LIVELIHOODS AND THE TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL OF THE CITY OF RUSTENBURG

By
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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Johannesburg, 2015
I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. It is submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not
been submitted before for any degree or examination to any other University.

(Ngakaemang Benjamin Mosiane)
July, 2015
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Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at, are mine and are not necessarily to be attributed to any person or institution referred to above.
Abstract

Cities are characterised by a contradictory dynamic of opportunities for and the suppression of the livelihoods of the poor. At the turn of the twentieth century, well into the first half of that century, Rustenburg was defined by a broad-based participation in the local economy. Although black people’s involvement in that economy was marked by the relation of dependency to the dominant, white social formations, they both managed their relationship with the city and contributed to its vibrancy. Today, the same is true for livelihood activities in this city. However, from the mid-1990s (as it was the case from the 1940s until the official end of apartheid) various forces are delivering Rustenburg into an elite space of formal cultural practices. With that said, such exercises of power are not generalisable to the whole city. Thus, the way various sites of the city are constituted and valorised affect whether or not ordinary people can build livelihoods and pursue other goals in and through such sites. Overall, the redevelopment practices in Rustenburg bring into focus the tensions of city life – urban residents and the city space are agents of social reproduction on the one hand and are resources for creating emancipatory spaces on the other. In this sense, living and making a living in the city involves mediating such tensions – although the new spaces produced by the body and the dream often cohere into real material landscape that shapes everyday practices and social identities, the sensual, rationality, history, and the landscape provide resources for continual exploration and reproduction of new spaces of emancipation from poverty and domination.
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BONUME</td>
<td>Bophuthatswana National Union of Mineworkers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBD</td>
<td>Central Business District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Code of the Commission of Immigrant and Asian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Dutch Reformed Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIFA</td>
<td>Federation of International Football Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Employment and Redistribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMS</td>
<td>Hermannsburg Missionary Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSDS</td>
<td>Health and Social Development Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDE</td>
<td>Code for <em>Secretaris van Lande</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>LGNF</td>
<td>Local Government Negotiating Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIG</td>
<td>Municipal Infrastructure Grant</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRB</td>
<td>Code for <em>Stadsklerk</em> Rustenburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NARS</td>
<td>National Archives and Records Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTS</td>
<td>Code for the <em>Departement van Naturellesake</em> (Native Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUM</td>
<td>National Union of Mineworkers</td>
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<tr>
<td>OVC</td>
<td>Orphaned and Vulnerable Children</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>Previously Disadvantaged Areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>PVA</td>
<td>Public Viewing Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBA</td>
<td>Royal Bafokeng Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBEB</td>
<td>Royal Bafokeng Economic Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBED</td>
<td>Royal Bafokeng Economic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBH</td>
<td>Royal Bafokeng Holdings</td>
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<td>RBI</td>
<td>Royal Bafokeng Institute</td>
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<td>RBN</td>
<td>Royal Bafokeng</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBNMP</td>
<td>Royal Bafokeng Nation Master Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBSC</td>
<td>Royal Bafokeng Sports Campus</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBSP</td>
<td>Royal Bafokeng Sports Palace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCCPC</td>
<td>Rustenburg Co-operative Packhouse Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RLM</td>
<td>Rustenburg Local Municipality</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTC</td>
<td>Rustenburg Transitional Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAB</td>
<td>South African Breweries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANCO</td>
<td>South African National Civic Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STK</td>
<td>Code for the <em>Bevolkingse en Statistiek</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAB</td>
<td>Code for the Transvaal <em>Argief Bewaarplek</em> (Transvaal Archives Depot).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAR</td>
<td>Zuid Afrikaanse Rand (South African Rand)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1

Livelihoods and the transformative potential of the city of Rustenburg, South Africa

1.1 Introduction

This research examines the extent to which ordinary poor people are able to harness a city’s resources to reshape their lives within the context of changes in practices of livelihood formation, landscape forms as well as social identities. The resources of the city being referred to here are services and facilities such as universal public amenities, stronger markets for informal economic activities, and opportunities for networks of support between the informal economic sector on the one hand, and the formal advocacy organisations, state and private agencies on the other. Such resources also include interacting in ideas as well as trade supply and market networks with migrants and migrant operators. It is for these reasons of the local and distanciated networks as well as the concentrations of people, things and institutions that cities are attractive to people from rural areas (among other places), who in the context of circular rural-urban migration, use their rural support networks and bring to the city the more rural ways of life – attitudes of sociality as well as various forms of economic activities such as traditional beer brewing and livestock rearing.

It is on the basis of that reality of city life that I discuss in this thesis the transformative potential of cities – the possibilities for a city’s facilities and services to be useful for ordinary people to build livelihoods and to use such livelihood assets to pursue other ends. In that potentiality for ordinary poor people’s socio-cultural and economic transformations, I place emphasis more on the contexts and practices which enable or inhibit livelihood initiatives, than on specific indicators. Such indicators are identified during the research process as determined by ordinary people themselves (even though their preferences are outcomes of historically constructed local norms as well as the more global functions of landscapes and commodities).

I begin the discussions in this introductory chapter by making brief remarks on the ideas of ‘ordinary people’ and ‘livelihoods’ as well as the limitations of this thesis. I then move on to discuss the intellectual context within which this research is placed and identify specific themes that frame its analysis.
1.2 Absences and definitional clarifications

One of the themes that is glaringly absent from the discussions in this thesis is the role of organised groups for constructing spaces of livelihood formation. Indeed the life of the city, in which livelihoods are constructed, is constituted by a wide range of actors, interacting in particular ways in specific spaces and times. For example, a city may be constituted by any combination of relations: the everyday informal economic actors; the loosely organised social and political formations; the state’s increased control on social life; ordinary people’s collective resistances against such controls; the state’s actions as “a consummate agent of – rather than a regulator of – the market” (Smith, 2002: 427).

In that conception of the city as a highly complex space of differentiated socio-spatial relations, the excluded groups often take on an exterior, antagonistic position, expressed through particular relationships with an institutional authority such as the state – ordinary poor people tend to act individually or in networks that focus on livelihood formation and are prone to mass outbursts of anger because of their lack of sufficient material resources and limited access to centres of power and the judicial system (Ballard, Habib and Valodia, 2006; Ballard, et al., 2005).

Ordinary people’s less structured efforts to build livelihoods at times emerge into popular leadership, and thus become effective when such efforts converge with those of organised formations (Freedom Park in Rustenburg, one of my research sites, was formed as a space for building livelihoods at a time when that place also became useful for labour struggles in the mines – mineworkers moved out of their conflict-ridden hostels to live and organise their protests at Freedom Park).

The inner city of Rustenburg is another research site I used. The activities of Kgetsi Ya Tsie hawkers organisation there, with the support of the Legal Resources Centre¹, have mainly served to delay the application of the Rustenburg Local Municipality’s (RLM) ‘cleaning up operations’ on Fatima Bayat Street and on the bus and taxi ranks. However, such

¹The Legal Resources Centre is a South African human rights organisation. It advocates for the protection of vulnerable and marginalised people (including poor, homeless, and landless people and communities) against various forms of discrimination on the basis of their social, economic, and class positions as well as other categories of exclusion such as race, gender, and disability.
interventions have not been able to secure Fatima Bayat Street and other parts of the bus and taxi ranks as spaces of livelihood formation for ordinary people because street trader organisations there tend to be weak. Thus, although I discuss the collective actions where and when ordinary people are involved, I mainly focus on their everyday socio-cultural and economic practices because such practices are mainly undertaken in a less organised manner.

Similarly, Bafokeng’s conflicts with the mining companies (between 1925-1952 and 1966-1999) shaped their political subjectivity. The conflicts were over mineral prospecting and operating contracts as well as associated land purchases (Mbenga and Manson, 2010). Such struggles also prepared some Bafokeng for new rounds of contestations in the post-apartheid era, rooted in historical patterns of landownership and contemporary socio-economic inequities. The groups within Bafokeng challenge their history of common heritage, claiming that they affiliated with and submitted themselves under the Bafokeng tribal authority since the mid-nineteenth century well into the twentieth century for a strategic purpose: to pull together resources (cattle and cash, for example) required to buy land (Caldwell, 2002.). Despite these and other collective struggles in the broader Rustenburg area, many of the activities associated with ordinary poor people’s livelihood activities are loosely organised. It is for this reason that the scholarly works on Bafokeng such as Mnwana (2011), Ndaba (2010) and September (2010) cannot be fruitfully used in my thesis – they are focused on organised community contestations over land, without making links to the everyday activities of livelihood formation.

I mainly use the idea of ‘ordinary people’ rather than ‘the poor’ because the latter has increasingly come to be seen as pejorative in public and academic discourse (Escobar, 1995). Indeed recognition of poor people’s resources that are not based on income led to the World Bank, governments and some civil society institutions affirming, not rejecting, the conditions of the poor (RSA, 2002b). In contrast to this view, I am particularly using the idea of ordinary people as a way of acknowledging that poor people can move in and out of poverty,

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2 Phokeng, the capital of Bafokeng, is one of my research sites. The name Bafokeng has come to be used more recently to refer to a conglomeration of people, the core of whom were called the Fokeng. “Ba” (as in Bafokeng) stands for the English article “the”, and in line with the Setswana language, it has come to be incorporated into the name Bafokeng. It is for this reason that in this thesis I speak of Bafokeng, rather than ‘the Bafokeng’. “Ba-” (as in Bafokeng) indicates more than one person in Setswana, while “Mo-” (as in Mofokeng) indicates one person. The Bafokeng territory in Rustenburg today is made up of 29 villages and about 300,000 people (this number includes non-Bafokeng migrants).
depending on a portfolio of livelihood assets that individuals, households, communities, and groups can amass in particular places and times. This is particularly the case given that livelihood activities have come to denote power-riddled social, political, and economic relationships, rather than conditions of assetless-ness (Bebbington, 2007). Additionally, in contrast to the aforementioned affirmations of the poor’s non-monetary resources, I consider significant ordinary people’s agency to improve their situations, but also consider that the class, ethnic, and gender categories of difference influence, rather than define, what they do. Thus, since location influences the composition of livelihood portfolios, I use the case studies of Freedom Park, the inner city and Phokeng in Rustenburg as representative spaces of where ordinary people live and/or work; where their economic status, social networks, and relationships are expressed and reworked. Broadly, my thesis’ discussions are about ‘a city’ (using Rustenburg as an example) from the point of view of ordinary people’s livelihood activities.

The idea of livelihoods has come to be used conceptually since the 1990s to capture ordinary people’s means of gaining a living; to capture their entitlements, strategic assets, capitals and capabilities (Perreault, 2009). Academics and practitioners such as Johnston-Anumonwo and Oberhauser (2011), Rakodi and Lloyd-Jones (2002), Ashley and Carney (1999), and Moser (1996) use it methodologically to think about or support ordinary people’s ways of making a living, their strategies and livelihood goals. Despite their focus on urban contexts (in addition to those that are rural), what is common about these kinds of academic and policy works is the limited attention they pay to ‘theories about cities’ and how such theories speak to livelihood activities. In some ways, Robinson’s (2002) critique of the global city theory, among other aspects of her discussions, points to this lacuna of urban studies divided against itself – urban theory separated from development studies. A claim I am making in this thesis is that I am not aware of research work that makes links between urban theory and livelihoods in the ways I do in my thesis – I claim this as one of the contributions that my thesis is making.

As an income generating sector, the informal economy is one of the most common elements of livelihood activities. Against the backdrop of growing sentiments opposed to

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3 Failure to amass livelihood assets often lead to ‘absolute poverty’, a condition in which the problem of access to resources may render an individual or a group of people incapable of satisfying the minimum requirements for clothing, food, and/or shelter. The idea of ‘chronic poverty’ captures the long-term condition of poverty that is both inter-generational and experienced over the length of a person’s life.
distinguishing between the formal and informal economic sectors (Roy, 2011), to date Rogerson’s (1996) earlier work remains useful for demonstrating the significance of such distinctions as well as the forms they take (see Table 1.1).

Table 1.1: The differences between growth enterprises and survivalist enterprises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Viable Enterprises</th>
<th>Survivalist Enterprises</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Their defining feature is their potential to develop and flourish into larger business enterprises.</td>
<td>Their defining feature is poverty and the attempts to survive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They are very small businesses, often involving only the owner, some family members, and at most one to four paid employees.</td>
<td>They represent a set of activities undertaken by people unable to secure regular wage employment or unable to secure access to an economic sector of their choice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They lack all the trappings of formality in terms of business licences, formal premises, operating permits, and accounting procedures. Most of them have a limited capital base, and their operators possess rudimentary business skills.</td>
<td>The incomes generated from these enterprises, the majority of which tend to be run by women, usually fall short of even a minimum standard of income, with little capital investment, virtually no skills training, and only constrained opportunities for expansion into a viable business.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They are commonly found in areas of some economic potential.</td>
<td>They are commonly located in areas of low market potential.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Rogerson (1996)

The viable, ‘growth’ micro-enterprises (small-scale production and construction activities) are seen to be able to make connections with actors across and beyond the city, and are thus crucial in improving ordinary people’s lives and the urban economy (Peberdy and Rogerson, 2003). This is because the informal ‘second economy’ enterprises are seen to have the potential to develop and flourish into formal ‘first economy’ businesses (Rogerson, 2007). In my thesis, I concentrate on the survivalist enterprises/survivalist livelihood activities. If my research was to focus on viable forms of livelihoods, it would present a more triumphant statement on livelihoods and the transformative potential of cities. Thus, for the reason of constrained opportunities for survivalist enterprises to expand into viable socio-economic activities, my thesis assesses whether ordinary people are able to use the city’s resources to meaningfully improve their lives and to achieve other ends. Rather than reject the distinction between the formal and informal economic sectors, attention should be paid to the kinds of urban configurations and economies that form from interactions between them (Myers, 2011). This research project is particularly significant because participants in survivalist
forms of livelihood activities, which tend to yield low returns in social and economic terms, constitute the majority of participants in livelihood activities. I claim this as one of the contributions that my thesis is making – survivalist livelihood activities provide a useful measure to assess how meaningful are the post-apartheid socio-spatial, cultural and economic transformations.

1.3 The Rustenburg intellectual context

I use Campion and Cook’s (2006) paper to launch a discussion of the scholarly work on Rustenburg in which I situate my study. Campion and Cook (2006) examine the ways in which ‘Bafokeng young women and girls’ react to and interpret the global, national, and local educational and economic changes with regard to such women and girls’ hopes for the future. In the face of limited work opportunities, and thus the lack of motivation to do well at school; low literacy levels of family members; an education system fraught with administrative complications and mismanagement; the lack of money to pay for tertiary education; the emotional damage caused by poverty (hungry and drunk learners cannot concentrate well at school); and hopelessness and negativity among youth workers and teachers, young women and girls are not downhearted and discouraged. Instead, they take active and strategic roles in building social networks with local peers, boyfriends, family members, uncles, and neighbours: relationships that stretch to spaces across the country as their acquaintances, partners, and friends change location. In doing this, girls and young women not only create opportunities to obtain essentials (food) as well as luxuries (new clothes, for example), they also build relationships in order to create chances to obtain jobs (Campion and Cook, 2006).

However, by focusing their attention on building networks and not gaining a tertiary qualification – a strategy they learned from their mothers, aunts, sisters, and grandmothers (Bozzoli, 1991) – young women and girls are effectively undermining their chances for upward social mobility. They are entrenching dependency and exposing themselves to various forms of abuse and diseases. Campion and Cook’s (2006) work is illustrative of the kind of contemporary research that has been undertaken on the city of Rustenburg. It tends to focus mainly on the Bafokeng area, making limited links to resources such as land and other spaces of the city of Rustenburg as livelihood assets. The criticisms of livelihoods research often point to the survivalist thinking of this kind of research – that it is oblivious to the fact that during the era of neoliberalisation, ordinary people are being left to their own devices (Parnell et al., 2009). Even the scholarship that makes links to land as a livelihood asset is
limited to the Bafokeng territory (Capps, 2012; Kriel, 2010; Mbenga and Manson, 2010; Bergh, 2005; Caldwell, 2002). The exceptions to this are Simpson (1986), who attends to a number of ‘tribal places’ of the Rustenburg district, and Bozzoli (1991), who follows the political, social, and economic activities of ‘the women of Phokeng’ to Johannesburg. The recent work of Comaroff and Comaroff (2009) on Rustenburg is also focused on Bafokeng and other comparative elsewheres.

While part of the body of work identified above highlights the broader places of ordinary people’s socio-economic and political activities beyond Bafokeng territory, the discussions leave us with little knowledge of the city of Rustenburg itself – what is it that this city can or cannot offer to the people of Rustenburg as they adapt to the changes in social formations locally and beyond? Frankel’s (2013) work is representative of a more complex account of Rustenburg, making links among this city’s major constitutive elements – the underground places of work (shafts); informal settlements near mining shafts (using Nkaneng as an example); the labour sending areas; the local state (including traditional authorities and tribal places); and issues of the mining Charter of the Mineral and Petroleum Resource Development Act of 2002. With that said, Frankel’s (2013) use of ‘mineworker safety conditions’ as well as the Bench Marks Foundation’s (2013; 2012; 2007) and Rajak’s (2012) use of ‘corporate social investments’ as entry points to their discussions of the impact of the mining Charter on host communities (Rustenburg) allow them to provide only limited, albeit complex, accounts of relationships constituting Rustenburg – their discussions are limited because they do not account for the everyday socio-cultural, economic, and state activities outside the mine’s immediate lines of interactions, and how such activities themselves shape city life. There is, therefore, a need to examine how ordinary people (including mine workers) use the various spaces of the city to improve their lives, to recreate the city, and, in turn, how the city shapes their activities and experiences. I use the story of Nathi to illustrate what I mean by this and to highlight the major themes that organise this thesis.

Nathi is a Xhosa woman from the Eastern Cape, who joined her father (a mineworker at the time) in Rustenburg in order to attend school there. Upon completing high school, she unsuccessfully attempted cohabitation with a boyfriend, who was a mineworker. She now rents a plot of land in Phokeng, where she put up two shacks of her own. She lives by selling fat-cakes and coffee/tea to morning-shift mineworkers at the taxi and bus ranks in downtown Rustenburg. She employs three women from Lesotho and the former Transkei, and she makes
ZAR 500/600 per day. Nathi used part of that money to participate in a stokvel with ten people, contributing ZAR 1,000 per month. She has saved much of that money at the local post-office, and also paid fees for her son’s high school education and post-high school training. She also applied for and received a Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) house in Freedom Park because, as an unmarried woman (let alone being non-Mofokeng), she could neither have access to a plot nor an RDP house in the Bafokeng territory (ideally the Bafokeng administration does not allow state-provided RDP houses to be built in its territory for anyone). From her savings and with the assistance of her son (who now works at a local mine) she spent about ZAR 100,000 to rebuild her RDP house into a fancy, dream house (see Plate 1.1). This is remarkable because she spent much of this money on a flexible house foundation (as per building requirements associated with the cracking mining terrain).

Plate 1.1: Nathi’s sense of social transformation
Source: Photographs by Ngaka Mosiane

Nathi’s lived reality raises a number of issues and questions. First, it is evident that she would have not been able to enact livelihood activities without the use of Freedom Park, downtown Rustenburg, and Phokeng together (and possibly without the use of sites in the Eastern Cape).

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4 A stokvel is a voluntary savings association for those people with very little money to save at formal banking institutions. Members of the association pool together designated amounts of money each month, which goes to one member. At an occasion organised to give out that money, members of the stokvel and neighbours are expected to buy food, drinks, and alcohol as they indulge in mass singing and dancing – these activities are intended to allow the host to make money.

5 The RDP is an interventionist, state-led national development programme. It was adopted in 1994 in South Africa. Thus, the state provided benefits, especially housing, came to be and continue to be called RDP programmes. In 1996, the macro-economic framework – Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) – was introduced. It is a pro-market macro-economic strategy. There is little consensus existing in South Africa on whether GEAR replaced RDP, or whether GEAR is mainly a framework for economic stability and development while RDP guides the political and socio-cultural development processes.
Indeed this is consistent with Robinson’s (2002) suggestion that those connections of the city that extend only to its physical limits should be considered in imagining a city’s creativity and dynamism – an efficient and affordable public transport systems could strongly link Freedom Park, downtown Rustenburg, and Phokeng as well as sites within each area. Additionally, the relatively co-existing spaces of the city are seen to create conditions not only for money to circulate locally, but also for social and economic creativity. This is indeed the case regarding the three case studies, which form the basis of this thesis. Such intimate and relatively co-existing spaces of income generation and socio-cultural creativity have also been observed in places such as Ecuador (Bebbington, 1999) and Jakarta (Simone and Rao, 2012), and historically in South Africa (Hart and Pirie, 1984) and in the United States of America (Jacobs, 1961). Today, the South African Less Formal Establishment of Township Act (113 of 1991) can be creatively used to facilitate such a networked spatiality.

The theme of ‘spatial propinquity and distanciation’ is used in this thesis to discuss such an interconnected physical space: In the case of Phokeng, the intimate and mixed spatialities are constituted by the Bafokeng land (fractured, gendered, and exclusionary as it is): the chances to use that land to rent out rooms to migrants; the chances to use that land to build taverns and tuck-shops; the road networks that connect Bafokeng villages to one another and to major urban centres; health and school facilities; a business development centre as well as water and electricity services. In the first half of the 1990s, similarly, the intimate and relatively mixed spaces were being formed by ordinary people in the Rustenburg inner city sites: the expansion of street trading in shopfronts of formal businesses, the growth of supply sources for informal sector trade goods, the cosmopolitanisation of business ownership, the existing local purchasing power, the road and transport connections as well as personal and institutional networks across the city.

Additionally, the densities and concentrations of people, things, institutions and architectural forms of Rustenburg are in many ways connected to other parts of the world, making Rustenburg spatially open, being cross-cut by a number of mobilities. Indeed the international connections that are cultural and political as well as connections in urban design and urban planning constitute resources that can potentially improve city life (Robinson, 2002). The key point I am making is that spatial propinquity (both near and far due to modern transport and transport technologies) may create favourable conditions for livelihood creativity and experimentation in both traditional and modern contexts. In such situations, the sites,
services, and facilities in Phokeng and the inner city could have complemented one another to provide invaluable resources for livelihood formation had ordinary people been allowed to use them – rentals for operating shops and for accommodation are cheaper in rural areas with their proximity to the city increasing their value. In that sense, propinquity can be a resource itself. Instead, ordinary people’s imaginations have variously been truncated in a situation that is characterised not only by ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ forms of governance, but also by contemporary and historical structuring dynamics. The historical ideological and material forces as well as those that are more contemporary, have shaped and are being reshaped by ordinary people’s livelihood practices; providing opportunities and obstacles in various time-spaces. Although the interventions of the RLM and RBA are varied, they converge in their prestige-based, globally connected, and extensive forms (the stadium, the FIFA World Cup, the formal regeneration of the inner city). Notably, space and emotion are and have historically been connected in situations that are traditional, modern, and global.

Second, Nathi’s activities represent those of many ordinary people making a living in the bustling and fluid spaces of the city. Thus, ordinary people’s socio-cultural and economic activities are often presented in complex and poetic language (Simone, 2010b). My study is a more decipherable rendition of the flux of the life of the inner city Rustenburg: sex workers’ creative access to men for money in taverns; ordinary people’s performances of dances, music and splits for money; their flexible identities that can turn into living beings or non-living objects; as well as their full-blast music as a marketing tactic in public space – what other activities than these can speak more to the theme of the body and intellectuality for ordinary people to engage with the city? One can also make sense of ordinary people’s livelihood strategies such as street trading and stokvels. Their specific goals of building dream houses and educating their children can also be determined through interviews. Such strategies and goals are enacted as ordinary people stay put in Rustenburg, even though other spaces such as the Eastern Cape, Britain and China6 remain important to what they do. Thus, even though movement itself can become space because people are always on the move (Malaquais, 2007), it is ordinary people’s desire to find viable spaces that can be used as bases not only for livelihood formation, but also for rebuilding the city in their images.

6 The Eastern Cape is the home of Nathi’s parents, who play a role of moral support. Britain is a source of funding to non-government organisations in places such as Freedom Park. China buys platinum-related commodities (jewellery and catalytic converters). What happens in the Eastern Cape, Britain and China can positively or negatively affect Nathi’s ability to make a living and to pursue other ends.
(received and/or recreated) – the rebuilding of the city into a hodgepodge of the more urbane and rural lifestyles.

A growing body of work on southern urbanism is also useful for discussing these kinds of issues (Simone, 2010b; 2012; 2008a; 2008b; Pieterse, 2012; 2013a; 2013b; Roy, 2011; 2009; 2005; Malaquais, 2007). The major efforts of some of these scholars have been to push forward existing ideas (informality and periphery) and introduce new ones (intersection, social infrastructure) in order to address the spaces and practices of urban residents in cities of the global South. The effect of this scholarship can be seen as advancing livelihood research by highlighting relationships of all kinds, often unanticipated by urban residents and institutions. It also does this in the way it pays attention to everyday tactics such as small gestures, bets, intuitions, manoeuvres, calculations; as residents and institutions pull spaces, histories, and connections together. Broadly, despite its shortcomings of self-balkanisation into the global South as well as Simone’s (2010b) inaccessible language, the scholarship on southern urbanism is useful not only for thinking about what ordinary people themselves do to rebuild their lives and reshape the city, but also for connecting livelihood research to city studies. The theme of ‘the body and intellectuality’, as resources for ordinary people to engage with the city, is useful for thinking about the actions of ordinary people – the ways they create their own spaces that cannot be reduced to the rationality of abstract space. Therefore, together with ‘spatial propinquity and distanciation’, this idea of the body and intellectuality bring into sharp focus livelihoods as practices which are not only economic, grounded in place, but also social, sensual, and aspirational.

Third, the existing tendency for institutional support bias towards viable small businesses (while suppressing the survivalist informal economy) as well as the fact that by the 2010 Federation of International Football Association (FIFA) World Cup, the Rustenburg Local Municipality cleared street traders off the lucrative spaces of the inner city, both raise questions not only about the sustainability of ordinary people’s creativity and energy, but also about the transformative potential of cities. Nathis’s sale of fat-cakes and coffee/tea, as her main livelihood strategy, means that she sources her supplies mainly from the formal supermarket stores. Then, who actually benefits from the relationships among informality, the city, and the formal economy? Additionally, Nathi can only conduct her work in the inner city between 2am and 7am because of the ways in which the spaces of livelihood formation there are configured. Such spatial configurations are based on the reality that the city
embodies the aspirations and fears of those who have the power to create the city in their own image.

In that sense, the Rustenburg urban landscape is also a source of power for those who have come to control relations of social reproduction through their command of the city’s property market. However, the exercise of dominant power associated with such a landscape is not generalisable to the whole city. For example, since 1990, spaces such as Freedom Park have experienced little state interference in the way of livelihood formation. Thus, the different experiences of the three case studies in the city indicate that the way they are constituted and valorised affect the place of ordinary people and what such people can do in that place. Therefore, Simone’s (2010) work is indicative of how ordinary people’s geographies of livelihood formation are overlooked – where are the spaces of creativity built? How many people, and from which range of groups, participate, and for how long? Even in a medium-sized city like Rustenburg, the experiences of Freedom Park (as a space that is generative of socio-cultural and economic innovation and adaptation) can be seen to be confined to that space, and cannot be generalised for the city region. It is for this reason that I adopt a case-study approach, rather than a thematical one across case-studies.

Overall, the redevelopment practices in Rustenburg highlight the tensions of city life – the tensions between urban residents and the city space as agents of social reproduction on the one hand and as resources for creating emancipatory spaces on the other. In this sense, living and making a living in the city involves mediating such tensions. Although the new spaces produced by the body and the dream often cohere into real material landscape that shapes everyday practices and social identities, the sensual, rationality, history, and the landscape provide resources for continual exploration and reproduction of new spaces of emancipation from poverty and domination.

I locate my discussion of livelihoods and the transformative potential of the city of Rustenburg within the broader project of placing African cities in the mainstream, northern urban theory. Accordingly, in their critique of the global city theory as well as their use of the idea of the metropolis to discuss the elusive city of Johannesburg, Mbembe and Nuttall (2008) highlight the role of the cultural economy and other symbolic aspects of city life (in addition to the real economy and other material inputs such as steel and bricks) as significant in the processes of city formation. Importantly, these scholars make connections between the
suburbs on the one hand and marginal sites such as the township, the homeland, the informal settlement and the inner city on the other. In this way, the ordinary, everyday lives constitute the many identities of city life (locally or globally connected). Jennifer Robinson’s work also attends to similar issues, although her extensive work (2011; 2006a; 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; 2004d; 2002) goes further to engage with the imperatives of developmentalism. For Robinson, a consideration of the many identities of city life allows for thinking across many different elements of the city (and indeed across a diverse range of cities). “The particular form of this limitation [of having urban theory divided against development studies] makes it particularly hard to mobilise creative ways of addressing the situation of poor and marginalised people in cities across the world” (Robinson, 2002: 533). It is on the basis of this inspiration, therefore, that this thesis addresses the following gaps in cities studies literature and the Rustenburg literature:

- It makes unusual connections between livelihood research and city studies; organising the discussions around the themes of ‘the spaces of livelihood formation’, spatial propinquity and distanciation as well as the bodily and intellectuality as resources for ordinary people to engage with the city.

- Much of research on the informal economy and livelihoods in general does not attend to the differentiations within these activities (viable and survivalist, for example). This thesis pays particular attention to survivalist livelihood activities because they provide a useful yardstick to assess the post-apartheid socio-cultural and economic transformations.

- The livelihood spaces of ordinary people tend to be overlooked – where are the spaces of creativity built? How many people, and from which range of groups, participate,

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7 Developmentalism refers to way of improving a nation’s economic productivity, the capacities of governance as well as the practice of providing infrastructure for services such as water, electricity, transport, sanitation, and refuse removal. The ideas of modernisation, structuralism (World Systems, Dependency), and neoliberalism are well known theories of development. Escobar’s (1995) *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* is one of the key works that underscores development as an idea that does not so much express people’s material realities, but reflects how the North imagines the South — how the North has historically produced and reproduced development through making certain statements about the South and corresponding interventions. The colonial world, which was in fact a battleground between the colonial and Western powers, was constructed as ‘undeveloped’ and ‘poor’ because the cultures of the colonial world were seen to stand in the way of development.
and for how long? The case studies of the inner city of Rustenburg, Phokeng, and Freedom Park bring insights into such geographies and times.

- The socio-cultural and economic activities of ordinary people are presented in complex post-structural language (Simone, 2010; Mbembe, 2008). This thesis presents such activities in language that is accessible.

- Research on Rustenburg tends to focus on Bafokeng, leaving us with little knowledge of the city as a whole, particularly how ordinary people use the various spaces of the city to improve their lives and recreate the city, and how the city in return shapes their experiences. This thesis provides an expanded discussion of Rustenburg from the point of view of ordinary poor people.

Overall, Rustenburg provides a setting for considering post-apartheid urban development which is both distinctive and representative of wider South African urban processes, especially the majority of municipalities in South Africa referred to as Category B (smaller and medium sized cities that are often amalgamated with areas under traditional leadership). It is distinctive as it is constituted by a relatively financially independent traditional authority. The city is also one of few places with the large scale mining operations that give a distinctive edge to resources and capability of governing such smaller and medium-sized cities. Rustenburg is also representative of wider South African urban processes in the way its development interventions reflect shared practices of governing South African cities as well as a shared envelope of national state constitutional and financial provisions.

This thesis also enriches a post-structural urban theory derived in and from the global South by engaging with livelihoods research (also anchored in historical and lived everyday realities of ordinary people). This is original. Additionally, its mix of conceptual and empirical elements of research demonstrates the limits of post-structural meso-level urban theory, which tends to reference livelihoods issues, while failing to engage with specific processes and practices of everyday people.

1.4 Thesis Structure
Chapter 2 provides a wider theoretical discussion that offers grounds for the interpretation of the fieldwork data I collected. It makes unusual connections between livelihoods research and
mainstream urban theory, with the goal of examining the role of cities in ordinary people’s quest to improve their lives. It draws attention to the city’s resources, to ordinary people’s livelihood assets, and to the private sector’s developmental role, all of which lead to the proposition that cities have the transformative potential. However, the scholarship on the informal economy, as a significant aspect of livelihoods, has established that unequal relations of dependency exist between the formal, dominant aspects of social life and those that are informal and marginal. It has also made connections between the informal economy and the city’s built form; connections which not only create obstacles to livelihood formation, but also influence the goals that city dwellers (including ordinary people) pursue. Nonetheless, ordinary people’s small and creative practices enable them to make good use of limited opportunities around them. They respond to the city’s challenges by drawing from resources such as intellectuality, the sensual, history, and the landscape to free themselves from poverty and domination. I identified three themes to organise these discussions: the spaces of livelihood formation, spatial propinquity and distanciation, and the bodily and intellectuality as resources for ordinary people to engage with the city. These themes enable me to address the issues of livelihoods (as material, sensual, and aspirational practices), the urban landscape, and subjectivity.

Chapter 3 – placed here on advice from one of my examiners – focusses on research methods and methodology. It presents a mix of historical and archival sources, interviews, and post-apartheid planning and administration documents of the RBA and the RLM. It also offers a description of the comparisons made among the three case studies of Phokeng, downtown Rustenburg and Freedom Park as well as the description of associated analysis of the data collected. Full details are provided in Chapter 3.

Chapter 4 provides the start of the empirical and theoretical discussions of the thesis through historical accounts of Rustenburg. It explores the historical processes that led to ordinary people making a living the way they do. In line with the theoretical background in Chapter 2, such historical changes presented some scope for viable social and economic activities, such that by the 1930s the spatialities that provided opportunities for social and economic empowerment for the people of Rustenburg were created. In particular, the broader economic development of Rustenburg, the building of the urban landscape, missionary work and the introduction of modern farming technology were significant in the ways in which the people
not only made a living, but also in the ways in which they managed their relationship with the city.

Similarly, Bethlehem (a township for black people in what came to be downtown Rustenburg) was recreated into a space of livelihood formation, with its own ways of life – the stokvels, shebeens, and the broader cultural life of the settlement sustained ordinary people there. For the first decade of the twentieth century, they participated in the local economy, albeit in a relation of dependency to the social, political, and economic life of Rustenburg. Beyond Bethlehem, Indians and white people of this town (such as Helen MacGregor and members of the Federation of the Magaliesberg’s Tobacco Farmers’ Co-operation) played a role in the vibrancy of this town’s economy. The holy communion (nagmaal) time provided opportunities for the creation of landscape of practice, the everyday routines that produce and reproduce the actual living landscapes. Central to this generative environment was the town’s intimate and relatively mixed socio-spatial forms. However, by the end of the 1930s, the ideological, political, economic and socio-cultural forces militated against such potentiality. They delivered the relocation of the people of Bethlehem to Tussenkomst (the present day Tlhabane), indicating that the apartheid city was relatively established in Rustenburg by the end of that decade. They also delivered a Rustenburg that is today constituted by powerful and competing interests in the context of the extractive platinum economy and associated migration flows (competing interests include the municipality and the Bafokeng administrations, militant labour organisations, ordinary people differentiated according to class).

This Chapter shows that historically, spatiality (in its proximate or segregated forms) was critical in the ability for ordinary people to build livelihoods. Although they were able to draw from their intellectuality and bodily resources in order to rework that spatiality, such spatiality both presented opportunities for them and undermined their efforts.

8 It is partly for this reason that my thesis does not cover the period of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s – compulsory segregation was achieved long before the formation of the Department of Community Planning in 1960, which was meant to turn the 1950 Group Areas Act into some reality by destroying old mixed or inner city areas and creating settlements of black townships, and Coloured, Asian and white areas. Additionally, Tlhabane is not included as one of the case studies for discussing contemporary issues in my thesis because it turned out not to be a really poor area – mayors, municipal workforce and former Bophuthatswana officials largely live or have lived there before. Instead, as advised by one RLM employee, I chose Freedom Park: I was looking for a place that would help me discuss the city’s social and economic transformations following the end of apartheid, and Freedom Park, an exclusively migrant area and poorer than Tlhabane, was more relevant for my research goals (also see Appendix 4).
Chapter 5 discusses the current context within which ordinary people build their livelihoods. This is because although the historical changes presented in Chapter 4 continue to influence ordinary people’s livelihood activities, such changes do not provide enough explanations of why they continue to live and make a living the way they do. Thus, Chapter 5 focusses on the current socio-spatial interventions in the RLM and RBA – the local economic initiatives and social development programmes, and the provision of basic services create the context within which ordinary people build livelihoods. In particular, the creation of particular kinds of spaces through the RDP housing projects, through the regeneration of the inner city as well as the Bafokeng land-use Master Plan projects all influence livelihood trajectories. The discussion does not analyse whether the objectives of these interventions and ordinary people’s initiatives have been realised, it merely establishes the basis for analysing, in the Chapter that follows, the extent to which the city offers opportunities for ordinary people to remake their lives and the city itself. In theoretical terms, this Chapter (5) mainly speaks to the theme of spatial propinquity and distanciation, highlighting the kinds of spaces of interactions, creativity, spontaneity, and/or repression being created. Thus, this Chapter maintains the connections between the theme of spatial propinquity and that of intellectuality and the bodily in the way new spatial interventions influence practices of livelihood formation and how the latter rework such spatial forms.

Chapter 6 is discussed against the backdrop of the discussion of the accounts provided in Chapter 4 on the historical forces behind changes in Rustenburg’s forms of livelihoods, physical landscape, and social identities. Chapter 6 is also discussed against the backdrop of the contemporary context discussed in Chapter 5. It specifically focuses on each of the research sites, outlining the kinds of livelihoods that people build for themselves is provided. The Chapter then discusses the ways in which Rustenburg’s socio-spatial interventions facilitate or hinder ordinary people’s social and economic activities – how the Master Plan deliverables affect backyard dwellings for rent, spazas, stokvels, the informal sector activities; whether the relationships between taverns and the National Sorghum Breweries/South African Breweries-Miller are useful for ordinary people’s social and economic activities.

As I did in the historical Chapter (4), that discussion addresses the suggestion that the interplay between successful elements of the city and its marginal poorer components may
generate opportunities for ordinary people to enact livelihoods and meaningfully transform their lives. The chapter also examines whether by bringing together different people and ideas from far beyond their borders (international connections in cultural, urban design and urban planning), cities can produce something new for ordinary people to improve their lives. In this respect, in what ways does the power to create urban landscapes, the land and property markets, an urbanism of the everyday (the middle-class and ordinary people’s social and economic activities) facilitate or inhibit the livelihoods of the poor? The establishing of Freedom Park was undoubtedly a significant milestone in ordinary people’s struggle for livelihood formation during apartheid. What role do places like Freedom Park play in the post-apartheid era as regards livelihood formation? This Chapter also explores the extent to which ordinary people can use livelihood assets to pursue a variety of ends (educate children to give them a leg-up in life, self-interest, stylish or rural lifestyles). Thus, this Chapter too maintains in the discussions on the interconnections between spatial forms and issues of creativity, imagination, and desire.

Chapter 7 discusses the state’s delivery of a particular set of universal public services as significant resources for ordinary people’s livelihood activities. Given that the equitable share, social security grants, and indigent policy are instruments to deliver such entitlements, what is the level of access to basic services made possible by the tariff structure related to ordinary people and the building of infrastructure for such services? What are the prospects for access to social grants and to what effect? The role played by the Bafokeng administration has not been insignificant in the delivery of basic services and social development initiatives generally. That said, the provision of basic services and social security grants are not fully guaranteed by the state due to constitutional limitations as well as higher demands made on South Africa’s extensive social security system. These internal challenges to sustain and expand the delivery of universal public services, which are significant resources for livelihood formation, are compounded by those that are external: the growing number of African and Asian migrants to South Africa; African economies that are increasingly growing, mainly to the benefit of the rising numbers of the middle and higher classes; the increasing demands on the limited state fiscus; and lower levels of investments in infrastructure for universal public services in sub-Saharan Africa (which are also significant resources for livelihood formation).
Chapter 8 provides the concluding remarks of this study. It argues that the concepts of spatial propinquity and distanciation as well as the bodily and intellectuality can be used to bring together the discussion of livelihoods as practices that are not only material, but also sensual and aspirational. Spatial propinquity (in both senses of nearness and distant connectedness due to modern transport and telecommunications) create conditions for socio-cultural and economic imagination and creativity. Such creative actions, often unanticipated, are based on bodily tactics which cannot easily be constrained by rational spatial configurations. The road networks, infrastructure and services for basic amenities, empowerment initiatives, access to land and the livelihoods activities it enables, and the circulation of money locally enabled by stronger local economy and associated purchasing power, are all resources (embedded in interconnected spaces) for livelihood formation.

The other point that the thesis make is that Rustenburg derives its richness as a research site from being constituted by areas of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ as well as this city’s historical and contemporary dynamics. Figure 1.1 shows Rustenburg municipality, North West Province, South Africa, and the three study areas of Phokeng, Freedom Park and Rustenburg inner city in the RLM. Historical forces, including areas of the former Bophuthatswana, continue to influence processes of transformation in this city.

![Figure 1.1: Location map of Rustenburg](image)

Rustenburg is one of the global centres of extractive economic activities. As a site of the world’s largest producers of platinum-group-metals (80% of known deposits), it is a
significant player in the global economy (RLM, 2012). Apart from jewellery making, “most of this platinum is utilised for catalytic converters in just about every car in the world” (Frankel, 2013: 9). In that sense, Rustenburg is also one of the leaders of South Africa’s export market.

Rustenburg is also an important player in the national economy and employment. The mining sector in this city accounts for 60 percent of employment (RLM, 2012). Although in its formative stages, Rustenburg was driven by a thriving agricultural economy, mining activities (dominated by Anglo Platinum, Impala Platinum, and Lonmin9) have come to shape its contemporary physical, social, and economic landscapes – mining companies not only own and rent a significant size of housing property and office space in Rustenburg, they are also behind the creation of the boundless stretches of informal settlements interweaving between the mining shafts and hostels. As a result of these global, national, and local roles, Rustenburg has also become one of the leading nodes in the regional movements of people: about 650,000 people live and make a living there (RLM, 2012). From the 1960s, especially in the 1990s, this city saw rapid increases in migrants, with a significant number of them living in the informal backyard and shack settlements – the migration rate was about 25 percent per annum in the 1990s (Plan Associates, 2001; 2000; Maxim Planning Solutions, 2002). These migrants are from different provinces of South Africa, from neighbouring countries such as Lesotho, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Swaziland, and from countries as far away as Ethiopia, Somalia, Mali, Eritrea and Burkina Faso, and from Asia.

Rustenburg is constituted, among other places, by 29 villages of Bafokeng (the Royal Bafokeng Nation), with Phokeng being the administration seat. Historically, such villages existed in proximity to the city of Rustenburg and they remain governed by a hereditary male king. It is estimated that about half of the people of the RLM, including migrants, live in these villages (Surbana International Consultants, 2006). As the current custodian of land on which mining operations take place, the Bafokeng ‘traditional’ administration has come to command large mining royalties, thereby enabling it to corporatise itself. It is for this reason that the Royal Bafokeng Nation (worth ZAR 30 billion in 2013 in net asset value10) has the ability to provide, from their own resources, infrastructure for water services, road networks

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9 The smaller, unstable mines include Glencore (Xstrata) and the more precarious Black Economic Empowerment mines such as Aquarius and Northam Platinum.
10 http://rbh.integrated-report.com/2013/operations/financial-review (last accessed on 12 December 2014)
and other social development services. The Bafokeng administration has since the second half of the 1990s (and indeed historically) ambiguously positioned itself as an autonomous political entity, with significant implications for power relations both locally and nationally. The economic, socio-cultural and governance issues that arise from this context make Rustenburg a complex space whose circumstances shift with the changing local and global circumstances. For example, the impact of the economic crisis globally since 2008 as well as the longest wage strike in South Africa in 2014 is casting Rustenburg’s status as an international economic player into doubt. This has implications for the transformative potential of this city, and thus makes it a compelling research site for assessing the socio-cultural, political and economic creativity not only of ordinary poor people, but also of the traditional authority, the local municipality, mining companies and labour. This is not withstanding the contestations among these players. It is mainly because of the effects of the politics around the 2012 and 2014 industrial action in the Rustenburg platinum belt that I am placing this thesis at a particular moment in Rustenburg: 1990 to 2010 – the discussions on the historical background of this period date back to the nineteenth century.

With its very complex socio-spatial dynamics, Rustenburg presents social and economic opportunities for ordinary people to make livelihoods and pursue other goals (at least until the long 2014 industrial action in the mines). Such opportunities were even more pronounced in the earlier period of transition from apartheid. Freedom Park, as a periphery, continues to generate ordinary people’s socio-economic creativity, notwithstanding the current tensions between mining capital and labour. These possibilities for socio-cultural and economic transformations can be traced back to the pre-Second World War Rustenburg as characterised by broad-based participation in the local economy. The breakdown of such possibilities was linked to the political, class, and albeit racialised interests associated with such changes. From the mid-1990s in the inner city and Phokeng, similarly, ordinary people’s livelihood activities have come to be suppressed as the city increasingly became a site of doing formal business. Such suppression is undertaken in the context where ordinary people’s goals and priorities are influenced by the work of ‘the critical infrastructure’ as well as commodities and the rural or urban landscapes. In the end, living and making a living in the city involves mediating the tensions between social reproduction (the formation of particular kind of social, economic and political identities) on the one hand, and the bodily and city’s emancipatory spaces on the other.
The complexity of Rustenburg – as a critical national and global mineral-industrial site, constituted by historical and contemporary dynamics of the traditional and modern state interventions and distancing – is unpacked and explored through the use of the three case studies. The three research sites, variously interconnected and linked to distant elsewhere, also open up the analysis of ordinary people’s socio-cultural and economic creativity – of livelihoods as corporeal, bodily, and goal-driving, as they take shape and are being shaped in different ways in and through such sites.
Chapter 2
Livelihoods, the body, and city space

2.1 Introduction
This chapter locates the discussions of my thesis within the broader project of placing African cities in mainstream urban theory (Mbembe and Nuttall, 2008; Robinson, 2006a; 2002). The first part of the chapter attempts to make connections between that project and research on livelihoods. It highlights the role of cities in ordinary people’s quest to reshape their lives as well as the historical role of cities in the production of the ‘livelihoods of the poor’. The second part of the chapter highlights the major themes that I use to organise the discussions of the thesis: the spaces of livelihood formation; spatial propinquity and distanciation as well as the bodily and intellectuality as resources for ordinary people to engage with the city. These themes point to various sources of the transformative potential of cities, suggesting that although city spaces often cohere into real material landscape that shapes everyday practices and social identities, the sensual, rationality, history, and landscape provide resources for continual exploration and reproduction of new spaces of emancipation from poverty and domination.

2.2 The promise and power of ordinary cities
The ways in which the city is perceived has implications for what it is seen to be able to do – to be transformative, exclusionary or some combination of the two. The discussions below attend to these perspectives; pursuing the roles that cities play in the quest for ordinary people to reshape their lives and the city itself. As regards the former (the discussions around creative urbanism), Mbembe and Nuttall (2008) highlight the role of ideas, images, memories and bodies (in addition to the more material inputs such as machinery, bricks, glass, and steel) in the processes of city formation. This formulation of the production of the city enables seeing powerful economic interests as well as cultural practices such as sports, church gatherings, and concerts as constituents of city life. In turn, the city’s built forms and associated constellations of spectacles (exhilarating skyline, consumer products, highways, and advertising billboards, for example) contribute to subject formation, including that of the poor and the working class. In that sense, a city is not only a space of division, it is also an aesthetic project. Mbembe and Nuttall (2005) also point to the Brazilian favelas, the American ghettos, the South African townships, the informal settlements, and hostels as part
of the many identities of city life. These seemingly marginal spaces are undoubtedly sites of immiseration, but in some cases they have become centres of hybridity, consumption, and gentrification.

Much of that work on creative urbanism comes out throughout my thesis. Suffice to mention here that its significance – written from the vantage point of Johannesburg, Africa, and the global South – is that it engages directly with the mainstream urban theory (it critiques the global city theory and uses the idea of the metropolis to describe Johannesburg as “the premier African metropolis, the symbol par excellence of the African modern”), without losing sight of the informal and marginal spaces of the city (Mbembe and Nuttall, 2008: 1). This work is also significant for highlighting the city as a space of culture – a site of pride, desire, fantasy, wealth, history, technology, and education. In highlighting these cultural aspects of city life, Mbembe (2008: 38) underscore the experimental dynamics of city life: “the collage of various fragments of the former city [apartheid city] is opening up a space for experiences of displacement, substitution, and condensation”. However, Mbembe and Nuttall’s (2008) creative urbanism does not face up to the imperatives of developmentalism. This is unlike the works of scholars such as Jennifer Robinson and David McDonald, which also engage the mainstream theories of the ordinary city and the global city. Mabin (2014: 22) notes the role of ‘social assistance/grants’ in how “cities of the south present a space of experimentation that prefigures the near future of the west (or north)”. On the other hand, McDonald (2008) contends that the changes underway in the South African urban space do not sufficiently benefit the city’s ordinary people. In particular, the neoliberal post-apartheid state interventions in municipal services (utilities and capital infrastructure) disproportionately benefit transnational elites and private capital. An important point to note here is that these developmentalist issues of basic services and social security are discussed in the context of debates on city studies.

For now, I focus on Robinson’s (2011; 2006a; 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; 2004d; 2002) extensive work because it brings together issues of both creative urbanism and developmentalism. She launched her project in 2002, making a case for dropping the concepts of global and world cities in favour of the ordinary city idea. In particular, she argues for seeing cities as constituted and shaped by diverse socio-cultural, political, and economic connections, rather than constituted mainly by dominant economic activities commanded and controlled from New York, London, Tokyo, and Chicago. For her, networks between local and translocal
informal economic activities, the national and transnational economic connections, the transnational firms trading in international commodities, and the financial, institutional, and intergovernmental networks among cities are all potentially valuable resources in the quest for improving city life. Additionally, popular culture, urban design and planning, religious influences, innovative urban governance systems, the creative production of diverse forms of urbanisms as well as links between city-wide or neighbourhood firms are all resources to be drawn upon to imagine possible paths to improve living conditions and enhance economic growth across the whole city. In this sense of diverse experiences and connections, the city has the potential to generate socio-cultural, economic, and political transformations.

Indeed Robinson (2002) treats the city’s power relations seriously, although in this project she is pushing for seeing connections rather than conflict. While Mbembe and Nuttall (2008) see the relationship between suburbs and seemingly marginal favelas, ghettos and the township as constituting the many identities of city life, Robinson (2004a) pushes this argument further, arguing for the role of spaces of the city in the emancipation of ordinary people from poverty and domination. To this end, the dynamic economic sector of wealthy suburbs can be used to enhance the well-being of the whole city through the flows of goods, information, and people as well as through cross-subsidy redistribution mechanisms. The city-wide redevelopment strategies and agglomeration economies of related industries (cultural districts, museums, music venues, art galleries) may be promoted. Moreover, the borders between dominant aspects of the city and those that are marginal are subject to transgression and contestations, while lessons from historical inner city emancipatory moments can be excavated (Robinson, 2004b).

In such an understanding of cities as ordinary spaces of diverse experiences and connections, which allows for learning from a range of different kinds of cities in both the global North and the global South, capitalist practices are seen to constitute the seedbeds for progressive socio-cultural and economic transformations. This is indeed possible as long as discussions such as these are pitched at the theoretical level. For example, Robinson (2011) asserts that the histories and dynamics of neoliberalisation will vary across cases and contexts, thus they might be irrelevant to policy outcomes in other contexts. She argues that market and private sector-led solutions often represent a crucial opportunity for service delivery in the poorest cities where local governments are newer (since the 1990s decentralisation processes), where local governments are weaker in terms of infrastructure, personnel, and skills, and where they
are underfunded (due to national level concerns about political competition). In fact, state ambitions related to tax revenue generation, job creation, and basic services delivery are tied to capitalist and other forms of economic activity (Robinson, 2011). Furthermore, while the impacts of neoliberalisation on welfare and redistribution regimes may be negative in some context (the global North), they may be normalised in those cases where welfare interventions has been minimal from the outset (the global South) (ibid.). It is through the analysis of concrete research that these ideas can be tested, and my research shows that in socially and economically lucrative spaces of the city historically and today, ordinary people’s activities tend to be prohibited, although private sector organisations may have been willing to accommodate them. Additionally, under the conditions of neoliberalisation and high demands on welfare, the redistributive agendas of the state are undermined by its lack commitment to provide them.

The poststructuralist ideas expressed by Mbembe and Nuttall (2008) and Robinson (2011) significantly inform the arguments made in this thesis. However, both sets of contributions are located at the meso- and higher analytical levels. In order to give some content to their analyses and to my thesis, I use the idea of livelihoods as an entry point to these discussions of city life, for now drawing from mainstream urban theory located in cities of the north. Accordingly, activities such as rotating credit schemes, cash-in-hand for gardening, household repairs as well as the state-supported small business schemes, associations and common assets are seen as constituents of city life (Amin and Thrift, 2002). These economic activities and support systems intersect with economic circuits in the not-for-profit sector: voluntary and community organisations, micro-credit networks, and local trading schemes set up to deal with socio-economic exclusions or to support alternative lifestyles. They also include religious organisations (which provide food or shelter to the poor), voluntary groups (which provide support to the elderly) and charities (which attend to the needs of the unemployed, the drug addicts, and the disabled) (ibid.).

The activities of the not-for-profit sector also include communities getting together to clean up the neighbourhood or to provide child care facilities, squatters claiming empty properties, communities setting up to provide mutual support and shared resources, and low-income groups establishing non-monetary trading networks (Amin and Thrift, 2002: 71-72). These spatialities of city life (often neglected in mainstream urban theory), together with universal public services (utilities, communications, public works, green spaces, schools, hospitals,
nursing homes, medical centres) generate and redistribute livelihood assets and meet ordinary people’s consumer and welfare needs. In line with my inclination towards a globalised, universal urban theory, these activities and public goods should be incorporated in urban theory. Amin and Thrift’s (2002) sentiments above suggest that this is possible – they suggest that a conversation between urban theory and livelihoods research can create a fertile ground for discussing the transformative potential of cities as regards ordinary people. Indeed this chapter is narrated from such a universalist theoretical position, even though almost two-thirds of citations I make are from Africanist scholars and about a third from other scholars.

In the global South specifically, knowledge about livelihoods derives, in part, from studies of the informal economy, as pioneered by Hart (1973)\(^\text{11}\). Although the ideas being addressed in this scholarly tradition are seen as outdated in city studies (Roy, 2011; Simone, 2010b), I highlight them here because they continue to express practices that are crucial to livelihoods (Potts, 2008; Bebbington, 1999; Wratten, 1995; Chambers, 1995; Rakodi, 1995). In dismissing this scholarship without engaging it, and rather proposing alternative concepts, scholars such as Roy (2011) and Simone (2010) tend to overgeneralise the experiences of ordinary people in the city, and ignore the strategic importance of making distinctions between, for example, the formal and informal economy. Given that the ‘growth’ micro-enterprises are able to yield higher social and economic returns, specific attention needs to be paid to ‘survivalist’ micro-enterprises, which are constrained to yield higher returns. Additionally, the higher number of people in the survivalist sub-sector qualifies it as a crucial yardstick for assessing the city’s socio-cultural and economic transformations\(^\text{12}\). Broadly, it is more useful to see the interactions between the formal and informal activities (supportive or oppositional) as having the effect of producing differentiated economic spaces and city forms (Myers, 2011). A key point to be noted here is that in both the global North and South, socio-cultural and economic activities (often associated with livelihoods) are seen as constituting city life.

\(^{11}\) Hart (1973) described the informal economy in political economic terms, as petty-capitalist practices that substitute wage labour. Alsayyad (2004) provides a useful historiography of the idea of the informal economy, linking it to the works of Hart (1973); Lewis (1958) and the ILO Report (1972) on Kenya, among other earlier works.

\(^{12}\) It has not been possible to establish reliable current statistics, but Rogerson (1996) estimated that there were no less than 4.3 million people involved in survivalist enterprises, a number that is nine times more than those participating in growth micro-enterprises.
In what follows, I discuss the poststructural accounts of the position of the informal economy in relation to the formal one: accounts which suggest that at the sectoral level the informal economy can play a transformative role. Accordingly, the informal economy has come to be treated not only as complementary to the formal economy (Rogerson, 2007), but also as having an “equal conceptual importance” with the formal economy (Pavlovskaya, 2004: 336). Rogerson (2007: 1056) explains such a relationship in less competitive ways, seeing it as “part of the entire economy with complementary formal and informal ends”. Similarly, in her model of ‘diverse economies’, Pavlovskaya (2004: 335) represents the relationship between the formal and informal economies through “dashed lines, indicating not only that their boundaries are permeable and fuzzy”, but also that both the formal and informal economies co-exist in continuous and overlapping manner. In this sense, the urban poor involved in the informal economy can move in and out of poverty, depending on a portfolio of livelihood assets they have amassed in particular places and at particular times. This analysis is also useful in that rather than just being dismissive and generalising the viability of city dwellers’ socio-economic activities, it recognises the disadvantageous position of the informal economy in the broader economic spectrum, while seeing possibilities for it to move out of poverty.

Likewise, Du Toit’s (2008) discussion of the relationship between the informal and formal economic sectors advances this conception of the transformative capacity of the informal economy. He argues that “both margins and centre are everywhere…, fractally interpenetrating and overlaid one over another (Du Toit, 2008: 140). Notably, “existing at the margins could bring prosperity” to the poor because of limited legal obligations that exist there (ibid.: 144). For him, the Shixini sub-ward community in the Eastern Cape (South Africa) is “disconnected from the formal economy and lacking leverage and resources…, and it would thus be a classical example of those whose poverty is linked to their exclusion” (ibid.: 144). Yet, “what matters is how far they can participate advantageously in the local moral economy”, and not “their disconnection from the broader market economy” (ibid.: 143). Broadly, Du Toit (2008) advocates for an appreciation of the marginal spaces as spaces of opportunity and power in their own right. McAllister (2008) goes further, suggesting that the condition of ‘marginalisation’ may in fact be socially inclusive, albeit in terms that are disadvantageous (hence his term of ‘adverse incorporation’). These discussions of the informal economy being complementary to the formal economy, being conceptually equal to the formal economy, and being socially inclusive, acknowledge informality’s
disadvantageous position in relation to their formal counterparts, while suggesting that informality can be a source of opportunity.

In terms of distanciated informal economic connections, informal cross-border trade is seen to play a significant role in southern Africa’s regional trade relationships and development (Peberdy, 2000) – it is seen to be a force for Africa’s backdoor entrance to globalisation (Meagher, 2003). Peberdy and Rogerson (2003: 96) represent the trans-border entrepreneurs in the Southern African Development Community as “highly mobile and directly involved in complex networks of transnational trade”. For example, the West and Central African migrants in Johannesburg “have strong interactions with formal sector retail and wholesale outlets which supply them with inputs for production and goods for sale…They often form part of the international trading networks including Europe, North America and the Far East through family members working and living there” (ibid.: 35). Peberdy and Rogerson (2003: 92) also represent working in informal economy as ‘an occupation of choice’, such that most street traders and shoppers are “content to work as entrepreneurs. They repeated their satisfaction with self-employment, ‘independence’ and selling and trading”.

Three key points can be made from the discussions on the informal economy above. First, unlike the current city studies on ordinary people (below), which mainly affirm an informality left to its own devices, the discussions on the informal economy so far suggest that state interventions can be made for improving its performance for the benefit of ordinary people. Second, the current trajectory of studies on the informal economy make links between informality and the spaces of the city (Myers, 2011; Simone, 2010; Parnell, et al., 2009; Parnell, 2008) as well as between the state, the city’s middle class and private capital (Roy, 2011; 2009; AlSayyad, 2004). This is a welcome development, for informality is linked to the resources of the city as well as the city’s powerful interests. As we have seen above, however, such linkages should not be done at the expense of the analysis of the informal economy as a sector: its variations, and the implications of such differentiations for the transformative potential of cities. Third, the above discussion on the informal economy provides insights into what Mbembe and Nuttall ’s (2008) and Robinson’s (2006) mainstream theoretical works might mean – it is in the informal sector that opportunities for ordinary people’s transformation might be located and developed. Overall, the discussions of the informal economy show that this economic sector has the potential for transformation.
However, such possibilities are not without challenges: thus I continue to discuss the informal economy scholarship, presenting the challenges it has to contend with.

Although the current proliferation of the informal economy is linked to the restructuring of the formal economic sector since the 1970s (privatisation and outsourcing, shrinking formal employment, and trade liberalisation), it was historically part of the broader process of political and economic struggles during colonialism and apartheid. Despite the shortcomings of some of the associated scholarship, emphasising economic structures as the defining forces of historical change at the expense of human agency (Forbes, 1981; Moser, 1978), it managed to establish that unequal relations of dependency exist between the formal, dominant aspects of social life, including their materialisation in the built environment (Mitchell, 2002), and those aspects of social life that are informal and marginal. In that sense, the unmaking and remaking of a place is a result of not only the actions of the colonial state and capital, but also of family labour, of the local petty-bourgeoisie space economy as well as the chieftaincy’s control of land and the local state (Capps, 2010; Simpson, 1986). Thus informal trade “represents the highly visible casualties of the outworkings of the twin processes of peasantisation and proletarianisation” as well as the casualties of the city’s by-laws and national laws that worked against black workers (Beavon and Rogerson, 1982: 108). The more recent scholarship on this theme represents the relationship between the formal and informal economic sectors as structurally interdependent, “with the informal sector subordinate and conditioned by changing priorities in the formal sector, and with both sectors affected by broader global forces” (Potts, 2008: 160, emphasis added). Additionally, Mitchell’s (2007: 254; 2002) work on ‘the work of economics’ locates the relationships between the formal and informal economies in the history of capitalism. He draws empirical material from nineteenth century Egypt on land dispossession, where titling, counting, law, and other modern mechanisms were used to map and register hitherto informally managed state land used by local subsistence farmer. In the process, this state land was auctioned to formal property owners.

The key issues that emerge from the preceding discussion is that, first, informality is not natural and inevitable, it is historically produced, notwithstanding the cultural meanings that have come to underpin informality – that what came to be seen as an informal economic practice constituted a non-Western way of life that has worked well for those involved for many generations. Second, one of the effects of the relationship of dependency between the
formal and informal economies is that the potential for positive change in the informal economic sector is “often constrained by a restrictive, and possibly institutionalised, framework imposed by colonisers and the ‘modern’ society” (Potts, 2008: 152). Third, the scholarly tradition on the informal economy is useful for highlighting the complex ways in which informal economic practices are linked to the city’s built form (Mitchell, 2007; 2002). Accordingly, the modern mechanisms of surveying, titling, counting, and law that have delivered land used by subsistence farmers to powerful property interests also served to create the national space economy “imagined to have its location [in] the city” (ibid.: 96). Thus, before the making of the national economy in its mid-twentieth century meaning – as a distinct social sphere, now always with a definite article ‘the’ – the city “was used to imagine the density and tangibility of economic relations” in rural and urban Egypt (ibid.: 96). That is, the city was the place of economic activities (cotton production, land markets, banking, and commerce), only later to be filled by the idea and practice of ‘the economy’. In this sense, the city mystifies the relations between the concrete and the abstract – it mystifies the reality of the built form as intimately linked to the livelihoods of the poor (Harvey, 1996). It is on this basis of the urban built form having historically naturalised the informal economy that I locate my account of the origins of ‘the livelihoods of the poor’.

Mbembe (2008) makes a similar point in relation to South Africa. He attends to the production of the colonial and apartheid landscapes in Johannesburg (the city’s racist production of a superfluous, expendable black labour force and its dependence on a luxury commodity, gold) and the extent to which such landscapes have come to be seen as natural. Mbembe (2008) weaves together the issues of class, race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality and land use, bringing into focus the form and content of the landscapes of racial and economic exclusions – the colonial black labour reserves, the apartheid workplaces, the township and squatter settlements – as well as the colonial and apartheid times during which nature was appropriated and transformed into commodities and human goods. The forces of class relations, the migrant labour system, residential segregation, regulation of work and home lives produced the spaces of racial and economic exclusions (thus, the livelihoods of the poor, one might say): Robinson (2006b) provides an interesting review of this work. In the historical accounts of both Mbembe (2008) and Mitchell (2002), the built environment is work: it is a product of the work that has gone into making it. It embodies the aspirations and needs of, largely, those with the power to make the city in their own image (Harvey, 1973). The built environment represents the wishes and fears of those who have the power to shape
the outcomes of the struggles over land use, between classes, and around race and ethnicity. Thus, the current shape of the Rustenburg landscape is an outcome of the forces of race, ethnicity, class, politics, and gender (Bozzoli, 1991). In an attempt to resolve the competing interests of some of these forces, the colonial state created chieftaincy which not only came to internalise and express accumulation and political interests (Capps, 2010), but for Simpson (1986) the chieftaincy also acquired distinctive political and economic interests of its own.

The built environment also does work – it intervenes in such relations of power, representing and reinforcing power in the city’s stones, bricks, mortar, wood, and asphalt. It is the source of power for those who have come to exercise some command over it – the control over the city’s property market, which in turn confers, through the ground rent\(^{13}\), certain powers to control relations of social reproduction. The point I am making is that the built environment, solid and finished as it appears, not only represents the interests of power, it is also a form of practice with real and personal effects on the daily life of ordinary people (Ollman, 1993; Harvey, 1985). Of course the city’s built form can be redeployed in the process of social, economic and political transformations – new architectural layers may be imposed on the old ones, past architecture may be placed in new contexts, and old buildings may be adapted to new purposes (Boyer, 1996). Indeed, until the early twentieth century, the city was characterised by multiple elements and uses – the co-presence of people and livestock, the primitive elements of city life and new technologies, new commodities and new buildings as well as an intimate and integrated form of neighbourhood planning. These conditions provided opportunities for progressive social and economic transformation (Robinson, 2006a; Benjamin, 1978).

However, the city’s symbols of power have, since the 1980s, come to be characterised by distinctively elite/corporate spaces of consumption and associated control measures against the informal economic sector as well as the removal of the poor from rundown buildings (not least because of escalating real estate prices) (Dirsuweit, 2009; Smith, 2002). Through architecture, engineering, science, statistical knowledge, finance, commerce, and government practices, the social and economic ideas and values of those in power came to not only take

\(^{13}\) The concept of ground rent refers to the value of a building and land on which it is built. When their use is at its lowest in poorer areas, reinvestments in them begin: an urban renewal activity which starts the process of takeover for the middle-class and for the traders of consumer goods and services.
on the appearance of objects – commodities and the built form itself as a commodity – they also came to define the meaning of such objects, and thus transformed people’s ideas and values (Mitchell, 2002). The city’s built form has come to highlight selected aspects of reality so as to bring out only particular meanings (landscape as an ideology): the meanings (such as happiness, style, and a sense of well-being) have been developed, circulated, and made concrete in built forms such as suburbs and shopping malls. Such landscapes, “through accretion of meanings over time, [have] come to define how people think about a place (and how they think about their place in that place), and how they behave in it, and how they expect others to behave” (Mitchell, 2000: 120). Overall, the built environment has come not only to create obstacles for ordinary people to create livelihoods (city by-laws prohibit informal sector activities in lucrative parts of the city), but also to be agents of social reproduction – to influence the goals that city dwellers, including ordinary people, pursue. Over time, city dwellers have come to buy and buy into the representations of landscapes and commodities. Ordinary people’s consent to the images of well-being and success is often reflected in the houses they build and the commodities they buy as well as the identities they adopt. The key issue here is that the city’s built form reproduces social identities, but also creates obstacles for livelihood formation. Having said that, such obstacles are experienced less on the city’s peripheries, and more in its lucrative parts and in spaces under patriarchal forms of governance.

In this thesis, therefore, I treat this conception of the city as a space of domination and social reproduction seriously, determining through my case studies how it creates and recreates restrictions to ordinary people’s social and economic activities. I also treat seriously the poststructural work on the informal economy (Du Toit, 2008; McAllister, 2008; Peberdy and Rogerson, 2003), linking it to city studies. The contradictory perspectives presented so far in this chapter – the city as a space of opportunity and a space of suppression – are resolved through the discussion of the experiences of the ordinary people of Rustenburg. These perspectives constitute the argument I make in this thesis: that although city spaces often cohere into a real material landscape that shapes everyday practices and social identities, the sensual, rationality, history, and the landscape provide resources for continual exploration and reproduction of new spaces of emancipation from poverty and domination. The thesis itself is about the city (its transformative potential) and livelihoods (as the entry point into the discussion). Before reviewing the major themes that I use to organise my discussion, I provide ontological accounts of the city as a space of opportunity for, as well as of
suppression of, ordinary people’s social and economic activities. Such ontological foundations have implications for what is seen to be possible or not as regards improving city life.

2.3 On the ontology of city life

The analytical emphasis on ‘the promise of the city’ or ‘the urban condition’ (Mabin, 2013) depends on the philosophical foundations of an analysis. In the poststructural perspective, the social life of the city is seen to be fragmented, multiple, and indeterminate. For Amin and Thrift (2002) city life is continually made and remade in ways that are shaped neither by the preceding nor existing social, political, and economic processes. It is characterised by all manner of divergent and discontinuous practices (with each set of practices having its own spaces and times), including the unexpected juxtapositions at all kinds of levels – the meeting in the street, the rich and the poor areas cheek-by-jowl, and notably, a lack of control of public spaces. Moreover, in that sense of the city as a space of becoming, the city is shaped, in part, by non-orchestrated repetitive movements of people folding time and space “in all kinds of untoward localisations and intricate mixtures” – groups that come together briefly around a particular purpose and then disperse again; groups of people getting together at shopping malls, pubs, clubs and other such sites of sociality (ibid.: 47). Consequently, while a city’s social networks will “attempt to stabilize and pin down the urban world, they also contain [through interaction with other networks] the potentiality to produce something else ” (ibid.: 29). In this sense of the city as a space of becoming, it provides conditions for urban dwellers to creatively improve their lives, pursue other ends, and recreate the city itself.

Amin and Thrift’s (2002) discussion is part of the broader scholarship that attempts to move analyses of city life beyond what are seen to be the administrative and political boundaries of cities. Accordingly, Stevenson (2003) pushes for celebrating the city’s street encounters, its creativity, energy, and spectacles. The effect of this theorising of the transient and fleeting social encounters in the streets, restaurants, and such spaces of sociality (which are mainly middle-class spaces in cities of the North) is that their analyses are translated to the spaces of ordinary people in cities of the South. Hence, writing from the vantage point of the South, Mbembe (2004: 401) notes “an unravelling, chaotic city centre besieged by swarming and inchoate crowds, incessant shouting and peddling, and a failure to contain disease, crime and pestilence”. For him, crucially, such a city centre “is characterized not so much by decay as
by the coexistence of divergent elements of different origins brought together in a space whose limits are constantly made and remade” (ibid.: 399). Simone (2010b) discusses such murky situations of the city, which, for him, exceed attempts to regulate through laws, policy, norms, and urban planning. Such situations are outcomes of intersections of actors, sectors, institutions, positions, resources, and place; collectivities which have implications for various networks in which each element is situated – although each component of a collective has to deal with one another, each also has a life outside the collective (ibid.). In such fluid situations, daily life is conducted through calculations, attentiveness, intuition, betting, and chance taking, generating unanticipated outcomes as actors penetrate territories for which they are unprepared. Such situations are replete with locally generated moral and social economies, which are part of an expansive engagement with a broad range of external processes and actors. These practices, Simone (2010b) avers, make African cities work.

The language that Simone (2010b) and Mbembe (2004) use intersects with that of Stevenson (2003) and Amin and Thrift (2002) in the way they draw their analytical insights from poststructural ideas about multiplicity, fragmentation, and indeterminacy of the world. The spaces of ordinary people and the middle-class in cities of both the North and the South are then presented as disconnected from the city’s social relations, including its past as well as those relations embodied in its landscapes. Similarly, marginality and the slum areas are presented as spaces of opportunity rather than spaces of oppression (Roy, 2011; Simone, 2010b). By extension, marginality and the slum areas, in the same way as the middle-class streets, homes, and suburbia, are seen as central to ordinary people’s construction of a positive sense of themselves (ibid.). Although social networks in the city are often defined in terms of geographical space, ordinary people’s networks are seen to be cutting across a range of interests, including class, age, ethnicity, and race (Robinson, 2004c). At this ontological level, the positions of the poor and middle class are undifferentiated, despite the fact that the extent to which these differentially located actors can use the city’s resources for their own benefit is influenced by their social locations and relations. Thus, in this poststructural formulation, power is not an entity to be possessed and wielded: it is not embedded in social structures such as class, age, ethnicity, and race. Instead power is located in the micro-situations of the slum areas, the streets, home, and suburbia; it is a negotiated attribute (Stevenson, 2003). The urban dwellers use, and identify with, the micro-spaces of the city in ways that contribute not to their subordination, but to the expression of their personal power (ibid.).
The point I am making is that it is useful to understand the ways in which the spaces of the middle-class are often represented (as ahistorical and as social expressions of power), because, despite their situated-ness in particular spaces and social status, their experiences tend to be conflated with the more marginalised and often controlled spaces of ordinary poor people. However, to the extent that much of city life is about engineering certainty, to the extent that the openness and flow of city life depend on a whole series of rules, conventions, and institutions of regulation and control (Mbembe and Nuttall, 2004), ordinary people’s options are limited to using the city’s faultlines and fissures, including carving out some sites from the city’s dominant spaces in order to eke out a living. The issue then becomes which spaces of fluidity, creativity, and energy are being referred to? where are such spaces created? how many people, from which range of groups, participate? and for how long? (Featherstone, 1994).

Robinson (2006a; 2004b; 2004a; 2002) is more sensitive to differentiations between the poor and the middle class, and even among the poor themselves, as she develops a framework for a more internationalised, comparative urban theory: the ideas of the ordinary city and comparative urbanism, for example. Toward that end, she draws from the work of urban anthropologists of the 1950-1970s, such as Aidan Southall, J. Clyde Mitchell, and Phillip Mayer, to discuss the city as a network of networks. It is a city where individuals are located within varying types of networks: intense and intimate kinfolks, distant and passing, and single stranded. Such networks change depending on the nature of the social network and situation as well as the place of interaction. However, there is a sense in which, for Robinson (2006a), these networks provide opportunities across the city, rather than obstacles. Robinson also draws from the work of Walter Benjamin who reflected on the relations between urban modernity and its ‘others’ in different cities (Berlin, Paris, Naples, and Moscow) (Robinson, 2004d). Each city was different, she avers, with Moscow characterised by the co-mingling of people and livestock as well as lacking the anonymity of private life. Some aspects of Naples reminded Walter Benjamin of the African kraal, which to him, was a sign of purity, considered potentially invigorating in the context of a decaying European culture (ibid). Naples was also characterised by both contradictory attitudes of anonymity and sociality: the intermingling of private and public life, which explained the dynamism of social life there. Naples was also characterised by the interplay between modern innovations (new technologies, new commodities, and inventions) and tradition: an interplay which was
considered to be dynamic and potentially transformative. In that sense, tradition was not just a backward element of social life, but represented the possibility for a transformative politics that is opposed to commodity fetishism and the exploitative form of urban development of the 1930s Paris and Berlin (Robinson, 2006a). Additionally, the co-presence of tradition and nineteenth century modern innovations (the application of glass, the arcades, stairways, department stores) offered a way into imagining different possible futures, some of which might involve the intermingling of the public and private lives and the co-existence of tradition and technological innovations (Robinson, 2004d: 19; 2004c). Such conditions of the city were also expected to wake up the sleepwalker of the modern city to a revolutionary consciousness of the problems of the present city (ibid.).

A key point that arises from the discussion above is that the outcomes of the more fluid spaces of the city (observed or imagined) are left undefined, while the outcomes of the interactions among coexisting modern and traditional lives are left open-ended (Robinson, 2006). Similarly, social networks in spaces of becoming are unable to pin down some social orderings (Amin and Thrift, 2002). In both the Hegelian and Marxist utopianism of process (the Idea or social relationships as motors of historical movement, respectively) the spatial forms to be taken by such utopianisms (classless society) have not been specified (Harvey, 2000). Harvey (2000) contends that a definition of spatial forms is fundamental and unavoidable for the materialisation of any social process. And to materialise space, however temporary, is to engage with closure, which is a prohibitive act. For him, to evade materialisation of space is to embrace an agonistic romanticism of perpetually unfulfilled longstanding desire (ibid.: 183). Rather, meaningful outcomes of a city’s social transformation are to be built from the “fertile dung-heap of [a city’s] contradictions” – they are to be built from the contested and messy terrain of urban politics (ibid.: 206). As a Marxist, he claims that free market utopianism of process and its restless and perpetual reorganisation of spatial form has to be part of any argument about the nature of urban change. Accordingly, could it be that it is because of that free market utopianism (built around the commodity structure of society) that possibilities for progressive socio-spatial and economic transformations have historically been limited, if not ultimately undermined? A Marxist such as Lukács (1968) would agree that the commodification of industrial products and labour power, the necessity for commodities such as car ownership and the privileging of private life of isolated individuals, have all come to be seen as necessary and inevitable realities of daily life. In the case of Rustenburg, social life, including communal situations, is
commodified – the communal land is turned into property used for extracting royalty from mining operations (Capps, 2010). In such situations, where commodity relations extend to cover every manifestation of life, people do not even attempt to overcome and transform this state of affairs: they consent to practices that are against their own interests (Lukács, 1968).

In more optimistic terms, Benjamin (1978) likened modern technological developments (the factory machine, for example) to a social organisation. While the machine is seen to enslave workers to itself and turn them into paupers (Lukács, 1968), Benjamin (1978) represented it as the meshing of passions, which can produce an utopia filled with new life. For him, although the arcades served commercial purposes, they also became dwelling places. For Buck-Morss (1989), Walter Benjamin also employed dialectical thinking (‘dialectics at a standstill’) to bring together contradictory elements of city life referred to above (modernity and tradition) so as to awaken the historical dreams held by modern developments – the factory machine, the original promise of industrialisation, the arcades, fashion designs, and the panorama – all entailed fantasies that sought to disassociate with the past and to deliver a classless society of material abundance.

In sum, the discussions above on the opposing ontological accounts of city life will inform my analysis of the transformative potential of the city of Rustenburg. Although the more dispersed and murky world of the poor and the middle class are said to provide them with opportunities and power, although the interactions between the formal and informal activities are said to create dynamic and potentially transformative conditions of the city, the necessity to spatialise social processes is an engagement with closure, which under capitalist conditions often results in the exclusion of the poor. Cognisant of these opposing perspectives of city life, below I discuss the themes that I use to frame the discussions of my thesis.

2.3.1 Spaces of livelihood formation

In the previous section I tried to make connections between livelihood research and mainstream urban theory. In this section I use a burgeoning body of work in city studies, discussed from the vantage point of spaces and practices of ordinary people, as a bridge between mainstream urban theory and livelihoods – the discussions on the spaces and practices of ordinary people in city studies, which has come to be constitutive of urban

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14 Simone (2012; 2013a; 2013b; 2010b; 2008a; 2008b; 2004; 2001); Pieterse (2013; 2012a; 2012b); Roy (2011; 2009; 2005); Roy and Alsayyad (2004); Malaquais (2007).
theory, have a lot in common with those on livelihoods. Accordingly, although some of this emerging scholarship holds that its insights offer lessons for cities of the global North, other authors go as far as to suggest that cities of the global South embody the future of humanity (Barac, 2013; Pinther et al., 2012; Roy, 2011; Mbembe and Nuttall, 2008). A claim that ‘Lagos is not catching up with us; rather, we may be catching up with Lagos’ reverberates throughout much of this work. Such a claim is based on the fact that 92 percent of the world’s urban population lives in the global South (Barac, 2013), where the experience of managing various forms of rogue urbanisms have been gained for over fifty years (Pieterse and Simone, 2013). Although only 38 percent of Africans live in cities, the majority of them (62%) live in informal settlements and obtain income from the informal economic sector (60%) (Pieterse, 2013a). These people, living and making a living in these ‘real African cities’ (informal settlements), are not in the margins of global urbanism, but in its centre (Malaquais, 2007). That a city of the global South is going to be the prototypical city of the future is also based on the fact that metropolitan expansion is driven by informal urbanisation: for example, informally acquired housing and related infrastructure by the elite in the fringes of metropolises; the eviction of the poor to the peripheries of cities; the demarcation of metropolitan zones in the peripheries; the rural-urban interfaces – physically as well as through labour flows and housing types (Roy, 2005). Due to the attention paid to informality and associated practices, this body of work is useful for advancing my discussions of livelihoods within the context of urban theory. The Routledge handbook on cities of the global south (Parnell and Oldfield, 2014) further clarifies the theory and themes for a southern dominated urbanism.

I use Roy (2011) to launch this city studies discussion because she clarifies her arguments on the spaces and practices of ordinary people in relation to neoliberalism, post-capitalism, and subaltern politics. She argues that the idea of subaltern urbanism is a vital and radical challenge to the narratives of the megacity theories (insalubrious slum areas, exemplary dystopia, dirt-poor habitat). However, she notes, subaltern urbanism is weakened by its continuing focus on the study of poverty. Also, the entrepreneurialism of self-organising economies and the ‘habitus of the dispossessed’ being promoted in such discussions are in fact potential frontiers of and the greenfield sites for contemporary capitalism (ibid.). In particular, the advocacy of an influential international consultant, De Soto (1989), for legalising informal housing and the informal economy has the effect of promoting the transformation of spaces of poverty into frontiers of accumulation and gentrification (Roy,
Similarly, Gibson-Graham’s (2006) promotion of ‘autonomous community economies’ has the effect of turning such economic spaces into commodities for capital accumulation (ibid.). Moreover, community land development practices driven through subaltern politics (Bayat, 1997) are often vulnerable to criminal syndicates connected to global real estate capital. Roy (2011) also contends that despite the use of notions of transmodernity, subaltern cosmopolitanism and slum cosmopolitanism to problematise, decolonise and disrupt dominant narratives of modernity and cosmopolitanism, post-colonial states use their megacities to generate and stage global investment and value. Having clarified all this, Roy (2005) holds that informality can be used to mitigate some of the vulnerabilities of the urban poor. This can be done through building people’s livelihood capacities, and through addressing inequality for the poor to participate in the broader economy. Informality can also be used for the benefit of the poor by stopping evicting them from their subaltern inner-city spaces, by expanding access to infrastructure and by the promotion of incremental adherence to housing codes (Roy, 2005; Alsayyad, 2004).

What is significant about this scholarship (on city studies related to ordinary people) for my discussion of livelihoods is the attention it gives to concepts related to the practices of ordinary people. Here also, Roy (2009) makes links between neoliberal capitalism and ordinary people’s livelihood practices. She reformulates the idea of informality into a mode of production of space of capital (commodification and the exchange of commercial and residential property), and hence, a mode of the production of uneven geography of spatial value (Roy, 2009). Thus, spaces of informality are seen to have become terrains for corporate interests, with the state often informally legitimising the acquisition of business ventures by the formal economic sector, while criminalising the informal practices of the subaltern (Roy, 2011). In this sense of the spaces of informality as attractive to the advance of capitalism, informality is not only to be equated with poverty, but it is also a “a heuristic device that uncovers the ever-shifting urban relationships between the legal and illegal, legitimate and illegitimate, authorized and unauthorised” (ibid.: 233). In fact, the distinction between the formal and informal economies is seen to have little purchase due to informal transactions that are seen to connect not only different economies and spaces to one another, but also the seemingly separated geographies of the slum and the suburb. Although this use of informality to capture informal urbanisation provides insights into how differential spatial values are produced and managed, that move runs the risk of detaching the concept of informality from the condition it was initially intended to describe – poverty. This is notwithstanding the fact
that Roy and Alsayyad’s (2004) earlier work discussed informality largely in relation to the conditions of ordinary people. In the end, the efficacy of the idea of informality will depend on the balance of discussions between informal urbanisation as the purview of wealthy urbanites on the one hand, and the purview of slum dwellers on the other. The broader issue is that Ananya Roy links the spaces of ordinary people to a theme in mainstream urban theory: the processes of capital accumulation, gentrification and global real estate market shape, define, and sustain the urban condition (Smith, 2002; Mitchell, 2000; Harvey, 1973).

Having explored how cities can provide opportunities for and create obstacles to ordinary people’s social-cultural and economic activities so far, the concepts being discussed by Simone (2010b) are useful for understanding what ordinary people themselves do to rebuild their lives and recreate the city itself. Simone (2010b) explores the analytical possibility of the concept of the ‘periphery’. From merely referring to a location further away from city centres, it is extended to describe a number of scenarios. Like the South African townships during apartheid, it is now seen as a space that can be used advantageously to advance freedom from domination and to enact some semblance of citizenship. Due to limited enforcement of regulations in peripheral areas, the periphery is now seen to be a space that is generative of socio-economic innovation and adaptation for the poor. The role of the informal economy in that regard was discussed in the first part of this chapter. Moreover, seen as a platform for anticipatory urban politics, the periphery is connected to an idea of ‘anticipation’ – one of many of Simone’s (2010) concepts. Indeed the practices of anticipation also belongs to the middle class and the state-corporate powers, who may use it to trigger the poor to make the first move before the eviction process is launched (through spreading rumours, as a way of testing the waters before that process) (Simone and Rao, 2012). It is also a tactic of establishing non-bridgeable and non-negotiable distance between the rich and the poor, white and black, centre and periphery, and thus, it articulates a position of enclosure (Roy, 2011).

Nonetheless, anticipation also relates to ordinary people seeing loopholes and quickly acting on them. For example, consolidating one’s position in particular set of relationships or

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15 Roy (2009) also discusses the idea of the ‘worlding of cities’ (of the global South) – recognising the encounters, movement and exchanges among cities. Another concept she discusses is the ‘production of space’ (of cityscapes) – cities’ encounters, movements and exchanges are not limited to its fluid and disjunctive constituents (finance and information capital, commodity exchange, media, ideas, ideologies, and people), they also include international migrant workers (maids, nannies, assembly line workers, sex workers) and other everyday strategies of worlding.
moving to a different, more favourable place (Simone, 2010b). It is a streetwise tactic through which urban residents connect with one another in order to expand their networks and opportunities (ibid.). Similar modes of operation (of scalar relations of connectivity and separation) are seen in another concept, ‘intersection’, which is the crossing of ideas, resources, and capital among people of various backgrounds, statuses, and capacities. They are meant to make things happen. Such intersections are characterised by compromises and aversion of danger as well as dealing with the unexpected in relation to the city’s information, people, and materials. They are also about disarticulation of one neighbourhood from another, of a neighbourhood from the state, disarticulation of social identity from another, as well as the separation of the formal from the informal. Such enfoldings and unfoldings of relationships lead to situations where networks, bodies, feelings, and ways of doing things are forced out of their particular identities. They are no longer tied to any particular meaning or value. It is then difficult to make a distinction between the formal and informal, between an adult and a youth, and between a citizen and a stranger (Simone, 2010b).

The concept of social infrastructure describes personal characters, people’s capacities, situations, and locations in particular arrangements of residence and circulations. Such positionings convey stories, resources, information, cash, obligation, and possibilities into viable opportunities for everyday survival. Social infrastructure also facilitates intersections of objects, spaces, persons and practices, opening each constituent element onto a multiplicity of relations between forces; and thus serves as platform for providing and reproducing city life (Simone, 2012). Other concepts such as the ‘public’, the ‘street’, and ‘discrimination’ also describe similar experiences (albeit expressed differently) (Simone, 2010). The point that Simone (2010b) makes is that urban residents are more alert to opportunities and danger, as they connect themselves to ideas and resources located in different class positions. In contrast, they also separate conventional ways of doing things: they separate behavioural connections, they separate connections among themselves, between economic sectors, between localities, and between a locality and the state. In this way, urban residents not only change the meanings of places, economic practices, relations, age, and citizenship, they also create cities in their own image and make them work.

AbdouMaliq Simone and Ananya Roy’s conceptions of urban residents’ socio-cultural, political and economic practices are clearly advanced in relation to the traditional discussions on livelihoods. We now understand informality to be pervasive within formal ways of doing
things as well (Roy, 2011). Simone’s (2010b) nuanced analysis of ordinary incidents and encounters allows him to see relationships of all kinds, including those unanticipated by urban residents and institutions, such as the crossing of ideas, resources, capital, objects, spaces, persons and practices (Quayson, 2014). Simone (2010b) describes such practices through words such as small gestures, bets, intuitions, manoeuvres and calculations, as residents and the corporate sector pull spaces, histories, and connections together. The evocative language he uses dispenses with the linearity of the social science tradition of assertion-followed-by-evidence. The problem with such a presentation, also observed by scholars such as Myers (2011), is that it does not describe the workings of ordinary people’s practices and spaces, but is a creative representation of what their situations might be like. Even in one paper where a longer extract of the thoughts of Bahwani (an interview participant) are highlighted, the discussion is not so much about specific activities of Bahwani and people like him, but about a space through which Bahwani operates: Menteng Dalam, a district in central Jakarta (Simone, 2013a).

The problem with AbdouMaliq Simone’s work is not that it is not based on particular case studies. He uses the idea of ‘the district’ to discuss central Jakarta’s topological space, which facilitates mobility from one district to another (Simone, 2013a). Here official conventions are transgressed, and different stories, sets of information and potential opportunities are navigated in order that residents reconfigure themselves and rearrange their overall relationship to the larger city (ibid.). In Johannesburg, he discusses the tentative and precarious processes of remaking the inner city, focussing on drug dealers, prostitutes, street traders, homeless people, and gangs (Simone, 2012). The inner city of Johannesburg is a cosmopolitan space constituted by Nigerians, South Africans, Zambians, Congolese, Malawians, Zimbabweans, Angolans, and Gambians, among other nationalities. Alliances among these actors tend to be built along national lines, as clandestine groupings become channels for business transactions, legal and/or illegal. They are also engaged with one another actively and/or symbolically across national lines and territories: townships, squatter settlements, and other sites in the African continent (ibid.). Thus, although Simone’s (2010b) work is grounded in particular locales, his discussions are a generalised representations of the life of the poor, which for him, are not necessarily in opposition to those of the middle class and of corporate investors there (below). For him to dispense with the ‘if-then’ syntax makes it hard to see how specific experiences are connected to the broader sites and contexts he discusses.
Simone (2004) also mentions something notable: the concepts he introduces and uses are only “heuristic entry points into describing varied capacities of diverse urban residents to operate in concert without discernible infrastructures, policy frameworks and institutional practices” (2004: 13). Such concepts “may not necessarily have an empirical coherence but rather elaborate a possible field through which residents from various walks of life pay attention to approach and coordinate their actions with one another” (ibid.: 13). In fact, a case study “does not serve to illustrate a specific conceptual notion. Rather, a specific notion is employed as a means of focusing attention on a process of interconnection in the gaps” (ibid.: 22). Thus, in Douala, Cameroon, the idea of ‘the spectral’ is used as an entry point to discuss the lingering sense of incompletion that haunts the way in which the city is visualised by its residents. In Winterveld, South Africa, the idea of ‘invisibility’ is used to discuss loosely organised cooperation among syndicate churchgoers, municipal officials, mineworkers, and buyers. Such syndicates (Mozambiqueans, Congolese, and South Africans) manage tender offers, the issuing of licenses and land-use plans, and they configure resources such as diamonds, rhino horns, guns and narcotics as well as liquor and construction of materials stolen from warehouses – illicit ways of making the most out of invisibility. I am sceptical of his focus on ‘a field of interaction’, with little attention paid to specific processes and concepts of explanation – the weight of his discussion is in the language he uses, than in the lived realities of ordinary people.

There is a sense that the idea being used is not engaged with in order to show how it explains experiences on the ground (Quayson, 2014), and how such experiences may redefine such concepts. This is crucial given that informality and associated practices, for example, differ even in any one city (Myers, 2011). Simone (2004: 15) himself provides an additional warning on his use of concepts: “the experiences I discuss here have been complicated, and clear and simple lessons are not easily packaged. The language description will thus also be complicated at times. It will not always be clear just what is going on, as stories open up to other stories”. The key issue here rests with the use of ‘sites’ and ‘contexts’ as units of analysis, without a discussion of the experiences of the people themselves. Hence, it is not clear how people’s capacities, situations, and positions convey stories, resources, obligations, and so forth into viable opportunities for everyday survival. It is clearer in Chapter 1 how Nathi combined social and material resources as well as various sites of Rustenburg
(Freedom Park, the inner city, and Phokeng) to create not only livelihoods, but also the city itself.

Simone’s (2010b) discussions are also enfeebled by his conception of the relationship between space, power and the activities of ordinary people – he disregards the workings of power relations in his research sites. For example, the Building in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, is a name for blocks of flats in close proximity to one another, occupied by sex workers, artists, former refugees from the Thai-Cambodian border as well as other residents in a block formerly occupied by the police. The point that Simone (2008b) makes is that the Building constitutes possibilities for making the city work for its residents – it is remade by various groups of residents to accommodate new social relations: youth, students, gangsters, and ‘bona fide’ locals forming alliances and exchanging information. It is also a corridor to the rest of the city, a resource that is used by urban residents to counter exclusion (ibid.: 194). The Building is located near state and business complex sites, some of which are part of the increasing speculative investments from South Korea, China, Singapore and Malaysia. Although such developments threaten the continued existence of the Building, Simone (2008: 201) points out that residents may collectively hold off its demolition because this site has been reconfigured into a ‘pioneer settlement’ so as to draw attention to itself and to attract people to live there (although people are simultaneously preparing to leave).

Simone’s (2010) conception of the city without contestations is also linked to his discussions of Kinshasa’s Bloods (young professionals-turned gangsters), who are working to penetrate the local economy by operating in-between traders. As sellers, they coordinate their customers by approaching them, even outside the market areas, and build them into loyal clients. The goods are sourced from different areas and repacked in bundles according to customers’ orders. It is “only through the central market”, Simone (2010: 143) avers, “will something [unspecified] be put in motion and change Kinshasa as a whole”. Similarly, specific development projects such as the Cité de la Fleuve and the Grand Inga Hydroelectric dam have been used to facilitate the articulation of investment streams, capital flows and communication systems without long-term commitments or intensive scrutiny. Notably, however, such development projects: the Bloods operating in the market slum as well as urban cultivators “are neither mutual threads nor contradictory, they exert an important force in reshaping contemporary cities. They turn uncertainty into resource and a fundamental condition of decision-making rather than a field of interference that must be reduced”
(Simone, 2013b: 215). Simone’s (2010) city without power contestations marks his ambiguous conception of an “African optimism conveyed in an overemphasis on radical openness and contingency”, even as his work carries a gloomy view of that continent (Myers, 2011: 140). A more useful analysis of the conditions and possibilities for ordinary urban residents recognises the small, creative urban practices applied by the abject poor (making good use of limited opportunities) in the context of power dynamics which increases their marginalisation.

Furthermore, the suggestion that city life in the global South is all about just trying to make the present moment possible may be symptomatic of depoliticising characteristics of postmodernity – there seems to be little room for real involvement (Barac, 2013). If all that ordinary people do is to desperately patch together the city that is not even there at all, there is limited space in AbdouMaliq Simone’s work for assessing the state of the city today in relation to what it could be (Barac, 2013). For Barac (2013), although cities are the result of actions or happen in what people do, they cohere into a real material landscape that shapes everyday practices and form the basis for social reproduction. In that sense, everyday navigation of the city is always more than narration of spatial encounter, it involves the realisation of power through space.

In my thesis, therefore, I combine the analyses of individual and household experiences with spatial and contextual descriptions of livelihood formation. I highlight the ‘livelihood assets’ that individuals and households build: relations at the household, community and other levels; housing; tenure rights; common property resources; income; labour, including that of women and children; entitlements from the state; claims on others; and reciprocity systems. I also discuss the ‘strategies’ through which livelihood assets are built: sharing food; diversifying or increasing household income through asset and labour pooling; migration; informal sector activities; rotating credit schemes; stinting, hoarding, savings and borrowing. It is on the basis of discussing such assets and strategies that the dynamics of spatial contexts can be understood, even when the language adopted by, for example, Mbembe (2004: 399) is used: the spaces of ordinary people are characterised by “the coexistence of divergent elements of different origins brought together in a space whose limits are constantly made and remade”. It is also on the basis of discussing livelihood assets and strategies that ‘the actions’ of ordinary people can be understood, even when Mbembe’s (2004: 401) language is adopted: speaking of the “swarming and inchoate crowds, incessant shouting and peddling”
when representing ordinary people’s actions in the city. Beyond the use of such poststructural language, it is possible to determine the goals that ordinary people pursue as defined by and for them: reducing vulnerability through a safety net, maintaining and enhancing other assets, self-interest, status, lifestyle, identity, and conspicuous consumption. Overall, I draw from the traditional livelihood research as well as city studies to provide a more legible rendition of ordinary poor people’s socio-cultural and economic activities.

2.3.2 The bodily and intellectuality as resources

This section builds on the issue of subject formation discussed earlier in this chapter: the ways in which ordinary people, like other city dwellers, are subjects of social reproduction in the way they develop stylish modes of living and other goals they pursue. Like Nathi in Chapter 1, they also accumulate new commodities and pursue goals based on self-interest, status and classy lifestyles. Alongside these identities is the freeing of bodily senses of intuition, creativity, and chance-taking as engendered by history, imagination, and the urban landscape. On the basis of these realities of subject formation and liberation of the senses, I make a broader argument that living and making a living in the city involves mediating such contradictory impulses – mediating the social reproductive effects of commodities and the landscape on the one hand, and city dwellers’ ability to create emancipatory spaces (other than those created by the state-capital partnerships) on the other. Accordingly, Simmel (1971) discusses city dwellers’ development of the attitudes of indifference. To him, the city’s exhilarating skyline and masses of people can be overwhelming, with the effect of stimulating city dwellers to the highest degree of cognitive and sensory energy. To the extent that overstimulating the nerves is dangerous, individuals ‘consciously’ deflect the shocks of the city, and in the process, a blasé, matter-of-fact attitude develops. Although Simmel’s (1971) ideas of intellectuality and indifference point to some of the positive aspects of city life, the conditions that engender acceptance of social difference (Stevenson 2003), the calculating and blasé attitudes can be seen to be negative to dealing with the challenges of city life – they work against the social networks needed for urban residents’ social and economic creativity and gain. In response to such mainstream research on the impersonal attitudes of urban life, urban anthropologists working on African cities have noted the more sociable urban sensibilities:
It is often argued that life in the city is impersonal, that residents of the 27th floor of a skyscraper do not know each other; that the stranger who asks for directions on the street in Detroit is told: sorry buddy. I can’t help, I only live here...[R]ecent research in urban Africa indicates that at best this proposition is a half-truth (Gutkind, 1974b: 76).

Researchers in urban Africa noted the more tightly-knit solidarities among such city dwellers (Gutkind, 1974a; Southall, 1961a; 1961b; Mayer, 1961). Southall (1961a) provided an example of sociable attitudes in the Kisenyi suburb in Kampala, Uganda. It was a dense settlement for black people characterised by regular retail services, welfare networks of credit-and-savings schemes and burial societies and beer bars. The beer bars were not simply sites of pleasure and work (dancing, chatting, and sex work), they were also sites where rural migrants met and found fellow-tribesmen, kin, or old friends. A number of group types – ephemeral, egalitarian, or highly structured – generate benefits for urban dwellers: for example, to receive kindness, to be assisted to get a job, or to be helped with protection of a property (a shack house)\textsuperscript{16}.

Importantly, it is not that urban dwellers are not excited or overwhelmed by the city’s skyline and/or masses of the people, or that they do not develop impersonal attitudes. Rather, the issue is that it is through the kinds of solidarities identified above that urban dwellers deal with the dominating experiences of city life. In fact, for Robinson (2006), the shocks of the city can have positive effects on urban dwellers, and thus be at the very centre of the experience of a city. The sensual realm can be drawn upon to respond to the overwhelming sights of the city, to imagine the concerns, motives and lives of people in a city. The urban dwellers can parry the shocks of a city with the ‘spiritual self’, or even allow the ‘conscious self’ to simply note the shocks of a city as part of the flow of life (ibid.: 54-55). The point she is making, with which I concur, is that a city can be actively sought out to be part of the deeper and intense memories that make up the long-term experience of life (ibid.: 55). Therefore, people’s response to the city’s challenges and images cannot be predetermined – rationality, indifference, the sensual, and other attitudes and social relations are sources of conflicts and reconciliations, and the city provides the arena for acceptance of difference, for

\textsuperscript{16} Other benefits for urban dwellers include being able to borrow money and a means of transport (bicycle), to visit each other and drink together; to have access to tribal bonds and/or cross-tribal experiences, to have access to people of the same occupation or religion, to obtain medicine or medical treatment when sick, and to access food and initial accommodation for new migrants.
networks of solidarity, for contestations, for stylish modes of living, and for identity formation.

Other than the ordering regimes of the visual and geometric space, the historical, the landscape and imagination can be resources for producing ways of living through space. People can reimagine space and use it through their cultural symbols and meanings, they can place the landscape ideal onto space, and can draw upon the historical memories of other ways of living through space. Thus, for Robinson (2004a) these resources, constituted by the unconscious/the body and the dream, have the potential to emancipate ordinary people from poverty and domination. Accordingly, the body signifies this possibility of new spatialities because it is a space of affectivity (the experiences of feeling and emotions) that cannot be reduced to the rationality of abstract space.

Pieterse (2012) asserts that affectivity forms a key part of an organism’s interaction with external stimuli, before cognitive reaction can be triggered. The affective can decipher deeply embedded predispositions, desires, and concerns that steer people toward resonant, appealing, and promising responses. It draws from experience to reproduce an inherent and constitutive potentiality for becoming. The experiences related to memories, habits, reflections, desires, and tendencies give some depth to a body’s movement, which at a certain moment, registers as emotion (a feeling of change in capacity for continual motion of relations, contingencies, scenes, and emergencies). These sensual experiences cohere in the context of cultural practice that allows people to rethink their relationship with various spaces they traverse and mobilise in order to reproduce an existence in the city (Pieterse, 2012).

It is in the body-culture-mind network that new meanings, images and symbols of space can be produced through an external space of the environment. Accordingly, urban dwellers potentially imagine space and use it differently, beyond the spaces of the state and capital, every time they move around the city. For example, ordinary people involved in the informal sector activity in central city areas often cross, redraw, and reimagine the city outside of conceived, planned spaces. Gotz and Simone (2002) highlight those parts of the city that juxtapose the spiritual and the corporeal: those spaces where street trading juts out into busy

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17 Affects are things that happen during habits of relating; things that happen in public and social worlds; in sensations, impulses, expectations, daydreams, encounters, forms of persuasion, contagion, and compulsion as well as modes of attention, attachment, and agency (Pieterse, 2012).
roads and sidewalks, where street traders locate in front of doors and shop front windows of formal stores, competing directly for the business of passing shoppers and blocking numerous lines of sight. These are also the spaces where taxi drivers use codes and sign-language for dropping off and picking up passengers, where taxi attendants use codes for when and where vehicles can be parked. These are the spaces where taxi guides use street sign-language to control the movement of incoming and outgoing vehicles. As will be seen in this thesis, Freedom Park in Rustenburg was meant to be a mining workplace, it was never meant to be a residential area. But it has been creatively recreated by migrants into a space of residence and livelihood formation. Similarly, the inner city of Rustenburg was not planned for informal sector activities. Regardless of the intentions of city planners and other dominant structures, ordinary people reimagined these spaces as places of opportunity, creatively turning them into places that are generative of social and economic gains.

I mentioned earlier that the dream constitutes the cultural, the historical, and the landscape as resources for producing new spatialities beyond the dominant, abstract space. As a metaphor representing a dynamic agency of partial unconscious feelings, the dream mediates the energy of the unconscious (an intuitive reuse of the city) and the cautious self (its creative reuse). An example may be street traders agreeing to the city’s by-laws, but not operating within sharp lines of order. Malaquais (2007) addresses this issue of the dream/imagination through a discussion of the global form of urbanity in Douala, Cameroon. In the context of infrastructure problems (transport) and place rootedness facing some inhabitants, knowledge about distant cities and their city dwellers instil in Doualais the imagination (as the driving force of the city) for what is possible. They shape the way the city is thought, lived, and transformed daily.

Malaquais (2007) refers to a ‘barber shop wall’ that is turned into a canvas in Douala. This canvas portrays, on one spot, an image of a man with a shaped haircut (see Plate 2.1). On another spot of the canvas, the gathering of people discussing sports, politics and events that shape the conditions of their city are portrayed; the image of celebrities such as President Osama bin Laden. On another spot (see Plate 2.2), the canvas portrays a collage of landscapes from various cities: New York City (Citicorp Centre, Van Wyk Expressway, Tri-Borough Bridge, palm trees, mosques, Al-Khoei Benevolent Foundation, a car or taxi), Johannesburg (the Carlton Centre, city centre), Chicago (Sears Tower), Istanbul (the mosque of Aya Sophia) and Timbuktu (the Djingeray Mosque).
Malaquais (2007) argues that the previous memories and experiences are not only integral to the way Doualais apprehend the city, such memories and experiences also shape their hopes for the city’s present and possible futures. Doualais live in a dream Douala, not the city itself – they simultaneously live in cities such as those referred to above and also live nowhere else. The point I am making is that the painting expresses the dreams of Doualais: the places they might have seen previously as well as well as the spaces, experiences and times of travels between and through these cities\textsuperscript{18}.

\textsuperscript{18} She interviewed a 25-year-old man who had spent eight years of his life travelling from Douala to Equatorial Guinea, then to Gabon, Brazzaville, Kinshasa, Angola, Namibia and Cape Town (his attempts to enter countries
Such an imagination of Douala’s possible futures demonstrates that ordinary people such as an informal hairdresser are not only concerned with survival. They dream about being involved in the management of their lived realities (in governance processes), they dream about decent life as represented in the collage of spectacular urban landscapes. In another context of crumbling infrastructure, assassinations, torture, and political crackdown for maintaining state dictatorship, urban Cameroonians elaborated overlapping maps of the city, using narrow alleys, escape routes that meander through unpaved spaces of their neighbourhoods (Malaquais, 2007). They superimposed such routes on regular ones. As part of this infrastructure of imagination, people constructed a carpet of water hyacinths as a canal surface (ibid.). This capacity for infrastructural imagination entailed a critique of the city and its leaders, as well as a conceptualisation of what the city might offer. Thus, a hyacinth bridge may not be a solution, but a production of a solution, signalling what should be there in the way of infrastructure, and the hyacinth bridge gives a sense of what form such a solution might take. These kinds of resources (the cultural, the historical, and the landscape) for imagining city futures are also true for places such as Rustenburg where research informants draw from what they see around them, from their imaginations, place histories, experiences and feelings as well as the Western, indigenous and other forms of religious influences in order to critique their present situation on the basis of the past they have lost and in order to imagine the future they want.

As I mentioned earlier, the problem with this discussion on imagining new urban spaces is that such possibilities are not specified, they are left open-ended. Additionally, although the body has played a role in the freedom from the absolutism of the Newtonian space-time, it has also produced such a reality (Harvey, 2000). Then, whose body is to create emancipatory or even transformative spaces? This point is related to the issue of subject formation – the social, political, and economic identities we adopt as well as the landscapes we have come to buy into have been created by the ‘critical infrastructure’ (the work of architects, engineers, scientists, statisticians, financiers, commercial traders, state bureaucrats and religious leaders). In that sense, the goals that city dwellers, including ordinary people, pursue have been defined for them through the meanings circulated via landscapes and other commodities around them by a particular configuration of critical infrastructure. Indeed in his discussion of such as Zimbabwe failed). Thus in situations where a 25-year-old man has spent a third of his life travelling, movement itself becomes a place.
transformations in landscape forms and livelihoods, Bebbington (1999) contends that the Ecuadorian landscape is symbolic of many changes that have occurred in how people live and think of living in Ecuador. Many of the people’s practices are mediated through the incorporation of modern ideas and commodities. The people of Colta, Guamote and Otavalenos in Ecuador used various livelihood activities to accumulate new commodities: vehicles and breeze-block houses of up to four storeys to replace adobe and thatched roofed houses. The Otavalenos have come to be known for being well-dressed, for their success, and for being proud about themselves (Bebbington, 2000; 1999). In this sense, the built environment and commodities play a significant role not only in the processes of subject formation, but also in the goals that such subjects pursue: self-interest, status, lifestyle, identity, and conspicuous consumption. In contrast to the urban landscape (among other resources) being able to produce alternative, emancipatory ways of living through space, these discussions are useful for highlighting the ways in which the city shapes ordinary people’s livelihoods and identities.

Ferguson (1999) explored how urban black Africans in the Zambian Copperbelt make sense of their circumstances in the city and the futures they may expect. The site for them to interpret their situation in the city is a bar that is visited by people of different class positions. The unemployed, ladies of the night, and gangsters that Ferguson (1999) observed in a bar in Kitwe adopted particular stylish modes as signifying practice through which they explore their identities in the face of their deteriorating economic circumstances. The choices that Ferguson’s (1999) research participants made, including relaxing in bars and clubs, opting for food that is not associated with village staples, drinking bottled liquor (rather than traditional beer), listening to fashionable music, speaking English, dressing flashily, all had affinities with a distant world, such as New York or London, a distant world that they never experienced. A picture of a city’s skyline printed on a T-shirt of Ferguson’s (1999) informant with the following words is one of the competing discourses in Kitwe in the Zambian Copperbelt:

POSH BOY
SCHOOL BOYS ENJOYABLE EXCITING
CAFÉ THOUSANDS OF WONDERFUL
CITY IN CALIFORNIA

Despite the incomprehensibility of this text, it highlights the dreams that ordinary people have about their future – stylish lifestyles, decent life – even as they informally subsist in
livelihoods. Southall (1961) also observed the concern for status in East and Central African towns, where smart clothes with brand names were important for an individual participating in the prestige-bearing European or Western style social structure, which in real life lay beyond their reach. They were not only concerned with survival, it was as important for them to ‘be’ as it was to ‘do’. Again, the question is whose body is to create the city’s transformative spaces, given that the body itself has been involved in the contradictory processes of its production and emancipation? Having said that, I also argue that although the new spaces produced by the body and the dream often become prohibitive and cohere into real material landscape that shapes everyday practices and forms the basis for social reproduction, imagination, history and the landscape provide resources for continual exploration and reproduction of new spaces.

2.3.3 Spatial propinquity and distanciation

One of the characteristic features of cities is that they are constituted by a wide range of social, economic and political activities that are in many ways globally interconnected. In that sense, cities are more spatially open, and are being cross-cut by many different kinds of mobilities. In reviewing discussions on the co-location of firms in cities for accessing common facilities and resources, for managing complex transactional economic activities, and for firm innovations and competitiveness, Amin and Thrift (2002) concluded that the role of such ‘urban foundations’ (co-location) in firms’ competitiveness is small compared to firms’ own distanciated networks – it is firms that benefit from global connections, not cities. Nonetheless, cities are formed out of densities and concentrations of people, things, institutions and architectural forms that often operate as sets of single units in real time on a planetary scale. It is in this context that cities may be generative of social and economic transformations, such that “in bringing different things [as well as people and ideas from far beyond their borders] together, cities might produce something new” (Robinson, 2004b: 163). The international connections in cultural, political, urban design and urban planning constitute resources that can potentially improve city life, and thus improve the lives of ordinary people.

Robinson (2006) has also suggested that those connections that extend only to the physical limits of the city should be considered in imagining the creativity and dynamism of cities. The interplay between successful elements of the city, and its marginal, poorer components can generate benefits for ordinary people to enact livelihoods and meaningfully transform
Towards that end, she suggests that paying attention to a neighbourhood’s socio-economic activities promotes inclusive policy formulations across the city: the support for flagship economic projects, linking economic growth and basic service delivery, establishing linkages between formal and informal enterprises, building connections between formal and informal governance systems, addressing the needs of globalising firms, and creating a learning environment for firms through knowledge spill over from untraded interdependencies and technological innovations through inputs that are external to the firm. This conception of cityness (a city’s distinctive forms, its diverse constituents and its potential dynamism and creativity) forms the basis for imagining new urban futures.

This issue of the co-location of the city’s constituents (distanciated or local) also has affinities with other city forms observed in various places at different times. Historically in South African cities, spatial propinquity among the poorer white, Coloureds, Indians and blacks enabled cultural and economic gains, despite the trajectory of such propinquity toward socio-spatial segregation (Hart and Pirie, 1984; Koch, 1983; Western, 1981). Koch (1983) discussed the ‘means of subsistence’ for ordinary people in the 1920s and 1930s Doornfontein, a Johannesburg neighbourhood made up of a mixture of workers, the self-employed, the unemployed, and the middle class. The livelihood activities of the people of Doornfontein were rooted in the struggle between capital (its demand for the physical well-being and productivity of labour) and the ordinary people’s search for a secure place within relation of dependency to the city. The cross-cultural mixture of lower class people there, and their proximity to the middle and higher class white areas, also generated a set of cultural forms and practices that were not only useful for humanising the brutal working conditions, but also enabled ordinary people to be creative in their efforts to build livelihoods. The playing of music during the occasion of stokvels, in the shebeens, and at night clubs glued them together. The point I want to stress is that the intimate and mixed socio-spatial forms of cities create conditions not only for money to circulate locally, but also for social and economic creativity.

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19 The ordinary people in Doornfontein were working in the mines, they were involved in activities such as stokvels and shebeens, they made loans from relatives and friends, and they developed relations of reciprocity in areas such as child care as well as the vat-en-sit marriage patterns that were based neither on an official certificate nor on traditional values. Additional strategies for making a living included women’s domestic work, men making furniture to sell to ‘white-owned, second-hand furniture shops’, and collecting bottles, tins, bags for commission-based ‘recycling’. The livelihood activities also involved boys caddying, begging, pickpocketing, selling newspapers on the street, and forming gangs to protect their areas of operation.
Similar benefits can accrue in the contemporary period. Parnell et al. (2009) discuss pro-poor planning approaches in South Africa, including integrated and sustainable human settlements. This is a kind of planning that ensures the development of compact mixed land-use and diverse life-enhancing environment with maximum possibilities for pedestrian movement as well as safe and efficient public transport. In terms of housing, such planning attends to the social environment (crime, social cohesion, moral regeneration, land rights), to the need for poor people’s housing to be located closer to economic opportunities, to tenure types as means to economic growth and livelihoods, and to universal public services. Parnell and Pieterse (2010) also attend to the kind of urban zoning that reintegrates the peripheral, historically segregated black areas back with the city. The Less Formal Establishment of Township Act (113 of 1991) is intended to release land without requiring urban zoning – without the demarcation of commercial and religious zones as well as open spaces. In that sense, the absence of a disciplinary urban zoning mechanism is good for informality and livelihoods formation, for the building of shebeens, taverns, tuckshops, backyard shacks, and home-based panel-beating centres. Parnell and Pieterse (2010) further discuss the dynamic relationship between the household, city and neighbourhood scales. While city-wide planning can deliver redistributive benefits through cross-subsidy mechanisms, the neighbourhood that is linked to a city’s economy can facilitate the building of social solidarities and unlock individual/household creativity and entrepreneurism.

The everyday socio-economic benefits of spatial propinquity have also been observed in the United States of America. Zukin (2010) described such intimate and integrated forms of urban development in New York City – Brooklyn, the Bronx, Queens, Harlem – which was, by the 1960s, occupied by immigrants, people of colour, the working class, and artists in areas of co-existing older buildings, art galleries, small boutiques, upscale food markets, neighbourhood old-timers, and funky neighbourhood ethnic restaurants. Jacobs (1961) is widely cited as one of the most vocal opponents of the breakdown of such integrated neighbourhoods in cities of the United States of America and associated growth of suburbs and shopping mall culture. Grant (2006) notes that following Jacobs’ (1961) influential book, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, planners and architects such as Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, Leon Krier and Andres Duany spearheaded a movement that advocates for a particular kind of planning: the building of corridors (the connectors and separators of neighbourhoods and districts) as well as the building of districts (the functionally specified spaces that support diverse and complementary activities of districts). Leaving aside the
building of ‘good communities’ (through codes that set design rules), a neighbourhood characterised by compact, mixed housing and building types, a neighbourhood that enhances affordability, social diversity, vibrant sociality, interactions and integration, that is walkable and connected to the city through the public transport system, also creates conditions for more inclusive spaces and for social and economic creativity.

In the case of the global South, Bebbington’s (1999) discussion of spatial propinquity and social capital points to the everyday spaces that ordinary people organically build themselves. His work in Ecuador has shown that social capital, as a livelihood asset, is also useful for villagers to construct their own meanings of wealth, well-being and poverty. In particular, ordinary people put more value on co-residence (living in the same village) and cultural practices such as fiestas and volleyball games on community courts. In this sense, such cultural practices and spatial propinquity, fiestas and volleyball games create conditions not only for retaining the circulation of money locally, but also for forging networks between individuals and social organisations in order to build livelihoods and defend associated assets. However, the migrancy option available to ordinary people, Bebbington (1999) claims, can undermine social capital, leading to a situation where one’s income and loyalty are stretched between the rural and city life. In contrast to this affirmation of spatial propinquity, Katz (2004) has shown how connections to the elsewheres provide opportunities for livelihood activities – the ways in which migrancy, the increase in local trade and the associated introduction of new consumer goods in a locality open up opportunities for ordinary people to improve their lives.

Simone (2010) and Simone and Rao (2012) looked at the territorial consolidation of middle class and slum areas distributed across the central districts of Jakarta; always in close proximity to one another. These are areas of people from various backgrounds, histories, economic capacities, and professionals (petty-bourgeoisie enterprises, racketeers, and service workers). They participate in shifting alliances and enmities across groups, discourses, opportunities, and situations. Here, spatial proximity translates to economic proximity due to intersections of interests and various projects. Different members of a household get involved in diverse activities of a particular sector; exposing themselves to numerous relational networks, vantage points, interfaces, and opportunities as they also prepare to shift gear, resources, and emphasis at an opportune time. Therefore, affordability, social diversity, vibrancy, interaction and integration are enhanced through the connections of spaces such as
the townships, suburbs and other distant sites through efficient transport and telecommunication systems as well as the planning of compact, walkable and connected neighbourhoods.

2.4 Conclusion

I use the scholarship on southern urbanism not only to advance livelihood research, but to also connect that research to city studies. In this chapter, I have made unusual connections between livelihoods research and the mainstream urban theory. The key argument I am pursuing is the role of cities in ordinary people’s quest to improve their lives. Toward that end, I organised the discussions of my thesis around the themes of ‘spaces of livelihood formation’; ‘spatial propinquity and distanciation’ as well as the bodily and intellectuality as resources for ordinary people to engage with the city. These themes highlight various sources of the transformative potential of cities, suggesting that although city spaces often cohere into a real material landscape that shapes everyday practices and social identities, the sensuality, rationality, history, and the landscape provide assets for continual exploration and reproduction of new spaces of emancipation from poverty and domination. These themes are also useful for discussing Rustenburg’s changing livelihood forms, landscapes, and social identities.
Chapter 3
Research Methods and Methodology

3.1 Introduction
At the start of this project I lived in and out of Rustenburg – I lived between the research field and the university theoretical world. The reconnaissance study in Rustenburg and the time I spent at the University of North-West helped me align the conceptual frameworks with the empirical realities of the research sites. Importantly, it was during this moment of reflexivity that allowed me to create an unusual conversation between livelihood research and urban theory. Thus, this thesis is not about livelihoods research in and of itself – it does not so much explore the dynamics internal to the study of livelihoods, but create a space of engagement between it and city studies. Importantly, it advances a post-structural urban theory derived in and from the global south, and anchored in historical and lived everyday reality of ordinary people.

Part of that phase of my research process was marked by publications of my emerging ideas in the *Singaporean Journal of Tropical Geography* (Mosiane, 2011) and *GeoJournal* (Mosiane, 2009). I also reviewed, for the *African Affairs* journal, Sarah Mosoetsa’s (2011) book: *Eating from one pot: The dynamics of survival in poor South African households* – a book title that clearly depicts a ‘strategy’ of the poor people (‘eating from one pot’) as they respond to their changing social and economic circumstances. That research phase also provided me with interview lessons: I would make appointments with research informants so that during the first meeting I could take each of them through a ‘consent letter’ and the ‘participant information sheet’ prepared beforehand and also collect biographic data (gender, age, nationality, ethnicity, education and skills). The plan was to conduct full interviews on our second meeting, but it turned out that for both ordinary people and officials of Bafokeng and the RLM, I had to conduct full interviews during my first contact because it was hard to secure another interview appointment. Such interviews enabled me to collect richer responses, especially from ordinary people who are not able to handle the complications associated with techniques such as telephone interviews and e/mailed questionnaires.

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20 Research methods refer to the techniques for gathering research evidence (observation, participant observation, interviews, secondary material, archival sources, research surveys, documentary research, and life histories). Research methodology refers to the concepts used to formulate theories of the research procedure.
I also learned that my initial concern that the informants’ socially constructed differences (ethnicity and nationality) could be used against their participation in livelihood activities was, generally speaking, not significant. This was proven by the absence of xenophobic attacks in Rustenburg in May 2008 and 2015 compared to some places nationally. However, this does not mean that there are no small-scale or hidden xenophobic experiences in Rustenburg. It is for this reason of my regard for possible social intolerance locally that I ensured that differences based on gender and migrant/immigrant statuses are represented in my interview samples. The key point I am making here is that the situation of being able to speak directly with my informants in a context of relative social and political stability allowed me to capture the local meanings of ‘livelihoods’ and ‘the transformative potential of the city’.

The second important moment in the process of this research was when I resigned from the University of the North-West and accepted an appointment for one and half years as a researcher in the Bafokeng administration. I subsequently participated actively in discussions on the writing of the narrative for the proposed Bafokeng People’s Centre (Museum). I also led the project of updating and publishing, for RBA, Bernard Mbenga and Andrew Manson’s (2010) book ‘People of the Dew’: A History of the Bafokeng of Phokeng-Rustenburg Region, South Africa, from Early Times to 2000. The main research interest for me during that process was how the Bafokeng history was represented – how a confederation of affiliated communities, which came to be relatively vibrant agricultural producers, was portrayed as a homogeneous community. I also led the project on the research, writing and publishing of the book Mining the Future: the Bafokeng Story, which focuses on the achievements of the Bafokeng administration and its communities’ middle class as well as the new development goals of that administration (Royal Bafokeng Administration, 2010). From this latter project, I obtained some insights into the ways in which the Master Plan21 is likely to shape the livelihood activities of ordinary Bafokeng. Overall, my tenure as a researcher in the Royal Bafokeng administration exposed me to research materials relating to the history of Bafokeng; the 2005 and 2008 Bafokeng demographic surveys; the annual Public Meetings Report (Kgothakgothe Report) and the Annual Review Speech (a kind of state of the nation address). The formal and informal conversations I had with officials in both the Bafokeng

21 The Master Plan was launched by the Bafokeng administration in 2006 as a socio-spatial and economic development framework. It is a planned, controlled, orderly and sustained growth of a place through coordinated programme of public improvements of a place’s streets, infrastructure, housing and leisure (Graham and Marvin, 2003).
administration and the RLM, have enabled me to gather important materials for this research. Importantly, that ethnographic immersion did not compromise my detachment from and critical analysis of both institutions (RLM and RBA).

I grew up in the North-West Province, and I have thus been able to grasp the nuances, richness and depth of what I have been told during the interview sessions. As a ‘local’ person, it was possible for me to complement the trappings of semi-structured interviews with conversations just before interviews, during the interludes and the lengthy farewells, all of which ultimately went into the research database. In many ways, I have been able to present my concepts on livelihoods and the transformative potential of the city while retaining the logic of research participants’ responses (Bozzoli, 1991). Additionally, research participants volunteered information to me as they saw me as a local person, an ‘insider’ who is a potential participant in their livelihood strategies that straddle legality, illegality, morality and immorality.

Although discussions in this thesis are anchored around specific themes, I am using the research sites of Phokeng, downtown Rustenburg and Freedom Park as well as individuals, households and groups in these sites as units of analysis. I am adopting a case study approach so as to be able to provide ‘thick descriptions’ of sites through which livelihoods are created and to bring together the multiplicity of practices necessary for discussing livelihoods and the city. Indeed, any case study is constituted by multiple relations and can thus speak to other sites elsewhere. Notably, while the body in such sites is a surface of various socio-cultural, political and economic inscriptions (Harvey, 2000), it also constitutes resources that can produce emancipatory ways of living through space (Robinson, 2004a). The research sites already identified above give spatial content to what Rustenburg is from the point of view of ordinary people – they represent areas in this city where ordinary people live and/or work (informal settlements, informal trading sites and villages). Phokeng and Freedom Park are spaces of livelihood formation and residence, while the inner city (the old Central Business District) is mainly a place of work for informal street hawkers and formal business owners.

I interviewed informants from the major language groups in Rustenburg (141 informants from the Sotho, Xhosa, Tswana, Swati and Tsonga groups). My interviews with ordinary people in the three selected localities in Rustenburg – Phokeng, Freedom Park and ‘the inner city’ – was a sample of mainly unemployed and/or self-employed men (41%) and women
from the targeted Sotho, Xhosa, Tswana, Swati and Tsonga groups. While 70 percent of research participants across the major language groups were South Africans, others from the same groups (Sothos 9%, Tsongas 15% and Swatis 6%) were from Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland respectively. Over 80 percent of women interviewed were between the ages of 30 and 45. Men’s ages clustered between the ages of 30 to 45 and between 50 to 65. Just over 60 percent of men had variously attended school for three to eight years, and the rest attended school for up to eleven years. Twenty percent of women have graduated from high school and ten percent of them had post-high school training in basic computer skills and elementary education. The rest of the other women (70%) had variously attended school for four to twelve years. The size of the interview sample and the period I spent in Rustenburg enabled me to reach a saturation level of information gathering – a level beyond which the interview and other methods of data collection reveal little new information. I employed a combination of research methods in order to build reliable datasets.

3.2 The Phokeng Case-Study

Although Phokeng is mainly a place of residence, ordinary Bafokeng and migrants there have turned it into a place of work as well. I conducted intensive, semi-structured interviews with officials in the Bafokeng administration so as to obtain relevant documents and speak with them about the implications of their socio-spatial interventions as well as the state grants and subsidies (intergovernmental transfers, indigent grants, basic services tariff structure and infrastructure spending) for livelihood formation (see Table 1.2 for interview pool). It should be noted that although some of the Master Plan projects and state grants and subsidies are significant resources for livelihood formation, the interviews were meant to tease out the actual resources that households have been able to access and gather – different people will have access to different sets of resources and networks in different places at different times. In order to establish how ordinary people have been able to use which networks and resources, I conducted interviews with key research participants in Phokeng, selected on the basis of their gender and migrant/immigrant status.

Table 3.1: The research interview pool: Phokeng

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee Pool</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary Males</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Bafokeng**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Females</th>
<th>45</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male migrants</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female migrants</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Bafokeng officials**

| Economic Development | 1 |
| Infrastructure Development | 1 |
| Town Planning | 1 |
| Health and Social Development Services | 1 |
| Bafokeng elected councillor | 1 |
| Bafokeng nominated councillor | 1 |
| Chairman of the Supreme Council | 1 |
| RLM Councillor for Phokeng | 1 |

In selecting research participants, I used a combination of random and snowball sampling methods in order to avoid the problem of self-selection. Although I requested research informants to suggest other participants that I interviewed, I also walked randomly to houses, shacks, and trading stalls in Phokeng. Such random interviews have been possible because I am able to speak the Setswana language commonly used by ordinary people to navigate the city of Rustenburg. I used the English language as well as the services of a translator of other languages when necessary (isiXhosa or siSwati, for example). The key question that I asked the ordinary people of Phokeng (as well as Freedom Park and the inner city) was: how do you make a living? The follow-up questions were mainly determined by the responses to this question, and such questions centred on livelihood assets, strategies and goals (see Appendix 1). Closer attention was given to a specific area in Phokeng in order to explore its socio-economic potential – this area seems to be fertile for social and economic creativity. I also inquired about the forms of exclusions and repressions against such creativity. The objective I had with the information obtained from Phokeng was to explore how the Bafokeng administration interventions square up (or not) with ordinary people’s initiatives: whether the co-presence of the modern and traditional forms of governance facilitate ordinary people’s livelihood activities or facilitates the interests of the elite. Freedom Park and the inner city did not afford me this unique opportunity for this kind of data gathering because they are not settlements under traditional leadership.

### 3.3 The Freedom Park case study

Since the 1970s, Freedom Park has changed from being a male-only residence and workplace to a space of livelihood formation and residence for mineworkers as well as the
unemployed/self-employed male and female migrants from other parts of South Africa, Southern Africa, and Asia. Migrants settled there gradually from the 1970s. Since 2003 a number of development projects have been launched there by both private and state bodies. I interviewed the Catholic Church representative about the interventions they have made (clinic, crèche, primary school, adult education centre, skills training in bread making, fence making and garment sewing). I also interviewed a representative of Impala Platinum about the company housing project and its funding of development projects in Freedom Park through the Catholic Church. I interviewed the RLM’s Planning and Human Settlement Directorate about the RDP housing in Freedom Park. Following the completion of that project, I wanted to know how the Directorate intend to turn this space into a ‘human settlement’, characterised by more vibrant social, political and economic activities. Regarding the ordinary people of Freedom Park, I used the same sampling techniques and asked similar questions as in the case of Phokeng (see Table 1.3 and Appendix 2). The objective I had with the information obtained from Freedom Park was to explore the ways in which ordinary people can use their ‘peripheral’ position (constituted in part by the development interventions of the RLM and Impala Platinum) both to generate social and economic activities and to recreate the city of Rustenburg. Phokeng and the inner city case studies did not afford me the opportunity to discuss this because they are not former informal settlements, physically peripheral to the city.

Table 3.2: The research interview pool – Freedom Park

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant Pool</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Park</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basotho</td>
<td>6 males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xhosa</td>
<td>6 males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tswana</td>
<td>6 males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swati</td>
<td>6 males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsonga</td>
<td>6 males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant traders</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation for migrant traders (Ethiopia, Somalia, Mali, Eritrea and Burkina Faso)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The inner city case study

The inner city of Rustenburg is mainly a place of work for informal traders, taxi drivers, and formal business owners. In this old Central Business District (CBD), I interviewed researchers and architects working for the Rustenburg Rapid Transport project, taxi drivers, formal business owners, members of the Legal Resource Centre, and a number of unelected/administration officials regarding the place of street trading in the inner city – whether street traders can be accommodated in the spaces of the city.

The RLM officials were from the Directorate of Local Economic Development, the Directorate of Public Safety, and the Planning and Human Settlement Directorate (see Table 1.4 for the interview pool). Regarding the ordinary people of the inner city, I used the same sampling techniques and asked similar questions as in the cases of Phokeng and the inner city. I also interviewed street traders, including migrant traders and their organisations, about their place in the inner city – whether they are provided with space to conduct their activities (see Appendix 3). The objective I had with the information obtained from downtown Rustenburg was to determine how informal traders in the dominant and more contested spaces of the city rework the inner city through direct engagement with structures of power.

Although the interview questions in each research site are similar, the difference is that each research site is unique and provides distinctive insights into the role of cities in ordinary people’s efforts to rebuild their lives – thus I adopted a case-study approach, rather than a thematic one. In particular, Freedom Park provides insights into the role of the periphery in socio-cultural and economic change. Downtown Rustenburg allows for a discussion of direct engagement with and contestations between ordinary people and the structures of power – the ordinary and dominant spaces of the city shape one another.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Committee</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing Committee</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Church</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impala Platinum Company</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.4: The research interview pool - downtown
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Downtown Interviewee Pool</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Entrepreneurs</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal business owners</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street traders</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant traders</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation for migrant traders (Ethiopia, Somalia, Mali, Eritrea and Burkina Faso)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxi drivers</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NGOs</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Resource Centre</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>City Government</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning and Human Settlement Directorate</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Economic Development Directorate</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Manager</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget and Treasury Directorate</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directorate of Public Safety</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rustenburg Rapid Transport (researcher, communication, architect)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Phokeng allows for similar discussions, albeit in the context of traditional authority. It also allows for an analysis of what happens when traditional villages (Phokeng) and the city coexist/overlap administratively, politically, and spatially – what socio-economic opportunities and/or obstacles arise from the co-presence of traditional and modern forms of governance? The three case studies bring into sharp focus the interactions between the city (its services, facilities, and socio-spatial interventions) and ordinary people’s initiatives. While some parts of the city are generative of socio-cultural and economic activities, others repress them.

I deviate from a case-study approach to adopt a thematic discussion in only one instance (Chapter), where I put the spotlight on the issues of universal basic services (water and electricity), as well as social security grants, as livelihood assets. The goal is to move beyond naming (from interviews) these sources of livelihoods, and attend to the dynamics around
their provision. The ‘equitable share’ and the ‘indigent policy’ on free basic services are instruments used by the South African state to deliver such entitlements: what is the level of access to free basic services and social security grants? To what extent does the basic services tariff structure facilitate access to water and electricity? The role played by the Bafokeng administration has not been insignificant in the delivery of basic services and social development initiatives. That said, the provision of basic services and social security grants nationally are not fully guaranteed by the state due to constitutional limitations as well as higher demands made on South Africa’s extensive social security system. These internal challenges to sustain and expand the delivery of universal public services and social security grants are compounded by those that are external: the growing migrants to South Africa and associated requirements by international conventions22 and protocols, that ordinary people should have access to universal public services and social security grants wherever they live in the world; the increasing demands on the limited state fiscus as well as lower levels of investments in infrastructure for universal public services in sub-Saharan Africa; African economies that are increasingly growing mainly to the benefit of the rising numbers of the middle and higher classes.

In order to collect data for these contemporary issues (in addition to the interviews), I used various planning documents such as the Integrated Development Plan Review (RLM, 2012); Royal Bafokeng Nation Master Plan (2007; 2006); Maxim Planning Solutions (2004); the South African and the Bafokeng administration’s census reports and the minutes of the RLM on informal trading. I also gathered information by way of attending community meetings, where related documents are often provided to those people present at a meeting23. I used that official data to discuss the socio-spatial interventions in the RLM and Phokeng – the usefulness of the local economic initiatives and social development programmes (in addition to traditional role of providing basic services) for ordinary people’s livelihood trajectories. That discussion includes the creation of particular kinds of spaces through the RDP housing projects, through the regeneration initiatives of the inner city as well as the Bafokeng Master Plan projects.

Overall, the three case studies (their modern and traditional forms as well as the historical and


23 I attend community meetings such as the Integrated Development Planning meetings and the public meetings (Kgothakgothe) of the Royal Bafokeng Nation.
contemporary forces that shaped and continue to shape them) bring insights into the relationship between ordinary people’s initiatives and the state’s socio-spatial interventions. Themes of spatial propinquity and distanciation as well as the bodily and intellectuality organised the analysis of related discussions. I used historical and archival sources, interviews, and post-apartheid documents of the RBA and the RLM to collect data for this thesis. For information on livelihoods in the three case studies, the analysis was driven by the main interview question (how do you make a living?), and follow up questions prompted by associated responses. Given that the defining feature of research participants is poverty and the attempts to survive, many of them had very little to say. It should be remembered that I was interested in these vulnerable people, not informants who have interesting stories to tell. I transcribed their responses every evening after the interviews. In such responses, I was specifically looking for the livelihood assets, strategies, and associated aspirations of ordinary people as well as the dynamics of age, status, and gender regarding such livelihood assets and strategies. I used a series of maps, photographs, and tables to present the information I collected. In addition to such an analysis of livelihood activities, I used specific themes to frame that analysis: spatial propinquity and distanciation as well as the bodily and intellectuality as resources for ordinary people to engage with the city.

History is an important consideration in such an analysis. I traced the historical forces (divergent) of the three case studies; how they have shaped not only the nature of spatial segregation, land dispossession and repossession, but also ordinary people’s current livelihood practices – why do ordinary people make a living the way they do? Additionally, such historical processes were used – together with those that are contemporary – to explain the varied development interventions of the RBA and the RLM (and the interplay among them) as well as ordinary people’s forms of livelihoods. These administrations launched their contrasting but not dissimilar ambitious development plans (the Master Plan projects and programmes, the FIFA World Cup, the formal regeneration of the inner city) not only to address the historical socio-economic disparities, but also to show their fantasies for prestigious standing at the global level. For this kind of information, I used interviews with officials and the documents of the two administrations as sources of information. What I was tracing from interviews with both ordinary people and local state officials was the interactions between livelihood activities and local development interventions.
I also made a comparison of the three case studies of Phokeng, downtown Rustenburg and Freedom Park in relation to how they shape and are being reshaped by individual and shared livelihood strategies. Freedom Park is a residential area for mineworkers as well as a space of livelihood formation for ordinary poor people. As it is the case with other informal settlements in the city (whether or not formalising through the provision of RDP housing and related land-uses and services), Freedom Park is of little value to the developmental local government of the RLM and the RBA. This local state distancing, in part due to these settlements’ ‘peripheral’ and citizenship issues, create space creativity and livelihood formation in places like Freedom Park. Although in reality Phokeng, as the administrative seat of the RBA, receives more investments relative to other villages, the Bafokeng villages are meant to access resources such as land and receive basic services, all significant in livelihood formation. In this sense, these villages have better opportunities for local state investments and livelihood formation than urban informal settlements like Freedom Park.

In contrast to the above-mentioned traditional and municipal state distancing, the post-apartheid downtown Rustenburg has come to suppress ordinary people’s livelihood activities (street trading and income-based cultural shows). For this I analysed the minutes of the RLM Directorate of Public Safety as they relate to street trading. Regarding Phokeng village, it is largely a residential area characterised less by street trading, but by various home-based activities such as tuckshops, taverns, and backyard accommodation for rent. Thus, opportunities for or suppression of livelihood activities are not certain. They depend on new land-use requirements of the Master Plan since 2006 and their relaxation in less than a decade or on the targeting of participants in livelihood activities by the traditional authority due to political differences/confrontations. Common among the three case studies is their global connections either through ideas of the Master plan and the regeneration strategies, platinum trade or higher rate of migration. Again, in each of the three case studies, I was looking for the types of livelihood assets (existing and/or being accumulated) and livelihood strategies associated with those assets. Over and above building livelihood assets, I was looking for livelihood strategies that are sensual, that slips the structuring tendencies of the Euclidian space as well as ordinary people’s goals; their aspirations for status, traditional or modern identities.

As a post-structurally inspired study, also informed by a postcolonial critique of the wider field of urban studies, the information gathered and analysed for this thesis does not provide
all the facts about the topic of study. Rustenburg is constantly changing. Also, secondary sources provide partial information and research informants’ responses are selective (Gilbert, 1994). This is because the informants (and indeed the historical and contemporary records) often provide incomplete accounts of what actually happens in a particular situation. I understand that the information provided to me by my informants is their interpretation of their actions and/or of other people, depending on their gender, ethnicity, place of origin, age, what they remembered to say, what they may have understood or misunderstood a research process to be, and also depending on how they perceived me (as a male, black researcher – they may trust me, not trust me, or choose to give me more or limited information for reasons not known to me). That said, the data I obtained from them is an objective account of their subjective experiences, thoughts, beliefs or feelings about their situations, rather than mere opinions. Thus, it is possible to develop a reliable knowledge. Although all knowledge claims are selective, situated and contextual, they should not be rejected because knowledge claims do not all reside in the contextual, but are also analysed into ‘practically adequate’ concepts (Sayer, 2000).24

Similarly, truth claims can be established even when values are acknowledged because value-neutrality is not necessary for finding true statements – values may or may not affect, for better or for worse, truth claims. What is experienced, believed, thought, or felt might not say anything about whether a statement is objective in the sense of true or practically adequate representation of its object (it may have truthful, false or neutral implication for truth claims) (Sayer, 2000). Nonetheless, the selective, situated and contextual character of knowledge, as an artefact of the researcher and the researched, does not mean that nothing lasting or practically adequate can be said about the city of Rustenburg and the realities of ordinary people there.

In collecting data, I considered England’s (1994) concerns that the interview process, even unintentionally, may exploit informants’ lives, loves, and tragedies; it is an imposition in people’s spaces and times. I therefore explained my research to my respondents: what it is; what it entails, and how I conduct it. I explained the benefits that an informant can expect

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24 The information is considered ‘practically adequate’ to provide some truth about a certain reality when the expectations about that reality materialise (on the basis of justifiable grounds). Such practically adequate claims may indeed be shown, later, to be false, and may then be replaced or augmented by theoretical propositions that may better explain the object of study (Sayer, 2000). The point is that it is possible to produce some practically adequate knowledge, rather than statements about some generalisable and universal truths.
from the interview, without promising things that will not be forthcoming. The risks and discomforts associated with participating in the research were also explained, and the respondents were allowed to say, if they wished, that the tape recorder be turned off for certain answers and then turned back on. I allowed an informant to request that I move on to the next question without answering a particular one; or even to stop the interview. The confidentiality of respondents was explained to them: that in citing their direct quotes in my thesis and other publications, I would maintain their individual privacy in the way they wished. This means that I will not use their names when using interview quotes, even if I may use other references to their identity such as job, gender, and sexuality. Respondents were told beforehand that participating in the interviews was voluntary, that they had the right to participate or not without any negative consequences. In case a respondent had any question regarding my research project and wished to report any research-related discomforts or concerns, I gave them my contact information and that of my supervisor as well as of the School of Architecture and Planning. The respondents were allowed to ask questions and decide whether they wanted to participate in this research study.
Chapter 4

The making of the Rustenburg landscape, livelihoods, and subjects

“Land removals, proletarianisation, geographical and other forms of segregation, and the powerful impact of racist ideology, have been only some of the forces and structures with which the poor have had to contend – and indeed which will affect their lives for generations to come, whatever the outcome of current political affairs in that country” (Bozzoli, 1991: 1-2, italics added).

4.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a historical account of the current Rustenburg landscape as well as the processes through which the people who came to be called ‘poor’ make a living the way they do. The question that organises this discussion is what were the driving forces behind the changes in this city’s landscape and social identities that resulted in ordinary people making a living the way they do today? The discussion shows that the changes in the identities of the people of Rustenburg and the ways they created livelihoods were linked to changes in their landscape. Some of the spatialities that were created by the first half of the twentieth century provided opportunities for socio-cultural and economic empowerment for the people of Rustenburg, not least because of their resourcefulness. However, particular socio-cultural, political, and economic forces were at work, which not only transformed Rustenburg into a capitalist city built along racial, gender, class and ethnic lines, but also debilitated its transformative potential.

The first part of the chapter discusses the forms of the pre-colonial landscape, livelihoods, and social identities. It particularly addresses the drivers of change (economic development and the building of the urban landscape) behind the social identities, livelihood and landscape forms of the second half of the nineteenth century. The second part of the chapter discusses the drivers of change (land dispossession, missionary work, land purchasing, and the introduction of farming technology) during the same period well into the first half of the twentieth century. Although this chapter is simply meant to provide an historical background to contemporary issues, it locates its accounts within the historical processes of transformations in livelihood activities, in landscape forms as well as social identities (rather than read such accounts from institutional structures – making sweeping connections between, for example, the 1895 Squatter Law and the livelihoods of the poor). The third part of the chapter attends to similar issues as the first and second sections, attending to the social,
political, and economic dynamics of the Bethlehem location. Taken together, the sections of this chapter highlight the possibilities for socio-cultural and economic transformations at the turn of the nineteenth century and the forces that undermined such possibilities. The material for these discussions is drawn from the ‘published’ sources on Bafokeng as well as from the primary ‘archival’ materials on Bethlehem. I use Bafokeng areas and Bethlehem as case studies for discussions of Rustenburg as a whole; hence, discussions on the city’s Indian and white people are also included in relevant places. They are framed around the themes of the spaces of livelihood formation, spatial propinquity and distanciation as well as the bodily and intellectuality as resources for ordinary people to engage with the city.

4.2 The pre-colonial Rustenburg landscape, livelihoods and subjectivities

Following a period of fragmentation and dispersal (1500s-1700s), when a number of Sotho-Tswana formations over central and southern Africa regularly broke into lineage clusters, the Sotho-Tswana began to amalgamate into confederations from 1750s onwards (Capps, 2010). Thus, by the turn of the eighteenth century, Bafokeng\(^{25}\) were part of a number of Batswana groups that had come to settle in what came to be known as Rustenburg. Figure 4.1a shows the major 18\(^{th}\) and 19\(^{th}\) century lineages that constituted what came to be known as the Rustenburg area. This area was bordered by the Selons River to the west, the Bakwena-ba-Mogopa to the east, the Magaliesberg to the south and the Elands River to the north (Mbenga and Manson, 2010) (see Figure 4.1b).

\[\text{Figure 4.1a: The major 18}^{\text{th}}\text{ and 19}^{\text{th}}\text{ century lineages of the Rustenburg area} \]
\[\text{Source: Hall et al. (2008)}\]

\(^{25}\text{See footnote 2.}\]
The numbers of Batswana confederations have increased greatly by then (ibid.). Part of the early nineteenth century Rustenburg landscape can be seen in Plate 4.1, Charles Bell’s painting depicting part of the Sotho-Tswana landscape in 1835 in the present-day town of Rustenburg. The face of the area began to change after the mid-nineteenth century, following its invasion by the Voortrekkers\textsuperscript{26} and the establishment of the village of Rustenburg in 1852\textsuperscript{27}.

There is an indication that there were no more than 10,000 people of all races in Rustenburg (including Bafokeng) by 1900\textsuperscript{28}. Even as late as 1921 the total population in this area was small at 12,047 people. Plate 4.2 shows Rustenburg town as seen from the south in 1921 according to Henry Hartley, a long-time resident of Rustenburg. At that time it was a village that was largely dependent on the agricultural activities in and around it.

\textsuperscript{26} The Voortrekkers are the pioneer Dutch settlers who moved from the Cape Colony between 1834 and the 1840s, and founded the South African Republic and the Orange Free State (two of the four provinces of colonial and apartheid South Africa).

\textsuperscript{27} In 1852, there were 700 white people in Rustenburg (Mbenga and Manson, no date) and in 1884 there were about 100 black people (20 housing units) in the Bethlehem location of Rustenburg (Mbenga and Manson, no date). Sometime after 1866, there were 200 Bafokeng families on mission land in Phokeng (Saron) (Mbenga and Manson, 2010). In 1879, there were 185 Bafokeng families on privately owned farms (labour tenants and share-croppers) (ibid.). According to the the 1921 population census, these numbers remained low well into the first half of the twentieth century, with only 162 Asians and 23 Coloureds counted in that year (National Archives of South Africa, Population Census 1921, STK, 21/199).

\textsuperscript{28} National Archives of South Africa, Population Census, STK, 21/199, 1921
Plate 4.1: The Sotho-Tswana landscape in 1835
Source: Museum Africa, MA 1955_930

Plate 4.2: Rustenburg town as seen from the south
Source: Museum Africa, PH 2006_7985A

Plate 4.3 is a closer look at that landscape, showing open pasture-land interspersed with the built environment of the village of Rustenburg. Today, that area constitutes what is now the old central business district. Figure 4.2 shows that much of the area around the village was privately owned as burgher rights.
The village of Rustenburg and Bafokeng areas came to not only constitute one another in the ways they influenced local socio-cultural and economic activities. Plate 4.4 shows a modernised traditional house for a servant at Paul Kruger’s residence in Rustenburg.

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29 Paul Kruger was a prominent Afrikaner by the mid-nineteenth century, who was President of the South African Republic, 1883 – 1900.
Plate 4.4: Servant’s house (left); inside President Paul Kruger’s house (right)

Photographs by Ngaka Mosiane

Inside Paul Kruger’s house, with the mannequin can be seen a traditional mortar and pestle as well as the more modern iron, plate, pots and other household utensils. A clay oven for home-made bread can also be seen in the residence surroundings. The narrative below continues to discuss this kind of encounter between the traditional and the modern as well as the changes such encounters engendered. Bafokeng came to be constituted, at the turn of the eighteenth century, by their core clans and the remnant groups of difaqane (the refugees who came to be well integrated into this community and those who were loosely affiliated to or entirely depended on the Bafokeng chieftaincy) (Capps, 2010). Throughout much of a period that Bozzoli (1991) refers to as Bafokeng’s golden age of traditionalism, hierarchy and tranquillity (the second half of the 1800s), Bafokeng were self-supporting agricultural communities, with families owning cattle, sheep, goats and other livestock and growing sorghum, butter beans, peas, sugar cane and pumpkins, among other crops. These crops and livestock later constituted the basis of the economy of Rustenburg, meaning that Bafokeng would be able to ‘participate’ in local economic processes. For those households who did not have enough livestock and crops to sustain themselves at particular times, the chief Mokgatle Mokgatle, who led Bafokeng from 1836 to 1891, used to keep some of his cattle in their care, “giving them the right to use the animals in any way they wished, short of killing them, selling them, or giving them away without his permission” (Mokgatle, 1971: 30). This practice is called mafisa. It should be noted that it is at this community level that livelihood practices take on a broader sense of collective/community acquisition and distribution of land
and food for people to maintain themselves daily and over time. In this sense, livelihood activities are part of community-wide practices of social reproduction, as opposed to ‘the livelihood of the poor’ that came to be a reality after the 1930s.

In order to maintain the sustainability of households built on a polygamous form of marriage, each Mofokeng wife (with her children) had her own cattle and grew her own crops. The girls helped their mothers in the crop fields, while the boys herded their mothers’ cattle (Mokgatle, 1971). Each wife could use her livestock and crops in whatever way she wished, a tradition that turned into lucrative businesses for women in the monogamous Bafokeng households since the beginning of the twentieth century (Bozzoli, 1991). As part of household management, women’s work schedules involved building the storage containers for grain (difala) in order to keep grain fresh and free of insects. They brewed sorghum beer (bojalwa) for their husbands, and they made threshing floors (diboana), winnowing baskets (maselo), clay pots (dinkgo) and woven grass mats (diphate), among other utensils. Men’s responsibilities involved supervising boys herding livestock. Their responsibilities were also limited to assisting in the building of houses and in maintaining law and order within both households and the community. These livelihood activities were an integral part of Bafokeng’s gendered landscape – the general look of the land that was constitutive of Bafokeng communities.

For example, Bafokeng lived in round, thatched-roofed houses built out of stone, timber and soil (Mokgatle, 1971; Plate 4.1). For administrative and ceremonial purposes, the homesteads of a hamlet were usually arranged in a circular manner, all facing towards a central open space on which were one or more cattle kraals (Sanderson, no date)30. Pistorius (1996; 1992), an archaeologist, has closely studied the city of Bakwena-ba-Modimosana in Rustenburg (Figure 4.3), which is one of the three settlements that constituted this city of about 20,000 people (Professor Jan Boeyens, pers. Comm., 2010).

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30 An existing body of archaeological work provides some insights into this kind of socio-spatial organisation of different Batswana settlements, going back to the Iron Age (Pistorius, 1996). It also provides some insights into the changing gender relations within these groups since the late Iron Age period (Hall, 1998) as well as the beginnings of Batswana, including those that may not have Tswana origins (Hall, Anderson, Boeyens and Coetzee, 2008; Huffman, 2007; Legassic, 1969).
Figure 4.3: The stone-walled settlement of Bakwena Bamodimosana bammatau

In Figure 4.4, women’s courtyards – the outer semi-circular scalloped walls which encircled the dwellings marked 1 were sites of food production characterised by (a) the upper grinding stones (*lelwala*), (b) the storage containers for grain (*difala*), (c) grain basket (*moseme*), (d) mortar and pestle (*kika le motshe*), (e) threshing floor (*seboana*), (f) monolith (*mmotoana*), and (g) hearth (*leisho*). Indeed women’s courtyards also served as sites for various social, economic and ideological functions at the household level. It was at the central, inner kraal complexes – the domain of men marked 2 – where the community level social and ideological functions were performed (including the juridical and political activities, ancestral worship, ancestral graveyard and agricultural ceremonies such as rain-making, eating of the first fruit, and initiation of boys and girls)\(^{31}\). Thus, although the grazing and ploughing fields are not shown in Plate 4.5 or in Figure 4.3, livelihood activities are inseparable from a community’s socio-spatial organisation and its social identities. That is, before 1900 the land and food that Bakwena Bamodimosana, and by extension Bafokeng, acquired to maintain themselves were linked to their cultural values and practices, and they were also linked to the

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\(^{31}\) The intervening space for humans and stock (marked 3) was more of a public space, where taboos and social relations were regulated. The entrances and exits, marked 4 and 5, were for humans and livestock respectively. Playgrounds for children and sites for rituals (burials) are marked 7. A courtyard for the wife of a headman is marked A. The main courtyard is marked B, while C1 and C2 are the main cattle kraals. This city of Bakwena-ba-Modimosana was destroyed by Mzilikazi in 1826/8.
ways in which they developed relationships amongst themselves and how such relationships were expressed spatially.

Drawing from Barrow’s travel observations in 1805, Comaroff (2004) confirms that Tswana cities in general were, until the late nineteenth century, organised in a complex and precise series of concentric, radiating social aggregations:

These were by no means haphazard villages, but organized in a simultaneously curvilinear and axial arrangement that positioned community members by family and social position, and inscribed political relationships in a geographical order. Distinct spaces were made for public life, and housing was carefully positioned such that an immediate spatial continuum might exist between the civic, social, and private realms...[I]n elegance and solidity, Tswana homes were as good as the Casae...built in imperial Rome. Similarly, Anthony Trollope, looking down from a hilltop, wrote that the Southern Tswana town of Thaba Nchu exhibited a sense of ‘municipal regularity’ that was in striking contrast to the scattered European homes on the plain below (Comaroff, 2004: no page numbers).

Plate 4.5 is the closest image I could get of what the socio-spatial organisations of the Tswana communities in the region might have looked like until the end of the nineteenth century.

Plate 4.5: A Kaffir Ward in the Transvaal

Source: TAB 20600. Photo by L.B. Jansen

The social identities of indigenous groups were characterised by keeping their bodies in accordance with their particular climatic conditions, and thus in accordance with the ways
such identities have worked well for them for generations. Following his visit to Phokeng (among other places) during the period 1851-1852, Sanderson (no date: 249) provided the following account of Bafokeng:

The dress of the men consists of a triangular piece of leather, two ends fastened round the loins, and the third passed between the legs and fastened behind. Besides this, they wear a mantle made of dressed skins, and frequently a hat or helmet of various shapes made of the same material. Sandals are also commonly worn. Women’s dress consists of a short leather petticoat, over which they also frequently wear a mantle. The young children of both sexes go naked, or wear only a string or two of beads,

These identities and ways of self-preservation transformed, following local people’s encounters with the practices of Western modernity. This is what Sarah Heckford observed regarding ‘black’ people in the village of Rustenburg – a settlement for white people – and its surrounding farms in the early 1870s:

Natives and Native women troop [the village of Rustenburg] daily, dressed in skins and adorned in barbaric ornaments, appeared to me to be a sort of Ultima Thule...Blacks were actually squatters...[in farms surrounding Rustenburg]. Besides these...we had several families of what are called urlams32, or civilized natives, living in mud houses...These families dressed like Europeans, and acted like Europeans, even to the drinking of early coffee. They also went to school at the Missionary Station at Rustenburg periodically, and learnt a little reading and singing of hymns. I don’t think the school did them much good. I heard one ‘Native’ woman saying that when she came back from school and had been made a Christian, she would sit on a chair and eat with a knife and fork, and not let the ‘raw Natives’ eat with her, for then she would be better than they (quoted in Rosenthal, 1979: 82).

The point I am making is that the livelihood assets that Bakwena-ba-Modimosanas and Bafokeng built to maintain themselves (land and shelter), the ways they cared for their bodies, their spiritual practices and spatial organisation were all interconnected – a change in one triggered a change in others. An urbanism inherited from their town planning traditions not only continues to organise local lives today, but also provides areas of possible economic development through environmentally friendly designs, the creation of local industry and the ‘building construction’ expertise (Comaroff, 2004). Nonetheless, Bafokeng’s social identities continued to change in the twentieth century, with their social relationships coming to be mediated by commodity desire – Bafokeng have come to buy and buy into the representations of stylish landscapes and commodities. Indeed the turn of the twentieth century was a turning

32 A detailed discussion of the urlams will follow in the last part of this chapter, spelt as Oorlams.
point in the socio-cultural and economic transformation of Rustenburg. By the 1880s the use of money and the purchase of household and farm goods were minimal. Bafokeng bought cloths with grain from Indian traders in town (Bozzoli, 1991). Plants were extensively used to make products (sorghum beer, threshing floors, winnowing baskets, weaved grass mats) (ibid.). Milk pails were made of cowhide, loin-cloths and candles were often home-made. Soap was home-made, either in the style of Boers (from pig-fat) or obtained from a plant, which produced lather when rubbed in water (ibid.). At the same time, the Bafokeng social identities were also Europeanising as indicated by the changing ‘urlams’ identity and chief Mokgatle Mokgatle’s elegant European attire, at least for a rich black chief at that time (Plate 4.6).

Plate 4.6: Chief Mokgatle Mokgatle’s European identity in the late 1800s
Source: Adapted from TAB 36374 (Photographer not identified)

The commodities in Paul Kruger’s dining room in Rustenburg (Plate 4.7) indicate that commodities were available in Rustenburg by the late 1800s (Paul Kruger died in 1904 and Mokgatle died in 1891). It is on the basis of these kinds of historical experiences that I argue in the chapters on the contemporary issues of this thesis (see Chapter 5) that ordinary people’s consent to the images of well-being and success is often reflected in the houses and commodities they buy as well as the identities they adopt (also see Chapters 9 and 10 in
Bozzoli, 1991). This focus on the relationships between livelihood activities, spatial forms and stylish lifestyles is also important for the discussions on the contemporary spatial interventions by the Bafokeng administration and the Rustenburg Local Municipality. In the context where commodity relations extended to cover every manifestation of life, such local state interventions have implications not only for how ordinary people make a living but also for how they reproduce their identities.

Indeed the socio-spatial organisation and identity of pre-colonial Rustenburg were in part influenced by conflicts among tribes at different times: Batlokwa, Bakgatla, Bapo, Bammatau, Bapedi and Ndebeles). This is why an aerial view of Rustenburg today still shows remnants of stone-walled settlements as shown in Plate 4.5. They are located along the necks of a range of hills in the northeast (Maralla-a-Nape), central (Phokeng) and western part of Rustenburg (western Magaliesberg). Nonetheless, it was a period of conquest by the Dutch in 1837 that set Bafokeng on the current livelihood trajectory – the particular ways in which they gained and distributed their means of existence (food, shelter and other resources), how they structured and spatialised their relationships and how they developed their subjectivity.
4.3 The advent of Rustenburg’s new spatialities, identities, and livelihood forms

In 1837 the Voortrekkers, who later came to be known as Afrikaners or Boers, invaded the region which included Bafokeng areas. They declared the Transvaal and the Orange Free State to be their territories, and the black people within them as their subjects (Mbenga and Manson, 2010). The local Voortrekkers, Veldkornets and commandants as well as private companies were given huge tracts of land as payment for services of one kind or another to the budding Transvaal government – until 1857, every adult Afrikaner of 16 years or above was entitled to two farms of 6,000 acres: one for grazing and the other for growing crops (Capps, 2010). Similarly, as a compensation to people who did not receive farms from government, 1,358 ‘citizen stands’ were laid out and given to local white people in 1892 by the Transvaal City Council in Rustenburg (Rustenburg Herald, 2010a). Plate 4.8 shows a ‘citizen stand’ in Rustenburg with a furrow for water reticulation.

Plate 4.8: A ‘citizen stand’ in Rustenburg

Source: The original photo belongs to the Rustenburg Local Municipality

33 Mbenga and Manson (2010) note that Chiefs Mokgatle and Mogale (the leaders of Bafokeng and Bapo respectively) went to fetch the Boers along the Vaal River (Orange Free State) to come and settle in the Rustenburg area.

34 A local district official (in the South African Republic) with administrative and especially military duties.

35 Rustenburg itself was founded and declared a ‘village’ in 1852, with about 700 white residents. It was governed through a magistrate system, a health committee, and a ‘heemraden’ by the Transvaal City Council. A heemraden was a system of legislative council with representatives from various localities. Rustenburg was briefly elevated to a ‘village council’ in the early 1880s, but downgraded to the heemraden system at the outbreak of the 1899-1902 South African War until 1918 when it became a town council.
This change in the ownership of land from black to white people and the founding of the village of Rustenburg meant that the advent and spatialisation of modernity among Bafokeng instantiated different social identities, a different way of relating to their land, and a different way of making a living through that land, although some influence also went the other way. A number of scholars have taken the analyses of these socio-spatial processes to different directions: see the discussion on Capps (2010), Bozzoli (1991) and Simpson (1986) below. Here I discuss the ways in which economic development and the building of the urban landscape brought about changes in livelihood forms and in social identities.

One of the town’s founding residents, Pieter Jacob Marais, was among the first people to conduct extensive exploration of minerals – gold, diamonds, silver and copper – in Rustenburg in the 1860s (Rosenthal, 1979). Although such explorations did not yield any significant results, the need for accommodation for explorers and commercial travellers through the western and northern parts of Rustenburg led to the establishment of the Rustenburg Hotel in 1869. In the early 1870s, when the Grand Hotel was built, Rustenburg came to be a ‘refreshment station’ for commercial travellers operating in the western Transvaal (see Plate 4.9) (ibid.).

Plate 4.9: The Grand Hotel
Source: TAB 24661

Meaningful spatial and economic growth of the village of Rustenburg was marked by the establishment of the First National Bank of the South African Republic in 1894, followed by

36 Modernity refers to a post-traditional period of newness in political organisation through nation-state, in capitalist economic arrangement, and in cultural values of secularity, rationality and progress (Willis, 2007).
the opening of Standard Bank in 1903 (Rosenthal, 1979). Rustenburg’s connection to the Transvaal was realised through the introduction of the mail coach in 1891 and the building of the railway to Pretoria in 1906 (see Plate 4.10a and Plate 4.10b).

The establishment of the Rustenburg Agricultural Society in 1867 and the Rustenburg Cooperative Fruit Growers Association in 1908 marked Rustenburg as one of the most productive agricultural centres in the Transvaal (ibid.). By the mid-nineteenth century, Rustenburg was a leading centre of settler agriculture, with activities centred around the breeding of sheep, cattle, and goats, and the production of oranges, naartjies, mangoes, cotton and maize, and to a limited extent the production of coffee, sugar cane and wheat (Rosenthal, 1979). The establishment in 1904 of the Magaliesburg Cooperative Tobacco Planters Association and the cotton spinning and weaving workshop meant that tobacco and cotton were also significant drivers of the local economy (see Plates 3.11 and 3.12) (ibid.). Although much of the tobacco was exported to Anton Roupert’s Rembrandt Group of companies in Cape Town in the 1940s, attempts were made by the United Tobacco Company to process, in Rustenburg, the well-known cigarette brands (Peter Stuyvesant, Van Rijn) and pipe brands such as Orinoco Tobacco, Hartley’s Horseshoe Tobacco, and Boxer (interview with a local businessman, Pieter Wissekerke). During the same decade, Rustenburg had the potential to grow almost 20 million orange trees, with an annual market value of almost £10 million (Rosenthal, 1979).
Those fruits that were produced were enough to be exported to other parts of South Africa and to Europe. By the 1980s, Rustenburg Co-operative Packhouse Company (established in 1928) oversaw the growing of 400,000 orange trees and the export of up to 600,000 cases of oranges, and a lesser number of naartjies and mangoes, in the Rustenburg district (Rustenburg Herald, 2010b). The production of citrus fruits represented about 85 percent of all citrus fruit production in the Western Transvaal (ibid.).

Plate 4.11a: Government Tobacco and Cotton Experiment Farm
Source: The original photo belongs to the Rustenburg Local Municipality

Plate 4.11b: Tobacco farm in the Rustenburg area
Source: TAB 755

Plate 4.12a: The United Tobacco Co. in Smit Street
Source: TAB 737 (left)

Plate 4.12b: Tobacco delivered by train from a Rustenburg company, WH Mandel,
Source: TAB 727 (right).

What emerges from the above discussion is that there is a constitutive relationship between Rustenburg’s economic development and its changing landscape. Following Mitchell (2002),
the urban built form is an expression of economic activities (such as commercial agriculture), land dispossession associated with these activities, and social differentiation. The major, dominant farming was conducted along the eastern side of the Magaliesberg mountains in Rustenburg: see the location called Golden Mile in Figure 4.4, an area of large commercial farming by white people growing and trading oranges, naartjies, mangoes, cotton, maize, coffee, sugar cane and wheat. Thus, the contemporary general look of the land, including its economic activities, is the outcome of these processes resulting in local black people losing land as a livelihood asset. A segment of the black people became petty commodity producers, breeding cattle, sheep and goats and growing sorghum, butter beans, peas, sugar cane and pumpkins. Such a constitutive relationship between economic development and the changing landscape also meant that agriculture and access to land was an important part of being in Rustenburg.

Figure 4.4: The Golden Mile: the site of Rustenburg’s citrus farms

The next section discusses the work of missionaries, land buying, and the introduction of farming technology as drivers of the changes in the local landscape, identities and livelihood

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37 The Golden Mile was a site of favourable climatic conditions for the production of citrus fruits (mild winter climate and loam soils). Such a physical environment stood in contrast to the Bafokeng and other white farming areas further out in the eastern, north-eastern, and south-eastern parts of the city; where climatic conditions are not favourable for citrus crops due to frost-prone winters and clay soils (see Figure 4.5).
forms. Opportunities for socio-cultural and economic benefit for the ordinary people of Rustenburg are part of this discussion.

4.4 In what ways have Bafokeng adapted to internal and external forces of change?

The work of missionaries contributed to the ways in which Bafokeng adapted to internal and external forces of change. Following some twenty years of Bafokeng’s encounters with the Boers from 1837 to the mid-1860s, missionaries began their work in these communities. The Reverend Christoph Penzhorn of the Hermannsburg Missionary Society (HMS) lived among Bafokeng from 1866. Later, in 1895 and 1915, came the black missionaries of the African Episcopal Church (also known as the Ethiopian Church) and the Pentecostal Holiness Church respectively, both from the United States of America. Penzhorn taught Bafokeng European geography, catechism, arithmetic, the skills of writing, reading, singing, carpentry and brick-making, mainly in the Setswana language (Reports of the Missionaries of Hermannsburg, 1889: 82). The black American missionaries used the English language in their teaching of the Bible, a language which was attractive to many Bafokeng. These religious and educational practices were highly regarded by Chief Mokgatle Mokgatle, especially because he had earlier lived for a few years in Lesotho, where he was impressed by the school system of the Paris Missionaries (Mbenga and Manson, 2010). According to the Reports of the Missionaries of the Hermannsburg Mission (1889: 49), in July 1884:

The old man [Chief Mokgatle Mokgatle] called a large meeting of the people and urged them to give up the circumcision. But the old heathens didn’t want to hear anything about that at all. So in the end, he told them to just go on with it until they would be able to understand it better. I do hope the circumcision, this bastion of the devil, will soon come to an end.

Indeed circumcision was abandoned in the early years of the twentieth century as the Western moral conduct and world-view took root among Bafokeng. Plate 4.13 shows Bafokeng being Christianised, through baptism, as members of the African Methodist Episcopal Church.

Plate 4.14 shows Bafokeng having begun to embrace modern commodities such as the steel bucket, even as they continued to use the traditional calabash to draw water. They are also dressed in Western clothing that is different from the dressing described at the beginning of this chapter (skin sandals, skin mantle and hat/helmet across gender differences, a triangular piece of leather fastened round the loins, between the legs and the behinds of men, leather
petticoats for women). Additionally, traditional practices of rain-making and polygamy as well as traditional utensils such as difala, diboana, maselo, dinkgo and meseme were being abandoned (Bozzoli, 1991). The work of the church in the community was also instrumental in replacing the village homesteads, built with thermal mass thick walls that are not only cool during the day but also radiate heat at night, with environmentally unsuited brick-wall houses. Plate 4.15 and Figure 4.5 provide an example of such a modernist planning.
Saron section was a site of the chief Mokgatle Mokgatle and the Reverend Christoph Penzhorn of the HMS and was the initial site from which the village expanded. The church was also instrumental in introducing the rational spatial order on Bafokeng settlements. The Report of the Missionaries of the Hermannsburg Mission (1889) points out that most of the Christians had settled close to the Hermannsburg Mission Station, where a large Christian village built along straight lines had been created. In fact, 200 families lived on mission land in Phokeng (Manson and Mbenga, 2010). Beyond that site Mokgatle (1971: 61) also notes that:

Anyone in the tribe, who wanted to build a house, particularly newly-married couples, had to go to the chief’s court to ask for a site. From the chief’s court they were sent out with three or four men to a place to cut a site for them and to see that it would be in a straight line with other houses built before theirs. As a result of these new methods, which were due to the church and Mr. Penzhorn’s influence, well-surveyed streets developed and houses faced each other in a manner which was absent before the church came. Phokeng became a Europeanized tribal village.

The introduction of farming technology in Rustenburg also transformed the ways in which Bafokeng led their lives. “Whereas in… [1865] the whole community owned only one plough and one wagon, by… [1895] every family possessed a plough and enough oxen to plough land” (Bozzoli, 1991: 38). Such a transformation was characterised, among other means, by punishing work schedules for women both at home (with some help from the children) and at the farming fields. The communal

Plate 4.15: A colonial house symbolising a community becoming more European at the turn of the twentieth century
Source: Photo by Ngaka Mosiane
forms of land ownership in which women were cast locked them into a situation of dependence and lifelong subordination. They tilled the land, grew and reaped crops – pumpkins, beans, corn, sorghum, spinach and sunflower, among other crops. Men on the other hand maintained a relatively exclusive control of their farming – they had access to the agricultural markets, controlled the labour of women and youth, and controlled the earnings of their migrant sons and daughters (ibid.).

Having said that, women could still say that “Our main occupation during those years [the turn of the twentieth century] was farming and it was really profitable…No woman ever thought of going to work for a white man, we got rich through farming” (Bozzoli, 1991: 41). Thus, as households, Bafokeng’s participation in the agricultural economy expanded to such an extent that Bafokeng petty-commodity producers employed the poorer members of the community to work in their fields. A share of the farming produce was sold on the streets and the ‘market areas’ of the town of Rustenburg (MRB 1/1/10, 1930). Again, access to land and participation in the local farming economy were important for being in Rustenburg. Broadly, land dispossession and the way Bafokeng related to their land after ‘repossessing’ part of it, economic development, the building of the urban landscape, missionary work and modern farming technology (the introduction of ploughs) were the major drivers of change in the ways Bafokeng made a living as well as how a modern Mofokeng subject was produced (Christian, ‘commercial farmer’, identities marked by modern houses, clothes and other commodities). Indeed these forces of change were the very basis for struggles against settler
colonialism, but they also provided opportunities for socio-cultural and economic transformation. How has the process of land buying contributed to these dynamics?

4.5 Mediating dispossession through land purchases

I mentioned in section 3.3 that upon the Boer conquest of the region in which Bafokeng were located, the Voortrekkers, *Veldkornets*, commandants and private companies as well as some white residents of Rustenburg were given land as payment for various kinds of services rendered to the Transvaal government. In a similar gesture, the president of the Transvaal, Andries Hendrik Potgieter (a Voortrekker leader, 1837-1867) rewarded Bafokeng for their support during the war between the Voortrekkers and Mzilikazi (the latter had earlier invaded and occupied the local territory and beyond). He rewarded Bafokeng by allowing them to stay on land similar to that which they had occupied prior to their dispersal by Mzilikazi and the Voortrekkers’ invasion of the Bafokeng area (Bergh, 2005). However, Bafokeng still could not claim land ownership with any certainty because “white settlers encroached on these lands very soon afterwards and dispossessed Bafokeng” (Bergh, 2005: 101). Many blacks suffered extreme shortage of land as a consequence of such encroachments as well as land being given to individuals and private companies by the Transvaal government. Bafokeng chiefs made their cases against this shortage before the Native Location Commission in 1881 and again in 1908 (Bergh, 2005).

In order to secure additional land, Bafokeng rented farms from Boer landowners who charged them exorbitant rents – a flat rate of forty cattle paid to Paul Kruger is one example (Mbenga and Manson, 2010: 34). The Boer relations with Bafokeng also involved tactics that were seen to be extortionary: when the Boers celebrated some event, they would demand a slaughter cow from Bafokeng. Additionally, Paul Kruger (who later became President of the Transvaal, 1883-1900) insisted on three year contracts of unpaid labour from members of Bafokeng community, and also reclaimed for family reasons, part of the farm that he rented out to Bafokeng for a flat rate of forty cattle. Moreover, Nicholaas Theunissen claimed in 1868 the payment of twelve oxen from Bafokeng after his harvest failed (Mbenga and Manson, 2010: 32). These kinds of problems, based on the experience of land shortages, led to the decision by Bafokeng to purchase land, nominally registering such farms in the names of missionaries and other white individuals. This is a complex process that has been comprehensively analysed by Capps (2010).
Immediately following his arrival among Bafokeng in 1866, the Reverend Christoph Penzhorn agreed to register land purchases by Bafokeng, individuals, families and loosely affiliated refugee syndicate groups in his name because the Volksraad Resolution 159 of 18 June 1855 had forbidden any land purchases by black, Asians or Coloureds in the Transvaal (Mbenga, 2004). The Reverend Hermann Wenhold of the HMS and other local white people also registered land for such families, communities and groups in their names. The role of Paul Kruger in this was inspired by his ‘benevolent paternalism’ (Bergh, 2005), while Capps’ (2010) explained it as being motivated by the interest to create an exclusive labour reserve for himself.

The 1860s and 1870s were marked by land buying by the Hermansburg Missionary Society, individual families, the Bafokeng chief, and syndicate groups. In addition to using animal skins, maize and livestock (cattle, sheep, goats, pigs), cash was needed to buy land. For this reason men went to work in the diamond mines in Kimberly from the late 1860s. Some of these men were levied, on their return, £5 of their total earnings, which ranged between fifteen shillings and one pound ten shillings a month, by chief Mokgatle Mokgatle (Bergh, 2005). The general practice in the Transvaal was that a chief would claim £1 from every returning migrant worker (Manson and Mbenga, 2010). According to Capps (2010), many if not most of land purchases during this period were done by discreet syndicates organised within both the core and the peripheries of Bafokeng areas. Indeed by 1880, 40,000 hectares of land had been registered in the name of the HMS in the Bafokeng area (Capps, 2010). Figure 4.6 shows farms originally registered to the HMS in the nineteenth century. Following the British control of the Transvaal in 1877, blacks could buy land in their own names rather than using missionaries’ names (Ntsebeza, 1999). The state required that land registered in

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38 In terms of the 1855 Volksraad Resolution Asians had no right to occupy land except in certain specific areas allocated to them (along Plein Street). The 1938 Commission on the Asiatic Bazaar made it clear that the 1855 Volksraad Resolution could not be enforced because there were no specific provisions for penalties in case the law was broken, nor were provisions made for relocating Asians to their allocated areas. The point is that the Indians, in particular, were trading outside their prescribed areas because, not unlike Bafokeng, they bought properties in the name of a white person. More discussion on this follows later in this chapter.

39 The ‘founding fathers’ of modern Bafokeng were Mokgatle Mokgatle (1839-1891), James Tumagole (1891-1896), August Molotlegi (1896-1938). See Chapter 4, footnote 91, for a list of Bafokeng chiefs and kings from 1938 to the present.
the name of the HMS (and those farms subsequently purchased) be re-registered to a state authority in trust for Bafokeng chief and his tribe.\footnote{When the British annexed the Transvaal in 1877, the land bought by Africans was to be held in trust for them and registered in the name of the British Secretary for Native Affairs (1880–1881), the Transvaal Native Location Commission (1881–1884), the Superintendent for Natives (1884–1902); the Commission of Native Affairs (1902–1907), or the Minister of Native Affairs (1907 onwards) (Capps, 2010; Ntsebeza, 1999: 26).}

![Figure 4.6: Farms originally registered to the HMS in the nineteenth century Bafokeng](image)

Source: Bergh (2005)

This was meant to not only protect such farms from dishonest titleholders, but to also be an informal arrangement in which the affiliated sub- or non-tribal groups would remain \textit{de facto} owners of their purchased property under the protective umbrella of the \textit{de jure} tribal land ownership (Capps, 2010). The sub- or non-tribal groups would gain the ‘customary’ right to be consulted and have the final say in the wider (tribal) decisions relating to it. However, these measures of land re-registration and the introduction of the location system from the 1890s onwards amounted to ‘dispossession within the tribe’ and forced territorialisation – the
dispossession of land of the sub- or non-tribal groups and their demarcation (together with the rest of Bafokeng) into separate geographical areas (ibid.).

In the context of competition for labour among black petty-commodity producers, white commercial farmers, the better-paying diamond and gold mines as well as the state’s railroad and other infrastructure projects, small-scale white farmers who had difficulty accessing labour, advocated for the anti-squatting law. The state promulgated such laws (1870 *Kaffirs Wet*) in order to render landless share-croppers and labour tenants and those people on land held under communal tenure – the anti-squatting laws were meant to restrict any more than five families from living on a white-owned farm (Mbenga and Manson, 2010). Some Bafokeng were living and working on the white-owned farms because of land shortages that they came to experience. By 1879, 185 families were living with white farmers as labour tenants or share-croppers, while 200 families lived on mission land in Phokeng (Mbenga and Manson, 2010). Such living and working arrangements, including those in communal Bafokeng villages, undermined the Boer’s labour requirement in the context of the growing local economy.

Thus in the context of forced territorialisation for the benefit of the chieftaincy as well as efforts to render more Bafokeng landless as a way of releasing black labour, the government instituted the Transvaal Native Locations Commission in 1881 to establish ‘reserve’ areas for black occupation41. This Commission declared that of the 18 farms belonging to Bafokeng, ten were considered to be in excess of the area required by the Bafokeng communities (Bozzoli, 1991). Thus such farms were subject to the 1887 *Plakkers Wet* and the 1895 Squatter Law (ibid.). Although communal land was not subjected to squatter law due to the advocacy of chiefs and missionaries, tribal households were each squeezed into no more than ten acres of land (Capps, 2010). Even so, Paul Kruger was not happy that the ten farms deemed in excess meant that the subjects living there (affiliated to Bafokeng) were out of chief Mokgatle Mokgatle’s jurisdictional control (ibid.), so he encouraged the chief to inform those loosely affiliated subjects that the law did not allow them to live on tribal farms and/or

41 The reserve areas were also necessary to ensure that blacks resided in clearly demarcated locations so that a degree of control could be executed over their affairs. The terms ‘reserve’ and ‘location’ have a special meaning in South Africa: ‘reserve’ refers a separate geographical area for black occupation, while ‘location’ refers to a separate residential area for blacks.
mission land outside the Bafokeng location. They were then moved to a new site. This is how the village of Luka – Doornspruit 106 – came to be established, as Paul Kruger’s labour reserve (in addition to Phokeng, Beerfontein 263) (see Figure 4.5) (ibid.). Although the Squatter Law curtailed excess farms’ viability as places of residence, those farms could still be used as outlying cattle posts and ploughing fields for the affiliated subjects, thus retaining a vital link between the people of Luka and its resources (ibid.).

In the meantime, negotiations within the state over which land areas were to be defended as ‘locations’ and which were to be subjected to the Squatter Law were still going on in 1908, a situation that allowed Bafokeng to not only avoid outright land dispossession, but to also continue purchasing more land (Bozzoli, 1991: 38). The Beaumont Commission, which was set up in August 1913 to ascertain whether land for black occupation in the ‘reserves’ was adequate, found that in the Transvaal land required for black occupation was insufficient, and recommended that five times more land be provided to black reserves in the Transvaal than elsewhere in the country (ibid.). The white landowners association of Rustenburg was opposed to this idea, and Local Land Committees were set up across the country by the Beaumont Commission to verify its findings (Bozzoli, 1991). Before the end of the verification process, however, black people were allowed to buy land if the need to make a living necessitated it (Mbenga and Manson, 2010). The process of ascertaining whether land occupation by blacks was adequate resulted in the Native Land Committee or the Beaumont Commission being empowered to approve the buying of land or the leasing of land to black people in areas recommended for black occupation (Bozzoli, 1991).

Consequently, despite the attempts to subject some of Bafokeng land to the Squatter Law, and despite the white landowners association opposing land additions to blacks in the Transvaal, the Transvaal Native Affairs Department, which superseded the Native Land Committees, demarcated a further 13,604 hectares of tribally registered farms as Bafokeng reserve in 1909, making a total of 32,229 hectares (10 farms were still not added) (Capps, 2010). Similarly, despite the 1913 Native Land Act, which sought to confine black people to designated rural areas under the customary authority of chiefs – in terms of which rent tenancy and share-cropping were outlawed, and in terms of which blacks could not buy or hire land from whites or vice versa, the Bafokeng chieftaincy continued to buy more land and have more land added to it (see Mbenga and Manson, 2010, pages 79, 81, 82 for a list of farms bought by Bafokeng as well as the farms designated and not designated by government
as part of the Bafokeng location). In 1936 the Native Trust and Land Act was passed in order to clearly delimit the ‘reserves’ under the rulership of traditional authorities and to consolidate them by eliminating squatters from white-owned farms. Nonetheless, the state still had to add another 58,000 km² to the ‘reserves’ in order to enable traditional communities to recover from the effects of the 1933 Great Depression (Bozzoli, 1991).

It should be noted that the state prohibited smaller groups of black people from purchasing land in favour of community-wide or individual land ownership. Attempts by Bafokeng groups to purchase land between 1914 and 1924 were declined by the Department of Native Affairs because group purchases would lead to ownership complications as the group dynamics changed (Simpson, 1986). Thus, the apparent resourcefulness of ‘coherent community land purchases’ were in fact engineered by the state’s actions that amounted to dispossession within the tribe and forced territorialisation of communities loosely affiliated to or entirely depended on the Bafokeng chieftaincy (Capps, 2010). The purchase of land by the Bafokeng tribal authority in Rustenburg was significant because of the support of state officials in the white government. The officials in the Department of Native Affairs often advised the Bafokeng chiefs on the best possible prices they could pay when purchasing land – advice that shielded Bafokeng from exorbitant land deals (Mbenga and Manson, 2010)⁴².

Moreover, beyond the accounts of seemingly coherent community land purchases, Simpson (1986) makes a case for internal struggles over land ownership among Bafokeng, which led to contentions over Bafokeng traditional governance. An example of such conflicts was seen in 1908 when the headman, Modisakeng Petlele, and a group of 24 people claimed that farm Turfontein on which they lived was their exclusive property, and thus did not belong to the rest of Bafokeng⁴³. As part of these kinds of claims, a ‘protest march’⁴⁴ was held, led by one

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⁴² For example, in the case of farm Kookfontein 337 (2,000 morgen) the Native Affairs Department would not approve the purchase of this farm because the sale price was too high (£12,000). The Department of Native Affairs, the Department of Justice and individual white attorneys stood for them, seemingly at times, at the expense of the individual white sellers and buyers of land (Manson and Mbenga, 2010: 93). Indeed the Veldkornet testified before the Beaumont Commission that it was easier for the natives to acquire land than for Europeans because, through the communal form of purchases, blacks could buy land at higher prices than individual whites could afford (ibid.).

⁴³ Paulus Khunou’s claim on Klipfontein provides another example (Mbenga and Manson, 2010).

⁴⁴ Participants blew trumpets around the chief’s house, threatening and insulting him and his messengers, and singing inflammatory songs in and around Phokeng (Mbenga and Manson, 2010: 69). They even disrupted the chief’s meetings and staged demonstrations in Phokeng (p. 70).
community group that included two members of the royal family (David Mokgatle and Monnafela Mokgatle). In this instance, as may have been the case with others, the protesters subsequently lost the court case, and nine leaders (joined by 351 supporters) were expelled from the village in 1924 (Mbenga and Manson, 2010; Bozzoli, 1991; Simpson, 1986). The conflicts within Bafokeng communities, which marked a period of contest over the control of community resources in the first part of the twentieth century, opened up the competing reinterpretations of the practice of traditional governance (Simpson, 1986). The context of these developments is that the colonial administration created the customary law and applied it rigidly to preclude any competition for chiefly power. Thus, the position of a chief became hereditary, whereas in terms of the pre-colonial traditions, an incompetent chief would be replaced by a competent one from a different family (ibid.). This manipulation of tradition by the state also led to a change in how Bafokeng had previously related to their land – a change from consensus-based decision-making for allocating the rights of land-use, to the sole control of that decision-making process by the chief (Caldwell, 2002).

The conflicts within Bafokeng communities also highlight the broader issue of class formation and social differentiation among them as well as the fault lines of the dominant, racialised political economy (Simpson, 1986). According to my reading, the postcard (see Plate 4.16) showing a native residence in Rustenburg represents the middle class Phokeng household and poorer households in the foreground.

Plate 4.16: Rustenburg Native Residence
Source: TAB 24664
As discussed by Capps (2010), from British West Africa through East Africa to South Africa, a class of rural accumulators advocated for the expansion of property rights among blacks. Although education played a role in this (see the case of the Kholwa in KwaZulu-Natal in Hart, 2002), individual land ownership as well as group and communal land tenure delayed the formation of the landless working class (Capps, 2010). Such forms of land ownership also enabled the rise of cash cropping peasantry and their integration into the capitalist agricultural economy. In the case of Kenya, the success of the African producers in relation to settler producers accounted for twice as much in both tax revenue and import duty by 1910, and it also accounted for about a third of export earnings in 1913 (ibid.).

These fractures in the local political economy (some participation of local black bourgeoisie) speak to the ways in which indigenous peoples used their imagination and harnessed opportunities provided, for example, by land-buying, labour tenancy and share-cropping to make good use of limited opportunities offered by the city – the city itself is constituted in part by processes associated with rural land dispossessions, repossessions and class formation. Importantly, the rural-urban continuum is expressed through migration (the transgressing of the ordering regimes of the visual, abstract space of colonial segregation), which provided opportunities for ordinary people to join, in cities, the activities of informal economy, workplace-based and/or civic struggles (Bozzoli, 1991).

For the younger generation of Bafokeng, the option of migrancy to Kimberly and later to Johannesburg and Pretoria offered the potential for individual economic action. Migrancy presented opportunities for Bafokeng women in particular to attain some independence and choice to enter into marriage on their own terms rather than in terms of arranged marriages (Bozzoli, 1991). Although, as migrants in places such as Doornfontein (Koch, 1983), women were confined to domestic work, to shebeens (traditional pubs selling sorghum beer with ‘live music performance’) and/or stokvels45, their incomes offered them some opportunities for accumulating resources in order to build a modern house back home in Phokeng and to start a family (Bozzoli, 1991). Similarly the Bafokeng farmers had the latitude of choosing

45 Stokvels are voluntary savings associations for those people with too little money to save at formal banking institutions. Members of the association pool together designated amounts of money each month, which goes to one member. At an occasion organised to give out that money, members of the stokvel and neighbours are expected to buy food, drinks, and alcohol as they indulge in mass singing and dancing – these activities are intended to allow the host to make money.
whether or not, when and where to enter the wage labour market, while those living and working on white-owned farms as share-croppers and labour tenants did it as a means of becoming independent farmers in the long term (Bozzoli, 1991). Broadly, Bafokeng did not succumb to the dictates of the city. Their relationship with the city was carefully developed such that those who worked in cities hired people to work on their land, and thus Bafokeng urban migrant workers saw themselves as farmers seeking cash to buy more modern farm equipment for their farming practices (ibid.). Therefore, placing the landscape ideal onto space brought opportunities for producing ways of living through space, and for producing new spaces of liberation from domination. Following Stevenson (2003), city life and its impersonal sensibilities (Simmel, 1971) opens up the opportunities for individuals to develop their own qualities and pursue their own goals, as opposed to the cultural expectations and demands of rural life. Similarly, Gutkind (1974) and Southall (1961a; 1961b) highlight the more sociable sensibilities of city life as supportive for developing personal qualities and for adapting to city life.

That said, cities are also products of the work that has gone into making them. They embody the aspirations and needs largely of those with the power to make the city in their own image. They represent the wishes and fears of those who have the power to shape the outcomes of the struggles over land-use, between classes, and around race and ethnicity. What is a city, if not an expression of rural/urban economic and socio-cultural activities, including the histories of land dispossession, embourgeoisement, and immiseration (Mbembe, 2008; Mitchell, 2002)? By the end of the 1930s, the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act had brought an end to share-cropping and tenant farming, a move that severely diminished ordinary Bafokeng’s stake in agricultural production (Bozzoli, 1991). As Bafokeng started to depend mainly on wage earnings, they came to engage directly with the cities of Johannesburg and Pretoria solely through migrancy.

In the following remarks, I highlight the forces that undermined the possibilities for progressive socio-cultural and economic transformation entailed in the processes discussed above. In particular, it was the issues of Bafokeng labour on white farms, the effects of the anti-squatting laws, the 1881 Transvaal Native Locations Commission, the 1913 Beaumont Commission, and the 1913 and the 1936 Land Acts, which led to increased dependence on wage earnings as well as the loss of control of their land due to the new powers of the chief to control communal resources. Moreover, the innovative and impressive involvement of
Bafokeng as share-croppers and labour tenants would have not changed their dependent relationship to the Rustenburg’s commercial agricultural economy. Such farming arrangements were subordinate and conditioned by the changing priorities of landlords, such that any potential for positive change in such arrangements would be undermined by the changes in the landlord’s priorities: the discovery of ‘platinum group metals’ in the 1920s – the other minerals being palladium, iridium, osmium, rhodium and ruthenium – should have created interests for private landowners to shift from farming characterised by share-cropping and labour tenancy to mining. Moreover, although the introduction of commercial agriculture created some semblance of black participation in the local economy (a participation that depended on white commercial farming), it was the shift from agriculture to mining that led to the local economy being monopolised by mining companies such as Impala Platinum, Anglo-Platinum and Lonmin, and the advent of mining marked the end of broad-based participation in the local economy by households and members of farming organisations. This domination by only three mining companies is despite the Bafokeng administration and other holder of mineral rights receiving mining royalties. In an interview with a high and long-time Bafokeng official, even during the 1970s, the Bafokeng administration could only access their mining royalties by making claims at a local magistrate for infrastructural and social development (see Plate 4.17 for the beginnings of modernised Bafokeng administration

**Plate 4.17a:** A hospital building at “Magatostad” (Phokeng), 12 miles north of Rustenburg  
Source: TAB 6692  
**Plate 4.17b:** An administration building of the chief of Magatostad  
Source: TAB 713
and social development facilities). During my interviews, I also met Bafokeng household members who receive royalties directly from the mines, the magnitude of which is not known because research participants do not want to talk about it. Importantly, it is this moment of the growth of mining activities in Rustenburg that introduced the ‘livelihoods of the poor’: livelihood activities based on a limited asset base commonly operated in the fault-lines of the dominant political economy. A discussion of the Bethlehem location in Rustenburg in the section that follow provides some insights into its social, political and economic dynamics, including the prospects that spatial propinquity creates for socio-spatial and economic transformations. The people of Bethlehem, as former slaves, were subjected to raids and human captures. Later, as residents of the village town of Rustenburg, they have come to establish their own material and symbolic resources through which they differentially mitigated the impact of their past history and current demands of work.

**4.6 The Oorlam native location (Bethlehem): From slavery to twenty years of uncertainty to ‘Forced Removals’**

The earliest residents of Bethlehem in Rustenburg were former human captives (*inboekelinge*). During the 1850s, 1860s and 1870s, slaves were procured through raids in central and western Transvaal (Capps, 2010). Rustenburg itself has been described as “a slave trading centre with its own resident dealer” (Mbenga and Manson, 2010: 29). Blacks who became slaves were captured in order to provide free labour to the Boer farms (ibid.). Chiefs collaborated in this, supplying regiments (*mephato*) not only to raid slaves but also to assist in the Boers’ military campaigns and hunting. A chief would in return secure political protection and acquire substantial wealth in traded ivory, cattle, plantations, tools, buildings and dependents (ibid). The people of Bethlehem lived in farms near the village of Rustenburg as captives, and they attended Christian baptism and confirmation classes in the village (Regional Land Claims Commission, 2003). In 1873 the missionary Ferdinand Zimmerman of the HMS registered a portion of land in the village town of Rustenburg as a settlement for the freed slave congregants (ibid.). Figure 4.7 shows sites of the first half of the twentieth century Rustenburg superimposed onto a current street map of downtown Rustenburg, and include the location of Bethlehem.
Figure 4.7: Early twentieth century Rustenburg

Figure 4.8 shows that although in 1903 the Asiatic Location was not surveyed, the Kaffir Location was not even clearly demarcated as part of the town: it was not quite part of the

Figure 4.8: The Kaffir and Asiatic Locations were 183 metres apart\(^{46}\)

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\(^{46}\) CIA, 12, H25, the Asiatic Bazaar Rustenburg, 1907–1938.
village town. In 1884, there were about 20 housing units in Bethlehem, and by 1900 the number of residents had risen along with the growing local economy (Breutz, 1953). The residents of Bethlehem by this time included people from the Pedi, Nguni and Tswana ethnic groups, the Rhodesian Ndebele, and a Coloured minority group (ibid). They were all socialised into the Boer culture, but it was a segment of that black community (seen as the civilised *kaffirs* – *Oorlams*)\(^{47}\) that was accorded “special status as having equal rights [with whites] before the law” (Mbenga and Manson, no date: 4-5). The first part of this section discusses the livelihood dynamics of Bethlehem within the context of the broader Rustenburg economy. It points to some of opportunities that Rustenburg provided for the people of Bethlehem to positively transform their social and economic lives – again agriculture and access to land was an important part of that process, and of being in Rustenburg. Since its founding, the setting of Rustenburg was one of a racialising city. However, the relative spatial propinquity of all racialised groups of different class positions created conditions for the small-scale, interactive social life: a condition that supports economic creativity for people across class, race, ethnicity, gender and other forms of difference. This is one of the important themes of this thesis, which also inspires the current thinking about the transformative potential of cities. Nonetheless, there are very specific social, political and economic reasons why such potential has not been realised – racism and associated eviction of the people of Bethlehem to the outskirts of the city, the dispossession of the people of Bethlehem of their pastures, the state’s control of local social life and the local economy’s connection to the broader capitalist economy ultimately debilitated against the conditions that facilitated broad-based social and economic development.

The main livelihood activity for the people of Bethlehem was agriculture and wage labour. They worked as domestic workers and workers in the town’s hotels, butcheries houses, mill, mission school and units of government departments as well as brick-making, citrus and tobacco industries\(^ {48}\). Additionally, by 1920 they were allowed, along with the rest of the village residents, to graze their livestock on the town-lands and ‘trust farms’ (ibid). Breutz (1953) notes that Bethlehem had ten black-owned stores, and many residents kept kitchen gardens to grow various vegetables and maize. The people of Rustenburg generally built livestock kraals in the village, and in one case approximately 60 animals (cattle, horses,

\(^{47}\) NTS, 3438, 53/308.
\(^{48}\) National Archives of South Africa, NTS, 3438, 53/308.
mules, goats, sheep, chickens and donkeys) were kept by a single household\textsuperscript{49}. The people of Bethlehem also ran tuck-shops and were involved in the petty rentier market of a growing class of migrants. Since they were wage labourers, they hired unemployed immigrant tenants in Bethlehem to work in their kitchen-gardens. According to Breutz (1953), well-to-do men built modern apartments to rent out to migrants in Bethlehem, while some agricultural producers and the Town Council built hostels for their employees. A piece of land was allocated for sports activities, and one fairly large black-owned cinema was operational in Bethlehem. A music club, which also owned a brass band, organised social functions for Bethlehem’s socialites. There were nine traditional black churches, and four Western churches: Lutheran, Anglican, Dutch Reformed and the Methodist Church of South Africa (ibid.). The people of Bethlehem lived in close proximity to the Indian quarters, and they somewhat ‘co-resided’ with the white residents – 40 percent of 1,700 blacks in Rustenburg were accommodated by their employers with the remaining 60 percent living in Bethlehem.

The people of Bethlehem who were still alive in the 2010s (those who lived in Bethlehem as young people in the late 1930s) mainly speak Afrikaans\textsuperscript{50}. I indicated in the first part of this chapter that, by the 1870s, residents had come to express their Afrikaner identity in the manner of their dress (formal and fully dressed), in the Western forms of house-keeping, in the home-made bread baked in a clay oven (see Plate 4.18). Although the social and economic lives of the people of Bethlehem were dependent on white and Indian goods, services and vocational opportunities, their place had come to be relatively distinct, with its own ways of life. Similar to many black urban dwellers in the South African cities in the 1920s and 1930s (Hart and Pirie, 1984; Koch, 1983), they developed their own cultural practices in order to mediate the racialised socio-economic and political inequities of Rustenburg. They also formed a *stokvel* (they called it *oorgooi*) and *shebeens* (beer brewing trade), both of which were activities designed to entertain members and to enable the owners to make money. According to a city official, these economic activities also generated incomes to “native girls and women who have come in from country stands and who have no work…They are there only to brew beer and are therefore undesirable”\textsuperscript{51}.

\textsuperscript{49} National Archives of South Africa, MRB 1/1/17, 1937.

\textsuperscript{50} The residential area for the light skinned ‘Coloured’ people (a racial category special to apartheid South Africa) is Zinniaville which remains intact in Rustenburg. I am referring here to the dark skinned people who live in a black township, but cannot speak any of the black people’s languages. Most of them have European last names such as Davids, Ernst, Leeuw, Sampaan, Andreas, Girhil and many more (MRB 1/1/11).

\textsuperscript{51} National Archives of South Africa, MRB 1/1/11, 1931.
The stokvels and shebeens were part of the broader cultural life of the people of Bethlehem, which was initially confined to musical performances on the streets at night. Such cultural activities were later extended and formalised into a ‘dance club’, bioscope shows, games such as soccer, basketball, tennis and boxing, as well as school and church music competitions within the community, and between Bethlehem and similar communities just north of the RLM (see Figure 1.1), Johannesburg and Pretoria. Despite their apolitical forms, these cultural activities served to sustain the people of Bethlehem who were stretched between the demands of their employers, their own productive activities, and household work.

Broadly, the people of Bethlehem managed to participate in the fringes of the city’s economic and social life, creating a particular ‘social order’ within relations of dependency to the social, political, and economic life of the town of Rustenburg. The context was that of a vibrant agricultural economy from 1867 well into the twentieth century – Rustenburg was one of the most productive centres in the Transvaal (Rosenthal, 1979). In fact, Bafokeng’s agricultural activities, including that of women, and the larger membership of the Magaliesbergs Cooperation Tobacco Farmers Federation (see Plate 4.19) indicate the importance of agriculture and access to land for being in the town, as well as the broader participation of ordinary people of Rustenburg in the local economy. Additionally, several sites in the town were used as wagon outspan sites for ‘parking’ ox-wagons that came from surrounding farms and villages such as those of Bafokeng to sell agricultural produce.
Even in the late 1930s, a Council official reported: “I have seen wagon out-spans for a week on vacant ground, sidewalks and streets”\(^{52}\). Such farmers’ markets were located along Plein Street just north of sites 15, 11 and 12 on the map (Figure 4.8). Moreover, the sale of oranges and their export to Europe, as discussed earlier in this chapter, were often disrupted by incidents such as the First World War, incidents that would open up opportunities for more economic creativity and participation at the household level (Rustenburg Herald, 2010c). Indeed that war disrupted global trade, resulting in unexpected production of surplus fruits, which were simply dumped by farmers (ibid.). A Rustenburg resident, Helen MacGregor, decided to turn those dumped oranges into a marmalade fruit preserve (ibid). For that production, the black women collected the dumped oranges, while black men were involved in the embryonic routine and techniques of cutting the peel and timing a large iron-pot (a receptacle of about two feet across) suspended over a large log-fire out in the open, or grading and packing the citrus crop at MacGregor’s home (see Plate 20). Plate 4.21a shows local black women delivering oranges to MacGregor’s production site operating at her home. The production site was later relocated to town and named the Rustenburg Co-operative Packhouse Company, where local white women are shown packing MacGregor’s then famous Outspan oranges for export (see Plate 4.21b).

\(^{52}\) National Archives of South Africa, MRB 1/1/10, 1930
MacGregor’s home-made marmalade was sold to the retail market and school boarding houses in and outside Rustenburg, at the gold mines and to the South African Army during the Second World War, when soldiers in North-Africa were treated with the Vitamin C-rich made candy from orange-juice concentrates (ibid). The Indians’ stronger participation in the economy of Rustenburg (in addition to ‘blacks’ and ‘whites’) added to the vibrancy of the town’s economy. The Indians were located mainly along the north-end of Plein Street (see the Asiatic Bazaar/Location on Figures 3.7. and 3.8). Some Indian families were located
towards the south end of that street (a mainly white area), indicating relative ‘integration’ of higher class Indians into the white inhabitants of the town (see Figure 4.9). In 1903, the

![Figure 4.9: Indian residences and businesses in the town centre](image)

resident magistrate in Rustenburg, the Colonial Secretary, and the British Indian Association in Johannesburg had a conversation around moving Indians from their current locations to sites A or B (higher ground free from malaria and away from the Kaffir location). Notably, it was suggested that two Asian firms, owned by Suliman Ismael and Mohammed Ismael, “be allowed to remain in their present location [in town] as they are responsible persons”. As Figure 4.10 indicates, the number of such residents was higher, including the Fatima and Suliman Bayat family.

According to the Commission on the Asiatic Bazaar the Indians by 1938 operated 38 dealerships in comparison to seven stores operated by whites. In the Rustenburg district as a

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53 The Bayat family (Fatima and Suliman Bayat) arrived in South Africa and Rustenburg in 1877. They immediately established a store (General Dealer) and within a few years it was the largest in Rustenburg and one of the largest in the Transvaal. This family stood in good stead with President Paul Kruger and the white community of the village such that in December 1880, when the first Transvaal War of Independence broke out, the family sold, on credit, war materials such as rifles, carriages, blankets, saddles, tobacco pipes, medicine and groceries to Paul Kruger and his commando. The value of the materials was ZAR 38, 000, which was repaid the following year at the end of the war, on behalf of the Transvaal Republican government (to that money, two bars of gold was added as a token of appreciation for providing the Boers with war necessities) (Rustenburg Herald, 2007).

54 National Archives of South Africa, MRB 1/1/16, 1937. In 1885, the Volksraad passed a law preventing Asians to own land, live or own business property except in specific areas allocated for them. That law was never enforced because it did not make provisions for taking action against those who broke it, nor did it make provisions for removing those who were located in areas that were not allocated to them. Consequently, prior to 1913 Asians bought the land in the name of Europeans. By 1919, when the Asiatic Land Tenure Act was passed, prohibiting Indians from owning land (expanded in 1928 to prohibit buying business property except in prescribed areas), the Indians had accumulated much of the land they needed to live and to conduct business
whole, Asians operated 86 dealerships in comparison to 174 stores operated by whites (ibid.). Indians were also involved in the property market in Rustenburg. Some of them (operated by the ADBRO Investment Company, the Transvaal Investment Corporation, the Transvaal Eastern Properties, and Incorporated Investments) were to be investigated by the commissioners on the Asiatic Bazaar in 1938 because, although they were located outside the Asian prescribed areas, when some companies were liquidated, an Indian would get the company assets. The preceding discussion on Bethlehem and Rustenburg’s Indian and white businesses indicate that, at the turn of the twentieth century and well into the first half of that century, the Rustenburg village had the potential to develop into a centre of economic activity for white, Indian, Coloured and black population groups. This participation was possible partly because of the spatial propinquity of racialised groups that were well aware of their constructed positions in society (and possibly championing or resisting such positions). The use of ox-wagons, horse-drawn wagons, and the bicycle (the main forms of transport at the time) created conditions for such relative co-residence, which resulted in white and Indian businesses accessing patronage support across social boundaries. The white, black and Indian sections of the town and the town’s places of work were all within walking distance of each other (ibid).

The ways in which Rustenburg is described above and below seems to be the kind of town which caught the attention of urban theorists in the first few decades of the twentieth century. I referred in Chapter 2 to Robinson’s (2006) discussion of Berlin, Paris, Naples and Moscow, where people co-mingled with livestock and attitudes of sociality and anonymity could be observed. Such co-existence of modern and African traditions was seen to be able to invigorate a decaying European culture, while a co-presence of private and public life explained the dynamism of social life as well as a way of imagining different possible futures. In that sense, tradition is not seen to be backward, but as representing transformative politics. Indeed Benjamin (1978) employed a dialectical thinking (‘dialectics at a standstill’) to bring together contradictory modern and traditional elements of city life and to awaken a dream of material abundance possible with the modern technological equipment (a plough, for example, in the case of Rustenburg). Plate 4.22 shows the Transvaal Hotel which has been

55 Ox-wagons were used to ferry heavy goods, farm products and churchgoers to town. Horse-drawn carts transported goods from the train station to merchants, store-keepers, tradesmen and samples to commercial travellers.
extended by an indigenised thatched roofed structure, with horses and a mule cart in front of the hotel. For my study, the co-existence of the ‘backward’ aspects of a city (the more

Plate 4.22: The Transvaal Hotel
Source: TAB 684

indigenous thatched-roofed buildings as part of the Transvaal hotel, the oxen, horses, wagons, and the sites for parking them) and the modernist buildings (some of which were built in the late 1860s and 1870s) invokes the possibilities of an urban life that is opposed to commodity fetishism and the exploitative form of urban development. The contemporary urban theorists are also inspired by similar concerns, of the co-location of street trading and the formal aspects of city life. For scholars such as Lees (2004: 4) the challenge is to turn the creative aspects of capitalism into seedbeds where new paths for social change may be forged, constructing a liveable city that accommodates the class, gender and other categories of difference (instead of the unrestrained suburban developments). Indeed in the first half of the 1990s, local business organisations were willing to accommodate street traders in their preferred spaces (section 4.5 below). In the early-to-mid twentieth century Rustenburg, such intimate socio-spatial forms took the form of a mix of residence, workplace and play, with a polo ground and a building for polo club members. Plate 4.23 shows The Rustenburg Landscape at the turn of the twentieth century along what is today Beyers Naudé Drive and between Joubert and Heystek Streets, with the polo ground towards the right hand side. Plate 4.24 shows a zoomed photo of the polo ground. Immediately behind the play, work and residence landscape is the city centre (see Plate 4.25). Plate 4.25 shows the Transvaal Hotel on the left and the Post Office on the right.
Plate 4.23: Rustenburg at the turn of the twentieth century
Source: The original photo belongs to the Rustenburg Local Municipality

Plate 4.24: The Rustenburg polo ground
Source: The original photo belongs to the Rustenburg Local Municipality

Plate 4.25: The centre of Rustenburg town in 1905
Source: Museum Africa, MA 1963_2094_2
Plate 4.26 shows the building of the state physician on the far left, and next to it is the more visible Post Office building just referred to in Plate 4.25. The building situated a little further back near the Post Office is the Reformed Church of South Africa (almost invisible), and next to it is the Sample House, showing commercial travellers’ trade items such as guns, ivory, skins, ostrich feathers, karosses and trophies. The last building visible on the extreme right of the photo is the Grand Hotel. The congregants for the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) used to camp on the open space in Plate 4.26 during the Holy Communion period (also shown in Plate 4.27).

Plate 4.26: The centre of Rustenburg town
Source: Original photo belongs to the Rustenburg Local Municipality

The two photos on Plate 4.28 are contiguous, both of them on the south end of Plein Street. The photographer for the photo on the right was facing north of Plein Street. The DRC is just behind the photographer of Plate 4.28. The intimate socio-spatial forms also facilitated the town’s socio-cultural and economic activities. Holy Communion (nagmaal) time provided an opportunity for farmers living outside the village town to spend at least a week there.

56 Further south of Plein Street are the Indian Bazaar and the Bethlehem Location. The Indian Bazaar was located roughly between the present day Plein Street, Van Zyl Street, Malan Street and Smit Street. Bethlehem is located between Van Zyl Street, Zendeling Street, Benede Street, and Klopper Street.

57 Some of the key churches included the Dutch Reformed Church (die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk – the mother of the other two churches: the Reformed Churches of South Africa (die Gereformeerde Kerke van Suid-Afrika) and the Netherdutch Reformed Church (die Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk)).
Plate 4.27a: Holy Communion time at the Reformed Church of South Africa

Plate 4.27b: The Dutch Reformed Church

Source: The original photographs belong to the Rustenburg Local Municipality

Plates 3.28: Plein Street, Rustenburg

Source: TAB 24668 (left); TAB 684

This was a space and time of social activities. Teenagers attended bible classes and bible examinations during the day. Adults met their friends and relatives at night near the site of leadwood fires that were used to prepare family dinner, constituted by, among other items on the menu, boerewors and boeretroos (sausage and coffee of sorts, respectively). Nagmaal time was also a chance to consult with one’s medical doctors and legal advisor and/or legal representative, and to purchase groceries and other farm necessities. In line with the established social order (racialised), the pitching of the white canvas tents and the caring of oxen that transported farmers were carried out by servants and piccanins (black workers were so-called) (Rustenburg Herout, 2008).
Nagmaal time also provided opportunities for creating living urban landscapes – the kinds of landscapes that farm people create, inhabit, assume, combine and include into their world. To an extent that everything moves in space, bodily movement is key component to an understanding of place – it is in the actions referred to above that the spatialities of their bodies (their movements) are brought into being (Cresswell, 2003). The affective can decipher deeply embedded predispositions, desires, and concerns that steer people toward resonant, appealing and promising responses. It draws from experience to reproduce an inherent and constitutive potentiality for becoming. The experiences related to memories, habits, reflections, desires and tendencies give some depth to a body’s movement, which at a certain moment registers as emotion (a feeling of change in capacity for continual motion of relations, contingencies, scenes, and emergencies) (Pieterse, 2012). Movement then becomes primary form of consciousness: when one walks to a doctor, lawyer or shop there is little thinking because people tend to act pre-consciously such that any given order is re-established and reproduced. In this way, the urban landscape is an experience/world created by the people of Rustenburg, rather than an object marked by its existence at a distance. It is a dwelling that arises through engagement, through using the world rather than by looking at it. It is these kinds of landscapes, as arenas of practice based on the more intimate and relatively integrated spatial forms, that create opportunities for the people of Bethlehem, Indians and white people. The question then is, given these prospects that Rustenburg presented for social and economic gains at the turn of the twentieth century, why were such possibilities not fully realised? It is because the affective is less individual, but connected to the context and the forces that shape our lives. Thus, the landscape is a site of dialectical tension between its dominant, distinguished, remarkable articulations and its lived, embodied, practicing form.

Indeed despite the thriving agricultural economy at the time (and the mining economy about to be built) the possibilities for social and economic transformation of the colonial Rustenburg were not fully realised because the people of Bethlehem were evicted to the outskirts of the city and were dispossessed of their farming land. The possibilities for socio-economic transformation were also not realised because of racism and the state’s stronger control of local social life, enforcing tribal customs and laws in the urban township, and stronger patriarchal control of township life through headmen, local church ministers and the Council of Elders. Importantly, the local economy’s connection to the broader capitalist economy meant that the involvement of the people of Bethlehem, as small-scale agricultural
producers, would have not changed their dependent relationship to the Rustenburg’s commercial agricultural economy.

With regard to local social dynamics in the 1920s and the 1930s, the negative effects of alcohol abuse on political mobilisation, the hard-drinking milieu that stokvels and shebeens embodied exacted a heavy physical and moral toll on the people of Bethlehem, and thus lessened the possibilities for more organised political action (De Kock, 1983). It will be seen below that despite constant beer raids by the police, and despite the Council’s imposition of fines and legal actions against those tenants who defaulted in paying rent, there is little evidence that the people of Bethlehem attempted to resist such local state actions. Politically, Bethlehem was a very controlled place. An institution called the Council of Elders was established, and together with six headmen, assumed the role of maintaining some order in Bethlehem through, among other strategies, enforcing tribal customs and laws. Moreover, the Advisory Board, with a strong membership of local church ministers\(^{58}\), the Council of Elders and the six headmen worked closely with the Rustenburg office of the national Department of Native Affairs to maintain order in Bethlehem (Breutz, 1953).

The Advisory Board often made submissions such as the following to the local office of the Department Native Affairs: it resolved “to stop the sale of yeast and moulted kaffir corn with the view to stopping the brewing of kaffir beer and skoiaan”\(^{59}\). In December 1931 the Advisory Council noted that “The dance hall is causing much disturbance in the location every night, including Saturday nights up to the morning of Sundays”\(^{60}\). Even by July 1938 the Advisory Board was still requesting “the District Commandant to raid the location twice a month on Sunday afternoons…owing to drunkenness and rowdyism”\(^{61}\). The Advisory Board also campaigned for stringent control of tenants living in Bethlehem and for landlords to

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\(^{58}\) The Advisory Board was provided for in the Native (Urban) Areas Act of 1923. The Native (Urban) Areas Act of 1923 is the statutory framework within which many forms of urban black policies (on segregation) were formulated. They were constituted to regulate the influx of blacks in a city’s Locations and to facilitate the removal to rural areas of those blacks who were unemployed. Generally, the Advisory Boards served as an institutional link within Locations between the Superintendent of the Native Affairs Department and the local residents. What this ‘link’ means is that the ‘Locations’ were governed by both the Town Council and the Native Affairs Department (which was also responsible for rural areas such as the Bafokeng areas)

\(^{59}\) National Archives of South Africa, MRB 1/1/7, 1927

\(^{60}\) National Archives of South Africa, MRB 1/1/7, 1931

\(^{61}\) National Archives of South Africa, MRB 1/1/17, 1938
adhere to paying rent of close to £5 a month to the Rustenburg Town Council. The power that the Advisory Board wielded over the people of Bethlehem undermined the cultural life of the people of Bethlehem. Moreover, the beer trade was ordinary people’s intellectual property, but the state expropriated it to raise funds for township service provision. The control of the Advisory Board on the people of Bethlehem was in tune with the way the Department of Native Affairs exerted control over the Advisory Board itself, and thus it could not affiliate with relevant national bodies:

As experience has proved that all native organizations and congresses are invariably hostile to Europeans and European Administration, and are influenced, dominated and led by native agitators and scoundrels, I am of the opinion that the affiliation [of the Rustenburg Advisory Board] to the Location Advisory Board Congress of South Africa is neither politic nor desirable and should not be effected.62

The social and economic possibilities that Rustenburg held with regard to the people of Bethlehem) were ultimately undermined in August 1920 when the Rustenburg Town Council withdrew the permission it had given to the people of Bethlehem to graze their livestock on the allocated town lands, beginning the process of removing them to the outskirts of the city.63 The decision to withdraw grazing land could be related to the fact that Rustenburg was elevated, in April 1918, to a fully-fledged municipality with a town council and a mayor in charge. This meant that the Rustenburg Town Council obtained greater power in municipal affairs than before: the power to carry out its modernist ideals (racialised).

Indeed discriminatory attitudes were also hardening at a national level at this time: Afrikaner, English and Coloured voters united in the face of the tougher times of 1919-1924 (the drought, economic recession, and the great strike in the gold mines) during which General Jan Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa, was perceived to be softening towards blacks. The decision to withdraw permission for the people of Bethlehem to graze their livestock on the allocated town lands could also be related to the high demand for buying land in the Rustenburg region. According to Bergh (2005) foreign companies were involved in land purchases in the Transvaal (14 companies, including banks, were involved in at least 80 farm

62 National Archives of South Africa, MRB 1/1/17, 1937
63 LDE, 1123, 21335: February 28 letter written by the magistrate in Rustenburg to the Secretary of Lands, explaining why the Rustenburg Town Council withdrew permission from the people of Bethlehem to graze their livestock on the allocated town lands – that in the long run, and through a complicated process, the town lands were to be used for grazing by whites only.
transactions). Although in 1860 only 28 percent of land in the Transvaal was owned by private individuals and corporations (mainly white), 67 percent of land in the Transvaal was owned that way by 1900. Bafokeng’s participation in that process constituted 20 percent of landownership in the Transvaal (Bergh, 2005:115). The high demand for land purchases in Rustenburg was demonstrated by the Bakgatla tribe (in addition to Bafokeng):

I would invite [your] attention to the fact that in February 1921 Isang Pilane [the chief of Bakgatla] made application on behalf of the Bakgatla tribe [about 35 miles to the northeast of Rustenburg] for permission to purchase seven farms [one of which was called Tusssenkomst in Rustenburg]…and presumably in so far as these…properties are concerned the Bakgatla should be regarded as having a greater claim to consideration than the inhabitants of the town location [Bethlehem]64.

The local and national social and political dynamics described above, together with the Council’s lack of commitment to address overcrowding and the concomitant sanitation problems in Bethlehem, were the context within which the Town Council began the process of removing Bethlehem to the outskirts of the city. Towards that end, the Sub-Native Commissioner of Rustenburg stated that “the only available farms [for resettling the people of Bethlehem] are those situated in the vicinity of Mabiskraal approximately 40-60 miles [northeast of] Rustenburg”65. However, due to the drought situation and thus the financial problems among Bakgatla, they could not proceed with purchases. Then the Senior Native Commissioner of Rustenburg changed his earlier position to relocate the people of Bethlehem to the Mabiskraal area. He instead recommended to the Department of Native Affairs and the Department of Land Affairs that the people of Bethlehem be allowed to lease land for a period of ten years on the farm Tussenkomst 188, one and half miles northwest of the town of Rustenburg. If the people of Bethlehem would make improvements on that land by the end of that period, he (the Senior Native Commissioner of Rustenburg) recommended that they be allowed to purchase plots as individuals66. In contrast, the Secretary of Native Affairs

64 NTS, 3438, 53/308: A letter from the Secretary for Native Affairs, E.R. Garthorne, to the Sub-Native Commissioner, Rustenburg (April 1921).

65 NTS, 3438: A letter from the Sub-Native Commissioner, Rustenburg to the Secretary of Native Affairs, Pretoria (February, 1922).

66 NTS, 3438, 53/308: A letter from the Senior Native Commissioner to the Secretary for Native Affairs (August 1922).
recommended that the people of Bethlehem be relocated to farm Tusssenkomst 188 as squatters, while the residents themselves were willing to move only as landowners.\footnote{NTS, 3438, 53/308: A letter from T.P. Taylor (an attorney to the people of Bethlehem) to the Secretary for Native Affairs, E.R. Garthorne (December 1921).}

The Secretary of Native Affairs’ decision to impose on the people of Bethlehem the squatter status at farm Tusssenkomst 188 led Mr. J.J. Davids, a member of the Advisory Board, to convene a meeting in June 1923 to discuss the imposed terms of tenure (squatting). Although the meeting could not reach an agreement on the way forward, the fact that “some of them would like to keep their livestock at Tusssenkomst and still live at Bethlehem” indicates their desperate desire to have their own land.\footnote{A total of 228 people, including children and women: NTS, 3438, 53/308: A letter from the Sub-Native Commissioner, Rustenburg to the Department of Native Affairs (June 1923).} As Mr. Davids put it in a letter he wrote in the Dutch language to the Sub-Native Commissioner of Rustenburg, “time is running out for us to begin preparing for cultivation. If you can’t help us, we can speak directly with the government [Department of Native Affairs]”.\footnote{NTS, 3438, 53/308: A letter from Mr. J.J. Davids to the Sub-Native Commissioner, Rustenburg (April, 1923).} Indeed in September 1923, three families (Davids, Motlaloga and Duma) requested “permission to go to Tusssenkomst to reside there under the ‘crown lands squatting terms’ as from January 1924. I understand that if these three, who are leaders of the Bethlehem Oorlam, find the place suitable, others from the Location will follow.”\footnote{NTS, 3438, 53/308: A letter from the Sub-Native Commissioner, Rustenburg to the Department of Native Affairs (September 1923).}

The process for relocating the people of Bethlehem lasted for almost twenty years because, first, the special racial status of the residents of Bethlehem legally precluded them from settling on the native areas. “Your clients are Oorlam people who would not be classified as natives for the purposes of the Native Land Act of 1913”\footnote{LDE, 1123: A letter from the Secretary for Native Affairs, E.R. Garthorne, to the Secretary of Lands and T.P. Taylor (February 1922). Also see NTS 53/308: A letter from T.P. Taylor (an attorney to the people of Bethlehem) to the Secretary for Native Affairs, E.R. Garthorne (December 1921).}. That said, in February 1922 T.P. Taylor, an attorney for the people of Bethlehem, agreed with the Secretary of Native Affairs that the people of Bethlehem be classified as natives, and that they be allowed to settle on the ‘trust land’ under the provisions of the Native Land Act of 1913 – all it took was a decision by state officials to arbitrarily assign a segment of the people of Rustenburg a particular

\footnote{LDE, 1123: A letter from the Secretary for Native Affairs, E.R. Garthorne, to the Secretary of Lands and T.P. Taylor (February 1922). Also see NTS 53/308: A letter from T.P. Taylor (an attorney to the people of Bethlehem) to the Secretary for Native Affairs, E.R. Garthorne (December 1921).}
racialised attribute (Oorlums and later blacks). That said, Taylor made it clear to the Secretary for Native Affairs, E.R. Garthorne, that the people of Bethlehem were “unable to subject themselves to the native chiefs and that they do not understand native law.” Indeed the people of Bethlehem had earlier indicated that they wanted to have a *stad* (a village) and a chief of their own. Thus, Taylor’s statement was only meant to ensure that the people of Bethlehem would not be incorporated into the Mabiskraal or Bafokeng villages, a position that expressed the existing contest for social status between the *Oorlams* (civilised, Afrikaans-speaking blacks, not Coloureds) and the *Kaffirs* (blacks).

Second, it is also reasonable to suggest that the slower process of relocating the people of Bethlehem was linked to the fractures within the state (the Department of Native Affairs, the Department of Land Affairs, the Rustenburg Native Commissioner, and the Town Council). The Department of Native Affairs, The Department of Land Affairs and the Rustenburg Native Commissioner on the one hand, and the Town Council on the other could not agree on the appropriate site of relocation. In August 1923, the Town Council appointed its own subcommittee to determine whether it was advisable to set aside new separate sites for the Native Location and the Asiatic Bazaar or to relocate the Asiatic Bazaar elsewhere, and thus extend the Native Location towards the north of the Asiatic Bazaar but south of the ‘burgher rights’ settlement on the left (see Figure 4.10). The area for township development, points A or B, the location for Mohamed Ismail and other Indian shops and residences were part of the context within which these relocations were considered. In September 1924, the subcommittee recommended that Bethlehem be relocated some shorter distance to the north-eastern central business district, and leave intact the Asiatic Bazaar because the central government was about to promulgated segregation policies regarding Asians, a ruling over which the Town Council might have little control. The decisions of the subcommittee were also considered from the point of view of town planning and economic relations in the town: to make way for the future growth of the town (to the south), but making sure that Bethlehem remained located within walking distance from the town’s employers (ibid.). Accordingly,

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72 LDE, 1123: A letter from T.P. Taylor to the Secretary for Native Affairs (February 1922).

73 NTS, 3438, 53/308: A letter from T.P. Taylor (an attorney to the people of Bethlehem) to the Secretary for Native Affairs, E.R. Garthorne (December 1921).

74 National Archives of South Africa, MRB 1/1/4, 1923.

75 National Archives of South Africa, MRB 1/1/5, 1924.
Figure 4.10: The making of the segregationist Rustenburg

the size of Bethlehem was likely to grow faster than the Asiatic Bazaar, and the proposed site (to the northeast of the Asiatic Bazaar) was spacious enough for both the recreation grounds and the future growth of the people of Bethlehem, and was also closer to town for the convenience of employers and employees.\(^{76}\) The people of Bethlehem were to be relocated also due to racial attitudes of the Rustenburg Town Council and the people of Rustenburg. The stay of the people of Bethlehem in town was “undesirable”, and therefore “growing a couple of rows of trees [between the new site for the people of Bethlehem and the town] would have the effect that Bethlehem would not be seen from outside”\(^{77}\). In fact, because the proposed site was rather closer to some five white land owners, “it may be advisable for Council to either buy out these ‘burgher rights’\(^{78}\) or to exchange them for some erven elsewhere in the town”\(^{79}\) (see Figure 4.10). While the people of Bethlehem were undesirable in the town (hence relocated to the outskirts of the city), they were to be preserved against the immorality of Bafokeng Kaffirs. That is, Bethlehem was not to be moved to the north of the non-Dutch European site referred to earlier because “of the difficulty of controlling them if

\(^{76}\) National Archives of South Africa, MRB 1/1/5, 1924.

\(^{77}\) National Archives of South Africa, MRB 1/1/5, 1924; the Town Council Sub-Committee Report, September 22, 1924 (MRB 1/1/5).

\(^{78}\) The idea of the ‘burgher rights’ was historically used to describe a certain kind of citizenship rights (the rights of white people in South Africa, rather than blacks, to vote, to have access to African labour, and to possess land).

\(^{79}\) National Archives of South Africa, MRB 1/1/5, 1924.
the location is too far away, more especially in view of the proximity of Kaffir village [Phokeng, about four miles to the north]. The issue of Bethlehem’s nearness to the five burgher rights was also raised by the Native Commissioner, who argued that such proximity would lead to “crime and the contraventions of liquor and morality laws” by the people of Bethlehem.

The September 1924 recommendations were not implemented, probably because of the disagreements among the state organs, and the Town Council appointed another sub-committee in November 1927 to re-examine the issue of the relocation of Bethlehem. In April 1929 the sub-committee recommended that the Asiatic Bazaar and the site between it and the banks of the river in Figure 4.11 further to the north (but south of the ‘burgher rights’ settlement on the left) be used for the growth (not relocation) of Bethlehem (see Figure 4.4). “It is considered that the site should be as near as possible to the town, without being of the town”. The report also mentioned the need to screen Bethlehem from any European houses by planting trees on the south-east of Bethlehem. For reasons that are not clear, it was Tussenkomst 188 that was agreed upon for the relocation of the people of Bethlehem by all the branches of state, and signed into law by the Minister of Native Affairs early in 1931.

For the next six years, however, the Council did not want to take on any of the costs of relocation, including the building of new houses for the people of Bethlehem. The people of Bethlehem did not want to move because they argued that they did not have money to build new houses on their own. Instead of forcing relocation, the Town Council resolved not to move the people of Bethlehem, but ruled that no new residential permits for tenants or new licenses for stands would be issued in Bethlehem. By March 1934 the moratorium on tenant ‘site renewals’ had given rise to a new problem: “Europeans are letting rooms in their backyards to natives on the excuse that there is no accommodation in Bethlehem”. For this reason, the white employers and black workers affected by the moratorium on new ‘tenant

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**Notes:**

80 National Archives of South Africa, MRB 1/1/5, 1925. In the meantime, the people of Bethlehem continued to show their desperation – they held a meeting where 38 of those present voted to move and three were in favour of remaining at Bethlehem: about 1,000 people lived in Bethlehem at that time (National Archives of South Africa, MRB 1/1/5, 1925).

81 National Archives of South Africa, MRB 1/1/5, 1925.

82 National Archives of South Africa, MRB 1/1/9, 1929.

83 National Archives of South Africa, MRB 1/1/11, 1931.

84 National Archives of South Africa, MRB 1/1/14, 1934.
permit’ renewals and/or by the moratorium on the granting of licenses for residential sites threatened legal action against the Town Council should black workers be evicted from employers’ backyards. The Town Council was by then housing its employees in the Council Compounds, and it also negotiated with employers in the private industries to provide housing for their employees in Tusstenkomst 188, which was later called Tlhabane. In 1937, there were no less than 1,700 people in Bethlehem when the first six families moved voluntarily. In 1941, 53 people also moved voluntarily, while the rest were moved by the Town Council (including 569 tenants and 712 lodgers) (Mbenga and Manson, no date). Plates 3.28 show the Church building, which is all that is currently left of Bethlehem, and the Bethlehem site became a white residential neighbourhood. It should be noted that such a social engineering process (that later delivered the apartheid city) was completed in 1931, well before 1948, which was the year in which the National Party won the white-only national election based on the policy of apartheid.

Plates 4.29: The Church building on the left is all what is currently left of Bethlehem, and the site became a white residential neighbourhood as indicated by the picture on the right.

4.7 Conclusion
By the end of the 1930s, spatialities that provided opportunities for social and economic empowerment for the people of Rustenburg were created. The broader economic development of Rustenburg, the building of the urban landscape, missionary work, and the introduction of modern farming technology were significant in the way they not only made a living, but also in the way they managed their relationship with the city. Similarly, Bethlehem was recreated into a space of livelihood formation with its own ways of life – the stokvels,
shebeens, and the broader cultural of the settlement ‘sustained’ ordinary people there. For the first decade of the twentieth century, they participated in the local economy, albeit in a relation of dependency to the social, political and economic life of Rustenburg. Beyond Bethlehem, the Indians and ordinary white people of this town, such as Helen MacGregor and members of the Federation of the Magaliesbergs Tobacco Farmers’ Co-operation, played a role in the vibrancy of this town’s economy. The nagmaal time provided opportunities for the creation of landscape of practice, the everyday routines that produce and reproduce the actual living landscapes. Central to this generative environment were the town’s intimate and relatively mixed socio-spatial forms. Thus, Bafokeng, the people of Bethlehem, Indians, and ordinary white people of Rustenburg drew from the sensual to create their own spaces for self-expression and socio-economic creativity, spaces that cannot be reduced to the rationality of abstract space.

However, racism and the associated eviction of the people of Bethlehem to the outskirts of the city, the dispossession of the people of Bethlehem of their pastures, the state’s stronger control of local social life and the local economy’s connection to the broader capitalist economy ultimately militated against the conditions that facilitated broad-based social and economic development. In the case of Bafokeng, over time, the effects of their free labour on white farms, of the anti-squatting laws, of the 1881 Transvaal Native Locations Commission, of the 1913 Beaumont Commission, and of the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts, increased dependence on wage earnings as well as the loss of control of their land due to the increased powers of chiefs. Moreover, the innovative and impressive involvement of Bafokeng as share-croppers and labour tenants would have not changed their dependent relationship to Rustenburg’s commercial agricultural economy. In terms of the Bafokeng administration, although the dawn of mineral prospecting and the subsequent mining of platinum group metals in Rustenburg in the 1920s had begun to seriously threaten Bafokeng’s agricultural practices, the Bafokeng administration was already reaping £3,000 annually from mineral leases in 1928 (Manson and Mbenga, 2010: 100). The amount could have been higher had it not been for the price of platinum falling from £19 per ounce in 1926 to about £6 per ounce in 1930 (during the period of the Great Depression) (ibid.). Thus, although the development of the platinum industry in Rustenburg finally led to the incidence of ‘the livelihoods of the poor’, generating revenue through mining royalties strengthened Bafokeng administration’s position in terms of development and power – it is one of the few tribes that have been able to
provide its own services such as health care facilities and schools, although such resources do
not, in and of themselves, guarantee ‘development’ status for ordinary Bafokeng.

By the end of the 1980s, Rustenburg was a fully developed apartheid city with strong
functional links to the Bophuthatswana bantustan, where Phokeng and Bafokeng villages
were located (see Figure 4.11). This meant that the post-apartheid Rustenburg was constituted
by powerful and competing entities (the municipality and the Bafokeng administration) in the
context of the extractive platinum economy and associated migration flows. A key concern
for the chapters that follow is whether the post-apartheid context provides opportunities for
the structures of power to deliver social and economic transformation and whether state
interventions facilitate or hinder ordinary people’s efforts to rebuild their lives and the city
itself.

Figure 4.11: Apartheid Rustenburg in regional context
Chapter 5

The remaking of the Rustenburg landscape, livelihoods and subjects

5.1 Introduction
While the discussions in Chapter 4 served to highlight the historical moment of the transformative potential of cities as well as the forces that produced ‘the livelihoods of the poor’, the dynamics referred to in Chapter 5 point to the reproduction of such moments and forces in the contemporary period. In particular, it discusses the ‘traditional’ Bafokeng administration’s and the ‘modern’ Rustenburg Local Municipality’s socio-spatial interventions – social development initiatives, the Master Plan and the city centre regeneration projects – as moments in ordinary people’s quest to improve their lives. Whether such interventions serve to facilitate or hinder ordinary people’s livelihood activities are matters for Chapter 5 – I do not discuss the links between livelihoods and socio-spatial interventions in Chapter 4. The theme of spatial propinquity and distanciation is used to organise the discussions in this chapter, highlighting the spaces of interactions and spontaneity being created in downtown Rustenburg, Phokeng and Freedom Park.

5.2 The new political-economic formations as context for livelihood formation
The circumstances within which the poor make a living influence the extent to which they are able to use the city’s resources to transform their lives. Such circumstances include the fact that about 40 percent of the people of Rustenburg, and indeed of South Africa, are unemployed (Maharaj et al., 2011). This rate of unemployment is the result of the downturn in the national economy since the 1970s, reaching crisis proportions by the 1980s (Gelb, 1987). In particular, the government withdrawal of crop and credit subsidies in the agricultural sector and the general liberalisation of agricultural market in the 1980s, alongside mechanisation of agriculture, led to substantial job losses in the countryside, and hence a rapid growth of informal squatter settlements on the fringes of South African cities from the 1970s onwards (Lemon, 1991). Similarly, the profitability of the manufacturing sector began

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85The second part of this chapter focuses on Rustenburg’s social development interventions (including the delivery of basic services) for socio-economic transformations. The third part attends to the more spatial reconfigurations of Rustenburg – the ways in which the Master Plan and the CBD regeneration projects can create conditions for viable livelihood activities. Whether the Master Plan and the CBD regeneration projects in practice serve to facilitate or hinder such activities are matters for Chapter 5.
to decline drastically in the mid-1980s (Natrass, 1989), shedding just over a million jobs by 2004 (Francis, 2006). The sustained post-World War II profitability in the gold export market weakened markedly by the mid-1980s, with employment continuing to fall from about 800,000 in 1984 to just over 600,000 in 1994 and to 450,000 in 2004 (Francis, 2006). At the national level, changes in economic practices are one context within which ordinary people make a living and pursue other ends.

Locally, Rustenburg had, by the mid-twentieth century, become one of the key economic centres in southern Africa. According to Mbenga and Manson (2010), much of the world’s platinum group metals are deposited in what came to be Bafokeng land. The mining companies of Anglo Platinum, Impala and Lonmin own the major means of production in the greater Rustenburg space economy, and they contribute about 60 percent to the local economy and employment (RLM, 2012). By the end of the 1990s, however, the main employers in the city shed a substantial number of jobs: employment in the mining sector dropped by about 50 percent, from 72,255 in 1991 to 36,402 in 1998 (pers. Comm., officer, then Department of Minerals and Energy, Pretoria, faxed raw data, 2001), while manufacturing jobs fell by about 66 percent, from 8,172 in 1991 to 2,773 in 1995 (Phalatse, 2000). Expressed in terms of the number of household members who depended on these jobs for survival (a national average of four dependents for every worker), these losses are quite substantial (ibid.). The decline in the rate of employment and the associated contraction in the volume of cash-flow among the lower classes locally are, in part, related to the widespread adoption of flexible systems of production and flexible labour regimes in the mines (Frankel, 2013). These job losses in agriculture, manufacturing and mining were, by the 1990s, coupled with a growing number of migrants (up to 25% in the 1990s, according to Plan Associates (2000)). The participation of migrants in informal sector activities had the effect of saturating that sector. The increased flow of people into Rustenburg also put more pressure on local resources, while the decline in the local economy diminished options for ordinary people to structure livelihoods.

The South African and the Bafokeng’s local state reconfigurations provide another dimension of the context within which the poor attempt to transform their lives. Since the Interim
Measures for Local Government Act of 1991\textsuperscript{86} the Rustenburg area has undergone fundamental restructuring, with important implications for the role it was to play in the period that followed. In the years leading to 1990, the South African local state was divided into rural/traditional villages and urban areas in the ‘homelands’, the white local councils and Black Local Authorities in urban ‘South Africa’, and Regional Services Councils that serviced mainly rural white farmers. In these forms, the local state was instrumental in advancing the ideology of white supremacy, while the black townships were variously vital in the anti-apartheid campaigns.

The rural black reserves had come to serve the colonial and apartheid plans of subjugating the rural masses through chieftaincy (Mamdani, 1996). In post-apartheid South Africa, the local state is seen as the main agent for delivering social and economic development (Pycroft, 1998). This 1990s reorientation away from the ‘national’ as the driver of regional planning to the role of the ‘local’ in economic development was influenced by global economic trends from the early 1970s as well as the 1990s discourses on various aspects of the development processes: gender-sensitivity, people-centeredness, sustainability, alternative development and post-development. In particular, the 1992 Rio Summit on sustainable development, the 1994 forum on Human Rights in Vienna, the 1995 forum on social security, development and social justice in Copenhagen, the forum on gender equality and women’s health in Cairo in 1994 and in Beijing in 1995, as well as the forum on sustainable urban development in Istanbul in 1996, all reinforced the central role that the local state had come to play in the post-apartheid reconstruction process (Parnell and Pieterse, 1999).

In 2000, the local state reform process in South Africa was completed, and it is now structured along three primary types of local government: metropolitan councils (for metropolises), local councils (constituted by medium-size cities and towns amalgamated with neighbouring rural/traditional villages), and district councils, which coordinate integrated planning across a number of local councils, and also provide services on behalf of weaker

\textsuperscript{86} The Interim Measures for Local Government Act of 1991 represented a framework for the ensuing negotiations that eventually determined the new structures of local government. “The breakthrough came in September 1992 when the government, provincial administrations and organised local government met with representatives from the South African National Civic Organisation (Sanco) to create the Local Government Negotiating Forum (LGNF). In March 1993, the LGNF, in consultation with the Multi-Party Negotiating Council (the body responsible for the interim constitution), was empowered to create a democratic, non-racial, non-sexist and financially viable local government system” (Pycroft, 1996: 235-236).
local councils (RSA, 1998). Traditional villages have been incorporated into the neighbouring urban councils because, for Ntsebeza (2005), the traditional authority is an undemocratic institution. This means that the institution of traditional authority is marginalised in local governance because it has historically shifted its allegiance away from its ‘subjects’ to the colonial and apartheid regimes (Mamdani, 1996). Although this institution is recognised and protected by the post-apartheid constitution, it does not form part of local government structures, except as an ex officio member with no voting rights. Traditional villages have also been incorporated into the neighbouring urban local councils because the traditional leadership is financially and administratively too weak to provide basic services or to facilitate economic development in its areas of jurisdiction (RSA, 1998). It is for these reasons of the historical ‘subjection’ of the rural masses as well as limited revenue sources and administrative capacities in rural municipalities that local state reformers seemed determined to extend the redevelopment (not necessarily democracy) to rural areas.

In theory and in law, the local council is no longer a lower ‘tier’ of the state, but like other arms of the state, it constitutes a ‘sphere’ of government that accounts directly to parliament. The new role of local councils goes beyond the traditional function of providing basic services to their constituencies. Conceptualised within the rubric of ‘developmental local government’, local councils are required by the law (RSA, 1998) to facilitate and coordinate poverty alleviation strategies and local economic development initiatives through integrating the physical, social and economic aspects of development (integrated development planning). “This horizontal integration enables the developmental municipality to operate through partnerships with the public sector, private sector, community-based and non-governmental organisations that operate within the municipality’s boundaries” (Pycroft, 1996: 155). Overall, local government restructuring in the 1990s was intended to create conditions for local development and practices of livelihood formation. However, other dynamics created challenges for realising such goals: higher levels of unemployment (40%) and poverty (48%) (Maharaj et al., 2011); the absence of a basic income grant for unemployed, economically active people; the state’s negligent grants to municipalities for the provision of basic services; the household and community power dynamics that control entry to livelihood

87 Despite these sobering numbers on the country’s unemployment and poverty rates, the state has not eased the living conditions of the unemployed as regards the provision of basic services such as water, electricity, roads and sanitation infrastructures. The state used the lowest possible measures to determine the level at which these entitlements are subsidised, the politics of which are brought to bear by the fact that, for much of the period since 1994, various state agencies used different income levels to determine specific state subsidies and grants
resources; and the confrontational nature of local protests for basic services. This bleak account of national and local socio-economic and political dynamics presents serious challenges to ordinary people to make a living and to pursue other ends.

Having said that, in this chapter I highlight some of the services, institutions, sites, and facilities that constitute resources for ordinary people to build livelihoods: the stronger local institutions (Kutles and Kgotlas); the higher budgets for the Rustenburg Local Municipality and the Bafokeng administration; the gendered Bafokeng land; the significant levels of working migrants who constitute the market for using Bafokeng land to rent out rooms and to trade through taverns and tuck-shops; the higher possibilities for networking with state institutions, other agencies, and people across or beyond the city; the higher levels of access to basic services (water, electricity, and road infrastructure) and facilities such as schools, health centres, roads; entitlements such as RDP housing and social security grants and assistance; the city’s sites (Freedom Park, the inner city, Bafokeng areas); the proximity of such sites to sources of goods for sale on the streets, in taverns and tuck-shops; the stronger purchasing power in Freedom Park and Rustenburg in general. These facilities, services, and infrastructure provide invaluable resources for the people of Rustenburg to build livelihoods.

across the three spheres of the state (local, provincial, and national). In 2000 a state agency (Statistics South Africa) used a monthly income of ZAR 670 (USD 96) as a minimum income which was deemed sufficient to cover people’s basic needs; this value was used at the time when the then Ministry of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development was using ZAR 800 (USD 133). The National Treasury is still establishing the national poverty standard, currently suggested to be ZAR 431 (USD 63) per capita per month. A per capita monthly income of ZAR 216 (USD 31) is suggested to indicate the conditions of extreme poverty. These amounts are calculated from the 2006 commodity and food prices (RSA, 2007). It is interesting to note that despite the increasing rates of unemployment and poverty, ordinary people’s incomes have been decreasing over time relative to the cost of living. In 1998, the Ministry of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development used ZAR 800 to determine the subsidies for basic services (RSA, 2000). In same year, the ‘equitable share’ (a state mechanism for distributing its revenue between the national, provincial, and local spheres of government) was introduced, in terms of which a household earning up to ZAR 800 per month was provided with a monthly subsidy of ZAR 86 (USD 14) for an essential minimum package of basic services (RSA, 2000). However, the World Bank put forward an argument that the household income level of ZAR 800 per month, computed from the 1996 South African population census reports, was a substantial underestimation of the economic resources available to the poorer households, including those resources that are not based on income (RSA, 2000). Consequently, the funds allocated to municipalities through the equitable share mechanism now constitute only about 10 percent of municipal income.

South Africa has seen an outburst of anger in the form of violent service delivery protests. They occurred at the rate of at least eleven protests per month between 2007 and June 2011: 9 protests per month in 2007, 18 protests per month in 2009, and 9 protests per month by June 2011 (Karamoko and Jain, 2011).

A Kutle is an institution of governance at the level of related families. The plural for Kutle is Dikutle. Lekgotla is a ward system of local administration under the leadership of a headman, his wife and ward-men who attend to people’s day-to-day matters. The plural for Lekgotla is Makgotla.
5.3 Rustenburg’s social development trajectory

In terms of its new demarcation lines, statutory functions, and ‘integrated development planning’ mandates, the Rustenburg Local Municipality (RLM) has to provide basic services and facilitate social development to Bafokeng villages. Indeed 75 percent of the people of Rustenburg have access to water (including those that use communal stand pipes within 200 metres from their houses) (RLM, 2012). The same number of people have access to improved sanitation services – either connected to the city’s sewerage systems or using the Ventilated Improved Pit latrine (ibid.)

Although it is not easy to identify the pro-poor social and economic projects/programmes as per developmental local government mandate, the RLM has established partnerships with the Department of Public Works and the Department of Trade and Industry to hire some three dozen unemployed women to clean the streets of Freedom Park (RLM, 2012). I often see them roaming the streets picking up trash when I am there for research fieldwork. The women are given food parcels that are equivalent to an unspecified monthly salary.

The RLM is also partnering with the North-West Department of Sports, Arts and Culture to provide ‘information hubs’ on government services at schools, clinics and municipal halls. It also supports just over a dozen vegetable projects and the processing of sunflower to produce livestock fodder and vegetable oil. Other projects are pig farming, the recycling of glass to make new glass containers, kitchen tiles and retail counter tops, and the recycling of waste rock to produce crushed stones and concrete (RLM, 2012). Religious organisations such as the Catholic Church have embarked on development initiatives in poorer areas (vocational training, health services, soliciting financial support from local, national, and international state and private institutions for development purposes). These services are only additions to the widely distributed RDP housing projects as well as social grants and assistance provided mainly through the provincial and/or national state agencies (the Foster Care Grant, the Child Support Grant, the Old-Age Grant, the Care Dependency Grant and the Disability Grant). In fact, the Bafokeng administration is currently facilitating the registration of qualifying households in the RLM ‘poverty and indigent register’. This will enable more households to receive social grants and assistance as well as basic services (electricity, water, refuse removals, sanitation, ‘rates and taxes’) free from the RLM, Eskom or the Bafokeng

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90 Although the statistics on electricity access and waste removal are patchy, it is known that people with RDP houses have accesses to basic services. It is also known that 94 percent of Bafokeng have access to electricity, and 98 percent of Bafokeng villages have access to water, 77 percent of which are in the form of taps in the house yard, and 21 percent of which are in the form of boreholes or public taps (Thompson, 2008).
administration. Additionally, the ZAR 3 billion (USD 360 million in 2012) Rustenburg Bus Rapid Transport project is underway, driven by the national Department of Transport. It is intended to promote access to transport within 500 metres of a resident’s house. The Catholic Church interventions and state social grants and assistance will be discussed in some detail in Chapter 5, providing an analysis of the ways in which they have been useful for ordinary people’s social and economic practices. For now I focus mainly on the ways in which the state’s (including the RLM and the Bafokeng administration) services, programmes and projects may provide favourable conditions for ordinary people to build livelihoods. Considered individually, such services, programmes and projects do not attract much interest because they do not fit in the expected conventional job-providing operations of the mines. However, as resources for livelihood formation, they remain areas of local, national and global funding and support. The sheer multiplicity of such services, programmes and projects (discussed below) signals a potential platform for ordinary people’s access to the opportunities of city life, which are captured in Simone’s (2010) ideas of ‘intersections’ and ‘crossings’. Although for Simone (2004: 13) ordinary people’s activities often slip off the conventional norms, policy frameworks and institutional practices (services, programmes and projects), the next chapter (5) will show how they engage or even rework them, and how their activities hold together various actors, sectors, institutions, positions, and places. This chapter (4) is mainly discusses the coexisting and potentially transformative Bafokeng administration and the RLM’s development norms, policy frameworks and institutional practices.

The ‘traditional’ system of Bafokeng administration has become a significant power player in Rustenburg’s political, economic and social processes. It draws its power from the substantial resources at its disposal (about R33.5 billion in net asset value – RBH, 2007), 40 percent of the municipal land, and facilities such as schools, health-centres, water reticulation and road infrastructures). The Bafokeng administration has since the second half of the 1990s (and indeed historically) ambiguously positioned itself as an autonomous political entity. The chief of Bafokeng (Mollowane Molotlegi, educated at Howard University in the United States of America as a communications major) set out to corporatise the traditional community’s administration (Cook, 2008; Royal Bafokeng administration, 2002)91. As part of that neoliberal reorganisation process, he considered the designation “tribe” to be derogatory, and

thus renamed the Bafokeng tribal area the Royal Bafokeng Nation (RBN) and its administrative body (formerly the Bafokeng tribal authority) the Royal Bafokeng Administration (RBA) (Caldwell, 2002). He held a position at the top of both of these structures, as the CEO in the RBA and as the king in the RBN. In addition to viewing the category “tribe” as a disrespectful colonialist invention, King Mollwane Molotlegi regarded the English translation of his title as “chief” to be demeaning, and ruled that the leader of the Bafokeng should be referred to as the king (ibid.).

The Bafokeng are governed by a Supreme Council headed by a hereditary male king, hereditary headmen and their wives as well as appointed and elected councillors. Their functional agencies include the Department of Infrastructure Development and Planning, Royal Bafokeng Holdings (RBH), Royal Bafokeng Enterprise Development (RBED, formerly the Royal Bafokeng Economic Board), Royal Bafokeng Sports, Protective Services, Research and Planning, and the Royal Bafokeng Institute (RBI). The Department of Infrastructure Development and Planning is responsible for providing basic services and community infrastructure. Figure 6.1 shows that access to water and toilet facilities is higher among Bafokeng. Similarly, access to and the use of electricity for lighting and cooking is higher in Bafokeng areas and Rustenburg generally (Thompson, 2010). The royalties from mining generate the main revenues for the Bafokeng administration to provide such infrastructure development and services. The RBH is charged with the responsibility of reinvesting the Bafokeng revenue by buying shareholding rights in companies ranging from resource companies, financial, insurance and information technology services to coal, manufacturing, engineering industries and transport firms. Health and Social Development Services (HSDS) provides a variety of programmes to the community, including disaster relief (a programme which facilitates the provision of food and shelter as well as the rebuilding of, for example, a house following a disaster). The programmes of this entity also include nutritional education in sustainable vegetable gardens in schools and the community. In addition to the existing clinics, HSDS regularly provides a mobile clinic comprising a

92 [www.bafokeng.com](http://www.bafokeng.com). The names of these entities are changed from time to time, and their functions becoming more and more corporatised.

93 The majority of the R33.5 billion (in the year 2007) that Bafokeng have at its disposal was raised through the ‘equity-for-royalty transaction’, through which Impala paid annual royalties to Bafokeng in advance by thirty-two years (R12.1 billion) (Royal Bafokeng Holdings, 2007). This represented a 218 percent rise from R8.8 billion in 2005. That payment enabled Bafokeng to convert its platinum assets into equity, buying 9.4 million shares in Implats, and thus becoming the largest shareholder (13.4%) in Impala (ibid). By the beginning of the 21st century, Bafokeng were already regarded as “The Richest Tribe in Africa” (Manson and Mbenga, 2003: 25).
doctor, social workers, coordinators for people with disabilities and coordinators for orphaned and vulnerable children. It also facilitates independent living for 'people with disability'; it coordinates programmes for the 'frail aged' (including running luncheon clubs for them). It operates a feeding scheme programme for school-going orphans, while the RBI operates a school food production and feeding scheme for all Bafokeng school-going pupils.

![Comparison of Water Access and Toilet Facilities](image1)

![Comparison of Lighting and Cooking fuels](image2)

**Figure 5.1: Comparison of water access and toilet facilities**

Source: Thompson (2010)

The RBI programs are intended to get the Bafokeng schools (operated by the South African Department of Education) to function better than they have been during and after apartheid. Some of these programs include improving adult basic education, vocational training and tertiary education. RBI is also running programmes that seek to improve pupils' performance in mathematics, science, language and culture, sport and fine arts. As regards the business
enterprise, the RBED offers a number of programmes and projects that support small businesses, ranging from agricultural activities such as cattle farming on communal land, pig farming, poultry and hydroponics to activities in the manufacturing, mining, agriculture, hospitality and construction industries. The support provided by the RBED involves coaching and training small businesses, facilitating their market access as well as financial assistance from the mining and relevant state agencies. It also facilitates linkages (in the form of procurement opportunities for small businesses as well as joint ventures) between Bafokeng small businesses and larger corporations that operate in the Bafokeng territory. Some of the many linkages that have been established are the supply to local mining companies of gardening services, the production of furniture, the supply of nuts, bolts, pipes and cleaning materials, electrical and paint services.

The above descriptions are not exhaustive of the interventions made by Bafokeng administration: suffice it to mention that the higher level of basic services provision shown in Figure 5.1, and the financing of the above-mentioned services, programmes and projects, including sports development, protective services, food security, and environmental management (see Table 5.1) should be noted because they indicate the possibilities for a tribal administration’s development processes to complement those that, in terms of statutory requirements, are the responsibilities of the South African state. Importantly, the services and programmes that the Bafokeng administration provides are useful resources for those people who participate in livelihood formation. The disaster relief may assist them re-establish livelihood assets (a house, for example) in case of a natural disaster. The services provided to people with disability and the ‘frail aged’ takes demands away from those family members who would rather focus on the activities of livelihood formation.

Table 5.1: RBN 2010 Budget (ZAR m)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Focus Area</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Actual value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance and Administration</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Social Development Services</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public and Community Utilities</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports and Recreation</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety and Security</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The work of the RBI may also go some way to break the cycle of poverty through improving the quality of education and/or facilitating access to it by variously providing funding from early childhood development, through adult and vocational training to tertiary level. The RBN development initiatives are particularly notable because they complement the ongoing government programmes, projects, and services. The difference that these programmes and projects make for ordinary people to make livelihoods cannot be emphasized strongly enough. This is evident during the questions and answers sessions at the by-quarterly public meetings (Kgothakgothe) and the more regional Dumela Phokeng public meetings. These meetings have been used by community members to raise issues regarding the provision and maintenance of universal public services. During one of these meetings, I was sitting next to a woman who told me that she makes a living by running a small bakery, laundry services, and a tuckshop. She told me she was proud to be Mofokeng. “Where else have you seen a fanfare community meeting, with state of the art sound system and televisuals in a modern civic centre building and in the overflow marquees; a community public meeting where a mid-morning snack and lunch are provided?” she asked me. I noted the way her statements and tone changed from the achievements of Bafokeng to that of a community activist, who would resist the demolition of some of her home-based businesses by the Bafokeng administration. This shift in the unsolicited narratives was prompted by some community members expressing their dissatisfaction (during the Kgothakgothe question and answer session) with the demolition of their home-based businesses. One of these kinds of experiences will come up in the next chapter. Suffice it to mention here that although insufficient and reproduced by the Bafokeng power structures, the Kgothakgothe and Dumela Phokeng regional meetings provide an avenue for ordinary people to express their views on development projects.

**Source:** RBN Review, 2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Sustainability</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>32</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food Security</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Environmental Sustainability

Food Security

Total
Although Bafokeng and RLM have undoubtedly been involved in a struggle for power during the process of local state reform\(^4\), the resources that they both possess can enable these two administrations to provide opportunities for economic and socio-spatial transformation. The annual budgets of the Rustenburg Local Municipality (RLM) and the Bafokeng administration totalled about ZAR 2 billion in 2010 (USD 200,000,000). This is significant because for a city of about 650,000 people, this budget is more or less equal to that of Kinshasa, with nine million people (Simone, 2010b). It is within this context of the co-presence, cooperation and show of power between the modern and traditional forms of governance that the context for facilitating livelihood formation can be created (notwithstanding the failure to realise the initial intentions of the mining Charter of the Mineral and Petroleum Resource Development Act (2002)).

The next section begins to speak to the broader theme of spatial propinquity and distanciation. It addresses the spatial reconfigurations of the city through a discussion of the RBN Master Plan and the regeneration strategy of one of the RLM city centres.

### 5.4 Rustenburg’s spatial development trajectory

#### 5.4.1 The Royal Bafokeng Nation Master Plan (hereafter referred to as the Master Plan)

Surbana International Consultants (2007 vol.1 and 2; 2006 vol. 1) has been aligned with the broader Rustenburg Development Concept (Plate 5.1), particularly its basic principle of ‘service delivery centres’ (coded as regional or town centres in the Master Plan\(^5\)). In terms of the Rustenburg Development Concept (RLM, 2006), Phokeng and downtown Rustenburg are regarded as the core redevelopment areas (first order redevelopment areas) from which other service delivery centres are linked (second and third order redevelopment areas). In fact, the

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\(^4\) During the local government transition period of 1991 to 2000, the Bafokeng administration submitted proposals on possible models of local governance that would leave them with significant autonomy as a relatively self-sufficient administration. The Bafokeng administration lobbied for such models independently, outside the organised formations such as the North-West Provincial House of Traditional Leaders. Such a process was characterised by the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding by the Bafokeng leadership, the RLM, and the Bojanala District Municipality in the presence of Thabo Mbeki, the South African State President (see Mail and Guardian, 2003).

\(^5\) The Master Plan aims for a planned, controlled, orderly, and sustained growth of the city through a coordinated programme of public improvements in the city’s streets, infrastructure, housing, and leisure (Graham and Marvin, 2003).
majority of the service delivery centres in the Rustenburg Development Concept are Bafokeng villages.

![Diagram of Rustenburg Development Concept](image)

**Plate 5.1: Rustenburg Development Concept**

**Source:** RLM (2006)

In the context of cities as densities and concentrations of people, things, institutions and architecture often operating at a global scale, it is suggested that “in bringing different things [as well as people and ideas from far beyond their borders] cities might produce something new” (Robinson, 2004b: 163). The international connections in cultural, political, urban design and urban planning are elements of such resources, which can potentially improve urban life. Indeed King Leruo Molotlegi\(^ {96} \) employed a Singaporean consultant group to develop the Master Plan, which serves as the guiding framework for the ongoing town planning and development projects. In terms of the Master Plan, the larger residential, shopping, office, education and health facilities will be located in Phokeng (the seat of the Bafokeng administration), while the peripheral, rural sections will receive low-order social and basic retail facilities (Surbana International Consultants, 2007, vol. 2). It proposes to transform Phokeng into a regional centre which “will serve as a secondary commercial node to complement the old Central Business District (CBD) and Waterfall Mall in Rustenburg”.

\(^ {96} \) King Leruo Molotlegi assumed the role of King after his brother King Mollowane Molotlegi died in 2000. He has since extended the target date for realising the promises of Vision 2020 to 2035.
The regional/town centres will be constituted by a mixed use of residential, commercial, social and institutional services.

Plate 5.2: The Phokeng Master Plan
Source: Pers. Comm., officer, RBA Infrastructure Department, emailed raw data, 2011)

The Master Plan and indeed the regeneration project of the Rustenburg CBD emphasise the aesthetics of the built environment. The Master Plan (vol. 2, 2007) envisages Phokeng as a distinctive and vibrant area that embraces a live-work-learn-play environment – that is, integrating spaces for residential, office, administration, retail, convention and exhibition facilities, together with venues for sport, cultural experiences and entertainment (see Plate 5.2). Such a kaleidoscopic landscape will include the Sport City (indoor and outdoor facilities, swimming pools and accommodation for athletes) and the Education Hub that will offer courses in information technology, business and management as well as arts and design (including fine arts, product design, multimedia, interior design and landscape design). Part of the Education Hub is already under way, having started with the establishment of an elite school privately owned and run by the RBI (see Plate 5.3). The new landscapes will also include an Exhibition and Convention Hub, which will house exposition halls tailored to accommodate large item car and machinery exhibitions. The Institutional Hub will be constituted by the residence of the King (the Royal Palace Complex) and other facilities such as an old-age home, hospital, skills training centre and children’s home. It is important to note that much of the Sport City landscape is almost complete, with a spectacular ZAR 275 million (USD 34 million) stadium having hosted six of the 2010 FIFA World Cup matches (USA vs England, USA vs Ghana, Mexico vs Uruguay, Ghana vs Australia, Denmark vs Japan, and New Zealand vs Slovakia) (see Plates 5.4 and 5.5).
Plate 5.3: Part of the Lebone College of the Royal Bafokeng
Source: Photo by Ngaka Mosiane

Plate 5.4: The Royal Bafokeng Sports Palace, with swimming pool and tennis court facilities
Source: Google images, The Royal Bafokeng Sports Palace
The Royal Bafokeng Sports Campus was used as a base for the English national team during the 2010 Federation of International Football Association (FIFA) World Cup. The Sports City, the Education Hub, and the Exhibition and Convention Hub will be linked by pedestrian road networks, among other connections, in order to create a public space for interaction, thereby generating the vibrancy that Phokeng needs in order to function as a metropolitan area. This system of interconnected public and private spaces will improve the aesthetics of Phokeng landscape and create conditions for spontaneous human interaction (Vol. 1: 44). All these features of the Master Plan (Education Hub, Sports City, Culture and Commercial Centre) “will significantly transform Phokeng into a distinctive and vibrant urban area” (vol 2: 14).

The Phokeng regional centre will see denser, smaller stands or a cluster of new township and multi-storey condominiums. Thus, associated with the Master Plan features referred to above, housing is an avenue through which the Bafokeng landscape might be transformed. In line with de Soto’s (1989) thinking, the current Bafokeng houses are seen to be ‘defective’, lacking significant capital value because “the stands cannot be mortgaged to finance the building of houses” (vol 2: 38). Thus the Master Plan “provides opportunities for Bafokeng to invest in property for the purpose of asset accumulation and for purposes of offering non-Bafokeng the option of private home ownership” (vol 2: 38). The Bafokeng administration will build and operate ‘proper’ rental housing for non-Bafokeng in order to have better
control of the petty rentier market that is currently dominated by ordinary people (vol 2: 47). In some cases, private housing for Bafokeng and non-Bafokeng who can afford high-end quality housing will be promoted by leasing land to commercial developers:

[The suburban townships] will be self-contained with a comprehensive range of retail, educational, social and recreational facilities. Private townships [will be] designated for upper class housing and meant to be exclusive. Therefore, themed developments such as ranch, golf or garden estates will be designed for such housing. They will also be serviced with a range of retail, educational, social, and recreational facilities (vol 2: 11).

In contrast to such a glitzy image of Phokeng, villages on the peripheries will be turned into town centres and smaller townships (see Plate 5.4). They will be characterised by suburban townships and modern, comprehensive low-order social and basic retail facilities (Vol 2: 5):

The suburban townships [will be] formed by amalgamating existing villages and expanding into new areas. All townships will be served by an efficient road network that connects them to the Rustenburg-Phokeng metropolitan area which will be the key activity centre (vol 2: 11).

Plate 5.5: A town centre for smaller peripheral villages

Source: Pers. Comm., officer, RBA Infrastructure Department, emailed raw data, 2011)
Given the need to create employment opportunities, land will be allocated for industrial estates near or within various townships in order to realise the work-near-home concept and reduce concentrating employment opportunities in Phokeng (p. 11). It should be reiterated that should the Master Plan deliverables be fully realised, they will add to the existing infrastructure for water, roads, schools and health facilities as well as the existing access to free communal land used by ordinary Bafokeng men to build houses. Thus the Master Plan cannot instantly be dismissed. It has the potential to deliver a progressive socio-spatial redistribution and to provide comprehensive planning, bureaucratic delivery and a needs-based development framework. This is particularly important given that Bafokeng also have access to the state social security benefits. Thus, the Master Plan and the social development programs have the potential to facilitate the modern and traditional socio-spatial and political interventions for the benefit of ordinary people. Notwithstanding the debates around the mining charter social labour plan (wealth distribution to the poor), the Bafokeng administration is relatively able to provide development, although it is not its statutory mandate. Although its informal and traditional features are a hindrance to some of its modernised development processes (unwritten and undemocratic traditional laws discriminate against women and young men), they are not determinate.

That said, the extent to which the Master Plan as a cultural practice (a particular approach to planning) will facilitate an improvement in ordinary people’s lives will depend on the kinds of spaces it promotes – the dense and clustered political, socio-spatial forms and their distanciated connections can create conditions for ordinary people’s social and economic creativity, or the spaces of capital investment and middle-class lifestyles. The kinds of spaces the Master Plan will promote are also influenced by the more neoliberal global ethos of doing development. For example, unlike the Bafokeng development approaches of the past, which were embedded in the existing villages (the construction of water infrastructure, the building of schools, clinics, tarred roads and higher education bursary provisions), Chapter 5 will confirm that the Master Plan has the makings of exclusivity for particular kinds of people, centred in exclusive spaces of Phokeng. The Master Plan should also be seen as one of the latest attempts in Bafokeng’s history of adapting, since the 1830s, to today’s political and economic conditions. In post-apartheid South Africa, the Master Plan is part of the broader strategy to keep the Bafokeng administration’s assets (land and mineral royalties), which are at risk of being democratically run and nationalised. For example, the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (2002) legislates for the abolition of private mineral rights, and
thus the loss of mine royalties by those people and institutions, including traditional communities, that had previously owned mineral rights. After representations to the Portfolio Committee on Mineral and Energy in parliament and other measures (Royal Bafokeng Administration, 2002), Bafokeng were allowed to continue to receive their royalties on condition that such royalties would be used to promote local economic development (Taplin et al., 2003).

The Communal Land Rights Act of 2004 poses a threat to the South African traditional political structure, which draws much of its power from land administration. The Communal Land Rights Act (2004) provides for legal security of tenure by transferring communal land to communities from the trusteeship of chiefs. It provides for the democratic administration of communal land by communities and for co-operative performance of municipal functions on communal land. According to this Act, the community must adopt rules and establish Land Administration Committees. All these changes are meant to transfer the land administration function to communities and to connect that function to the broader issues of spatial planning and local economic development. Notably, members of the Land Administration Committee must be elected and should not hold any traditional leadership position. This move is intended for a more democratic land administration process. For Ntsebeza (2005: 289), however, by providing for an establishment of the ‘traditional councils’ in traditional administrations, the government is reneging on this aspect of the law that has the potential to advance some level of rural democracy:

the establishment of traditional councils has arguably given traditional authorities more powers than elected councillors…Traditional authorities derive their authority and support from their control of land allocation. This was the case particularly under apartheid and, it seems from the latest developments, it will be the case even in the post-1994 South African democracy.

If Ntsebeza’s (2005) assessment is anything to go by, the continuities of the apartheid form of the land administration in the post-apartheid era has strengthened the hand of the institution of traditional authority. Given the decision to allow Bafokeng to continue receiving mining royalties, it now has both the stronger institutional authority and financial power to construct consent among Bafokeng for a particular kind of development trajectory built around the

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97 As happened in the past, disputes over land (today linked to the Communal Land Rights Act) tend to trigger internal class struggles around which ideological governance issues over the affairs of traditional authority are contested.
Master Plan. It is within this context of the challenges posed by the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act and the Communal Land Rights Act (2004) that the Bafokeng administration has placed as a public display in the foyer of the administrative offices (the Civic Centre) posters and models of planned development projects, which promotes the vibrant, middle-class spaces of interactivity, including the live-work-learn-play environments. These kinds of spaces have also come to define the contested inner city spaces of Rustenburg.

5.4.2 Regenerating Downtown Rustenburg

Although the specific details regarding the social and economic regeneration of downtown Rustenburg are still being developed through public participation processes, the city’s policy document (Maxim Planning Solutions, 2004) and the documents of the appointed constructors (Rustenburg Integrated Network Joint Venture, 2012) show that the design of the informal sector stalls, the sidewalks and the signs and advertising boards in the downtown area will be aestheticized. Plate 5.7a shows that a significant number of the informal sector operate without street trading stalls. Plate 5.7b shows images that are provided in the Regeneration Study for Rustenburg CBD (2004) to show the possible designs of stalls, advertising banners, garbage containers, and benches that could be used by informal traders as part of the strategy to regenerate downtown Rustenburg. The goal of enhancing the aesthetics of the city is to make the downtown area “a gathering place for social and cultural activities”, thereby constructing a creative and innovative city for the benefit of all inhabitants (Regeneration Study for Rustenburg CBD, 2004: Vol. 1: 13).

Towards this end, attractive gateways (main entrances to the city), foyers (secondary entrances with larger reserves and splays), key landmarks, pedestrian streets, public spaces, and more parking bays are to be built. Plate 5.8 shows a plan for the aestheticisation of downtown Rustenburg, with gateways, foyers, pedestrian streets, public spaces that are some of the features that will constitute such changes.
In addition to the existing convention centre in the up-market section of the city (the south), a special event program – a social and cultural hub consisting of a multipurpose centre – is to be built in the inner city in order to attract the middle class back there. Some of the city’s roads are being converted into boulevards and pedestrian malls, and more importantly (as Plate 5.9 shows), such road networks will be configured to accommodate informal business activities.

Indeed Plein Street (renamed Fatima Bayat Street), where a 350 metre stretch of Fatima Bayat connects the Midtown Mall in the south and the taxi/bus rank area in the north, is being closed to traffic and turned into a pedestrian street (see Figure 5.2).
Additionally, clusters of specific social and economic activities have been identified. For example, the bus/taxi terminal is said to be characterised by an ‘affordable market area’ that could be used to integrate the informal sector activities into the mainstream urban economy. Thus, the bus/taxi terminal is to be linked to Fatima Bayat Street, both of which used to buzz with pedestrians and street traders. In fact, from the early 1990s until just before the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the inner city of Rustenburg bustled with different kinds of common-sense social and economic activities (Plate 6.10). In the public spaces of the Midtown Mall, young men could be seen performing astonishing dances and splits for money. Elsewhere in the
mall, bizarre-looking and unusually dressed individuals would stand motionless, quickly changing postures when money was dropped for them on a receptacle on the floor. The next day the spot would be taken by a young man with a painted face standing still as a mannequin, but also swinging back-and-forth between a living being and a non-living object as money is dropped on a receptacles on the floor.

Plate 6.10: Comic performance and traditional dance in downtown Rustenburg
Source: Photo by Ngaka Mosiane

Fatima Bayat Street, the Midtown Mall and the bus/taxi rank were also places of incessant song and dance. Small music dealers would set up shop near Fatima Bayat Street, and play house music full-blast as a marketing strategy to those walking past. At nearby sites, performances of live gospel music, house music, and traditional music choirs could be seen as operatives move through the fluid audiences/crowds to sell the artists’ compact discs. Elsewhere in the spaces of the Midtown Mall, a ‘magic man’ could be seen collecting ordinary people’s money (promising to magically get them jobs) after tricking them into believing that he turned underwear into biscuits. Some of these performances were a welcome comfort and comic relief to a sick and indebted body walking and shopping in the city.

In a small area of about 5, 600 square metres, there are no less than six taverns (Malan Taxi Rank Sports Tavern, Silver Cloud, First Class, Mabaleng Sports Tavern, Bravo Sports Bar, I. S. Tavern). These are spaces for daily entertainment and interaction by people coming from work and many other people during the week and weekends. Some of the unemployed men
use taverns as hideouts/waiting spots for their covert activities, while some of the women use
taverns as sites for obtain money from men. These women work in groups, targeting those
men who seem to be buying more liquor, as a sign of them having more money. After making
some connection with a man in a tavern, a woman lures him out for some hanky-panky
encounter (a luring that is to be achieved before the man spends all his money on liquor). If
one fails to lure a man, a different woman makes a similar attempt. If the man agrees, the
woman takes with her some bottles of beer, and if necessary, drops a substance such as snuff
inside the beer bottle in order to render a man unconscious so that she can pickpocket him.
The money is shared among the women involved, at the discretion of the one who was last
involved in the action.

Plein Street, the Midtown Mall, and the bus/taxi sites are also spaces of common informal
economic activities (see Table 6.2). Those who participate in such activities are local street
traders and migrants from other parts of the country and southern Africa.

Table 6.2: Inner City case study: Some of the interviewed inner city street traders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Livelihoods</th>
<th>Edu</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tswana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>Street trader, savings-and-credit scheme</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>North-West</td>
<td>1972</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Street trader, savings-and-credit scheme</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>North-West</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Street trader, savings-and-credit scheme</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Local township</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Street trader, savings-and-credit scheme,</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Local township</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>spaza shop</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tswana</td>
<td>Street trader</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>1998</td>
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<tr>
<td>Males</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xhosa</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>1999</td>
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<td>Females</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>56</td>
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<tr>
<td>Xhosa</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The informal sector activities in which both men and women participate are similar, except
that women are also involved in savings-and-credit schemes. The informal sector participants
provide hairdressing services, and sell flowers, flower pots, plant fertiliser and many other
items such as:
sweets, cooked food, fruits, vegetables, cigarettes, belts, stockings, socks, handkerchiefs, washing racks, umbrellas, wallets, toys, necklaces, earrings, sunglasses, combs, cosmetics, sweaters, skirts, underwear, shoes, track suits, sunglasses, shirts, trousers, watches, watch batteries, bangles, shaving razor blades and mobile phone accessories (phone handsets, batteries, chargers, starter packs, cell phone faces, cell phone strings and cell phone hands-free). Additional items sold include ribbons, bags, glues, sprays, passport covers, lip ice, nail cutters, key holders and many more items (RTC, 1999b).

A cluster of the more formal businesses run by foreign Africans and Asian migrants/immigrants can also be observed along Fatima Bayat Street and some of the streets that cross it (see Plate 6.11). Although these businesses flood the local market with cheap overseas imports, they could do more to introduce foreign restaurants, cuisines, music, and film products that add to the vibrancy of the inner city (ibid). Overall, the spaces of the ladies of the night, informal economic activities, comic acts, traditional dances and other musical performances show that the inner city of Rustenburg can provide the sites for ordinary people’s social and economic activities. It is important to note that these are the spaces that ordinary people created for themselves as the city was opening up to their activities following the break-down of apartheid restrictions in the early 1990s. Indeed the city managers of Rustenburg and other power players made efforts to have the social and economic activities of ordinary peoples and the dominant users of the city co-exist side-by-side. The colloquially dubbed ‘right to develop agreement’ provided a framework for such co-existence.

Plate 6.11: Nigerian and Asian businesses on Plein Street
Source: Photo by Ngaka Mosiane

5.5 The ‘Right to Develop’ agreement in the Inner City
Following the end of apartheid, the ideal post-apartheid city was represented as a place for
anyone to live, work and pursue other goals. The national Businesses Act, No. 71 of 1991 (RSA, 1991) and the ensuing North-West Business Act, No. 6 of 1997 (RSA, 1997) abolished several historical laws that variously restricted and/or disallowed the operations of informal sector activities. Leading up to the first democratic elections in 1994, the incoming government led by the African National Congress (ANC) mobilised the nation to subscribe to the goals of the interventionist state-led Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). For urban reformers in Rustenburg, the ANC agenda signalled the onset of a process that would create the city into a place where all people live and work.

The first major move towards that end was when the Rustenburg Transitional Council (RTC) initiated a process of establishing space in the city for street hawkers with initial efforts to regularise those already operating there. Although the onerous process of registration had to be stopped because of the deluge of applications (about 200 application requests were processed per hour), unregistered hawkers were nonetheless allowed to trade in their preferred sites in the city. The best of the inner city sites set aside for street hawkers centred on the 350 metre stretch along Fatima Bayat Street, anchored in the south by the Midtown Mall and in the north by the main taxi/bus rank (see Plate 6.12). This initiative to re-imagine the inner city as an inclusive space entailed negotiations among hawkers, the private business sector, the local branch of the conservative Afrikaner National Party (that had led the apartheid state from 1948 to 1994) as well as the Rustenburg Transitional Council. The negotiations entailed details of, for example, how the informal sector activities would be accommodated while keeping the city pavements functional. Business organisations such as Die Afrikaner Sakekamer and the Rustenburg Chamber of Commerce and Industry made submissions that accommodated hawkers on one of the most contested sites (Fatima Bayat Street):

The Rustenburg Transitional Council should decree that hawking only takes place on one pavement of any given street (Plein Street, in particular) and the existing parking area on that side of the street should then be turned into a pedestrian walkway. The informal traders should face the street with their trading spots being restricted to one meter away from the edge of the pavement. A minimum of two meters between the traders’ spots and the shop-front should also be established. This type of control will ensure that the by-laws can be enforced by the council (RTC, 1996).

98 See footnote 5.
Plate 6.12: Spatial zoning on Fatima Bayat Street, from the Midtown Mall at the south end (top), going along the contested trading pavements and past the Power Sales store (middle) to the bus/taxi rank at the north end (bottom).


The second major move to transform Rustenburg into a city for all to live and work was when some members of the formal business sector in the city, especially land developers, advocated their right to do business in the inner city. Thus the ‘right to develop’ agreement took off in March 1992 as part of the process of facilitating the coexistence of formal and informal economic activities in the city. The ‘agreement’ has, since then, seen the leasing of the 12,500m\(^2\) area to a property development company (Fox Lake Investments and its associated Transenergy and Transforum companies) for forty years in order to develop the bus/taxi terminal, to build a shopping mall and to build a Caltex petrol and service station. A general store (Boxer) has also been built there. Notably, within the leased area, the Rustenburg Transitional Council set aside ZAR 16,000 million (USD 5 million) to erect 10 covered stalls for hawkers, a goods storage area and an office for the hawkers’ control master, as well as toilet facilities and an overnight facility for drivers of heavy-duty vehicles. Overall,
through the influence of the Reconstruction and Development Programme, the first half of the 1990s appeared to make space for ordinary people’s activities in the inner city.

The colloquially dubbed ‘right to develop’ agreement may have been a good starting point to facilitate the coexistence of formal and informal businesses in the city. In fact, in response to the attempts by some property developers to buy the bus/taxi rank, the RTC indicated that the bus/taxi rank “should be seen as a community service, for use by the public of the city of Rustenburg and its environs. By allowing it to be owned and managed by a private organisation, it could be perceived that the City Council had a negative attitude towards the public” (RTC, 1997: 15). The current moves towards regenerating the inner city spaces seem to have a similar inclination to facilitate the coexistence of formal and informal businesses in the city. The thinking about ‘the affordable market area’ that seeks to accommodate the informal business activities in proximity to the formal businesses, the thinking about linking the taxi/bus rank to Fatima Bayat Street, the spaces that ordinary people used to make performances and dances for money and to sell music, the thinking to attract the middle-class back to the inner city and to make the downtown area a gathering place for social and cultural activities, all have the makings of an inclusive space of new urbanism that are not only fertile for ordinary people to create livelihoods, but are also constitutive of the inner city as a vibrant space of interactivity.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the social interventions by the state (Rustenburg municipality and the Bafokeng administration) as well as the context within which ordinary people build their livelihoods. The chapter did not provide an analysis of whether ordinary people are able to use the city’s services, programmes and projects to build their livelihoods, but has prepared the ground for such an analysis. In theoretical terms, this chapter mainly speaks to the theme of spatial propinquity and distanciation, highlighting the spaces of interactions and spontaneity being created. What comes out of social interventions as well as the aesthetics of downtown Rustenburg and parts of Phokeng is addressed in the next chapter, which also analyses whether the activities of the co-existing traditional and modern forms of governance and the formal and informal economic activities provide conditions for ordinary people to improve their lives.
Chapter 6
Livelihood strategies and the city spaces of Phokeng, the inner city and Freedom Park

Living in African cities is labour-intensive. It requires mental agility to negotiate the gaps between everyday aspirations and the realities of survival (Matthew Barac, 2013: 47).

6.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an analysis of the role of livelihoods in a city that is characterised by opportunities for social and economic transformations. It draws empirical material from Phokeng, downtown Rustenburg, and Freedom Park. In the discussions of each of these sites, an overview of the kinds of livelihoods that people create for themselves is provided as well as the goals they pursue. For discussions of Phokeng and downtown Rustenburg, this material is particularly used to explore the extent to which ordinary people use sites such as the sports stadium, the inner city, and Fatima Bayat Street as resources for their social and economic activities: I examine the relationship between ordinary people’s activities and the city’s interventionist projects – the extent to which the Master Plan and the old city centre regeneration projects facilitate or inhibit their livelihood activities. Due to the peripheral location of Freedom Park, I examine the extent to which the periphery can generate ordinary people’s social and economic transformations.

These discussions will bring into focus the struggles between livelihood activities (street traders, taverns, spazas, backyard dwellings) and Rustenburg’s interventionist projects at the time of transition from apartheid. It will show that the city administrations’ benevolent intentions to create an inclusive city got lost at the moment of defining and spatialising the contents of such redevelopment processes. The opportunities for constructing an inclusive city were compromised in favour of promoting the aesthetic landscapes of the middle class and of productive capital. This is an indication of the links that exist between livelihoods and the urban landscape. On another note, although the formation of Freedom Park during apartheid marked a significant milestone in ordinary people’s struggles for creating spaces for livelihood formation, it is largely less contested in the post-apartheid era because it is located in the socially unfavourable part of the city. It is thus characterised by tensions of being marginal to the dominant socio-cultural and economic aspects of the city, even though it is physically close to mining shafts and hostels, while it is also generative of some opportunities.
for livelihood formation. It is because of these kinds of tensions that the city’s social and economic transformations remain a potentiality, rather than realisable. That said, ordinary people’s activities in Rustenburg show remarkable resourcefulness in making ends meet and in pursuing other goals. The links between livelihoods, the landscape, and social identity are evoked throughout the discussions in this chapter.

6.2 “Spazas, taverns, and rented rooms are our farming fields”
Rustenburg’s significant migrant population is a fertile market for petty real estate activities (backyard and shack dwellings), serving the lower end and often poor market base. Almost all the migrant respondents interviewed in the inner city and Freedom Park were living, or had at some point lived, in rented accommodation in Rustenburg. About 100,000 migrants live in the Bafokeng territory alone (Maxim Planning Solutions, 2002). A significant number of them are mineworkers (Surbana International Consultants, 2006, vol. 1). Drawing from the RLM, 2006 data, they support poorer Bafokeng’s livelihood strategies in that while about ZAR 10 million (USD 1.4 million) accrued to other locales through remittances in 2006, an estimated ZAR 30 million (USD 4 million) was funnelled into Rustenburg’s informal economy, including the petty rentier activity (RLM, 2006). The backyard and shack dwellings have been built by plot owners in Phokeng’s ‘communally-owned land’ and on stand-alone plots elsewhere in the city. During my field research, the maximum number of dwellings rented out by a single family in Phokeng was twenty (20). I later observed, through an opportunity to fly by helicopter over Rustenburg, that some Bafokeng (and some people in Freedom Park) are renting out more than this number of rooms. Table 6.1 shows that taverns (home-based liquor outlets), tuck shops (home-based retail shops) and backyard rooms for accommodation constitute the major livelihood activities for ordinary Bafokeng. Of the nine people interviewed, almost all of them rent out rooms to migrants for accommodation. It is interesting to note that although renting out backyard dwellings is the most common source of income for many Phokeng households, it is not captured in official records as a business activity (see Table 6.2).

Table 6.1: A portfolio of livelihood assets for Bafokeng

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Livelihoods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Magrita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Renting out backrooms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Tavern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Boyfriend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Electricity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Neighbours and daughter’s moral support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Manosi
   a. Renting out rooms
   b. Renting a shop
   c. Water
   d. Electricity
   e. Savings-and-credit scheme
   f. Grand-children support grants
   g. Mother’s old-age pension (more on this in Chapter 6)
   h. Extended family support, Kutle, Lekgotla

3. Letswalo
   a. Renting out 20 backrooms
   b. *mmorogo* (mining royalty)
   c. Bafokeng scholarship
   d. Water
   e. Electricity
   f. Savings-and-credit scheme
   g. Extended family support, Kutle, Lekgotla

4. Manosi’s Mother
   a. Pensioner
   b. Water
   c. Electricity
   d. She is also housing her daughter (a petty rentier)

5. Sibulele
   a. Rents out a spaza shop
   b. Water
   c. Electricity
   d. Rents out a house
   e. Government employee who has moved to the city
   f. Extended family support, Kutle, Lekgotla

6. Rosemary
   a. Restaurant employee, who is a Mofokeng by marriage
   b. Water
   c. Electricity

7. Akhona
   a. Municipal employee, petty rentier
   b. Extended family support, Kutle, Lekgotla
   c. Water
   d. Electricity

8. Sonwabile
   a. Mineworker, who is also a petty rentier
   b. Water
   c. Electricity
   d. Extended family support, Kutle, Lekgotla

9. Mdluli and Ziyanda (married)
   a. Construction (aborted)
   b. Water
   c. Electricity
   d. Community organising work
   e. Ziyanda hawking
   f. Taxi (short-lived)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survivalist Enterprises</th>
<th>Growth Enterprises</th>
<th>Number of Businesses</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Street Traders</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taverns</td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuck shop</td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts and Crafts</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurants</td>
<td></td>
<td>111</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail</td>
<td></td>
<td>74</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardware Stores</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>333</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That said, the prevalence of tuck shops and taverns in Table 6.1 compares relatively well with those in Table 6.2 as income generating activities. Additionally, more than half of the informants either rent out business premises or run businesses themselves. Table 6.1 also shows that the ‘rotating credit scheme’ (stokvel) is one of the livelihood strategies for ordinary Bafokeng. Nonetheless, it is not as important as it is to the people of Freedom Park because of the higher prospects for ordinary Bafokeng to use land to create stronger income-generating activities such as tuck shops, taverns, and backyard rooms for rent. In the context of the declining circulation of cash locally due to job losses in the mines, the importance of stokvels and burial schemes as savings mechanisms has come to be replaced by family and community networks that do not require monthly financial contributions. Unlike the burial schemes, the extended family members, Dikutle and/or Makgotla\textsuperscript{99} give financial support during an incidence of death without requiring membership contribution. That shift has been found to be the case in Mosoetsa’s (2011) study of the Enhlalakahle and Mpumalanga townships in KwaZulu-Natal. It might be for this reason, the unaffordability to make monthly payments toward stokvels and burial societies, that these savings mechanisms are more prevalent among the middle-class Bafokeng than they are among the poorer ones. The middle-class Bafokeng participating in rotation-credit schemes can be seen wearing uniform clothing on Sundays before and after their regular meetings. The income-rotating activities of the middle class are beyond the scope of this thesis.

Table 6.2 shows a single street trader in both the ‘arts and craft’ trade (upholstery) and traditional ‘street trading’. They are generally able to operate without many obstacles. That said, an informally-run upholstery business was hidden from view by the Federation of International Football Association (FIFA) covers during the 2010 Soccer World Cup, and the smaller number of street traders I have observed at the Bafokeng Shopping Mall might indicate the suppression of street trading in Phokeng generally. Overall, the higher participation in ownership of rental accommodation, tuck shops and taverns indicates their significance as a source of income for ordinary Bafokeng (although it is the case that the employed and the well-to-do Bafokeng are also strong participants in the rentier market).

Moreover, the prevalence of rented accommodation, taverns, tuck shops, and the smaller participation in street trading, arts and crafts as well as informal car-washing services reflects,

\textsuperscript{99} See footnote number 89.
partly, the overwhelmingly residential form of Bafokeng built environment. Except for one shopping mall, Bafokeng areas do not have attractive commercial land-use areas. Phokeng, as a residential area, necessitates that businesses are carried out in homes. All trading activities mentioned so far can be established with some ease by people who do not have much initial capital or business skills. It was mentioned earlier that participants in such activities usually fall short of even a minimum standard of income, with little capital investment and skills training. The interview transcripts in Table 6.3 below provide personalised details of the livelihood activities identified above.

Table 6.3: Examples of a portfolio of livelihood assets for ordinary Bafokeng

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Magrita lived in a mud house without a water connection.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magrita died a few years after I interviewed her. She used to rent out ten rooms to migrants for ZAR 80 each per month. Her married daughter, not living with her, used to take all the rent from her to invest it for her mother in a commercial bank. Magrita lived with a boyfriend who almost every month gave her ZAR 500-600 out of his monthly earnings of about ZAR 4,000. After January 2008, she started selling ‘traditional’ beer, a shebeen outlet of United National Sorghum Breweries. She did not have a water tap in her yard because of fear that her aluminium-made ‘water meter equipment’ would be stolen (water meter equipment that does not attract theft has since been introduced by the Bafokeng administration, but not on this site yet). The electricity connection was installed by Eskom (the state-owned electricity provider) for free. Water and electricity are significant livelihood assets that would support livelihood activities such as backyard rooms for rent and a liquor trade.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manosi lives at her parents’ house, while her two children attend school in Johannesburg.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manosi was a hawker for 16 years, selling blankets, flowers, and flower pots with her mother throughout the Rustenburg district. After the death of her parents, she took over their house and is now renting out five backyard rooms. Since 1988, she has been receiving an annual royalty (colloquially referred to as ‘mmorogo’) from Impala Platinum Mines. With the rising price of platinum in the international market, Manosi’s mmorogo amounted to ZAR 30,000 (USD 4,000) in 2006, having increased by 6,000 percent from 1988.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Despite that income (plus the advantage of having the ‘right’ surname related to the royal family), she claims that she is unable to meet her expenses, including launching a viable business enterprise because, as she put it, “by the time I receive my royalty portion, it is already ‘damaged’ as it has to be divided proportionally among all her siblings and their children”. She also said that she had been cheated out of her own mining subcontracting company (drilling and blasting) by the managers or executives in the Royal Bafokeng Economic Board (RBE). She applied for a business loan from that institution, but her application was denied and her business idea was allegedly passed on to someone else. It thus appears that in addition to having the ‘right surname’ she would still need to have the ‘right connections’ in RBE in order to realise her economic goals (see Compion & Cook, 2006). Additionally, she has identified a piece of communal land where she could grow vegetables for sale, and because of her failed attempts to get the Bafokeng administration to resolve her problem regarding the drilling and blasting business, she has given up making any further requests from that administration. Her daughter was on a scholarship from the Bafokeng administration to attend a reputable university in the country, while her son was completing high school in Johannesburg. She has since met a widowed boyfriend who is preventing her, on the basis of cultural values they both uphold, to establish contact with anyone, especially with males.

**Letswalo lives in her parents’ house. Two of her four children live with her.**

Letswalo makes a living through renting out her parents’ grocery store for ZAR 2,500 per month and through renting out 20 backyard dwellings to migrants for ZAR 300 per month. She lived with her mother whose old age pension added to a portfolio of household income. Letswalo had previously attempted to build a block of flats to rent out to migrants, but the project was forbidden by an unnamed authority in the Bafokeng administration. She was once visited by the tribal security force, demanding an explanation for why she was renting out her grocery store to foreigners. She remained defiant against their threats to close her store because she felt strongly that she had the right to rent out her property. The problem she faces is that if she runs the shop herself, she makes about ZAR 300 a day as she does not get the support of the local people, who she says are jealous of her business. This is far less than the Somalians renting her shop make per day: up to ZAR 2,500. Although her three daughters might have not taken advantage of the scholarship that the Bafokeng
administration grants for university education, she is proud of them. In 2008, one of them got a job in the United States of America (USA) as a baby-sitter; subsequently she married and lives there now. Another daughter is married in Dubai and the last born (a daughter) has just finished her university undergraduate education. These marriages meant success in relation to Letswalo’s aspirations.

**Mdluli is currently living in Phokeng with his family.**

Mdluli is a former mineworker who was also an active member of the National Union of Mineworkers. Upon early retirement, he had for some time made a living mainly through his minibus taxi business. As is often the case with men, he is focused on a single livelihood activity. Other than that work, he volunteers in a local environmental organisation. Drawing from his experience as a political activist in the mine in the 1980s, he organises the community to engage Impala Platinum to be involved in community development projects, which also includes individual community members accessing business contracts in companies that invest on Bafokeng land. In 2008, he secured a mining subcontracting work to refurbish used mining equipment, at which time he stopped operating the minibus taxi business. Entry-level entrepreneurs such as Mdluli and his partners were awarded this contract as part of Impala Platinum’s corporate social responsibility programme. More of Mdluli’s story is provided later in this chapter, suffice it to mention here that the sub-contracting work he secured from Impala Platinum has since stalled, if not collapsed, for reasons he has not been able to obtain from the company. His attempts to get such an explanation through legal means left him with the impression that his own lawyers have been bought out of the litigation process by Impala Platinum.

Table 6.1 shows that it is possible to construct, from these interview transcripts, a portfolio of livelihood assets, which provides an idea of how Bafokeng make a living. Although such assets appear quantitatively limited, they are qualitatively stronger, such that the death of a member of the family does not negatively affect the livelihood assets of the household. Letswalo is able to make a living even after the loss of her mother, who was receiving an old-age pension (more on this in Chapter 6). Similarly, even if Magrita (who has also died) had

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100 An institutional programme that annually allocates money towards social development of communities in which an institution operates.
left dependents behind, a portfolio of livelihood assets she built could have seen them through. That said, it can also be seen that it is difficult for both men and women to graduate to capital-intensive businesses (drilling and blasting, fruit and vegetable supplies, real estate, refurbishing used mine equipment) because of lack of business skills, initial capital, and state support. Due to cultural reasons, it is particularly hard for women (Bafokeng or not) to access land to use it to build livelihoods.

In discussing access to ‘communally-owned resources’ (or lack of it) in the context of the city that has the potential to deliver social and economic transformation for ordinary people, an argument can be made that ordinary Bafokeng find it hard to use their resources to build more livelihood assets due to socio-cultural reasons (discrimination against lower class women, younger men and migrants/immigrants), rather than the lack of local resources. Bafokeng own land that can be used to build taverns and tuck shops; they host migrants that constitute a market for renting out rooms on that land; Bafokeng have financial investments that run into billions of ZAR; they have built road networks, health and school facilities, and they have developed business development programmes as well as water services. It is for this reason – the disconnect between the availability of resources and the poorer economic conditions of ordinary Bafokeng – that Manosi’s frustrations with the RBEB and the tribal administration were shared by almost all my respondents in Phokeng, including some village ward leaders (headmen), even though many of them also feel proud to be Bafokeng. They have been historically depended on communal land for farming (crops and livestock) but with mining having replaced that economic activity, they are now left without a key source of livelihoods.

Even those who have managed to keep their land since the advent of platinum mining operations in the 1920s, they discontinued farming, apparently because of experiences or threats of crop and livestock theft by migrants who came to Rustenburg to search for work. Broadly, the experiences of Magrita, Manosi, Letswalo and Mdluli show that access to (communal) land is important for livelihood formation. Although Table 6.1 shows that women are able to rent out backyard rooms and to own shops and tuck shops, it does not show the difficulty with which they build such assets. In fact, most women who are shown in Table 6.1 to be involved in the petty real estate market (restaurants, tuck shops, and renting out backyard rooms,) have taken over such assets from their parents, who are either old or dead (this does not protect those women from constant attacks from their siblings, attempting to expel them from the family properties). In terms of Bafokeng traditional laws (unratified in
documented form by 2014), a Mofokeng man can be allocated land at any age as long as he is married. The law also allows unmarried men and women to be allocated land from the age of 30. I got the impression during the interviews that ordinary men and women continue to struggle to have access to land after the age of 30 partly because of their lower class status. If one is of this status, he or she receives inconsiderate treatment from Dikutle, Makgotla, and administration officials such that a higher class and better connected non-Mofokeng can receive comparatively better treatment. Notably, Dikutle and Makgotla, which are meant to be initial points of contact for attending to the needs of ward members, have not been mentioned in the struggles that unmarried women and men face, indicating their ineffectiveness as support institutions.

The age, status and gender-based access to land is even harder for divorcees and widows who marry Bafokeng men. Rosemary expressed her concerns about what often happens to a household site after a Mofokeng man has died or walked away from home. She is a restaurant employee who married a Mofokeng, and her daughter was born in that marriage. After the death of her husband, she was not sure whether she would be allowed by village headmen, the relevant Lekgotla and Kutle, to continue living in the shack she and her late husband built on the Bafokeng site. Although she remarried a Mofokeng man following the death of her husband, she managed to continue living on a plot of her late husband (where she built a spectacular house) primarily because that site was declared by local Bafokeng institutions to be belonging to her daughter from the first marriage (see Plate 6.1101). Otherwise, she would have had to leave the site and possibly move to the one secured by her new husband. She reported to me that, in terms of the Bafokeng traditional law, and despite having married a Mofokeng man, she will not be allowed to bury her mother, who is living with her, on the Bafokeng land when her mother dies102.

The difficulty with which women access land is only one part of the broader societal challenges they face. Lestwalo is driven to start a larger, more viable business because of the qualitatively stronger livelihood assets she commands (mmorogo and backyard rooms to

101 The spectacular nature of this house is of particular significance to my thesis, a point to which I return below.

102 With the growth of mining industry and associated migrants, excluding the dead from Bafokeng land has become a common practice. Family members of migrants used to come to Bafokeng authorities to demand the exhumation of their dead. Hence, grave sites have come to be protected with fences and access is controlled, and allowed only to Bafokeng who comply with a local headman. The sites are well tended with tarred road connections, cleaning services, and toilet facilities.
Towards this end, she has often asked help to make connections with people who can be of assistance to her. She has, however, entered into an affair with a widowed man, who has stopped her from establishing contacts with anyone, especially with males, essentially stopping her from developing her personal qualities and associated livelihood activities. Manosi’s mother also had to leave her professional job in Pretoria in the 1960s in order to be with her husband, who was a shop-owner back in Phokeng (she was trained as a professional nurse, at her parents’ insistence; and she was also trained as a teacher, a profession of her choice). Other women told me about their struggles against their village headmen, who refused to allocate plots to them to build their own houses. Nonetheless, they persisted with their demands until they obtained plots at locations of their choice, and used such plots to build their houses, spazas, taverns and backrooms to rent out to migrants. In fact, both male and female informants told me that they are prepared to resist the traditional authority’s threats to their livelihood activities, the activities such participants regard as ‘replacements for their farming fields’ that they had lost to platinum mining after the 1920s (see Appendix 5) for some of the political economic dynamics behind the formation of that consciousness.

Two broad statements can be made from the preceding discussions. First, Rustenburg is a site of the movement of goods to many parts of the world (platinum-group-metals). It is also a node of migrants from southern Africa and Asia. In this broader spatial context, access to land is a key livelihood asset – using it to run rooms for accommodation, tuck shops, taverns,
and other retail stores or to rent out these assets to non-Bafokeng for income. It is due to these global and local constitutive elements of Rustenburg that livelihood formation becomes possible. For example, migrants constitute markets for informal economic activities. Together with free RDP houses (see footnote 5) and universal public services, these activities are livelihood assets which form the basis for realising other goals. However, the socio-cultural issues (which the literature on livelihoods adequately addresses) hinder ordinary people, particularly women, from having access to livelihood resources such as land. Indeed the livelihoods literature contends that the ‘practical gender needs’ (women’s productive and reproductive work), which are integral to their livelihood activities, are the basis for women’s ‘strategic political goals’: for removing various forms of institutional discrimination as shaped by the political, economic, cultural and ideological structures (Moser, 1993). Hence, despite the socio-cultural obstacles they face, the women of Phokeng and Freedom Park are able to enact livelihoods because of the political struggles in which they have been involved historically (see Appendix 5 for some of the political economic dynamics behind the formation of that consciousness).

A second broad statement that can be made from the preceding discussion is that Bafokeng women and the people of Rustenburg generally did not participate in struggles to enact livelihoods just for survival, they are concerned with showing to themselves and to others what they ‘work’ for. Letswalo is proud of her daughters who got married in the USA and Dubai, meaning that she is concerned about image and recognition. Manosi sent her children to top academic institutions in Johannesburg for similar reasons. Spectacular houses such as Rosemary’s are a common feature of the Phokeng physical landscape. In Chapter 1, I referred to Nathi, a Xhosa woman from the Eastern Cape, who provides a compelling example of how ordinary people enact livelihoods not just to get by. Another example is provided by Bontle, a Mofokeng woman who has only four years of schooling. She used the experience she gained from her work as a domestic worker, including being a cook, in Johannesburg in the 1960s to begin a business in her village: selling fat-cakes, fried fish and soup at a local school gate as well as cooked chicken at the gate of a local mine hostel. She later diversified her business by selling handbags in the inner city of Rustenburg. She also cooked food and fat cakes at the Rustenburg Bus and Taxi Rank: Plate 6.2 shows some of Bontle’s business sites: an informal restaurant at the Rustenburg Bus and Taxi rank (left) and a posh restaurant in the Bafokeng Shopping Mall. She bought a mini-bus taxi and gave it to her son from which he made a living. She also bought, from an auction at a local mine, a
complete set of restaurant cooking materials – raising ZAR 167,000 from her own savings, from her brother, her sister, an official in the Bafokeng administration as well as a Portuguese businessman in the city of Rustenburg.

Plate 6.2: Some of Bontle’s business sites
Source: Photo by Ngaka Mosiane

This is a simplified background of a woman who also worked on farms, weeding the fields; a woman who at the age of 17 hid her body in a pond to avoid being arrested by the police for hawking; a woman whose business was initially met with resistance from the formal shop owners in her village; who met resistance from members of the local school committee for selling at a school and resistance from fellow hawkers in the city. She worked her way out of a one-roomed house of 13 siblings as a young person to a 10-roomed house of her own as an adult. At the early stages of her business, she bought her business goods by asking rides and/or using a wheelbarrow to transport the items she sold (her employee would help her push the wheelbarrow, allowing her to carry some goods on her head). Although she continues trading at the Rustenburg Bus and Taxi Rank, she has managed to build viable businesses over the years. In 2008, she used ZAR 30,000 of the ZAR 167,000 referred to above to pay the operator of a restaurant (on the right side of Plate 6.2) in order to rent it herself: this speaks well of her as a businesswoman, she says. In 2013 she also opened a second smart restaurant at the Rustenburg City Square Mall (the former site of the Netherdutch Reformed Church). In contrast to the more localising and self-enclosed conceptions of Bafokeng territory (Mbenga and Manson, 2010; Campion and Cook, 2006), living and making a living in Phokeng involves connecting various people, resources and institutions to build livelihoods and pursue higher class status and accumulate commodities such as a 10-roomed house and its contents. This is similar to Nathi’s experiences in the introductory chapter. Broadly, drawing from studies on the city as a site of creativity, energy
and spectacles, the landscape as an agent of social reproduction or liberation and the attitudes of sociality or indifference (Chapter 2) has analytical significance. It makes it possible to explain ordinary people’s livelihood goals beyond making ends meet to appreciate the social and economic transformations that ordinary people prioritise, albeit under circumstances which are not of their own choosing. The interactions among livelihoods, landscape configurations (access to land and what people can do with that access) and subject formation (its social, political and economic dimensions) constitute such transformations, which I explain in this thesis at the scales of the personal and the city. The experiences of Magrita, who exhibited a plainer, unstylish lifestyle, mean that Rustenburg is a hodgepodge of the rural and urbane landscapes. Nonetheless, the experiences of Magrita, Manosi, Nathi, Bontle, Rosemary, Mdluli and ordinary people like them show the active role of the perceptual and the sensory in the formation of such spatialities. The Western, vernacular, and the ordinary (shack) identities reflect the cultural socialisation and creative aspects of transformation as expressed in their livelihood and architectural language.

The transformative potential of the city can also be read through the work of the RBEB, which speaks to the ways in which the diverse social and economic networks across the city and the interplay between successful elements of the city and its marginal, poorer components generate benefits for ordinary people to enact livelihoods and meaningfully transform their lives. The RBEB facilitates linkages between, for example, a national furniture company and local small carpentry enterprises by securing the training of the latter. It facilitates the procurement of opportunities for local businesses to supply furniture to the Anglo Platinum company as well as establishing and operating some of its crusher plants. RBED also assists in establishing ‘black economic empowerment’ joint venture initiatives between relevant local enterprises and the well-established mining companies that operate on Bafokeng land. However, the kinds of businesses being discussed in this section (backyard accommodation, street traders, taverns, tuck shops, arts and crafts) have not even been considered for RBED’s development programs. It is not that there is a differential approach to assist viable and survivalist businesses with regard to coaching, training, financial and networking services by the RBED: business enterprises such as taverns, tuck shops, backyard accommodation and street traders are, in fact, as will be seen below, undesirable to some of the key Bafokeng officials that I have spoken to formally and informally. What this bias of institutional support for viable small businesses means is that in addition to the socio-cultural issues discussed above, the ideological meanings of development comes into play – the self-
responsible, formal and first economy is prioritised over the multitudinous survivalist businesses.

The idea of the transformative potential of cities has also been thought of in the context of global flows of people, goods and information. The situated articulations of such flows are expected to take the form of interactions among actors across the city and beyond, thus creating the context for various forms of social and economic creativity for ordinary people. Peberdy and Rogerson (2003) have observed that in southern Africa, retail and wholesale stores are points of interaction between the formal and informal economic sectors. In Rustenburg, what forms do local and international connections among social networks and economic sectors take and to what effect? Migrant entrepreneurs have a significant presence in much of Rustenburg, and it is thus possible to discuss their role in ordinary people’s socio-economic transformations. In the northern region of the Bafokeng territory in 2008, 46 businesses were owned and operated by Bafokeng, another 40 businesses were owned by the Bafokeng but leased out to and operated by migrants, and 35 businesses were owned, built and operated by migrants on sites rented from Bafokeng (personal communication with an official on businesses in Bafokeng villages, emailed raw data, 2008). Migrants listed as operating businesses in that small Bafokeng area include those from Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, as well as those from Ethiopia and Somalia, and even from Bangladesh, China and India. Table 6.4 shows the percentage distribution of migrants participating in food and liquor businesses in Bafokeng territories.

Table 6.4: Migrants Participating in Food and Liquor Businesses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Migrant-Operated Businesses*</th>
<th>Migrant-Built and Operated Business</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>116</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Percentages are rounded off to the nearest five (5).
The large number of international traders in the Bafokeng territories indicates their strong presence throughout Rustenburg. A significant point to note about this migrant aspect of Bafokeng business is that the goods sold by informal local and migrant entrepreneurs are limited to food and alcoholic beverages, and are thus sourced from local formal retail and wholesale stores. A survey conducted in 2003 by the Rustenburg District Municipality confirms that about 80 percent of Rustenburg informal traders buy their goods from the wholesale supermarket stores (Bojanala Platinum District Municipality, 2003 – this is still the most quoted study in RLM documents to date). Therefore the international flows into South Africa related to the informal sector are confined to people, and do not include much goods. While it is undeniable that large amounts of goods flow out of Rustenburg, there is very little evidence of goods traded in the informal sector flowing in. Such goods, if they existed, would expand the supply base for informal sector trade, and enable it to compete with formal traders. Peberdy and Rogerson’s (2003) account of the patterns and movements of trading goods in and out of Johannesburg is also true for Rustenburg (see Table 6.5).

Table 6.5: Transnational imports into and exports out of South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports into South Africa</th>
<th>Exports out of South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Traditional clothing fabric</td>
<td>* Clothes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Mozambique fish, nuts and vegetables</td>
<td>* Electronic equipment (televisions, videos, hi-fis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Handicraft and curios</td>
<td>* Appliances (stoves, iron, refrigerators, washing machines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Crocheted doilies</td>
<td>* Household goods (bedding, pots, cutlery)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Wire products</td>
<td>* Food (rice, mealie-meal, sugar, eggs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Leather goods</td>
<td>* Cosmetics and lotions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Mozambique fish, nuts and vegetables</td>
<td>* Wines and spirits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Handicraft and curios</td>
<td>* Car parts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Crocheted doilies</td>
<td>* Bicycles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Wire products</td>
<td>* Jewellery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This near one-way movement of goods out of South Africa to other southern African countries reflects trade imbalances which have been seen to undermine investments in productive activities in countries that receive significant imports through informal trade. On this point, Meagher (2001) highlights the ability of the informal trans-border trade to operate outside the state’s tax system, a practice which can severely undermine a nation’s productive capabilities: operating outside the tax system deprives the state of revenue that could be invested in productive activities (indeed Meagher recognises that the informal trans-border trade provides an avenue through which ordinary people may, at the level of the everyday, strategically respond to the negative effects of the changing global political economy).
To the extent that informal traders add very little value to goods bought from formal suppliers, they cannot compete with formal wholesale supermarket stores. Additionally, taverns have now replaced shebeens103 and have become the outlets of the world’s second largest beer producer (South African Breweries-Miller, and to a limited extent, United National Sorghum Breweries). Magrita’s story above is a case in point. South African Breweries-Miller is relentless in its use of local liquor outlets to push up the volume of sales. It uses fieldworkers to provide tavern owners with round the clock assistance with strategies of selling higher amounts of beer each month (in 2012 I had to give up observing fieldworkers’ operations, turning down an offer around 2am to accompany them to other areas in Rustenburg).

South African Breweries-Miller also provides taverns with the potential to reach the set target sales with fridges, branded umbrellas, chairs, lights and television screens to enhance the look and feel of the tavern premises. For outdoor events, a ‘beer garden’ (constituted by a ‘mobile liquor container’ with counters attached) may be set up. As will be seen below, tavern owners benefit very little from their relationship with SAB-Miller. Such relationships between taverns and shebeens on the one hand, and big retail companies on the other, typify those relationships in which the formal retail and wholesale enterprises have a relative advantage. The point I am making is that beyond the fact that survivalist enterprises are not supported by the state and local institutions (RBED), the actual beneficiaries in the formal–informal trade relationships are owners of wholesale stores and corporations. The competitive buyer–seller relationships are key factors that characterise trade relationships in Rustenburg, the kind of relationships that debilitate chances for the improvement of survivalist enterprises.

Additionally, the diverse connections of the city should be considered in imagining the creativity and dynamism of cities. In the Bafokeng area, where sports has been adopted as a mode of local social development, what benefits can taverns and pubs derive from national and international events that take place at local stadiums such as the Royal Bafokeng Sports Palace (RBSP)? To the extent that the Master Plan deliverables such as the Sport City are accessible to professional athletes only, are there other avenues through which ordinary Bafokeng may derive some socio-economic benefits from such a Master Plan spectacle? Outside of the normal operations of pubs and taverns, it is during the sporting events that

103 Shebeens are home-based liquor stores, which are the intellectual property of the rural people, brought to the South African cities through migrancy in the 1920s and 1930s.
sports fans tend to visits local taverns and pubs in larger numbers. The Phokeng village sections (Malla, Kgale, Masosobane, Dithabaneng, Greenside and Riverside) constitute a ‘cluster’ of sections that are characterised by popular taverns, pub and grills (see Figure 6.2). 

Figure 6.1: The sections of Phokeng village

Although Masosobane is located away from the Bafokeng stadium, and away from the main road 565, it is part of the cluster of sections that were visited by a large number of soccer supporters during the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Pule’s Pub and Grill was selected among the local competitors by supporters of the English national team to host them for drinking and binging after the game that involved their team. Nonetheless, soccer supporters and members of the media who were looking for Pule’s Pub and Grill, realised on their way there that there are other liquor retail outlets in this cluster of the village sections.

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104 I interviewed all 70 business owners found in Phokeng.
A significant feature of this area is that street trading, art and craft markets, taverns and tuck shops create sites of social encounters as much as they are sites of money-making for socialites and owners respectively. The taverns not only provide the environment for sex work, they also contribute to the creation of a vibrant neighbourhood, where food, drinks and liquor are sold amidst a jovial music atmosphere. Customers themselves grill meat from a specially assigned fireplace outdoors, and are served cooked porridge, gravy and a selection of vegetables. Some taverns and pubs attract the more lively crowds that are often treated with ‘house music’, and some attract the older middle-class patrons with a taste for ‘contemporary rhythm and blues’ music. The taverns and pubs do not always fit in the formal and orderly modern space of Phokeng (see Figure 4.6): they are often located in residential land-use areas, and do not meet social expectations there, as they become sources of much resented noise and disorderly car parking on the streets. Nonetheless, this cluster of sections is a potentially organic social and economic space that provides options for not only imagining alternative development initiatives, but also spatialising them (initially in the form of tuck shops, backyard rooms for rent and taverns).

Figure 6.2 and Table 6.6 show that Masosobane made a gross income of just over ZAR 6 million. This accounted for 91 percent of gross income of all the 70 Phokeng businesses that were interviewed, and Pule’s Pub and Grill accounted for 99.8 percent of all the businesses in Masosobane. On the basis of interviews of all businesses in Phokeng, Pule’s Pub and Grill benefitted the most from the 2010 soccer tournament.
Table 6.6: Gross Revenue for 35 Businesses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of businesses</th>
<th>Gross Rev (ZAR)</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kgale</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lemenong</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masosobane</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6,382,570</td>
<td>91.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saron</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dithabaneng</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malla</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>86,500</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winsor</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>57,000</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punodung</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16,900</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salema</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machemeng</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>121,000</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshwara</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>45,900</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lenatong</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>103,496</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6,989,786</td>
<td>99.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Oom Luke Pub owner reported that he made ZAR 40,000 during the day of the England/USA game only (the first game of the 2010 World Cup to be played in Phokeng and the second game of the 2010 soccer extravaganza in general). For the rest of the games, his profit was similar to that of the period outside the World Cup. In fact, during the 2009 FIFA Confederations Cup\textsuperscript{105}, he made more money than the 2010 FIFA World Cup month because in 2009, he was not affected by the FIFA traffic regulations. At that time, he made ZAR 15,000 each day a match was played at the RBSP. FIFA had during the 2010 World Cup closed the road at the Oom Luke Pub junction after the England/USA game (see Figure 6.3). The road closure was moved a little further south of that junction, preventing traffic and potential customers from seeing and coming to sites such as the Oom Luke Pub. This action by FIFA upset the business owner concerned, as he saw the road closure as part of the general lack of support for liquor businesses by the Bafokeng administration.

Lenatong section made just over ZAR 100,000, partly from the fans coming from Park and Ride 2. Figure 6.3 provides a broader picture of the 2010 FIFA World Cup ‘park and rides’

\textsuperscript{105} The FIFA Confederations Cup is the soccer competition meant to test the readiness of the country that will host the FIFA World Cup in the forthcoming year. The competition consists of eight teams: the FIFA World Cup winner; the host nation, and the winner of each of the following confederations: the Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football; the Confederation of African Football; the Asian Football Confederation; the Union of European Football Association; the South American Football Confederation; and the Oceania Football Confederation.
and the Public Viewing Areas (PVAs) in Rustenburg as a whole, including the Tsitsing Village and Fields College. Outside the Phokeng sections being discussed here, PVAs at Tsitsing Village and Fields College were additional sites from which local small businesses could sell their goods. Soccer supporters moved through the Lenatong section from Park and Ride 2 for sightseeing and for buying liquor as well as other items from local businesses. Malla and Salema made ZAR 86,000 and ZAR 75,000 respectively.

Figure 6.3: Public Viewing Areas for the 2010 FIFA World Cup

They both benefitted from being favourably located along the main road (R565) and near to the stadium entrance, while those in the cluster of village sections benefitted due to the vitality of the area and soccer supporters pre-arranging with a specific pub for entertainment. The Windsor Section is a relatively quiet entrance into Phokeng from the north. Although it is located along the main road R565, it has a limited number of taverns and thus lacks the vitality and movement of people that characterises the cluster referred to above.

Similarly, the proximity of the land-locked Metlapeng section to the entrance side of the Bafokeng Shopping Plaza creates a situation in which the number of larger retail stores declines in Metlapeng, while the number of tuck shops increases. Although Metlapeng, like Machemeng, Pitso, and Saron, is located nearer to the Phokeng tourist attractions (the Bafokeng administration building and the historic Royal Residence), they did not attract
visitors during the FIFA 2010 World Cup compared to the cluster concerned – these tourist attractions did not compensate for the inability of taverns, pubs, and tuck shops in Metlapeng, Machemeng, Pitso and Saron Sections to attract visitors.

What do these village sections revenue results mean for the transformative potential of Phokeng – the possibilities for the Royal Bafokeng Sports Palace to benefit local liquor stores in particular? They show that the potential exists for local facilities such as the RBSP to benefit local businesses. The problems result from a lack of support for tavern owners by state agencies and the Bafokeng administration, the result of which is that local businesses are not able to take advantage of the opportunities such as national and international games played at the Royal Bafokeng Sports Palace. A Mofokeng artist (Tshepang Maelangwe) suggests that this inability to take advantage of local opportunities is common among Bafokeng in relation to education, businesses and community projects. He makes this point through his artwork, drawing from what he sees around him, from his imagination and his feelings, the Bafokeng history as well as Western, indigenous and other forms of religion (he is a Rastafarian and the son of a Christian priest). Tshepang portrays Lemenong as a village section that boasts major basic facilities such as schools and infrastructure for roads, electricity and water.

However, this village section does not provide job opportunities. Thus, Tshepang’s artwork (Plate 6.3) shows an image of people leaving the section to move to mining villages such as Luka or to the city of Rustenburg in search for opportunities. In the painting, the school does not contribute to the social vitality of the village section because the teachers live outside that section, if not outside the Bafokeng territory. The roots of this disadvantage are located, in part, in the ways in which the local economy came to be organised in the wake of the transition from agriculture to the mining economy from the 1920s.

In Plate 6.4, Tshepang portrays the economy of Phokeng as dominated by mining activities, which pushed Bafokeng out of the hitherto profitable local agricultural economy, in the process creating massive unemployment and bringing about social and environmental problems. In Plate 6.4 a woman is shown disposing diapers at the dumping site: a symbol of social problems (teenage pregnancy, school dropouts, unemployment) and environmental problems (pollution caused by the mines and villages and noise from the passing trains).
While talking to Tshepang at his home, we were interrupted several times by a passing trains transporting ore-bearing platinum group metals. Broadly, Tshepang’s argument is that the infrastructural facilities available in Bafokeng villages are cover-ups for social inequalities. My argument is that the Bafokeng landscape (mining activities, tarred roads, educational and health facilities) get people to consent to what is not in their best interests, to think that they
are developed while they are not able to take advantage of available opportunities; to sit back and watch television without being involved in the management of their lived realities through Makgotla and Dikutle as local governance structures. The issue, therefore, is the need to assist people to develop skills that will enable them to use local social and infrastructural resources to their advantage, and to also support their socio-cultural and economic livelihood activities. Although Simone (2010) urban residents’ murky and fluid ways of living (their use of impulse, wit, affect and psychological manoeuvres to live and make a living) slip off from governance systems, law/policy, norms, town planning layouts, and provisioning systems, I argue that the experiences of Bontle, Manosi, Letswalo and people like them in Phokeng, Freedom Park, and downtown Rustenburg engage, work with and evade them as and when it suits them.

6.3 The Bafokeng Land-Use Master Plan suppresses ordinary people’s livelihoods

As regards the socio-spatial redevelopment and the transformative potential of the city of Rustenburg, it has been suggested that “in bringing different things [as well as people and ideas from far beyond their borders] cities might produce something new” (Robinson, 2004b: 163). The international connections in cultural, political, urban design and urban planning constitute resources that can potentially improve the life of ordinary people. Indeed the Bafokeng King employed a Singaporean consultant group to develop the land-use Master Plan to serve as a framework for the social and economic transformation of Bafokeng:

The Royal Bafokeng Nation is a community facing a number of serious challenges, including unemployment, underperforming schools, health crises, and numerous social issues. It is conventional in a developmental context like ours to take baby steps towards growth, to remain ever conscious of the social, economic, and political limitations to change. Well, the Master Plan has been conceived within a completely different paradigm, of perfecting THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE. It is founded on the idea that if you want to achieve big things, you have to dream big, and take big calculated risks to reach beyond your limitations…In light of this, the term “rural development” seems a little bland, and almost defeatist in its expectations, for I want much more than that for the Bafokeng people (excerpt from speech given by King Leruo Molotlegi, September 2006, emphasis in original).

King Leruo Molotlegi, trained as architect, is imagining a new landscape: one that breaks with the “defeatist expectations” of developmentalism (the ambition to improve the life of the poor along certain policy-informed paths). As it was indicated in Chapter 5, the land-use
Master Plan combines comprehensive planning, bureaucratic delivery, a needs-based development approach, and a progressive socio-spatial redistribution framework. It aligns the existing road, health, schools and water infrastructure with future socio-spatial plans. Although the new development projects are being built on vacant land in order to avoid possible destruction of the protective social networks that people have long built around themselves, it is not clear why such a formal planning approach cannot be integrated with the more ‘informal’ ways of being and living in the already modernised Bafokeng landscape (Chapter 4). The building of the Master plan projects on vacant land as shown in Plate 6.2 in the previous chapter tends to isolate them from ordinary people, making them into exclusive spaces of middle-class lifestyles and of capital investments.

Although Bafokeng are proud of the Plan, seeing it as a forward-looking endeavour, they also see it as a threat to their livelihoods. This impression of planning resonates with how it is experienced globally: a coordinated program of public improvements that have, since the 1990s, come to entail the more elitist work-live-play planning model (Graham and Marvin, 2003). In particular, the land-use regulations and ‘building controls’ are likely to pose a threat to ordinary Bafokeng’s livelihood assets. The initial thinking around the Master Plan was to build socio-spatial interventions upon Bafokeng’s inherited planning traditions of open continuous spaces, interior and exterior continuity, modular growth and ecological sustainability (Comaroff, 2004). The significance of such a planning approach is not only that it has affinities with international architectural values, it also provides areas of possible economic development through environmentally friendly designs as well as through the creation of local industry and ‘building construction’ expertise (ibid.). To these traditions, Comaroff (2004) avers, new design principles were to be added, notably, spatial orderings, civic space mixed with housing, and the use of design principles as a means to economic development were to be embedded on the existing space making traditions. The evolution of space was not meant to be prescriptive of particular building controls, but such spaces would grow and change along with broader architectural, economic and social needs of Bafokeng (ibid.). This is unlike the modernist and exclusivist ethos of the Master Plan as produced by the Singaporean-based Surbana International Consultants.

As it turned out from 2006 onward, however, by preventing the creation of “unhealthy backyard dwellings” (Surbana International Consultants. 2007, vol. 2: 28), the land-use
regulations are likely to flush many petty rentiers out of the housing market and suppress taverns, tuck shops, street trading and backyard rooms (see Plate 6.5 below). Despite the

Plates 6.5: A backyard dwelling rented out by Bafokeng. Will the petty rentiers be assisted to improve these kinds of dwellings or will they be replaced with private property market.

existential importance of taverns, tuck shops, street trading, and backyard rooms, officials at the Bafokeng administration’s Infrastructure Development and Planning Department as well as the Governance Department insist on making a clear separation between residential sites (which constitute almost all Bafokeng villages) and business sites. Except for the Bafokeng shopping mall, there is very little indication of sites that have been demarcated for commercial use. Meanwhile, street trading, taverns, tuck shops and backyard accommodation are seen as inappropriate forms of making a living. When I asked Bafokeng officials about the by-laws designed to regulate the rental backyard rooms, spazas and taverns in the Bafokeng villages (because such laws can protect, support, and facilitate these actors), I was confronted on separate occasions by three administrators with questions such as: ‘Did you ask them [informal sector traders and petty rentiers] why they do not make incomes in a proper, legal way? Did you ask them why they do not seek formal employment?’ One even said that “there is no poverty among Bafokeng”, citing the cultural practice of extended family (Dikutle) and ward (Makgotla) support systems as poverty safety nets. However, a female official at the RBA’s Health and Social Development Services was more sympathetic to promoting the course of livelihood formation among poorer Bafokeng. She spoke of the

Indeed the Bafokeng household expenditure (as a proxy for income) is above the proposed national poverty level of ZAR 431 (USD 63) per capita per month. People in Bafokeng regions spend an average of R800, and the Bafokeng Central Region spends even less, R694 (Thomson, 2008). However, these income-based measures alone are not useful indicators of poverty or lack of it.
possibilities of promoting large-scale vegetable gardening in order to assist tuck shop owners to produce their own vegetable supplies for trade. She also spoke of the necessity for the RBA to assist petty rentiers to improve the quality of the housing blocks they rented out. It is clear from discussions around the ‘commercial farming oriented’ agriculture Master Plan, in which I participated, that her ideas could not sell in the Bafokeng administration. The statements of the three men at the Infrastructure Development and Planning and Governance Departments said little about protecting ordinary people’s livelihood strategies, or about providing support and training to make survivalist livelihoods viable.

The point I am making here is that the landscapes of domination as expressed in the Master Plan deliverables often do not accommodate the activities associated with livelihoods of the poor. The questions “why they do not raise incomes in a proper, legal way? Why they do not search for formal employment?” show that, far from promoting ordinary people’s livelihood activities, the Master Plans (land-use and agriculture) are likely to suppress ordinary people’s economic activities. As mentioned earlier in relation to the land-use Master Plan, some tribal land will be set aside for building private housing estates and for putting up such estates for sale or to rent them out to migrants in order for the Bafokeng administration both to have full control over the housing market and to mitigate the impact of migrants on the social fabric of Bafokeng (Surbana International Consultants, 2007, vol. 2). Indeed Letswalo’s experience with the tribal security forces (regarding renting out her store to a Somalian) illustrates this ideal of mitigating the negative impact of migrants on the social fabric of Bafokeng. Moreover, some of the village tuck shops were demolished. In the words of an official in the Research and Planning Department, the aim of the demolition was “to regulate business and to ensure that people apply for rezoning” (Sowetan Live, 2010). Such building controls do not accommodate ordinary people’s ways of being, living and doing business, but they accommodate a different type of subject – a private, contracted service provider, a ‘growth’ entrepreneur, a tourist, a manufacturer or an industrialist rather than a petty rentier, a tavern owner, a participant in voluntary associations or a spaza owner/operator. In this sense of the land-use Master Plan being biased towards the needs of the middle class subjects, it is likely to be a tool through which the local Bafokeng managers control the ‘visual images’ of the village and thus construct a particular social homogeneity where everyone appears to be middle class, strolling, looking, eating and drinking.
It was mentioned in Chapter 5 that the residential villages will be relocated and ‘compacted’ around regional and town centres. Although these centres will deliver an efficient investment in and maintain the village’s physical infrastructure, they will also “create a place, a public or private space of moment” (Surbana International Consultants vol. 2: 34). The spaces of moment are sites of economic vitality and social interactions – a cluster of village sections in Phokeng referred to earlier (pages 167-171). However, to the extent that taverns, spazas and backyard rooms are not supported by the Bafokeng administration as legitimate sources of income, ordinary people’s spaces of moment are being suppressed. Instead, in terms of the kaleidoscopic land planning seen in Chapter 5 (Plate 5.2), the spaces of moment are sites of middle-class delight, enjoyment and pleasure. Thus the Master Plan does not respond to ordinary people’s “art of the possible” through which ordinary people incrementally build on what they already have (the rental backyard rooms, spazas, taverns and the stokvel social institution). Instead, the Master Plan is used to construct consent through grand development projects that serve the interests of the middle class. In view of the challenges posed by the provisions of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (2002) and Communal Land Rights Act (2004) (Chapter 5), the new ways of doing things among Bafokeng reformers are characterised by the drive to promote development projects such as real estate, to reinvent the traditional political structure, to promote the public image of a tribe, and to promote the language through which it is represented to the outside world.

Indeed the Master Plan may be looked at as a means for improving the social and economic positions of ordinary Bafokeng. The expenditure pattern shown in Table 5.1 (Chapter 5) seems to indicate some commitment towards that end – it appears to be biased to human capital development and basic service provision. However, it does not reflect the expenditure on the Master Plan deliverables such as the Sports City, the Education Hub, the Exhibition and Convention Hub, and the Institutional Hub. This point should be noted because the Master Plan deliverables are mainly professional institutions which are not easily accessible to ordinary people. Importantly, a number of these facilities have already been built by the Bafokeng administration, for a total cost of about ZAR 1.6 billion in comparison to the 2010 budget of ZAR 800 million\(^\text{107}\). It is still too early to know whether or not these institutions

\(^{107}\)ZAR 293 million/USD 37 million was spent on the highway (the Western Bypass), ZAR 70/ USD 10 million was spent on the Bafokeng Civic Centre, ZAR 418 million/USD 50 on the Royal Bafokeng Sports Palace, ZAR 275 million/USD 35 million on Bafokeng Sports Campus; ZAR 540 million/ USD 72 million on the elite school (Lebone II College of the Royal Bafokeng) (personal communication with and data provided by an official in the Bafokeng administration).
will sustain themselves, failing which the cost of maintaining and running them will continue to exceed that of human capital development.

The issue, though, is not about the contentions in favour of the Master Plan spectacles or human capital development but about whether or not the Master Plan threatens the continuing operations of ordinary people’s livelihoods activities. This appears to be the case, although it is unlikely that the Bafokeng administration will be able to suppress en masse the petty rental market, *spazas* and taverns through the implementation of the Master Plan. This is because Manosi, Letswalo, and Mdluli’s stories should be seen within the context of the broader struggles of how Bafokeng have historically sought to champion their subjective, political and economic freedoms within a more responsive and accountable traditional system, rather than bringing that system to an end completely. They gained this political consciousness historically, particularly during the 1980s and 1990s when the labour struggles in the mines, where some young Bafokeng worked, and the struggle against the Bophuthatswana regime, escalated to a point of being taken up by Bafokeng living and working in cities such as Johannesburg (see Appendix 5). People such as Letswalo, Mdluli and Manosi are inclined to advance their own sense of purpose and justice by directly facing up to the challenges posed by their leadership. During the interviews, the Bafokeng officials admitted that almost all tuck shops and backyard rooms are established without permission from the administration.

This section on Phokeng has attended to issues of subjectivity (the bodily and intellectuality as resources for ordinary people to engage with the city), the landscape, including spatial propinquity and distanciation as well as livelihoods. I argue that Bafokeng are losing out on the provisions of the Less Formal Establishment of Township Act (113 of 1991) – a less restrictive planning law that is conducive to the development of shebeens, taverns, tuck shops, backyard swellings for rent, and home-based panel-beating. The challenge facing ordinary people in the Bafokeng areas may stifle the evolution of vibrant local areas (a cluster of village sections) that have the potential to keep money circulating locally for ordinary people’s economic activities. The ordinary people in the inner city of Rustenburg also face similar challenges, despite the protective regulatory environment of the Businesses Acts of 1991 and 1997 (RSA, 1991; 1997). At the end of this chapter, I compare the various roles of Phokeng, the inner city, and Freedom Park in understanding the transformative potential of the city and the extent to which ordinary people are able to reshape the city in their own image.
Phokeng is a node of connecting actors, sectors, institutions, positions, resources and places: we have seen how Bontle used the city of Rustenburg for a taxi business, how she used her connections with a Mofokeng official, her cooking experience from Johannesburg, a village school, the mining restaurant’s equipment, extended family members as well as the city’s formal business owner. The same is true for Nathi. Without Phokeng and Rustenburg being sites of interactions and creativity, Bontle and ordinary people like her would have not been able to make a living and to achieve other goals (survive, build businesses, accumulate commodities, stand out and be recognised, differentiate oneself from others as a point of honour and also as a way of giving oneself and one’s children a leg-up, assisting children to enrol for post-high school training or even attend reputable universities). Importantly, these activities, including ordinary people’s personal/sensual experiences, are undertaken within the context of distanciated social, political, and economic activities as well as intimate and mixed socio-spatial forms. As a site of the global extractive economy and a node in the global movement of people, and access to social grants and basic services are resources for ordinary people’s livelihood creativity. In contrast, the case studies of Freedom Park, Phokeng and the inner city provide insights into such ideas of creativity and interactions – the role of people of different class positions, histories, and responsibilities, the role of RBED institutional support, and the role of the Royal Bafokeng Sports Palace in the transformative potential of cities. Rustenburg shows that the intersections of people of different origins, differentially positioned, constantly make and remake the city (Freedom Park and the inner city below). Or they face tremendous challenges to build livelihoods and pursue other ends (the inner city below).

5.1 Creating Rustenburg into a space for formal businesses and the middle-class

The case of the inner city of Rustenburg also provides some insights into the suggestion that the city’s transformative potential may be created from interactions among actors across the city and beyond, thus creating the context for various forms of social and economic innovations for ordinary people (Robinson, 2004a). One way through which that potentiality may be realised is through informal traders setting up stalls in the shadows of the city’s skyscrapers (ibid.). Indeed it was mentioned in Chapter 4 that the RTC and different local players made a significant move in 1992 to accommodate street traders in the city,
regularising those already operating in the lucrative Midtown Mall, Plein Street and taxi/bus rank areas.

The colloquially dubbed ‘right to develop’ agreement added to that process by facilitating the co-existence of formal and informal business activities in the city. Indeed the inner city had a chance to become a vibrant space of interactivity constituted by the presence of taverns, the creativity of performers, live music performances, traders in items such as African film products, and retail businesses. On the basis of this reality – captured at some length in Chapter 5 – the relationship between the urban landscape and livelihoods was to change (in the first half of the 1990s) the Rustenburg inner city into a space for different actors to use in the way it was useful for their social and economic activities, with the support of almost all the local power players. However, the local power structures – the planners in the RLM and the private engineering firms contracted for the CBD regeneration project as well as the support of the public (including rate payers associations) and other players in the private sector (property developers) – regained leverage for pursuing a more formal business and ‘middle class’ vibrant space of interactivity. Maxim Planning Solutions (2004, vol. 1: 13) represents taverns and such sites of sociality as “unsightly”, and as places of “low image and security risk”:

any low end uses like pawn shops, adult entertainment and night clubs tend to lower the investment potential of an area. It is important that these uses should be distributed throughout the city and not be allowed to congregate in specific areas, which can lead to decay and disinvestment (Maxim Planning Solutions, 2004, vol. 2: 32).

Despite those sites being the very nuts and bolts that hold the inner city spaces together, they have over time come to be suppressed, rather than being given space and regulated as a way of facilitating their activities. Plate 5.6 in Chapter 5 shows that the goal of power structures is in fact to rid the city of its informal aspects and open more space for the aesthetised formal business and middle class sites of interactivity. This inclination of the local power structures mentioned above to launch the upmarket form of urban regeneration represents the move, by the mid-1990s, towards repressing ordinary people’s livelihood activities. The foundation for such repression was, nonetheless, laid earlier. For the Rustenburg Transitional Council to lease, in 1992, a 12,500m² area to Fox Lake Investments and associated companies to build a general store, shopping mall, Caltex petrol and service station as well as the taxi and bus
ranks, and allowing for a very limited number of stalls for street traders, was both an imposition and intervention of power. Figure 6.4 shows the space allocated to informal traders relative to other users.

**Figure 6.4: A map of the bus and taxi rank**

The goal was to build a formally-run business space, instilling consent among the users of the city for an ‘upmarket look and feel place’ with elitist social sensibilities. Such a hegemonic intervention also served to staunch contentious relations between the city government, the taxi and bus operators and informal traders, making such sanitised relations among them appear natural and timeless. Broadly, the landscapes of domination often do not accommodate the activities associated with livelihoods of the poor. The process of repression of ordinary people’s activities was reinforced by broader trends in the mid-1990s. Most crucial was the introduction, in 1996, of the pro-market Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) policy and the move globally to reposition cities as engines of economic growth (Harris, 1992). Such trends not only motivated Rustenburg city managers to mobilise all citizens around the common goals of keeping the city ‘clean’, they also spurred the efforts of the city managers to protect the city’s tax base: in other words, the formal business sector (details below). It is, therefore, not coincidental that, by the second half of the 1990s, hawking was identified as a major environmental and governance problem by certain power players, particularly those represented by the local branch of now defunct New National Party. Consequently, the relationship between the Rustenburg Transitional Council
and the formal business organisations on the one hand, and street traders on the other, had begun to deteriorate. The image of hawkers as eyesores (signifiers of environmental and governance decay) by this time was discussed and made operational in some parts of the country.

In August 1998, the conservative national newspaper, *Beeld*, highlighted the issue of curbing hawkers in two extremely conservative Afrikaner towns (Nelspruit and Witbank) (RTC, 1998a), while the following month, in Rustenburg, the local New National Party sought an “urgent action to control the informal sector more effectively and [demanded] that a time frame be set for the implementation of the by-laws” (RTC, 1998b: 4). In the midst of this clamour, critiques in the liberal press included popular columnist and intellectual Dr Xolela Mangcu’s succinctly expressed caution in relation to similar developments in Johannesburg: ‘In their zeal to get rid of hawkers and build a revenue-flush world-class city, our managers may also be missing the forest [the city as habitat] for the trees [the business sector]’ (*Sunday Independent*, 1999: 5). Additionally, the class-based spatial realignment of the city of Rustenburg was well underway, with the upmarket housing and business activities locating in and relocating to the southern and western sections of the city, while the ‘black middle class’ areas mushroomed in the north-western parts of the city, and the boundless stretches of the poor’s informal settlements spread along the platinum belt from the south-east through to the north-eastern parts of the city. Following the profitability of the Maponya Shopping Mall in a Johannesburg township (Soweto), shopping malls in Rustenburg are now following these local spatial shifts and shopping malls are being established in the eastern and south-eastern parts of the city.

In the meantime, the hawkers in the inner city were increasingly becoming repressed and the conditions for social interactivity and economic vibrancy being eroded. Crucially, what came to define the type of a city that Rustenburg would be in the post-apartheid era, with regard to the place of street traders in the city, was a move to declare the municipality of Rustenburg off-limits for street hawkers (except for the small number of hawkers allowed in the taxi/bus rank area) (see Figure 6.4). Under the new by-laws that came to regulate this ruling (RTC, 1999a), even Fatima Bayat Street was declared off-limits despite its popularity as a street trading site, and despite the willingness expressed earlier by local business organisations to accommodate hawkers there (see Chapter 5).
The declaration was in clear contravention of two core directives provided in both the national and provincial Businesses Acts of 1991 and 1997 respectively, under a section on the ‘powers of local authority’ (RSA, 1991: Section 6A). The first directive institutes protections for the informal sector as one of the significant economic activities in cities (RSA, 1997: Section 1. viii). The second directive identifies the sites where informal hawking activities are to be restricted or prohibited: in front of private establishments selling the same goods and where vehicular traffic, pedestrians and access to fire hydrants will be obstructed (RSA, 1997: Section 7.2). A third ruling declares that further prohibitions or restrictions of hawkers’ activities in the city could be promulgated only on the condition that consultation had determined not only that such decisions would not drive a substantial number of hawkers out of business, but also that even with more effective supervision or control of their activities, such a decision would be necessary (RSA, 1997: Section 6A (2) (c)). It is clear from these directives that both the national and provincial business laws intend to encourage the informal sector, and expect the city to remain open to it, especially in those sites that are already preferred by street traders.

Nonetheless, August 1999 the RLM declared the entire municipality of Rustenburg off-limits for street-trading. It began to demolish most of the sites used by hawkers at the bus and taxi ranks in October 1999. It should be mentioned that hawkers were not against some kind of intervention at this site because it had been infiltrated by criminal elements. The hawkers were instead concerned with the heavy-handedness of the Rustenburg City Council in carrying out the demolitions, which in fact reflected the city’s inability to respond to the needs of street traders. Indeed, since October 1999, the city centre had become a major focus area for the municipality’s “cleaning up operations” (demolishing hawkers’ stalls and impounding their goods). The one that street traders remember the most was carried out on the notorious night of February 2000, when goods belonging to informal traders were impounded.108

The expression of discontents by various users of the city added to the suppression of street traders. A complaint letter from the EB Ellerine Bros., the owners of the Midtown Mall, to the Rustenburg City Council illustrates the kinds of conditions under which street traders

108 A clean-up operation in May 2005 involved the RLM mobilising back-up from the Provincial Police Services, the South African National Defence Force and private security companies (RLM, 2005a; see Appendix 6).
worked since then: “It is…with great concern that I note the hawkers are making a return to
the mall and unless something is done, you are going to find that they will be back” (RLM,
2004: 1). Two months later the Rustenburg City Council responded that “special operations
with members of the South African Police Services have resulted in no hawkers being seen in
the Mall anymore. The enforcement of the by-laws will continue and we will try our utmost
to satisfy the community of Rustenburg” (RLM, 2004: 4, emphasis added). The situation in
the city was increasingly coming to be marked by conflicts among different users of the city
as the city’s administration, the private sector, and some members of the public intensified
their grip. For example, a resolution that was passed by the RTC in May 1999 – that only
bona fide residents of Rustenburg (those with verifiable local addresses) would be permitted
to trade in the exempted inner city sites – escalated the latent tensions among such users of
the inner city, as forcefully expressed by one local resident in a letter to the RLM:

Illegal immigrants are causing threats to our small businesses. We are trying to create jobs on our own
as we know that unemployment is one of the crises in our country. I would like the Municipality to
monitor them on a regular basis. Our small businesses, as emerging small enterprises, are falling apart.
I would also like to urge the Local Municipality to take steps against illegal immigrants who have
illegal tuck shops. They are generating money but they are not tax payers. There are about thirty (30)
illegal tuck shops located in the area where I work (RLM, 2004).

In response to the 1999 resolution that only bona fide residents of Rustenburg could trade in
exempted sites, refugees from Ethiopia, Somalia, Mali, Eritrea and Burkina Faso petitioned
the council to grant them their international right of protection as refugees and provide them
with a place to trade in the city (RTC, 1999b). Additionally, the Hartebeesfontein Taxi
Association Co-operative expressed its dissatisfaction with hawkers operations in a letter to
the RLM in March 26, 2002 (other organisations – the Taxi Forum and Freight and Passenger
Bus Services echoed these sentiments in June 2, 2002):

The so-called hawkers have opened bakeries, restaurants, tearooms, etc. within our lanes of operation,
which you were kind enough to allow us to use for our transport operations. But these so called
hawkers are so sturdy, they just squat on any space that they see in our taxi rank without any
consultation with us, the operators and masters of our taxi rank. They occupy every space that might be
there, regardless of who says what. They are hard nuts to crack. We had many times tried [to remove]
them, but in vain. Now that this is so, they are threatening our security; saying that they will deal with
us accordingly, that means violently. What they tell us is that we have no right to say anything about
what they do to us as operators in the rank. We must shut our mouths up and that’s all. Therefore, dear
Councillors, particularly our Executive Mayor, your immediate intervention in this regard will be

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highly appreciated by us, because we understand that prevention is better than cure…Please humbly remove this group of persons from our taxi rank by law. Please handle this matter with a great sense of security for us, complainants. Don’t expose our names to this group of persons, like it happened before when we asked for your help (RLM, 2002: 5).

Similar discontent was captured in a letter written to the Rustenburg City Council by an inner city café owner in May 27, 2002:

There are hawkers selling bread, meat, fat cakes, and more in front and around my business. These are the products that keep my business afloat…Hawkers have taken half of my morning rush hour business and I am finding that I will not be able to cover my overheads if this continues. Please could you look into this matter as I feel that it is not right that they may do such good business and not have to pay any overheads? P.S. Please keep my name and business anonymous! Thank you (RLM, 2002: 7).

The street traders could not make money without locating their business anywhere they dim fit because, as we have seen above, many of them were not allowed to trade in the city. Thus, they had to adopt desperate measures in order to stay in business. This was expressed in the following statement by the Rustenburg City Council:

Hawkers have occupied parking bays and operate their businesses from them which make it difficult for our vehicles to be parked and to gain access to the toilets to do necessary repair work. Hawkers have also occupied toilets, using them as storerooms, to prepare food and even worse, to operate their businesses from inside these toilets. This makes it difficult if not totally impossible for the maintenance personnel to carry out their duties to the best of their ability (RLM, 2004: 3).

Despite this desperate situation of hawkers and due to the discontent expressed by different users of the city, the Rustenburg City Council became relentless in protecting downtown Rustenburg as a space for doing formal business.

Figure 6.5 shows Rustenburg as it has come to be cemented as a space for doing formal business with the building of the Midtown Mall, with the Mosque turned into a shopping mall (the Mosque Plaza), and the Netherdutch Reformed Church turned into a shopping mall (the City Square Mall). Generally, the retaking of downtown Rustenburg for retail capital and the middle-class as well as the continuing suburbanisation of the upmarket business sector to the west and southern parts of the city, will negatively affect hawkers’ spaces of work, especially those areas that are popular for hawking (the Midtown Mall in the city centre, Fatima Bayat
Street and the bus/taxi rank in the north) (see Figure 6.5). In fact, the R3 billion Rustenburg Bus Rapid Transport project described in Chapter 4 might turn out to be the last nail in the coffin of hawkers’ place in these areas – the buses will use Nelson Mandela Street, President Thabo Mbeki Drive and Oliver Tambo Drive as designated lines of travel, as designated lines of dropping and picking up shoppers in the city (Figure 6.5). Such potential changes in the path of city users from using the taxi/bus rank as entry points into the city through Fatima Bayat Street to the new routes mentioned above will drastically reduce the use of the bus/taxi rank and pedestrian movement on Fatima Bayat Street.

![Figure 6.5: Church, Mosque, and informal sector areas turned into spaces for formal businesses](image)

In summary, this section on the inner city of Rustenburg has shown that despite the inner city of Rustenburg being produced organically, early in the period of post-apartheid reconstruction (early 1990s) by ordinary people and structures of power into the more inclusive space, the middle-class, private capital, and other local power structures began in the mid-1990s to turn the tables towards creating Rustenburg into an elite space. In particular, the city was declared off-limits to hawkers in 1999, despite the accommodating regulatory environment of the provincial and national government. In the same year, the city resolved that only bona fide residents of Rustenburg would be permitted to trade in the exempted inner
city sites. Also in 1999, the city launched cleaning up operations. These sustained resolutions to turn the inner city of Rustenburg into a space for doing formal business were indeed met with resistance by ordinary people, including refugees. However, it is the recently launched projects (Rustenburg Bus Rapid Transport system; the transformation of church and mosque sites into shopping malls – the City Square Mall and the Mosque Plaza respectively – as well as the turning of informal sectors areas into spaces for formal business) which broke the back of the inclusive space of the inner city. Thus, the inner city Rustenburg of the second half of the 1990s provides some content on what an inclusive space of the city means to the dominant structures of power – investing in productive capital and the spaces of the middle class, while suppressing the dynamic spaces of ordinary people. In the next section, I discuss the transformative potential of the city from the point of view of Freedom Park, at the end of which I provide a comparative analysis of the various roles of sites discussed so far.

5.1 Living and Making a Living in Freedom Park

This section on Freedom Park discusses the livelihood activities undertaken by the ordinary people of this place, distinguishing between those livelihood activities undertaken during the 1970s and 1980s and those undertaken thereafter. It argues that ordinary people draw from their emotional and intellectual qualities and develop networks across and beyond the city, as they explore the livelihood options they have in the city. The kinds of livelihood goals they pursue are linked to the landscape changes that structure their lives and associated changes in their subjectivities. Such landscapes, networks and sensibilities are also resources for their social and economic practices.

The people of Freedom Park are migrants and immigrants from many parts of South Africa, southern Africa and Asia. Plate 6.6 shows a typical housing shelter for landowners, mineworkers, and later the unemployed people of Freedom Park at least until 2003 when RDP housing came to constitute that landscape. About 20,000 people continue to live in these structures, while about 4,000 RDP housing units have been built in the same neighbourhood in 2003 (interview with a Housing Committee member). Table 6.7 provides a broad picture of the livelihood activities the ordinary people of Freedom Park undertake, according to gender and ethnicity.
Plate 6.6: A typical housing structure in Freedom Park, at least until 2003
Photo by Ngaka Mosiane

Table 6.7: Livelihood activities for the people of Freedom Park

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Informant</th>
<th>Livelihoods</th>
<th>Education (standard)</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Year of arrival</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tswana Female</td>
<td>1 RDP house; water, electricity; boyfriend, survival sex, rotating-credit scheme; child-support grant;</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>North-West</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tswana Female</td>
<td>2 RDP house; water, electricity; boyfriend, survival sex, rotating-credit; child-support grant.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>North-West</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tswana Male</td>
<td>4 RDP house; water, electricity; temporary public works jobs, community worker/ local politician</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>North-West</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tswana Male</td>
<td>5 Mineworker, RDP house, water, electricity</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>North-West</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tswana Male</td>
<td>6 Water, electricity, landowner and rentier, child-support grant. Motswenyane’s land was later used to build Phase 2 of Freedom Park. Phase 1 is built on land that belonged to the Mkgale family.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>North-West</td>
<td>1960s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sotho Female</td>
<td>8 She collects discarded materials from scrapyards for sale; hawker; boyfriend; savings-and-credit scheme; her daughter’s temporary jobs</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sotho Female</td>
<td>9 Temporary formal jobs; renting out a shack</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sotho Female</td>
<td>10 Spaza shop</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sotho Female</td>
<td>11 Child support grant; spaza shop owner; temporary construction job; her daughter’s temporary jobs; a daughter’s assistance in her street trading activities; boyfriend; savings-and-credit scheme; RDP house; electricity; water</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informant</td>
<td>Livelihoods</td>
<td>Education (standard)</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Origin</td>
<td>Year of arrival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Hawker; internationally useful community worker; boyfriend; survival sex;</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>savings-and-credit scheme; temporary jobs; water, electricity; RDP house;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>child-support grant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Boyfriend</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sotho Male</td>
<td>Spaza shop owner</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Pensioner; RDP house, water, electricity</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsonga Female</td>
<td>Sell crocheted doilers; vegetables; boyfriend; savings-and-credit scheme</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Street trader; boyfriend; savings-and-credit scheme; RDP house, water,</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>electricity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Traditional healer; husband’s salary; water; electricity; RDP house</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Boyfriend, domestic work; water, electricity; RDP house; child-support</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>grant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Unemployed - boyfriend, survival sex; savings-and-credit scheme</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsonga Male</td>
<td>Unemployed (former mineworker awaiting pension-funds)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rent a car; sell paraffin</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Unemployed; scavenger</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Build shacks; tables; and chairs; dig pit toilets; water, electricity</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>On retrenchment package; leader of a section in Freedom Park; spaza shop</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Shop-owner</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xhosa Female</td>
<td>Renting out shacks; informal trader</td>
<td>12+</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>She depends on her boyfriend; child-support grant</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Tavern; spaza</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HIV/AIDS volunteer worker; spaza shop and tavern owner; savings-and-credit</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>scheme</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Bakery women’s group; a political organisation committee member</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xhosa Male</td>
<td>Mineworker; local political leader; block leader</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The foundation upon which they build their livelihoods – the money that drives their livelihood activities – is mineworkers’ wages. The unemployed men make a living through an informal housing market – building, selling, and renting out shacks to mine workers, informal traders, and other migrants. Men also live by providing car repair and maintenance services, and by recycling used wood from the mines to build chairs and tables for sale (see Plate 6.7). Due to the peripheral location of Freedom Park in relation to the Rustenburg downtown area, some men offer transport services otherwise unavailable to small traders who need to stock.
up goods for sale as well as to people who need to be taken to the hospital near the city centre.

Plate 6.7: A Mozambiquean man makes tables and chairs from used wood
Source: Photo by Ngaka Mosiane

There are little differences in the way men of various ethnic groups make a living, except that Batswana men tend not to be involved in informal activities such as street trading. Women’s options are limited to informal trading and cohabitation arrangements with men. Batswana women tend to rely more on men, often initiating ‘survival sex’ and cohabitation arrangements with them in order to create some access to money (it was easier to identify and interview Tswana female sex workers). The non-Tswana women are also variously involved in such arrangements, but tend to be more resourceful. They are also involved in individual work such as making crocheted doilies as well as arranging for older children and other family members to help in street trading. Additionally, they are involved in group projects such as health services run by the Catholic Church, bread-making and sewing.

The Sotho women from Lesotho tend to be very poor, collecting disposed copper and aluminium metals from mine dumping sites to sell in the local scrapyards. Generally, the informal sector activities in which both men and women in Freedom Park participate are of the survivalist type, confined to the activities mentioned above as well as to the very low-scale production of garments at the Catholic Church site in Freedom Park; the sale of beer at

109 The idea of ‘survival sex’ was used by Wojcicki (2002) to capture the practices of women who participate in sex for purposes of generating an income.
homes; the sale of vegetables, fruits, cooked food, snuff, potato chips, paraffin and used clothes at homes or along streets. These livelihood activities are performed at spazas, taverns, or as street trade. While those women who have reliable financial income utilise formal banking systems to accumulate interest, stokvels are voluntary associations for those women with very little to spare. Stokvels differ across space and have changed over time, but in Freedom Park they essentially entail one or more of the following (I draw from my interview with Batswana women):

1) Members of a group of four to fifteen women pool a designated portion of income each month, and one member will receive the full amount for that month. It is designed to allow members to use it however they wish – save it; buy food, clothing; pay for ‘lay-by’ purchases; pay monthly dues toward a funeral society; send the money back home as a remittance during Christmas, Good Friday and other major holidays.

2) There are savings associations where a recipient has to host an entertainment occasion, and members and neighbours (invited or not) attend. They are expected to buy food, drinks and alcohol, as they indulge in mass singing and dancing. A host woman has to provide a set number of drinks/alcohol, which will not be taken until a cash bidding contest – between those for and against the start of drinking and bingeing – is settled. An individual attending may also select another person, through cash bidding, to dance for all who are present. The selected person is obliged to dance, unless she or he can redeem himself or herself through cash. All these activities are intended to allow the host member to make more money.

3) Members of a stokvel may arrange to buy groceries (sorghum meal, vegetables, sugar, coffee, flour, milk) for another member as a contribution specifically towards an occasion of death within a family.

4) Occasional contributions of small amounts of money can also be made to a stokvel member in instances of family functions such as weddings and birthday celebrations.

5) A group of women may fortnightly contribute particular items such as soaps. At each round of contributions, a member would send much of such items back home in a rural area.
6) A stipulated amount of money may be contributed and saved for a year with a formal banking institution until just after the Christmas and New Year holidays. The savings are meant to be a lifeline resource to make up for expenditures incurred in Christmas and New Year festivities. Early in January, the money is divided equally among members in order for them to pay for school fees and children’s school transport; to buy groceries, school uniforms and/or books. During the course of the year, members are also encouraged to take out loans (and invite non-members to take out loans) from the stokvel, which will be charged at a higher interest rate. The interest accumulates as a share for the member who raised it through taking (or through inviting people to take out) loans.

Stokvels are more important among women in Freedom Park than those in Phokeng. For example a woman from Mozambique (Kgarebe) reported to me that she obtained start-up funds for informal trading from a newly-found boyfriend following her arrival in Rustenburg (other women obtain informal trading start-up-funds and initial accommodation from acquaintances or relatives). Kgarebe used the money to buy goods for street trading. She then used some of the proceeds from street trading to join a stokvel. The lump-sum payments to Kgarebe allowed her to pay for a plot, to buy a shack, and to attach her spaza shop to her shack, and later to a house she got from her sister who lived with her husband elsewhere in Freedom Park. Plate 6.8 shows the makeshift stall, located on the right of the left photo, where Kgarebe initially sold her goods. After buying her own shack in 2006, she attached that stall to her shack located further behind that stall. The photo on the right shows a house ‘given’ to her by her sister in 2008, where she attached her tuck-shop. She also used her stokvel money to amass furniture in that house.

Plate 6.8: Kgarebe’s sites of livelihood formation
Source: Photos by Ngaka Mosiane

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Kgarebe explained to me that her income “cannot be of any use in and of itself – it needs to be split and scattered among other women in order to multiply it or delay its expenditure. When added to the income I make it enables me to use it for something”. Some commentators have suggested that relying on boyfriends and activities such as stokvels are inherently limited, seldom allowing for any upward mobility and often acting as a trap that keeps the participants confined to the very poverty that they seek to escape (Campion and Cook, 2006). Indeed ordinary people’s participation in voluntary associations such as stokvels has declined because their incomes have not kept pace with the growing costs of their basic needs (Mosoetsa, 2011). It is important to note, nonetheless, that stokvels are not the only activities on which ordinary people rely. For example, Kgarebe relied mainly on her tuck shop, which was the main activity that generated new money. She then used the stokvel as a saving mechanism from which she purchased larger items such as a shack and furniture. Such reliance on livelihood activities other than stokvels is underscored by the fact that the establishment of a Somalian shop near Kgarebe’s tuck shop (photo on the right) resulted in her disposing of her main stock (vegetables that got rotten because they were not bought), stopping her participating in a stokvel, and ultimately closing her tuck shop. It is interesting to note that when she began selling on the street following her arrival in Freedom Park, she entered into an agreement with the owner of the tuck shop (seen at the extreme left of Plate 6.8) that she was the only one to sell vegetables. However, the Somalian shop-owner did not entertain such arrangements, and Kgarebe had to close her tuck shop, rented out her house to migrants, and moved on to live with her sister elsewhere in Freedom Park.

In order to understand the dynamics of livelihood formation in Freedom Park, it is useful to distinguish between the people who came in the 1970s and 1980s and those who followed thereafter. For the most part, the 1990s marked a period of transition during which opportunities to eke out a living in Freedom Park were significantly diminishing. The 1970s to 1980s generation of informal traders rented plots on the land that belonged to the separate families of Motswenyane, Makgale and Mosete (the Mosete family is located on land that seems to be communally owned with Bafokeng) (see Figure 6.7). The Motswenyane and Makgale families are former landowners who were compensated with the same size of the land that they lost after being ‘forcibly removed’ in the 1960s from areas defined as ‘black spots’ elsewhere in what later came to be the North-West Province (interview with an 80 year old Makgale woman – documents were not obtained at the time due to the sensitivities around the land purchase by government). While the majority of mineworkers lived in male-
only hostels, a small group of those who brought family members with them rented plots from the aforementioned families. In fact, this renting of plots on privately owned land by mineworkers, informal traders, and later the unemployed people, was crucial (in the 1980s) in frustrating police eviction of squatters from the nearby Bafokeng land (more on this below). Some of the tenants sought to live in Rustenburg permanently, and thus attempted to acquire plots from the Bafokeng villages and elsewhere in Rustenburg.

![Figure 6.6: A land-use map of Freedom Park](image)

While a considerable number of them were ‘accepted’ as members of the Bafokeng tribe, others were not. Like Nathi’s experience in Chapter 1, Nokwanda claims her family was denied a residential site in one of the Bafokeng villages when she joined her husband, a mineworker, in 1977. As a result Freedom Park became an alternative base from which her family earned livelihoods. In Freedom Park she augmented her husband’s income by selling beer, cooked food and soft drinks at the gate of mineworkers’ hostel number 8. She also made an income by renting out 12 shacks at ZAR 50 each per month. Nokwanda was able to pay for her three children at school, including vocational and tertiary institutions. The children are now independent and self-sufficient, with one of them being a professional teacher in Freedom Park. Nokwanda also receives a government old-age pension, and her husband died having applied for an RDP house, which was transferred to her upon completion. Through financial help from her daughter (a teacher), she is extending it into an impressive seven-room house connected to the world through a satellite television dish, among other
connections (see Plate 6.8). In some cases it was the people’s involvement in the informal economic sector, specifically, that played a central role in their livelihood strategies. Such a focus on a single livelihood activity is common among men.

Plate 6.9: An RDP house turned into an impressive commodity/object of identity
Source: Photo by Ngaka Mosiane

Monghadi left Johannesburg and came to Freedom Park in 1984 because he saw untapped business opportunities in the Rustenburg mines. He sold clothes (underwear, skirts, second-hand military uniform) and blankets at the gate of hostel Number 8 near Freedom Park (see Figure 6.7). Until the end of the 1990s, he was able to make a significant income per month, especially around paydays: he profited from miners’ bonus payment and skontere (end-of-day cash pay on a holiday) in addition to the normal end-of-month pay and sleep-out allowances. As is the case with Nokwanda, Monghadi managed to support his children at institutions of higher learning because, in addition to scholarships and the extended family support that his children received, his tuck shop was selling at full-stock levels. In my conversations with Monghadi’s children, they did not deny the role he played in their education nor did they attribute their educational achievements to him only. Beyond that, in 2002, Monghadi spoilt himself by buying used classic cars (a 1984 Mercedes Benz 380 SL and a 1975 Ford Fairlane). Monghadi, an informal trader, bought these cars out of self-interest: “When riding either of them, everyone looks at you, clap their hands and those who are not jealous will wish you well. When stopping at traffic lights, fellow drivers will commend you for what you are driving”. Plate 6.10 is a house of a woman from the Zeerust area in the North-West
Province, converted from an RDP house through income from her shebeen and with the help of her working children.

Plate 6.10: An RDP house turned into an impressive object of identity
Source: Photo by Ngaka Mosiane

6.6.1 An Analysis of Livelihoods in the 1970s and 1980s Freedom Park

As Table 6.8 shows, Nokwanda and Monghadi’s livelihood positions are stronger and more certain, although fewer of their livelihood assets are attributed to their ability to combine a portfolio of any number of the following assets: informal trading, renting out shacks, old-age pension, a scholarship, RDP house as well as a range of social support networks (an extended family, collective political resistance in Freedom Park, for example). The extended family support comes into play when, for example, one or more children live with relatives, including when they are attending school. Nokwanda’s children grew up living interchangeably in the Eastern Cape with relatives, and in Rustenburg with their parents. Similarly, Monghadi’s children variously grew up living with their parents and/or relatives in Rustenburg, Johannesburg and Lesotho.

Table 6.8: Examples of Portfolios of Livelihoods Assets in Freedom Park

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nokwanda is an old-age pensioner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. She has access to low-cost state housing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. She runs a tuck shop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. She rents out twelve shacks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. She receives Old-Age pension (more on this in Chapter 6).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Her husband’s salary was crucial earlier in her life in Freedom Park.
6. The immeasurable extended family and other social support networks have been important to her livelihood strategies.

Monghadi
1. Informal trade

Lesedi lives with her two children
1. She has access to low-cost state housing.
2. She receives a child support grant (more on this in Chapter 6).
3. Her daughter participates in the ‘orphan vulnerable child support program’.
4. She rents out a shack.
5. She receives unspecified regular donations from a church pastor.
6. She can count on occasional support from her boyfriend.
7. Stokvels, irregular temporary work, including street trading, are often turned to as survival strategies
8. She often solicits money from her working acquaintances.
9. Her social support networks are numerous, tenuous, and still important to her survival. Apart from buying food and furniture for her house, she uses part of what she can get to pay for tuition and transport for her high school going son.

Tshipi is an unemployed man living with a girlfriend and her son
1. He is a former mineworker
2. He has, since 1992, been involved in the leadership of local organisations and forums in Freedom Park.
3. He worked as a clerk in 1992 for a construction company connecting water pipes in Freedom Park.
5. In 2004, he worked for a construction company to install electricity cables in Freedom Park, Pretoria, and elsewhere in the region.
6. He also occasionally performs household electrical work privately, especially given the newly built RDP housing in Freedom Park. In 2006 he worked at the school building project in Freedom Park.

He appreciates that public works programs play an important role in the poor’s survival strategies. One may get a job for a period of about eight months, stay without work for about two months, and then get another job. Such programs are also useful because local small businesses may access sub-constructing opportunities, and generally public works programs provide a chance for a person to buy larger goods, such as furniture, and pay for children’s school field trips and/or tuition.

Notably, beyond building such livelihood assets for making a living, the goals of Monghadi and Nokwanda include preparing their children for contemporary vocational demands and building some semblance of classy lifestyles. These are respectively influenced by the need to meet social demands and the influence of the landscape and commodities around them. Despite their different personal and social experiences, some of their children have achieved high school, post-high school or university qualifications. Three of Mongadi’s children are qualified in Further Education and Training engineering, and one of them is a teacher. This is in contrast to Katz’s (2004) research participants in Howa (Sudan) and Harlem (New York City), who learned skills that are inconsistent with those required in the changing job market – in rural Sudan household chores were allocated to girls while cattle herding was the responsibility of boys. The young black people in Harlem were not trained in skills required
in the post-Fordist economy of the USA since about 1973 (Katz, 2004). Beyond that goal of giving his children a leg-up in life, Monghadi’s Mercedes Benz and Ford Fairlane were, for him, objects of honour. The same could be said about Nokwanda for turning an RDP house into a fancy, plastered house connected to the world through a television satellite dish and cellular phones. When she walked me out of her house following an interview, she expressed concern about the unwillingness of her neighbours to improve the look and feel of their houses and surroundings. Nokwanda and Monghadi aspired to achieve these goals of personal distinction and public esteem as they rented out backyard rooms, sold beer, cooked food, sold underwear, skirts, blankets and soft drinks. Their children’s occupations of teaching and engineering are different from their informal sector work. A plastered, painted house and a shack are different in quality and social status.

It is important to note that the livelihood goals and subjectivities the people of Freedom Park have been influenced by historical changes in their landscape forms among other forces of change. As migrants/immigrants, they have been subjected to various forms of land dispossession in their home villages (although unique, the Bafokeng example is just a local example of a more general experience). Similar to Manosi, Letswalo, Bontle and Rosemary in Phokeng, they are using their survivalist livelihoods to achieve the more stylish lifestyles and they acquire commodities as objects of honour. Additionally, their subjectivities are developed through acquiring meanings associated with commodities they see around them. It is already known that the landscapes of domination (the colonial, apartheid, and contemporary) embody and circulate the meanings of well-being, happiness and style. Through the accretion of such meanings over time, ordinary people have come to buy, and buy into, these kinds of representations as reflected in their houses and other commodities they buy. I mentioned earlier that the people of Colta, Guamote and Otavalenos in Ecuador used various livelihood activities to accumulate new commodities (vehicles and breeze-block houses of up to four storeys to replace adobe and thatched roofed houses) (ibid.). The Ecuadorian landscape is symbolic of many changes that have occurred in how people there live and think of living (Bebbington, 2000; 1999). Many of their practices are mediated through the incorporation of modern ideas and commodities.

That said, living and making a living in the city involves negotiation between such hegemonic effects of social reproduction and the possibilities for creating emancipatory spaces, including freedom from poverty and domination. Accordingly, the profitability of
Mongadi’s business and Nokwanda’s ability to build livelihood assets can be traced to the increased militancy of the labour force in the mid-1980s and the 1990s, and the concomitant decline in labour exploitation (increasing wages). Such labour struggles resulted in an increased cash-flow that circulated locally and in Rustenburg in general – this is captured in Monghadi’s and Mdluli’s stories. Mdluli, whom we met in the discussion of Phokeng, also demonstrates the connections between the struggles in the Bafokeng areas, in parts of the city such as Freedom Park and in the mining workplace – how the workplace and community struggles have been significant in the ability for ordinary people to build a place for livelihood formation (called Freedom Park). The increases in wages for mineworkers (associated with workplace struggles) have also been significant sources of livelihoods for the people of Phokeng and the inner city.

In 1984, about five members of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM)\textsuperscript{110} from Johannesburg infiltrated Impala Platinum mines (located in Bophuthatswana, and thus in the Bafokeng area) with the intention of organising mineworkers to work towards breaking down the repressive conditions under which they worked (actions which were part of the broader struggle against apartheid). Anglo-American Platinum mines in Rustenburg, located outside Bophuthatswana, were by then already unionised. In order to introduce NUM to the mines in Bophuthatswana, one of the NUM strategies was to recruit white-collar mineworkers who would not only mobilise ordinary mineworkers to join NUM, but also to instruct them on their rights as workers.

Mdluli was one of these recruits. He had to move from his home in one of the Bafokeng villages (Luka) to live at the nearby hostel Number 6. Mdluli also managed to work his way into becoming one of the hostel ‘room monitors’ (isibonda), and he joined the Adult Basic Education and Training (ABET) program in the mine as an instructor\textsuperscript{111}. Mdluli’s moves were intended to expand his target audience in order to ‘sneak in’ (during his daily work responsibilities) NUM’s instructions on the rights of workers. He performed a delicate balance of taking on multiple subjectivities: he was both a member of the mining bureaucratic

\textsuperscript{110} In October 1982, the Council of Unions of South Africa launched a black miners’ union: the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). In December 1985 NUM established the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) with the aim of mobilising a power block of workers to pressure the apartheid government for political change (Pycroft and Munslow, 1988).

\textsuperscript{111} Impala Platinum had earlier introduced ABET for mineworkers who were at that time (and still, in many ways, are) some of the illiterate and the most undereducated people in the country.
establishment and also an activist who often had to mobilise mineworkers into taking industrial action, only to process their dismissal for not reporting to work (the process he often undermined). The actions of NUM (and Mdluli, who represented the experiences of many younger generations of Bafokeng) had, by 1986, laid a strong foundation upon which subsequent struggles could be built, including constructing Freedom Park as a space for livelihood formation.

In the second half of the 1980s, the Impala Platinum company (henceforth Impala) and labour were involved in an intense struggle over better working conditions. Impala aligned itself with the Bophuthatswana regime (rather than the owners of the land on which they were operating, Bafokeng) because the company believed that Bophuthatswana was a more stable and profitable choice. During labour strikes, the Bophuthatswana army and police would raid the mine hostels and arrest workers on behalf of Impala, only to have employers back the release of workers in order to prevent losses of production of platinum-group metals. The conflict between Impala and labour often triggered fights among workers themselves: the Bophuthatswana National Union of Mine Employees (BONUME) and the progressive National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). Such fights had important implications for the building of Freedom Park as a place of livelihood formation. NUM gained a leading control of the labour struggle as BONUME’s influence waned in 1991, partly due to political changes in South Africa since 1990. The mine employers attempted to co-opt migrant workers from Lesotho. Basotho are among the major groups of foreign workers who were often ambivalent about participating in industrial actions, largely because of the risks associated with their foreign worker status. The Sotho workers would show up for night shifts, only to be met with a fight by the mineworkers who supported industrial action. The conflict among workers was exacerbated by the inability of the Xhosa to distinguish between the Tswana (perceived to be fellow comrades) and the Sothos (seen as detractors of workers’ struggles), a problem that often caused the Xhosa group to indiscriminately fight the Tswana and Sotho groups. Between 1990 and 1994, such conflicts often spilled over into Freedom Park.

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112 Chief Jonathan of Lesotho was overthrown by the Lesotho military and Major-General Lekhanya in January 1986 due to his anti-apartheid stance. According to Pycroft and Munslow (1988), the new military Council discouraged Basotho, who comprised a large percentage of NUM, from becoming involved with union activities (especially those with political content). The Lesotho Ministry of Labour also condemned, at a meeting with Lesotho trade unions in April 1986, NUM’s increasing political involvement in South Africa. Lekhanya issued a public statement advising Basotho working on the mines not to allow organisations representing them to jeopardise their livelihood (Pycroft and Munslow, 1988).
Park where, increasingly, mineworkers were living, having moved out of nearby conflict-ridden mine hostels.

The growing number of mineworkers in Freedom Park represented a relative shaking up of the apartheid labour geography in Rustenburg – mineworkers moving out of the male hostels to live in an emerging community. Even so, the Bophuthatswana police continued demolishing shacks and evicting squatters on Bafokeng land (as a way of maintaining the hostels as a place for mineworkers, a place that separated, male black people’s workplaces from their homes). It has to be recalled that the squatted Bafokeng land and the Motswenyane, Makgale, and Mosete land parcels were close to one another, a situation which often frustrated the eviction of shack-dwellers from the Bafokeng land by the police: squatters would simply walk across to the private plots of the aforementioned families to evade police arrest. In most instances, women were arrested for selling beer (a significant source of income for them), but due to favourable conditions in the informal trade market until 1994 they were able to pool funds together for the release of their ‘comrades’, especially if they were arrested in a group. The relationship that the politicised hawkers were developing with the highly politicised mineworkers living in both the shack settlements and mine hostels not only strengthened shack dwellers’ resistance against eviction by the police, it also consolidated a process of place formation (Freedom Park)\footnote{The migrant and immigrant bodies in Freedom Park may be part of Rustenburg’s global economic and social networks. However their livelihoods are more linked to the dynamics of regional politics within the former Bophuthatswana as they engaged in such politics from their very specific ‘place’ in the city: Freedom Park, and by the end of the 1990s they extended their alliances to other actors across the city and beyond.}.

In 1991, a local civic committee was appointed to bring some structure and order to the evolving community, stamping it as an official place and acknowledging it as a space of livelihood formation for migrants, immigrants, and mineworkers. The committee named that settlement Freedom Park, hitherto known officially as Weltebeesfontein. This shanty settlement was demarcated into blocks, A to F, each with its own committee. The Block Committees’ roles involved arbitrating for individuals who were defaulting on paying back informally arranged loans or arbitrating for individuals who defaulted on rent payment. They also mediated ‘family’ disputes, involving financial claims that women would often make when a cohabitation relationship breaks up, or the financial claims from a legal wife coming from a rural area to check on a husband who had not visited home for a long time. The people
of Freedom Park also established a ‘self-defence unit’ in order to intervene in broader community disputes, mainly making up for the absent state police services (police station). It patrolled the settlement at night and arrested those residents of Freedom Park who were seen to be behind the killings in the settlement\textsuperscript{114}. The self-defence unit also arrested residents who were suspected of stealing livestock and cars from the surrounding Bafokeng villages as well as those people who were suspected of stealing power cables from the local mines. It also took on a self-appointed role of enforcing ‘values’, including limiting multiple sexual partners per person as well as ensuring that women were properly dressed. Overall, the city’s struggles in the mining workplaces and in what came to be Freedom Park were significant for the increases in wages for miners and thus an increase in the circulation of money locally as well as the profitability of the informal economic sector in Phokeng, the inner city and Freedom Park.

A new wave of migrants/immigrants arrived in the 1990s in the context of changing political landscape nationally and the establishment of Freedom Park as a place of livelihood formation. Although they were more immiserated than their predecessors, they also pursued goals other than mere survival. Teboho left her home in Lesotho in 1990 and went to several places searching for work in order to support herself and her family back home. She reported:

\begin{quote}
In Johannesburg I lived with a married mineworker from Lesotho, who helped me pay rent and buy food. Since I could not get enough money from him to send back home, I moved to a farm in the Mpumalanga Province. There I lived with another Sotho man who used to divide his salary between his family and me, giving me ZAR 900 a month and took ZAR 1,000 to his family. I lived with him until 1997 when I moved elsewhere in Mpumalanga because he had to leave his job to take care of his family’s livestock back in Lesotho. Although he continued sending me ZAR 500 a month afterwards, I decided to move to Freedom Park in 1999, at which time he also stopped giving me money. I am now living with an unmarried Tswana boyfriend. I used to sell beer to
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{114} In 1996, 36 people, mainly Mozambicans, died over a pint of milk belonging to a Pondo man. A fight between a Pondo and a Mozambican over a pint of ‘long-life’ milk, allegedly stolen from a tuck shop, spread into the whole of Freedom Park. In 2000, 16 people, mainly Mozambicans, died over a missing goat that belonged to a Pondo household. Some Mozambican men were accused of stealing a goat. In both instances, Freedom Park came to be spatially divided into the following ethnic sections: Sotho/Tswana, Xhosa/ Swati and Mozambicans/Tsongas.
augment the money that he gave to me but I stopped doing that due to the unprofitability of that trade.

Teboho has moved from one country to another, from villages to farms and ultimately to cities, with the purpose of finding a place from which she can make a living. Freedom Park became that place. Indeed an interview extract above represents the realities of many woman of Freedom Park, as expanded in some detail by Abongile’s story. In 1980 Abongile left her troubled home in Taung in the North-West Province and moved to the town of Welkom in the Free State Province (see Figure 1.1). She moved from one place to another for fifteen years: to one of the farms in Welkom, and later back to the town of Welkom again, to Durban, and back to Taung (although she did not visit her home), to Klerksdorp in the North-West Province. She later moved again to the KwaZulu-Natal area, and after some time, she moved back to Klerksdorp, and then to Carletonville in Johannesburg. She later went back to Taung (at which point she went to live with her parents for some time), and then moved to Rustenburg in 1995 before finding Freedom Park as a home and a place of livelihood formation. Abongile knew that she was struggling throughout the fifteen years of being on the move, each time unwillingly ‘moving in’ with a man. She was subjected to sexual and physical abuse in the face of her desperate need for food and accommodation, she was beaten by her boyfriends and sometimes beating some of them in self-defence. Her troubles also included being hidden in a store-room in Welkom to avoid police arrest for working in ‘South Africa’, outside her Bophuthatswana ‘homeland’ without a permit. She was also advised, at some point, that her troubles signified an ancestral calling, to which she responded by undergoing traditional medical training in Kwa-Zulu Natal, until she dropped out due to the long training period and the punishing household work schedules.

Abongile’s actions during her movements can be explained, unlike Malaquais’ (2007) analytical emphasis on ‘movement as space’¹¹⁵ and Ferguson’s (1999) emphasis on ‘discourse analysis’ that endlessly leaves open ordinary people’s explorations of their possibilities and options. To Malaquais (2007), the movements of his research participants were so fundamental a factor that movement itself became space. Additionally, the meanings

¹¹⁵ Malaquais interviewed a man who had spent eight years of his life travelling from Douala to Equatorial Guinea, then to Gabon, Brazzaville, Kinshasa, Angola, Namibia, Cape Town (his attempts to enter countries such as Zimbabwe failed). Thus in situations where a 25-year-old man spent a third of his life travelling, movement itself becomes a place.
of the actions of her and Ferguson’s (1999) research subjects could not be known because there were many competing discourses used to express them. In fact, in the unhappy event that people’s imagined worlds were fully understood, such worlds would be ruined. In contrast to these unknowable and unlocated actions, Abongile’s hopes for the future (of improving her life) can be explained because such hopes have been spatialised throughout the fifteen years of ‘movement’ up to Rustenburg. Her trials, possibilities and options have been given content, not left endlessly open with unknown and unlocated actions. The improvement of life that Abongile, Teboho and many women like them sought is built from Freedom Park (as a base) and its connections elsewhere as well as its contested and messy politics.

Abongile, Teboho and many women like them are looking for some stability to rebuild their lives in ways that are very specific: helping their children through the education system beyond high school (which is clearly beyond their financial ability), building modern houses (at times fancy ones), accumulating decorative furniture, building businesses, participating in the public life of Freedom Park and creating some room for privacy. Abongile arrived in Freedom Park in 1995, where she found some footing by cohabitating with a married man who gave her ZAR 500 a month, from which she supported her family and participated in stokvels. In line with Gutkind’s (1974) and Southall’s (1961a; 1961b) thinking about sociable urban sensibilities, the shack settlement in Freedom Park, where Abongile initially lived, provided the kind of space in which one’s life, livelihood assets or the lack of such assets, were shared with and known by neighbours. This is because small shack sizes catered for a limited indoor life, and thus created conditions for more sociable living. In addition to this outdoor living, Abongile also participated in the life of Freedom Park, volunteering as a member of the Policing Forum at the time when Freedom Park did not have a police station. This work paid some money to volunteers, and she used that money to buy some fancy furniture while still living in the shack settlement (kitchen unit, stove, fridge and VCR) (see Plate 6.11). The furniture she bought indicate that she is given to the nice things of life: “I buy these things in order to show what I am working for. I grew up liking nice things”. She later received an RDP house, which she hopes will be an asset for her children in case of her death.
Notably, and in line with Simmel’s (1971) ideas of indifference and blasé attitudes, the RDP house gave her some privacy that she did not have when she lived at the shack settlement. The introduction of a police station in Freedom Park also meant that she no longer had to share her problems with members of the community (neighbours, the Block Committee or the Policing Forum). “In the past I used to share my problems with my neighbours. Now I have some privacy due to my RDP house and I do pray when I have problems”. The acquisition of satellite television and the provision of services such as water and electricity, all inside the RDP house, allows her to create some private living, even when times are hard. The RDP house encourages new consumer needs and the desire to consume at higher levels – buying possessions which begin to define the relationships among themselves and with other people, creating some space for privacy and expressing their consumption lifestyles as a way of standing out from their neighbours in order to be recognised. Thus, with the building of the RDP, there is some erosion of social sensibilities and connections to neighbours and local structures such as the Policing Forum. That said, there are those RDP recipients who incorporate the more rural ways of living. The end result is that Freedom Park has become a jumble of urbane and rural spaces, subjectivities, and livelihoods.

Importantly, Abongile’s activities can be outlined: she was able to rebuild her life because of her own income from community volunteering work as well as the financial assistance of her boyfriend and son (her son buys food and clothes for his siblings). It is also because of these income sources that she was able to commit to one man. Women with insufficient financial support from a partner operate in ways that are similar to women’s tactics of accessing money discussed in the previous chapter on the inner city taverns. These women with
insufficient financial support also enter into multiple and steady sexual relationships with about five men at a time. They support each other through their own stokvels, and tactically use one another’s shack-rooms for their sex work. They discuss issues such as condom use and the buying of commodities such as fridges, televisions, shoes, clothes and food. A mining company (Impala) recruited a number of them to work as ‘peer educators’ on the use of condoms, on HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases. As peer-educators, Impala paid them ZAR 200 a month. The national Department of Health later took over the project, and paid them ZAR 1,000 a month. In addition to their access to RDP housing and their own incomes generated from sex work, the ZAR 1,000 income significantly added to their livelihood assets, which they used to accumulate commodities as shown in Plate 6.12.

Plate 6.12: Some of the livelihood assets of a sex-worker
Source: Photo by Ngaka Mosiane

Since 2003, the Cape Town-based sex-work and HIV/AIDS advocacy organisation Sonke Gender Justice Network has been working with them, flying them to Cape Town for training on issues of sexual and reproductive health, and on their human rights and security as sex workers. They are a group of HIV positive women who feel empowered to move back to their home villages to run similar peer education projects. The work of the Catholic Church in Freedom Park, discussed below, had similar effects on the lives of another group of covert female sex workers who work as caregivers to HIV/AIDS patients in Freedom Park and Rustenburg. The ability of Abongile and sex workers to transform their lives, under conditions which are not of their choosing, highlights what South Africa’s post-apartheid social and economic transformation might mean to them, even if the form of that transformation (education for children, fancy houses and furniture, flashy used cars) was in part informed by their socialisation over the years of their upbringing and travelling.
Beyond adopting these kinds of involvements and investing in distinctive fashionable forms, some of the women take pride in using their RDP plots as a kind of rural space, keeping goats and planting crops (see top-left and bottom-right of photos on Plate 6.13), in keeping with what they can afford and the landscapes that influenced their subjectivity over time. Other women and men tap into the spiritual to make a living: providing spiritual services for almost any need, including healing services; performing rituals to help people get married; helping people to get employment; to conceive a child; to do well in business; and to protect people from bad luck and witchcraft. Broadly, the spiritual is essentially an anchor to face the challenges of city (and rural) life. It is common to see a household preparing an early morning meal\textsuperscript{116} for their ancestors in the hope that such individuals or households will be protected against the above-mentioned social ills and realise their dreams.

\textsuperscript{116} The meal consists of cooked meat (beef, lamb or chicken), porridge, traditional beer, a bottle of brandy and sweets as well as a package of tobacco, matches and snuff. These are left on the stoep of a house early in the morning for ancestors to ‘eat’; and after sunrise, family, friends and neighbours gather to literally consume them.
Plate 6.13: Freedom Park as a hodgepodge of urbane and rural spaces, subjectivities, and livelihoods.
Source: Photo by Ngaka Mosiane

The photo on the right (Plate 6.13, top) shows a group of traditional doctors (sangomas) dancing at one of their regular meetings. Generally, my research informants draw from what they see around them, from their imaginations, place histories, experiences and feelings as well as the Western, indigenous and other forms of religious influences to the options they have. They use these sensual and intellectual resources to pursue various goals, including creating a good life, also as defined for them by missionaries/priests, architects, engineers, scientists, statisticians, financiers, commercial traders and state bureaucrats through the accretion of meanings, over time, as represented in the landscapes and other objects around them.

No less than 200 owners of tuck shops and retail stores have been built by people from other parts of South Africa, from China, Somalia, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, India, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. In the end, Freedom Park is a confluence of people brought together by various and interrelated social, political and economic processes; a confluence of localised and more global subjectivities seeking to access mineworkers’ wages in order to improve their lives and pursue other goals. In the sense of generative socio-economic and political creativity, albeit under conditions of marginality; in this sense of varying subjectivities (their sociable, private, sensual, and intellectual sensibilities), in this sense of localised and broader connections, Freedom Park is hodgepodge of urbane and rural lifestyles and activities, a dynamic space existing in a relation of dependency to the social, economic and political lives of the city of Rustenburg.

In the more developmentalist sense, the 1990s generation of the people of Freedom Park not only built on the groundwork of its predecessors, they also forged networks of support from certain parts of the city. Some of my informants were members of the Freedom Park Development Forum and/or the Freedom Park Housing Committee. The Housing Committee delivered, through the government social housing scheme, more than 4,000 houses to the self-employed, unemployed and/or underpaid working men and women of Freedom Park. Basic services such as electricity, water and sanitation were partially provided to housing recipients. Freedom Park has generally seen some level of infrastructural developments since the year 2000, and such projects have largely been possible because of the community’s ability,
through the support of the Rustenburg Catholic Church, to forge links with actors in multiple places. The Catholic Church has a long tradition of working with the poor in Rustenburg. It helps to empower neighbourhoods neglected or not yet reached by the state. Through funds from the local mining companies (Anglo Platinum, Impala, Lonmin, Aquarius, Xstrata), the Church often builds temporary structures to serve as schools and health centres as well as sites for several income-generating community projects. In the case of Freedom Park, the Catholic Church worked with the Freedom Park Development Forum to source temporary structures for a school, a crèche, a police station and a private clinic. It also secured a minimum of about ZAR 200,000 for community-based projects from the British High Commission, Impala and the local association of medical doctors. The projects included a makeshift bakery, fence making, a car battery charger, and garment sewing. When such projects are registered and operate as community and state entities, the Church leaves a locale and moves on to another needy one. This is how the Catholic Church came to work in Freedom Park in 1997.

The people of Freedom Park entered into a partnership with the Catholic Church as a point of contact for the support from local, national and international state and private institutions. Thus, at the level of institutional support (faith-based agencies, private organisations and companies, international state agencies), some transformative relationships across and beyond the city were forged, with the potential to generate an improvement in the lives of the urban poor. Although the institutional approach to development is necessary for attaining some social goals in a context where institutional structures are weak, relations of support and associated projects are often unsustainable. Indeed the bakery and sewing projects in Freedom Park are just getting by, and the rest of the projects had to close their operations. In fact, the overall development process in Freedom Park later took on a more charity-oriented

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117 The Catholic Church assisted 600 families, who from the late 1980s to the early 1990s squatted on a private farm whose owner could not be located. The neighbouring farmer wanted to evict the squatters, and the Catholic Church invited the Human Rights Commission to intervene on behalf of the squatters. Alternative land was provided in 1992 (a move that led to the formation of the Boitekong township in Rustenburg), and the apartheid government provided services in the form of a police station, a graveyard, and the housing ‘site and service’ scheme. The Church also conducted a community needs survey, which brought to light the need for a school, an adult education centre, a skills training centre, a clinic and a crèche. Tsholofelo Community College was established, funded by Anglo-America Platinum Mines and Impala Platinum Mines. This college offered karate skills, computer classes, knitting, sewing, electricity courses and drama lessons, among other courses. When the government built its own clinic in the Boitekong township, the Catholic Church stopped offering health services there, and moved to Freedom Park.

118 Around 2000, US$1 was equal to ZAR 5.
trajectory. The Catholic Church initially adopted an approach that empowered people through community-based projects. From around 2003, its programs narrowed down to HIV/AIDS treatment. Alongside the Orphaned Vulnerable Children (OVC) program, it focused on the Anti-retroviral Treatment Program, an outreach program rendering home-based healthcare, nursing, counselling and support services. Crucially, although the local state is well-positioned to act as a guarantor of social and economic development projects in both distributional and empowerment senses, it was largely absent in many initiatives. Even in social housing provision, only a quarter of the people living in Freedom Park received formal housing from the national housing department. Thus the number of recipients was much lower when all the people who were then living in Freedom Park (about 20,000) were taken into account. In the context of increasing movements of people, at least, across Africa, one would not expect governments to provide everyone (especially migrants) with formal housing and associated services. A southern African social security policy is needed to facilitate appropriate interventions for migrants living in southern African cities (see Chapter 6).

6.6 Conclusion: inner city, Freedom Park and Phokeng comparative gesture

The interventions by Rustenburg city managers and ordinary people’s livelihood strategies bring into focus the tensions of city life – the tensions of urban residents and the city space as agents of social reproduction on the one hand and sources of liberation from poverty and domination on the other. As regards the latter, the ways in which women in the inner city creatively access money from men; the use of the inner city site to perform dances, music and splits for money; to recreate flexible identities that can be changed into living beings or non-living objects; the playing of music for marketing purposes, are all innovative feats of imagination. In this context, ordinary people not only reimagine other ways of living and making a living, they also emplace their own landscape ideals onto space, they create their own spaces of income in order to obtain essentials and luxuries, for example.

Similarly, the use of livelihood assets in Phokeng (taverns, petty rentier market, tuck shops) is creative endeavours. The taverns sell food amid a jovial music atmosphere. The result is these taverns, backyard accommodation for rent, and tuck shops provide the basis for an alternative social and economic development. In Freedom Park likewise, stockvels, mineworkers salaries, informal housing market, street trading, car repairs and maintenance services, recycling wood from the mines to build tables and chairs, transport services to the
old CBD, and taverns characterise livelihood activities and assets. Women also take on cohabitation, survival sex, bread making, sewing, and waste collecting as livelihood activities.

The goals that ordinary people pursue in the three case studies are also similar. They educate their children to give them a leg-up in life; they turn RDP houses into an impressive commodity; they buy other commodities (used cars and furniture) out of self-interest, as objects of honour and identity. Importantly, these actions can be explained, unlike those of Malaquais (2007) and Ferguson’s (1999) research participants. The meanings of the actions of such participants could not be known because there were many competing discourses used to express them. In fact, in the unhappy event that people’s imagined worlds were fully understood, such worlds would be ruined. Additionally, these case studies provide some insights into the ways in which transformations in the landscape influenced social identities and livelihood forms. This came to be expressed in how the small shack size in an informal settlement, which catered for restricted indoor life, creates conditions for social outdoor life. Also, the activities of the Policing Forum due to the absence of a police station in Freedom Park allowed the sharing of personal problems with that formation as well as the Block Committees. Broadly, the formation of Freedom Park during apartheid, in alliance with mineworkers’ struggles, marked a significant milestone in ordinary people’s struggles for creating spaces for livelihood formation. Similarly, the activities of Kgetsi Ya Tsie hawker organisation there, with the support of the Legal Resources Centre, have mainly served to delay the application of the RLM.

In contrast to the everyday and collective actions above, the socio-cultural obstacles for women in particular; the particular meanings of development (elitist interventionist projects) being pushed by the local state; the competitive buyer-seller relationships between the formal and informal enterprises, the street trader cleaning up operations from their lucrative spaces of the inner city; the lack of support for survivalist enterprises all serve to undermine these creative, imaginative, and organic alternative development spaces. Similarly, an RDP house has come to provide some space for anonymity. The furnishing of an RDP house and its reticulation with portable water, electricity, and waterborne sanitation create conditions for some private living. This means that with the introduction of the police station in Freedom Park, live became increasingly individualised and private. Additionally, an RDP house has come to encourage consumer needs and the desire to consume at higher levels – buying possessions which in turn defined the relationships among themselves and with other people.
Notably, the contribution of Freedom Park in particular to this study is that, since the end of apartheid, it has not been subjected to cleaning up operations. Indeed we have seen how ordinary people there create livelihoods with little interference from the state. This freedom to live and creatively make a living in Freedom Park and the suppression of ordinary people’s social and economic activities in the inner city indicate that the ways in which the spaces of the city are constituted and valorised affect the place of ordinary people in the city. Indeed the city also embodies the aspirations and needs of those with the power to make the city in their own image, it represents the wishes and fears of those who have the power to shape the outcomes of the struggles over land use, between classes, and around race and ethnicity. The ideas and values of the ‘critical infrastructure’ have come to define the meanings of the landscapes and commodities they produce, and influence the goals that city dwellers, including ordinary people, pursue – over time, they come to buy and buy into representations of landscape and commodities. Such representations of happiness, style and a sense of well-being were evident in the goals that ordinary people throughout Rustenburg pursued. The end result is that although the formation of Freedom Park during apartheid marked a significant milestone in ordinary people’s struggles for creating spaces for livelihood formation, it is largely less contested in the post-apartheid era because it is located in the socially unfavourable part of the city. It is thus characterised by tensions of being marginal to the dominant socio-cultural and economic aspects of the city, even though it is physically close to mining shafts and hostels, while it is also generative of some opportunities for livelihood formation. It is because of these kinds of tensions that the city’s social and economic transformations remain a potentiality, rather than realisable.

Across the three case studies, the sensory, affect, and imagination were constitutive of these spatially integrating actions. Ordinary tap into the spiritual to make a living, providing spiritual services for almost any need and using that spirituality as an anchor to engage with the city and rural life. They draw from their imaginations, feelings, historical appeals, and religions to engage with the (post) modern spaces of the city and organically create spaces for alternative development. Thus, the body is not only a surface of social and cultural inscription (including self-inscription), it also constructs cities in its varied images of their producers. In this sense, living and making a living involves mediating hegemonic forces of social reproduction on the one hand and the landscape and bodily resources for creating emancipatory spaces on the other.
Chapter 7

The role of basic services and ‘social security and assistance’
in the transformative potential of cities

7.1 Introduction

Chapter 5 discussed the contexts within which ordinary people create livelihoods. Given that the socio-spatial interventions that constitute such contexts are biased towards the middle class, meaningful access to basic municipal services and state grants cannot be assumed: the dynamics around access to and the impact of these services and grants need to be discussed in some detail in order to assess their prospects not only as livelihood assets, but also for their role on socio-economic transformations. Some commentators on city studies have expressed some optimism about the role of basic services and social grants in this regard (Parnell, 2008; Parnell et al., 2009; Parnell and Pieterse, 2010). On the other hand, McDonald (2008); McDonald and Ruiters (2005) and McDonald and Pape (2002) are more pessimistic, seeing not only basic services and spatial planning as benefiting the elites and investment capital, but also challenging Seekings’ (2002) assertion that South Africa is a social democracy, on the basis of this country distributing more social security than its global South counterparts. These are the kinds of tensions that have characterised my thesis so far, resolved by discussing related experiences on Rustenburg. The argument I make in this chapter is that basic services and social assistance are areas where interventions for ordinary people’s social and economic transformations can be made. Focus is often directed at the city manager’s treatment of payment defaulters as well as the city’s biased tariff and expenditure patterns. Such a focus diverts attention away from the fact that there are existing possibilities for universal public services and social assistance to provide resources for ordinary people to build livelihoods and to pursue other goals, although the political, economic and social dynamics at national and international scales are working against such possibilities. The first part of this chapter examines the dynamics around the provision of municipal services and associated funding. The second part attends to the social assistance aspect of social security.

7.1 Basic services and urban change

The local state is at the intersection of expenditure channels by government and other agencies operating through a particular locale. Intergovernmental transfers are distributed through complex apparatuses of the state for social, infrastructural and institutional
development at a municipal level. There are limited sources that provide information for constructing a comprehensive map of such transfers and other revenue streams for a particular municipality. Even the ‘need-capacity gap’ captures basic services backlogs and their financing only from the point of view of a municipality. Below I discuss the broader dynamics around basic municipal services as livelihood assets. The discussions of these entitlements are pertinent because they constitute assets for ordinary people to build livelihoods. They are significant as they appear in all cases of the people interviewed in Phokeng and Freedom Park (pages 153, 154, 189, and 190).

The South African constitution (RSA, 1996: Chapter 7, Section 153) requires the state to provide for the basic needs for their communities: water, electricity, sanitation, housing, refuse removal. In order to meet such a mandate, the constitution provides for municipal, provincial and national spheres of government to receive an unconditional ‘equitable share’ of nationally raised revenue in addition to the traditional provisions for municipalities to charge property rates, utilities, and to make loans (RSA, 1996: Chapter 13, Sections 214 and 227). The equitable share, which includes the ‘municipal service transfer grant’, is thus touted as an important municipal revenue source that can be used to finance part of the basic services costs for every household. “It is then the responsibility of municipalities to develop their own targeting mechanisms for passing on this subsidy to the poor” (RSA, 2000: 2). When it was first introduced in 1998, the equitable share was meant to provide a household earning up to ZAR 800 (USD 133) per month with a monthly subsidy of ZAR 86 (USD 14) for an essential minimum package of basic services. By then, the local state’s equitable share of ZAR 5.6 billion (USD 56 million) (Reschovsky, 2003) constituted only 10% of the total municipal income (Hart, 2002; Fül-Flynn, 2001; Deedat et al., 2001). Municipalities have to raise 90 percent of their revenue from their own sources: that is, from their residents, some of whom cannot afford to pay for rates, taxes and utility services. This is in spite of the fact that the first half of the 1990s was a period of increased government spending on social, housing and infrastructure development through the Reconstruction and Development Program – a state-led, interventionist development framework. Despite that

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119 The need-capacity gap is an estimate of expenditure needs to provide basic services by a municipality minus revenue-raising capacity: the amount of money a municipality may be expected to rise from local sources at a normal rate of revenue effort (Reschovsky, 2003).

120 The equitable share is a state mechanism for distributing its revenue between national, provincial and local spheres of government.
smaller transfer amount (ZAR 5.6 billion), the equitable share was reduced in the second half of the 1990s to ZAR 2.3 billion in 1998/99 and to ZAR 1.7 billion in 1999/2000 (Reschovsky, 2003).

A decline in the equitable share was justified on the basis of the World Bank argument that the household income level of ZAR 800 per month is a substantial underestimation of the economic resources available to poorer households, including those resources that are not based on income (RSA, 2002b). Consequently, the municipal service transfer of ZAR 86 per month for each poorer household was seen to be more than enough (RSA, 2000). For a short period in 2000/01, the equitable share was raised to ZAR 6.5 billion in order “to assist municipalities with the incidental and once-off transitional costs” following the completion of the municipal demarcation process in 2000 (RSA, 2000: 6). Although the equitable share is transferred to the local state unconditionally, the national government expects municipalities to use it to finance an indigent policy that was introduced in 2000 to assist people who are unable to afford basic services:

[The] policy of free basic services includes providing basic levels of services for free to those already having access to services and extending service delivery to those who do not have access. By encouraging municipalities to determine the most appropriate subsidy mechanisms, they are given adequate scope of authority to internalize the costs of delivery subsidies, and thus the risks of moral hazards are minimized. The national government should only set minimum national standards as guidelines to municipalities (RSA, 2002b: 44).

What this statement means is that every resident will be allowed 6,000 litres (6 kilolitres) of water per month free as well as 50 kWh of electricity per month, with a graduated tariff structure designed above these ‘below subsistence’ levels (Ruiters, 2011). In addition to the equitable share for indigents, the local state provides for municipal infrastructure grants, which do not cover the cost of operation, maintenance or replacement of related infrastructure.

121 The municipal demarcation process essentially affected the wall-to-wall municipality in all the rural and urban areas across the country. The first (pre-interim) local government transition phase, 1993-1995 and the second (interim) phase, 1995-200 essentially legitimised and left intact the historical rural/traditional villages as distinct municipalities, which were still separate from the ‘integrated white local councils and black local authorities (urban)’. The interim phase of the municipal transition process created 686 new local authorities throughout the country. The completion of the wall-to-wall municipal process in 2000 reduced the number of municipalities to 284, divided into three categories: 9 Metropolitan Municipalities, 44 District Councils, and 231 Local Councils.

122 The subsidies on services such as sewerage and refuse removal are also catered for at the municipal level.
(RSA, 1994: 9). Although these grants constitute only 10 percent of municipal income (meaning that their provision is actually ‘cost reflexive’ as reflected in the laws governing water provision, for example, RSA, 2000; 1998; 1997\textsuperscript{123}), possibilities for a more redistributive provision of services exists (more on this below).

The municipal debt from non-payment of services has accumulated over a period of ten years or more (pers. Comm. with RLM official). Although almost all users are paying for services, by April 2014 the RLM was owed just over ZAR 2 billion (28% and 19% of which were for water and electricity respectively). Despite the high rate of payment for services, which ranges between 95 percent and 98 percent (pers. Comm., data provided by an officer, RLM, 2014), third time payment defaulters are compelled to install prepaid water and electricity meters. Their services are also being capped, discontinued or terminated. They are harassed with notices of demand, handed to attorneys and listed on credit bureaux (ibid.). Given the high rate of paying for services, the city officials’ harsh treatment of ordinary people who cannot afford to pay for services refocuses the attention of such officials away from the existing scope for cross-subsidisation and from the possibility of ordinary people’s socio-economic transformations (more on this below).

7.2 Promise of basic services as livelihood assets: a mixed experience

Although Table 7.1 shows that, for the 2006/07 year, state grants constituted only ten percent of the total municipal income, there are several national state transfers to the local state designed to subsidise various activities carried out by municipalities\textsuperscript{124}. In fact as indicated above (and discussed in some detail below) much of infrastructure spending to address the historical backlogs in basic services is funded by the national government through the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) facility. Such grants could have been higher had the RLM registered more participants in the municipality indigent program. Municipal records show that the minimum population for Rustenburg is about 650,000 (RLM, 2012), with about 40 percent unemployment. However, the number of people in Rustenburg benefitting from the ‘indigent policy’ on free basic services fluctuates annually between two and three


\textsuperscript{124} Intergovernmental transfers not discussed in this thesis include the Integrated Housing and Human Settlement Development Grant, Public Transport Infrastructure Grant, Local Neighbourhood Development Partnership Grant and Indirect Infrastructure Grants such as the Water Services Operating and Transfer Subsidy and the National Electrification Programme.
thousand indigents (pers. Comm., data provided by an officer, RLM, 2014; 2008). Although in 2007 the number of beneficiaries reached 5,000 indigents, it stood at 3,908 beneficiaries in April 2014 (that is about ZAR 1 million worth of the equitable share). Thus, the municipality is failing to register higher numbers of indigents, a failure that reduces the size of national transfers to the municipality. This failure is seen to be related to the process of ‘means testing’. The issue of indigence and associated state grants through means-testing brings into focus Parnell’s (2008: 605) emphasis on ‘the efficiency’ of the bureaucratic system of local government to build universal urban citizenship: “Fundamental to implementing the principles of universalism and redistribution in poor and highly unequal cities with only limited resources, is the imperative of addressing the efficiency of the bureaucratic system of local government to build universal urban citizenship” Indeed she is concerned that using ‘the household’ as the unit for distributing state grants is likely to erode the fluidity of ordinary people’s social arrangements and associated livelihood strategies. However, for McDonald and Ruiters (2005) and McDonald and Pape (2002), household-based ‘lifeline service provision’ (water and electricity) are, to start with, insufficient and the means testing process is tantamount to harassment. For an average South African household of eight members, 6 kilolitres of water equals 25 litres per person per day as opposed to the World Health Organization standard of 50 litres per person per day (Chirwa and Fynn, 2005). In Rustenburg, the small number of indigents registered and the complaints of state officials that ordinary people want things (basic services and social grants) for free indicate unwillingness to broaden participation in free basic services. Additionally, the local state efficiency that Parnell (2008) refers to often signifies ring-fencing, performance management systems and associated performance bonuses (the neoliberal approaches which divert funds away from the needs of the poor) (McDonald, 2008). It also signifies the neoliberal requirement for metered electricity and water access, which often come with punitive measures such as service surcharges, service blocking and self-imposed cut-offs by limiting consumption (ibid.). This is also what I found in Rustenburg, even though these measures were unnecessary because to

125 Notwithstanding criticisms against modern development practices based on statistical formulations and Euclidian partitioning of space, efforts to establish the need-capacity gap can be criticised for making ordinary people ‘visible’ to the state, enabling the state to suppress ordinary people’s resources and practices (practical knowledge, informal processes, improvisation) that are indispensable in the face of unpredictability (Scott, 1998). For Scott (1998) the failure of socialist or liberal schemes to deliver an equitable improvement in the human condition is attributed to the modernist mechanism of formalisation. However, modernity has also been important in the human capacity to overcome nature (Peet and Hartwick, 2009). Regardless of these varying emphases on the need for visibility and formal planning or the benefits of the intangibles and the informal, it is generally acknowledged that bottom-up, people-driven engagement with the complex and sometimes informal actors and forces should be part of the development process.
the extent that almost all users pay for the services they receive, some space exists for cross-subsidisation.

In addition to the MIG, the RLM has some capacity to finance its capital and operational budgets. In 2012-2013, the RLM was able to finance a ZAR 1.5 billion water and electricity operating budget entirely from its own funds. Almost all of the users of municipal basic services are able to pay for the, such that the utility charges in Rustenburg in 2006/07 financial year amounted to ZAR 676 million, which was 76 percent of the total municipal income (see Table 7.1).

Table 7.1: Rustenburg Municipality Income Distribution for 2003/04 to 2006/07 in '000 ZAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income category</th>
<th>2003/4</th>
<th>2004/5</th>
<th>2005/6</th>
<th>2006/7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Property rates</td>
<td>59,089</td>
<td>68,356</td>
<td>67,000</td>
<td>78,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>User charges</td>
<td>541,824</td>
<td>590,110</td>
<td>593,000</td>
<td>675,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent of equipment</td>
<td>9,609</td>
<td>6,997</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>4,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interests on investments, etc.</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>18,714</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>20,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fines</td>
<td>3,528</td>
<td>7,609</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>10,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licenses and permits</td>
<td>3,955</td>
<td>3,904</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>5,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income for agency services</td>
<td>4,028</td>
<td>4,820</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>6,415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants and subsidies</td>
<td>50,839</td>
<td>68,900</td>
<td>86,000</td>
<td>98,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other income</td>
<td>8,548</td>
<td>9,986</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>21,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale of assets</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,920</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less income forgone</td>
<td>-100</td>
<td>-109</td>
<td>-100</td>
<td>-6,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>697,320</td>
<td>782,207</td>
<td>787,900</td>
<td>920,917</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The extent to which basic services can be used to support ordinary people’s social and economic activities is dependent on the structure of user charges. In line with the 2010 indigent formula, households whose total gross monthly income does not exceed ZAR 1,000 per month, the services affected are subsidised in full. Where the household’s gross monthly income ranged between ZAR 1,000 and ZAR 1,740, the cost of services is subsidised by half (50%). Table 7.2 shows the 2005/6 RLM tariff structure in which consumers of electricity paid a basic fee of ZAR 49.30/kWh, with indigent and lower level consumers receiving (through a means test) free basic electricity of 50kWh. However, Table 7.3 shows a six-fold jump in the second block from ZAR 34.92 to ZAR 251. This cost is significant, constituting
about 30 percent of the monthly expenditure of low-income households across the country (Maharaj et al., 2011).126

Table 7.2: The Tariff Structure of the Rustenburg Local Municipality, 2005/6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>High Consumption</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land Evaluation</td>
<td>R120,000</td>
<td>R50,000</td>
<td>R10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity Consumption</td>
<td>3,000 kWh</td>
<td>1,200 kWh</td>
<td>1,000 kWh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Consumption</td>
<td>100kl</td>
<td>30 kl</td>
<td>12 kl</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tariffs in ZARs</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assessment Rates</td>
<td>380.00</td>
<td>158.33</td>
<td>31.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuse Removal</td>
<td>48.95</td>
<td>48.95</td>
<td>48.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewerage</td>
<td>49.55</td>
<td>49.55</td>
<td>49.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity Basic</td>
<td>49.30</td>
<td>49.30</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity Consumption</td>
<td>900.00</td>
<td>360.00</td>
<td>46.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Basic</td>
<td>28.90</td>
<td>28.90</td>
<td>28.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Consumption</td>
<td>681.65</td>
<td>171.65</td>
<td>61.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-12 kilolitres</td>
<td>61.80</td>
<td>61.80</td>
<td>61.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-25 kilolitres</td>
<td>77.35</td>
<td>77.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-40 kilolitres</td>
<td>97.50</td>
<td>32.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-60 kilolitres</td>
<td>141.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+ kilolitres</td>
<td>304.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAT@14%</td>
<td>246.17</td>
<td>90.77</td>
<td>32.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Amount</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,393.17</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>361.59</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 7.3: The 2013/14 RLM Graduated Electricity Tariff Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 – 50 kWh</td>
<td>ZAR 34.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 – 350 kWh</td>
<td>ZAR 251.50 (at 250 kWh)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

126 Although little data exists on the number of people in Rustenburg who fall below the poverty line (less than USD 1.25 daily), studies on the social and economic conditions of Bafokeng by Harris (2005) and Thompson (2008) show that an average per capita monthly household expenditures (as a proxy for income) among the Bafokeng is ZAR 800 (USD 116), and that it is even lower in the poorer central Bafokeng villages, ZAR 694 (USD 87). While the South African poverty standard is yet to be finalised, the National Treasury calculation (at 2006 commodity and food prices) suggested that a monthly income of ZAR 216 (USD 31) is an indication of conditions of extreme poverty, while a minimum monthly income of ZAR 431 (USD 63) per capita is sufficient to cover basic needs (RSA, 2007). It therefore appears that, based on the proposed South African poverty standard as well as the Harris (2005) and Thompson (2008) studies, most Bafokeng live above the poverty line. A significant portion of income derives from the economic activities of ordinary people themselves (Harris, 2005). Additionally, the Bafokeng’s traditional family and ward institutional structures (kutles and kgotlas respectively) as well as the higher rate of basic service provision, places Bafokeng in better conditions of making a living – these institutional structures and the extent of provision of services are indeed useful for some Bafokeng as they devise complex strategies to acquire livelihood assets and entitlements from diverse activities and sources of support.
In contrast, higher income household using 601 kWh spend only ZAR 547.38, a charge that is not only insignificant in terms of income share, but also plateaus from the third graduated block onwards. As a result, a room for cross-subsidisation is severely limited. Thus, in this case McDonald (2008) has a point that free basic electricity is consistent with the neoliberal full-cost recovery approach, which disproportionally protects the rich. Indeed Table 7.4 and Figure 7.1 show that for 2005/6 and 2012/13 years, the poor benefitted only a third of ZAR 48 million and ZAR 75 million respectively (electricity infrastructure capital budget). However, the situation is more redistributive in respect of the water infrastructure capital budget.

Table 7.4: Electricity Capital Budget showing direct benefit for previously disadvantaged areas (PDA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Amount</th>
<th>Direct Benefit for PDA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>47,680,763</td>
<td>13,847,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2007</td>
<td>36,836,034</td>
<td>27,144,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>64,376,112</td>
<td>22,817,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>11,340,821</td>
<td>43,006,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>104,514,426</td>
<td>18,596,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2011</td>
<td>35,172,422</td>
<td>17,999,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>65,292,914</td>
<td>7,672,131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-2013</td>
<td>75,411,595</td>
<td>21,784,298</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


For the consumption of 12kl of water, ZAR 61.80 cents is to be paid (see Table 7.2), with indigent consumers subsidised that amount in full. With regard to the 2013/14 figures, Table 7.5 shows a steeply rising tariff structure in the second block (ZAR 251.82). As opposed to electricity, the water tariff structure rises steeply throughout the tariff blocks, resulting in higher costs for higher income groups. In this way, there is a possibility for progressive cross-subsidisation from higher blocks. Although for McDonald and Ruiters (2005)
Figure 7.1: Electricity capital budget showing direct benefit for previously disadvantaged areas (PDA)


Table 7.5: The 2013/14 RLM Graduated Water Tariff Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 – 12 kl</td>
<td>ZAR 111.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 – 25 kl</td>
<td>ZAR 251.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 – 40 kl</td>
<td>ZAR 436.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 – 60 kl</td>
<td>ZAR 716.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61+ kl</td>
<td>ZAR 1,010.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


the poor people merely get a ‘lifeline’ supply, which only serves to reinforce powerlessness, Table 7.6 and Figure 7.2 show that for the period between 2005 and 2012 more than 80 percent of the budget on water infrastructure went to the previously disadvantaged areas.
### Table 7.6: Water Capital Budget showing direct benefit for previously disadvantaged areas (PDA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Amount</th>
<th>Direct Benefit for PDA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>58,022,121</td>
<td>46,710,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2007</td>
<td>50,174,839</td>
<td>40,849,301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>75,691,151</td>
<td>68,216,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>35,133,326</td>
<td>17,558,907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>34,669,841</td>
<td>29,442,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2011</td>
<td>22,590,862</td>
<td>22,590,862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>24,061,565</td>
<td>24,061,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-2013</td>
<td>119,291,902</td>
<td>40,730,193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Tables 7.1 and 7.7 show that, for the 2006/07 financial year, the RLM raised about the same amount of income it spent (about ZAR 1 billion). The RLM spent about 31 percent of that budget on the infrastructure for water, electricity, sewerage and road networks, using just over a third (34%) to buy bulk services (water and electricity). Although much of the expenditure is on salaries, loans and other lavish and wasteful lifestyles (by officials), the discussion above has shown that a significant amount that was spent on infrastructure has gone to the poor (especially water infrastructure). Even the expenditure on electricity infrastructure is skewed to the rich and middle class because the data is mainly for the old ‘white’ municipal boundaries. The larger part of the RLM is serviced directly by Eskom (the state-owned electricity provider), which has distributed power to the former ‘homeland’ parts of the city.

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127 Nonetheless, that budget doubles to about R2 billion when the Bafokeng administration’s annual budget is considered (while a number of South African rural municipalities are running on deficit budgets) (pers. Comm., officer, Nkonkobe Local Municipality, Eastern Cape, emailed raw data, 2008).
Figure 7.2: Water Capital Budget showing direct benefit for PDA

Table 7.7: Breakdown of Rustenburg Local Municipality expenditure, 2003/04–2006/07 in ’000 ZAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure Category</th>
<th>2003/04</th>
<th>2004/05</th>
<th>2005/06</th>
<th>2006/07</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal recoveries</td>
<td>48,149</td>
<td>37,604</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>60,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee related costs – wages &amp; salaries</td>
<td>145,297</td>
<td>141,766</td>
<td>129,000</td>
<td>204,898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs capitalised</td>
<td>1,568</td>
<td>2,425</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs reallocated</td>
<td>3,536</td>
<td>2,098</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remuneration of Councillors</td>
<td>7,835</td>
<td>10,664</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>12,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working capital reserve</td>
<td>52,300</td>
<td>52,300</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection costs</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>977</td>
<td>1,051</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depreciation</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>6,632</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repairs &amp; maintenance</td>
<td>13,289</td>
<td>17,501</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>25,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest expense – external loans</td>
<td>8,250</td>
<td>10,621</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>13,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulk purchases</td>
<td>385,800</td>
<td>446,060</td>
<td>339,000</td>
<td>454,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracted Services</td>
<td>15,800</td>
<td>20,861</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>50,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General expenses</td>
<td>58,467</td>
<td>68,702</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td>85,931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal charges</td>
<td>47,668</td>
<td>37,465</td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td>60,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution from operating to capital</td>
<td>5,116</td>
<td>4,779</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>7,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer from/to other reserves</td>
<td>4,871</td>
<td>5,883</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>6,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Expenditure</strong></td>
<td><strong>803,825</strong></td>
<td><strong>866,338</strong></td>
<td><strong>737,051</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,054,940</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


For McDonald (2008), municipal spending and resource distribution are skewed towards suburbs and industry, with smaller flat rates (R0.68 for sanitation and R6.59/kilolitre of water) charged in such elite spaces. Additionally, there have been tax breaks for private sector investments as well as huge public sector spending and investments and government-
sponsored loans for infrastructure that favours the private sector (cheaper municipal services, telecommunications, housing, roads, railways, ports, harbours, entertainment and convention facilities) (ibid.). Such tax breaks and private sector investments have been part of the new accumulation strategy in South Africa since about 1996. Although billions of South African rands have been spent on low income housing, water and electricity infrastructure and services, such expenditure is disproportionate relative to that spent on the needs of private capital and transnational elites (ibid.).

I mentioned in Chapter 5 of this thesis that only 20 percent of residents of the informal settlement of Freedom Park are provided with formal housing (4,000 out of about 20,000 people). Notably, the rest live in informal shacks, without access to either RDP housing or basic services. Although none of my informants in Freedom Park are registered as recipients of the indigent subsidy, those Freedom Park residents living in RDP housing do not pay for the water services they continue to receive. The RLM deal with defaulters by threatening them with notices of attaching assets, evictions and service cut-offs as well as threats of removal of infrastructure to avoid illegal connections. These include the cost of water incurred during the construction phase (by a private contractor) being passed on to RDP house recipients. What this situation of intimidation and uncertainty mean for the people of Freedom Park is that they don’t have access to a free basic service (electricity), especially because the service is provided through the pre-paid meter system. This is not the case when it comes to access to water.

Similarly, I mentioned in Chapter 4 that Bafokeng’s access to basic services is higher than comparable communities nationally (see Figure 7.1). In 2008, 94 percent of Bafokeng had access to electricity, 98 percent had access to water (77% with taps in the house yard and 21% using boreholes or public taps). Nationally, large numbers of rural households were, by 2002, on communal water standpipes, pit latrines and without electricity (McDonald, 2008). Similar to the people of Freedom Park, 80 percent of Bafokeng villagers do not pay for the water services that they continue to receive (pers. comm., official, Department of Infrastructure Development and Planning, Phokeng, interview, 2008). Given that no legal threats are made for non-payment of water services, Bafokeng indirectly benefit free basic water service. Although serious backlogs remain in the area of sanitation, with 92 percent of Bafokeng using pit latrines for sanitation, the Bafokeng administration was planning to roll out the sewerage network system.
The Bafokeng administration prefers to partner with government to provide better services in Bafokeng villages (for example, better quality housing for which the Bafokeng administration would augment regular state expenditure on housing\textsuperscript{128}). Similarly, officials in the Bafokeng administration would like to have distribution of stronger electricity voltage in Bafokeng villages. In fact, the Bafokeng administration attempted, around 2004/05, to prevent, for reasons of inferior quality, the building of RDP housing and provision of high mast lights in some Bafokeng villages (a high mast light is shown in Plate 7.1). It is not clear whether the

![Plate 7.1: A pole for a high mast light in Rustenburg](image)

*Source: Ngaka Mosiane*

state could have provided more RDP housing and electricity services had agreements on their provision been struck between the Bafokeng administration, the RLM and relevant state agencies. Such actions by the Bafokeng administration might indicate their willingness to deal with the existing problems of lower quality RDP housing, unreliable water supply and frequent electricity blackouts. The other reason for Bafokeng administration to resist government intervention such as high mast lights and RDP housing is the fact that the

\textsuperscript{128} In 2012, the state spent ZAR 85,000 for each house for people earning between ZAR 0 and ZAR 3,500.
Bafokeng administration has significant financial investments as well as their self-portrayed exceptionalism – “because we are Bafokeng” (King Leruo Molotlegi’s phrase at the public meeting, 31 October 2009). The point is that in Rustenburg the promise of the indigent policy is not met regarding access to electricity. However, it is met when it comes to water through ordinary people not paying for the service they continue to receive. The small number of people indirectly having “access” to indigent subsidies, should also be seen in the context of ‘the level’ of services provided (pit latrines, inadequate 50 KW/h electricity per household per month; low quality social housing; 6,000 litres of water per household per month), which means a user gets what is affordable to them. The provision of an inferior level of services speaks to cost-recovery (as opposed to state subsidy), reduced budget allocations and outsourcing of functions to cut costs (McDonald and Pape, 2002).

It is indeed the case that the provision of basic services through the equitable share system is undermined by the state’s willingness to deliver services through the local state but much less willing to devolve funds to that level because of the belief that income distribution is better done through national government fiscal instruments than transfers to the local state (Schroeder, 2003). The national government has put caps on rate increases as they threaten its tax-reducing, fiscally conservative strategy (McDonald, 2008). There is also an indication that, through instruments such as water user fee structures, the significant levels of revenue in Rustenburg places that city in a better position to support ordinary people’s social and economic efforts.

7.3 The role of social assistance in urban change
As is the case with the basic services, it is suggested that social grants play a role not only in livelihood formation (Parnell et al., 2009; Parnell, 2008), but also in global South experimentations with urban change (Ferguson, 2012). Are these pragmatic assertions or are they expressions for desperately attempting to decentre the global North as the source of urban theory? It is clear so far in my thesis that ‘the spaces of the city’ are critical to activities of livelihood formation, and social security and assistance are also crucial in that regard. Nonetheless, the role they play needs to be assessed in some detail. They cannot be read off the tables on livelihood portfolios in Chapter 5.

The South African constitution grants everyone, including those individuals who are unable to support themselves and their dependents, the right to access social security and appropriate
social assistance (RSA, 1996: Chapter 2, Section 27). Today, about 3.4 percent of South Africa’s gross domestic product (just over R109-billion) is being distributed as social security grants to about 20 percent of the population (just over 15 million people) (Southern African NGO Network, 2014). The number is higher if dependents of social security recipients are considered. In 2012, the Foster Care Grant paid out to an individual child per month was ZAR 770. A modest Child Support Grant for children up to 14 years was ZAR 80 – the money is paid out when a married couple’s income adds up to ZAR 1,100 or a single parent earns up to ZAR 800. Other more generous grants, according to Seekings (2002), include the Old-Persons Grant (ZAR 1,200), the Care Dependency Grant for people up to 18 years who are unable to care for themselves (ZAR 1,200); and the Disability Grant for people between the ages of 18 and 59 years (ZAR 1,200), including some of the people who are debilitated by HIV/AIDS. In a country where about 40 percent of working age are unemployed, the number of people outside the social security net (those between the ages of 14 and 65) is much higher.

In fact, one of the issues that remain unresolved in discussions on the role of social security in the growth of ordinary people’s incomes is what to do with the large number of people outside the social security grant system. The People’s Budget Coalition advocates for the introduction of a basic income grant for every unemployed, working-age person. It is also arguing for an increase in the amount of free water from the current 6,000 litres per month, for an increase in free electricity from the current 50kWh per month, and for an increase in the age of children receiving the child grant from 14 to 18 years (Seekings, 2002; Mail and Guardian, February 19, 2008). The introduction of the basic income grant would enable unemployed people, including informal workers, to receive a minimum monthly income. It has to be mentioned that informal sector workers are denied access to social insurance and assistance despite the provisions of the United Nations Social Security Convention 102 of 1952 (Becker and Olivier, 2008). Even though for Becker and Olivier (2008: 10) “South Africa…is one of those countries where the rights-based approach has been used with great

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129 According to Seekings (2002: 11), the South African social security system is distinctive from the rest of the global South in the sense that it combines a very limited contributory insurance scheme with a very extensive non-contributory social assistance program. The result is that South Africa spends nine percent of total government spending on the social security grant; which amounts to 3.5% of GDP (two times more than its counterparts in the global South). (Also see http://www.cssr.uct.ac.za/ssu).

success to ensure access to social security – particularly to non-citizens”, there is an indication in their book that non-nationals are mostly excluded from social security in South Africa (Becker and Olivier, 2008: 145). Thus, the absence of basic income grant and social security benefit for informal workers and migrants means that many ordinary people in cities of the global South are without income for basic subsistence.

Having said that, although the amounts of social grants are small, they are often used to support the unemployed members of households (Mosoetsa, 2011). However, such meagre grants become significant constituents of livelihoods, especially when used in combination with other livelihood assets that ordinary people tend to create for themselves (Chapter 5). Although public discourses on the levels of poverty since 1994 reflect conflicting assessments (primarily due to the use of different data sources – the official Statistics South Africa and the more private Southern African NGO Network, for example), consensus has emerged that since the year 2000, the frontiers of poverty have been contained, if not pushed back. Even though for Maharaj et al. (2011) the ‘war on poverty’ has been lost, there is general agreement that some progress in service delivery has been made (Dubbeld, 2013; McDonald, 2008) and the incomes of the poorest of the poor grew by about 38 percent between 1993 and 2004 (Mail and Guardian, November 26, 2007). An important point to note is that such incomes have grown because of the expansion in social grants since 1994 (Seekings, 2002)\textsuperscript{131}.

The point I am making is that due to the expansion of social grants the income growth of ordinary people means that they can use such grants as a to complement their portfolio of livelihood assets (for example, Manosi renting out rooms to migrants; renting out a shop; having access to water and electricity; her mother’s old-age pension; Manosi’s participation in the savings-and-credit scheme; her grandchildren’s support grants; and her support from her extended family, Kutle, Lekgotla) (see Table 6.1). Some of the complaints of officials at the RLM and the South African Social Security Agency are that beneficiaries use social security grants as sources of income, rather than a form of assistance, and that beneficiaries want more social grants and free basic services (such as electricity) that they, as officials, and the middle class do not receive.

\textsuperscript{131} Also see http://www.cssr.uct.ac.za/ssu (last accessed April, 2011)
The other challenge for ordinary people is that access to social security and basic services (as livelihood assets) is thinly guaranteed by the state due to constitutional limitations: the state is only expected to take reasonable measures, within its available resources, to achieve progressive realisation of these rights (RSA, 1996: Chapter 2, Section 27). To the extent that those provisions are non-committal, it is likely that the maintenance and expansion of social security grants (just over 3.5% of the country’s GDP) may be undermined. Indeed the landmark case of Mrs Grootboom versus the Republic of South Africa in 2000 could have removed any uncertainties regarding the state’s responsibility to provide access to social security, housing, health care, food and basic services to those unable to support themselves (Grootboom vs. the Republic of South Africa, 2000, 11). Mrs. Irene Grootboom and her co-complainants were rendered homeless as a result of their eviction from their informal homes, which were situated on private land earmarked for formal low-cost housing. Although the Constitutional Court ruled in favour of the complainants, it could not compel the state to grant them access to basic services as well as social security and assistance. Mrs. Irene Grootboom died in August 2008 having not realised her right to social security and basic services. This is because such rights are framed in the constitution as “the right to have access” to a basic need (RSA, 1996, Chapter 2, Section 27) as opposed to “the right to a basic need”. The state is only expected to “take reasonable…measures, within its available resources”, to achieve “progressive realisation of these rights” (RSA, 1996, Chapter 2, sections 26 and 27). Thus, given the country’s market-friendly macro-economic policy that emphasises inflation targeting over robust job-creating, labour-intensive industrialisation drive, the problem of job losses that has been experienced since the 1970s through the 2008 financial crisis will undoubtedly put more of a burden on the country’s social security system as well as the provision of basic services. The sustainability of these issues of entitlement should be considered in thinking about their experimental role in southern urbanism.

Social grants and urban change should also be considered in the context of the financial burden that might be placed on countries like South Africa, as social grants incentivise immigration (Becker and Olivier, 2008: 166). The continued provision of social security and basic services (as constituents of livelihoods) is more uncertain when considered within the

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132 Inflation targeting of between 3-6 percent is meant to ensure that the state runs a positive net in international reserves and current account surpluses, and to ensure that favourable conditions for the often insatiable and more volatile capital flows are maintained.
context of African\textsuperscript{133} migration flows. Indeed migrants are aware of the constitutional provision that “everyone has the right to have access to…social security” (RSA, 1996, Chapter 2, Sections 27; Olivier and Kakula, 2004) wherever they are (Parnell, 2008). Many of them, however, are not able to apply for social grants for fear of exposing their ambiguous and fragile immigration statuses. For Becker and Olivier (2008: 145) “apart from some exceptions for foreigners with permanent status, non-nationals on the whole are mostly excluded from social security in South Africa. In Chapter 5 it was noted that Kgarebe is afraid to seek health-related social services out of fear that she may be caught and deported. Although there are international conventions that protect the socio-economic rights of the documented and undocumented people (the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 1976 International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, for example), they are undermined by the requirement of many host countries that, except for refugees and asylum seekers, visiting guests should have sufficient means of subsistence upon admission.

In the current era of the global movement of people, efforts are being made to integrate social security benefits across southern Africa (as in the European Union, where citizens enjoy full and equal social security protection across the region). An integration of social security benefit across southern Africa may prove to be a challenge given the varying and lower levels of development across the region. In fact, the informal sector activities and the informal trans-border trade constitute the bulk of the private sector in much of Africa since the 1970s (Meagher, 2001). The informal sector has come to be a force for Africa’s regional integration and an avenue for the development of an authentic indigenous bourgeoisie (Peberdy, 2000). However, Meagher’s (2001) main point is that trans-border informal sector activities can severely undermine a nation’s productive capabilities. In West Africa for example, less than three percent of trade is intra-regional, with the rest of trade in the region dominated by overseas imports as well as by rerouted regional goods destined for world markets. Critical tax revenue from imports and exports is diverted to (or lost as a result of broader participation in) the informal cross-border trade. In the process, the state’s fiscal and monetary resources are drained, while its control by related institutions is weakened. Custom duties are an important revenue source for investing in agriculture and industrial development, but they are lost to the workings of informal cross-border trade. In this sense, informal cross-border trade

\textsuperscript{133} The imagined and indistinct notion of Africa.
has weakened the possibilities for exploiting regional complementarities in resource endowments, and it has instead “reinforced the parasitic, economically destabilizing character of the trade” (Meagher, 2001: 44).

Thus, African states need to be able “to take a lead in shaping international policy frameworks and the way they are implemented” Meagher (2003: 69). The political, economic and other relationships that Africa is developing with the global South (for example, Brazil, Russia, India, China, Turkey, South Korea and the United Arab Emirates) is likely to fuel the ‘trend-break’ away from economic stagnation and to increase access to overseas development assistance (The Economist, 2011). China and India are expected to boost Africa’s investment in infrastructure, manufacturing and skills development as well as opening their markets for Africa’s consumer goods. Having said that, Africa’s reversal of economic stagnation is still led by trade in natural resources, a reversal that is mainly useful for supporting the domestic economic growth of Brazil, India and China. Similarly, Africa has seen an expansion of the middle class (earning more than US$3,000 per annum) to about 60 million people. This expansion is projected to increase to 100 million middle class Africans by 2015, with the benefit of supporting Brazil, India and China’s new exports (ibid.). The point I am making is that while members of the global South have well-developed strategies of engagement among themselves (access to natural resources and a growing market for their export), Africa does not have a coherent regional strategy, it is a passive participant in such interactions (ibid.).

7.4 Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted South Africa as having the most extensive social security system in the global South. Although a large number of unemployed people are still left out of this system, its role is more than a crucial safety net. The growth in the incomes of the poorest category is attributed to the expansion of social security, meaning that both basic services and social grants provide significant resources for the activities of livelihood formation. It is for these reasons of the role of social grants and the small progress made in the delivery of basic services that it has been suggested that middle income nations such as South Africa are making an urban redistribution agenda possible (Parnell, 2008). The case of Rustenburg has indeed shown that possibilities exist to increase access to basic services and deliver more developmental goals (the tariff structure as it relates to ordinary people is favourable: just over 60 percent of the RLM budget is spent on the purchasing of water and electricity as well as building infrastructures for sanitation, water and electricity). The role played by the
Bafokeng kinship has not been insignificant in this regard. Indeed the delivery of both basic services and social security is under enormous pressure. The state transfers for the provision of basic services are prohibitively negligent, as municipalities fail to register larger numbers of indigents. These services, together with social security grants, are not fully guaranteed by the state due to constitutional limitations and the higher demand on an already extensive social security system, all in the context of growing African and Asian migrants to South Africa, with the economies biased to the middle and higher classes, with state infrastructure expenditure skewed to them.
Cities are characterised by a contradictory dynamic of opportunities for and the suppression of the livelihoods of the poor. On the one hand, the coexistence of ordinary people’s social and economic activities with sites of formal businesses, affordable tribal authority accommodation and business rentals, and the city’s rapidly globalising networks creates a dynamism conducive for livelihoods creativity. The scholarly works of Peberdy (2000), Meagher (2003), Peberdy and Rogerson (2003) have been useful for thinking about such spatialities as they relate to opportunities for livelihood formation. I have also used an emerging body of work on southern urbanism (Simone, 2010b; Pieterse, 2012; 2013a; 2013b; Roy, 2011; 2009; 2005; Malaquais, 2007) to connect livelihood studies to mainstream urban theory – what ordinary people do to rebuild their lives and to reshape the city itself.

Historically, spatial propinquity of Rustenburg had by the 1930s created conditions for social and economic creativity and empowerment. That spatial form was also constituted by the introduction of the plough technology and the teaching of carpentry and building construction by missionaries facilitated a broad-based participation in the local economy – the Indian businesses’ patronage across social boundaries locally, the Bafokeng’s gendered competitiveness in the agricultural economy; Bethlehem’s stokvels, shebeens, and its cultural life; Helen MacGregor’s marmalade Packhouse Company; the work of the members of the Federation of the Magaliesberg’s Tobacco Farmers’ Co-operation, all served to sustain the lives of the people of Rustenburg. These practices were significant not only in how ordinary people made a living, but also in how they managed their relationship with the city. Although black people’s involvement was characterised by a relation of dependency to the dominant, white social formations, they played a role in the vibrancy of this town’s economy. Similarly, the holy communion time of the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, the Gereformeerde Kerke van Suid-Afrika, and the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk provided opportunities for the creation of landscape of practice, the everyday routines that produced and reproduced the actual living landscapes.

Today, the same is true for sex-workers accessing money from taverns goers; for using full-blast music in public spaces as a marketing strategy; for performing (for money) music and dance and splits; for shifting identities from living beings to objects and back again. These
activities, together with stokvels, street trading, taverns, and shebeens, are the nuts and bolts of Rustenburg’s vibrant spaces of interactivity. They were also useful also for generating income to build houses for status and other forms of identity, and for educating children in order to give them a leg-up in life. In Phokeng, access to land plays a role in generating money and keep it circulating locally – plots of land are used by Bafokeng to build taverns and tuckshops, to rent rooms out to migrants or even rent the land itself out to migrants for trading activities. Additionally, health and school facilities, water and electricity infrastructure, local supply sources for trade goods as well as business services and development centres indirectly support the livelihoods of the poor. Rustenburg in general is characterised by stronger local purchasing power as well as opportunities for personal and institutional networks across and beyond the city. Such connections, including the international urban design and planning traditions, facilitated by an efficient and affordable telecommunication and transport systems, have been significant in Rustenburg’s new socio-cultural and economic spaces.

The empirical material above led to three major conclusions for this thesis. First, transport and telecommunications can enable the interconnectedness of space locally by way of physical co-existence and globally by institutional and personal networks. Such interconnectedness is in turn fed by resources (in the rural context – Phokeng) such as facilities for health, schools, and business development; infrastructure for water and electricity as well as land and associated forms of livelihood activities. In the urban context, street trading, informal sector trade goods, local purchasing power, and the cosmopolitanisation of business ownership have fed the composition of the inner city. It is important to note that the rural and the urban complement one another, with cheaper accommodation and business sites rented in rural areas supporting ordinary people’s engagement with the city. In that situation, interconnectedness is itself a resource not only for the circulation of value locally, but also for socio-cultural, economic and political creativity. Equally important is the sensory and the perceptual in the configuration of such spaces of creativity. However, historical and contemporary forces continue to variously undermine the consolidation and sustainability of these spaces.

The second major conclusion of this thesis is that the activities of ordinary people are often presented in a poetic language that is inaccessible to scholars and practitioners – Simone’s extensive work (2001; 2004; 2008a; 2008b; 2010a; 2010b; 2012; 2013a; 2013b). My thesis
has presented ordinary people’s bustling and fluid spaces in ways that are accessible, using the ideas of the body and intellectuality to explain their practices – how do they use their emotional sensibilities to engage the city. Although such a flux of the life of the city is characterised by both the local and global movements (as made possible by affectivity – the experiences of feelings and emotions), some rootedness in space, as a base for living and making a living, is necessary. Notably, the everyday navigation of the city is part of the broader imaginative practices that enable ordinary people to make good use of limited opportunities around them, in the process creating their own spaces of livelihood formation. Having said that, such navigation also involves the realisation of domination through space, such that space (including movement itself as space) is an active agent in processes of identity formation. In the end, a city is produced by ordinary people and dominant powers into a hodgepodge of urban and rural lifestyles. Importantly, affectivity can translate deeply embedded predispositions, desires, and concerns and steer people toward resonant, appealing, and promising responses that often subvert official controls.

The third major conclusion is that the city has, in its constitution, the makings of constraining and occluding ordinary people’s livelihood practices: in the relationship between informality, the city, and the formal economy; in support for viable informal businesses versus those that are survivalist; in the configuration of space that favours prestigious projects of the Master Plan, city regeneration and the FIFA World Cup, for example. In that sense, there has been a refocusing of urban functions away from social support toward investment in the service economy. From the mid-1990s, efforts have been made to produce distinctively middle-class spaces of consumption, recreation, pleasure, and residence. Crucial to the discussions on livelihoods and the transformative potential of cities is the ways in which these spaces are coming with the draconian control measures against the informal economic sector as well as the removal of the very poor from derelict buildings in order to make way for the middle-class.

Having said that, the exercise of dominant power associated with such landscapes is not generalisable to the whole city. Thus, although ordinary people in the three case studies have shown remarkable resilience, resistance and resourcefulness, their activities have increasingly come to be undermined by the structures of power. Nonetheless, spaces such as Freedom Park experienced little state interference in the way of livelihoods formation throughout much of the post-apartheid period. Thus, the different experiences of the three case studies sites in
the city (the inner city, Phokeng and Freedom Park) indicate that the ways in which they are constituted and valorised affect the places of ordinary people in the city and what such people can do. Therefore, even in a medium-sized city like Rustenburg, the experiences of Freedom Park (as a space that is generative of socio-cultural and economic innovation and adaptation) are confined to that space, and cannot be generalised for the city region. Overall, the redevelopment practices in Rustenburg bring into focus the tensions of city life – urban residents and the city space are agents of social reproduction on the one hand and are resources for creating emancipatory spaces on the other. In this sense, living and making a living in the city involves mediating such tensions – although the new spaces produced by the body and the dream often cohere into real material landscape that shapes everyday practices and social identities, the sensual, rationality, history, and the landscape provide resources for continual exploration and reproduction of new spaces of emancipation from poverty and domination.

**Future research directions**

The discussions in this thesis are placed in the broader experiences and theories developed across the global South and North. Having said that, it is analytically fruitful to conduct comparative studies between Rustenburg and other cities in Africa and beyond. Such a comparative work will be useful for determining how differently constituted and valorised spaces of the city affect ordinary people’s activities and how they in turn rework such spaces.

Additionally, I mentioned in the introductory chapter that the role of organized groups in constructing the spaces of livelihood formation is relatively absent in this thesis because ordinary people lack sufficient material resources and have limited access to centres of power and the judicial system (Ballard, Habib and Valodia, 2006; Ballard, et al, 2005). Moving forward, making connections between the household/individual everyday practices and collective actions might yield fruitful insights. Of significance here will be to explore the coexistence, co-selection, co-variation, and co-institutionalization – the forms of interactions which may lead to transformative outcomes by complementary players – even situations where a wide range of actors with different objectives and agendas might be seen to be in contentious relations.

Another line of future research direction relates to the implications of the issues raised in this thesis (the spaces of livelihood formation, spatial propinquity and distanciation as well as the
bodily and intellectuality as resources for ordinary people to engage with the city) for the broader discussions on southern urbanism – what is the potential geographical reach of the vernacular as explanatory concepts? Is it fruitful to use and develop such vernacular? In the context of southern dominated urbanism, is there a role for concepts developed in the north?
Appendix 1

Semi-structured intensive interview questions
Phokeng

A. Officials

1. In what ways, if any, do you think each of the following projects/programmes facilitate or hinder ordinary people’s livelihood activities: grants and subsidies for ordinary people’s benefits (intergovernmental transfers, indigent grants, basic services tariff structure and infrastructure spending); social security grants; ward and family structures – Makgotla, Dikutle – road and public transport networks; enterprise development/small business linkages, water, electricity, sports, the Royal Bafokeng Sports Palace, and the Royal Bafokeng Sports Campus?

B. Ordinary people

1. What do you do to make a living (the different social and economic activities you use to make a living)?
2. Are you able to create livelihoods in places you prefer?
3. What ideas do you have about making such areas of livelihood formation viable?
4. Do you have access to water and electricity? Are they enough for you to carry out your livelihood activities?
5. Do you have access to Lekgotla and Kutle; road and transport networks; schools; RDP housing; sport programmes and facilities (the Royal Bafokeng Sports Palace); enterprise development programme/small business linkages as well as water and electricity for your social and economic benefits? In what ways do they assist you to carry out your livelihood activities?
6. Do you have access to state grants and subsidies (indigent grants, basic services subsidies) and social security grants?
7. I am asking you to allow me to record your daily activities and connections, including the people you speak with on the phone? I am only interested in the activities and networks related to your livelihood activities. I will do this by asking you questions about your activities and connections on any day of my choice (10 days in total). I am asking to accompany you during these days while you carry out some of your activities?
Appendix 2

Semi-structured intensive interview questions

Freedom Park

A. Officials

1. In what ways, if any, do you think each of the following projects/programmes facilitate or hinder ordinary people’s livelihood activities: grants and subsidies for ordinary people’s benefits (intergovernmental transfers, indigent grants, basic services tariff structure and infrastructure spending); social security grants; road and public transport networks; enterprise development/small business linkages, water, electricity?

B. Ordinary people

1. What do you do to make a living (different social and economic activities)?
2. Are you able to make a living in places you prefer?
3. What ideas do you have about making the areas you make a living viable?
4. Do you have access to water and electricity? Are they enough for you to carry out your livelihood activities?
5. Do you have access to road networks, education facilities, enterprise development programmes, RDP housing, sport programs and facilities? In what ways do they assist you to carry out your livelihood facilities?
6. Do you have access to state grants and subsidies (intergovernmental transfers, indigent grants, basic services tariff structure and infrastructure spending)?

7. I am asking you to allow me to record your daily activities and connections, including the people you speak with on the phone. I am only interested in the activities and networks related to your livelihoods. I will do this by randomly asking you questions about your activities and connections on any day (10 days in total). I am asking to accompany you on some of these days while you carry out some of your activities?
Appendix 3

Semi-structured intensive interview questions

Downtown Rustenburg

A. Officials

1. In what ways, if any, do you think each of the following projects/programmes facilitate or hinder ordinary people’s livelihood activities: grants and subsidies for ordinary people’s benefits (intergovernmental transfers, indigent grants, basic services tariff structure and infrastructure spending); social security grants; road and public transport networks; enterprise development/small business linkages, water, electricity?

B. Ordinary people

1. What do you do to make a living (different social and economic activities)?
2. Are you able to make a living in places you prefer?
3. What ideas do you have about making the areas you make a living viable?
4. Do you have access to water and electricity? Are they enough for you to carry out your livelihood activities?
5. Do you have access to road networks, education facilities, enterprise development programs, RDP housing, sport programmes and facilities? In what ways do they assist you to carry out your livelihood facilities?
6. Do you have access to state grants and subsidies (intergovernmental transfers, indigent grants, basic services tariff structure and infrastructure spending)?
7. I am asking you to allow me to record your daily activities and connections, including the people you speak with on the phone. I am only interested in the activities and networks related to your livelihoods. I will do this by randomly asking you questions about your activities and connections on any day (10 days in total). I am asking to accompany you on some of these days while you carry out some of your activities?
Appendix 4

Tlhabane

The relocation of the people of Bethlehem indicates that the apartheid city was relatively established in Rustenburg by the end of the 1930s. To an extent that it is not easy to translate a law into some reality (the March 1950 Groups Areas Act, for example), it is remarkable that Rustenburg achieved its compulsory segregation effort long before the formation of the Department of Community Planning in 1960, which was meant to turn the Group Areas Act into some reality by destroying old mixed or inner city areas in order to create settlements of black townships, Coloureds, Asian, and white areas. There is limited evidence of Tlhabane’s anti-apartheid struggle\textsuperscript{134}. This might be related to the stronghold that the Department of Native Affairs (DNA) held historically (via the Black Local Authority – BLA) over Bethlehem and later Tlhabane\textsuperscript{135}. Indeed some of the individuals who were relocated to Tlhabane from the Bethlehem location held positions of Ministers in the Bophuthatswana regime (Norman Sechele and Hendrick Tlou, for example), while others held local leadership positions such as school principals.

\textsuperscript{134} The South African history online (www.sahistory.org.za) points to the following regarding Tlhabane’s resistance against apartheid: the conditions of farm workers; Bram Fisher’s hiding in Rustenburg; the National Union of Mine Workers (their activities confined to the mines and nearby informal settlements) and the Food and Allied Workers Union (their activities confined to the Rainbow Chicken factory); the Seoposengwe Party (a Tswana, Bophuthatswana-based political party); activists who would meet at the house of Joe Letsie in Moroka Street.

\textsuperscript{135} It was mentioned earlier that the Advisory Board was established under the provisions of the Native (Urban) Areas Act of 1923. In 1961, the Urban Bantu Councils were provided for by the law (the Urban Bantu Council Act, 1961) to replace the Advisory Boards. In 1977 the Community Councils were established (Community Council Act, 1977), and for the first time the black local administrators were given some executive powers. They were self-supported financially. In 1982, the Black Local Authority body was provided for by the law (the Black Local Authority Act, 1982) and they were established in townships across the country (not in black ‘homelands’). They were given some form of local autonomy and local power, with some administrative functions on budgets raised locally.
Although the 1960s were generally characterised by extremely tight political repression in South Africa, and thus harder to mount political opposition, the National Union of Mine Workers (NUM) was active mainly in the Rustenburg mines, maintaining. It might have been because of the stronghold that the DNA and the BLA held over both Bethlehem/Tlhabane and the fact that the majority of mine workers in Rustenburg were and remain to be migrants from elsewhere in South Africa as well as from southern African countries that there was distance between NUM and the Tlhabane politics. The workplace politics and the township politics did not feed into each other by way of carrying the workplace struggles into the township struggles or vice versa. Hart (2002: 159) observed in the case of KwaZulu-Natal that “industrial dynamics in Ladysmith-Ezakheni in the first half of the 1990s were not only moulded and shaped by historically and locally specific arenas and forms of struggle, they also unleashed new rounds of struggle that reconfigured these local arenas, and indeed the form of the [post-apartheid] local state”. Therefore, Tlhabane’s apparent lack of resistance against apartheid or against incorporation into Bophuthatswana led to the absence of vibrant and robust civil society in the post-apartheid Rustenburg.
Appendix 5

Bafokeng

As regards the changes in Bafokeng’s political subjectivity, it was in their defence of their land against mining companies that shaped their current political consciousness (such a political subjectivity is important for contemporary politics of livelihood formation). Accordingly, in November 1925, Chief Molotlegi signed a mineral prospecting contract with William Schreiner Cooper of Pretoria on behalf of Bafokeng, according to which William Schreiner Cooper would prospect on eleven farms. Subsequent to the 1925 land and mineral lease contracts, one year prospecting leases were entered into between Bafokeng and mining operators over the following farms: Vaalkop, Stylrdrift, Hartebeespruit, Goedgedacht, Kleindoornspruit, Reinkoyalskraal, Turfontein, and Vlakfontein. William Schreiner Cooper subsequently ceded his contract to the Rustenburg Platinum Ltd, a contract also ceded to a series of mining operators: the Eerstegeluk Platinum Mines Ltd, later the Potgietersrust Platinum Ltd, and the Waterval Mine. In 1931, Eerstegeluk Platinum Mines Ltd, Potgietersrust Platinum Ltd, and Waterval Mine were bought by Rustenburg Platinum Mines.

In 1926 Bafokeng, as the land and mineral rights holder, began to be involved in a struggle with the companies contracted to mine platinum on Bafokeng land. Their struggle with Eerstegeluk Platinums was over the provisions of the 1926 agreement between Kgosi August Molotlegi and William Schreiner Cooper—the provisions included the right to

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136 Much of the remarks below are sourced from Mbenga and Manson (2010).

137 The platinum group metals were discovered in the Rustenburg area by Dr. Hans Merensky, a geologist, in 1924.

138 The following is a genealogy list of Bafokeng kings during and after apartheid: August Molotlegi (1896-1938), Manotshe Molotlegi (1938-1956), Edward Lebone Molotlegi (1956-1995), and Lebone Mollowane Molotlegi (1995-2000). It has to be mentioned that during Edward Lebone Molotlegi’s exile in Botswana (1988-1994), he nominated Cecil Tumagole (his uncle) to act on his behalf as chief. However, Mangope (the leader of Bophuthatswana) managed to remove him for Mokgwaro George Molotlegi (the younger brother to Edward Lebone Molotlegi).
purchase the farm Klipfontein and lease, perpetually, its mineral rights. In that year (1926) the Bafokeng chief--August Molotlegi – was persuaded to sign on his own (without the consent of the community/Tribal Council) the contract with Eerstegeluk Platinums, giving the company a ‘perpetual mineral lease’ in the farm Klipfontein. The problems surrounding that agreement between Bafokeng and Eerstegeluk Platinums were not resolved until they resurfaced in the form of a legal battle in 1952 when Eerstegeluk Platinums wanted to buy Klipfontein according to the 1926 provisions. Bafokeng--under the leadership of Kgosi James Manotshe Molotlegi--won that legal case because the community denied knowledge of them agreeing to grant Eerstegeluk Platinums the surface rights (they accepted knowledge of agreeing to lease to the company the mineral rights). Bafokeng won that case also because even if the perpetual mineral lease included the right to purchase land on which mining operations were conducted, in terms of the 1913 Land Act, white ownership of land was prohibited on the areas scheduled for black occupation, unless the Governor-General had approved the land purchase transaction. The 1913 Land Act, as it pertains to Scheduled Areas, gave certain measure of protection to African-owned land (Mbenga and Manson, 2010).

In another legal case, Impala mining company (henceforth Impala) entered into certain notarial prospecting contract with Bafokeng in 1966, and the agreement to mine the so-called First and Second Bafokeng areas for thirty five (35) years was reached in 1977. Impala needed to prolong their rights of mining the First and Second Bafokeng Areas and to obtain access to a new adjacent platinum reserve (the Third Bafokeng Area). However, Bafokeng were not interested in granting Impala additional rights. The Bophuthatswana ‘homeland’ was given a semblance of independence in 1977 by the South African apartheid regime, and the Tswana-speaking places such as Bafokeng territory were automatically incorporated into that administration. Therefore, Bophuthatswana administration became the
new custodian of Bafokeng land, and began to negotiate mining contracts with Impala Platinum on behalf of Bafokeng (hitherto the Secretary of Native Affairs held land in trust for its owners—he acted as a trustee). The action to negotiate mining contracts with Impala was opposed by Bafokeng, thereby further deteriorating the relations between Bafokeng and the homeland administration. The opportunity for that administration to intensify its harassment and repression of Bafokeng, which included imprisoning some Bafokeng and their leadership (Chief Lebone Molotlegi and his wife, the Queen Semane Molotlegi) arose after the failed coup d’état against Bophuthatswana in 1988 – Chief Lebone Molotlegi was alleged to have at least bank-rolled the coup d’état. Following Chief Lebone Molotlegi’s exile to Botswana the new leader of Bafokeng imposed by the Bophuthatswana administration prolonged, in 1990, Impala’s request to mine the First, Second, and Third areas. A legal battle ensued between Bafokeng and Impala, ending in 1999 when the courts ruled in favour of Bafokeng (Cooke, 2008).

These struggles did not only provide the breeding ground for Bafokeng’s political consciousness, they also unleashed new rounds of struggles in the post-apartheid era, when the history of Bafokeng has become highly contested between smaller community factions and the broader community. The community factions are found in Bafokeng villages such as Chaneng, Mogono, Kanana, Tsitsing, Photshaneng, Thekwaneng, and Luka. The fact that the contest over Bafokeng history is between smaller community factions and the broader community was brought into sharper focus at public meeting (Kgotha-kgothe) during the second half of 2006. The public meeting was supposed to agree on the transfer of financial and immovable assets from the Royal Bafokeng Nation to the Royal Bafokeng Nation Development Trust. The ‘rebels’ (as they are sometimes called) claim that their distinctive communities in the region did affiliate and submitted themselves under the Bafokeng authority in the second half of the nineteenth century for a strategic purpose: to pull together
resources (cattle and cash, for example) required to buy land (Caldwell, 2002). The current factional campaigns against Bafokeng’s common heritage are undoubtedly rooted in historical ownership of land and the contemporary socio-economic inequities among Bafokeng.
Appendix 6

RUSTENBURG STADSRAAD
RUSTENBURG CITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM

DEPARTMENT
PROTECTION SERVICES
10 AUG 1999
RECEIVED
03 AUG 1999

TO: CHIEF PROTECTION SERVICES

REF: 14/7 (2720)

LAW ENFORCEMENT PERTAINING TO HAWKERS IN THE AREA OF JURISDICTION OF THE RUSTENBURG CITY COUNCIL

Your memo dated 28 July 1999 refers.

The hawker’s committee led by Clr F Saloojee met on Friday, 30 July 1999 to discuss issues around the implementation of resolution 353 of 18 May 1999 regarding the establishment of hawkers areas.

Amongst the issues discussed, it was agreed that the South African Police Department (SAPD) as well as the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) will have to be engaged in this whole exercise. A meeting with the SAPD and the SANDF will be held on Thursday, 19 August 1999 at the Health Department.

A delegate, Mr Kobus Bester from your department was requested to make the necessary arrangements with the SAPD and the SANDF.

E. Coodray

ACTING CITY SECRETARY
(EML/rs)
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HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (NON-MEDICAL)
R1449 Mosiane

CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE

PROJECT TITLE
Livelihood and the transformative potential of the city of Rustenburg

INVESTIGATOR(S)
Mr NB Mosiane

SCHOOL/DEPARTMENT
Architecture and Planning

DATE CONSIDERED
18/10/2013

DECISION OF THE COMMITTEE
Approved Unconditionally

EXPIRY DATE
29/11/2015

DATE 29/11/2013

CHAIRPERSON (Professor T Mianii)

cc: Supervisor: Prof A Mabin

DECLARATION OF INVESTIGATOR(S)
To be completed in duplicate and ONE COPY returned to the Secretary at Room 10003, 10th Floor, Senate House, University.

I/We fully understand the conditions under which I am/we are authorized to carry out the abovementioned research and I/We guarantee to ensure compliance with these conditions. Should any departure to be contemplated from the research procedure as approved I/we undertake to resubmit the protocol to the Committee. I agree to completion of a yearly progress report.

Signature

Date 05/12/2013

PLEASE QUOTE THE PROTOCOL NUMBER ON ALL ENQUIRIES