. Participation is an end in itself:

People have the right and duty to participate in the execution (i.e., planning, implementation and execution) of projects which profoundly affect their lives.

2. Participation is a means to improve project results:

If people participate in the execution of projects by contributing their ingenuity, skills and other untapped resources, more people can benefit, implementation is facilitated, and the outcome responds better to the needs and priorities of the beneficiaries.

3. Participation is a self-generating activity which stimulates people to seek participation in other spheres of life:

Participation builds up a self-reliant and co-operative spirit in communities; it is a learning process whereby people become capable of identifying and dealing actively with their problem” (UNCHS, 1984:6).

Moser argues that, in these basic statements, three different objectives of participation are linked together. She states that the first links participation to empowerment (in static terms as a right), the second to efficiency, and the third
to capacity building. At this point Moser combines her own definition of objectives with those of Paul and the UNCHS to show their similarities in the figure outlined below (figure 3.2).

**Figure 3.2: Categorisation of objectives of community participation (Moser, 1989:83)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Means</td>
<td>Means to improve project result</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project cost sharing</td>
<td>Improving project efficiency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing project effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building beneficiary capacity</td>
<td>Building self reliance, co-operative spirit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End</td>
<td>Empowerment</td>
<td>Right and duty to participate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This figure is valuable in bringing together important sets of objectives, each derived from a different source, and showing that they are inter-related. On one level this gives support to Paul's conceptual framework. At the same time, however, it is important to see how Moser uses this to justify and reinforce her own hypothesis. Moser's subsequent analysis, which indicates her progression in thinking from 1983 to 1989, shows how this is done.

In 1983 Moser defined community participation as a means and end duality. In 1989 she still argues that a fundamental twofold distinction can be made between those (community participation) projects which include an element of empowerment and those which do not, and she uses the above table to prove this point (Moser, 1989:83-84). However she also states that "as with any
dualistic division, this one between participation as a means and participation as an end is mechanistic and limited in its applicability" (Moser, 1989:84) and then goes on to say that "In reality it is not the evaluation of participation either as a means or as an end which is important, but the identification of the process whereby participation as a means has the capacity to develop into participation as an end" (Moser, 1989:84).

Having made this statement, and drawn in both the UNCHS and a complex conceptual framework like Paul's to support it, Moser justifies the retention of the "means and end" duality as the conceptual framework. Furthermore, by recognising that it may take time to achieve participation as an end, Moser provides a valid reason why there are so few projects implemented which have empowerment as their objective, since empowerment-based projects may have difficulty in achieving their goal immediately.

3.6 Shortcomings of existing conceptual frameworks

3.6.1 The "intensity" conceptual framework

All community participation processes must have an objective. Thus a framework such as this one which operates solely using the criterion of intensity, or the degree to which the community becomes involved in the decision-making process, can only function if the objective is already decided. The question then becomes who decides the objective. In limited cases, such as simple rural self-help projects, this may be the community, but generally it will be either the government or the development agency acting with the consent of the government, which decides. This conceptual framework is compatible with a community development approach, but clearly incompatible with an empowerment approach.
3.6.2 Paul's conceptual framework

Paul's conceptual framework of objectives-intensity-instruments has addressed, in a satisfactory manner, two key issues which have plagued the earlier debate on participation, namely the disparity of objectives and the confused terminology. Thus it brings together the multiplicity of objectives into a unified structure and clearly distinguishes the level of community input (intensity) from those objectives. However, what this framework does not address is the question of who decides the level of intensity or indeed the objective. In this regard the objectives-intensity-instruments conceptual framework of Paul is extremely weak. While it provides an adequate conceptual framework for the evaluation of projects, identifying clearly the objectives, the intensity and the relationship between them on any particular project, it cannot be used to develop an implementation strategy unless this issue of "who decides" is addressed in some way.

The "means-end" duality has addressed this issue of "who decides" the point of entry of the community into the project, since the foundation of the framework itself places the community in the role of primary decision maker. Unfortunately this simple idealised approach has run into serious difficulties, as Moser acknowledges (Moser, 1989:84). The central problem is that of reconciling community control with the capacity to exercise that control.

To date there is no clear solution to this problem. In earlier work Hollnsteiner attempts to address the problem by distinguishing six modes of participation, constructed around the issues of power sharing and decision making (Hollnsteiner, 1982:61-63). These modes represent an interesting combination of intensity and instruments of participation, again defined along a continuum, and using the locus of power as a classifier of participation (Hollnsteiner, 1977:24-25). But again, like Paul's conceptual framework, this approach can define an ideal, as well as an existing, situation, but cannot be used to create an implementation strategy. Sheng refines Hollnsteiner's classification using two criteria: locus of power and the relationship between the parties to produced four
concepts of: participation, co-operation, education and manipulation (Sheng, 1990:59). This is a potentially interesting development. However it retains two significant weaknesses. Firstly the parties are limited to the community and the authorities. This is in spite of Sheng’s recognition of Racelis’ work which incorporates planners into the decision-making process. Secondly the paper still does not define the point of entry.

In a recent paper Marsden and Moser (1990) have attempted to approach the problem from a different angle, arguing that “The focus is on building institutions which are flexible and sustainable, on the part of both government and local organisations. In many cases this requires a renegotiation of the relationship between those who control resources, whether they are public or private interests, and the recipients of those resources” (Marsden and Moser, 1990:3). This point is perfectly valid, but again there is no indication how this might be achieved in practice.

From its recent publications (e.g. World Bank, 1990), the World Bank appears to be taking the view that one solution is to give greater responsibility to the NGOs, operating as professional advisors to communities and community based organisations (CBOs), thereby providing a more equitable “balance of power” for the community in their negotiations with authorities. While the introduction of NGO’s in a key role may lead to an improvement in the success rate of projects from the objective of empowerment, it also changes the relationship between the parties. There is now an additional major actor, with his or her own agenda (as described in chapter 2.4.3). In addition the implementing authority is likely to view the NGO with grave suspicion. This means that new relationships need to be analysed, i.e. the relationship between the NGO and, respectively, the community and the controlling/implementing authority.

3.6.3 The “objectives” conceptual framework

The “means and end” duality is relevant to an empowerment approach and chapter 2 shows that the empowerment approach itself is valid in specific
situations. Nowhere in the literature is there an attempt to quantify what these situations might be. Instead Moser (1989) attempts to justify the "means and end" duality and the associated empowerment approach as the dominant approach to community participation which is valid for all applications. This is where the problems arise.

Underpinning this expanded view of the "objectives" conceptual framework is the concept that the list of objectives identified by Paul can be placed on a continuum. There are two objections to this. The first is the implicit linkage between the objectives which is the fundamental notion of a continuum. For example, it does not follow that the objective of effectiveness is naturally closer to empowerment (in the socio-political sense) than that of efficiency. It may be valid to argue that the achievement of effectiveness is more likely to require a higher degree of community involvement than does the achievement of the objective of efficiency, but that is a different issue.

The second problem concerns the decision-making arena. The debate around empowerment and the "means and end" duality places community control and power within the socio-political sphere. This is clear from the definitions quoted earlier as well as the case studies discussed in Chapter 2.4. This assumption is questionable. Later chapters will show how decision-making in projects can also take place around economic and technical issues, in addition to social and political issues, and often independently of the latter.

If the 'objectives' conceptual framework, within which objectives lie on a continuum, is not valid, then this has wide ramifications. Section 3.5 indicated how the centrality of empowerment depended upon the notion of a continuum. If this now falls away it weakens significantly the dominant role of empowerment, since the latter is no longer underpinned by a strong conceptual framework which will translate the concept into reality.
3.7 Relationships and arenas of participation

The literature described above, which deals with a conceptual analysis of community participation, together with that described in Chapter 2, can be summarised as shown in figure 3.3 below.

**Figure 3.3: Summary of conceptual relationships**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptual Framework</th>
<th>Associated Approach</th>
<th>Development Paradigm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Intensity&quot;</td>
<td>Community Development</td>
<td>Modernisation Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Objectives&quot;</td>
<td>Empowerment</td>
<td>Dependency Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Objectives-Intensity&quot;</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>de-linked</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The shortcomings of the three conceptual frameworks, described above, centre around two fundamental issues, the point of entry of the community into the decision making process and the relationship between the different parties involved in that process.

A useful underpinning of an understanding of relationships in the development process is provided by Goulet's paper, who uses the concept of perceptions (Goulet, 1986). Goulet argues that development decisions are made by three different categories of actors: technical specialists; politicians (or their bureaucratic agents) and persons pressing some special or general concern (Goulet, 1986:301). Excluding self-interest (a sub-section of the third category), he argues that the first two categories of decision makers apply distinct rationality systems, the technological and the political. Those who plead
for moral values pursue ethical rationality (the third category). (Goulet, 1986:301-302). These rationalities are defined in the following way:

- Technological rationality rests on the epistemological foundations of modern science... and obeys a hard logic guided by a calculus of efficiency in the assessment of time or the utility of any object. Technological rationality’s animating procedure or dominating spirit leads it to treat everything other than the goal instrumentally.

- Politicians’ veritable goal is to preserve certain institutions and rules of the game, or their special power position within those institutions. Political rationality as described here is that exhibited by persons who wield power. Aspirants to power positions however are also animated by political rationality, but their logic is frequently aimed, not at maintaining the status quo but at destroying or altering it.

- Ethical (or humane) rationality takes value norms as its goal, that is, the creation, nurture, or defense of certain values considered worthy for their own sake. Unlike the other forms described, ethical values takes as its absolute goal – in the light of which all else is relative – the promotion of values, not the performance of concrete tasks or the preservation of institutions or power positions. Ethical rationality draws its themes and its legitimation from two distinct, albeit usually allied, sources. The first is some holistic meaning or belief system; the second the world of daily life as experienced by people devoid of power, status or expertise.

All interlocutors in decisional arenas no doubt be motivated by ethical values in playing out their roles. But the dominant form and content of their contributions to rationality mirror their special roles and express the formal warrant they possess for engaging in decision making” (Goulet, 1986:302-304).
Goulet argues that, "when they converge in common decision making arenas, the three rationalities impinge upon one another, not in the mode of horizontal mutuality, but at cross purposes and in a vertical pattern. Each brand of thinking tends to approach the others in triumphal, reductionist fashion, and leads either to unfruitful conflict or abdication, both of which generate poor decision making" (Goulet, 1986:304-305).

The remainder of Goulet's paper basically covers the negotiation process in this and two other case studies. There is also some discussion of the inter-relationships and interactions between the different rationalities, and their sociological complexity. In his conclusion Goulet ends by saying that "Ultimately the issue is how technological reason will discourse with politics and ethics. Can the logic of efficiency join the logic of power and the logic of virtue in a holy alliance that produces genuine development? The new discourse of the three rationalities is crucially important because development decisions themselves are crucially important" (Goulet, 1986:315).

Three pertinent points emerge from Goulet's analysis. The first is in the essence of Goulet's three rationalities, namely that different parties to the participation process are likely to have different perceptions of what constitutes development needs and differing views of how these should be resolved. Goulet looked at several examples of this in the context of case studies and Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis also look at this issue. It is clear however that, if this understanding is to be translated into practice, there is a need to structure the conceptual framework such that it can extend through to a working model. An early attempt to do this was made by Abbott (1988), with the concept of defining and matching agendas. This concept is developed fully in Chapter 9. The second pertinent point is the prominence given, for the first time, to the importance of technology, when Goulet highlights the role of technical specialists in development decisions (Goulet, 1986:301). This role, and its impact on the participation process, form one of the key components of this thesis.
The third point links into the idea, discussed in section 2.1, that conceptual frameworks operate within specific paradigms. Specifically it is necessary to understand the relationship between participation in projects and participation in non-project specific development arenas. Thus Goulet for example argues that community participation can be classified according to the scope of the arena in which it operates. Here Goulet quotes small (e.g. family) arenas; sectoral arenas; and national arenas. He states that, depending upon the scope of the arena or field in which participation occurs, its impact on development will vary accordingly (Goulet, 1989:166). In this sense Goulet defines an arena as being 'the environment within which the community participation process operates."

3.8 Conclusion

One problem which becomes clear from reviewing the literature on community participation is its disparate nature. There is no structured or coordinated approach to the research. As Midgely argues "unlike most other ideas in development studies popular participation has not been subject to careful academic scrutiny" (Midgely, 1987:6). Thus while it is possible to identify a broad chronological sequence in the evolution of conceptual frameworks, this comes very much from a position of hindsight.

This ad hoc approach has led to frustration and a general lack of progress in the field. This is summed up by Marsden and Moser when they state that "We are, however, rather tired of hearing that participation is an indispensable part of any programme or project, coming from sources as varied as national Governments, UN agencies and non-government organisations. We are equally tired of hearing accounts of failure that so often accompany the work of those who advocate participatory strategies, without adequate documentation of the participatory processes . . . " (Marsden and Moser, 1990:3).

Yet community participation does have successes. Thus Paul states that, in the projects where community participation had as its objective the improvement of
project effectiveness, and where this was implemented (a total of 10 projects)
"In all cases CP seems to have brought about a redesign of project services to
better match beneficiary needs" (Paul, 1987a:19-20).

There is clearly a need for a universally recognised structure of participation,
which will provide a uniform set of objectives around which research,
implementation and evaluation can be based. The available conceptual
frameworks can be classified as (i) "intensity"; (ii) Paul's "objectives-
intensity-Instruments"; and (iii) "objectives" (which includes Moser's
"means and end" duality). All have limited application but equally all have
serious shortcomings. Some of these shortcomings are addressed by Goulet
(1986) but this work in itself does not constitute a conceptual framework. Thus
all of this diverse material needs integrating. This means that, in addition to
Paul's three important components of objectives, intensity and instruments, the
following components, which represent the major gaps in the existing
frameworks, also need to be evaluated and incorporated:

- the arena or context within which the project takes place;
- the point of entry into the participation process;
- the relationship between the different parties involved;
- the role and agendas of the different parties.

The chapters which follow use South Africa's case studies which have dealt with
these issues. This will provide the base data from which a universal structure,
effectively a theory of community participation, can be constructed.

Endnote

1. See for example the debate between Burgess (1985:271-312;
1987:137-146) and Gilbert and van der Linden (1987:129-136) on
the ideological and political differences between state supported self-help
housing and squatter self-help housing.
CHAPTER 4

THE GROWTH OF THE CIVIC MOVEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA
AND ITS IMPACT ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

4.1 Introduction

South Africa provides a valuable opportunity to explore the meaning of community participation for several reasons: (1) it is a country in a transitional phase from an illegitimate regime to a legitimate form of government; (2) it has a very strong urban mass movement (the civic movement) which is demanding a more participative approach to urban development; (3) virtually every party involved with the urban development process has made statements supportive of the principle of community participation (see Chapter 1.3); and (4) access to basic and essential (physical) services for the urban poor is considered a political priority.

Together these factors have placed infrastructure provision at the centre of the debate on community participation for the first time. This is important because infrastructure provision, unlike other issues at the centre of the development
debate (such as land tenure) has its own technical dynamic - the delivery of a product within time and cost constraints. This is often portrayed, especially by engineers, as a static, given end-point. This in turn leads to an assumption of a simplistic duality of process versus product (i.e., the community participation process and a technically-based group of services). In practice it is an interaction between two dynamic processes. Several South African case studies are presented in later chapters, which highlight different aspects of this interaction. Before these are discussed however, it is important to understand how infrastructure came to achieve this central role in the community participation debate in South Africa. This is the purpose of the current Chapter.

Seekings (1988) provides a sociological framework for the urban "unrest" which characterised the townships of South Africa in the period 1983-1985, by placing it within the context of the "urban movements" of Latin America, as defined by Castells (1983). Having drawn this parallel, Seekings then traces the thread of housing through the historical developments discussed in this chapter and states that "the most important effect of the state's fiscal crisis (during the 1960s and 1970s) was on housing" (Seekings, 1988:200-202). Seekings goes on to say that "At the root of conflict in the PWV townships is the built environment... the most important of these has been the most basic - housing - although demands for other elements... are becoming more important" (Seekings, 1988:201). Thus Seekings argues that housing is the focus of mobilisation used by the urban movement in its struggle against the state.

Coovadia differs in his analysis, and choice of focal issue, stating that the struggle was around "the needs and demands of the urban poor, especially in the areas of land, housing and services" (Coovadia, 1991:334), a collection of different issues. Collinge, on the other hand, emphasises the role of service provision, arguing that it is "The pressures to negotiate on service provision to entire communities... [which] have shaped thinking on the long term nature of civics" (Collinge, 1991:8). As the case study of Soweto in chapter 5 shows, this last analysis is the most accurate. The township grievances underlying the rent boycott were primarily concerned with service charges and levels of service.
The state was able to suppress all opposition except that of the rent boycott. In literature from Latin America on urban movements, the role of physical infrastructure is relegated to a minor position. Yet in South Africa it became the focus of the successful mobilisation of opposition to the state. This chapter will analyse different aspects of opposition to the state and then examine the relationship between services and the wider political struggle.

4.2 State policy for black areas 1902 - 1982

Grest (1988) takes a similar approach to Seekings when he states that the current crisis of local government has to be understood in terms of the historical development of the system as a whole (Grest, 1988:87). He argues that control over Africans was an early priority, leading to the emergence of uniform state policy in the 1920s (Grest, 1988:88).

Prior to the Boer War a number of local authorities had made provision for the separate residence of Africans but the only restrictive South African legislation was in the Orange Free State, which passed a law controlling ownership and occupation of land in urban areas in 1893 (Davenport, 1991:1). In the face of increasing African urbanisation following the Boer War there was a dominant fear of health hazards and the first legislation was passed to provide control over the location of Africans, in both urban and rural areas, between 1902 and 1904 (Davenport, 1991:1).

After several attempts between 1910 and 1920 to pass further controlling legislation, the Natives (Urban Areas) Act was finally passed in 1923. This act provided the framework for a uniform national system of "Native Administration" (under central government control) in which municipalities had a key role as the local agents of the central state. Residential segregation was enforced by the municipal authorities which were delegated the power to build and administer "native locations" and to control African housing. Central to this was the concept that urban areas were European preserves and that Africans
were temporary sojourners, there to serve only as long as they were needed (Grest, 1988:89-90).

The administrative framework consolidated in the 1920s laid the foundations upon which the apartheid state was built from the 1950s. Residential segregation was enforced by the municipal authorities which were delegated the power to build and administer "native locations" and to control African housing (Grest, 1988:90). The law was complex and had major loopholes, one of which was considered to be the difficulty in controlling the influx of women. This led to the introduction of a permit system at both ends of a journey (Davenport, 1991:9), the first influx control laws. Under these laws the costs of urban African administration were met from a separate Native Revenue Account, financed from the proceeds of the sale of sorghum beer under municipal monopoly. Local administration of Africans was expected to be self-financing, and municipalities were generally reluctant to consider any subsidy by transfer from the general rates account to which whites contributed (Grest, 1988:90).

And finally, in terms of African involvement in the management of their own affairs, provision was made for municipalities to create purely consultative Advisory Boards for the articulation of urban African interests. However municipalities proved reluctant to take even this limited step and often failed to give any real weight to the opinions expressed by these bodies (Grest, 1988:90).

Industrial growth during and immediately after the 1939-1945 war accelerated the urbanisation process so that by 1946 the number of Africans living in urban areas (1 794 212) exceeded the number of whites (1 719 338) (Posel, 1991:20). Two documents were produced in 1948 which addressed this situation. The first was the Fagan report, commissioned by the United Party, which argued that the urbanisation of Africans was inevitable and the process required overall supervision and control by the authorities. The second was the Sauer report, commissioned by the National Party, which retained the concept of urban Africans as temporary sojourners and which outlined the basis of subsequent apartheid strategy (Grest, 1988:90-91). The result was the
strengthening of influx control under the Urban Areas Act (1952) and the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act (1951).

During this period the vehicle for local (African) consultation within the local authority system continued to be via the "Advisory Boards", but in 1961 this system was replaced by the Urban Bantu Council (UBC) system, whereby a group of purely advisory bodies acted as agents of the local authorities and were equipped with some additional powers. By the late 1960s the process of centralisation of administrative power by the Department of Bantu Administration and Development was far advanced, with the main thrust of its policies being directed towards urban control rather than the provision of services to the population. Finally, in 1971 the municipalities lost all control over local (black) administration with the creation of 22 Bantu Affairs Administration Boards, constituting a separate specialised branch of the state (Grest, 1988:91).

In 1977 Community Councils were created to replace the moribund UBC's and advisory boards. They were intended to function as representative bodies with greater executive powers operating alongside the Administration Boards. The relationship was cast as that of "agent" (Administration Boards) and "principal" (the Councils) ((Hughes and Grest, 1983:125), but in practice the boards continued to wield management power in the townships. Councillors were thus nominally responsible but had no real powers. Ministerial power over the community councils was total; the minister established the councils, allocated powers and made regulations in regard of elections, period of office, conditions of service, conduct of meetings, employment and finance.

Community councils were designed to take over some of the responsibilities for the provision and management of housing at a time when the state was trying to shift the financial burden down to local people. At the same time there was a growing recognition within the State that influx control was failing to curb urbanisation and should be seen as a tool to make the flow of labour more orderly (Posel, 1991:27). Grest quotes Bloch (1982) as stating that the creation of
Community Councils was aimed at co-opting a section of the urban population as agents for the state at the local level through the extension of a limited range of concessions (Grest, 1988:94-95).

By 1980 about 224 Community Councils had been established in the face of large scale rejection of the system by the vast majority of township residents. Polls had consistently been very low and the Community Councils lacked political legitimacy (Grest, 1988:95).

4.3 State policy for black areas 1982 - 1989

By 1982 the community council system had all but collapsed (Grest, 1988:97). Elections scheduled for 1980 had been twice postponed at the request of councillors themselves. Following upon the recommendations of the Riekert Commission report (Grest, 1988:97) which articulated a new urban strategy, the government passed the Black Local Authorities (BLA) Act in 1982. This provided the mechanism for the conversion of discredited Community Councils into a system of local government similar to that operating for whites.

The BLA Act conferred certain powers on the new local authorities, giving them greater status and a larger measure of autonomy. They were also vested with a range of powers previously the function of the administration boards. However, a large degree of control remained in the hands of the Minister of Co-operation and Development however, including financial control. Specifically this Department continued to control township and housing development. The first elections, for 26 Councils, were held in November and December of 1983.

Shubane divides the period during which the BLAs have existed into three distinct phases. 1982-4 was the period during which the BLA's were introduced. This period was characterised by boycott campaigns and calls for residents not to avail themselves for participation in these structures. When people stood and were elected they were faced with demands to resign. The period from 1985-9 was
one in which the many townships became ungovernable. The government introduced the State of Emergency which included a decision to shore up the BLAs, by force if necessary, and to incorporate the BLAs into the state security network. In the third (post 1989) period, the state recognised that resolution of the rent boycott needed the participation of community organisations and a process of negotiation was initiated (Shulze, 1991:67-72).

Community Action in response to urbanisation policy

African opposition to the government urbanisation policy has always been one of the key elements of the struggle for political equality in South Africa. Opposition to the carrying of passes by women had led to open confrontation with the police in the Orange Free State in 1913 and by male workers on the Rand in 1919 (Davenport, 1991:3). These anti-pass demonstrations continued in the face of increasingly stringent enforcement, culminating in the ANC anti-pass campaign and the Sharpeville anti-pass demonstration and subsequent massacre in April 1960 (Davies et al, 1984:287). This led to the banning of the ANC and the formation of the ANC military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe. The state responded with increased state violence and repression and Dikgcolan laws which effectively prevented all open opposition.

The early 1970s saw an upsurge of mass struggles in South Africa, of which two were particularly important, those of workers within the Trade Union movement and the growth of, largely student-based, black-conscience organisations. Part of this challenge was the Soweto uprising of 1976 and the general strike which followed (Davies et al, 1984:289-290). Again the state responded with repressive measures and banned 18 Black Consciousness movements and a large number of leaders in October 1977 (Davies et al, 1984:307). In this way the state continued to respond to political opposition by banning and detention.

The introduction of the Black Local Authorities Act in 1982 and the new Constitution of 1983 was the next major impetus to opposition politics at the
local and national level. By firmly excluding African participation it also led to
greater unity of opposition forces and the emergence of national groupings
committed to challenging state policy (Grest, 1988:101-102). The two leading
vehicles used to rebuild a broadly based national democratic resistance inside
South Africa were the United Democratic Front (UDF) launched nationally in
August 1983 and the National Forum (NF) which met in June 1983 (Barrell,
1984:6). The UDF did not set out to be a political party, but rather an umbrella
organisation claiming, at its first national conference in December 1983, to
represent more than 560 affiliates from political, trade union, youth, sport,
religious, professional and other organisations throughout the country (Barrell,
1984:17). The NF was not an organisation but rather a platform for
organisations, with AZAPO as its driving force, with over 200 organisations
attending its first meeting (Barrell, 1984:11).

Overt political opposition of this nature and effectiveness provoked a rapid and
effective clampdown by the state. In 1985 the government introduced a State of
Emergency in a limited number of magisterial districts. This was revoked the
following year, but reintroduced nationally several months later. The first state
of emergency was used to detained many of the leaders of the above organisations,
considerably weakening, but not destroying, them. Under the second state of
emergency the repression was taken further and all the major opposition
organisations, including the UDF and AZAPO, were banned altogether. This action
by the state was successful in preventing large and ongoing mobilisation. In
response however a range of other types of defiance activities were started.
These were consumer boycotts, stayaways, transport boycotts and rent boycotts.

The first State of Emergency had increased politicisation in the African
community but it had also limited the political space. In this environment
boycotts were seen by community organisations as relatively resilient in the face
of repression (Helliker et al, 1987:34). The boycotts began in the Eastern Cape
in March 1985 and rapidly spread throughout the country. The intention was to
mobilise business against apartheid. However there were other objectives such
as the creation of class alliances (Obery and Jochelson, 1985:10), to build a
wider and more cohesive structure of mass resistance to the state. The effects of
the boycott on business were mixed, with a hardening of attitudes on the one hand
coupled with increased sympathy for the plight of African people on the other.
Generally however a significant political gap opened between business and the
government during 1985 and early 1986, with a significant loss of confidence in
the state’s ability to resolve political conflict and provide a stable economic

At their height there was strong support for the boycotts, particularly in the
Eastern Cape, and they were successful as a form of pressure on business and
local authorities to achieve limited socio-economic gains; but the genesis of the
boycotts lay in heightened mass resistance (Helliker et al, 1987:39). The
state’s response to the boycotts is divided by Helliker et al into two phases
(Helliker et al, 1987:47). The first phase was up to June 1986 when the state
appeared to vacillate between obstruction and indifference. The second phase
began when the state declared a national State of Emergency in June of that year
which launched a major offensive against organisations and prevented local
authorities from compromising with those organisations. The boycotts then
collapsed because of a leadership vacuum and organisational weaknesses
(Helliker et al, 1987:49) caused by banning and detention. Helliker et al argue
that community’s became demoralised as the possibility of making concrete gains
became ever more remote, while the boycott strategy, for all its resilience, was
not able to withstand the onslaught of the state launched under the second state of
emergency (Helliker et al, 1987:49). This was in spite of the very high level of
public support. The importance of this will be demonstrated when discussing the
rent boycott later.

Transport boycotts, like consumer boycotts, have a long history, with well
known boycotts being in Alexandra in the 1940s and again in the 1950s. A
subsidised bus and train transport system was an integral component of the
apartheid policy which involved the relocation of three and a half million people
This resulted, by 1979, in 700 000 so-called “frontier” commuters (Lemon,
1982:85) over half of whom travelled by bus. 46.5% of these worked in the
Pretoria, East London and Durban areas. By 1983 the cost of subsidisation had reached R162 million and the state set up a Commission to find ways of reducing this which resulted in proposals for fare increases (McCarthy and Swilling, 1984:28).

Major bus boycotts broke out in Durban, between December 1982 and May-June 1983, and in East London in July 1983 continuing sporadically into 1984. In both cases the nominal reason was a fare increase but McCarthy and Swilling highlight the general high level of dissatisfaction with bus transport and the wider impact of transport in people lives. Thus they comment that transport costs for Bophuthatswana communities near Pretoria were between 5 and 20% of income in 1982 while in East London 70% of all working class respondents identified transport as their most serious problem (McCarthy and Swilling, 1984:38).

Physically the boycotts achieved some success in retaining lower fares and marginally improving services. Politically the boycotts generated the formation of progressive community organisations in areas which were previously unorganised. In spite of this however, and the fact that workers “have frequently identified the transport system as part of the cause of their exploitation” (R. Elsworth quoted in McCarthy and Swilling, 1984:34), transport organisations have been unable to use boycotts as part of a wider mobilisation process.

The mass-based work stayaway was another tactic of opposition to the state which re-emerged in the 1984-1985 period (see Swilling, 1986). Again though, as with other forms of protest discussed above, the State was effective in immobilising opposition with the State of Emergency of June 1986. This inability to use real grievances to build up opposition to the state serves to increases the significance of the rent boycotts, which also began in the mid 1980s, but which the state was never able to crush. The rent boycotts are of particular significance to this thesis because they centred around physical infrastructure services. This makes the mass struggle different from that in
other countries, a factor which is not considered normally when researchers draw comparisons with empowerment struggles in, for example, Latin America.

4.5 The rent boycott and the growth of the civic movement

The seeds of the rent boycott lay in the 1976 students' uprising. One of the results of this had been the destruction of the liquor outlets of the Administration Boards, which resulted in a subsequent loss of revenue. This led the Boards to increase rents substantially, an action which had two effects - a raising of public consciousness (people were being asked to pay to support a repressive administration) and a focusing of attention on the Urban Bantu Councils. Thus in Soweto, for example, the Soweto Students' Representative Council (SSRC) led a successful campaign against such a rent increase, while local demonstrations caused the resignation of the Councillors (Lodge, 83:353).

This stalemate lasted until 1978 when the Community Councils were elected. Seekings argues that initially these councils enjoyed a degree of legitimacy, being seen in the role of makgotla or arbiter of family disputes (Seekings, 1988:206). However they were in a difficult position. They had been given some responsibility for housing at a time when the state was trying to shift the cost of housing and service provision to a local level, and were made responsible for the collection of rents. However, important components of local government remained outside of their control. Thus there ensued over the next 4 years an increasing tension within the Councils, under pressure from residents on the one side to limit rent increases, and from the government and Administration Boards on the other side to increase rents. Many Councillors recognised the contradictions and sought to achieve a balancing act by demanding continued financial support from the state (Seekings, 1988:204). However the contradictions became more acute with time and Councils resorted with increasing frequency to coercive measures against residents. It was this ongoing struggle between Councils and residents, in which the Councillors were becoming
increasingly isolated, which led to the development of community based organisations.

The first major attempt to form a community organisation was in June 1977 when 61 Soweto notables elected a "Committee of Ten" (Lodge, 1983:253). Their first project was to develop a plan for Soweto's autonomy. Although enjoying a degree of local support one of the major criticisms levelled against them was that they were slow in building a political structure which would allow their constituency to participate in decision making rather than merely ratifying decisions at public meetings (Lodge, 1983:354-355). This led to the formation of the Soweto Civic Association (SCA) in 1979, an organisation which was less elitist than the committee of 10 and more directly linked to the grassroots constituency. This organisation grew rapidly so that by 1980, when the Soweto Community Councils proposed a 10% rent increase, the SCA had 33 branches and was in a position to spearhead an extremely effective campaign against the increase.

The second major community structure launched in South Africa was the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Association (PEBCO), formed in October 1979. Again the problems were the same as in the rest of the country (and covered in greater detail in Chapters 5 and 6), namely poor housing, sub-standard health conditions, minimal services and lack of room for expansion of urban land allocated to Africans.

The aims and objectives of PEBCO were to fight for equal civil rights for all the people of Port Elizabeth, as well as for broader national issues. PEBCO was defined as a civic organisation as opposed to a national political one and had as its main aim the creation of a unified local authority. The distinction between a civic organisation and a national political one was to prove ambiguous and led to different interpretations of the organisation's functions. The relationship between the civic struggle and the national struggle was articulated by defining PEBCO's aim as being to unite and conscientise people at the local level by taking up everyday issues. National political issues were seen as taking place at a higher
level and often losing contact with the people. By dealing with local issues a civic
body could prepare people for the time when a national body was formed. This
national body would either be as a result of Pebco's expansion or its inclusion in
another body (Cooper and Ensor, 1981:20).

The reason for Pebco's meteoric rise is given as (1) that it constituted for the
black population a platform for political expression at a time when organised and
overt political activity was non-existent; (2) there is a strong militancy which
characterises the Eastern Cape area (Cooper and Ensor, 1981:49). A large
degree of its popularity derived from its readiness to fight both for long term
wider political goals as well as to involve itself in immediate local problems.
The depth of people's resentment and bitterness over the appalling living
conditions in the townships and the threat of removals were key factors in
support (Cooper and Ensor, 1981:52); and (3) the charismatic leadership of
Thozamile Botha (Cooper and Ensor, 1981:52).

The most damaging action taken by the state (which lead to the decline of Pebco)
was the arrest and subsequent banning of Mr Botha and other members of the
executive. The loss of leadership caused disarray in PESCO's ranks. The new
leadership failed to formulate a clear strategy and PESCO became racked by
internal conflicts. Thus by late 1980 the organisation was largely ineffective.

In 1984 Grest and Hughes argued that "The state has responded to local crisis by
modifying existing structures for participation and creating new ones, without
conceding ground to opposition groupings" and that while "State initiatives have
afforded community organisations an opportunity to strengthen their position . . .
none of them has succeeded in forcing the state to modify its structures
fundamentally" (Grest and Hughes, 1984:60). Thus it appeared at the time that
the state had managed to suppress and contain the community based organisations
in the same way as it had other organisations which opposed its a. uthority. A
recognition that this was not the case began to appear in late 1984 with the start
of the rent boycotts.
The term "rent" in South Africa does not have the conventional meaning, since it has two components: a "rental" component made up of site and house rent for state housing tenants; and a service charge covering the cost of township capital development and the provision and maintenance of services. In practice these components are indistinguishable to township residents as they are billed and paid together. Thus a rent boycott involves a refusal to pay both rent and service charges. The cost of housing historically has been very low so that service charges actually constitute most of the rent in many townships. In Sebokeng for example service charges comprised 83% of the proposed total rent for 1984-85 (Chaskelson et al, 1987:53).

When the first BLAs were appointed in November and December 1983 they were under severe pressure to improve the level of infrastructure services, which had deteriorated substantially since the appointment of the Administration Boards in the early 1970s (see Chapter 5). Prior to the election some parties (e.g. the Sofasonke Party in Soweto) had promised rent cuts, while others (e.g. the VaPP in Mamelodi, Pretoria) had opposed high rents. Once in office however all were faced with the need to balance budgets and this could only be done by increasing rents; the primary source of income. As a result 1984 saw an unprecedented rise in rents in townships throughout the country, as Councillors more and more frequently presided over rent increases and resorted to coercive measures against squatters (who did not pay rent). In addition they came increasingly to be seen as corrupt, unaccountable and irresponsible as they attempted to resolve the financial problem at the expense of their political credibility (Chaskelson et al, 1987:55). The increases were being applied during a period of falling real incomes, so that the effect was more apparent. Thus in the period between 1980 and 1985 conservative estimates of research data indicate that at least 25% of PWV residents had falling real incomes (Chaskelson et al, 1987:55) while in the Vaal Triangle rent increases during that period comprised 56% compared to rises in real incomes of 17% (Jochelson, 1986:17).
The rent boycott is generally considered to have started in the Vaal in September 1984 (Jochelson, 1986:15; Swilling and Shubane, 1991:223). Vaal local authorities ran at a profit, due primarily to rent increases of over 400% between 1977 and 1984. When the August 1984 increase of R5.90 was announced, this created strong objections and a march was planned on the Council's offices on 3rd September to protest. Police fired on the crowd and created ongoing protests in which sixty-three people were killed in one week. Prior to 3 September, Vaal residents did not intend boycotting rent (Chaskelson et al, 1987:57) but after the clashes all payment stopped.

Chaskelson et al state that widespread hostility and an inability to pay do not in necessarily lead to a boycott. In the South African situation there were three root causes (Chaskelson et al, 1987:56-58). The first was a collective decision arising from moral outrage, as in the above case, and similarly in the "Mamelodi Massacre" of 21 November 1985 (see Borraine, 1988); the second evolved out of uncoordinated mass non-payment, due to financial constraints and an inability to pay; and the third (the smallest) as a tactical decision. Different causes became evident in different parts of the country over the following twelve months as the boycotts spread, to the extent that, by September 1986, there had been at least 49 rent boycotts (Jochelson, 1986:15).

4.6 State response to the rent boycott

The state had set up a National Security Management System in 1979 (Ratcliffe, 1992:3) to co-ordinate security activity and this body was to gain increasing influence over the next ten years. When boycotts began, the first action of the state was to detain those considered to be leaders and to ban all public meetings. Initially, however, the state does not appear to have formulated any wider, overall plan to counter the rent boycotts, believing that they were the work of agitators and intimidators and that this minority contrasted with the mass of "reasonable" residents who would recognise that paying rents was in their own interest (Chaskelson et al, 1987:60-61). Thus they concentrated on facilitating
"safe" payment by alternative methods. There was also a fear of provoking further violent conflict as well as a notable lack of success in using the courts to enforce evictions.

By late 1985 the state had moved to a more coercive stance but this shift did not reflect a fundamental change in thinking as to the cause of the boycotts; rather a recognition that new responses were required (Chaskelston et al., 1987:64). To control the increasing level of dissent a State of Emergency was declared in 36 magisterial districts in July 1985. The state attempted to counter the increasing ungovernability of the affected townships through armed occupation by the military and there were mass arrests. The state of emergency was lifted in March 1986 but reimposed nationally in June of that year (Grest, 1988:106). In Alexandra, for example, the entire civic association leadership was detained; the SADF cordoned off the township and mounted 24-hour roadblocks at every entrance; high mast lights were installed and search lights set up on high ground adjacent to the township (Jochelson, 1988:14).

This approach became one component of a wider strategy which was adopted during 1986. First a series of joint management centres (JMCs) were established. These were combined teams of security and state administrative personnel who would co-ordinate activities. The JMCs then identified 34 townships as so called "oil spots" (the image is that of pouring oil on troubled waters), these being strategic centres from which it was believed the security forces could "regain control" over the black population (Borraine, 1988:19). In major centres, such as Alexandra, dedicated "mini-JMCs" were established. This then provided the structure for the wider "three-pronged" policy.

The first prong was that described above, namely elimination of all opposition, followed by an ideological offensive to counter the popular offensive. Those arrested were to be tried in an attempt to criminalise township leaders and their radical ideas (Jochelson, 1988:14). The second was to upgrade the socio-economic conditions that "agitators" used to mobilise people and restore the authority of the town council; and the third was to turn councillors into
"political representatives" by incorporating them into regional and national councils (Borraine, 1988:19). The second prong, which revolved around the improvement of physical infrastructure, was considered such a key element that the Defence Minister took personal responsibility (Borraine, 1988:19). Thus in the period which followed the government made upgrading of services the central focus of the ideological struggle that was taking place.

In spite of the efforts of the state to crush the rent boycott in the same way as it had crushed other forms of resistance, it was unable to do so. This was in spite of detaining or forcing into hiding every activist considered to be involved.

While the civic movement operated at a grassroots level, with area and street committees, this was not a closed cell system designed for operating underground. Thus, while this structure was useful in transmitting information, its leaders could not operate openly. Hence the structure alone cannot explain the ongoing success of the boycott. Rather, it had to do with two underlying issues. The first is the real and ongoing dissatisfaction of African township residents with the poor levels of physical services which played such an important part in their daily lives. This can be demonstrated in two ways: (1) by examining the effect that poor services had on ordinary people and exploring their feelings and perceptions of service levels (Chapter 5); and (2) by looking at the response of Civics to this issue in the post state of emergency period (section 4.7).

The second issue is the paying of arrears. Chaskelson et al state that "Rent boycotts easily develop their own momentum. They involve immediate material benefits to participants, and as arrears escalate the cost of ending the boycott rises. Not only do residents have a direct financial stake in its continuation, but past a certain point they do not have the financial resources even to consider breaking the boycott" (Chaskelson et al, 1987:69). This is only a partial analysis. Of greater importance is the recognition that what people are receiving by way of services in their everyday lives is not worth paying for. This point is illustrated by, and discussed at length in, the case study of KwaThandeka (Chapter 6).
4.7 The role of civic organisations in political transition

Civic organisations articulated their demands at the beginning of the rent boycott and, although repressed during the State of Emergency, re-emerged to take up local demands in 1989. However this was in a political environment which was significantly different to that of 1985. Over the period 1989 to 1991 there was a high level of debate about the role of civics in a changing society, not only among researchers but also among civic leaders themselves. Coovadia, for example, argues that civics are local social movements accountable to local communities, with the extent of their support being dependent upon their capacity to articulate everyday grievances of the ordinary township resident (Coovadia, 1991:336).

The way in which this type of social movement should develop however was not clear. In that period prior to 1989 the state had made urban infrastructure provision its top priority, in line with its three-pronged strategy described earlier. But this upgrading of services was not proceeding well. It had been introduced in haste, and implemented without taking into account the needs and expectations of the community; the rapid demographic changes taking place in the townships; and the long term operational and maintenance capacity. The result was inappropriate services, inadequately designed, which engendered a high level of resentment and opposition among local residents. When the civics were unbanned and regrouped they were forced to respond to this existing agenda. This pressure to maintain infrastructure as the central issue at a municipal level was continued by the introduction in 1991 of the IDT capital subsidy scheme (see Chapter 8).

The dominance of infrastructure provision on municipal level politics can be judged from the policy direction taken by the association of civic organisations (later the South African National Civic Association - SANCO). In the run up to a national consultative conference of between 600 and 700 Civic organisations in May 1991 three possible directions were considered (Collinge, 1991:8). The first was to be replaced by African National Congress branches or to become ANC.
residents' associations. The second was to attempt to take over the administration of towns and cities; and the third and most popular was that “the civic movement must remain autonomous, a broad mass-based structure, which will not attempt to take over local government” (Collinge, 1991:8, quoting coordinator of the National Interim Civics Committee, P Lephunye).

Nzimande and Sikhosana of the ANC argue strongly in favour of integration with the ANC (the first option), on the grounds that the political perspective of the civic movement is the same as that of the liberation movement (Nzimande and Sikhosana, 1991:38). Nkwinti, also of the ANC, argues for the third option, stating that “there is a need for grassroots democratic organisation in all societies, that social movements - because they relate directly to social issues that shape peoples lives, and are not mediated by the necessity of holding or attaining power - are best place [sic] to answer this need.” (Collinge, 1991:8). At the May 1991 conference to form a national civic organisation, delegates voted for the third option.

There are two major implications to this decision, in the light of the above debate, both of which influence the role of community participation in South Africa in the 1990s. The first implication is that, in opting for autonomy, the civic movement rejected the political integration of local and national government as attempted by the government during the state of emergency, and as proposed by Nzimande and Sikhosana. This concept was later confirmed by the ANC at its policy conference in 1992 when it expressed a belief in strong local government and stated that “Local government should actively promote the process of sustainable and participatory community development” (ANC, 1992:15) and “... [this] includes facilitating a strong, independent civil society” (ANC, 1992:14). This is significantly different to the situation in Latin America where the distinctions between national and local government are blurred and where national political patronage is a key factor in setting local government priorities.
The second implication is that, in making the decision, the civics retain an independent voice to argue for people’s needs in the provision of services. The implication for community participation is that this decision increases the number of parties that need to be involved in the development process. In addition infrastructure remains a central issue on the civics’ agenda. As Collinge argues “The pressures to negotiate on service provision to entire communities . . . have shaped thinking on the long term nature of civics” (Collinge, 1991:8). Drawing on lessons from the electoral overthrow of the Sandanistas in Nicaragua Lephunya states that “You may have very good revolutionary theories but without delivering material returns to people you will never remain in power . . . the challenge of the civics is partly to deliver the goods to the people, to ensure that there are real improvements in their harsh living conditions” (Lephunya, quoted in Collinge, 1991:11).

4.8 Conclusions

The success of the civic movement in winning major concessions from the state (see chapter 5) appears to support the empowerment approach to community participation described in Chapter 2, while the nature of the struggle has similarities with several Latin American examples. However there are two significant differences which indicate that a new approach to community participation is now required. These are:

1. With the political transition, the civic movement has taken a democratic decision to maintain autonomy from other political structures, operating on the basis of negotiation, rather than confrontation, with the state. The ANC is also supportive of a strong demarcation between national and local government.

2. In South Africa community organisations have mobilised around the provision of urban infrastructure. The case study of Soweto in chapter 5 gives further evidence for the importance of services in the urban
struggle. This has a significant impact upon the type of negotiation required.

Another important conclusion, which is discussed further in chapter 7, is the way in which community organisations interact with other parties around the issue of infrastructure provision. This interaction is different around services than around land or housing. In the latter cases the notion of two negotiating parties (e.g. those controlling resources and those seeking to benefit from the resources), as in the empowerment approach, may be a valid assumption. In the case of service provision the roles of a number of other parties (e.g. technical professionals and financial institutions) become important and the ensuing negotiating process becomes more complex.

Endnotes

1. Castells describes urban movements as “in general, a somewhat homogeneous phenomenon” which share the following basic characteristics:
   “1. they consider themselves as urban, or citizen, or, in any case, related to the city . . .
   2. They are locally-based and territorially defined . . .
   3. They tend to mobilise around three major goals . . . : collective consumption, cultural identity, and political self-management . . .”
   (Castells, 1983:328).

2. The rent boycott continued in many areas beyond 1990 when the national party government’s political reforms were announced in parliament.

3. This situation has been analysed in detail by Abbott (1992) in an evaluation of the upgrading of Alexandria township. This work was then incorporated into Lee (ed.) (1992). The final version of this report had not been released at the time this thesis was submitted.
CHAPTER 5

A CASE STUDY OF SOWETO

5.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the first of several case studies which will examine different aspects of infrastructure provision to African townships in South Africa. Whereas chapter 4 looks at African urban development from the perspective of state policy, this chapter examines the history of one specific area, Soweto, in terms of the development of its physical infrastructure. Current levels of service are described based upon the results of a random survey carried out by the author in 1988-1999, followed by an assessment of how this information was used by the Soweto People's Delegation who commissioned the study. This work links back to chapter 4 to show the critical role that infrastructure has played, and continues to play, in the political development of South Africa.
5.2 Soweto

Soweto is situated in South Africa's largest metropolitan area where there is a long history both of development and of struggle against the regime, resulting in a highly politicised environment. Soweto itself is an artificial township, created as a dormitory suburb for black people working in Johannesburg where over 90% of all employed Sowetans work (DBSA, 1988, 10). Greater Soweto is divided into three separate municipalities: Soweto itself, which is by far the largest, with 82,116 formal housing units; Diepmeadow, with 29,123 and Dobsonville with 6,184 formal housing units (Transvaal Provincial Administration quoted in Swilling and Shubane, 1991:226). When the term Soweto is used here it will refer to Greater Soweto.

5.3 The historical development of infrastructure provision for Soweto

5.3.1 Introduction

Soweto is an acronym for South Western Township. The first settlement of people in the area is dated at 1904, with the establishment of an urban settlement at Klipspruit (subsequently known as Nancefield location and then later as Pimville), a piece of land adjacent to the site of Johannesburg’s first sewage treatment plant which was owned by the Johannesburg City Council (Payne, 1988:2). Prior to that date, and from its inception as a mining camp in the late nineteenth century, Johannesburg was both workplace and home to people of all races. The main area of occupation was in what was known as the Brickfield/Coolie Location area (now Braamfontein and the railway shunting yards), a working class suburb where Indian traders, poor Afrikaner and African workers lived (Payne, 1988:1-2). This situation, whereby African labourers were allowed to live in close proximity to work, changed in 1904, when an outbreak of bubonic plague prompted the destruction of the shanty town and the removal of its inhabitants to Klipspruit. Here they were provided with
"temporary" corrugated iron shelters, water tanks which had been cut in half and sealed at one end with a wall, which were in fact inhabited for thirty years (Payne, 1988:2). The area was highly unpopular because of its distance from work. As a result that the majority of the African population still found accommodation in the suburbs surrounding the commercial and industrial centre of the city (Payne, 1988:4).

5.3.2 The phased development of Soweto

The main development of Soweto can be divided into three phases, spanning the period 1923 to 1990. Prior to the passing of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act in 1923 attempts to provide formal housing for black people in the PWV region had been minimal. 227 houses were recorded as being built between 1918 and 1921 but there is no indication of service levels.

The first development phase is the long period between 1923 and 1969 when administrative responsibility for Soweto lay with Johannesburg. The second phase was between 1969 and 1979, when control was transferred to the West Rand Administration Board, while in the third phase between 1979 and 1990 the area was administered firstly by a community council and then by a local authority. This phase ended in August 1990, when discussions between the Transvaal Provincial Administration, the three Soweto councils and the Soweto Peoples Delegation reached agreement on ending the rent boycott and establishing a long term restructuring plan (Swilling and Shubane, 1991:223). This called for a metropolitan chamber to design and implement a new "non-racial and democratic" urban structure (Swilling, Cobbett and Hunter, 1991:190).

The three phases from 1923 to 1990 are important in understanding not only the different modes of development of infrastructure services in South Africa but also the perceptions of those services by the residents.
5.3.3 Phase 1: 1923-1969

The Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 placed the responsibility of housing provision for black people in urban areas on local authorities. This led to an initial boost of 1000 houses for Western Township, as well as the establishment of Eastern Township, with 400 houses. By 1927, however, the council had still only managed to provide 15 000 of the 96 000 Africans with houses. A large extension programme was started in 1928 so that by 1930 a total of 2 625 houses had been built and Orlando township established. By 1939 a total of 8700 houses had been provided in the three townships. Unfortunately the population had also increased significantly over the same period, to 244 000 people, so that the percentage population supplied with housing rose only from 15,6% to 21,4% (the latter figure being based upon a population of six people per house). Services over this period were minimal, comprising standpipes, a nightsoil bucket removal system and untarred access roads.

The demand for black labour caused by industrial growth during the second world war drew in more rural people. By 1946, there were an estimated 395 231 black people living in the area under the control of Johannesburg. The new residents were not accommodated by the Council and 11 new squatter settlements sprang up to accommodate them. The council then provided the Moroka emergency camp where 11 000 sites were laid out and provided with elementary services. In 1948 over 8 000 houses were constructed at Orlando East and West and in Jabavu, now all included in Soweto.

The National Party came to power in 1948 with a policy that all black people living in urban areas were temporary sojourners, who would eventually move back to the rural "homelands". Although the Johannesburg Council was controlled by the United Party, who opposed this policy, the Council itself was reluctant to pursue a house-building programme in the period 1948 to 1953. Housing was financed out of loan capital and the Council's concern was that black people would leave the city before the repayment of their 30 year loans. Thus there was effectively a moratorium on house construction, so that the total
number of houses in 1953 was still only 17,765, with additional hostel accommodation for 10,777 men.

The situation improved dramatically after 1953, when the "Bantu Services Levy Fund" was established. Under this scheme employers who did not house their employees had to make a monthly contribution towards the provision of housing and services in the black townships. In the same year the Site and Service Scheme became state policy. Under this scheme sites were allocated to those awaiting housing and basic services (access roads, communal standpipes, refuse removal and bucket sanitation) provided.

In 1954 the Johannesburg City Council created a separate Housing Division for black accommodation. These developments, plus other initiatives such as a six million rands housing loan from Anglo American in 1956, created a major house-building programme which lasted through to 1969 (Mandy, 1984:4). They also effectively set the standard for the future design of the township so that, for example, the concept of one dwelling per stand became entrenched and plot sizes standardised, to give an average density of 17 houses per hectare (Brand, 1988:15).

In June 1969 the population of Soweto was estimated to be 556,031 (Lewis, 1969:51) on 90,000 stands (Lewis, 1969:14). Of these 33,000 had been laid out by the Council and serviced with water, sewerage, tar roads and refuse removal (Urban Foundation, 1980:2). At that point almost all black residents of Johannesburg had a site, R66 million had been spent on development in Soweto (Lewis, 1969:17) and a further R20 million budgeted for upgrading (Lewis, 1969:45). Although there was no electricity, the Council had agreed to a ten year plan whereby all houses in Soweto would be supplied with electricity by 1979 (Lewis, 1969:16). At that stage the major services comprised 934km of 50mm water pipe (SSAP, 1980, appendix:1), 528km of sewer pipe (Lewis, 1969:15) and 960km of roads, of which 403km were tarred (Lewis, 1969:15-16). In essence then the housing backlog had been eliminated, albeit with the
assistance of the influx control laws, and there were plans to upgrade service levels.

5.3.4 Phase 2: 1969 - 1979

Until 1969, although Soweto was designated as a separate area, it had fallen under the jurisdiction of the Johannesburg City Council, who took full responsibility for maintenance and shared responsibility with the state for upgrading. In 1969 however the government instructed the JCC that responsibility for Soweto would be taken over by the State and a separate government department would be set up to deal with the area. The capital spending plans were frozen and development effectively stopped. Control of Soweto was fully transferred to the West Rand Administration Board (WRAB) in 1973. Between 1946 and 1969, the JCC rate account contributed to the Native Revenue Account, which financed the administration of Soweto, an amount varying between R200 000 and R900 000 per annum (PLANACT, 1989:74).

With the advent of the WRAB the policy for Soweto changed to one of economic self-sufficiency, although it was recognised that this could not be achieved by conventional means (e.g. rates and taxes levied against individuals), there being no industrial or commercial base. Instead revenue was generated by taking a profit on the sale of liquor within Soweto (which was a monopoly operation). However, even with this income there were insufficient funds, so that capital works virtually stopped, maintenance declined significantly and the quality of the services deteriorated. In addition the WRAB operated at a loss (on service account), which rose to R2 million in 1972 (Morris, 1980:16).

In 1979 the population was estimated to be between 658 000 and 900 000 people (SSAP, 1980, appendix:1), while the 1980 census figure later placed the population at 864 000 (Ecoplan, 1979:34). The WRAB estimated that “illegal” residents could account for an additional 20% not included in the census figure. Thus the population virtually doubled in the ten years from 1969 to 1979. Yet the number of sites in 1979 was given as 101 000 (Ecoplan, 1979:iii), an
increase of only ten percent over the same period. Influx control and other apartheid legislation prevented squatting so that new residents had to find accommodation within the existing townships. This led to a secondary rental market of sub-tenants who rented rooms on existing properties. This increased population placed additional strain on existing services.

These services had also been badly neglected over the period from 1973 to 1979, both in terms of providing for new capital works and in maintenance. The water system remained virtually unchanged (Ecoplan, 1979:ii), while the water reticulation network became encrusted and corroded so that, by 1979, the system was neither capable of meeting domestic demand nor of providing adequate pressure and volume for fire fighting needs (Ecoplan, 1979:ii). The level of deterioration was such that, on summer weekends, open taps sometimes failed to deliver water (SSAP, 1980, appendix 1). In 1978 an estimated R2.4 million of water was lost from the reticulation system as a result of the disrepair (Ecoplan, 1979:ii). Bulk service standards were also deteriorating in this period, with total reservoir capacity estimated to provide only twelve hours of storage for average daily demand (SSAP, 1980, appendix 1). The sewer system was equally poor and virtually unchanged over the period. By 1979 the reticulation system, comprising mainly 150mm piping, was overloaded, as was the main outfall sewer, which was also subject to severe silting and corrosion (Ecoplan, 1979:ii).

In 1979 there was a total of 1 023km of roads in Greater Soweto, of which only 440 km were tarred (Ecoplan, 1979:27). This represented an addition of only 36.8 km of tarred road over the decade and a lower proportion of tarred to total roads than in fact existed in 1969. The existing tarred roads were in a bad state of repair and their deterioration was accelerated by poor stormwater drainage. There was no main stormwater drain system and even major streets had inadequate stormwater facilities. Untarred roads were dusty, muddy, potholed and caused damage to vehicles (Ecoplan, 1979:42). There were only three major road links connecting Soweto to the different work centres and the level of traffic control was poor.
The proposed electrification of all of Soweto's houses did not materialise. By 1979, when the plan was to have been completed, 80% of the 101 000 houses had no electricity and the system serving the remaining 20% was heavily overburdened (Ecoplan, 1979:iii). This was clearly demonstrated by the fact that 70% of the power failures that occurred during the winter months of 1978 were due to overloads (SSAP, 1980, appendix:2). Thus residents of Soweto had witnessed a major decline in service levels over the decade while the services which did exist impacted negatively on the quality of life, in terms of overflying water and sewerage, potholed tar roads and muddy gravel roads.

5.3.5 Phase 3: 1979 - 1990

By 1979 the condition of services in Soweto was clearly critical, yet it was political pressure, stemming from the 1976 student uprising, rather than social or technical factors, which caused the government to set up a commission to investigate the state of services. This resulted in a technical report to the area, submitted in 1980 (SSAP, 1980). Just prior to this a separate technical report had been prepared for the newly formed Urban Bantu Councils of Soweto and Diepsloot (Ecoplan, 1979).

The first report estimated that a total of R703 million would need to be spent between 1979 and 1984 to eliminate the backlog in services and upgrade the existing system. The report recommended a major increase in reservoir capacity (SSAP, 1980, appendix:2) and the upgrading of all water mains to either 75mm or 100mm in diameter, as well as metering. Wastage was such that per capita consumption was estimated to be 2951 per person per day (SSAP, 1980, appendix 3). Similar upgrading of the sewerage system and the treatment facilities was also recommended. A separate analysis indicated the extent of the road and stormwater problem when it recommended:

"a. The installation of stormwater drainage on approximately 385km of existing surfaced roads that did not have storm water drainage."
b. The installation of 300mm mountable curbs on approximately 427km of existing surfaced roads that did not have curbing.

c. The construction of approximately 14km of single and dual carriageway arterial roads.

d. The rebuilding of approximately 34km of existing surfaced roads that showed signs of severe failure.

e. The resurfacing of approximately 173km of existing surfaced roads (preventative maintenance).

f. The construction of approximately 270km of heavy duty pavement.

g. The construction of 524km of surfaced roads of various widths, complete with curbing and stormwater drainage" (Viljoen, 1987:6 quoting a report by van Wyk and Louw of 1979).

Both this, and the Ecoplan Consortium report, based their proposals for service improvements purely on technical criteria. While both reports gave an estimate of the capital cost of improvement, neither considered: (i) how this money would be repaid; (ii) what the maintenance requirements of the improved system would be; (iii) where the human resources (professional, skilled and unskilled) would come from to operate the system; (iv) how much it would cost to maintain; and (v) whether the construction and operation of the new system met any affordability criteria. Nor did the reports give any consideration to what the wider social needs of the residents might be which could be addressed by the services.

Over the ten year period from 1979 to 1988 approximately R400 million was spent on the upgrading of Soweto. However the lack of recognition of the above factors shows clearly both in the author's survey of 1988/89 (discussed in sections 5.6 and 5.7 below), as well as in the findings of the Brand report of 1988, which stated that "The Soweto Community Council is at present seriously inadequate in fulfilling its role in the creation and maintenance of a physical environment in which its inhabitants can produce, trade, work, socialise and enjoy recreational activities. This is the result of three main problems. The
recurrent expenditure budget for maintenance does not reflect actual needs in terms of general repairs and preventative maintenance. The capital budget reflects ad hoc adjustments which negate priorities set in advance, and the provision of services is heavily politicised. This influences standards, cost recovery, collections, maintenance and terminations of services" (Brand, 1988:2).

5.3.6 The condition of services in 1988

The estimated population in 1988 was estimated by Brand to be between 1.2 and 2.0 million (Brand, 1988:10) living on 110 000 sites (Brand, 1988:15), while PLANACT estimated a population, based upon several different sources, of 1.74 million (PLANACT, 1989:21). Over the 20 year period from 1969 to 1989 the population of Soweto grew by a factor of approximately four times, while the available number of official sites grew by only twenty percent. In that time the estimated population density increased from 6.2 people per stand to between 13.6 and 22.7 people per stand. In 1988, two new studies (Davies Bristow & Ass., 1988; DBSA, 1988) presented the following information on the condition of services.

The water and sewerage systems are in danger of collapsing. There is 90% coverage of water reticulation and 60% coverage of sewerage (Davies Bristow & Ass., 1988:3). There are 100km of steel primary mains which are undersized and require repair, at a cost of R1.4 million per year. A five year programme to replace 600km of secondary mains is necessary, to service the whole of Soweto and thereby permit residents to upgrade to geyser and bathroom requirements. Reservoirs need to be constructed urgently (DBSA, 1988:26).

The sewerage system is difficult to maintain because of three factors. Foreign materials (especially newspapers and rags) are used instead of toilet paper; manhole covers are stolen and there is deliberate vandalism (Urban Foundation, 1987:20). Maintaining the present sewerage system is estimated to cost R2 million per year. 400 blockages are reported as being cleared each month, while
the 13km of trunk sewer have to be systematically cleared on an ongoing basis (Urban Foundation, 1987:20).

A large proportion of the tarred roads (715,5km) requires total reconstruction because of deterioration due to inadequate or inappropriate stormwater drainage (DBSA, 1988:26). Most minor roads are untarred, are too wide and ill-defined, carry too much traffic, are in a bad state of repair, and have inadequate stormwater drainage (Urban Foundation, 1987:19).

101 000 houses were electrified and connected to the distribution system between 1979 and 1986 at a cost of R206 million or R2 034 per house. Of this house wiring cost R414 and the distribution system cost R1 620. The (never completed) remote metering and control system installed added a further 8,5% to the system costs. The consumer was required to pay a R700 connection fee and a typical bill for 364kwh prior to October 1987 was R41,36. Of this R1,30 is an electrification levy, R29,00 is for capital redemption (later dropped to R12,00 due to unrest pressure), and R7,71 the unit cost for 354kwh (Davies Bristow & Ass., 1988:3-4).

This was the overall situation when the qualitative survey of services was carried out in December 1988.

5.4 Background to the survey

In December 1988 the Soweto Peoples Delegation (SPD), initially comprising seven prominent leaders of the community, was formed by the Soweto Civic Association (SCA) to negotiate an end to the rent boycott on behalf of the civic structures, which were then still restricted in terms of the emergency regulations (Swilling and Shubane, 1991:237).

The SPD commissioned research to provide the factual situation on the rent boycott and identified two issues to be addressed: an evaluation of the existing
housing stock, and an assessment of the current levels of services (Planact: 1989b:20). The latter, carried out by the author, was based on a survey of Soweto residents, examining the services. The objectives of the survey were to quantify the efficacy of service provision in Soweto; to find out people's reactions to, and views on, the individual services; to find out whether the services were technically satisfactory; and, if unsatisfactory, what the wider implications of this were in terms of health, social wellbeing and overall quality of life.

5.5 Methodology

Due to time constraints the survey population was of necessity small. To overcome this, and ensure that the survey was not weighted, a random survey was carried out. A map of Soweto was first divided into suburbs, which were then demarcated. A student with no knowledge of Soweto then used pins to choose one block in each suburb and then, using a larger scale map on which all stands were demarcated, a specific house was chosen using the same method. Where a suburb, block or house was chosen more than once the latter results were discarded, until a house had been pinpointed in every suburb. This method produced 20 houses for interview from the following areas:

Table 5.1: List of households interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suburb</th>
<th>Erf No.</th>
<th>Street</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orlando West</td>
<td>7612</td>
<td>Makheta St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orlando East</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>Makubo St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meadowlands West</td>
<td>3627</td>
<td>Van Onselen St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabulani</td>
<td>883</td>
<td>Bendile St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diepkloof</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>Moledi St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabavu</td>
<td>1327</td>
<td>Diokane Drive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emdeni</td>
<td>1565</td>
<td>Mandela St.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Before starting the survey it was agreed that, where no one was present in the house the adjacent house to the right would be interviewed. In the case of a house sub-division A, B, etc. A would be interviewed.

5.6 Details of findings

There were an average 10.1 people per house and 50% of the houses contained more than one occupied dwelling (either a converted garage or rooms). All dwellings were constructed of brick/block and mortar. The following data were obtained from the interviews.

5.6.1 Water

In all cases a water tap was provided in each yard, situated on the rear boundary of the plot on the toilet outside wall and discharging to a gully connected to the sewerage system. 8 households had installed additional taps in the house at their own expense, all of which discharged to gullies connected to the sewerage system. In addition two of the eight had installed bathrooms. The design was reasonable in
that water from the taps was generally contained by the gully and did not spill into the yard. Only one case of a broken gully was noted, and this had been done to accommodate stormwater run-off from the road.

17 households reported that the water supply had been disrupted in 1988. The frequency and duration of the disruptions are given in Tables 5.2 and 5.3.

Table 5.2: Frequency of disruption to household water supply

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FREQUENCY (times/yr)</th>
<th>No. reported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3: Duration of disruption to household water supply

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>No reported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no loss of water</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;6 hours</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-24 hours</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3 days</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-7 days</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;7 days</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From discussions with residents the water supply situation appeared to have deteriorated significantly since the rent boycott started, and the feeling among the residents interviewed was that the council is using water as a weapon to force residents to pay rents. Prior to 1988 the water supply situation appeared to have been slightly better, with fewer breakdowns (although still a significant number) and shorter periods without water. One case was identified however where the water was cut off regularly, at approximately two week intervals, in spite of those particular residents paying rents regularly. No reason was given for this. In those household which were themselves free of water problems the users stated that neighbours in adjacent areas suffered from serious water problems.

The detrimental effect of a poor water supply can arise either from an insufficient supply (quantity) or poor quality and with both of these the effect can be manifested either directly or indirectly. In terms of quantity, the water supply network is grossly overloaded (Haslett, 18/01/1989). The immediate effect of this is a lower pressure in the system and a lower flow at the taps. Thus flow measured in the survey varied between 0.24 and 0.40 l/s, compared to typical values of 0.4-0.5 l/s in Johannesburg. The primary outcome of this lower flow would be a lower level of convenience to the user (see Chapter 7.4.5 for a full discussion on this issue). More important however is the regularity of supply. 85% of house reported stoppages during the past 12 months, 35% of which occurred more than once per month, while 15% of household reported stoppages lasting in excess of 3 days (the longest period being approximately 3 weeks). It would appear from the interviews that the position deteriorated substantially in 1988, compared to previous years, and that the Soweto Council deliberately cut off water to people's houses for extended periods to try and make them pay rent.

When the water is cut off this appears to have been carried out over a large area. Because of the travel distance involved, this meant that people could obtain only limited quantities of water. In addition to the inconvenience factor the following problems associated with the stoppages were also identified:
1. People had less water overall and were thus forced to wash less frequently. This enforced drop in personal cleanliness could have a detrimental effect on health.

2. People washed clothes and dishes less, both again reducing the overall level of cleanliness and encouraging disease.

3. There was insufficient water to flush toilets properly or often enough. This represents a health hazard in itself, given that there are between 11 and 23 people per toilet, as well as contributing to sewer blockages and sewage overflow, a serious hazard discussed in the next section.

Under normal operating conditions (i.e., without politically motivated cuts in supply) the water supply would appear to be poor to moderate, with an average shut down occurring 2-3 times per year.

5.6.2 Sanitation

All houses had an outside toilet situated on the rear boundary, usually sited in such a way that the drainage could link directly with three other toilets from adjacent plots. One toilet had a problem with continuous flushing but otherwise the toilets themselves appeared to work well.

Disposal of sewage represented a serious problem for many residents, with 14 out of the 20 households interviewed reporting blockages either in the drains (within the property) (7 households) or in the sewers (in the road outside the property) (seven households). Details are provided in tables 5.4 and 5.5.
Table 5.4: Detail of drain blockages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>household No.</th>
<th>frequency of blockages in 1988</th>
<th>repairer</th>
<th>period before repair</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 p.a.</td>
<td>council</td>
<td>1 day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>monthly</td>
<td>contractor</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 p.a.</td>
<td>contractor</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1 p.a.</td>
<td>council</td>
<td>3 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1 p.a.</td>
<td>owner</td>
<td>1 week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>3-4 p.a.</td>
<td>contractor</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>3-4 p.a.</td>
<td>council</td>
<td>1 day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The general cause of sewage overflows from drains would appear to be blockages rather than surcharging, since all drains are a minimum of 100mm diameter. This appeared to be due to the use of non absorbent materials (such as newspapers) for anal cleaning. The situation was exacerbated by water shortages. Thus, when water is cut off for prolonged periods or at frequent intervals, toilet flushing frequency reduces. To overcome the associated problems people use more paper to cover faecal matter, thereby forming layers of paper and faecal matter in the toilet. When the toilet is finally flushed this causes balling and subsequent blockage.

Thus, while the sanitation system itself cannot be controlled by the Council for political purposes to break the rent boycott, a major effect of cutting off the water was in fact to increase the incidence of drain blockages. This led to sewage overflows into people's yards and created a major health hazard for residents, as well as being unsightly and unpleasant.

The response time for repairs to sewers was variable but generally poor. Three of the seven cases did not even consider waiting for the council to carry out repairs. One householder waited a week and received no response while a second waited three days. Only two cases reported an adequate response time of less than
one day. Unless this slow response time is deliberate (which does not appear to be the case) this implies that the Council lacks the necessary maintenance skills to operate the system efficiently.

Table 5.5: Detail of sewer blockages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Household frequency of blockages in 1988</th>
<th>Repairer</th>
<th>Period before repair</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>almost weekly</td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>see endnote¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>monthly</td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>1-2 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2 p.a.</td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>monthly</td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1 p.a.</td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>1 day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1 p.a.</td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>4 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1-2 per month</td>
<td>Council</td>
<td>see endnote²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The condition of sewers in Soweto is chronic. 35% of households interviewed reported sewage overflows in their street with this problem in some cases continuing for months. This appeared to be a widespread and ongoing problem unrelated to the rent boycott. At least 5 cases of sewage overflow were noted during the survey, one of which occurred outside a health clinic and, when seen, was in its third day. As well as the danger to the health clinic, fruit and vegetable hawker could be seen selling their wares within metres of the sewage flow. The potential danger to the health of residents is clear.

5.6.3 Roads

Of the 20 homes visited two were on or immediately adjacent to a major road and the remainder on service roads. Nine of the houses fronted onto gravel roads, nine onto tar roads and two were corner plots with one gravel and one tar road. Of the two major roads one was a dual road while the second was a 7.5m wide single carriageway. Both had defined edging and the surfaces were in good
condition. In the second case however the road was without markings and badly planned, with a large taxi rank opposite and a sharp bend 100m away, and with a food shop on the opposite side of the road to the houses. That this is dangerous was confirmed by residents who reported that accidents involving pedestrians, mainly children, occurred frequently (every one to two months). The major cause appeared to be cars coming around the bend hitting children crossing to the shops.

The condition of the roads was mixed. Road condition were generally good (although one very badly potholed road was encountered) but only one of the roads actually had markings; the verges were generally poorly defined; there were no real footpaths; and in several instances there was mud on the road which totally obscured the tar. Residents reported that several of the roads became very muddy during rain.

The gravel roads in contrast were uniformly poor in condition. The overall width between house boundary fences was approximately 9m, but within that distance there was no clear distinction between road and verge. All the roads were badly potholed and there was no indication of the roads being scraped or levelled recently. All residents reported major access problems during rain and in at least half the cases it was difficult to see how residents could in fact walk along any section of the street without passing through mud and/or water.

5.6.4 Stormwater drainage

Only three of the streets surveyed had piped stormwater drainage and in one of the cases the side entry gulleys were broken and had collapsed into the drain. 19 of the 20 houses interviewed reported some problems with stormwater, although in two cases this appeared to occur only in very heavy storms.

14 households suffered from flooded yards during rain. Of these, one reported water entering the house, and a second water lapping the door sill. In many of the yards poor design meant that the water could not flow away freely, so that there
was either standing water or residents themselves broke into the gulleys or broke through boundary walls to give the water passage (generally into neighbours yards). This practice, for which residents could see no alternative, appears to be a major source of friction between neighbours.

The survey was carried out just after moderately heavy rains and the conditions described by residents were confirmed visually. Several yards were extremely muddy with standing water and the condition of the streets was such that there was no dry access to peoples houses. In addition serious design faults were noted. Thus:

1. No provision appeared to have been made for the egress of stormwater from individual properties, resulting in the problems described above.

2. Properties sited sideways on to steep hills were particularly vulnerable to this lack of stormwater drainage. Here water ran freely from one property to the adjacent lower property, increasing in both quantity and flow velocity. Not only does this mean that substantial quantities of water reached the lower properties, eventually to accumulate there, but also that the water in the lower reaches had a significant scouring effect, both on gardens and on house foundations. These conditions are particularly dangerous for young children as well as being a source of significant potential damage to the house foundations.

3. Insufficient provision was made to prevent stormwater running from the street into properties sited below street level and this appeared to cause a significant portion of the yard flooding reported.

5.6.5 Refuse disposal

Two households reported that refuse was collected by the Council whilst the service for the remainder was operated by a private company. The service in all cases was considered reasonable, with rubbish being collected twice per week.
All residents reported a major improvement, either since the service was privatised during the latter half of 1988 or, in the case of the Council service, since the beginning of the year. Prior to that point the service appears to have been either very intermittent or nonexistent. That the service was until recently extremely poor was confirmed by the large amount of rubbish which continued to lie on street corners and open spaces.

Before collection, refuse is stored in standard dustbins in the yards. However none of the bins had lids and it was reported that these were all removed by the Authorities after the 1984/85 unrest and had not been replaced. This represents a serious health hazard.

5.6.6 Electricity

16 of the 20 residents reported that electricity had been cut off at some stage during 1988, with the worst case being 2 years without any electricity. Since the beginning of 1989, the situation appeared to have improve significantly, with only 3 residents still suffering problems in this regard. Details of the power cuts are detailed in table 5.6 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resident No.</th>
<th>frequency of cuts</th>
<th>duration of cuts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,6,10,15,19</td>
<td>bimonthly</td>
<td>1-3 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>biweekly</td>
<td>4-6 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,4,9,16,20</td>
<td>3-6 times μ.a.</td>
<td>1-12 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,8,17</td>
<td>no cuts</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>continuous</td>
<td>2 yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11,12,14</td>
<td>daily for 1 month</td>
<td>1 hr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>once, continuous</td>
<td>4-5 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>no electricity</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The nature of the electricity cuts varied between areas within Soweto, with the frequency and duration having an apparent random pattern. The fact that the situation improved in 1989 is supportive of the accusation, made by residents, that the power cuts were part of a deliberate policy response by the BLA to the boycott. Residents reported that they were given no warnings either of the timing or the duration of the power cuts.

As a service, the electricity supply appeared to be adequate, although somewhat erratic in certain areas. Prior to 1989 the service was cut off at frequent intervals, apparently as a deliberate act against residents in response to the boycott. As with water no warning was given of this retaliatory action.

5.7 Analysis of results

The key issue which arises from the study is the extent and uniformity of the level and quality of services. Only 10% of the population occupying the main house on a stand had a bathroom, whilst 40% had an indoor tap. With an average of 3 families per site (only one of whom occupied the main house) this equates to 3% of the population with access to a bathroom and 13.4% with access to an inside tap. This is in an area which Brand describes as displaying “the highest level of development of all the major Black urban areas” (Brand, 1988:9). He also states that “Soweto has the most educated, sophisticated and highly paid concentration of Blacks (sic) in any urban area” (Brand, 1988:9).

The majority of the people interviewed (90%) were deeply unhappy about the general condition of the services. Of the two families expressing satisfaction with the quality of the service one had a bathroom, the other an indoor tap. Both had houses fronting onto a tar road. Both stated that stormwater ingress had been a serious problem in the past but both had concreted their properties fully and channelled stormwater run-off into the street.
The level of anger in the interviews was very noticeable, as was the concern about sewerage in the streets and about dangerous roads. People interviewed were able to see, and draw a distinction between, services on two levels. The first was the performance of existing services, where the recognition that services were failing to perform adequately was well understood and was the major reason given for refusing to pay rents. This contradicts the view of Seekings, that housing lay at the root of the boycott in the PWV townships (chapter 4.1), as well as Coovadia's view on the dominance of land, housing and services (chapter 4.1). The argument that service levels were the primary cause of the rent boycott was supported by other research carried out as part of the Soweto rent boycott study and went forward as one of the findings of the study (Planact, 1989a). The second level on which people drew a distinction between services was the issue of relative levels of service between Johannesburg and Soweto, with the levels of service in Soweto being recognised to be well below that generally provided in Johannesburg.

Unlike the case study of KwaThandeka (chapter 6) however the anger was directed strongly against the councillors and the Soweto administration. Whereas in KwaThandeka the councillors were merely seen as opportunists and verbally criticised as being weak, in Soweto there was a much greater sense of councillors as part of an oppressive system. They were seen as far more directly responsible for the poor condition of the services.

There were several differences between the rent boycott and other forms of protest, which led to the ongoing success of the boycott in spite of the removal of all levels of leadership. As noted in Chapter 4.8, Chaskelson et al state that a major factor in mass support for the boycotts was many households' growing inability to pay rents (Chaskelson et al, 1987:55). However the Soweto survey supports the response that this alone was not the reason. It was not the inability to pay per se, but rather the clear perception of people about the poor levels of service and what this meant to them, particularly the lack of correlation between what they believed they were paying for and what they were receiving. This concept is supported by work carried out elsewhere (eg Abbott et al, 1988) and
is examined in greater detail in chapter 6. Associated with this were the very high levels of individual anger about the services and the degrading, undignified living conditions. These were the driving forces. The fact that support could be passive, i.e. that non-payment did not require any positive action on the part of residents, served rather to facilitate the continuation of the boycott, when residents were faced with countering strategies by the authorities.

5.8 Implications for community participation

The purpose of this chapter has been to highlight the central role of services in the process of urbanisation and in the wider political struggle. South Africa is currently in a state of transition and needs to resolve how this can be carried forward. At present there is a choice of two possible routes for the provision of services in Soweto. The first route is the one currently being negotiated in the discussion forum of the Metropolitan Chamber. This is to merge Johannesburg and Soweto and manage the two as a "conventional" local authority, providing Soweto with the high levels of services currently available in Johannesburg. However this route is based upon three assumptions. These are:

1. That the technical capacity exists to install, operate and maintain the services.

2. That sufficient funds will be available to install, operate and maintain the services using a cross subsidy formula. The Planact report (Planact, 1991a) indicated that Johannesburg ran a major trading surplus on electricity and this, plus the rating of industrial and commercial property, subsidised private rates. This surplus provides scope for extending the subsidy throughout the combined area.

3. That the common boundaries of the new metropolitan area exclude all informal settlements.
If these assumptions are met and this route succeeds it must be recognised that this is only because Soweto is a unique case. It already has a relatively high level of infrastructure and the highest per capita income of any township in South Africa (Development Bank of Southern Africa, 1988). Most importantly, informal settlements form a significant percentage of the population of many areas elsewhere, whereas this is not the case in Soweto. It remains to be seen whether the route chosen by the Metropolitan Chamber proves to be affordable and sustainable.

The second possible route is the provision of varying levels of services to different sectors within the wider municipality. Although rejected for political reasons this may be the better long-term solution for Soweto. This route is widely applicable throughout South Africa, including the remainder of the PWV, and to urbanisation in Africa as a whole. However, it carries with it major social and political implications, which make service provision in this environment a process, rather than simply the supply of given standardised products. This process needs to be understood before it can be meshed with the community participation process. The case study presented in the next chapter, KwaThandeka, explores in detail how service provision in low-income areas needs to be considered as a process.

**Endnotes**

1. This problem was due to a surcharged manhole with a broken surround which was only fixed in December 1988 after over 1 year of regular surcharging into the street.

2. The Council ignored complaints in this instance. Presumably the overflow is a surcharge problem which eventually clears itself.

3. See van Ryneveld (1992) for an analysis of affordability criteria for the PWV.
CHAPTER 6

A CASE STUDY OF KWATHANDEKA, EASTERN TRANSVAAL

6.1 Introduction

Chapter 5.8 shows how, in the new combined metropolitan area of Johannesburg/Soweto, all the key actors anticipate that Soweto residents will have a level of infrastructure which is on a par with that of residents in Johannesburg. This is a situation which all residents and community organisations would like to see throughout South Africa. However, as chapter 7 indicates, this is unlikely to happen. Instead the situation which applies in other African cities is a more likely role model. Thus many residents outside of Johannesburg/Soweto, but particularly those in informal settlements, can expect a lower level of services, while, increasingly, the capacity of the local authorities in many of these areas will be stressed, financially, technically and administratively. Further, this inability to meet expectations on services levels will come from a new, legitimate government.

Understanding this changed environment is central to understanding how community participation will function in this environment, since the type of
community interaction with the authorities which is required in this situation is
totally different to the political interaction described in chapter 5. There are
compromises to be made on a variety of issues and technical decision-making
plays a greatly enhanced role. The two chapters which follow explore these
interactions. Chapter 7 concerns itself more with a theoretical analysis of the
stresses placed upon local authorities, as managers of urban infrastructure, in
developing countries. This Chapter is a case study, which explores the differing
perceptions of infrastructure provision, on the part of technical professionals
(engineers and planners) and a community-based organisation. Understanding
these differences in perception is a necessary pre-requisite to the development
of meaningful community participation structures.

This case study covers work done on infrastructure provision in a small town in
the Eastern Transvaal (KwaThandeka) over a four year period (Abbott et al,
communities both the Soweto and KwaThandeka studies began with similar
objectives, namely to quantify the levels and operational performance of
infrastructure services and to obtain the views and perceptions of residents on
these issues. However the KwaThandeka study is more intense and involves a
much greater involvement on behalf of the community in the negotiation process.
It is more concerned therefore with exploring the perceptions of different
parties. This in turn lays the foundations for the new conceptual framework
developed in chapter 9.

The two studies, when taken together, highlight different aspects of community
participation. KwaThandeka is a small, well-defined community with clearly
identifiable problems. The residents have opposed attempts to have them
removed by force but there is no real history of struggle. This permits a good
understanding to be gained of the needs and aspirations of people in the
community. Where there is a long history of struggle this tends to dominate
thinking and subsume other issues.
Soweto on the other hand is large and complex. In terms of service provision, it has a clearly documented history of service levels which date back to its inception. This makes it valuable as a documented history of service provision in a black dormitory township. Given the seeming disparity between the two projects the case studies in fact show remarkable similarities in terms of needs and attitudes towards services. They indicate a very definite way of thinking in communities around the issue of participation; about the role and function of services; and about the role of local authorities.

The results of the KwaThandeka surveys indicate a situation which is typical of many black townships in South Africa. The area, which serves as a labour pool for the "white" town of Amsterdam in the Eastern Transvaal, suffers from overcrowding, lack of amenities and a very low level of service provision. The level of detail provided by the surveys, and the degree of professional support received by the community organisations, meant that the authorities (in this case represented by the Transvaal Provincial Administration - the TPA) could not dismiss the findings and found it necessary to engage with the Amsterdam Home Committee (AHC) (see section 6.3) and their advisors. The nature of this engagement differed from that in other areas, where a strong collective civic leadership had formed (e.g. Soweto, Chapter 5). In the latter case there was a strong political component to the negotiation process. In KwaThandeka this was not possible. The town is small and far from the political centre and external support was limited. As a result the TPA considered itself to have political dominance, as witnessed by its ongoing commitment to a non-representative council (section 6.3).

Given this negotiating environment the TPA attempted to focus the agenda constantly on technical issues (e.g. a physical town plan; specific service requirements) which necessitated a detailed analysis, not only of social conditions in the township, but of how these conditions affected the engineering and physical planning issues which the authorities considered important. This forced a quantitative assessment of the interaction between social, technical and economic issues to be undertaken. It also, through the nature of the ongoing
negotiation process over a period of three years, gave an understanding of the perceptions of the different parties, particularly with regard to physical infrastructure provision. It is this understanding of these perceptions which is of particular relevance, and assists in developing a wider understanding of the community participation process.

6.2 Description of KwaThandeka

KwaThandeka is a small town situated 313km east of Johannesburg near the Swaziland border, between Ermelo and Piet Retief. The population had been under threat of removal to KaNgwane since 1974 but was reprieved in August 1987 after a long series of negotiations with the authorities (interview with the AHC, 27/04/1988).

The adjacent “white” town of Amsterdam functions as a central place settlement and agricultural service centre and, more importantly, as a military base, due to its close proximity to the Swaziland border. State structures in Amsterdam are still controlled by the National Party, although the majority of the farmers in the area support the (pro-apartheid) Conservative Party.

According to the census of 1985, the total population of Kwathandeka was 1 557 people. Research undertaken during the study however, showed this figure to be grossly inaccurate (see table 6.1). The census data collected by the state excludes people who were in the area “illegally” (the census took place prior to the removal of influx control) but, while this may account for some of the discrepancy, there are other, more significant factors involved. There would appear to be hostility to state representatives by members of the community, which leads to a reluctance to provide accurate information. Equally important, however, is the reaction of the authorities themselves. There is evidence from research by McNeill (1985), for example, that the State is not neutral in its approach and that population statistics are understated so as to avoid meeting the real need for housing, education and other infrastructural requirements.
6.3 A brief history of KwaThandeka

The history of KwaThandeka is typical of the growth of many small towns in South Africa. Prior to the arrival of white settlers the local African people were farmers. In the period after the Boer War (1902) the land the inhabitants had been farming was gradually taken away through legislation. At the same time the debate on urban tenure for Africans, discussed in Chapter 4, carried on, culminating in the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923. Amsterdam was one of the areas proclaimed under Section 12 of this Act, on 1 December 1924 (Government Gazette, No. 1418, 1924:379).

The principle of individual tenure had been rejected in parliamentary select committee. Thus, under the Act as passed, the "white" local authority of Amsterdam was empowered to set aside land for African occupation in defined locations, or to house them, or to require their employers to do so (Davenport, 1991:7). The 1923 Act was designed primarily to solve the housing crisis in the growing industrial urban centres, rather than addressing the needs of rural towns and many of the latter made no provision for housing. This was the case in Amsterdam so that those evicted from the farms had to find a white farmer on whose land they would be allowed to live (Fine, 1988:90).

The farmer who allowed them to stay was called Scheepers and the eldest son of each family was required to work for him, for 6 months without pay, to enable the family to stay on the farm. In 1930, Scheepers no longer required the son to work for him but instead levied a rent of 20 to 30 cents, increased in 1936 to 35 cents. A "village for the residence of natives" was established by the Minister of Native Affairs under the Native Urban Areas Act of 1923 on the 12 January 1940 (Government Gazette, No. 2721, 1940, 58) and thereafter the farm was sold to the Provincial Administration (Fine, 1988:90). Between 1942 and 1984 the township was administered by the TPA, the municipality, the Peri-Urban Board and the Administration Board, after which it was administered by a local authority set up under the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982 (Abbott et al, 1988:2).
In 1974 a move to KaNgwane was first raised, which was publicly rejected by the community on the grounds that they had been paying rent for a long time and they would not get their money back; that they stood to lose the houses which they had built themselves; and that the community they had come to be a part of, and the area they had lived in for a long period, would be destroyed. The councillors continued to try to persuade people to move until August 1987, when the community was told that the area had been “reprieved” and that they were no longer to be removed. Thus for the first time in 13 years, community attention could focus upon improving conditions locally (interview with the AHC, 27/04/1988).

During the same period (the late 1970s and early 1980s), there was a steady increase in rents, culminating in a 20% rent increase proposal by the newly appointed local authority of KwaThandeka (KLA) in 1984. This increase had been instigated by the Eastern Transvaal Development Board (Memo, January 1988) but was in fact illegal because it had not been published in the government gazette (Fine, 1988:95). The community’s response to these two actions (the rent increases and the move to KaNgwane) was to form an organisation, the Amsterdam Home Committee (AHC) to oppose them and to refuse to pay rent (interview with the AHC, 27/04/1988).

A further issue of concern to residents at the time was the availability of land for housing. Residents began trying to obtain additional land for housing once the threat of forced removal was withdrawn. 80 families had either applied or were on the official list by the end of August 1987 (Minutes, 31/08/1987). However conflicting views were given by officials with the township superintendent saying that 350 sites were available and officials of the Department of Constitutional Affairs saying that there was a shortage of sites (Abbott et al, 1988:3). Finally, in January 1988 the TPA admitted that the 350 sites were available, but stated that the stands could not be allocated because the sites could not be identified. Consequently the township had to be planned, otherwise this could result in conflict between the plan and the random allocation.
No elections for any form of local government for KwaThandeka were held for a number of years (prior to October 1988). According to officials of the Development Board, a Local Authority Council (the KLA) was established in terms of Section 5 of the Black Local Authorities Act of 1984. Five people were elected at a meeting of residents in September 1984 and these names submitted to the Minister for approval. Ministerial approval had been confirmed in November 1984. In October 1986 a notice in the Government Gazette by the State President stated that all local authority positions were to be frozen until the October 1988 elections.

There was dispute between residents and members of the Council over a meeting which was supposed to have taken place on the 7 September 1984 to elect the Local Authority Committee. The AHC stated that there was no public notice and therefore residents did not know of the meeting (interviews with the AHC, 27/04/1988 and 02/08/1988). An official of the Department of Constitutional Development stated at a meeting with the community that as far as the Department were concerned those people were legally elected and would remain the representatives until October 1988 (Minutes, 31/08/1987). Powers were given to the Local Authority Committee on the 21 October 1987 (Minutes, 30/10/1987).

At that stage the township management structure comprised a Council of 5 members, together with a manager, transferred from the old Administration Board, who was employed on a full time basis. From interviews carried out as part of the survey it was clear that there was a great deal of unhappiness within the community at this appointment. It was perceived as a continuation of the old apartheid style Administration Board, with all its connotations.

Given this history, it became clear that there was a great deal of mistrust and misunderstanding between the authorities and the community. This study attempted to evaluate the situation in KwaThandeka objectively, in order to provide a basis for future development of the area which would be acceptable to all parties.
6.4 Background to the project

In an effort to end the rent boycott in KwaThandeka and to address some of the community's needs representatives of the TPA addressed a public meeting and requested the AHC to assist the development process for their area by providing input into this plan (Minutes, 31/08/1987). The AHC then called in a group of professionals, under the leadership of the author, to assist in this process.

Having been given official sanction to participate in the process it became clear that the AHC perceived that the issue of a physical plan was only one aspect of a much greater needs profile for the area, and as such could not be divorced from other aspects such as services, house construction, schooling needs and even work opportunities (interview with the AHC, 27/04/1988). Working within limited financial constraints, the group decided to limit the study to the areas of greatest need. The study therefore centred around the provision of physical and social services and housing, specifically addressing two issues:

1. Quantifying existing levels of service, confirming demographic data and identifying community needs (the survey).

2. Identifying or quantifying the minimum levels of service required to meet individual and community needs.

The development of these study objectives was carried out in such a way as to form the basis for a long term development plan for the township. This in turn led to a report (Abbott et al, 1988) which was submitted to the TPA and from which the data quoted in this Chapter is taken.

In parallel with the above the KLA appointed a town planner who, in 1989, submitted a township application which had been prepared without any community consultation and which was opposed totally by the residents of KwaThandeka. This plan was developed using a single criterion of minimised capital costs for infrastructure provision which, if implemented, would result
in multiple sub-divisions of existing stands. In accepting the planner's submission the TPA ignored the community's report. An objection to the township application was then prepared (Abbott, 1990). This incorporated a second, more detailed survey of the township (Social Surveys, 1990), aimed at acquiring specific information to use in motivating the objection. This looked at the social, political and economic implications of stand sub-division, taking into account factors such as the contribution of home-grown food production on health and on the local economy; the social impact of increased densities; the increased unemployment and the impact upon the social fabric of the community. The conclusions were that multiple sub-division would have a significant negative impact in all of these areas. After nine months of indecision and prevarication, the TPA finally accepted this objection. The AHA then prepared alternative proposals for the development of KwaThandeka (Abbott, 1991) and these were accepted fully by the TPA in May 1992 (Minutes, 11/05/1992). In KwaThandeka the community succeeded in dominating a negotiation process which centred around a technical agenda defined by the authorities.

6.5 Research methodology for the KwaThandeka study

In conducting the research into conditions at KwaThandeka five methods of research were used. The first of these was a series of discussions with members of the AHC (27/04/1988; 28/05/1988; 02/08/1988). The second was a mass meeting with the community, held on 28 May 1988, to discuss needs and problems. South Africa was under a State of Emergency at the time and public meetings could only be held with the written permission of the magistrate. As only one meeting was permitted, consultation with the wider community had to take place via informal meetings between community groups and individual members of the AHC.

The third method was a social survey of the township. Here, because no official plans of the area existed, and because the demographic pattern was known to comprise large numbers of extended families, every stand was visited and an
attempt made to interview more than one house occupant per stand. The questionnaire comprised predominantly closed questions, aimed primarily at gathering demographic information. The questionnaire was translated into Zulu and a pilot survey carried out among members of the AHC. The questionnaire was then modified and a full survey carried out over a 3 day period, using between 5 and 8 helpers from the community who were briefed and trained beforehand (the English translation of the questionnaire is given in Appendix B). In total 341 households were canvassed and support for the survey was strong, with only 12 people refusing to answer questions. Data was gathered on house distribution; household size distribution, age distribution, school attendance and income distribution.

The fourth method was an examination of engineering records, while the final method of research was the a review of secondary sources such as personal and public documents in the Legal Resources Centre (LRC). Ongoing participant observation was also considered to be valuable as a means of obtaining additional information.

6.6 Details of the survey findings

The study concerned itself with three areas of need in terms of service provision: physical infrastructure, education, and housing. This analysis will be concerned only with physical infrastructure. From discussions it became clear that the community had identified three broad areas in which they found the existing services to be unsatisfactory, namely cost, level of service and general efficiency of operation. These issues were central to the analytical process underlying the evaluation of the services themselves and were considered particularly important in evaluating different perceptions of service provision. Table 6.1 below is a summary of information related to plots, houses, population and densities. Details of the various physical services is then provided in the sub-sections which follow.
Table 6.1: Demography of the area

(a) General

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No of stands recorded by authorities</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of stands identified by survey</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of occupied stands</td>
<td>263</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(b) Information pertaining to stands visited and interviews conducted

<table>
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<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>No of stands visited</td>
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<tr>
<td>No of houses visited</td>
<td>351</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total no of houses counted</td>
<td>534</td>
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<tr>
<td>No of families recorded</td>
<td>469</td>
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<tr>
<td>No of persons recorded</td>
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(c) Extrapolated data (based upon 534 houses)

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<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of stands</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of houses</td>
<td>534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of families</td>
<td>713</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
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(d) Averages

<table>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of people per house</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of people per family unit</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>No of families per house</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of families per plot</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.6.1 Water

Water was supplied to the township from a water treatment plant in Amsterdam, via a small reservoir, from where it is distributed via a small bore (50 and 25mm piping) to communal standpipes. A total of 27 standpipes were identified of which three were broken. The reservoir was extremely small, with a capacity of only 2.6 hours at peak flow. In addition the flow into the reservoir was extremely low, being measured at 4l/s.

The main complaint that people had was of an intermittent supply. Prior to the survey the system was reported as providing water for only 3 days per week. In part this was traced to the council cutting off the supply in an attempt to break the rent boycott. This practice stopped during the survey but the supply was still found to be inadequate. Random checks over the six month period during and after the survey indicated an average operation of 5 days per week. In six random checks the reservoir was found to be full only once. On the remaining occasions it was either a quarter full with a falling water level; empty but with water passing directly through the system; or empty with no flow. All checks were made in the early afternoon. On the occasion when the reservoir was full the flow from the standpipe nearest to the reservoir was 25l in 100 seconds. There was thus a significant difference between the supply and draw-off rates.

The average availability of taps was one tap per 175 people but, because of the skewed distribution of taps and the varying density of housing this increased to 1 tap per 400 people in the worst case. Similarly the worst case for walking distance was 350m from house to tap. No provision was made for drainage around standpipes, resulting in pools of stagnant water accumulating at each tap. Finally the three taps which were broken had not been adequately sealed off and consequently leaked constantly, thereby reducing water availability still further. When there was no water, or water of inadequate quantity, residents used the river, situated approximately 0.5km from the nearest dwellings. The access point on the river was downstream of the outfall from the Amsterdam waste-water treatment plant.
6.5.2 Sanitation

The system of sanitation employed in the township was the bucket system. 251 plastic buckets were supplied to each house, where they were placed under a frame and seat in a toilet outbuilding. Twice a week the used buckets were placed in the street outside each dwelling, by the residents, for collection and replacement. To handle and treat the waste an evaporation pond system was constructed approximately one kilometre south east of the township, where the buckets were emptied, washed and reused. The collection system was manual.

Specific problems associated with the sanitation system as installed in KwaThandeka, were identified as follows:

1. Buckets were emptied twice per week but the emptying service was erratic, so that buckets could be left standing in the road for 3 to 4 hours. This created a fly nuisance and increased the potential for disease. Buckets were frequently knocked over by dogs, exacerbating the problem.

2. With a mean stand density of 15.9 people per stand, and based upon typical figures for excreta and urine production supplied by the World Bank (World Bank, 1990a) a volume of 951 of waste material would be generated over a four day period on a site served by one 251 bucket. This excludes cleaning materials, which could increase this volume by up to 50%.

3. Toilets supplied by the authorities were of poor quality and badly constructed.

4. The treatment system for night soil comprised 3 digestion/oxidation ponds in series. However, due to a lack of a permanent water supply, only the first pond was used as an anaerobic treatment pond (being diluted with water brought to the site by tanker), and functioned only because of the
limited quantity of faecal material collected. Yet the cost of the full system was debited to the KwaThandeka account.

6.6.3 Roads and stormwater drainage

Roads were constructed of in-situ compacted material. KwaThandeka itself takes the form of an ellipse, with the long axis paralleling the contours. The main roads along the axis are wide, with no provision for storm water removal. During rains, the water first accumulates in the roads and then runs off through the yards of people on the lower side of the road. There were many indications of the erosion of foundations. There were also indications (in support of residents' complaints) that water actually ran through people's houses during storms.

The effect on the minor roads running east to west across the contour was equally bad, although the detrimental action in this case was on the road condition itself. The stormwater washed out the finer material from the road surface, leaving coarser stones and cobbles on the surface and leading to extensive rutting and potholing which made vehicular access extremely difficult.

6.6.4 Rubbish removal

This service was not provided.

6.6.5 Other services

There was no electricity in KwaThandeka and, with the exception of one line to the senior school, no telephones.

6.6.6 Demand for land

The survey found that, in addition only to the 263 existing residential stands, there was a need for between 271 and 450 additional sites. The lower figure was
the expressed need while the higher figure reflected the total number of additional nuclear families sharing existing sites.

6.6.7 A comprehensive planning perspective

The report outlined from the beginning the need to view KwaThandeka from a more comprehensive planning perspective, rather than simply providing a physical plan. The need for this approach was confirmed as the results of the socio-economic study were produced. Throughout the report stressed the need to consider the information gathered as the basis for a development process, so that the physical plan could then be optimised and integrated into this process. In addition this report produced recommendations on service levels and proposals for cost restructuring of tariffs. At that stage the report highlighted the low income profile of the community and indicated that the large plots currently provided served a wider role in terms of producing food for local consumption, but did not go into detail (Abbott et al, 1988).

6.7 The follow-up survey

In March 1990 a firm of Town and Regional Planners appointed by the KLA (with the approval of the TPA) submitted a township establishment application for KwaThandeka to the TPA. This application proposed the multiple sub-division of stands in the area, coupled with provision for a major densification in terms of the local population. The rationale behind this plan was that optimising plot size would increase housing densities and thereby minimise service installation costs. From their submission it was clear that the planners considered that the capital cost of services was the only criterion of importance in determining the physical planning layout. In developing their proposals the planners did not consult with the community at any stage. Instead they based their proposal solely on information provided by an aerial photograph of KwaThandeka, which they commissioned,
Physically the situation on the ground appeared to be the same, in that the survey house count was 534 dwellings, while the number of dwellings counted in the aerial photograph was 521. However, the way in which this situation was interpreted was totally different. Firstly the planners ignored existing site boundaries and assumed that the 521 dwellings were occupying a non-demarcated piece of land, i.e. that KwaThandekwa was an informal settlement. Secondly they took the demand figures similar to those in the AHC survey and added these to the 521 existing sites. Thirdly, the planners made provision for a very large number of additional sites, which resulted in their final plan allowing for 1841 sites in total, compared to between 534 and 713 in the survey report. The only possible reason for such a high figure had to be an allowance for an influx from surrounding "white" farms. This coincided with a new government strategy (rigidly enforced by the TPA) of classification of all farm workers, coupled with the forced removal of those who could not prove that they were employed (e.g. relatives of farm workers and disabled or retired farm workers).

This planning application was totally unacceptable to the community. Firstly, the planners failed to recognise the strong sense of ownership associated with the larger sites, which had been allocated to the registered occupants legally. Secondly, the planners assumed that many of the occupants were "squatters", who would support their planning approach. The survey showed in fact that this was not the case. Very few site owners actually sub-let parcels of land to outsiders. The large majority of the additional people living in additional dwellings on the demarcated stands were in fact related to the head of household occupying the main house. And thirdly residents claimed that the plan, if implemented, would seriously disrupt their lives and make them poorer.

These plans, as submitted to the TPA, had economic, social, political and technical implications. In order that these could be more clearly quantified, a second, follow-up survey of the area was carried out, this time by a professional social survey company which specialised in this type of work (Social Surveys, 1990).
In the second survey 177 household interviews were conducted on two thirds of the stands, with one household interviewed per stand. For this survey a household was defined as all those people living under one roof. The stands on which the interviews took place were selected using a completely random sample, with strict substitution and call back rules used in accordance with this technique (Social Surveys, 1990:1).

This survey elicited more information than the first in terms of the relationships between the people living on the stands and provided a more detailed breakdown of income distribution. It looked at employment levels; the reaction of people to sub-division; the use of plots for growing food/keeping animals; and the economic effect on plot dwellers of losing their plots. On the basis of this data, and the previous information collected, the broader implications of the impact of the plan on the social fabric of KwaThandeka were identified and summarised in terms of their economic, social, political and technical impact.

From an economic perspective there were four major points of concern expressed, namely the effects on: food production and survival; employment and income; housing; and affordability in terms of infrastructure. The survey indicated a high reliance on home-grown produce in an area with a very low income distribution, where 93% of residents indicated that they grow their own food; 75% indicated that they would suffer materially if unable to grow food; and 40% indicated they would not have enough to live on if the supplementary food source was unavailable. The massive influx of new residents resulting from the provision of so many stands would lower the mean income still further since there are few job opportunities in the area; the loss of homes to road reserves etc. would create unnecessary hardship; and the proposed plan would not necessarily provide the lowest infrastructure cost as indicated in the planners’ submission.

Socially the plan would result in a general deterioration of the health and well-being of the community and a deterioration in the quality of life of residents; the
expanded site would encourage the local forced removal of farm labourers; and finally this influx would remove both the farm labourers' and the town peoples' means of support. Politically the plan had within it the seeds of major unrest, since it was so strongly opposed.

And finally, technically, the increased densities would necessitate the installation of a water-borne sewerage system (given the health hazards and social unacceptability of the current bucket system). This would also necessitate water to every site. Given the socio-economic profile of KwaThandeka such a system would not be the most economical, whilst the operational and maintenance cost was likely to be beyond the ability of the large majority of residents to afford.

These findings were submitted to the TPA in the form of a legal objection to the proposed development of KwaThandeka in May 1990 (Abbott, 1990) where they stayed, without an official response, for nine months. Finally the TPA accepted the objection and stated that recognition would be given to the existing situation. They also stated that a new approach to planning would begin and requested the AIC's assistance in demarcating existing boundaries (Minutes, 21/03/1991).

In August 1991 the TPA called a further meeting at which they requested a development plan from the AHC, having produced no plans of their own (minutes, 22/08/1991). After an acrimonious meeting the AHC agreed to produce a development proposal which they did in September (Abbott, 1991). The proposal was based upon: linking the development and the economies of KwaThandeka and Amsterdam; additional land for small-scale agriculture development; the cost and level of infrastructure; access opportunities to work and facilities; transport costs; education, health and other social facilities; and user preference. The findings of this report were presented at a meeting on 21 September 1991 (Minutes, 21/09/1991).

At a meeting on 12 March 1992 the TPA and the Council, through their town planner, stated that they accepted the recommendations set out in the above report (Minutes, 12/03/1992). Over the next few months meetings were held
with a variety of parties, culminating in a meeting on 17 July 1992 at which the AHC agreed to reform itself as a civic organisation, employ the services of a NGO specialising in small scale agriculture and support the formation of a small farmers group (Minutes, 17/07/1992). This group was formed on 15 August 1992.

6.8 Analysis of the KwaThandeka project

The community participation process in KwaThandeka was both intense and complex. Unlike Soweto, where the primary thrust centred around political negotiations, that at KwaThandeka centred around technical issues. The primary interaction from the community side was thus with technical specialists rather than politicians. As a result it was possible to analyse differing perceptions of what constitutes a service independent of a political agenda. Thus, for example there has never been an “empowerment” drive behind the actions of KwaThandeka residents, in the way that there was in Soweto and other metropolitan centres. There was a rent boycott because people were dissatisfied with the services provided. In public meetings the needs expressed were for employment opportunities, water, schools, improved sanitation and roads. These needs, and frustration with the performance of existing services, constituted the driving force behind the rent boycott. This difference with the metropolitan areas was also evident in the attitudes of the community towards the different authorities. Thus the KwaThandeka Local Authority was considered illegitimate and opposed by the majority of residents, and the AHC refused to deal with councillors directly. The TPA on the other hand was recognised as a legal authority. The community elected a committee (the AHC) to represent their needs but there was no indication of a desire for power or control in the sense expressed by Moser, and as practised by the civics in the PWV.

Several differences with Latin America case studies can be seen clearly in this study. People had land, and this was assured once the threat of removal to KaNgwane was removed. What played itself out was the underlying technical
issue of the different parties (the technical professionals in the TPA together with their consultants on the one side and the community on the other) playing out their different rationalities (Chapter 3.7) in respect of upgrading and the role of services. Central to this interplay were the different perceptions of what actually constitutes a service.

6.9 Differing perceptions of service provision

The series of meeting on KwaThandeka indicated that professionals and officials of the TPA shared a common, very clear, perception of what constituted a service. This perception is based upon a first world view of services, operated and maintained to provide maximum user convenience within a strong technical operational and maintenance capacity. This technicist approach views services in terms of their performance against the original design specification, the quality of the workmanship and materials of construction. The differing perceptions of service performance were summed up, unwittingly, by an official of the TPA, in a discussion with community representatives on service charges (notes of meeting, 19/08/1988). He stated that the principle behind the negotiations over the payment of service charges must be that people agree to pay for what they get (by way of services); i.e. that services must be paid for.

There are actually two statements there which express the authorities' concern about non-payment of services. The first is that "people must pay for what they get" and the second that "services must be paid for". Superficially these two statements appear to say the same thing. In the context of KwaThandeka however, the two statements actually highlight a fundamental difference between the perceptions of users in the community, whose interpretation is based upon the first statement, and professionals and officials, who base their actions on the second. This distinction, which has relevance for service provision in many developing countries, is one of the underlying reasons for the difference between ethical and technical rationalities.
Thus, in discussions with officials on this issue, the "official" view of service cost recovery was that a cost had been expended and must be recovered. Although it was acknowledged that the services generally were of poor quality and not performing satisfactorily, the officials were adamant that cost recovery remained a valid objective. When the services had been installed they had met the necessary technical criteria laid down in terms of the workmanship and materials specification, as well as the design criteria specified. The cost had been amortised over 30 years and this cost had to be recovered.

The community took a different view. To them the services were not performing their function satisfactorily and should not be paid for. However this view was not simplistic. From discussions in both public meetings and small groups it became clear that in fact the perception of services was quite complex and that the issue of performance of a service was viewed on several different levels.

### 6.10 Defining service performance

From the analysis of the services discussed earlier, together with the feedback from meetings and interviews, three components of service performance were identified. The first component centred around reliability. This reflected the level of operation and maintenance of the service as well as how effectively it met the technical design criteria. Thus it was a quantitative measure, defined as the "efficiency-related component of performance". The second was the issue of health and safety. Here individuals raised the issue of health hazards in water supply, sanitation, and roads and stormwater drainage. Thus this component measured, qualitatively, the relationship between the output or capacity of a particular service compared to the need for that particular service. This was defined as the "quality-related component of performance". The third component reflected how far the service went towards satisfying the needs and/or aspirations of the community, i.e. the socio-cultural and/or socio-political values of the community. This was termed the "political component of performance".
The various services available to the community in KwaThandeka were then evaluated against the above criteria.

6.10.1 Water

The water supply in KwaThandeka was intermittent and of variable flow. The residents did not know when it would be working nor how much water would be available. The supply was therefore unreliable. The limited per capita availability made personal hygiene difficult and thereby encouraged the spread of water-borne diseases. In addition, because of the poor and intermittent supply, many people used the river to supplement their requirements. This need for regular supplementation negated any public health benefit that a potable supply might (and should) provide. Thus, although the supply was in itself of adequate quality, the net result was an unsafe water supply situation for residents. With regard to meeting needs and aspirations, the community accepted the principle of communal standpipes. The number and spacing of the standpipes however were not acceptable.

The water supply therefore failed to meet any of the performance criteria adequately so that the value of the supply to residents was greatly diminished. In fact it could be argued that, as soon as people are forced to use a poor quality source of water (in this case a river downstream of a treated sewage outfall) on a regular basis, the supply of water lost all value in terms of benefiting health.

6.10.2 Sanitation

Whilst buckets were generally collected twice per week there was no fixed time for collection and the buckets were often left standing outside for prolonged periods. Furthermore the twice weekly collection was inadequate for the volume of excreta generated. Hence the system was unreliable. This inadequacy in turn causes a serious health hazard which rendered the system unsafe from a health viewpoint.
Finally the bucket system itself was highly unpopular and failed to meet the social needs and aspirations of the community. This meant that people were being asked to pay for something they did not want. The sanitation system was therefore extremely inadequate, when measured against all three of the performance criteria. Since there existed an efficient cheap alternative which could be easily provided (i.e. ventilated improved pit latrines) this meant that the sanitation system in KwaThandeka had no value whatsoever to residents.

6.10.3 Roads and Stormwater drainage

The condition of the roads was poor and the grading of roads infrequent. In addition provision for the drainage of stormwater was nonexistent. The overall result was a road and stormwater network which not only made accessing of houses difficult for both pedestrians and vehicles, particularly during rain, but also caused direct deterioration to houses. Measured against the criteria for performance therefore the road and stormwater system was deficient on all three counts.

6.10.4 Township management

The role of the Township Management was intimately bound up with the services provided and the level of those services. In the case of KwaThandeka, where the services had been shown to be of poor quality, this reflected upon the township management and, because of his high profile, the Township Manager. In addition the management structure was seen by the community as a continuation of old-style apartheid and was both unpopular and unwanted.

Township management cannot be quantified directly in terms of the performance criteria of efficiency and safety. However, since a primary function of the management was to provide and maintain services, its performance could be judged indirectly in terms of the level and quality of service provision. Measured this way management performance was poor.
6.10.5 Summary of findings

Overall the infrastructure service in KwaThandeka, whose function should have been to improve the quality of life of residents, actually had a detrimental effect on their quality of life, negatively affecting the health, comfort and convenience of the people living there. Whilst all services were of low quality when judged in terms of a performance specification, the sanitation system was particularly poor as well as being totally unacceptable to the community culturally, socially and politically. The system of township management, which strongly reflects a “top-down” paternalistic approach, was also found to be highly unpopular.

6.11 A comparison of “costs” and “value”

The community or user perceptions of services described above enable a comparison to be made between the different parties. From the controlling authority’s viewpoint a service can be defined in terms of a monetary value which equates to the cost of amortising and operating physical infrastructure and is based upon a materials and workmanship specification. However the above discussion has attempted to show that, from a user viewpoint, the perception of a service may be totally different, since it is based upon a performance specification, i.e. how well the service performs its task.

The latter specification has a qualitative as well as a quantitative component and hence is more difficult to evaluate. Nonetheless this section has attempted to evaluate the services in KwaThandeka against a performance specification and has shown that the services provided are of poor quality. This in turn raises the issue of what is a “fair” payment for services.

If the performance specification is lower than the materials and workmanship specification then this implies that, between the supplier of the service and the end user, there is a “loss” in the value of that service. The key issue then becomes whether the user should pay for that loss in value, when he or she has
had no say in the planning, provision and ongoing operation of that service. The argument of the community, which underlies the rent boycott, is effectively that the cost to the user should be based upon the value of the service he or she receives.

In KwaThandeka this would imply that service charges should be virtually nil, since only the water supply can justify even partial recovery. Obviously such a situation would be difficult for the authorities to accept, since there are other relevant factors such as costs incurred and affordability. In KwaThandeka it was argued that this should be done by drawing up a performance specification in conjunction with the community. The level and operation of services to meet this performance specification could then be determined and costed. This option would imply that certain costs associated with the present services may need to be written off.

Superficially this type of involvement in infrastructure provision on the part of the community appears to fall into Paul's category of community participation for the improvement of project effectiveness. However, bearing in mind that in KwaThandeka the proposals for upgrading came from the community, and took four years of debate before they were accepted by the authorities and their technical advisors, this is an inadequate description of what is happening. In Paul's interpretation the flow is outwards, from the project to the community; establishing a project and then seeking the involvement of the community. In KwaThandeka the direction was reversed, beginning in the community and then moving inwards to express community needs through a project, in a process of negotiation with the authorities. This is a form of engagement with the authorities which is centred upon re-defining the role of infrastructure, and establishing procedures by which priority-setting in infrastructure is achieved. The output from the negotiation process in KwaThandeka was a recognition that broader social and economic objectives were as important in achieving these as were financial and technical objectives. This links back to Chapter 4.1, supporting the concept that infrastructure provision is a complex process in itself, rather than simply the supply of specific products. If both infrastructure
provision and community participation are complex processes in themselves, then the crux of the debate on infrastructure provision is how to achieve an interaction between two processes.

6.1.2 Conclusions

The level of community interest in services in KwaThandeka was intense but, unlike Soweto, where the primary thrust centred around political negotiations, that at KwaThandeka centred around technical issues. The primary interaction from the community side was thus with technical specialists rather than politicians. This interaction illustrates the differences in perceptions of services that the two groups (community and technical specialists) have, arising from their respective vantage points.

The KwaThandeka study shows the way in which technical professionals use the quantitative data of cost and technical specifications as the base measurement criterion. This corresponds to Goulet's "technical rationality" (chapter 3.7). The study then demonstrates that the community uses a more qualitative criterion of value, corresponding to Goulet's "ethical rationality".

In a conventional approach to urban infrastructure provision a project will be designed on the basis of technical and financial criteria, and opposed by the community using a totally different set of criteria (social, economic and political). In order to prevent polarisation and integrate these two different rationalities a new project methodology is needed.

The first step in this process is to produce arguments for and against different project proposals (e.g. for each service level option) in terms of the whole range of criteria (social, economic, political, financial and technical). This can be done by carrying out a social survey which collects data on issues of importance to the community and the project, in terms of all these criteria. This step leads
technical professionals to appreciate the social and value-based criteria inherent in infrastructure provision.

The second step is to draw a distinction between the capital costs and the operating and maintenance cost of a project, and to treat the issue of cost recovery for the two components separately. There has been an historical amalgamation of capital cost (through amortisation) with operating and maintenance costs. This lies at the core of the differences in perceptions of services mentioned above.

At present technical professionals look at what a service is, and use a relatively straightforward specification to do this, namely the quality of materials and workmanship achieved during the construction phase measured against the original design specification. Based upon this perception, technical professionals tend to be pre-occupied with the recovery of capital cost. This issue is discussed in more detail in chapter 7.

The community's measurement of the performance of different infrastructure services is based upon tacit knowledge of what a service does at a particular point in time. The KwaThandeka study indicates that this tacit knowledge can be expressed in terms of three quantifiable components of performance. These are:

1. Reliability.
2. Health and safety.
3. Social, cultural and political acceptability.

These performance criteria can be quantifiably compared to the issues of operating and maintenance costs and affordability. This is the basis on which both parties (technical professionals and the community) can view infrastructure in terms of how people live with a given level of service in the long term - i.e. its sustainability.
These two steps need to be integrated into the process which controls the provision of infrastructure, i.e. the way in which services are chosen, designed and managed. Having looked at the choice of services in this chapter, chapter 7 now moves on to examine the management system.

Endnotes

1. See for example McCall 1987 for a discussion of the concept of tacit knowledge in communities.
CHAPTER 7

COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND THE ROLE OF TECHNICAL PROFESSIONALS IN AN URBAN CONTEXT

7.1 Introduction

The previous chapters examine community participation from a theoretical perspective; look at the role of urban social movements in shaping perceptions of participation; and identify community needs for improved services both as the driving force which enabled the civic movement to grow to its current strength and in providing the focus for improving community participation. Problems arising from differing perceptions of services have also been highlighted.

In this, predominantly political, context the logical solution would be to "democratise" the existing local government structure to make it more sensitive to the needs of the wider community, taking into account the problems and concerns mentioned above. One recent journal argues, for example, that "... [commentators on local government] accept the need for greater efficiency and effectiveness within local government but see this less in the technocratic
improvement of rules and procedures and more in terms of participatory structures, new partnerships with community organisation and a more direct accountability to citizens." (Environment and Urbanization, 1991:6). This thesis, whilst recognising the validity of these points raised, takes a different view, arguing that the role of technology is of equal importance to the democratic structures. The impact of technology is not confined to the technocratic improvement of rules and procedures, but is much wider, affecting all aspects of people's lives; as the case study of KwaThandeka shows. This chapter explores in detail the impact of complex technology on the management of infrastructure in a situation of acute resource constraints.

7.2 Municipal government in developing countries

There are three major systems of local government structures in developing countries. Two of these are strongly influenced by colonial occupation by the British and the French respectively. The third is that used in Latin America, which is similar to the United States model. There are many differences between them (for a comprehensive comparison of the first two see Batley and Stoker, 1991:23). However, in terms of relevance to this debate the two major differences between them are (i) the relationship between the legislature and the executive; and (ii) the relationship between central and local government.

On the first “Latin American municipal governments tend to organize themselves politically between the executive and the legislative. The first is usually assigned to a single body (the mayor or intendente) and the second to a collective body (a council chamber)” (Herzer and Pirez, 1991:81). Often “the legislative body is subordinate to the municipal executive” (Herzer and Pirez, 1991:81). In terms of the relationship between central and local government, the Latin American system has two characteristics. The first is a linkage between the legislative side of municipal government and party machines (Herzer and Pirez, 1991:84), based upon a system of “patronage”. The second is the strong influence of what Herzer and Pirez call the dominant sector of local society over
the executive, and employees, whose careers are often dependent upon being "receptive" to this sector (Herzer and Pirez, 1991:83).

The French system also has this dual elective system, which is dominated by the chief executive (the mayor) but, in terms of the relationship between central and local government, the linkage (with the system as operated in developing countries) is much more of a bureaucratic one. Thus "The devolution of power to local government (in francophone countries) . . . operates within a well established financial and administrative system that continues to maintain tight control [from the centre]" (Stren, 1991:18).

Under the British system the two arms of the local authority are more distinct with "the [elected] legislative arm (or council) concerned with policy formulation; and the executive arm concerned with the implementation of the policies and composed of administrative and professional staff" (Bubba and Lamba, 1991:40). On the relationship between central and local government the British system is different again from the other two. Here "... a number of important Anglophone countries [among developing nations] already enjoyed a considerable degree of financial freedom as well as a wide range of permissive functions at the level of local councils" (Stren, 1991:16).

South Africa is similar to other anglophone colonies which, to quote Bubba and Lamba's description from Kenya, operate "an urban administration system . . . derived from the British local administrative system" (Bubba and Lamba, 1991:37). For this reason the discussion which follows will concentrate on the British based model of local government. The relevance of the findings of this thesis to other systems of local government would be a valuable area of further research.

Prior to the Royal Commission of 1925-29 (Onslow, 1925;1928;1929), the majority of the functions of local government in Britain had related to social infrastructure such as education, watch committees, small holdings, care of the mentally defective, etc. This emphasis on social services remain strong in
England (for example, following the local government reforms of 1972, the provision of social infrastructure again became the dominant function) and this influences the way in which many British researchers view local government in developing countries (as illustrated by the earlier quotations).

The incorporation of physical infrastructure management into the local authorities arises from two distinct roots, one in public health and one in transportation. As a result of an investigation into the poor laws in the mid-1980s a relationship began to emerge between disease and the urban environment. This was established as an incontrovertible link by Chadwick's *Report on the Sanitary condition of the Labouring population of Great Britain* in 1842 (Fraser, 1973:58). Chadwick recommended improved sanitation (water supply and sewerage), controlled by a central authority (Fraser, 1973:58-75). This mobilised local authorities who, whilst balking at the cost of service provision, were not prepared to have centralised control for fear that this would mean the loss of local government (Fraser, 1973:65). The result was the Public Health Act of 1875, in which local government retained the management of water supply and sanitation but central government took legislative responsibility.

Transportation was different. Here, according to Onslow, it was only the County Councils and the Metropolitan Boroughs (Cities) which were involved heavily in physical infrastructure (meaning in this instance roads and drainage) (Onslow, 1925:81-88). In this instance it was the growth of (mechanical) vehicular traffic following the war of 1914-1918 which forced a restructuring of the system. The integration and rationalisation of all physical infrastructure was finally addressed in the final report on Local Government reform, and three broad technical functions of the large authorities were recognised: Roads and Bridges; Public Health; and Housing (Onslow, 1929).

In parallel with the debate on management control was a second debate on financing of infrastructure. With the debate on water supply and sanitation in the mid-1840s the choice was "between a joint-stock company deriving its
income from those who used its services and a public authority financed by all through the rates and backed by legal statute (Fraser, 1973:63). The second option was chosen, although those joint-stock water companies which had already been formed were granted licence to continue. The financial arrangements were codified by the second report on the Reform of Local Government (Onslow, 1928). The major implication of this decision was the separation of the source of income (rates) from the sources of expenditure.

The practical result of these local government reforms was the concept of government management by line function, with the key areas being administration (Town Clerk), finance (Treasurer) and physical infrastructure (town engineer). While powerful in their own right the latter two were nonetheless subservient to the first.

The local government structure which was set up in the Anglophone colonies was based on this model and remains substantially unchanged. However the functional nature of local authorities in developing countries has changed significantly since then. Thus, as Bubba and Lamba state, "The main function of local authorities [in developing countries] is the provision of basic services" (1991:42). Such a dramatic change must impact upon local government capacity, particularly when it is accompanied by severe resource constraints. This chapter examines the implications of this change in emphasis, not only on local government but also in terms of its effect on community participation.

It is important for the development of this argument briefly to examine structures of local government, and the differences between alternative local government in developed and developing countries. The relationship between the local authority, as the statutory agency responsible for urban infrastructure provision, the infrastructure itself, and the different actors involved in the process of providing and operating that infrastructure, is discussed. Having done this the technology of infrastructure can then be placed in context.
7.3 The influence of infrastructure provision on local government in developing countries

The increasingly dominant role that infrastructure provision plays in local government can be illustrated by two significant indicators: (i) community needs and priorities; and (ii) local government income, expenditure and employment patterns.

On the first of these Stren states that the "combination of rapid urban population growth, superimposed on a small urban base, is unique to black Africa as a region. In combination with severe economic decline during the 1980s, these two demographic forces have enormously increased the pressure for urban services, particularly in the largest cities across the continent. This 'squeeze' between burgeoning urban populations and the services they need is already one of the dramatic crises of the late twentieth century" (Stren, 1991:10). He goes on to state that "Perhaps the most noticeable and enduring problem is the absence or inadequacy of necessary supporting infrastructure and social amenities in most urban areas. Water supply, sewers, roads, electricity, health facilities, and social services are overloaded and unreliable... the environment is dangerously polluted...[and] a high proportion of roads are in a state of disrepair..." (Stren, 1991:14).

On the second indicator, Lee-Smith and Stren quantify this crisis. After reiterating that "African cities have been undergoing a serious 'service squeeze', according to which larger and larger urban populations are receiving fewer of the services they need, on a per capita basis" (Lee-Smith and Stren, 1991:24) they state (quoting Kulaba) that "Dar es Salaam... during the mid-1980s, was unable to spend more than the equivalent of $5.80 per capita [per annum] on urban services...[while] Nairobi...[had] an estimated annual expenditure of $68.00 per capita during the same period" (Lee-Smith and Stren, 1991:24).

In respect of this second indicator in a South African context, figure 7.1 shows the structure of the Johannesburg City Council in 1992. Six of the eight...
strategic business units are concerned either directly with infrastructure provision or with the wider urban physical environment (excluding recreation). Of the 21,266 employees, 12,896 are employed in these units while a significant proportion of the 2352 support staff could also be allocated (in terms of budget) to services for these units (Johannesburg City Council, 1992a:6). Thus approximately two thirds of the staff are involved with physical infrastructure and the physical environment. In terms of expenditure, spending on activities related to physical infrastructure provision accounted for in excess of 70% of total capital expenditure in 1991-1992, and approximately the same in terms of operating expenditure (Johannesburg City Council, 1992a:5).

One way of viewing local government crises in developing countries is in terms of an "Urban Management" approach (see for example Stren and White, 1989 for a wider discussion) - "the preferred approach of the World Bank in its urban projects" (Stren, 1991). However an alternative approach is proposed here, which may be particularly useful for addressing the specific crisis in urban infrastructure provision identified above. This approach focuses on infrastructure provision and views the local authority from the perspective of a support system for infrastructure provision. This discussion would be of significant length if it were to address every aspect of local government. It has therefore been limited in this chapter to a basic outline, which is then expanded to illustrate the implications for community participation in infrastructure provision.
FIGURE 7.1: MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE OF THE JOHANNESBURG CITY COUNCIL

City Council

Management Committee

Town Clerk

Support Service Units

Strategic Business Units

Treasury

City Secretariat

Human Resources

Organisation and methods

Culture & Recreation

Public Safety (Incl. traffic)

Health, housing and urban

Jhb Electricity

Roads

Transportation

Water and Wastewater

Planning
7.4 The concept of local government as a support structure for the provision and maintenance of infrastructure

In a developed country, the successful management of infrastructure has four facets. These are:

1. There is an accepted, and broadly acceptable, system of local representation, which enables people to express their views and exercise their influence. This facet represents legitimacy of the local government structure as a whole.

2. The financial cost, although significant, is within the means of most of the population, and mechanisms exist for helping those who cannot afford to pay, so that no one should (at least in theory) be forcibly removed from their homes or even lose the use of the services because they cannot afford to pay service charges. The money to operate this local authority is not necessarily collected locally but may be provided by central government. This is the affordability facet.

3. There is an adequate support system for infrastructure operation, in terms of management, financial and technical expertise. This facet is described as the institutional capacity.

4. The infrastructure services provided represent the optimum technical solution which provides maximum user convenience. Thus people do not have to worry about the nature of the service, as it does not require them personally to input more than minimum effort. An example here is the flush toilet. Consumers are rarely interested in the waste water treatment plant unless it is in their immediate vicinity.

These four facets, of legitimacy, affordability, institutional capacity and user convenience are all under stress in anglophone developing countries in Africa, including South Africa. It is this stress which is exposing the weaknesses and
deficiencies of local government structures in those countries. Thus any analysis of local government in these countries has to address the impact of this stress. Before looking in detail at the problems of infrastructure provision however, it is necessary to examine the way in which a local authority actually supports the provision and maintenance of infrastructure.

Departments within local authorities are traditionally seen as having independent line functions, but these are primarily operational structures. If the local authority is viewed from a different perspective, namely in its role as a provider and manager of physical infrastructure services, then the respective functions can be seen in a wider management context. In this context the local authority can be divided into a series of "control centres", with this term being used to describe a functional type of control over a key resource necessary for the provision and ongoing operation of physical infrastructure. This concept is illustrated by figure 7.2. To supply and manage services, the local authority is provided with legal responsibility (from central government) for the provision of various services and is mandated by the users (ratepayers) to do this. In turn, this requires that the local authority must be capable of three separate functions.

The first is to plan, design and develop both the urban environment and the infrastructure to support that environment. This requires a level of technical expertise, a part of which may be found outside of the organisation (i.e. with consultants and contractors). In the latter case the municipal authority would still have the technical capability to oversee and control the work of those outside bodies. The second function is to the effective management, operation and maintenance of the infrastructure and regulation the urban planning process. This is normally carried out as a departmental function, but again requires adequate technical manpower resources.
FIGURE 7.2: CONTROL CENTRES FOR THE PROVISION OF URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

delegates power to the local authority as the

CONTROL CENTRE FOR POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING

which in turn takes responsibility for the

LOCAL ELECTORATE

elects local authority as the

MANAGEMENT CONTROL CENTRE

using

INTERNAL EXPERTISE

TECHNICAL PLANNING AND DESIGN CONTROL CENTRE

using

EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENT PROFESSIONALS

FINANCIAL PLANNING CONTROL CENTRE

raising money from

FINANCIAL MARKETS, END USERS, BANKS
The third function is that of financial planning. This in turn has two components: the raising of capital and amortising of the loan; and the provision of funds for the ongoing operation and maintenance. Finance would normally be raised on the capital market with the interest rate being related to the credit worthiness of the local authority or, in the case of a government guarantee, to a centralised local government bond rate.

At this point the role of the different actors in the process can be examined and their roles in the two situations compared. In a developed country, under the local government system described earlier, the role of the actors can be clearly defined. Thus the controlling local authority dominates the decision-making process, constrained only by the limitations imposed by central government in terms of legislation and the specific authority’s own financial capacity. This control exists because the local authority has both de jure and de facto power, the latter arising from its financial independence and the credibility of the process through which it is elected. Thus whilst it may be influenced by other parties, such as financial institutions, it cannot normally be dictated to by them.

Coupled with this definite control is the fact that, as mentioned earlier, there is an adequate supply of skills to operate and maintain the project once it is built. In this context the other actors have very specific roles. Thus the Consulting Planner or Engineer has a very clear brief: namely, to produce a technical design, using, in the Engineer’s case, the best available technology. This is done in the knowledge that the operation and maintenance of the infrastructure will be handled by the client, and that the latter has the capability to carry out that function. The technical professional must then ensure only that the construction cost is minimised and that the project, as built, meets the technical specification. The Contractor, who constructs the work, would normally be peripheral to the decision-making process.

The above description represents an ideal situation. In the United Kingdom, where the model originated, “the twentieth century saw a steady transfer of
functions from local to central government" (Seeley, 1978:12), which accelerated after 1976 (see John, 1991:58-72). Prior to 1976 however the provision of urban infrastructure was probably the least affected of the local authority's services (in terms of managerial responsibility) and this is also true for many developing countries, including South Africa. From the perspective of infrastructure provision then this "idealised" situation is considered a valid base from which to begin the comparison with the de facto situation in developing countries.

7.5 Infrastructure provision in developing countries

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 illustrate the nature and extent of the infrastructure crisis in South Africa, while section 7.3 touches upon the situation in Africa generally. The international literature quoted highlights two key issues: namely institutional capacity and financial capacity, and views these as the major problems of local government in developing countries. However, following the construct developed earlier that infrastructure is becoming the dominant component of local government, this leads to a different perspective, which is supported by the South African case studies.

Section 7.4 identified four facets of the provision and implementation of urban infrastructure (legitimacy, affordability, institutional capacity and user convenience), all of which are under stress in anglophone developing countries in Africa. As such they may be termed areas of stress in the management of infrastructure in these countries. These stresses cause a weakening of the local authority structure and this in turn leads to the involvement of an increased number of parties in the provision of infrastructure. This then changes the nature of the decision-making process. The role of the technical professional in this situation is significantly different to that in a developed country. The effect of this series of changes is discussed in greater detail below.
7.5.1 The weakening of the local authority

The inability of a local authority to act as an independent body on behalf of local residents is severely hindered by constraints on managerial and technical capacity and lack of fiscal independence. Bubba and Lamba (1991) discussing the situation in Kenya, describe these constraints as follows:

"One is increasing central control which has resulted in a shift of the decision making power from central to local government. Another ... is that of staff resources, and particularly qualified personnel. This is partly because of the uncompetitive level of remuneration offered by councils. Another major problem seems to be that councillors are generally poorly educated ... have little knowledge of the purpose and practice of local government and are uncertain of their role as councillors ... and have tended to be more concerned with the private accumulation of wealth rather than the management of urban centres. A problem common to most local authorities is the poor relationship between the councillors and chief officers. Some of the councils are too small to allow an efficient delivery of services" (Bubba and Lamba, 1991:41-42).

All of these reasons are supported by South African experience (see chapters 4, 5 and 6). These constraints, which limit the local authority's capacity to provide and maintain adequate services, affect the legitimacy of the local authority in the eyes of the community. In addition, they provide openings for other parties into the decision-making process. Two examples of this are:

1. The effect of the decreasing fiscal base of local authorities in many developing countries, and the subsequent reduction in their financial dependence, means that the leverage of the financial institutions who provide the capital infrastructure projects is greatly increased. This constraint is affecting even the major municipalities, such as Johannesburg, where the influx of poor people has meant that the City's
ability to repay its long term debt is being increasingly questioned in the financial markets (Business Day, 23/11/1992). This in turn restricts the ability of the local authority to raise further loans through conventional sources. These authorities are then forced to rely increasingly on a limited number of development banks, rather than commercial lending institutions, which increases the external leverage even more.

2. The relationship between the technical specialists (both inside and outside the council) and the councillors themselves. Thus for example the power of external consulting engineers is greatly increased because the local authority does not have the technical capacity to supervise and control the consultant.

Both of these effects are well illustrated by an evaluation study of the upgrading of infrastructure for Alexandra township adjacent to Sandton (Abbott 1992). In this upgrading, which was of major proportions, costing approximately R150 million and catering for approximately 200,000 people, there were six government and parastatal bodies making decisions on the level of services to be provided (Abbott, 1992:41). However, none of these bodies was carrying the ultimate financial responsibility for their decisions. The money was being raised in the form of a loan repayable by residents. Yet the needs and aspirations of the people of Alexandra were not even an input into the process of decision making which defined the final levels of service.

The net effect of the changes effected by these constraints is that external bodies are perceived to control the decision-making processes and this exacerbates the distrust felt against local authorities already perceived by community organisations to be unrepresentative or lacking legitimacy. This further restricts the ability of local authorities to function efficiently.
7.5.2 The involvement of an increased number of parties

The limited capacity in local authorities leads to increased central government involvement. At the same time the leverage of the lending institution is increased and the position of the technical groups strengthened as described above. However, these are not the only external parties involved. Experience on urban infrastructure projects in South Africa indicates that, once the council structure weakens, more of the parties who previously had a peripheral role in the urban management process actually become much more heavily involved in the decision making process itself. This experience supports the work of Angel, carried out over ten years ago (Angel, 1981:15-22). Unfortunately this earlier work was not carried forward, apparently because it was difficult to quantify and contextualise. The parties identified by the South African studies are greater in number than those identified by Angel and comprise the following:

- the municipal authority;
- national, regional and local government departments;
- parastatal and private utility companies;
- local community organisations, both political and non-political;
- regional and national mass-based organisation;
- individual families within the community, in the role of consumers of the service;
- financial institutions;
- development professionals;
- NGOs (service organisations);
- construction companies.

The main impact of this proliferation of parties is to fragment the process of infrastructure provision by focusing on the different control centres described in section 7.4 as independent problem areas, without reference to the management structure as a whole. What then happens, almost by default, is that the technical group (of engineers and planners) begins to play a more central, and critical role in the decision-making process.
7.5.3 The changing role of the engineer.

In the same way that South Africa adopted the British local authority system; so it adopted the British system for the management and operation of civil engineering works, which include physical infrastructure. This system designated an "Engineer" for each project, who is required to be independent (i.e. not gaining profit from the project); and separated the functions of the design engineer from that of the construction company. In the United Kingdom, where "the traditional separation of design from construction has been questioned" (Institution of Civil Engineers, 1991:2), this is now changing. The way in which the construction process will be managed in the future has been made more flexible, by a revision to the Institution of Civil Engineers Conditions of Contract, the contract document which governs the management of construction projects (Institution of Civil Engineers, 1991). These management changes carry a warning to all Anglophone countries where this system of management applies but, in South Africa and the other developing countries of Africa, the problem is more complex than that. The changes taking place in urban management (as described above) take engineers beyond technical management and into the arena of decision-making around social issues.

Whereas previously South African civil engineers had a very clear, and specific, technical task to perform in the design and construction of infrastructure, this is no longer the case. Firstly engineers must now take cognisance of the views of three distinct groups of people: those in authority associated with the local authority, as described above; the financing institution; and the community organisations and their own professional NGOs, who oppose the local authority and seek greater involvement. As will be discussed in Chapter 9 all of these parties might have different agendas and priorities. In addition the engineers must also take account of several variables which did not exist before. These include:

1. The choice of technical option matched to affordability. It is no longer adequate or acceptable for the engineer to supply the best available
technology. Instead he or she must be able to provide a full list of options, each of which provides a different level of service. This has ramifications, discussed in section 7.6, which have not been fully evaluated.

2. The use of different construction techniques (e.g. labour intensive construction). Financial institutions and governments are viewing all construction in developing countries, but specifically infrastructure provision, as a vehicle for job creation on a significant scale. This not only introduces new variables in terms of construction costing and programming, but can also affect the design itself.

3. The operation and maintenance capability of the client. Both chapters 6 and 7 have illustrated the increasing centrality of the long-term viability of infrastructure in the decision-making around the initial choice of such infrastructure. Different levels of service have different implications for long term operation and maintenance, as well as being closely tied to the issue of affordability far more closely than is the actual provision of infrastructure (which can be supported by a variety of capital subsidy options). This impacts upon the design, by opposing the concept of “best available technology” with the concept of “simplest and most easily maintained technology”. It also raises the issue of the engineer becoming involved in the training of personnel for operation, as well as the ongoing operation and maintenance of the system itself.

The net result of this complex interaction is shown in figure 7.3 below. The need to satisfy different clients with differing agendas, and to provide technical solutions which themselves may be in conflict (e.g. the service which optimises job creation may not be that which minimises maintenance). These were not envisaged when the current series of agreements and contract documents was developed and they highlight the need to explore new structures.
All expect to influence project management decisions, which have to take into account:

- Appropriate Technology
- Job creation
- Training
- Operation & maintenance
7.6 The impact of the changing roles of actors

The changes described in section 7.5 reflect a change in the balance of power and control over the decision-making processes around infrastructure provision. These changes in turn impact upon the areas of stress discussed in section 7.4, namely on the facets of legitimacy, affordability, institutional capacity, and user convenience. This is then exacerbated by the way in which the different actors perceive their own priorities in this changing situation.

Thus the community organisations have concentrated on the issue of legitimacy as was clearly demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5. Implicit in this approach is a perception that creating legitimate structures will also enable people’s needs to be satisfied. This issue will be returned to in section 7.8. The major financial institutions such as the World Bank and, in South Africa, the Development Bank of Southern Africa, have been concerned increasingly over the past few years with the need to ensure institutional capacity (see, for example, McLachlan, 1990, for the DBSA perspective).

The engineering approach has been to concentrate on the issue of affordability. Previously this was done using measures which reflected their own rationality which, in a wider social context, are relatively crude and simplistic. At KwaThandeka for example (Chapter 6) the planner employed by the local authority produced a plan based upon the multiple sub-division of existing stands. The basic concept behind this plan was that reducing plot size would increase densities and thereby minimise service installation costs. This notion was shown to be incorrect. More recently the concept of affordability has become more holistic, recognising the wider social needs. Nonetheless it is still advocated as the primary determinant in deciding service levels, as illustrated by van Ryneveld for example (van Ryneveld, 1992).

The local authorities, being squeezed between these various groupings, have fallen back on their reliance on standards, i.e. the codified set of design recommendations which have developed over a period of time in an attempt to
optimise risk (of failure) against capital cost in the provision of services in developed countries. An explanation of the problems associated with the strict adherence to standards is given by Satterthwaite (1986:43-58).

The advocates of flexible standards fall midway between adherents of rigid standards and those who support affordability as the primary criterion for the choice of service levels. This group argues that it will not be possible to provide a high level of service to all urban residents in South Africa (e.g. Wall and Jackson, 1992) but, at the same time, a level of service is not imposed upon the community. Instead community participation is seen as an important component in achieving acceptance of a lower level of service, a viewpoint similar to that adopted by the World Bank in the Lusaka upgrading project (Rakodi, 1983:18). This remains a manipulative use of community participation, since it is still the technical professionals who decide the level of service.

7.7 The impact of changing power structures on the wider community

External interest groups have specific ideas of what criteria should be used to determine levels of service, as described above. However the people in the community will actually be using the service and should choose what level of service they will have, based upon the best information available to them. This is widely accepted by many parties as a principle of community participation, but in practice is regarded as unrealistic (as discussed in chapter 1). The case study of KwaThandeka presented in chapter 6 shows that what is important to the community is the performance specification, which in turn comprises three components: reliability; health and safety; and social, cultural and political acceptability. The understanding of these components is the key which permits the idealistic view of community participation to be translated in practice.

Reliability can be quantified using technical criteria including, for example, the materials and workmanship specification described in section 6. It is in setting
out the guidelines for the measurement of reliability that the separation of capital and maintenance costs becomes important. A second important factor is to make the technical professionals who design the infrastructure accountable and to have the input design data agreed by all parties.

The second component, health and safety, can be quantified by using as a measure the satisfaction of basic needs. This was the original objective of infrastructure provision but has become less prominent with improvements of technology. For example, the role of sanitation is to improve health and prevent the spread of disease. The World Bank states that improvements in health are the main social and economic benefit which planners and economists hope to achieve by investing in excreta disposal (World Bank, 1980a:1). This role is the dominant one in rural areas.

The third - social, cultural and political acceptability - is the one considered the most difficult, yet it can be quantified by measuring the user convenience of the various services. The World Bank makes the point that the flush toilet, and its associated waterborne sewerage system, was designed to maximise user convenience rather than provide health benefits (World Bank, 1980b:1-2). This strengthens the perception that waterborne sewerage is a "developed country" level of service and leads, in turn, to the concept that each type of service (e.g. water, energy, sanitation) can now be defined along a continuum, with the basic (or zero) need being at the bottom and the service providing maximum user convenience at the top.

When engineers seek to "lower" standards, what they attempt to do is to concentrate on the second component of health and safety (by ensuring that basic needs are met) at the expense of the third. This is because technical professionals cannot measure this third component. Those who advocate flexible standards are not necessarily intending to manipulate communities; they are simply setting out those variables which they see as quantifiable as the basis of community choice. To them social, cultural and political acceptability does not fall into this category.
In practice user convenience, the indicator of the third component, can be quantified, but its measurement will vary between, as well as within, countries. This is because what is actually measured is the reduction in user convenience against a "norm" which is an expectancy standard. Two of these, for Soweto and KwaThandeka, are described later in this section. They can be identified from social surveys of the community. This loss of user convenience can take one of three forms:

1. Increased user involvement in the service. In this situation the loss of convenience takes the form either of increased effort on the part of the user (e.g. in carrying water from a communal standpipe), or additional personal time, or both. The communal standpipe is an example of both, while an example of the second would be walking an increased distance to a bus route.

2. There is an increased risk of loss of convenience (e.g. being unable to reach work or home on certain days in the year, due to flooding, where a causeway has been used instead of a bridge). Alternatively there is increased inconvenience to person or property (e.g. having to walk along a muddy street to reach home or to have storm water running around or through a house). All of the examples in (1) and (2) have been illustrated in Chapters 5 and 6.

3. Finally the third user convenience factor is that which constrains the user from increasing his or her quality of life (e.g. where water is supplied to a site through a low pressure outlet to a storage tank, in a situation where there is electricity available). This would prevent the quality of life improvements which would be possible with a piped supply providing hot water "on tap".

The case studies of Soweto (Chapter 5) and KwaThandeka (Chapter 6) reflect differing "norms". In KwaThandeka people were prepared to accept a lower
level of service, in the form communal standpipes and ventilated improved pit latrines. There was an acceptance of their level of poverty and a recognition that they could not afford consumer goods which would affect the quality of life. Only a small percentage of the population had actually lived in a larger metropolitan centre where they had experienced a higher level of service personally. However this case study, like Soweto, illustrated that there were strong expectations of maximum user convenience around these agreed (lower) levels of service. Thus in terms of the provision of water via standpipes, for example, there was an expectation that the water should be supplied at an “adequate” flow (a qualitative perception); that there should be a constant supply; and that the water should be easy to access, i.e. that bucket filling is easy and the spillage area clean.

In Soweto expectations were for a high level of service. This was partly because the adjacent area of Johannesburg had a high level of service but also because people had personal experience of the higher levels of service. The high number of people using a single yard tap caused inconvenience, while one respondent in the Soweto survey stated that showering daily was his most important requirement, because of his dirty job and the absence of showers at work. In addition, there was increasing electrification and a higher number of consumer goods.

From this analysis, supported by the two surveys, it is clear that, in addition to whatever political forces were at play, there are significant social implications to accepting lower levels of service. These now require to be integrated into a unified procedure for decision-making which treats all of the variables equally.

7.8 The implications for community participation in infrastructure provision

The different engineering approaches to services described in the previous section, which have their emphasis on technical criteria such as standards and
cost recovery, while paying too little attention to the social implications of infrastructure provision, serves to confirm that technical professionals do have a value system which only recognises quantitative data having a measurable cost implication. This attitude has in turn been interpreted as being supportive of a "means" approach to participation, within the "means and end" duality (see for example Moser, 1989). In fact this does not automatically follow.

The problems with the "means and end" duality are twofold. The first is that it requires a given party to be placed at a pole, supporting either a means approach or an ends approach. Even where Moser accepts that participation in projects may require a transition from one to the other (i.e. along a continuum) this remains the case. The second, inter-related problem, is the definition of empowerment. Empowerment in the literature means control over political power and socio-political decision-making (chapter 2.4). This is clearly illustrated in the FUNDASAL experience where Stein specifically dismisses other areas of control as not providing empowerment (Stein, 1990:26).

This thesis has been exploring an alternative to this "means and end" duality, based upon the concept that infrastructure provision is a complex process of itself and what is therefore involved is the interaction of two complex processes, with the second being community participation. While the two processes are enmeshed, chapters 4 to 7 have concentrated on illustrating the complexity of the process of infrastructure provision and its wider impact on the community. Following the analysis in sections 7.4 and 7.5 the thesis can now examine the problem from the other side, namely the implications for community participation of interacting with the process of infrastructure provision. The starting point is to examine the inter-relationship between the four criteria of legitimacy, affordability, institutional capacity and user convenience.

The first relationship to be explored is that between legitimacy and user convenience. In Latin America the literature surveyed in chapter 2.4 shows that control over political decision-making involves the taking over of a functioning urban management system and access to services relatively quickly. In addition
the levels of service installed have to be broadly acceptable. These are implicit requirements of the "means and end" duality.

In the South African situation, where resources are a major constraint, and these requirements cannot be achieved, there is a separation between the attainment of political power and the satisfaction of personal needs. Having once attained power however, the groups representing the people will be faced with decisions requiring compromises which conflict with the needs and aspirations of their constituency. In the duality framework this elected body would become the authority and there would be a need for another body to represent the community's interests. This is impractical. Chapter 9 explores these different, seemingly conflicting needs and shows how they can be resolved.

This leads to the second relationship, between legitimacy on the one hand and the issues of affordability and institutional capacity on the other. This effectively looking at the relationships between the community and the political leadership on the one hand and the technocrats on the other. Whilst many technocrats may support the official political structures which pay their salary it is clear from the diagram in figure 7.2 that this is not an automatic relationship. The technocrats have a different set of priorities to the other two groups, as was clearly enunciated by Goulet and described in Chapter 3.

Nor does the political alternative automatically follow, i.e. that technocrats must be subservient to the demands of the wider community who is their real client. There are professional ethics involved here. Professionals are correct to highlight affordability problems or to argue that a water-born sanitation system, for example, is unlikely to operate if installed where there is a recognised lack of institutional and technical capacity and that this can lead to health risks. In a developed country this situation is catered for as described earlier. The professional submits his concerns and the client takes the decisions. In developing countries the capacity to take these decisions is often lacking. This gives the professionals power through their control of knowledge and experience.
The current approach to this problem, which is receiving some support from the World Bank, is to rely on technical NGOs or service organisations to advise communities. This parallels the political duality framework with a technical duality framework. However this type of solution still leaves many difficulties. it does not define the position of the financing institution in the various relationships, nor does it take account of the NGO's own agenda, to name but two.

7.9 Conclusions

This chapter has focussed on the institutional surround which conventionally provides and manages urban infrastructure in anglophone countries, namely the local authority operating at the third tier of government. There are four areas which the thesis identifies as central to the successful provision and maintenance of physical infrastructure in developed countries, which can be summarised as legitimacy, affordability, institutional capacity and user convenience.

In developing countries all four of these areas are under severe stress. This stress impacts upon the structure of the urban management system in a manner which fundamentally changes that structure, leading to a spiralling downward cycle of declining services. Existing studies of local authority management, which tend to concentrate on strengthening the institutional capacity, have failed to prevent this decline.

The cyclical impact of the stresses described above on the urban management system is illustrated graphically in figure 7.4 below. The stresses firstly cause a weakening of the power of the local authority which, because the stresses come from four separate areas, cannot be solved by addressing only one of the problems (such as, for example, institutional capacity). This initial weakening of the management structure in turn strengthens the role of other actors in the decision-making process around infrastructure provision. Again it is the differing nature of the four areas of stress which is a complication, since weaknesses are exposed and actors involved on four different fronts.
A weakening of the local authority management structure

which in turn increase or exacerbate

a change in power structures between parties

stresses in infrastructure provision capacity

cause

resulting in
Because these actors have specialist interest and knowledge, then once they are in a position to influence decisions, they have a tendency to view the problem (of service infrastructure and operation) from their own perspective. Limited resources means priority setting in the allocation of resources, but the different actors perceive these priorities differently. Hence the four areas of stress become an arena of debate around resources allocation, which leads to a vicious circle of local authority fragmentation.

Urban infrastructure provision, operation and maintenance is viewed as just one of several diverse local authority functions. An alternative is to look at what type of structure is necessary to manage infrastructure provision, when this is viewed (i) as the primary task of local government; and (ii) as a complex process rather than the provision of a product. This leads to a radically different approach to the problem. The case study of KwaThandeka in chapter 6 developed the concept of a performance specification for infrastructure, from the viewpoint of the community. In this chapter this specification is taken, converted into a more generally applicable form and quantified. The following chapter shows in practice how the process of community participation can be integrated with the process of infrastructure provision in the absence of adequate local authority structures.
CHAPTER 8

IMPLEMENTING COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION: THREE SOUTH AFRICAN CASE STUDIES

8.1 Introduction

The hypothesis for the research component of the work carried out in this chapter is that communities can play a meaningful role in the formulation and application of decision-making processes around infrastructure provision. The methodology was to undertake a series of projects in which the author's role was to maximise community participation in a practical environment. Three of those projects, which typify three different implementation strategies, are described in this chapter. The implementation strategies evolved as the project progressed, but were based upon an awareness of the need to achieve a balance of power between the different parties. Having completed the work some general conclusions about implementation strategies can be drawn from the research. These are discussed in chapter 9.8.
Each of the three projects discussed in this chapter has community participation as its stated objective, but each one implements this participation in a different way. All three of the projects are situated in Natal and all are funded by the Independent Development Trust under a capital subsidy scheme discussed in greater detail below. The three projects are: Stafford Farm, Madadeni, near Newcastle; Sibongile, near Dundee; and Luganda, in Pinetown. Each represents a different type of urban environment. The first is close to a major urban centre (Newcastle) but actually situated across a "border", within the "homeland" of KwaZulu. The second is a conventional apartheid township while the third is an informal settlement, originally occupied by land invasion, which falls within the boundaries of a large "white" municipality. These differences had a significant impact on the community participation process in the three areas.

8.2 Brief introduction to the IDT

In the 1990 budget an amount of R2 000 million was allocated to upgrading social and physical infrastructure. Control over its expenditure was given to justice Jan Steyn, previously head of the Urban Foundation. Steyn then set up a trust which was independent of government, comprising prominent business and academic persons, to oversee the spending of this money and obtain the support of all major national political organisations.

Of this R2 000 million, R750 million was allocated to urban infrastructure, in a scheme whereby a sum of R7 500 would be allocated as a capital subsidy for a serviced site. To ensure that the money was made available to low income families an income ceiling of R1 000 per month was placed on the main breadwinner. Applications for the subsidy could be made by any group or individual and was not limited to conventional developers or municipalities.

Within the IDT capital subsidy framework there are five major groupings of parties: the IDT as financier; Community based organisations (generally supported by technically based NGO's); project managers (which may represent...
professionals, contractors, developers, or a combination of these); local authorities; and provincial administrations. In practice the three main players in a given project are the community organisation, the local authority and the project manager. The IDT as financier theoretically remains aloof from the negotiation process, although in the projects described in this chapter the author, as IDT consultant, had to play a critical role in setting up the community participation process. Other bodies, such as the Regional Services Councils that provide bulk services, may have a peripheral role. Where this new system differs from the conventional model of local government is in the changed relationship between these different parties.

The IDT capital subsidy scheme differs from previous funding schemes in three respects: (i) the very fact that it is a capital subsidy of a fixed amount, which enables the system of financing to be freed from the constraints normally imposed by financial institutions, thereby opening the way for meaningful project control at a local grassroots level; (ii) the emphasis placed by the IDT on community participation and control (Independent Development Trust, 1991a); and (iii) the fact that any group or organisation can apply for the subsidy either on behalf of a group of residents or to develop an area for new development, provided only that the applicant (in addition to meeting the Community Participation requirements) has the capacity to manage the project and can obtain interim finance (since the IDT provides end-user finance).

Not only does this system break the monopoly of the State structures to control the development process, but (i) it provides the opportunity for meaningful empowerment of the community and their representative organisations; (ii) it reduces the leverage of the financier and hence his ability to interfere with the democratic process; and (iii) it increases the power and influence of the technical group, described here collectively as the project manager. Where the weakness of the system arises is in the contractual arrangements. Since the IDT will only allow for one “applicant” (in the legal sense) this has a major impact upon the relationship through the way in which it affects the balance of power.
This is because the "applicant" becomes the "developer", who is then the party with full financial responsibility.

In the case study projects this resulted in three different power relationships. In Stafford Farm (case study 1), although the project manager was the developer, the authoritarian nature of the KwaZulu political structure placed ultimate control over the decision-making process with the government, who viewed the local authority as an arm of central government (similar to the situation in many Latin American countries). In Sibongile (the apartheid township) (case study 2) the project manager was the developer and there was a weak local authority. This made the project manager the dominant party, albeit with a strong commitment to the principle of community participation. In Luganda (invaded land in a "white" municipality) (case study 3) the community organisation was the developer. This was made possible because of the strong technical support it received from an NGO. Hence the community organisation became the dominant party, although it was faced with a strong technical and administrative local authority.

The starting point, conceived by the author, was to give each community the maximum of control over the project as was possible in the given situation. Because each of the three projects had associated with them a specific approach to community participation, influenced by the circumstances described above, this resulted in three proposed working models, each one distinct from the other two. Even though these working models had been tailored to individual proposals the practicalities of the negotiating process around implementation resulted in significant changes having to be made to all of them. Consequently the working models as implemented were significantly different to and, in case studies 2 and 3, far more complex than, the proposed working models. The reasons for this are discussed in turn in the three sections (8.3 to 8.5) which follow.
8.3 Case study 1: Stafford Farm, Madadeni, near Newcastle

8.3.1 Brief history

Stafford Farm is a low income extension to Madadeni, an urban area within the KwaZulu "homeland" adjacent to the industrial centre of Newcastle. The land was opened up, pegged and settled, without any services, in 1990 in a move to prevent illegal squatting. The application to the IDT was for service provision to 3 606 sites, comprising three wards. It was accepted, initially at least, because the application showed a strong commitment to community participation from a government structure with a poor historical record of participation.

The original application for funding at Stafford Farm was made by the Town Council of Madadeni, with the assistance of a housing utility company. The Council stated specifically that they had held discussions with, and received the support of, a variety of political and other organisations in the area. They then stated that their intention would be to maintain contact with these (and other) organisations throughout the course of the project. KwaZulu is dominated by one specific political party - the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) - and all ministers, councillors and government officials belong to this party. As the IFP has, in the past, shown strong antipathy to these other organisations, this willingness to have discussions in a wider forum was considered to indicate a significant shift in official thinking.

A second major statement of intent, made in the original application, was to the effect that this project would be controlled by the Madadeni Town Council. Towns in KwaZulu are, nominally, jointly controlled by the Council and the KwaZulu Ministry of the Interior, but in practice dominated by the latter. Thus the Stafford Farm application appeared indicative of a further shift in KwaZulu government thinking, in permitting the council a degree of autonomy over the development of a large project.
However, once the application had been provisionally accepted and detailed discussions started with the council, it became clear that the original application had been misleading on two key issues. The first related to the autonomy of the applicant (the Madadeni Town Council), to pursue a project independent of (KwaZulu) Central Government and its appointed National Steering Committee for Stafford Farm. The second related to the process of interaction with a broader group of interested parties.

The KwaZulu National Steering Committee remained the controlling body for the project, through whom all issues had to be cleared. The Minister of the Interior retained final say over who would be consulted officially by the Council and what that degree of consultation would be. Discussions by the author with people in the area belonging to the local ANC, COSATU and Civic branches indicated strong opposition to Council-led projects. They stated that they had not been consulted earlier and initially refused to interact in any way. These problems were made more difficult by an intractable attitude on the part of the KwaZulu government.

High-level negotiations between the KwaZulu government and the IDT failed to change this stance. Eventually an instruction was received by the author from the IDT in Cape Town to accept the situation and to attempt to achieve a compromise. During this period, which lasted from October 1991 until the end of April 1992, all work on the project was suspended.

Negotiations were held with the progressive organisations (i.e. ANC, COSATU and Civic branches) in the Newcastle/Madadeni area. Fortunately Stafford Farm was not a typical upgrade situation, in that sites were already laid out and occupied (albeit with no services) and there was a reasonable degree of consensus on the desired levels of service, which were of a minimal standard. This limited the political opportunity value of the project and eventually a community participation procedure was worked out which was acceptable both to these organisations and to the Madadeni Council. In this compromise the utility company was appointed project manager and developer and took over the responsibility for informing all parties of site applicants and any action.
concerning the project which was deemed to affect the community. A mechanism was then developed to deal with comments and complaints from these bodies.

Although this agreement was accepted, under duress, by the progressive organisations, the level of participation which was agreed fell far below that envisaged by the IDT in its original planning as described above.

8.3.2 Model description

The structure of a theoretical working model for this project was taken from the original project proposal submitted to the IDT. This is shown in figure 8.1. Had this model been set out graphically in this way at the time the project was adjudicated it would have been clear that it was impractical, given the structure and attitude of the KwaZulu government described above. It goes beyond KwaZulu government policy in terms of its negotiation policy with other parties and it gives an independence and freedom of action to the local authority which does not exist in KwaZulu law. When this intent was stated in words these limitations were not fully recognised, but setting it out in the form of a working model gives a firmer impression of the structure being proposed and draws out the limitations more clearly.

In this working model the project is controlled by the local authority but responsibility for the detailed design and supervision of the project is delegated to the project manager. There is extensive liaison with other community organisations on all major issues as well as the formation of grassroots organisations who will also be involved in the consultation process.
FIGURE 8.1: CASE STUDY 1 (STAFFORD FARM) PROPOSED WORKING MODEL

Local Authority

controls

instructs

Project Manager

technical responsibility

consults fully with

Community and political organisations

FIGURE 8.2: CASE STUDY 1 (STAFFORD FARM) WORKING MODEL AS IMPLEMENTED

Local Authority

controls

instructs

Project Manager

technical responsibility

shares information with

Project

Community and political organisations
8.3.3 Implementation

The structure which was actually implemented is shown in figure 8.2. This model is extremely common and reminiscent of models of community development, which effectively it is. The relationship between the parties characterised by this model falls clearly into the category of participation described by Moser as a "means" approach. Although discredited by the "empowerment" school of thinking it is discussed here for two reasons. Firstly it introduces the concept of the relational model, i.e. a graphical description of roles and responsibilities of different actors. This is a valuable tool with which to explore implementation strategies (see chapter 9.7-9.8).

Secondly the analysis highlights the constraints which actually underpin this form of participation in infrastructure service provision. This is a necessary pre-requisite to the development of a community participation theory. It should also be recognised that this type of model (information sharing) is used extensively in South Africa (and elsewhere in the developing world) where it is considered by many governments to be an adequate form of participation.

The purpose of community participation in Stafford Farm does not equate ideally to any of Paul’s objectives (chapter 3.3.5). The closest objective is that of effectiveness whereby "Effectiveness of a project demands that project services are congruent with beneficiary needs and preferences" (Paul, 1987:19). Paul states that "in all cases [where effectiveness was the objective], CP seems to have brought about a redesign of project services to better match beneficiary needs" (Paul, 1987:20).

This statement has some validity at Stafford Farm and there are several underlying reasons for this. Firstly the community at Stafford Farm is ethnically homogeneous. It appears from discussions with member of the community that the majority of the residents are members of the IFP although, according to the progressive organisations, this is because membership of the IFP was a pre-requisite for receiving a site. Also, in allocating the land, the
Council moved rapidly to pre-empt a serious potential squatter problem, an action which was widely supported in the area.

Secondly, in Stafford Farm each person has a clearly defined site and the Council's policy has been to provide each family with services within two years of settling. Services are basic, comprising standpipes, ventilated improved pit latrines (VIPs) and gravel roads, while the electricity utility (ESCOM) has agreed to provide electricity. The project manager has built a number of different toilet structures for people to choose from (against the initial wishes of the KwaZulu government who would have preferred a single toilet option). In addition a major employment program is being developed for labour-based construction of toilets and water mains, and the setting up of three block yards, a precast concrete yard and door and window frame manufacture.

Thirdly there are other factors working in favour of the project. The services will to be provided free of charge and that the water and sanitation option is governed by technical constraints on bulk services. A higher level of service is not feasible technically at this stage, a factor which has been explained to the community and accepted. Support for the project is high and there is good attendance at mass public meetings held by the project manager's team to discuss various issues related to the transfer of land and services. The community has been informed of the various technical and financial constraints on the project but has not taken part directly in any of the decision making.

8.4 Case study 2: Sibongile, near Dundee

8.4.1 Brief history

In the Natal Midlands there were two housing utility companies operating in 1991, both of whom saw the IDT scheme as an opportunity to retain their involvement in the ongoing development of the area. Sibongile is a typical example of the approach taken by these companies to develop a project in
association with the community. Of the 22 IDT projects approved for Natal in 1991, approximately 60% were awarded to utility companies operating a similar participation process to that described below.

This project application, for 600 sites to be serviced, was originally a joint application between a housing utility company and an interim Development Committee of Sibongile. However, the ultimate intention was to form a community trust prior to construction which would take responsibility for the project as a whole. From a community participation perspective three issues were considered important at the beginning (August 1991): (i) the make up of the Development Committee; (ii) the relationship between the Development Committee and the utility company acting as project managers; and (iii) the overall responsibility of the Development Committee in respect of this project.

This project was classified, according to IDT criteria, as a greenfieldsite for an identifiable community. Even where there is an "identifiable" community, as is this case, the community participation process tends to be limited, as there is no residents group with which to negotiate. In Sibongile the situation was perceived differently. Although there were no houses on the site, the existing communities from which residents would be chosen were already defined. It was therefore treated as an upgrade. The Development Committee was drawn from the whole community of Sibongile and determined that this project would be treated as a Sibongile project which involved all residents. This was a critical distinction which is important. In planning terminology the site was classified as greenfield, but from a local political context it was perceived as an upgrade.

The original Development Committee which made the application comprised members of the Council, Government Department professionals, and local business and Church representatives. Discussions were underway with local political organisations but no firm conclusions were reached. Subsequently discussions were held between the IDT representative (the author) and the various political parties, on a local level, in order to draw these organisations into the process. Thus by October the Committee comprised representatives of: Health Department, ANC, Council, ANC Youth League, Civic, business, churches
and the Taxi Association (which attended the meeting setting up the Interim Committee but later withdrew). At a public meeting in October the community elected four independent representatives and this group subsequently joined the Development Committee. There was no formal IFP branch in Sibongile.

This process was repeated in all the areas where the application had been instigated by a utility company, in all cases successfully. The actual composition of the Development Committee varied, and different areas took a different view on the direct involvement of national political parties. Some areas had this political party involvement and others, by mutual consent, did not. The early meetings of the Sibongile Development Committee were marked by strong tensions between two factions, one Council-led and one ANC-led. These were never fully resolved but a workable compromise was finally accepted. At a meeting on 29 October 1990, agreement was reached to formalise the Committee and produce a constitution.

The whole of 1991 was taken up effectively with trying to reach consensus between parties as to the detailed objectives and final composition of the Development Committee. Thus it was only from January 1992 that the real work of agreeing documentation could begin. The project manager and the Development Committee reached agreement on all project documentation, including a Community Participation Contract defining their own relationship, in March 1992, and this was signed.

The contractual documentation was submitted to the IDT Head Office at the end of March and referred back with queries. It was re-submitted on 7 April 1992 for signature. In terms of participation, a mass meeting took place on 25 March 1992 to gain approval from the wider community to proceed with the development in terms of the project description. Representatives of all the main groups were present at that meeting in their capacity as Development Committee members and all supported the project openly. There was strong consensus from the meeting for the project to continue.
8.4.2 Model description

The type of community participation which evolved at Sibongile places the project (and others like it) outside the "normal" situation described in 8.3.2, whereby the primary relationship is between the local authority and the wider community. Sibongile was managed by a separate local authority "elected" in terms of the Black Local Authorities Act of 1992. This authority had little perceived legitimacy and no financial resources. To receive IDT funding the project required broad-based support, which meant the formation of a committee to manage the project which was independent of the local authority. It also required proven technical expertise, and the only group able to provided this was a private sector utility company operating in the area. Through circumstances described in section 8.4.3 the utility company not only provided the project management expertise but also became the "developer", taking full financial responsibility for the project.

Two factors stopped this project from becoming simply a technically dominated engineering project and turned it into an alternative management model with meaningful community participation. The first was a strong commitment on the part of the utility company, to "full" community participation, although they were not sure what this actually entailed when they first became involved. The second was strong pressure exerted by the author to provide contractual commitment to shared decision-making by the project manager and Development Committee. The outcome was the proposed working model shown in figure 8.3.
FIGURE 8.3: CASE STUDY 2 (SIBONGILE)
PROPOSED WORKING MODEL

Local Authority ➔ Political Organisations ➔ Community Organisations

each elects representatives to a

Project Manager ➔ shared decision-making ➔ Community Committee

technical responsibility

joint control

Project

FIGURE 8.4: CASE STUDY 3 (LUGANDA)
PROPOSED WORKING MODEL

Local Authority ➔ project liaison ➔ approve levels of services ➔ Integrated community/project management team

control

Project

Local Politica.l Community Authority Organisations Organisations each elects representatives to a Project shared decision-making Community Committee technical responsibility joint control Project

Local Authority project liaison approve levels of services Integrated community/project management team control Project
8.4.3 Implementation

When the IDT originally stated their intention to empower local communities through their involvement in, and control of IDT funded projects, it was envisaged that many communities would be in direct control, either alone or in conjunction with project managers, of the projects in all its stages. In the case of Sibongile, the initial intention was for the development committee to raise the finance and for the project to be a joint venture, effectively, between the development committee as developer (i.e. having fiscal responsibility) and the utility company, acting as project manager, having technical responsibility.

As the IDT process developed it became clear that there was a change in power relationships. The IDT was a provider of "end-user" finance, meaning that it would only refund the capital subsidy amount to the "developer" on transfer of the serviced site. Hence the "developer" had to provide interim finance. With no financial track record the Development Committee was unable to achieve this. As a result financial responsibility reverted to the utility company (who was also the project manager); the concept of joint control receded; and the Development Committee was downgraded considerably in terms of the potential for meaningful input into, as well as their ability to control, the project.

It became clear to the author that the issue of relationships was critical to the success of the community participation process. Although there were strong links from the beginning between the Council-led faction in the Development Committee in Sibongile and the utility company, the Development Committee as a whole ratified the position of the utility company as project managers to the project in October 1991. What then began to happen was that members of the Committee who were not involved originally began to question fundamental issues, such as land siting, plot size etc. This was the essence of the participation process but it soon became apparent that the disparity in knowledge and power between the project manager and the Development Committee meant that there could be no meaningful participation in the decision-making process.
This problem was rectified to some degree by a community participation agreement between the project manager and the Development Committee. There were two ways in which such agreement could be formulated. The first, adopted in other parts of Natal, would have been to insert a clause giving the committee nominal control over the project or a veto on the actions of the project manager. This was not considered adequate. A single, all-embracing clause would be difficult to enforce legally and would not overcome the problem of the disparity in the skills and knowledge base that existed between the two parties. The second option, developed by the author, was to acknowledge the difference in the financial and professional skills capacity of the two parties, but to commit the project manager to a training role over the period of the contract. All aspects of the development process would be discussed with, and thoroughly explained to, the committee. The training process was formalised by incorporating in the participation agreement a list of key decision making issues. Primary responsibility was allocated to a given party and the second party was provided with a power of veto over any decision. The project manager would have an educational role in respect of all those items for which it had primary responsibility. The second option was adopted. A copy of the final agreement is included as appendix C.

The way in which the community participation agreement evolved led a further major change to the relational model. The two parties agreed to form an executive committee to take the daily decisions and this changed the role of the Development Committee further. Those members of the Development Committee sitting on the executive gained a greater understanding of the technical process of development than did those excluded. At the same time the Development Committee, in moving out of this decision-making role, became a better vehicle for monitoring “grassroots” feelings about the project, because of this “distance” from the technical decision-making process. This issue is discussed further in section 8.6. These changes resulted in the proposed working model of figure 8.3 being changed to the implementation model of figure 8.5.
FIGURE 8.5: CASE STUDY 2 (SIBONGILE)
WORKING MODEL AS IMPLEMENTED

- Wider community
  - represented by
    - Local Authority
    - Political Organisations
    - Community Organisations
      - who in turn appoint representatives to
        - IDT
        - Provincial Administration
          - approval of planning and technical work
          - training
            - Project Manager
              - technical and financial responsibility (de facto control)
              - jointly appoint
                - Joint working committee (executive)
                  - nominal control
                  - Project

feedback
8.5 Case study 3: Luganda, Pinetown

8.5.1 Brief history

Luganda is an area of ground which, when the IDT application was made, was classified under the Group Areas Act as being an area designated for the use of people of "Indian" origin. Its use was therefore controlled by the House of Delegates, the "Indian" parliament of the apartheid tricameral legislature, although ownership of the land resided in a private development company. However for several years it had been occupied "illegally" by Africans and when the project application was made there was tacit agreement that it would no longer be racially segregated. Ownership of the land was a major problem, which delayed the project for over a year. However the details are not relevant to this discussion. The outcome was the eventual purchase from the private developer by the House of Delegates and the incorporation of the land into a "white" municipality - the Borough of Pinetown. The final relationship of relevance to the community participation debate was that of a formalised land invasion area situated within a "white" local authority boundary.

This project application was submitted to the IDT jointly by a non governmental organisation, the Built Environment Support Group of the University of Natal (BESG) and the Luganda Residents Association (LRA). The application was for the servicing of was for 1861 sites. The LRA had unanimous support among residents in Luganda and maintained a high degree of community involvement in the project, with community meetings held regularly every second or third Sunday for report-back and discussion.

From the beginning it was recognised that the project had several features which would make it difficult to develop in a conventional way without fragmenting the local community. The community itself was cohesive, but relatively small. It was in constant danger of armed attack from residents living in the tribal area on the far bank of the river. And, finally, once the project was fully developed, the existing population would represent less than a quarter of the final population,
population, which meant that great care would need to be taken to incorporate a relatively large number of new residents without destroying existing community (social) structures. For these reasons the community wanted to retain full responsibility for the project.

8.5.2 Model description

As with case study 2, this working model started from an idealistic base. The intention was that the community would "control" and manage all aspects of the project. This is very much in line with the conventional "ends" approach of Moser (chapter 3.3.4), whereby the project objective is empowerment and all aspects of the project are built around this concept. This idealised model is shown in figure 8.4: The only involvement of external bodies (such as Pinetown and the NPA) was anticipated to be the technical approval of planning procedures and engineering proposals.

In practice the situation became far more complex, for reasons discussed below. The management of the project was separated from the civic function of negotiating wider issues relating to the community. A Development Trust was formed to control the project technical, manage its finances and hold communal assets (such as public sites and open space), as well as reporting to the IDT and other guarantors. This Trust then appointed a Project Manager who was responsible for the physical development of the site. All of this was made possible because the Trust was able to raise interim finance. Due to the high political profile of the Luganda project, and the need to be seen to support some community-driven projects, the IDT had agreed to provide the guarantees which made interim financing possible.
FIGURE 8.6: CASE STUDY 3 (LUGANDA)
WORKING MODEL 3 AS IMPLEMENTED

Wider community

will, in future, elect

Community Organisations

liaises with

Technical NGO
provides technical assistance

Luganda Civic Organisation

founds

Luganda Development Trust

control and financial responsibility

appointment

Project Manager

technical responsibility

Steering committee

which monitors

Project

appoints

control and financial responsibility

all appoint representatives to a

Project Steering Manager committee

"White" local Authority

Technical NGO

IDT

Project Manager
6.5.3 Implementation

The approval of the project meant that Luganda residents became responsible for managing a R13 million project and this necessitated a review of community structures. The original negotiations had been initiated by the LRA but in the intervening period the civic structure, with which the LRA was associated, had developed into a more cohesive body responsible for negotiating, at a policy level, issues such as service charges and the future of local government. During this intervening period also, the Borough of Pinetown had taken over the responsibility for the ongoing maintenance of services and the future administration of the area. The Borough was therefore proposing a closer relationship with the civic on the IDT project.

The civic felt that they could be compromised in the wider political negotiating process if they were to become too closely involved with the Borough and that another body would be a more suitable vehicle to manage the IDT project (Luganda is only one of a dozen African settlements in the southern Pinetown area and there would be major negotiations taking place in the coming months on a variety of sensitive issues such as service charges, executive authority, representation on a single municipality, etc.). There was already a working committee in Luganda, at which the civic and various community groups (e.g. women, youth, sport and religious bodies) met to discuss the wider needs of the community, but this was also considered inappropriate. As a result a third body was formed, namely the Luganda Development Trust (LDT).

The net result, shown in figure 8.5, appears initially to be awkward and unwieldy, but in practice reflects a deep understanding of the complexities of the participation process on the part of the community. The Luganda project had evolved naturally into three community participation components: a civic, representing the political demands of the community; a trust, taking technical and financial responsibility for a specific project; and the working committee which, in conjunction with mass meetings, was the vehicle for expressing peoples needs and concerns on local issues.
The final issue to be resolved was the relationship with the Borough of Pinetown. A steering committee was formed, in which general progress and issues of mutual concern could be addressed. In this way the Borough had influence over the broad policy decision-making process but could neither dictate policy nor interfere in the direct management of the project. The community thus retained a high degree of autonomy.

8.6 Conclusions from the three case studies

The projects demonstrate three different approaches to community participation developed in three different environments. The first shows development by a council in a “homeland”, using a private developer. The second shows a development by a private sector project manager in an area under the nominal jurisdiction of a black local authority. In this situation the private developer has far greater latitude and control than would normally be the case under a conventional local authority. The third shows a development by a local community organisation, with the support of a NGO, in a land invasion area under the jurisdiction of a conventional local authority, but under special circumstances which provide a great deal of latitude and responsibility to the local community.

A theoretical analysis of the three relational models which arose is given in chapter 9.7. This section highlights the key issues arising from the specific case studies. The first case study in Stafford Farm took place in an environment where the (KwaZulu) government would not permit free political expression yet where the financier (the IDT) attempted to maximise community involvement under a project manager committed to this course of action. The result is community input on issues such as the type of toilet superstructure, location of standpipes, etc.; broad community support for the project (the level of theft, for example, is far lower than on a similar project operated by the bulk service supply authority, without any community participation, in an adjacent area of Stafford Farm); and maximising employment and job creation opportunities.
As discussed in section 8.3 this project is constrained by limited technical options and by the refusal of the KwaZulu government to tolerate political opposition. Nonetheless there is some involvement of the community in the choice of product (e.g. the type of VIP) and through the work opportunities generated. That this level of involvement is recognised and appreciated by the community can be measured by the extent of community support. The infrastructure supplied by the project is meeting a high priority need in the community and people's opinions are being sought. In Paul's conceptual framework this project can be described as meeting the objective of project effectiveness but there is no involvement in the decision-making process.

The second and third case studies are far more complex. In both there is wide debate around key decision-making issues (e.g. the levels of service; who would be allocated sites), together with a commitment to maximising the degree of community control over the decision-making process. The models which have been evolved to achieve this level of community participation differ significantly. The strengths and weaknesses of each will be outlined briefly.

Case study 2 (Sibongile) highlights two strengths. The first is how project managers can play a significant role in the process of urban infrastructure provision, as discussed in chapter 7. The project management-driven projects in the Natal Midlands (of which Sibongile has been chosen as one example), indicate that the independent project manager is well-positioned to act as a facilitator (i.e. the primary instrument of community participation), both in helping to prioritise conflicting internal needs of the community, and in balancing internal needs against outside interests and agendas. The second strength is the way in which the community organisations are grouped in order to carry out the project. Because of the similarities to Luganda (case study 3) this point is discussed later.

There is one major weakness, lying not so much with the model structure as with the original allocation of financial responsibility. As "developer" the project manager is the dominant actor in terms of both technical and financial control.
This leads to a power imbalance between the project manager and the Development Committee which is strongly in favour of the former. This was recognised as a flaw when the project was formalised but could not be changed for the reasons described in section 8.4. To compensate, a community participation agreement was been framed which (i) defined a training role for the project manager; and (ii) gave the community extensive rights of veto (see appendix C). The intention was to place pressure on the project manager to provide skills and knowledge training to the Development Committee. This has turned out to be the wrong emphasis. Because the Development Committee does not have financial responsibility, it is not sufficiently motivated to take advantage of the training opportunities. What has been created is a kind of "supply push" situation, with pressure on the project manager to provide knowledge and skills, whereas what is needed is a "demand-pull" situation, where members of the Development Committee demand training opportunities of their own accord. Financial control of the project by the Development Committee would create the conditions for its members to be so motivated. The validity of this statement is borne out by the Luganda experience.

Case study 3 (Luganda) shows the role of the Community Trust as "developer" with full financial responsibility. This forces the Trust to gain knowledge rapidly and to take meaningful responsibility for both technical and financial decision-making. Another strength is the way in which the community organisations group together to carry out the project.

Both the second and third case studies highlight a critical issue which began to appear in chapters 6 and 7, namely the conflicting demands placed upon the community organisations in attempting to represent the constituency on an issue as complex as infrastructure provision. In Luganda the community organisations foresaw that working closely with the local authority would constrain their negotiating strategy and political tactics. Potential conflicts were envisaged in (i) negotiating a new local government management structure (political decision-making) working closely with the same controlling authority on a major project (technical decision-making) and (ii) making compromise...
decisions on issues such as the levels of service, construction programme, type of construction techniques to be use etc. (an outcome of the community organisation having full financial responsibility for the project), while (iii) representing the needs and aspirations of community residents as users (i.e. consumers) of a service.

The civic continued to be the primary representative body for the residents of Luganda and retained its responsibility for negotiating wider political issues. Responsibility for technical decisions was passed to the Trust while the Luganda Working Committee became the primary vehicle for maintaining community contact at a grassroots level. All three bodies were available to report back at mass meetings. In Sibongile the same potential tensions and contradictions were recognised. Thus the political organisations retained their own identity and took responsibility for political negotiation. The Development Committee became the grassroots link organisation and the Joint Working Committee took the technical decisions.

The primary weakness of the Luganda model lies not in the structure itself but in the roles of the parties, particularly the role of the NGO, and the relationship between them. The Community Trust needs technical support, which is meant to be provided by the NGO. However the NGO has its own agenda which is a potential cause of conflict. The NGO supports the aims of the progressive movement and assists communities to realize their “demands” against the apartheid state. However the project itself makes conflicting demands on the NGO as on community organisations, as described above. These conflicts affect the NGO in the same way that they affect the community organisations, but the NGO cannot handle them in quite the same way.

The NGO deals with this by excluding itself from direct involvement in the decision-making process where compromise decisions might have to be made, and placing itself as advisor to the Community Trust. This is a dangerous situation since it separates decision-making on socio-economic issues, carried out by the Trust but advised by the NGO, from decision-making on technical issues, carried
out by the Trust but advised by the project manager. The possibility of conflict and polarisation arising from this situation has been recognised. This problem was overcome in Luganda by all the actors (including the IDT and the municipality) agreeing to provide additional technical resources to back up the Trust. While this approach may be valuable as a learning experience, it is neither a long-term nor a general solution. The use of technical expertise in this way is both expensive and inefficient.

The central issue in both Sibongile and Luganda comes down to the lack of knowledge and resources of the community organisation and the power that this control of knowledge places in the hands of external bodies. Currently the World Bank is placing increasing emphasis on the role of the NGO as a key player in projects such as urban infrastructure provision, because of their close working relationship with community organisations (e.g. World Bank, 1990). Yet this partisanship makes NGOs ill-equipped to deal with the potential conflicts and contradictions which may arise from the implementation of a complex project with multiple objectives. What becomes clear from both of these projects is that there is a massive need for technical training of community organisations and that this is a partisan function. Project management, on the other hand, needs to be as neutral as possible. The World Bank approach mixes these two functions.

On the other hand the model illustrated by case study 2, which places the project manager in a key role, has much greater potential for resolving these conflicts, but this in turn requires a redefinition of the role of the project manager and wider education and training of technical professionals. This issue is discussed further in chapter 9.7 when the results of this case study are incorporated into a generalised implementation strategy.
Endnotes

1. As one example of such outside interests the provincial government (Natal Provincial Administration) was distrustful of the IDT projects initially and, had it wanted to, could have undermined the projects. However the NPA was prepared to deal with the project manager because he was perceived as a technical professional with a neutral political stance.
CHAPTER 9

DERIVATION OF A THEORY OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

9.1 Introduction

The need for community participation in the provision of urban infrastructure in South Africa is a direct consequence of the failure of the socio-political structure of apartheid to maintain existing infrastructure and to provide for new infrastructure to the African population, particularly in the period after 1970. The result is that South Africa now faces an urban crisis which is similar to that of the majority of African towns and cities, albeit not yet as severe. This has severely stressed local authorities in four key areas associated with infrastructure provision: legitimacy, affordability, institutional capacity and user convenience (chapter 7.4). The result is a decline in the quality of infrastructure and a political backlash from those affected. “Community participation” is seen by a variety of different actors, including technical professionals, as contributing to a solution (chapter 1.1).
The practical implementation of community participation is, however, hampered by two factors. The first factor is that there are differing perceptions of what community participation means and how it might work in infrastructure provision. This is illustrated by the diverse views expressed by different South African actors (chapter 1.3), as well as by the list of differing objectives which have been identified in projects of this nature (e.g., Paul, 1987, Finsterbusch and Van Wicklin, 1989). The second factor is the limited study material available with which to develop an understanding of the relationship between community participation and infrastructure provision. The Lusaka upgrade, which is now almost 15 years old, remains the only critical analysis of community participation in infrastructure provision but this project has raised more questions than it has answered. The recently completed evaluation of the upgrading of services in Alexandra near Johannesburg shows that little progress has been made in developing such an understanding in the intervening period (Abbott, 1992). Thus the starting point for developing a relationship between the two (community participation and infrastructure provision) has to be the experience of community participation in other fields, supplemented by documented personal experience.

9.2 Approaches to community participation

The problem with the existing literature is that, while there is a substantial amount which deals with case studies of interactive participation at a community level, there is very little dealing with the conceptual development of community participation, and none which tries to build a comprehensive theory of participation. Two central points emerge on a conceptual level. The first is that all authors recognise that the community participation process has specific elements, though different elements are stressed by different authors. This issue of elements is contextualised and discussed further in section 9.6.

The second point relates to the concept of hierarchical structures in community participation. Several authors argue in favour of linkages between development
paradigms and what the thesis terms approaches to community participation (chapter 2.2). There are two linkages which dominate. The first links the community development approach to the paradigm of modernisation theory, while the second links the empowerment approach to the paradigm of dependency theory. In this argument empowerment is seen to displace community development over time as dependency theory displaces modernisation theory. Theoretical support for this notion of displacement is weak, as is the underlying concept of linkages between approaches and paradigms, but this is a complex debate. However what really calls into question the validity of the notion of displacement is practical experience. Chapter 2 shows that, while there are clearly projects where community development is not an appropriate approach, there are other projects where it continues to operate successfully.

This leads to the concept that there are different arenas in which different approaches to community participation are appropriate. Following from this chapters 2 and 3 look at the projects in which the different approaches have been appropriate and successful. This analysis finds that a given project can be classified in terms of specific characteristics. By examining successful community development projects and empowerment projects such characteristics can be identified (chapter 2.5). Then, using this classification system, a similar set of characteristics can be developed to evaluate infrastructure provision projects. The analysis of infrastructure provision carried out in chapter 7, supported by the case study work in chapters 6 and 8, provides the basis for this.

The characteristics of appropriate community development projects, empowerment projects and infrastructure provision projects can be divided into five categories: openness of the decision-making process; type of decision-making process (e.g. social, political, etc.); degree of technical complexity; degree of community homogeneity and instruments of participation. A summary of the categories and associated characteristics for community development projects, empowerment related projects and infrastructure provision projects are shown in table 9.1.
Table 9.1: The characteristics of community development projects, empowerment projects and infrastructure provision projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DETAILS OF CATEGORY</th>
<th>CHARACTERISTICS OF PROJECTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Openness of government to community involvement in decision-making.</td>
<td>Community development: Open but limited. Extent determined by government and government policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant type of decision-making and complexity of the variables.</td>
<td>Predominantly social. Issues easily understood by community. Time for debate. Time not measured in monetary terms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of technical complexity.</td>
<td>Technology not prominent. Matched to capacity of users.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community structure in respect of the project.</td>
<td>High level of homogeneity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.3 The characteristics of community participation

The five categories whose characteristics define the arena in which community participation operates are discussed in turn below.

9.3.1 The openness of government to the inclusion of the community in the decision-making process

By "openness" is meant the degree of support given by government to the communities' involvement in the decision-making process. It is clear from the literature that all community development operates within the confines of government policy. It is the failure of government to be responsive to local needs which has been the primary causes of disenchantment with community development. In these instances government can be perceived as "closed" and community participation does not function effectively. However, where governments are supportive of the community development process then this has laid the foundation for successful community development projects. It is in this context that the debate covered in chapter 3, about widely different interpretations of community participation, is situated. Openness in this context does not imply democracy or even legitimacy.

The type of openness of government required in infrastructure provision projects differs significantly to that required for successful community development projects. Here openness requires more of a direct sharing of decision-making responsibility. Thus there are differing degrees of openness, which can be expressed in terms of a continuum, but not all will be adequate for successful community participation in infrastructure provision.

Within the empowerment paradigm of community participation a different situation applies. At national level the governments in the countries involved are authoritarian and, further, have little perceived legitimacy, coming neither from a democratic base nor a widely supported traditional base. As a result they are threatened by local demands which are perceived to challenge their authority.
This makes them closed to any support for community involvement in the decision-making process. The point at which a government becomes closed is itself a variable factor which is discussed further in section 9.4.

9.3.2 The nature of the decisions to be made

Decisions which impact upon groups and individuals in society have at least four components: social, political, financial and economic. Increasingly, many of these decisions will also have a technical component. As decisions become more complex, i.e. as the number of variables increases, this has two effects. The first effect is to bring out tensions between individuals and groups, reflecting the natural heterogeneity of the community. This is discussed in section 9.3.4 below. The other effect is to make it more difficult for individuals to internalise the problem and to recognise a solution. This difficulty can be overcome in two ways: (i) by focussing on a single dominant issue (as occurs in many of the empowerment struggles) to the exclusion of other factors; or (ii) by receiving external support from individuals or groups who have more experience of the issues in question.

The second of these is a time consuming process. This may not be a problem when the issues involved are predominantly social. However, as soon as the issues in question involve the time value of money, then several problems arise. There is pressure to reduce the time spent explaining issues to the community; the issues are less clearly understood; and the opportunities for potential conflict increase. This is often the case with infrastructure provision projects.

9.3.3 Technical involvement in the decision-making process

Technical decisions are often multi-variable. Time is generally expressed in terms of monetary value, thereby leading to the problems described above. A further difficulty arises because those professionals who make technical decisions operate in what Goulet terms their own, technical rationality (chapter 3.7). Unlike community development workers for instance they are not trained.
to understand social problems. This leads to a lack of integration of the social components of decision-making with the technical. This is further complicated by the more dominant role of technical professionals. In decision-making around social issues community development workers play a supportive or facilitating role in communities. Around technical issues, technical professionals have their own set of decisions to take, for which they are fully responsible, and these are made independently of community input.

In developed countries this problem does not arise because infrastructure (the technology) is perceived to operate in a supportive role to communities, meeting social needs agreed in a democratic forum. However chapter 7 showed clearly that this requires significant levels of resources. Where these resources are under stress, as is the case with urban infrastructure provision in developing countries, then the role of technology becomes the dominant variable in the wider decision-making process, and different ways of dealing with it have to be identified.

9.3.4 Homogeneity of the community

One characteristic of the community development approach to participation is the homogeneity of the target beneficiary group. By its very nature, community development is about group work and self-help, which necessitates a unified, communal approach to problem solving. This removes a complex variable from the participation process. De Kadt (Chapter 2.5) argues that the inability to deal with heterogeneous communities was one of the reasons for the failure of the community development approach to participation in Latin America. However there is no indication that the empowerment approach has addressed this issue in a more satisfactory way. An analysis of the empowerment struggles in Latin America (of which three are discussed in Chapter 2) indicates that they centre around specific issues, such as land tenure. In these cases the communities are not so much homogeneous, as bonded by a very strong commonality of purpose around a single issue. However the net result is the same, namely that, for the
resolution of the specific issue in question, a complex variable (heterogeneity) is removed from the participation process.

Generally communities are heterogeneous. Smit provides a good analysis of the problems which can arise in communities, and which impact negatively on their homogeneity. He argues that "the notion of a community is always something of a myth. A community implies a coherent entity with a clear identity and a commonality of purpose. The reality is that communities, more often than not, are made up of an agglomeration of factions and interest groups often locked in competitive relationships. Development projects often have the effect of accentuating differences . . ." (Smit, 1990:1). He then lists, as an example, twelve axes of potential conflict, based upon experiences in South Africa. These axes are:

- conflict between political organisations;
- conflict between different organisations claiming to represent the community;
- conflict between landowners and tenants;
- conflict between tenants of rental housing schemes and backyard shack people;
- conflict between hostel dwellers and local residents;
- ethnic tensions;
- conflict between youth and parents;
- conflict between local business people and residents;
- conflict between shack dwellers and those in formal housing;
- conflict between groups and individuals competing in the same terrain (taxi wars);
- conflict between traditional leaders and modernists;
- conflict between men and woman" (Smit, 1990:1).

These types of differences may be suppressed temporarily to achieve a specific goal (e.g. to achieve the commonality of purpose described above) but will resurface whenever decisions involving difficult choices have to be made.
Deciding on different levels of service in infrastructure which have a variety of social, financial, economic and political implications is typical of the type of situation which exacerbates community tensions and reduces commonality of purpose.

9.3.5 Instruments of participation

The support mechanisms given to communities to aid them in the decision-making process are termed instruments of participation. A wider discussion of instruments of participation, which may include differing types of audio-visual aid material as well as people, can be found in Paul (1987). This section is primarily concerned with the human expertise component. In community development the dominant instrument is the community development worker. Community participation in empowerment projects is characterised by the dominant role of groups, e.g. mass urban movements and CBOs, and the dominant instrument also tends to take this group form, as a NGO. There is no recognised primary instrument for infrastructure provision projects at this stage. NGO are assuming this role but, as chapter 8.6 indicates, there are several problems associated with this (see also section 9.8). The project manager is also a potential party who could play this role. A third option is the use of an independent monitor, as was done successfully, albeit to a limited extent, in the project case studies described in chapter 8. While further research is needed in this area it is clear that the resolution of some of the complexities indicated above highlight an urgent need for appropriate instruments of participation.

9.4 The project environment

The characteristics described above provide an indication of which approach to community participation might be the most appropriate in a specific situation. However, in this form they are quite awkward to use. Categories 1 (openness of the decision-making process) and 5 (instruments of participation) are very specific and cannot be reduced further. However, categories 2, 3 and 4 can.
A more detailed analysis of these three categories indicates that both community development and empowerment, for example, deal with issues which are relatively simple in terms of their capacity to be absorbed by the community. There is generally one dominant issue, or a clearly defined set of social issues. In neither case is the degree of internalising required by the community particularly complex. In successful community development projects there is a large degree of homogeneity among the community. In empowerment projects the community involved may be heterogeneous but there is a strong commonality of purpose around the issue in question (e.g. land tenure).

Infrastructure provision, on the other hand, is extremely complex when it involves a choice between different levels of service. Not only is there a choice of options, but the implications of different options are extensive and difficult to internalise. There is a high level of technical expertise required which further removes the decision-making from the community. And finally, because there are a number of solutions available, different sectors of the community having different needs and priorities are likely to prefer different solutions. Hence there is less commonality of interest and the tensions inherent in a heterogeneous community ought to the surface.

The changes that occur in the different characteristics, moving from community development and empowerment projects through to infrastructure projects, all reflect changes in the ease with which communities can make decisions about projects, i.e. they are all indicators of project complexity. In addition all are inter-related, i.e. all become more or less complex together. As a result the three categories (2, 3 and 4) can be amalgamated into a single, broader category, which reflects changes to project complexity.

This amalgamation reduces the number of categories from five down to three, namely: openness of the decision-making process; complexity of the project; and instruments of participation. Appropriate instruments of community participation have not yet been developed for infrastructure provision projects. They are critically important but later sections will show how their relevance...
relates to the successful implementation of projects rather than to the arenas of participation. The removal of the instruments of participation from the arena reduces the number of categories to two.

What has been developed here is an environment which can explain how both the approaches of community development and empowerment, as well as community participation in infrastructure provision, operate successfully in different arenas. This environment is illustrated graphically in Figure 9.1. The wider environment itself is defined in terms of the two categories placed upon axes. The horizontal axis represents the degree of openness of the community participation process, starting with a closed system. The vertical axis represents increasing project complexity in terms of the communities' involvement in the decision-making process. This environment generates four sectors, each of which represents a different arena of community participation.

The first sector is sited in the lower left-hand corner, where the government is closed to community involvement in the decision-making process but where projects are simple. The empowerment approach falls into this sector. Here community participation is possible in spite of government opposition, but only because the issue is a simple, straightforward one around which community mobilisation can occur. In terms of community participation this sector is defined as the arena of confrontation.

Movement horizontally to the right leads to a situation in which the project is simple, but where the government is now open to a degree of involvement by the community in the decision-making process. The community development approach falls into this sector. Here the government supports community involvement, but it takes place within a government-defined framework. In terms of community participation this sector is defined as the arena of inclusion.
Increasing complexity

Complex

Simple

Arena of Exclusion

Arena of Confrontation

Closed

Open

Figure 9.1: The Project Environment and the Arenas of Community Participation
Moving upwards and further to the right leads to the third sector, in which the project is complex, but where the government remains open to the involvement of the community in the decision-making process. Community participation in urban infrastructure provision may fall within this sector, which is defined as the arena of consensus. The debate on intensity in chapter 3, which starts with Arnstein and runs through the work of virtually all authors, reflects the confusion in thinking that surrounds this issue. All levels of intensity reflect a degree of openness on the part of government, and different ones are suitable for the satisfaction of different needs when projects are simple. In other words all are capable of achieving some success in meeting specific objectives (as defined for example by Paul, 1987). However once a project becomes more complex, the role of other parties becomes more important to the success of a project. To achieve a successful project under these circumstances the government has to be more open and share the decision-making to a larger degree than is required for the successful completion of simple projects. Hence the divide between an open and a closed system moves to the right as project complexity increases.

The final sector is one where the government is again closed to the involvement of the community in the decision-making process, but where there is a high degree of project complexity. This makes community cohesion difficult. The government is in a very strong position to control the flow of information, which is an essential part of decision-making on complex issues. This sector is defined as the arena of exclusion, where community participation is extremely difficult, if not impossible. An example of this is the Alexandra upgrading under apartheid, i.e. pre-1990 (Abbott, 1992).

The siting of projects in different sectors, in the manner described above, makes it possible to view community participation as a dynamic process. The political, social and economic conditions surrounding a project may be examined to see the way in which changing conditions of government openness and changing complexity might "push" the project in the direction of another sector, and thereby change the type of community participation which can be achieved. For example with the Buenos Aires project (Chapter 3.3.2), Cuenya et
al argue that the return to a democratic system of government means that the previous channels by which participation was practiced (which were confrontational) become inadequate. In other words there is a force pushing the project from the arena of confrontation into the arena of inclusion. If allowed to proceed this would lead to what Cuenya et al. call conventional urban politics. However, if a need then arose for greater community involvement in discussions around wider urban issues, including technical issues, this would create a new force pushing in the direction of the arena of consensus. A different type of community participation would then become necessary.

This recognition that community participation takes place within a dynamic social system, and that conditions can therefore change in a variety of ways (including reversibility), is a factor which is not dealt with in the existing literature. Moser (1989) recognises that complex projects might require a time period to change to participation as an “end”, but this an idealised one way movement. In the environment shown in figure 9.1, the forces which induce change can be identified for different scenarios and can influence change in any direction. The likely impact on the participation process, which may lead to a change in the conceptual framework governing that process may thus be deduced.

As an example of how this might work, the various case studies which have been discussed in this thesis are shown, in their associated sectors, in figure 9.2. Here the forces operating on each one, and which may be pushing them in the direction of another sector, are indicated (where applicable). A brief explanation of how these forces arise is given in Appendix D.
Increasing complexity

Key:
1. Villa el Salvador
2. Buenos Aires
3. FUNDASAL
4. Lusaka
5. KwaThetha
6. Stafford Farm
7. Lugenda

In The Project Environment

Figure 9.2: Forces Influencing Change
9.5 Conceptual frameworks in community participation

An approach to community participation sets out the way in which the participation process will develop. It provides a conceptual map and a methodology for implementation. For each of the three operational arenas in the wider environment (i.e. neglecting the arena of exclusion) there will be a specific approach which is suited to conditions pertaining to that sector.

From the review of the international literature there is no recognised theoretical structure to a community participation approach. However, this thesis proposes that approaches do have a structure, and that this is made up of three components. The first component comprises the fundamental concepts which underpin the approach. This is the conceptual framework. By definition this framework is generalised rather than project-specific. In order to use a conceptual framework the approach has to be related more specifically to a particular activity or project. This requires the second component of the structure, termed a working model. Finally this working model needs to be translated into reality within the project environment. This third component is defined here as the implementation strategy. This leads to the structure shown in figure 9.3.

The term conceptual framework has been used by other authors such as Paul (chapter 3.3.5) and Oakley and Marsden (chapter 3.3.3). The interpretation is similar to that given above, but in these cases it has been used in isolation, i.e. without linking it to implementation. The most comprehensive work on conceptual frameworks is that of Paul, where he develops a three dimensional matrix comprising objectives, intensity and instruments of community participation. However, a further analysis of the literature shows that the work of other authors also fits within this context of conceptual framework development. Thus Arnstein's work (chapter 3.3.1) can be explained as the development of a conceptual framework focussed on "intensity", while the work of the UNRISD (chapter 3.5) can be explained in terms of a conceptual framework based upon "objectives".
FIGURE 9.3: THE STRUCTURE OF THE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION PROCESS

1. The Project Environment
2. Different Arenas of Community Participation
3. Approaches
   - Comprising
   1. Conceptual Framework
   2. Working Model
   3. Implementation Strategy
Although these conceptual frameworks are valuable, chapter 3.8 showed that even Paul's conceptual framework limited community participation to only three dimensions. There are other "elements" which need to be integrated into the community participation process. In total the thesis identifies ten elements of community participation which appear to be important and need to be accounted for in the community participation structure. These are:

- objectives (of participation);
- intensity (of participation);
- intensity (of participation);
- the arena or surrounding within which the participation process operates;
- identification of the primary actors;
- the roles, agendas and relationships of the different actors;
- the point of input into the participation process, and who decides this;
- the practical implementation of the participation framework;
- the differing needs of the community;
- the needs of the other actors.

These different elements need to be related to each other and weighted in some way. For example some may be core issues, others may be only peripheral or even descriptive, and some may not be at all relevant. To date this type of relational analysis has not been attempted.

9.6 The development of a conceptual framework for infrastructure provision

One of these elements, namely arena, has already been identified, and is situated in the project environment shown in figure 9.1. This makes it the most critical element, since the identification of the appropriate arena will determine the appropriate structure. Within each of the three operational sectors of the project environment is a hierarchical structure of the type shown in figure 9.3. This hierarchy will now be developed for the arena of consensus and the
remaining elements will be dealt with as the various levels of the hierarchy are created. This section deals with the conceptual framework.

A fundamental difference between community participation in infrastructure provision, compared to that in other situations, is the number of actors involved. The decision-making process is no longer the preserve of the government and the community organisation. This is clearly demonstrated in chapters 6 and 7, as well as in the published work of Goulet (chapter 3.7). All of these actors bring their own understanding (Goulet's "rationality") to a complex decision-making process and make their own contribution to a solution. In doing this they also bring their own expectations of the project outcome as well as their own agendas. This is all linked to the element of objectives. Chapter 7.5.2 identifies possible actors in this arena as:

- the municipal authority;
- national, regional and local government departments;
- parastatal and private utility companies;
- local community organisations, both political and non-political;
- regional and national mass-based organisation;
- individual families within the community, in the role of consumers of the service;
- financial institutions;
- development professionals;
- NGOs (service organisations);
- construction companies.

Paul identifies five different objectives for community participation which are potentially contradictory. In infrastructure provision for example this thesis shows (chapter 7.6) that these objectives are advocated by different actors. The most powerful actor claims his or her objective as the dominant one for the project.
This thesis proposes a different way of treating these so-called “objectives” of different actors. In the wider environment of figure 9.1, the arena of consensus effectively defines its own dominant objective, which is the achievement of consensus. However this can only be done by taking into account the needs, expectations and agendas of the different actors. These needs, expectations and agendas (collectively defined as needs for the purpose of this description) are not objectives of the project. They are potentially contradictory requirements which reflect the complex nature of the project. The needs of external (i.e. non community-based) actors are identified in chapter 7.5.3 and the needs of the community in chapter 8.6. The combined needs are:

- project time and cost constraints;
- product quality;
- affordability;
- job creation;
- consumer satisfaction;
- control over decision making;
- control over skills and expertise.

It is the combination of actors and needs which defines the conceptual framework for community participation in infrastructure provision. In this way the needs of the various actors supplant the objective and the latter ceases to be an element of community participation.

9.7 A working model for community participation in infrastructure provision, based upon South African experience

A serious flaw in much of the theoretical work described in chapter 3 is the failure to explore the practical implications of applying the theoretical concepts developed by the different authors. The hierarchy set out in figure 9.3 overcomes this problem. This hierarchy is based upon a recognition, developed
from lessons learned in the case studies (chapters 5, 6 and 8), that a conceptual framework cannot be translated directly into practice. This practical application is a two stage process. The first stage is to create a working model which is concerned primarily with setting the ground rules for the project and establishing a set of principles. The second stage, namely the implementation strategy, is to turn this model into a workable structure. The South African case studies described in this thesis were carried out with a view to the development of working models and implementational strategies for community participation in infrastructure provision. Hence it is possible to explore these concepts of working models and implementation strategies in some detail.

Figure 9.4 shows graphically how a conceptual framework may be translated into a working model. It is not drawn from any specific project but uses experience from several different South African projects to reflect a typical situation. The horizontal axis lists the seven major needs to be satisfied by such a project. The vertical axis identifies the key actors involved in the provision of infrastructure and links them to those requirements.

There are four major problem areas in the development of a working model. The first is the point of entry of the community into the decision-making process (one of the elements of community participation listed earlier). The conceptual framework and working model are both based upon the premise that the community is involved in the decision-making process from the beginning, but this leads to questions such as how this is achieved and who represents the community. A detailed social survey can obtain all the important information on community needs and community dynamics but this leads to the issue of who develops, carries out and interprets the survey. Resolution of this issue is critical. From South African experience, community organisations see themselves as the sole representatives of their communities, but do not at first see the contradictions of their own position in trying to satisfy a variety of diverse community needs. This role of information gatherer can only be carried out by a mutually agreed, independent body acting as an instrument of community participation (see section 9.3.5).
FIGURE 9.4: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACTORS AND NEEDS
A WORKING MODEL FOR COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consumer Satisfaction User Convenience</th>
<th>Decision-making and Control</th>
<th>Skills and Knowledge Transfer</th>
<th>Job Creation</th>
<th>Affordability</th>
<th>Product Quality Standards</th>
<th>Project Time and Cost Constraints</th>
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<td>Construction Companies</td>
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Actor/need relationships are defined using the following symbols:

+++ : dominant need
++ : secondary need
+ : neutral relationship
= : antagonistic relationship
MUST RECOGNISE THE INTERESTS OF ABOVE ACTORS

PARTICIPATION FRAMEWORK

MUST SERVE THE NEEDS BELOW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSUMER SATISFACTION</th>
<th>DECISION MAKING &amp; CONTROL</th>
<th>SKILLS &amp; KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER</th>
<th>JOB CREATION</th>
<th>AFFORDABILITY</th>
<th>PRODUCT QUALITY/STANDARDS</th>
<th>PROJECT TIME &amp; COST CONSTRAINT</th>
</tr>
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INCREASING QUANTIFICATION

FIGURE 9.5: A GRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACTORS AND NEEDS
The second problem is how to ensure acceptance, by the external actors, of the principle of equal treatment of needs. Figure 9.4 lists the different needs sequentially from left to right in terms of increasing quantification. The more easily a need can be quantified the greater the weighting it receives among external actors (especially technical and financial actors). A way of solving this problem is by the use of the performance specifications developed in chapter 6 and quantified, in terms of user convenience, in chapter 7.

Once these two problems have been resolved, a mutually agreed set of priorities must be produced. The third problem which now arises is that certain actors have more than one need. A graphical example of this is shown in figure 9.5. This is of particular importance to the community organisations since, as chapter 8 pointed out, the various needs may be in conflict, and must somehow be prioritised. Linked to this is the fourth problem, namely that one actor may have a strong objection to the inclusion of the needs of a second actor.

Figure 9.4 shows the first step in overcoming problems three and four and developing such a set of priorities. This relates to the internal prioritization of needs for each actor. Four levels of linkage are defined. The first is the primary (or dominant) linkage, which is identified by the sign "++". The second is the secondary or peripheral linkage(s), identified by the sign "+". The third is that where the relationship between an actor and a particular need is neutral, which is indicated by the sign "•". Finally there is the situation where an actor may actually oppose the integration of a particular need into the participation process, a linkage which is indicated by the sign "=".

The four categories are treated differently. Category one (++) is the most important and rated highly in the decision-making process. The presence of more than one requirement by a particular actor would be handled by a process of internal priority setting in the presence of all actors. The would then form a part of the wider decision-making process described below. The presence of category four (=) is indicative of serious misunderstandings over the process and potential areas of stress. The aim must be to remove all "opposition
linkages" by a process of education of the actors involved. It is important that each actor recognises the validity of the needs of the other parties before the negotiation process on determining priorities is started. One important outcome of this process is that one specific type of community organisation may not be able to represent the diverse community needs adequately. Hence more than one community organisation may be required. Two examples of how this problem was overcome are given in the case studies of Sibongile and Luganda in chapter 8. Once this internal determination of priorities has been done the different needs are weighted by all the actors, a process which provides the basis for deciding the levels of infrastructure. This is a form of multi-objective decision-making, of which the KwaThandeka case study (chapter 6) provides one example.

The process described above represents the "ideal" condition, where there is complete openness between parties, full access to information and equality among the parties. But then the working model is, to a degree, idealistic. It represents a set of working principles which all parties agree to as the basis for the project and, as discussed at the beginning of this section, is the first part of a two stage process. In a practical situation the weaknesses of this ideal situation will be highlighted and compromises will have to be made. This represents the transition from the working model to the second stage, which is the implementation strategy.

9.8 Implementation strategies for community participation in infrastructure provision, based upon South African experience

Chapter 8 describes three case studies which explore the concept of the implementation strategy. Since such a strategy is, by definition, project specific, the strategies developed in this chapter are illustrative rather than prescriptive. It is important to recognise that the development of implementation strategies can be a time consuming process. In the three case studies described in chapter 8 the negotiation process to constitute the
The primary task of the implementation strategy is to define the roles that each actor will play in the project as well as the relationship between them. This is a complex procedure and the concept of a relational model is developed in chapter 8 to describe this. The reason why the definition of roles and relationships is so important, is because the procedure ensures that all parties commit themselves formally to what was previously a set of theoretical principles. The case studies highlight four potential constraints which can prevent, or at least hinder, the successful implementation of an agreed working model. These are:

1. Parties being unwilling to carry through commitments agreed at the earlier stage.

Case study 1 (Stafford Farm) provides an example of this, which is illustrated in the change from the working model structure to the relational model as implemented (figures 8.1 and 8.2 respectively). Although there was agreement in the early stages that a variety of political organisations would be included in the decision-making process, this was not carried through to the implementational strategy. The project had already been limited to one basic technical solution for all services (water, sanitation, roads, stormwater and electricity). People were living on the sites, and there was an agreed service charge. As a result of these factors this project moves out of the arena of consensus and into the arena of inclusion. As the characteristics of these two arenas is different this requires a different approach to community participation.

2. Parties being faced with internal conflicts which were not recognised at an earlier stage.

This happened to the community in case studies 2 (Sibongile) and 3 (Luganda). In both cases the community organisations developed new structures (the Joint
negotiation process to deal with the contradictions in their respective projects and forestall internal conflict (chapter 8.6).

3. Parties being unable to fulfil their functions due to external factors outside of their control.

From the experience of the case studies in chapter 8 this constraint could prove a major problem inhibiting meaningful community participation in future infrastructure provision projects. The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, the projects highlighted the importance of the community organisations sharing financial responsibility for the project. It is clear that such responsibility is a critical force driving the community to demand resources, knowledge and skills which are an essential component of the associated management function. The issues of shared decision-making and shared financial responsibility are inseparable.

Secondly, the case studies highlight a large gap in technical knowledge, skills and expertise between the technical professionals and the community organisations. This is highlighted in chapters 6 and 7, but it is case studies 2 and 3 in chapter 8 which actually address the problem. Case study 2 (Siborogile) indicates how the lack of knowledge of the technicalities of infrastructure provision can be addressed through an adequate training programme (see appendix C). Unfortunately, in this case the funds were not available to provide the necessary training independently and responsibility was given to the project manager. This did not work. In case study 3 the knowledge transfer was more successful but only because of the combined input of individuals from four outside parties, namely the NGO, project manager, local authority and the IDT. All of these, with the exception of the NGO, were exceeding their brief in contributing this support.
4. **The choice of the most appropriate instrument of community participation**

Case studies 2 and 3 have different instruments of community participation. In case study 2 (Sibongile) it is the project manager; in case study 3 (Luganda) a NGO, although in both cases there was additional support from an independent facilitator. This is an issue which is critical to the success of community participation in infrastructure provision but which requires more research before definitive solutions can be given. Both have advantages and disadvantages. On balance however the case studies indicate that the independent project manager, acting in a redefined role as project coordinator and facilitator, is preferable to the NGO playing this role.

This conclusion differs from current international thinking (e.g. World Bank, 1990) which sees the NGO playing this key role. However this latter view is strongly linked to an empowerment approach to community participation (where the NGO is the facilitator). In this empowerment approach it is important that (i) the NGO is closely aligned to the community organisation; and (ii) that it can provide skills and training interactively. The needs of the facilitator for a consensus approach to community participation are different. Here the facilitator must be an independent party with a neutral agenda, and the role of facilitator for the project is separate from the role of trainer to the community organisation.

9.9 **Classifying the elements of community participation**

Section 9.6 gave a list of ten elements of community participation. As the different parts of the structure shown in figure 9.3 were discussed so the relevant elements were drawn out and linked into that structure. Eight elements were allocated in this way and this is the number which make up the community participation process in the arena of consensus. The result differs radically from any previous work on community participation, since the two elements
which have not been used in this structure (objectives and intensity) are the two which were previously considered central to a conceptual framework.

Objectives has not been excluded as much as superseded, by the needs of the project and the needs of the community. This structure considers all needs to be of equal importance until they are weighted by the actors in the development of the working model. Objectives as they were previously defined (e.g. by Paul, 1987) no longer exist. Intensity, on the other hand, has a valuable contribution to make towards the community participation process, but in a different way to the eight elements mentioned above. Together with the degree of consensus achieved in the project the intensity of community participation measures the success of the community participation process. These are the output indicators of the community participation process.

Endnotes

1. This category reflects the number and complexity of the variables, which in turn are indicators of the ease with which people in the community will understand the decisions to be made.

2. This category was not significant in the analysis of community development and empowerment projects in chapter 2. However it is a significant characteristic of infrastructure provision projects.
CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSIONS

10.1 Preconceptions of infrastructure provision and of community participation

In developed countries infrastructure provision comprises the supply of a
number of collective services as a series of products, designed according to a pre-
determined technical specification, and the ongoing operation and maintenance of
these services. As such it has formed the basis of a technical discipline
(municipal engineering, a branch of civil engineering), and the technical
component of urban design for planners. This interpretation is often considered
applicable to all urban areas. In developing countries however, where the urban
management system no longer functions effectively, and where this is coupled
with a condition under which different sectors of the urban population receive
differing levels of service, this interpretation becomes invalid. Under these
conditions, infrastructure provision becomes a complex process in which
decisions on levels of service have an impact in the wider socio-political
environment. It is then no longer adequate to take decisions based solely upon
financial and technical considerations. This is the arena within which community participation becomes necessary.

There is no shared vision, at the present time, of what exactly is the role of community participation in the provision of urban infrastructure in South Africa. Technical professionals (primarily civil engineers and planners) working on upgrading projects and the provision of municipal services have found themselves unable to follow "normal" procedures and have "discovered" community participation as a way of mobilising community support for projects (chapter 1.1). However this project-based approach to participation is dismissed by a significant body of international literature as manipulation of communities. Instead what is recommended is an approach whose only objective is for the community to take control of the decision-making process.

The basis for this empowerment viewpoint is also weak. The conclusion of this thesis, arising from a review of the international literature on community participation, is that there is no cohesive theory or rigorous academic basis on which an approach to community participation in infrastructure provision can be developed. There are various definitions, goals and objectives, but no cohesive structures underpinning the different viewpoints which have been put forward by various authors. This lack of structure is reinforced by confusion over terminology. This thesis has developed a new conceptual framework, working model and implementation strategy to resolve these problems and provide such a structure. This was done firstly by identifying threads and building linkages within the existing literature. To a large degree it was the gaps in the literature which provided the greatest assistance. Findings from the South African case studies carried out by the author were then used to build the new structure.

10.2 Community participation and infrastructure provision

The history of urban development in South Africa indicates that infrastructure was provided for the African population without any consideration of the quality
of those services or whether they met the needs of the population (chapters 4 and 5). This was particularly so during the period between 1969 and 1984, when those urban areas designated for Africans were controlled directly by the state, and during which time service levels deteriorated rapidly. The extent of the anger and frustration over these conditions laid the base for a successful struggle against the state (the rent boycott) by providing an issue around which people could be mobilised. The extent of this anger cannot be overestimated. The rent boycott of the late 1980s persisted and succeeded where other forms of opposition, including pass, transport and consumer boycotts, and work stoppages, had been crushed effectively by the state. It extracted major concessions from the state and provided an issue which supported the growth and development of a national civic urban movement (chapters 4 and 5).

In the context of community participation this historical development proved important for two reasons. Firstly, the emphasis placed on this issue in South Africa provided valuable experience, since there was so little international literature on community participation in infrastructure provision. Secondly, the relationship between the state, the civic movement and infrastructure provision could be studied over time, because the issue (of infrastructure provision) was central to the formation of the civic movement. This proved useful in drawing comparisons with other mass urban movements, particularly those in Latin America.

Up to February 1990 the struggle for participation could be classified as a textbook example of empowerment in the Latin American mode (chapter 2). A mass movement was making demands on the state in an environment of confrontation and was successful in its demands. When the transitional phase began in 1990, urban infrastructure remained a top priority. The government was prepared to allocate large sums of money to upgrading projects. However, this could only be done with the support of local civic bodies who, even if they did not control the townships completely, could prevent the government and local authorities from implementing projects there. Public bodies were therefore forced into a negotiation process. An example of this is the Witwatersrand
Metropolitan Chamber, called to discuss the future of Johannesburg and Soweto. As part of this negotiating process, all rent arrears were cancelled.

After February 1990 a new form of community participation began to develop, although this had been apparent earlier in isolated instances. Firstly, the contextual surround to the participation process began to change. Although the minority government itself remained illegitimate the structures of government which were negotiating infrastructure provision were themselves the focus of a higher level negotiation process. The negotiation process thus created a form of legitimacy. Secondly, the negotiations took place in a period of rapidly increasing urbanisation and a deteriorating economy. This meant that negotiations were about not simply the provision of infrastructure, but also about the level of infrastructure, since the state’s negotiators argued that there were insufficient funds to provide full levels of service for everyone. Thus the structure of local government and differing levels of service became the central issues of the community participation debate.

Community participation per se is not always necessary in infrastructure provision. It is not practiced in developed countries where there is a high level of service provided. In this situation the thesis identified four facets to the management of infrastructure, which make that infrastructure acceptable to the community and hence make community participation unnecessary. These facets are:

1. The local government system itself has legitimacy.

2. The cost of providing services is affordable to the target user group.

3. There is an adequate institutional capacity.

4. The infrastructure services provided represent the optimum technical solution which provides maximum user convenience.
When these facets are under stress there are two possible outcomes. The first is to revert to the status quo by increasing the resources available. This is what Johannesburg and Soweto are trying to achieve in negotiations in the Metropolitan Chamber. However, if these goals are achieved in Johannesburg/Soweto, and this is by no means certain given Johannesburg’s deteriorating status as a borrower in the capital market, it will only be because: (i) the existing infrastructure base is the highest of any combined area in the country; (ii) the combined geographical area has managed to exclude virtually all informal settlements; and (iii) there is a substantial injection of external funding made possible by Soweto’s high political profile (chapter 5.8).

The second outcome is the one which exists in other anglophone countries in Africa and is likely to be the dominant one in South Africa. The stresses on the urban management system become too great to regain the status quo. In this situation there is a perception of increasing illegitimacy, accompanied by a deterioration in the power base of the local authority. This is due to (i) a loss of power to central government; (ii) a deteriorating fiscal base which reduces the financial credibility of the local authority and increases the leverage of lending institutions; and (iii) diminishing technical and institutional capacity. The weakened technical base in turn provides more power over the decision-making process in infrastructure provision to the technical professionals outside the local authority, and often outside the country. Concurrently the role of these professional, particularly engineers, is greatly expanded. Whereas in developed countries they would have a limited, clearly defined technical brief, in many developing countries they need to take cognisance of factors such as job creation (by labour-based construction for example), maintenance capacity and training for maintenance, different cost-recovery scenarios and the multiplicity of social factors, discussed briefly below, which are the product of any decision to lower the standard of infrastructure service. The weakened institutional base increases the power of other bodies such as parastatals, e.g. an electrical authority, who have a peripheral interest in the area. Finally there is the weakened political base which strengthens the role of community and non-governmental organisations. All of these factors act to diminish the power of the
local authority even further and lead to the spiral of local authority fragmentation shown in figure 7.4.

The role of technical professionals becomes a central one in this situation. They are often given the power to determine the levels of service to be provided, which is done on the basis of perceived affordability. However, choosing different levels of service in this way has wider implications than are identified by a simple analysis of cost and technical sophistication. These extend into the social, political and economic areas, as illustrated by the case study of Kwathandeka (chapter 6). The technical professionals' criterion of cost is set against wider social political and economic needs of the community (chapter 6). In these situations community involvement in technical decision-making can become more critical to the participation process than involvement in political decision-making. Technical professionals are thus faced with interaction with the community across a broad spectrum of issues.

10.3 Community participation and development

Development, in its wider sense, has provided a wealth of experience in community participation. The literature on community participation in development can be divided into two categories. The first, and by far the largest, is case study material concerned with implementation, usually of specific grassroots projects. To date however there has been only one substantial published case study of infrastructure provision (chapter 2.6.1). The second category, which is more relevant to this thesis, is far smaller. This is the literature that views participation from a conceptual perspective. This in turn can be divided into two categories. The first looks at the macro perspective, i.e. community participation in relation to social history and the history of development. The second is concerned with overcoming the mass of contradictions and interpretations, in order to provide some form of conceptual framework.
A common interpretation of community participation is to place it within a paradigm, based upon one of the theories of economic development. Thus community development, as an early form of community participation, can be linked to modernisation theory and the failings of community development can be explained in terms of the demise of that theory. The rise in popularity of dependency and underdevelopment theories has inspired new approaches to community participation based upon concepts such as empowerment and consciencisacion. This latter approach to participation was then considered to have superseded community development, as dependency theory superseded modernisation theory. This thesis showed that this is not in fact the case and, in addition, that this interpretation, although popular, does not have a strong theoretical basis. Community development continues to flourish in many parts of the world and what is actually occurring is that, far from empowerment and consciencisacion superseding community development, each approach operates successfully in different situations (chapter 2.5). However, neither approach can be successfully adapted to community participation in infrastructure provision in those areas suffering the political, economic and technical stresses described in chapter 7.

By tracing the history of the two different approaches to community participation (community development and empowerment) specific characteristics were identified which categorised those approaches (chapter 2.5). From the author’s South African case study material, comparable characteristics were then identified which categorised infrastructure provision along the same lines. The result was an interpretation of community development, empowerment and infrastructure provision projects in terms of five categories of comparable characteristics (table 9.1). These five characteristics were described as:

1. The openness of government to the inclusion of the community in the decision-making process.
2. The nature of the decisions to be made, e.g. social, political, financial, economic and/or technical (which reflect the number and complexity of the variables within the project).

3. Technical involvement in the decision-making process and the associated impact of the time value of money (i.e. that time expended costs money).

4. Homogeneity of the community.

5. Instruments of participation.

By analysing each category in turn in respect of the three project types described above, categories 2, 3 and 4 were all found to be inter-related, with each one measuring a different aspect of the complexity of community involvement in the decision-making process around those projects, while category 5 was found to be of more direct relevance to the implementation of the projects. Thus projects covered by the community development and empowerment approaches to community participation, as well as those involved with infrastructure provision, could all be defined in terms of two primary variables: openness of government and complexity of the project. This led to the unified project environment shown in figure 9.1.

10.4 Arenas of community participation

Further analysis identified four sectors within this environment, three of which were different arenas of community participation, and the fourth an arena where community participation was not viable. The four arenas were described as:

1. The arena of inclusion, where government dominates the decision-making process but is open to community involvement. Projects in this arena are simple. Successful community development projects fall into this arena.
2. The arena of confrontation. Here government is closed to community involvement in the decision-making process but, because projects are simple, the community is able to mobilise successfully around specific issues. Successful empowerment projects fall into this arena.

3. The arena of consensus. Here government is open to the involvement of the community. However, because the nature of decision-making is complex, neither the government nor the community can dominate the community participation process and a new form of participation is required based upon consensus. Infrastructure projects fall into this arena.

4. The arena of exclusion. Here a "closed" authoritarian government has the power to prevent community access to information. Because of the complexity of the decision-making process, this makes any form of community participation extremely difficult.

10.5 The elements of community participation

Much of the conceptual literature on community participation is concerned with creating some form of structure which will provide a basis for understanding community participation, but this is all constructed around three elements of community participation: objectives, intensity and instruments (chapter 3.3.5). The outcome is three schools of thought, each based upon a permutation of these elements, which can be defined in terms of three conceptual frameworks, namely:

1. A conceptual framework based upon intensity. This indicator reflects the degree of community involvement in the participation process. Much of the early work on community participation was built around this indicator. Arnstein's ladder (chapter 3.3.1) is one example. This
conceptual framework defines a community participation structure which operates within the arena of inclusion.

2. A framework based upon objectives. Here there is a recognition that there may be different objectives in creating a community participation process, reflecting, for example, the different perceptions or needs of different parties. The assumption implicit in this framework is that one objective will dominate. Carried to its extreme this framework leads to Moser's concept of the "means and end" duality of objectives, whereby community participation exists either as a means to achieve an external objective or as an end in itself (chapter 3.5). This framework is linked to empowerment and describes the situation within the arena of confrontation.

3. A conceptual framework developed by Paul (chapter 3.3.5) and based upon all three elements of: objectives-intensity-instruments. In this framework, objectives and intensity are considered as separate variables, both of which contribute to the definition of the participation process. This is a more sophisticated framework, which can operate within the arena of inclusion. It can provide an evaluation tool for community participation projects operating in the arena of consensus but is not a conceptual framework for this arena.

This construct explains the chronological development of thinking around community development and empowerment. None of these conceptual frameworks can provide a satisfactory explanation of how community participation should function in many current projects. This failure stems from the de-linking of paradigms and conceptual frameworks in a changing environment. For example, community development was linked to modernisation theory. Now, however, it operates with success within a context of basic needs, which can equally be described as a development theory. Similarly in Latin America the efficacy of the confrontational empowerment view, with its associated "means and end" duality, is being questioned in situations of increased opening up and democratisation of
government. The unified project environment defined in this thesis provided a broader perspective within which different approaches can be studied for different types of projects.

The three elements of objectives, intensity and instruments described above were found to be inadequate for community participation in infrastructure provision. Other authors had identified other elements of participation which needed explanation. Matching these with the research carried out in the South African case studies, a total of eight elements of community participation were identified. These all need to be clearly understood for projects to operate successfully in the arena of consensus. The eight elements are:

- instruments (of participation);
- the arena within which the participation process operates;
- identification of the primary actors;
- the roles, agendas and relationships of the different actors;
- the point of input into the participation process, and who decides this;
- the practical implementation of the participation framework;
- the differing needs of the community, which is rarely homogeneous;
- the needs of the other actors.

What previous conceptual frameworks termed the objectives of community participation now divides into two separate elements: the differing needs of the community and the needs of other actors. Intensity is also no longer considered to be an element of community participation. Within the arena of consensus the success of the community participation process can be judged by the extent to which consensus has been achieved, and by the intensity of participation. These two criteria are therefore not elements making an input into the process, to be defined beforehand, but output indicators, to be assessed during, and on completion of, the process.
10.6 A conceptual framework for community participation in infrastructure provision

The main difference between operating in a complex project environment and a simple one is the number of actors involved. The decision-making process is no longer the preserve of the government and the community organisation. In the provision of infrastructure in South Africa these actors were identified (in chapter 7.5.2) as:

- the municipal authority;
- national, regional and local government departments;
- parastatal and private utility companies;
- local community organisations, both political and non-political;
- regional and national mass-based organisation;
- individual families within the community, in the role of consumers of the service;
- financial institutions;
- development professionals;
- NGOs (service organisations);
- construction companies.

Four key factors emerged from the analysis of actors in this process:

1. Each of the actors has their own set of needs and priorities and their own agenda. All of these needs are valid concerns which need to be recognised by the project (chapter 7.5.3).

2. The actors needs are linked to specific facets of the local authority management system. In prioritising their own interests, this acts to fragment the local authority management structure (chapter 7.9).
3. The technical role is more complex than in projects in developed countries. The different needs described above create conflicting demands on the technical professionals (chapter 7.5.3).

4. The community participation is itself of greater complexity. Meaningful participation is no longer a simple matter of political control. Instead the community involvement extends into three areas: (i) the political decision-making; (ii) the technical and managerial decision-making; and (iii) ensuring that the personal needs and expectations of the individual families or groups within the community are recognised and accommodated. The last area can broadly be termed consumer satisfaction. These three areas of involvement can create tensions and contradictions for community organisations to the extent that different community organisations may be required to represent the community in expressing these different needs.

The thesis identified seven major areas of need:

- project time and cost constraints;
- product quality;
- affordability;
- job creation;
- consumer satisfaction;
- control over decision making;
- control over skills and experience.

In this situation projects no longer have a single objective. All of the above needs are valid concerns of different actors and all have to be taken into account. It is the combination of actors and needs which defines the conceptual framework for community participation in infrastructure provision.
10.7 A working model for community participation in infrastructure provision

The thesis developed the concept of a graphical "relational model" (chapter 8, figures 8.1-8.6) as an analytical tool with which to explore the relationship between different actors. This model expresses in graphical form the principles of the relationship and provides the structure to translate this into an implementation strategy. In developing this relational model for a project, four key issues were identified which have to be addressed. These are:

1. Determining the point of entry of the community. Theoretically the community may be involved from the beginning but in practice it is necessary to determine who represents the community and what are community needs and priorities. This information can be gathered by social surveys, but then who controls this process? The research points to an enhanced role for a facilitator which goes beyond that necessary in the other arenas of community participation.

2. To ensure acceptance, by the external actors, of the principle of equal treatment of needs. The solution to this problem is in two parts. The first is an education process with all actors to understand the concept of what Goulet calls different rationalities (chapter 2). This leads to the recognition that other rationalities, which view the same problem from a different perspective, have equal validity. The second part is the weighting of different needs. In the analysis of the KwaThandeka project in chapter 6 the concept of a performance specification was developed for the evaluation of different technical options. This is discussed below.

3. That certain actors have more than one need. This is the issue which might create problems for the community organisations. Chapter 8 showed how this might be overcome by means of a division of responsibility within the community.
4. That one actor may have a strong objection to the inclusion of the needs of a second actor.

Whilst actors may have more than one need, all will have one need which dominates. The thesis developed a classification system whereby needs are divided into four categories for each actor, reflecting that actors attitude towards each. These four categories are dominant, secondary, neutral and antagonistic. A way of matching actors and needs in this way is shown in the matrix in figure 9.4.

The case study of KwaThandeka was concerned with resolving the issues described above. The work highlighted the problem arising from a fundamental difference in the perception of two central parties (technical professionals, supported by the provincial government administration, and community groups) as to what constituted a service. This difference, in an atmosphere of political mistrust, led to a polarisation of the two parties to the extent that communication between them became extremely difficult. The centrality of the difference in perception was shown to be that the technical professionals saw the infrastructure in terms of what it was, i.e. a physical infrastructure on which money had been expended which had to be recovered. Capital cost recovery dominated this thinking. The community viewed the service in terms of what it did, i.e. how it performed at a specific point in time. This thinking was concerned only with operational factors. As a result the case study identified the need to separate capital from operating and maintenance costs in the discussion of project implementation.

Based upon the community perceptions of services the case study then developed a performance specification, which covered all aspects of the service performance, and which could be defined in terms of three parameters: (i) reliability; (ii) health and safety; and (iii) social, cultural and political acceptability. These parameters could then be measured, respectively, in terms of: (i) a technical specification; (ii) the satisfaction of basic needs; and (iii) user convenience. The third measure, user convenience, was quantified extensively in chapter 7. Coupled with two social surveys of the community, which proved to be an
essential part of the process, the detailed analysis of the current situation, together with the options for further development, formed the basis of consensus on the future of KwaThandeka, not only in terms of its infrastructure provision, but also in terms of its wider development. Effectively this negotiation process constituted a form of multi-objective decision making.

10.8 An implementation strategy for community participation in infrastructure provision

The primary task of the implementation strategy is to define the roles that each actor will play in the project as well as the relationship between them. The reason why the definition of roles and relationships is so important is because the procedure ensures that all parties commit themselves formally to what was previously a set of theoretical principles. This is a complex procedure and much of the author's case study work was concerned with this issue. The experience gained from KwaThandeka (chapter 6) was used in the IDT projects (chapter 8). Broad consensus was reached, on all three projects described, with regard to the level of services, so that these case studies concentrated on two sets of issues: (i) the wider relationship between parties expressed in the relational model, and (ii) the internal problems faced by communities when they become involved in the process of infrastructure provision. The case studies highlighted four potential constraints which can prevent, or at least hinder, the successful implementation of an agreed working model. These were:

1. Parties being unwilling to carry through commitments agreed at the earlier stage.

2. Parties being faced with internal conflicts which were not recognised at an earlier stage.

3. Parties being unable to fulfil their functions due to external factors outside of their control.
4. The choice of the most appropriate instrument of community participation

The thesis provided examples of each of these and showed how the relational model could be used to plot these changes. The first and second constraints applied equally to all parties while the latter two points were found to be particularly relevant to community organisations. Whereas the first two tended to reflect ideological difficulties, the latter two reflected deeper structural problems, stemming from the discrepancy in knowledge and skills between the technical groups and the community organisations. The community and their representative organisations are the central element of this participation process. For them to operate successfully in this environment they must have access to all relevant information. This process of accessing information was found to have two components. The first was the supply of information in a usable form. This was achieved through the structure, i.e. the phased development of the different stages of the process, described in chapter 9. The second was understanding and processing the information internally. This required training. In the case studies (chapter 8), two different ways of carrying out this function were used, neither of which proved totally satisfactory. Part of the reason for this was lack of funds. For the implementation strategy to work funding has to be available for this training, which then has to form part of the wider project facilitation process.

The choice of instruments of community participation becomes crucial at this point. NGOs have been portrayed as the best vehicle for this role. However the two components of information transfer actually require two different types of skills. The first is that of managing the structure and the participation process itself. Key attributes here were found to be management skills; a wide knowledge of social, technical and economic aspects; and independence from, and neutrality towards, the other actors in the process. The second required a training capacity and an understanding of, and empathy with, community structures and organisations. NGOs are well suited to the second but less experienced in the first. In addition the thesis research questioned whether, in practice, these two
roles could be carried out by a single body. The work carried out in this thesis indicates that two separate facilitation roles may be necessary.

10.9 The process of community participation in infrastructure provision

The thesis has defined a process for community participation in infrastructure provision, which links together for the first time all the different components and elements of that process within a cohesive structure. The components represent the different stages of the process which make up the structure, from the original identification of the project environment through to evaluation. In this form the structure can be compared to the project cycle. The elements represent different facets of the participation process. These elements do not exist in isolation, but are linked to the different components of the process in the manner illustrated graphically in figure 10.1, and described below. To highlight the various elements and components of the process, the former (the elements) are underlined, while the latter (the components) are highlighted.

Firstly, a study of the project environment will determine the most appropriate community participation arena for a specific project, in terms of project complexity and the openness of government to the involvement of the community in the decision-making process, and the process will then move from the wider environment into the appropriate operating arena. In this way the arena represents both a component of the structure and an element of the process, a dual function which illustrates its importance and its centrality to the success of the wider community participation process. Community participation in complex projects, and this includes the majority of infrastructure provision projects in developing countries, falls within the arena of consensus. The remainder of the structure relates to the interaction of elements and components within this specific arena.
FIGURE 10.1: THE PROCESS OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION

THE PROJECT ENVIRONMENT

AREN OF CONSENSUS
- Definition of the Arena of community participation within which the project operates, in terms of complexity and openness of government

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
- Identification of actors
- Different needs of the community
- Needs of other actors

WORKING MODEL
- Point of entry of the community
- Identification of the instruments of participation

IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY
- Practical implementation
- Role and relationships of different actors

EVALUATION OF THE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION PROCESS
- Intensity of community involvement
- Extent of consensus
The appropriate conceptual framework identified for this arena (of consensus) is one which matches the various actors involved in the project with their own, and other actors', needs. This includes all the differing needs of the community. This framework recognises that the community can have more than one need and that different interest groups may be required to adequately represent these diverse needs and it therefore represents an idealised, general state which then needs to be "tailored" to a specific project.

This practical application of the conceptual framework is a two stage process. The first is the generation of a working model. Here the information on the community is gathered and working structures established for the different community organisations. This stage marks the point of entry of the community into the process, formalises the relationship between parties and establishes the operational principles for the project. The identification of appropriate instruments of participation is also agreed at this stage.

The second stage of practical application of the conceptual framework is the implementation strategy, which deal with the detail of the practical implementation. In particular, this stage of the process defines the roles that each actor will play in the project and the relationship between them. The final component of the structure is the evaluation of the community participation process, the success of which can be gauged by monitoring two criteria: (i) the extent of consensus achieved; and (ii) the intensity of community involvement in the process.

10.10 Further research

1. Instruments of community participation

For success all forms of community participation depend upon having the appropriate instruments of participation. The research indicated that, for community participation in infrastructure provision, neither of the two
dominant instruments of participation (community development workers and NGOs) are ideally suited to this function. The reason for this is that two distinct instruments are required. The first is that of manager of the process, which requires an facilitator who is independent of the other parties and neutral in terms of their own agenda. The second is that of trainer and possibly technical support group to the community organisations. This requires a body which understands, and is sympathetic to, the needs of the community organisation.

2. Application to other areas of development

The project environment developed in this thesis incorporates the two dominant approaches to community participation currently practiced, i.e. community development and empowerment. In making the transfer to a complex project environment however only infrastructure projects have been used to develop the conceptual framework, working model and implementation strategy. There is a need to evaluate other types of project which operate in this complex environment against the participation process and structure defined here.

3. Application to infrastructure projects in rural areas

Community participation in the majority of these projects operates within the arena of inclusion. However, there is a gradually increasing complexity to these projects which is tending to move them towards the arena of consensus. Further research is needed to determine what happens to projects which operate in this transition zone. The affect of different systems of local government on the choice of an appropriate arena of community participation also requires investigation.
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

AHC: Amsterdam Home Committee

ANC: African National Congress

AZAPO: Azanian People's Organisation

BESG: Built Environment Support Group

BLA: Black Local Authority

CBO: Community-Based Organisation

CSIR: Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research

DBSA: Development Bank of Southern Africa

DPU: Development Planning Unit (University College, London)

IDT: Independent Development Trust
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>ILGS</td>
<td>Institute for Local Government Studies (University of Birmingham)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCC</td>
<td>Johannesburg City Council</td>
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<td>JMC</td>
<td>Joint Management Committee</td>
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<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kwathandeka Local Authority</td>
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<td>LRC</td>
<td>Legal Resources Centre</td>
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<td>MLL</td>
<td>Minimum Living Level</td>
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<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>Natal Provincial Administration</td>
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<td>Port Elizabeth Black Civic Association</td>
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TBVC : Transkei-Bophuthatswana-Venda-Ciskei

TRAC : Transvaal Rural Action Committee

TPA : Transvaal Provincial Administration

UBS : Urban Bantu Council

UDF : United Democratic Front

UF : Urban Foundation

UNCHS : United Nations Centre for Human Settlements

UNESCO : United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

UNRISD : United Nations Research Institute for Social Development

USAID : United States Agency for International Development

WRAB : West Rand Administration Board