

***EXPLORING THE POLICY PROCESS LEADING TO THE  
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ARF (African  
Renaissance and International Co-operation  
Fund)***



***A RESEARCH REPORT PRESENTED TO THE WITS  
SCHOOL OF GOVERNANCE  
UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND  
By  
Aletta Brook  
Supervisor: Prof A Van Nieuwkerk***

### **Declaration on plagiarism**

I, Aletta Brook, (Student Number: 692479), am a registered student for MM P&DM in 2014.

*I hereby declare the following:*

*I confirm that the work I submit for all assessment for the above course is my own unaided work. I have followed the required conventions in referencing the thoughts and ideas of others. I am aware that the correct method of referencing material and a discussion on what plagiarism is, are explained in the WSG Study Guide and these issues have been discussed in class during Orientation sessions and documented in the Introduction and Orientation Guide.*

*I am aware that plagiarism (the use of someone else's work without their permission and/or without acknowledging the original source) is wrong. I understand that the University of the Witwatersrand may take disciplinary action against me if there is a belief that this is not my own unaided work or that I have failed to correctly acknowledge the source of the ideas or words in my writing.*

Signature: *AN Brook*      Date: 9 October 2014

## **ABSTRACT**

Development aid plays a significant role on the African continent in a number of ways which include, but is not limited to, financing budget deficits, conflict resolution and humanitarian assistance. South Africa, China, India and Brazil are among the “*four main South powers*” emerging on the global scene with aid policies designed at providing development aid to African Countries [Tjønneland, 2013: 1].

This study has examined the establishment and implementation of the African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund (ARF) by analysing the policy processes that led to its creation and operation, from 2000 to 2009. The principle behind the development of such an act was South Africa’s desire to show its commitment in assisting in resolving Africa’s socio-economic challenges that impede development in Africa. ARF has suffered inconsistency in policy making and implementation. The study has found that the challenges in ARF policy processes were attributed to governance issues, issues of accountability, temptation to be used as a state fund for political interest, weakness in the institutional framework, absence of autonomy in management, absence of monitoring and evaluation, political power and poor administration systems.

**Key words:** *Policy formulation, Policy adoption, Policy Implementation and Monitoring and evaluation.*

## **Dedication**

For my mother, Lulama Nowini Mildred Dlala Brook, my late father, Aloysius Titi Brook, my children, Mbasu and Simthembile Brook, my sisters: Babalwa, Nomthandazo and Pumla Brook, my three brothers: the late Mfundo Brook, Lunga Brook, Thamsanqa Brook, my brother-in-law (Reiner Thomae) and my late uncle: Bishop Zolile Brook, this report is dedicated to you. Thank you for your unconditional love.

Success is the fruit of positive attitude, hard work, perseverance and support from the loved ones. Ndiyabulela mabamba, *nibambisane ngenyanda yeenkuni ningayeki, sekukufuphi empumelelweni.*

## **Acknowledgement**

It is with deep appreciation to my supervisor, Prof Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk, for his constructive, professional and sincere support during the compilation of this report. With sincere gratitude to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation from the secretary, the executive management and officials for granting me an opportunity to interview its staff and ensuring that I have contact with the relevant people in the organisation, your time and the information was appreciated. A special thanks to my friend, Kaddy Kalima, for his valuable time.

## **LIST OF ACRONYMS**

AfDB:	African Development Bank
ANC:	African National congress
ARF:	African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund
AU:	African Union
COSATU:	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DIRCO:	Department of International Relations and Co-operation
DPSA:	Department of Public Services and Administration
DRC:	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FEDSAW:	Federation of South African Women
IBSA:	India, Brazil and South Africa
ICC:	International Criminal Court
SAB:	Science Advisory Board
SACP:	South African Communist Party
SADC:	Southern African Development Community
SACU:	Southern African Customs Union
SADPA:	South African Development Partnership Agency
NEPAD:	New Partnership for Africa's Development
OECD:	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
UDF:	United Democratic Front
WB:	World Bank
WSSD:	World Summit on Sustainable Development

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION .....	1
1.2 Background .....	2
1.2. Problem statement .....	3
Purpose of the study .....	4
Research questions .....	4
Significance of the study .....	4
Ethical Consideration .....	4
The research outline of Chapter One .....	5
Conclusion .....	6
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW .....	7
2.1. Public Policy .....	8
.....	9
2.2. Scope of the study .....	9
2.3. Foreign Policy .....	10
2.3.1. South Africa's state of affairs post 1994 to current .....	10
2.3.2. South- South Cooperation .....	15
2.4. Development aid policy .....	16
2.5. South Africa's Development Aid Policy in perspective .....	17
2.6. Policy analysis .....	17
2.7. Policy Model .....	18
2.8. Policy process .....	19
2.9. Policy dialogue or Consultation .....	19
2.9.1. Identifying the problem/ setting the agenda .....	20
2.9.2. Analysing the problem and Policy Formulation .....	21
2.9.3. Political mandate/Policy Adoption .....	22
2.9.4. Policy Implementation .....	23
2.9.5 Accountability .....	24
2.9.6. Policy evaluation .....	24
2.10. Conclusion .....	25
Chapter 3: Research methodology .....	27
3.1. Introduction .....	27
3.2. Research Philosophy .....	27
3.4. Research Design .....	28
3.5. Sampling .....	29
3.6. Data Collection Procedure .....	29
3.6.1 Primary and Secondary data .....	30
3.7. Data Analysis .....	31

3.8. Data validation and reliability.....	32
3.9. Significance of the study .....	33
3.10. Ethical Considerations.....	33
3.11. Conclusion .....	33
CHAPTER 4: Data presentation .....	34
4.1. Introduction .....	34
4.2. Research Guide .....	35
4.3. Sample profile .....	35
4.4. Case Overview.....	36
4.5. Policy process for establishment of Act 51 of 2000.....	37
4.6. Legitimacy of Policy.....	38
4.6.3. DPISA approach to monitoring and evaluation.....	38
4.6.4. Chapter 9 of the South African Constitution: .....	39
4.7. THE white paper: Act 51 of 2000.....	40
4.9. The problem identified/agenda setting .....	42
4.13. Consultation and Co-ordination .....	45
4.14. ARF Capacity .....	45
4.15. Challenges Encountered by ARF.....	47
4.16. Policy operation .....	48
4.17. Enablers and Constrains of running the funds. ....	51
4.18. Suggestions from policy makers.....	53
4.19. Annual Reports.....	54
4.19. Conclusion .....	55
Chapter 5: analysis and Findings.....	57
5.1. Introduction .....	57
5.0.1. Findings.....	57
5.1. Setting the Agenda.....	57
5.2. Decision Making/Alternative policies.....	60
5.3. Policy Adoption .....	61
5.4. Implementation.....	61
5.5. Monitoring and evaluation .....	64
5.6. Enablers and constraints.....	66
5.7. Suggestions from Policy makers.....	68
5.8. Conclusion .....	68
Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations .....	69
6.1. Introduction .....	69
6.2. Recommendations .....	69
Conclusion.....	71



<b>Bibliography .....</b>	<b>73</b>
<b>Appendices .....</b>	<b>77</b>
<i>Appendix A: Interview Guide .....</i>	<i>77</i>
<i>appendix 1[a] .....</i>	<i>78</i>
<i>technical Interview Questions .....</i>	<i>78</i>
<b>Policy Agenda .....</b>	<b>78</b>
<b>policy formulation .....</b>	<b>78</b>
<b>policy adoption .....</b>	<b>78</b>
<b>Implementation .....</b>	<b>78</b>
<b>Evaluation and monitoring .....</b>	<b>79</b>
<i>Appendix b: List of Interviewees .....</i>	<i>80</i>

## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Development aid plays a significant role on the African continent in a number of ways which include, but is not limited to, financing budget deficits, conflict resolution and humanitarian assistance. South Africa, China, India and Brazil are among the “*four main South powers*” emerging on the global scene with aid policies designed at providing development aid to African Countries [Tjønneland, 2013: 1]. Development aid policies have been debated by researchers, development agencies, governments, among others, not only in countries receiving aid, but also in countries providing aid. The development aid policy’s purpose, significance, relevance, intentions, feasibility, impact on development and influence on intergovernmental relations, to mention a few, are some of the areas of debate. South Africa is no exception to such rising debates, paving the way for scrutiny of its Development Aid policy. This research sought to examine the establishment and operation of the African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund (ARF) by analysing the policy processes that led to its creation and operation, from 2000 to 2009.

The ARF bill repealed the previous Economic Co-operation Promotion Loan Fund Act, 1968 (Act No. 68 of 1968), as amended by the Economic Co-operation Loan Fund Amendment Act, 1986 (Act No. 29 of 1986) and the Economic Co-operation Promotion Loan Fund Amendment Act, 1998 (Act No. 16 of 1998) [DIRCO, 2004]. The current Act was established in terms of section 2(1) of Act 51 of 2000 and is called the African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund [Agency, 2007]. It was published on 22 January 2001. It provides for the establishment of ARF for the purpose of enhancing integration and co-operation with and on the African Continent and to validate the Republic of South Africa’s commitment on the continent [Government Gazette, 2000].

## 1.2 BACKGROUND

Public policy making debates in South Africa are characterised by intense processes with different parties contesting their polarised views, often drawn along their political affiliations. Coming up with an agreed-upon policy is frequently the result of an absence of a policy in public issues or protest against a lack of service delivery. The principle behind the development of such an act was South Africa's desire to show its commitment in assisting in resolving Africa's socio-economic challenges that impede development in Africa.

Under DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Co-operation), an Act was created to assist the African continent. The Act was called the African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund Act, 2000; this reaffirmed the Republic's commitment to the concept of "African renaissance" which envisaged that African people and nations can overcome any challenges confronting the continent to achieve cultural, scientific, and economic renewal [Diop, 1996]. Through enhancing international co-operation on the African Continent, Mbeki saw the ARF as a step towards the vision (which was not a new phenomenon) which he publicised and supported. At its core, ARF was an economic and social development agenda for Africa. It was monitored and directed by the Department of International Relations and Co-operation [DIRCO].

The Fund's mandate as stipulated in the Act [p. 5] was to develop co-operation between South Africa and other African countries through:

- 1. promotion of democracy and good governance and the prevention and resolution of conflict;*
- 2. socio-economic development and integration;*
- 3. humanitarian and disaster relief in Africa and elsewhere in the world;*
- 4. technical assistance projects;*
- 5. capacity building, specifically in terms of human resource development, management training and student bursaries; and*
- 6. Projects relating to reaffirmation of South Africa's commitment to relations with Africa.*

According to one analyst, the ARF administered some commendable interventions throughout Africa such as: agricultural projects in Zimbabwe, cultural projects in Mali,

humanitarian assistance in Somalia, water dams in Lesotho, peace processes in Burundi, the DRC and Comoros; election observer missions in Zimbabwe and public administration training in Sudan, among others [Besharati, 2013]. There was however administrative and structural challenges which compromised the effectiveness of ARF [Braude, Thandrayan, & Sidiropoulos, 2008] given also that “*departments in South Africa could tap into the fund for nearly anything*” without being accountable [Besharati, 2013]. This showed misconstrued objectives for the fund.

Although the ARF Act was seen as a panacea to cure Africa through promoting development initiatives, there were flaws within the policy. For instance, other government departments, parastatals and non-governmental organisations provided support to their counterparts in other African countries and the fund’s development interventions were unclear and questionable [Besharati, 2013]. The above could be attributed to the lack of central control or records which should have been addressed by the ARF Act.

Since 2007, discussions about co-ordinating and restructuring of South Africa’s development aid policy had been taking place to address the shortcomings of ARF. Hargovan [2012] suggested that this was going to be addressed through reviewing the ARF Bill and developing a strategic agency that could manage all South African outgoing development aid. Even though the policy review and discussions are currently on-going on replacing ARF with a new fund i.e. the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA), ARF has been designed and is intended to better define, measure, and co-ordinate development co-operation activities.

## 1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Both anecdotal evidence [for instance: Tapula, de Kock, & Sturman, 2011] and reliable research [for instance: Besharati, 2013] suggests that the development aid policy of South Africa was inconsistent, not well co-ordinated, lacked proper implementing mechanisms and often diverted from policy objectives. South Africa has over the years been engaging other countries on the African continent through its different development initiatives and mechanisms. However, institutional incapacities, inconsistent actions to policy, misappropriation of funds, lack of proper

co-ordination, unaccountability, to mention a few, suggest the ineffectiveness of the development policy of the Republic.

As such, there is need for research on the South African government's development and foreign aid policy by looking at the policy processes of the ARF Bill, tracing it from 2000 when deliberations on the envisaged bill started. This research was conducted in Pretoria.

#### PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

In light of the range of problems identified with South Africa's development aid approach, the research explored the policy process relating to the establishment of the ARF bill from 2000 to 2009 in order to determine its strengths and weaknesses in terms of output and impact.

#### RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The main research question was:

What policy process was followed in the establishment of the ARF?

The following sub-questions framed the scope of the research:

1. How did ARF Act 2000 come into existence?
2. How was the institutional framework enhanced by the new policy process?
3. What were the new measures ensuring a credible and acceptable policy making process?

#### SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The result of this study is intended to add knowledge regarding foreign policy decision making processes. It aims to assist in the development of strategic direction on how the South African government can improve policy making relating to its development aid approaches.

#### ETHICAL CONSIDERATION

Prior to the interviews, the researcher asked for permission from the relevant authorities to conduct research. Respondents were asked to read and sign a consent form for the nature of their participation. It was explained to the respondents that the research was for academic purposes and that their participation was voluntary and their identification would be kept confidential.

The time and the scope of this research were limited to South African Department of International Relations and Co-operation Fund. The sample of this research involved

only the DIRCO policy makers, parliamentarians, minister in the presidency office and the South African president.

## THE RESEARCH OUTLINE OF CHAPTER ONE

The research report contains the following chapters, provided with the summary:

### **Chapter 1: Introduction**

This chapter provides an introduction to the study and presents the case study of the policy making process. The layout of the chapter starts by providing background, problem statement, purpose statement, and research question. At the end of this chapter, the structure of the entire research report is provided.

### **Chapter 2: Literature Review**

The literature review provides views of foreign policy of different continents and different countries. The focus on literature was to look at the way in which different countries conduct the policy making process.

### **Chapter 3: Research Methodology**

In this chapter, methods used to conduct the research were described. It provided the samples of data collection as presented from DIRCO. The study relied on the interviews and documentary research for the data collected. The researcher interviewed eight policy makers using a purposeful sample.

### **Chapter 4: Data Presentation**

This chapter provided data presentation from ARF policy makers. Data and facts relating to the question of the research were categorized based on their characteristics. A summary of interviews was provided under the main themes using the exact quotes from the respondents.

### **Chapter 5: Data Analysis and findings**

The chapter analyses the data that was presented in the previous chapter and in the literature review and what the policy makers said in context related to un-accountability, un-co-ordination and inconsistency of the policy making process in DIRCO. Themes for the analysis emerged during interviews and were used to group the findings for better analysis.

### **Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations**

This chapter discussed the conclusion based on the knowledge gap, the views of the policy makers and views and the findings. The research gives recommendations to DIRCO policy makers.

## CONCLUSION


Chapter one has provided an introduction which outlined the developmental challenges on the African continent, the problem statement showed inconsistency in the policy making process while the purpose statement was to explore the policy making process of the ARF bill. The research question related to the challenges above asked how the ARF bill was established and finally, the chapter outline has been presented for the structure of the research.

## CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this section is to unpack the emerging issues from previous research conducted elsewhere around which the topic has been mapped. This section critically looks at the foreign policy making process with regard to South Africa's foreign aid policy, specifically the ARF. The main focus is on theories and the conceptual understanding of ARF policy making process and its approach in order to set both the broad context and the specific context of the study. This fosters understanding as it looks in more detail at the theory around the policy making process of foreign aid policy.

In doing so, it follows an approach which broadly starts by giving a synopsis of public policy at definitional level, followed by an overview of foreign policy in order to position the study and finally focuses on the development aid policy and the policy making process. Intense examination of foreign aid policy making process is done. The following schematic diagram gives an outline of the study.

**Figure 1:** Outline of the research study



**Source:** Compiled by author from Kaarbo [2002]

Although this study does not cover public policy extensively, where necessary, reference is made taking into cognisance that foreign policy is a sub-domain of public policy. The literature review was selected in relation to the theory relevant to this study. This involved reviewing literature compiled by think tanks, professionals, and scholars that have done work in policy analysis, policy models and policy



process. As such, the literature reviewed for the study comprises peer reviewed journals, books and other scholarly publications extracted from the University of the Witwatersrand databases.

The manner in which this discussion starts is by giving a brief insight into public policy, then an overview on policy analysis, followed by a brief description of policy models. We delve into a more detailed discussion on the policy process or cycle by looking at the stages involved. These are: problem identification, agenda setting, problem analysis, policy formulation, policy adoption, policy implementation and policy assessment. Going through these typically agreed upon policy process stages will allow for understanding of the policy processes being taken in the making of the ARF policy.

## 2.1. PUBLIC POLICY

It is of importance to expand on what public policy is in order to understand South Africa's development aid policy as it is part of foreign policy. Given the heated debates that come with policy making, it is not surprising that a generally accepted definition of public policy is elusive. Public policy can narrowly be construed as a course of action adopted and pursued by a government or a regulation by government to run government institutions. However, to fully understand what it is, involves unpacking what "public" and "policy" in public policy means.


Policy is defined as a social science regulation using methods of enquiry and an opinion, to create, and convert policy related information used in the political environment to solve policy problems [Dunn, 1994]. As such, it can be concluded that policy works for those who make it and for those who participate in its application as a defence or as a standard of making things happen while guiding actions towards the achievement of desired outcomes. The term "public" is simplified by Colebatch [2002] to mean "of the people". On the other hand, Van Nieuwkerk [2006] refers to public policy as a choice among several alternatives.

In view of the above mentioned definitions, and for the purposes of this study, a more comprehensive definition of Public Policy is derived from Anderson [2003] who defines it as a stable, purposive course of action followed by an player or set of players in dealing with a problem created as a response to a perceived problem of a constituency, formulated by a specific political process, and adopted, implemented,

and enforced by the state. Therefore, public policy can be viewed as an attempt by government to remedy a public problem by instituting laws, regulations, or actions aimed at addressing the issue.

Public policy as shown in Figure 2, can be divided into two broad areas: domestic policy and foreign policy [Kaarbo, et al, 2002].

**Figure 2: Boundary of reference**



Source: Compiled by author from Kaarbo [2002]

## 2.2. SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The foreign aid policy is formed to achieve some of the foreign policy objectives. Domestic policy is defined as policies that work within the country's boundaries; whereas foreign policy refers to policies that address issues outside the country's boundaries [Kaarbo, et al, 2002]. However, there is a nexus between domestic policy and foreign policy as each influences the other and more interestingly, one country's domestic policy might be the trigger for another country's foreign policy, a good example is taken from the United States (US) case and China where US safety standards for food are aimed at improving the health of the US citizens. On the other hand, this also shaped the amount and type of food for the exporting countries like China. The domestic policy was aimed at improving the food internally; however, this has adversely affected China's exports and in the end, China had to abide to the "domestic" policy of the US [Kaarbo, et al, 2002].

Foreign policy of one country is likely to attract interest from another country, quite often with suspicion and scepticism [Moss, 2004]. In an effort to curb this, there has been a shift in foreign policy approaches towards foreign aid policy as an instrument to achieve overall foreign policy objectives [Baehr, 1997]. Therefore, the following

discussion positions foreign aid policy as a sub-domain of foreign policy [Kaarbo, et al, 2002].

### 2.3. FOREIGN POLICY

Van Nieuwkerk [2006] argues that foreign policy is seen as actions and plans of a national Government in the direction of its external environment. On the other hand, Onuki, [2009:136) defines foreign policy as “international treaties and agreements signed with foreign countries and international organizations, trade policy, direct actions on international matters, instrument referent to the functioning of the ministry of foreign affairs (MRE), diplomatic representations and national defence issues”, while Thipanyane [2011] defines foreign policy as a closer relationship and collaboration with international leaders in pursuit of influence on the continent, geopolitics, trade and international relations. The definitions above provide understanding of foreign policy in pursuit of collaborations with foreign countries to achieve international trade. Below is a brief background of South African foreign policy under different leaders from post-apartheid to the current situation.

#### 2.3.1. SOUTH AFRICA’S STATE OF AFFAIRS POST 1994 TO CURRENT

##### (a) Foreign policy process under Mandela

The following table shows a number of organisations that formed co-operation agreements with the ANC before a democratic government took over in 1994. Certain agreements were made by the ANC and a number of organisations joined forces in support of the transition from the apartheid government to a democratic government. The table below shows associations from 1984 to 1994 who contributed to the transition.

**Table1.** Source: Sahistory [2014].

1984	United Nations	General assembly rejects and considers the new SA constitution
1985	PW Botha	PW Botha offers Nelson Mandela conditional release from prison
1986	Anti Apartheid Act	The Comprehensive Anti Apartheid Act is passed in the United States (US) after Congress overrides president Ronald Reagan’s veto on the legislation.
1987	FEDSAW	Members of the Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW) fly to Lusaka to meet with the ANC for negotiations related to Nelson Mandela.

1988	Transkei Democratic Progressive Party	Members of Transkei's Democratic Progressive Party meet the ANC.
1989	UDF and COSATU	January, A joint delegation of UDF and COSATU goes to Lusaka for further consultations with the ANC.
1990	FW De Klerk	Announces the unbanning of the ANC and other banned liberation movements, and the release of Nelson Mandela
1991	NPA	The National Peace Accord is signed by leaders of various political organisations to bring an end to the violence. This is the first multi-party agreement.
1992	ANC, SACP and COSATU	August, The ANC, SACP and COSATU join forces to organise a massive campaign of mass action against the government involving rallies and a two day general strike.
1993	ANC and SA government	The ANC and the South African government agree to resume multiparty talks but both parties want input in the creation of a new negotiation forum.

With the transition to a democratic government in 1994, co-operation increased. Agreements on development co-operation were concluded between South Africa and other organisations [Herbert, 2012]. After the fall of apartheid in 1994, South Africa issued a white paper for a reconstruction and development programme (RDP) for tackling apartheid's legacy of poverty and inequality. Mandela, in his term of office, was obliged to accept the terms and conditions of the constitutional settlement to form a government of national unity (GNU) [Barber, 2005]. This was done to protect the new ruling party (the ANC) from their lack of experience in government. Though the ANC lacked governing experience, it succeeded in transforming itself from a liberation movement into a political party which led to a government [Barber, 2005]. Because South Africa regarded itself as a "giant" of Africa, the new government focused its priority on the African continent. On the other hand, the western governments were frustrated that they could not solve the problems in Africa; as a result, they saw South Africa as a "hope" to resolve political challenges in Africa. South Africa built partnerships with the AU and SADC.

The transformation of the South African foreign policy process during this time was aimed at altering political values from post-apartheid to ANC political values [Mandela, 1993]. These values were based on human rights, democracy and majority rule [Van Nieuwkerk, 2006]. During Mandela's government, human rights and democracy were pivotal to SA foreign relations. Van Nieuwkerk [2006] argues

that the human rights focus under the “new democratic government” was to advance the rights of the citizens. In 1993, in his speech, Mandela indicated that human rights would be the driving force behind the SA foreign policy [Mandela, 2003]. The struggle against apartheid contributed to Mandela's boldness on the relationship between human rights and foreign policy [Thipanyane, 2011]. The table below stipulates the values on which South African foreign policy was founded and its democracy [RSA, 1996]. The beliefs below were set to influence South African foreign policy in pursuit of its newly elected democratic government.

**Table1. Source: Mandela [1993]. Pillars of South Africa foreign policy**

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• That issues of human rights are central to international relations and an understanding that they extend beyond the political, embracing the economic, social and environmental;</li><li>• That just and lasting solutions to the problems of humankind can only come through the promotion of democracy worldwide;</li><li>• That considerations of justice and respect for international law should guide the relations between nations;</li><li>• That peace is the goal for which all nations should strive, and where this breaks down, internationally agreed and nonviolent mechanisms, including effective arms-control regimes, must be employed;</li><li>• That the concerns and interests of the continent of Africa should be reflected in our foreign policy choices;</li></ul>	
--	--	--

and proclaimed that Mbeki brought a distinctive feature to foreign policy-making. Barber [2005] argues that Mbeki stood for three core elements: “democratic, Africanist and anti-imperialist”. President Mbeki articulated a strong commitment to assisting in the revival and renewal of the African continent through the “African Renaissance” concept [Van Nieuwkerk, 2006]. This was done by championing the “roots” of developing countries on the continent through the South African government’s leadership in multilateral institutions. One example is where South Africa contributed to the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002 and the fact that SA plays an imported role in United Nations agencies and it is the driving force behind NEPAD initiatives [Ajulu, 2000].

Mbeki identified himself as an “African” in his speech [Mbeki, 2012]. Furthermore, he called for an African renaissance. With his passion for Africa, he aimed to fight a war against “poverty, ignorance and backwardness” on the continent [Barber, 2005]. His commitment to Africa has never faltered, and, despite many challenges on the continent, he is described as a hard worker with determination and a vision for Africa [Barber, 2005]. During his term of office, he formed a new economic framework for Africa’s development (NEPAD) with the intention of the eradication of poverty, sustainable growth and integration of Africa into the global economy [Barber, 2005].

NEPAD was welcomed by the US and EU and they agreed on an action plan for Africa.

Van Nieuwkerk [2006] argues that South African foreign policy after 1994 can be portrayed as vacillating between “realist” and “moral” internationalism. Further, he asserts that a palpable tension between the priority of its perceived commercial trade, political interest and its role as a moral crusader in the promotion of global human rights and democracy was always an issue [Van Nieuwkerk, 2006]. Conversely, the second term of political shift in foreign policy making under Thabo Mbeki secured an overwhelming political stability. Thabo Mbeki’s government showed confidence, rationale and vision in foreign policy.

The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) reformulated the mission statement of South Africa’s foreign affairs when Mbeki took over. As such, promotion of “security and wealth creation” was the fundamental purpose. This was enhanced by promoting compliance with international law and involvement in conflict prevention, resolution and management [Van Nieuwkerk, 2006]. In addition, the creation of wealth was managed through a balanced and co-ordinated mechanism to the globalised environment. However, Mbeki’s future was at stake during the Polokwane conference when he was surprisingly recalled by his own political party, the ANC [Landsberg, 2012]. His successor, Zuma, received overwhelming support from the ANC 2007 Polokwane conference and Mbeki had to step down.

### **(c) Foreign policy under Zuma 2007 – 2014**

South Africa’s foreign policy during Mbeki’s time could have been influenced by issues raised by the Polokwane conference. This was the result of tensions between Mbeki and Zuma [Landsberg, 2012]). This had an effect on the on-going foreign policy under Zuma. “Many of the expectations have revolved around the idea that the democratic coup would constitute not just a shift in personalities but in actual policies” [Landsberg 2011:246]. From 2009, when President Zuma took over, South Africa's foreign policy has been influenced heavily by domestic socio-economic challenges [Reardon, 2012]. President Zuma has tried to create jobs by partnering with Brazil and China and hoped that the business relationships would curb the socio-economic challenges in SA [Reardon, 2012]. Since 1994’s election under the post-apartheid government, South Africa's foreign policy has been supporting development and stability in the African continent [Reardon, 2012]. Two years after

Zuma had taken over from Mbeki; there were concerns and questions about the influence of human rights in the foreign policy and international relations of Zuma's government [Thipanyane, 2011]. During this time, perceptions arose that Zuma's government was moving away from the foreign policy initiated by Mandela and Mbeki [Thipanyane, 2011]. As such, Zuma's speech delivered on the 13 October 2011 did not mention the importance of human rights [Sidiropoulos, 2009]. This resulted in international countries doubting SA's capability to recover its standing in the global sector [Thipanyane, 2011]. Some of the issues that made international countries doubt Zuma's foreign policy directions are, to name a few:

- “South Africa's stand on the African Union's (AU) refusal to co-operate with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in its actions against a few African leaders, such as Bashir of Sudan;
- South Africa's international human rights treaty reporting obligations and ratifications; and South Africa's position in the UN Security Council in relation to Libya and Syria” [Thipanyane 2011:13].

### 2.3.2. SOUTH- SOUTH COOPERATION

The history of South-South co-operation relates back to 1955 to a conference held in Bandung [Poon, 2013]. The large developing countries who are the major players in the global world have brought South-South co-operation to the centre-stage [OECD, 2012]. South-South co-operation has been active since the 1960s and 1970s. However, not much progress has been achieved due to lack of resources, post-colonial restructuring, institutional weaknesses, and poor communication in developing countries [Sotero, 2009]. On the 6th June 2003, IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) was established. The new partnership (IBSA) revitalised the spirit of South-South co-operation. The three countries share elements of common economic and political history [Sotero, 2009]. The intent of this co-operation was to deliver expertise and financial support for economic and social welfare for other developing countries [OECD, 2012]. On the other hand, IBSA's approach was to provide a forum for consultation and co-ordination on significant political issues [Barber, 2005]. A good example is the reform of the United Nations (UN), its Security Council and negotiations at the World Trade Organization [Sotero, 2009]. The framework for SA foreign policy is predicated on an “Afrocentric” strategic perspective that reflects agendas for Africa [Sotero, 2009]. The African Agenda includes the Southern Africa



region with SADC, the Southern African Development Community. Furthermore development co-operation is expected to bring solidarity among developing countries and collective self-reliance to address the common challenges amongst the countries involved. At the present time, South Africa has worked to transform its foreign assistance to promote a positive social and economic change across the continent. As a result, in 2001, the African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund (ARF) was formed under the Foreign Affairs Department [Reardon, 2012]. This was done to replace the apartheid-era bureaucracy and the development assistance programme. The driving force behind the African Renaissance was Mbeki. He (Mbeki) believed that SA could lead the renaissance through initiatives for African development such as the AU (African Union) to promote socio-economic development on the continent [Reardon, 2012]. As such, SA development is also used as a tool to influence the African continent [Reardon, 2012]. The foreign development programs are promoted to build South-South co-operation. Funds from ARF are delivered through multilateral agencies like SADC, the AU and Southern African Customs Union (SACU) [Reardon, 2012]. An example of this program was funding Seychelles for infrastructure rehabilitation and Republic of Guinea to boost rice production [Reardon, 2012].

Therefore, the role of ARF was to consolidate the African and South agendas, and introduce to South African politics a real public diplomatic thrust [Edigheji, 2007]. But the challenge of South Africa and its ANC government is to address the contradictory ideological strands in foreign policy [Edigheji, 2007]. Therefore, the goal for the African renaissance is to achieve a stable and sustainable peace in Africa [OECD, 2012]. Furthermore, the “African agenda” must be built into a strong policy to defend its regional integration and development. Moreover, the political objective for South Africa is to support and develop South Africa’s political role as a stabilising factor in the region, the continent and beyond, while the role for development is reducing poverty and inequality by promoting internal social stability [Edigheji, 2007].

#### 2.4. DEVELOPMENT AID POLICY

Development aid policy is referred to as development co-operation in some sections of literature [see for instance: Alonso, 2012; Hargovan, 2012]. It is defined as “*the co-operation between developing and developed countries in the field of aid, trade, security and politics to promote economic and social well-being in developing*

*countries*” [Hargovan 2012:4]. Different countries and global institutions have development aid policies for a variety of reasons as listed in Table 1 below.

Table 1: The Rationale of Development Aid Policy

Political/Strategic	Economic/Commercial	Ethical/Humanitarian
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Instrument of domination</li> <li>▪ Combating terrorism/drugs</li> <li>▪ Influence in international situations</li> <li>▪ Access to local authorities</li> <li>▪ Friendships/neighbours</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Landing rights/access to ports and points of entry</li> <li>▪ Export promotion</li> <li>▪ Anti-cyclical instrument (combat recessions)</li> <li>▪ Promotion of investments (risk mitigation)</li> <li>▪ Access to primary products/minerals</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Feed and house</li> <li>▪ Solidarity after natural disasters</li> <li>▪ Promotion of peace, human rights and entitlements</li> <li>▪ Assisting Refugees</li> </ul>

Source: Hargovan [2012:7]

The above do not exhaust the reasons why development aid policies exist, but they provide an insight.

## 2.5. SOUTH AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT AID POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE

South Africa’s international co-operation programmes in 2012 included: African Renaissance Fund, Programmes at National, Provincial and Local level, India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Poverty Alleviation Fund, Multilateral programmes through concessional lending institutions such as African Development Bank (AFDB) and World Bank (WB), Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Agreements on revenue sharing [Hargovan, 2012]. Besharati [2013], however, suggested that, although the variety of development co-operation activities which are being run and provided by various institutions, agencies and stakeholders in South Africa are commendable, there are policy challenges in defining, measuring, and co-ordinating them.

## 2.6. POLICY ANALYSIS

Policy analysis is defined by Smith [2007] as fundamentals of value judgments, beliefs, relations, multi-disciplinary applications and the importance of its process. Furthermore, policy analysis is seen as entailing a range of activity on a spectrum of knowledge in policy process [Van Nieuwkerk, 2006]. The analysis of policy in government relates to what is perceived as the community’s views in the form of government regulations which are placed in a bureaucratic process. In relation to the analysis of the process, literature stresses the importance of a system’s capacity and

its good governance to be put as priority in the success of the policy process [Dun, 1994; Smith, 1997].

## 2.7. POLICY MODEL

Policy models represent the features of particular policy alternatives or paths selected in the creation of guidelines or policies to address problems for particular reasons [Dunn, 1994]. These models are formed to analyse the process of decision making in a particular format. The models include the Elite model, Systems model, Institutional model and Group model, among others [Smith, 1997]. Scholars in public policy often use a model that is practical to apply in a particular policy. The table below provides different models from different authors.

The diagram of each model that could be used in the analysis of policy making process is provided below. An example of a content model like a rational model unpacks the content of the policy options, its output and effects. These models are utilised in the making of a policy and could be used in analysis of an act as well [Dye, 1995; De Coning, 2000], while process models like systems models are used in analysing the policy processes as well as the stakeholders involved in the process. On the other hand, functional models are used in the functional stages of the policy decision making process [Dunn, 1994]. For the purpose of this study, Dunn's [1994] Process model will be utilised to assist in the analysis of the policy decision making processes followed in the crafting of the ARF Act. This model focuses on the generally acceptable policy processes in policy making.


**Table: 2. Classified policy models**

<b>Content Model</b>	<b>Process Model</b>	<b>Functional Models</b>
Rational	Systems	Dunn's policy analysis model Dunn [1994]
Incremental	Institutional	Patton & Sawicki [1993]
Mixed Scanning	Public Choice	Mutuhaba, et al [1993]
Normative-Optimum model	<b>Power - centred:</b> Bureaucratic politics Group/Pluralist, Elite, Marxist and Corporatist	Wissink's [1991] stage model

## 2.8. POLICY PROCESS

The process model is generally perceived as the ideal policy process [Tosun, 2008]. One can view the policy process as a series of political activities of: identifying problems or setting the agenda for decision making; analysing the problem or formulating policy proposals (options); adopting a policy alternative or political mandate; implementing policies; and evaluating policies. Bridgman [2003] argues that the approach in which the public policy is established, and sufficient attention to pressures which made the policy to be put in place, must be given attention to issues decided through political rather than bureaucratic process. This process involves individuals, institutions and agencies to make it an effective process [Shepherd, 2011]. Furthermore, policy decisions are not independent of decisions taken before; rather current policies have effects on the past and future policies. For the policy process to run smoothly during the public policy making process, enough experts with knowledge must be consulted and more effective consultation during the decision making process is important. A typical policy process below is provided:

**Fig 3: Adopted from Dunn [1994]**



## 2.9. POLICY DIALOGUE OR CONSULTATION

Stakeholders in policy making must be mindful of the divergent goals, thoughts, motivations and personalities involved when undertaking consultation processes [Freeman, 2013]. In addition, consultation “....tests opinions and wins support”

[Bridgman 2003:101]. It is key to a successful policy implementation [Althaus, et al. 2013]. It plays a role as part of allowing different opinions to reach consensus in policy decision, as [Freeman 2013:10] puts it “.....Consultation promotes consensus about policy choices...” At the end, it “provides proposals and evidence around which politics gel” [Bridgman, 2003]. In general, it improves the quality of the policy decisions through access to information and perspective [Freeman, 2013]. Weible, et al. [2012] highlights four characteristics that the stakeholders in policy making must have:

First, they must be goal oriented; second, they must be capacitated to process various motivations supplied by the policy environment; third, they must efficiently simplify, understand, interpret and respond clearly to incoming inputs and last, they must have no fear and trust in reasoning, allocating awareness, and making behavioural conclusions. In the same vein, there must be co-ordination in the making of the policy. By co-ordination, Shepherd [2011] argues that better co-ordination in policy must contain three elements; i.e. strategic control from the centre of government, ministries with capacity for co-ordination and lastly, there must be a mechanism for a parallel co-ordination.

The absences in these elements lead to poor monitoring and evaluation in policy implementation. As such, where performance is strong, it is possible to achieve effective co-ordination and evaluation. However, governments in countries have experienced growth in government institutions during the time of globalization. As a result, two problems have been identified that could impede effective performance in policy such as the growing size and complexity of government and coherence and control in policy [Shepherd, 2011]. These issues may contribute to failure in policy evaluation. As such, full capacity in government institutions must be exercised to prevent overwhelming governance in weak institutions. The first stages in policy decision making process, as illustrated in Fig 3, is discussed below.

### 2.9.1. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM/ SETTING THE AGENDA

The aim of this section is to test aspects of the theory in establishing an agenda. Agenda setting is defined as “*a list of subjects or problems that government people and other stakeholders paying serious attention within a specific time*” [Eustis 2000: 2], in other words, the list of issues or problems, government and other private partnerships take into account to form an agenda in the policy process. This stage of

policy refers to identification of the public problem which requires the state to intervene [Tosun, 2008]. While Freeman [2013] refers to this stage as an intelligence gathering and co-ordination phase, stakeholders in setting an agenda could have their own interests. In this regard, the study stresses the importance of stakeholders having a mutual agenda when attending to the policy process. Dunn [1994] and Dye [2007] agree that a mutual agreement has to be met and that setting of an agenda precedes the process of making a policy. If this is not the case, the stakeholders may try to push their own agenda [Eustis 2000].

A number of issues in the environment can influence the agenda of decision makers. It is argued that issues reaching the attention of decision makers affect the social construction of reality, where perceptions overwhelm reality [Barkenbus, 1998]. As such, media encourages this act. Certain actors will inform developers of the public policy, including public officials, mass media, interest groups and bureaucracy, the president, parliament, the ministries and courts [Tosun, 2008]. These actors also contribute in bringing issues to the agenda.

Moreover, the president's office is likely to get the main issues because of its high office. In support, Schnapps [2000] argues that it is an effective matter for the policy agenda setters as it clearly identifies circumstances when bureaucratic proposals will influence political process in decision making [Tosun, 2008]. Therefore, the success of policy depends on sound evidence of the policy development, policy drawn based on political context and focusing on delivery from the outset [Halsworth, 2011].

### 2.9.2. ANALYSING THE PROBLEM AND POLICY FORMULATION

Formulation of policy may be defined by the definition of the problem and acceptance of feasible courses of action for handling policy problems [Tosun, 2008]. It involves three activities where relevant data and information is collected, objectives explained and determined with important inquiries and alternatives are established [Manitoba, 2003]. The emphasis is that at this stage many options of policies are invited and reviewed by the policy committee. In agreement, Tosun [2008] states that formulation of policy deals directly with the elaboration of alternative courses of action. However, this is not a smooth process; the committee still has to choose the best alternative from many. The clarity of intended policy objectives decides on the achievement of the committee to filter the policy review and ideas from the public or

ministerial branch through co-ordination and meetings with other interested parties are needed to create a healthy policy proposal. This decision is supported by the main policy question and purposes of interpretation to build on the policy confidence. When there is confidence, the next policy stage evolves. Smith [1997] suggests that role players must debate and confirm the accuracy of the final policy document. On the other hand, policies must be easy to implement with no complexities. Halsworth [2011:14] argues that “policies must be brought closer to the real world and the real world closer to the policy process”.

Regardless of how the issue reached the public agenda; the experts are part of its resolution [Barkenbus, 1998]. The expert’s knowledge in decision making is more important than political members. However, political members should bend to intelligence, wisdom, and the reasoning that experts possess [Barkenbus, 1998]. The knowledge and qualities of experts in policy formulation provide opportunities that enlighten decision making [Barkenbus, 1998]. When experts are absent, decision makers could formulate policy options based on their influential powers and specific interests. Moreover, their perspective on the “issue” may be shaped by this basis [Barkenbus, 1998]. This could lead to limiting policy alternatives, while the enlightenment value of expert knowledge increases policy space and enhances potential formulation of a win-win policy situation [Barkenbus, 1998]. On the other hand, if the decision maker is from an elected government office, his role is to bring unlimited knowledge to the context in which they are operating, unlike the experts in policy who are unaware of the context. The state’s “coordinative mechanisms are needed to overcome fragmentation, to aggregate interests, to cope with complexity, and to take longer and broader perspectives on issues” [Barkenbus 1998:6].

### 2.9.3. POLITICAL MANDATE/POLICY ADOPTION

Policy adoption is one of the important stages in the policy process. The committee must show confidence in the White Paper in order to convince budget allocation. In addition, the condition of the budget puts more weight in the cabinet meeting [Subroto, 2011]. The lower the budget, the lower the positive gesture in cabinet meetings for policy adoption [Subroto, 2011]. In the end, the ability of the executive team raises confidence in the implementation of the policy, the more capable the team, the higher the confidence on policy application [Subroto 2011:19]. Before the policy is adopted, costs and benefits of the proposed policy will influence the



adoption of the policy [Tosun, 2008]. In order for the policy adoption stage to run smoothly, there must be a clear and constant consultation for alternatives and criteria of the agenda to ensure understanding, acceptance and legitimacy of the proposed policies [Feeman, 2013].

#### 2.9.4. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Policy frameworks provide much needed insight and clarity into the process that individuals face and policy regulations [Dunn, 1994]. Also there is “appropriation” of policy which is possibly action oriented and not static. Manitoba [2003] highlights the dynamics and the possibility that individual experience and situational expertise can be used to inform and create effective policy implementation. However, the literature on policy implementation assumes that individual actors, such as policymakers, must logically make logical choices within constraints to obtain the results they desire [Smith, 1997]. On the other hand, Anderson [2003] suggests that individual actor’s with the capacity and access to knowledge, time, attention, and other resources in real-world settings are able to act logically in policy implementation.

Implementation involves financial capacity in policy and includes good leadership in putting the policy into action [Smith, 1997]. Therefore, the policy framework is expected to be action oriented in guiding policymakers and implementers as they engage in the complex process of policy implementation. Furthermore, Geoffrey [2011] describes the implementation programme as a “quasi” system. He claims that politicians can easily influence civil servants when they implement public policy [Geoffrey, 2011]. Therefore, an independent system where civil servants are not influenced by politicians and apply their own minds to what the policy requires them to do could improve the efficient intent of the policy. Hallsworth [2011] laments that people implementing a policy need the capacity and opportunity to adapt. Thus, good policy implementation is a combination of presenting a vision, setting strategic objectives and realistic implementation plans. Freeman [2013] argues that good policies are worthless unless properly implemented. Meanwhile, Barkenbus [1998] argues that policies are not self-executing. The challenge is left with those who have to implement the policy. In support, Tosun [2008] argues that “policy without proper implementation has neither substance nor significance”, while, Barkenbus [1998] comments that implementation is so difficult to an extent that it would be surprising to see any positive accomplishment made by the policy itself [Barkenbus, 1998]. Tosun



[2008] and Barkenbus [1998] agreed that success on implementation of policy depends on how well bureaucratic structures implement government laws. As such, practical skills do not come easily on putting the policy into action. In addition, those who are administrators of policy are charged with the responsibility of carrying out the dictates of policy [Barkenbus, 1998]. Furthermore, practical mechanisms play a crucial role in the policy decision making process. A good example is the Food Quality Protection Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act [Barkenbus, 1998]. There are no accurate mechanisms to prove how safe the protection act is and how clean the water is. However, the more quantitative the determinations are the easier implementation plans will be for transparency and predictability [Barkenbus, 1998]. A good example to measure the quality of safety and cleanliness is the “Science Advisory Board” (SAB) that evaluates implementation standards. It can be said that policies are not “self-executing”, forces like courts, political pressure and interests group can influence the efficiency in policy implementation [Barkenbus, 1998]. Technical assistance from advisors of policy makers will play a large role in putting the policy into action. In the end, an institution with sufficient resources is able to translate policy objectives into an operational framework and is accountable for its actions [Gerston, 2004, cited by Tosun, 2008].

#### 2.9.5 ACCOUNTABILITY

Government institutions have a responsibility to introduce order where appropriate and holding implementers to account when something goes wrong [Halsworth, 2011]. Transparency throughout the policy making process is crucial. Anticipation of challenges in the decision making process must provide transparency, accountability and opportunities for involvement [Freeman, 2013].

#### 2.9.6. POLICY EVALUATION

This stage in much of the reviewed literature comes right at the end when all the policy process stages have taken place. According to Subroto [2011], this stage leads to the policy revision. After policy has been implemented, it becomes the subject of evaluation [Tosun, 2008]. In this case, the outcome of the implementation will either be positive or negative. The main goal is to assess if the policy objectives have been followed and achieved. On the other hand, the public will provide the

perception of “how far the policy has achieved the objectives” If the policy has been achieved, the assumption is that [Subroto, 2011] with a positive outcome, the public can benefit from the policy implementation which will lead to higher positive public satisfaction. This in turn, will indicate the success of the policy [Smith, 1997].

Generally, evaluation of policy is carried out by experts who are knowledgeable and understand the processes and objectives of the evaluation [Tosun, 2008]. Evaluators of policy must be motivated and be able to link policy and performance; this requires skill and more knowledge and promote consensus about policy choices [Hallsworth, 2011]. As Barkenbus [1998] asserts, “policy evaluation is most often a *forgotten* element”; in addition, two questions must be answered when evaluating policy, “how has the policy worked?” and “How can implementation of policy be improved?” The feedback will identify new problems that have arisen during the implementation process [Tosun, 2008]. As such, the negative feedback from policy evaluation could prove embarrassing to policy makers and implementers. Furthermore, the failure in policy implementation can be translated to perceived need to repress uncomfortable facts derived from impartial evaluation, or the need to conduct evaluation in a context certain to show positive results [Barkenbus, 1998]. This tendency explains the reason why evaluation is often ignored by decision makers. This highlights an issue to be resolved and leads to learning what the shortfalls or success of policy has been [Tosun, 2000; Barkenbus, 1998]. Evaluation of policy enables decision makers to draw lessons from the operation of the policy [Tosun, 2008]. Hence it is crucial to follow exactly what the policy detects.

Geoffrey [2011] argues that the growing size and complexity of government could become overwhelming to weak institutions and would impede successful policy results. In Canada, for instance, departmental programs are aligned with strategic objectives and outcomes of the policy. In the same vein, where co-ordination of programs and outcomes are linked, it is easy to see where the implementation of the policy went wrong.

## 2.10. CONCLUSION

The section above has identified concepts of policy analysis, different models, specifically the process model. Further, stages of the policy process from setting the agenda to the last stage, policy evaluation have been explained. The method of creating policy affects the context of public policy. As such, the policy stages help the

empirical research in guiding and influencing the new themes that might develop from data collected. Moreover, the policy process analysis is based on the reconsideration of ARF and its aim is verified whether a particular process was followed in establishing Act 51 of 2000.

The next part of this study is the methodology. The method in which data was collected and analysed is explained below.

## CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

### 3.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the methodology used in the study. A qualitative method has been followed to analyse the DIRCO case study. The case study is about the African Renaissance Fund Policy Processes Act, 51 of 2000. The aim of the study was to explore the policy processes that led to the establishment of this Act (ARF) from 2000 to 2009.

The methods used to collect data included: semi structured interviews, observations and document analysis. The purpose of the chapter is to introduce a vivid description of tools, methods or techniques that have been used in this study. Neuman [2011:1] states that this “*means understanding the entire research process including its social-organisational context, philosophical assumptions, ethical principles, and the political impact of the new knowledge from the research*”. Research methodology can be simply defined as the study by which knowledge in a study is gained. As such, this section provides direction of the manner in which this research was conducted by describing the paradigm approach, research design, research sample, data collection and the research limitations. It also provides an insight into how the data was analysed, validated, and then provides a conclusion.

The examination of the policy processes that were followed by the Government of South Africa in its reconsideration of its development aid policy for ARF has been done. The research took place in Pretoria at the Department of International Relations and Co-operation where a case of the ARF policy making processes was examined. The intention in analysing the policy processes was to foster understanding of: the underlying issues that led to the need of a policy rethink between 2000 and 2009, the policy processes that were followed, and the policy making model which was adopted. The research includes an analysis of both primary and secondary data as described in the following sub-sections.

### 3.2. RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY

*“The philosophical orientation or paradigm approach was qualitative as it seeks to foster understanding of the policy processes through interpretive explanations about how things or actions worked out as expressed and their meanings and subjective views”* [Neuman, 2011:84]. Policy processes in South Africa have constructed

meanings with which they are associated and this research looked to gather information as part of this examination to contribute more to the broader knowledge. A qualitative approach was appropriate for this research as it provided independent findings which Merriam [1995:52] asserts “are innovative or newer looking at familiar problems or when determining the historical trajectory of a situation”. Because the research is qualitative, a thick description of interpreted meanings from the data collected is presented in the next chapter [Bryman, 2012].

Research strategy means a general orientation to the conduct of social research [Bryman & Burgess, 2002]. This study was an interpretive examination of the policy processes that followed consideration by the government of South Africa of its development aid policy. As such, it utilised a descriptive phenomenological strategy which aimed at identifying the structure of processes as described by the research respondents [Bryman, 2012]. Lack of clarity and misconceptions existed about the policy model and processes being followed in the making of the ARF Act. Hence, the adoption of a descriptive phenomenology strategy offered a better view from the participants who experienced events and the changes taking place with the Act.

### 3.4. RESEARCH DESIGN

Research design, according to Bryman [2012], means a framework for analysis and collection of data. This research is a case study of the African Renaissance Fund and co-operation. A case study entails a detailed and intensive analysis of a “single case” of a broad topic [Bryman 2012: 66]. The fact that the deliberations of the ARF Act are a component of the broader foreign policy of South Africa justified this research as a case study. Case studies tend to produce complex explanations or interpretations in the form of an unfolding plot or a narrative story about particular people or specific events [Neuman 2011: 42]. This makes the passage of time integral to the explanation as quite often the emphasis is on the sequence of events: what occurred first, second, third, and so on. The focus on processes helped to reveal how the ARF Act has evolved and developed over the years.

Creswell [2003] and Neuman [2011] agree that there are a number of strengths in conducting research as a case study, one of them is that this works in favour of the researcher conducting this research as a case study, includes the ability to capture complexity and trace processes, it also clarifies thoughts by allowing the researcher

to link abstract ideas about the policy making processes in South Africa with the concrete specifics of the observed case. This research design was also appropriate because the responses of the participants and the documentation were shared, analysed and used to enhance our understanding of policy processes used by the South African government.

### 3.5. SAMPLING

Neuman [2011] defines sampling as the process of selecting a set of respondents selected from a larger population for research purposes. The respondents for this research were purposefully selected because of their unique expertise in their respective fields and their knowledge of the ARF policy making processes. The researcher conducted this study using a semi-structured interviewing technique with open-ended and closed ended questions to the respondents about their views and their assessment of the policy processes. A purposeful sampling was used for the selection of 10 participants for this study as it allowed for the selection of research participants according to the needs of the study.

Purposeful sampling allowed the researcher to use a wide range of methods to locate all possible cases of a highly specific and difficult to reach population [Neuman 2011]. The sample consisted of DIRCO Officials, ARF officials, Academia and Public Policy Analysts. The selection criterion for inclusion in this research was on the basis of their unique status, experience, and knowledge of policy processes in South Africa.

### 3.6. DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE


A field scan of the environment was carried out by the researcher prior to engaging respondents and the relevant documents. This informed the researcher about the environment while also getting to know where and how to get the necessary documents. Mail was sent to the prospective participants, requesting their participation in the research. Telephonic requests for availability were made for the DIRCO and ARF Officials. Instructions from DIRCO have been followed to administer the study. Each participant was contacted and a suitable location and time of interview was arranged.

### 3.6.1 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY DATA

A procedure consisting of a written semi-structured interview schedule was used to obtain data and, where permission had been granted, to record interview sessions. Having such a schedule allowed for questions to be asked the same way each time. The flexibility to probe was allowed, change of sequence and questions to accommodate respondents and issues that arose. The respondents were selected as follows:

**Fig. 2**

**Author: Researcher**



Data collection for this research included both primary and secondary data. The primary data entailed interviews, diaries and speeches [Bryman, 2012]. The other means of collecting data was secondary data, which included, among other things, but not limited to, published annual reports, ANC conference report, political speeches, press release and political programs. The inclusion of secondary data gave the research a view of perceptions from secondary sources, while also giving a world view of policy processes.


### 3.7. DATA ANALYSIS

Neuman [2011] contends that data analysis in qualitative research is descriptive in nature and it assists in interpreting raw data into understandable findings. Bryman and Burgess [2002] and Neuman [2011] also agree that qualitative data analysis entails ordering and the examination of information to make sense and establish meaning. The researcher firstly read all participants' transcribed data collected from the interviews and the relevant documents for familiarisation. The next step was reviewing the purpose of the research so as to sift significant statements and phrases relevant to examination of policy processes in DIRCO from each transcript. Respondents' responses were recorded and data from the policy documents has been interpreted to make sense. Descriptive data relevant to the research questions has been categorized to their unique meaning to form familiar qualitative characteristics. Coding was used to interpret data, this assisted in relating themes to theory, and this is referred as coding according to Bryman [2012]. Bryman and Burgess [2002] add that meaning should be categorised or organised into themes which evolve from theme clusters to theme categories. A rich and exhaustive description of the views and assessments of respondents based on the different stages of the policy making process has been provided. The diagram below provides stages of the policy making process in which data was collected and analysed.



**Fig. 3**

**Adopted from:** Dunn [1994]



### 3.8. DATA VALIDATION AND RELIABILITY

Bryman [2012] asserts that research is valid when it is supported by a variety of sources. Data validation involves offering a fair, honest and balanced account of social reality. This means how reliable, dependable or consistent are the research findings congruent with reality [Merriam 1995]. This qualitative study's validity was confirmation through the use of different approaches to check the validity and reliability of the findings.

Triangulation from different data sources: both primary and secondary data was used to build comprehensible themes [Merriam, 1995; Neuman, 2011]. Different respondents were interviewed using the same interview schedule and emerging themes were compared across the board.

Member checks was used to affirm the correctness of the findings through taking the final report or specific descriptions or themes back to participants to determine truthfulness [Merriam 1995]. Member checks also established credibility as transcripts were sent to respondents for review and verification. Each respondent agreed with the transcribed data of their individual interviews.

### 3.9. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The research report was structured according to the policy decision making process with the focus on the ARF policy process. The result of this study intended to add more knowledge on public policy decision making processes. It hoped to help the ARF agency develop strategic direction on how they will close the gap in the weakness of the policy making process.

### 3.10. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Prior to the interviews, the researcher requested permission from the relevant authorities to conduct research. Participants were requested to read through and sign a consent form on the nature of their participation. The researcher explained to the respondents that their participation in the research was for academic purposes, voluntary and that their identification would be kept confidential.

### 3.11. CONCLUSION

The ARF policy making process is the new development aid policy in the democratic SA. It receives aid from countries like Europe and US. The development aid supports developing countries in the SADC and UN. It is also meant to build and maintain good relations in these countries. Therefore, the ARF represents a development partner in Africa and, in turn, the good relations developed is South Africa's comparative advantage.

The purpose of this study was to explore the policy making process of ARF. The research responds to the problem experienced in the making of the ARF Act. The transition of the Act involved a challenging policy process in the foreign policy. This chapter has highlighted the method and methodology utilised to inform the research content and context. The next chapter presents data from the field researched.

## CHAPTER 4: DATA PRESENTATION

### 4.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents data as collected from the interviews. Data was collected using a primary method as indicated in the preceding chapter. Specified from chapter one in the problem statement, it indicated that the ARF has suffered institutional incapacities, inconsistent actions to policy, misappropriation of funds, lack of proper co-ordination, unaccountability, to mention a few, which suggests the ineffectiveness of the development policy of the Republic. The study is meant to explore the policy process leading to the establishment of ARF Act from 2000 to 2009. As such, this chapter intends to present the data collected. The data collected from DIRCO was categorised in themes in order to give a deep understanding of the policy process leading to the establishment of ARF. The data was collected by the researcher through recordings from semi-structured interviews. The themes that prevailed from interviews are the following: Accountability, Consultation and co-ordination, Governance, Human resource management, Monitoring and evaluation, Participation in policy makers, Project management, Power influence and Enablers and Constraints within ARF. After intense interviews with policy makers, data was transcribed for analysis.

This chapter offered responses from policy makers through interviews concerning the main question of the research which asked “What was the policy process that led to the establishment of ARF?” The manner in which this chapter flows is: It starts by providing guidance on research, followed by the profile of policy makers, case view, views of policy makers, ARF policy process, policy initiation, legality of policy, the white paper, reasons for the Act, political debates, analysis of the problem, stakeholder’s participation, consultation and co-ordination, ARF capacity, challenges encountered by ARF, implementation procedure, enablers and constraints in ARF, policy makers suggestions, annual reports and finally, concluding remarks.

Policy makers were asked questions related to policy process of ARF in order to provide answers to why the policy was established. As such, questions were asked to uncover details on setting the agenda, policy formulation, policy adoption, implementation of policy and monitoring and evaluation stage. The themes prevailed from the response of policy makers gave an overview of how ARF came into

existence, how it was implemented and at the end what the challenges were. It was established that policy initiation, Political debates, Stakeholders' participation, Consultation and co-ordination, Enablers and Constraints were some of the main themes that prevailed from the research about ARF policy establishment processes.

#### 4.2. RESEARCH GUIDE

The researcher asked the same questions to policy makers in the form of a semi-structured interview guide. There was probing where the response was not clear in order to keep the interview focused on the aim of the research.

#### 4.3. SAMPLE PROFILE

The sample of eight respondents was all from Gauteng. Some of the respondents interviewed have left the department after working for more than ten years in the department. Four interviewees were still working from the department and have been since 1994. Some of the policy makers from top management could not make it to their interview due to the intense work schedules and working outside the country. The sample of policy makers interviewed consisted of eight interviewees.

The following policy makers formed part of the interviews:

- Former Director General
- Former Advocate
- Former Chartered Accountant
- Director
- Director and Secretary
- 3 X Public officials

The organisation from which the data was collected is the Department of International Relations and Co-operation (DIRCO) and the focus was on ARF. Data and facts relating to questions of the research are categorized based on their characteristics. A summary of interviews is provided under the main themes using the exact quotes from the respondents. The analysis of the ARF policy process have considered the micro and macro policy processes, the stakeholders involved in making of the policy and the officials who implemented the Act. The capacity in which the analysis flows is from the view of achieving the objectives set by the Act. The flow of this data starts from the issues of South African foreign policy, the status and the policy process of ARF. Sandhlane [2007], cited in More [1995], argues that

the analysis of the policy process has to take into account the legitimacy, political viability with political leadership and direction to substantial valuation of the policy process.

#### 4.4. CASE OVERVIEW

ARF Act repealed the pre-existing Economic Co-operation Promotion Loan Fund Act, 1968 (Act No. 68 of 1968), as amended by the Economic Co-operation loan Fund Amendment Act, 1986 (Act No. 29 of 1986) and the Economic Co-operation Promotion Loan Fund Amendment Act, 1998 (Act No. 16 of 1998) [DIRCO, 2004]. The current Act is the African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund (Act No 51 of 2000). It was published on 22 January 2001. It provides for the establishment of the ARF for the purpose of enhancing integration and co-operation with and on the African Continent and to validate the Republic of South Africa's commitment to the continent [Hall, 2004]. The case study is about the policy process leading to the establishment of ARF. The post-apartheid act 16 of 1998 which was previously a loan act utilised by the then government of South Africa prior to 1994, reflected the origins of act 51 of 2000 before amendment. The loan fund act had no clear strategic plan on the way in which funds should be administered. Any African country could request financial assistance when in need; South Africa would disburse the required funds to that specific country with no follow up of how the funds had been used. From 1998, there was political discussion within government to replace this fund with new objectives. In 2000, act 51 of 2000 was approved replacing the loan fund. The Act was amended into act 51 of 2000 and implemented on the 22 January 2001. The ARF Fund has been referred to as the "technical assistance fund" which was meant to assist in economic, political and social challenges in the African continent.

The government Gazette [2000] provided the objectives of the new fund as stated below:

1. Co-operation between SA and other countries, particularly African countries
2. The promotion of democracy and good governance
3. Prevention and resolution of conflict
4. Socio-economic development and integration
5. Humanitarian assistance and

## 6. Human resource development.

### 4.5. POLICY PROCESS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF ACT 51 OF 2000

The policy process, according to Dunn [1994], revealed five different stages in which a policy can be established. The stages include: agenda setting, policy formulation, policy adoption, policy implementation and policy assessment. The policy process is simplified by De Coning [2004] into three stages: policy formulation, policy implementation and monitoring and evaluation.

The initiation stage of policy, according to De Coning [1994; 1995], regards legitimacy and stakeholder's consultation as important in the initiation of the establishment of an act.

Respondents reported that stakeholders in the establishment of ARF included the political parties such as the ANC, the Democratic Party (DA), the Freedom Front (FF) and the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP). It is only civil society organisations that did not play a part in the policy process. The main people who drafted the Act were government officials: Respondent B modified the act and fixed all the legal wording, while Respondent A assisted with his experience of working directly with the African continent. He (Respondent A) knew what the challenges were in Africa. The policy makers were in agreement that no particular process was followed in forming the act. They highlighted the fact that the bill was required to include the principles, its intention, the guidelines indicated how it should function and to form a committee who would oversee the running of the fund. The president at the time wanted something simple and quickly done so that the fund could be established. No particular process was followed to form the ARF Act. The Act was motivated by former president Thabo Mbeki's idea of African Renaissance.

The national assembly gave the ruling for the mandate and legitimacy of the Act. The consultation for the process of making the Act took place within government and parliament. There was no formal consultation done outside government, locally and internationally. The basis of the Act originates from the Economic Loan fund which was amended to form ARF. Discussions about what needed to be amended and included took place at DIRCO in Pretoria. There were various meetings held by the department. Respondent A, B and C, were some of the stakeholders who

participated in the process of establishing the Act at the time. The contribution they made was used as the genesis in drafting act 51 of 2000.

## 4.6. LEGITIMACY OF POLICY

### 4.6.1. How a Bill Act becomes law in South Africa

**Table1. Author:** Parliament [2014]

**The process of the Bill becoming into law in SA:**

The normal process starts from the national executive council of the ANC. Then it becomes a discussion document called a green paper. This process is initiated in the department that deals with the issue at hand. It is published so that people can comment and suggest ideas. It is then drafted and sent to NA. The National Assembly looks at a bill, and sends it to a parliamentary portfolio committee for consideration. The portfolio committee recommends changes and returns the bill to the National Assembly; it then becomes a legislative proposal, a white paper. At least seventy five percent of the members of the National Assembly must vote in favour of the bill for it to be approved by the National Assembly. The National Assembly approves the bill, and sends it to the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) who considers it. Then it is sent to NA to be passed. The vote of the majority of the national assembly decides on the finalities of the bill. It then becomes an act if it gets a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly and six provinces support from the NCOP. The National Assembly passes the bill. The bill is sent to the President. He signs it and it gets published in the Government Gazette. When this has happened, the bill becomes law and is called an Act of Parliament.

### 4.6.2. REGULATIONS FOR PUBLIC SERVICE

It must be noted that only in 2010 the government decided to introduce a Monitoring and Evaluation department. As such, this programme was absent when the ARF Act was implemented in 2001. The Department of Public Services and Administration (DPSA) regulates how public officials should deliver services when working for the government. The guidelines below were extracted from the regulations of the DPSA.

### 4.6.3. DPSA APPROACH TO MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Monitoring and Evaluation is meant to focus on the engagement of various stakeholders around inputs /outputs into policy monitoring.

According to DPSA [2014], the stakeholders in policy are expected to do the following:

- Evaluate the effectiveness, efficiency and appropriateness of Public Service policy implementation. In addition, Chapter 10 of the Constitution stresses principles of monitoring and evaluation in terms of:
- Transparency to the public fostered through provision of timely, accessible and accountable information. Further to the above, the regulations stated by DPSA also emphasise the objectives that public service should be guided by:
- To provide the Public Service with prescripts to facilitate the rollout of the monitoring and evaluation of the Public Service regulations and other DPSA's legislative and regulatory mandates.
- To provide the system to document, provide feedback and disseminate results and lessons learned.
- To provide the mechanisms to support the implementation of an effective monitoring and evaluation system and guidance in respect of the activities to be carried out in relation to the implementation of the DPSA M&E system for the public service; and
- To provide clear roles and responsibilities of the different stakeholders in the context of monitoring and evaluation.

Therefore, a step-by-step approach to the processes, procedures and methods for monitoring and evaluating of public services with strategy and policies is expected to play a fundamental role in policy implementation. As a result, it will be complemented by a series of tools, such as Monitoring and Evaluation guidelines applicable to DPSA, public servants, programme managers as well as government.

#### 4.6.4. CHAPTER 9 OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION:

SS195: Basic Values and principles governing public administration states that:

- s(e) Public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making;
- s(f) Public administration must be accountable and
- s(h) Good human-resource management and career-development practices must maximise human potential and must be cultivated [Barnes, de Klerk & Eldred, 2002].



#### 4.6.5. THE 53<sup>RD</sup> ANC CONFERENCE

One of the items discussed in the National Executive Conference of the ANC was the ARF policy renewal. The draft resolution captured the recommendations made for the future of ARF. There was an extensive debate that ARF should be replaced by SADPA. Moreover, the 53<sup>rd</sup> National conference resolution of the ANC revealed important issues that must be taken into consideration when the decision making process is taking place. The following were the highlights for DIRCO on the 53<sup>rd</sup> ANC conference:

**Table 2. Source:** Congress [2012]

<p><b>Pillar 5:Policy development</b></p> <p>Foreign policy review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>□ The appraisal of ANC relationship with SA’s national interest</li> <li>□ The state of bilateral relations and strengthening of Africa and Southern Africa</li> </ul> <p>The review of international relations and solidarity work since 1994 through foreign policy of the ANC led government</p>	<p><b>SADPA</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>□ The ANC encourages government to accelerate the establishment of SADPA to assist government in its vision of better Africa through solidarity and mutual assistance as well as of partnership with other development actors.</li> </ul>
<p><b>The conference also highlighted that:</b></p> <p>“There shall be peace and friendship”. Therefore some of the work that is done by ARF is towards peace on the continent and in the world, whilst pursuing South Africa’s “interest”. The conference also mentioned that the ruling party strengthen the IBSA forum and its ability to respond to strategic developmental challenges facing developing countries.</p>	<p><b>Capacity building for DIRCO:</b></p> <p>Assist government departments to strengthen infrastructure development capacity and capabilities to monitor economic maritime zones referred to as sea borders.</p>

#### 4.7. THE WHITE PAPER: ACT 51 OF 2000

##### **Policy Process**

Before the ARF bill was put before parliament, a number of objectives for the bill were discussed and brought together by the government and developed into a white paper. The process of developing a white paper was initiated by the then president, Thabo Mbeki. Respondent A mentioned that “there was an urgent need” to have a fund that would allow South Africa to assist developing countries with the economy, political strength and social ills, the policy makers were instructed to treat the drafting of the Bill as urgent to accelerate the process. Respondent A and B made sure that the process of the bill did not take long. They drafted a simple and easy bill with the direct objectives and who was responsible for what, Respondent B mentioned that “I drafted the simple bill, the president wanted something that can assist with AR and it had to be done quickly, ‘cause the longer the bill, the longer it will take to get it approved to parliament”. The bill was sent to parliament for discussion. After it came back with modifications; Respondent A mentioned that, his colleague, (Respondent B) “presented the modified act to the interim committee, the modifications were fixed and the draft was sent back to parliament for approval. The bill was approved; it became an act on the 22 January 2001”. On other hand, an official raised an issue that the previous fund the “Economic Cooperation Loan Fund was used by the apartheid government to fund friends, for instance, the building of the presidential palace and assisted in building a hotel in Madagascar”. Therefore, the ANC government wanted to establish a fund that will not assist in favour of “personal friends” but used for development in African countries.

#### 4.8. VIEWS OF THE POLICY MAKERS

This section presents the views of the policy makers of DIRCO. Respondents were asked to give an overview of how Act 51 of 2000 performed. They highlighted that the previous Act that repealed Act 51 of 2000 did not represent the “character” of Africa; the new ARF act was established to build the African character. The African character was described as a true representation of Africa. It was observable from the interviews that the former president, Thabo Mbeki, was the driving force behind the ARF establishment, “Thabo Mbeki called this technical assistance fund, the “African Renaissance and International relations cooperation fund”. The act itself

represented the building blocks of what the fund stood for. The latter was described as including economic, political and social development; the pillars were formed to address the African agenda. Policy makers emphasised the issues of conflict resolution, promoting peace, supporting human rights, community building, human resource development, creating bilateral relations with countries and good governance for development. The intent of the act was seen to provide financial support to assist neighbouring countries with development. ARF has been seen as assisting in resolving challenges when African countries were having general elections; this issue was described as political assistance. The latter development for the African continent meant building capacity in favour of building democratic principles. The policy makers expressed the need for funds in Africa to create jobs, products for the market for sustainable economic growth. It was a general view that the countries assisted with funding by the ARF would gradually grow their own economies. In terms of the social development, policy makers have generally agreed that making people understand their human rights, understand their communities would create a better life for people, women's organisations, social organisations and help uplift people, in addition to economic development.

#### 4.9. THE PROBLEM IDENTIFIED/AGENDA SETTING

The question was asked of policy makers what the reason was behind the establishment of Act 51 of 2000. The same question was asked across all the policymakers who were interviewed. Scholars argue that before the decision may be taken to form a policy, there must be an agenda or an identified problem by the government to initiate the process of making policy [Eustis, 2000]. In government, there is a norm that when society is dissatisfied with the services rendered by the government, they will protest, when this happens on a regular basis to an extent that it affects the economy, it could lead to government wanting to develop a policy that delivers services satisfactorily to stop the unhappiness in the society.

There was a general consensus from the policymakers on the objectives around the establishment of Act 51 of 2000. The respondents agreed that, amongst other things, development played a huge role in establishing the act. Respondent E stated that "it's all those five objectives of the act: the community building, humanitarian assistance, economic development bilateral co-operation's, capacity building, human

resource development or economic deployment”. While Respondent B also alluded that “a number of countries looked for assistance in one area or another and within government there was no institution that was capable of providing this type of assistance for funds”. There was a situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where the country needed assistance for their general elections. For instance; Respondent D stated “The DRC wanted to have elections but does not have money for the printing of ballots or participation of ballots that caused a huge havoc”. This is one of the areas that the Act was made for, as Respondent C referred to it as political assistance for the African agenda. However, one official argued that the previous loan fund that was supposed to assist strictly in development was sometimes misused by the then government for their personal friends. For instance “This fund was used to help political friends, for example, the building of the Presidential palace in Lilongwe and assistance in building a hotel in Madagascar, it was decided that a controlled fund needs to be established” commented Respondent A. Among the common reason from the policy makers, Respondent H added that “.....let us go back and re-embraced by the world, we ourselves were open to business, let the world come to SA, embrace the issues of conflicts resolutions, we promote peace to embrace the new democracy”

In summary, although the policy makers did not mention all the objectives of establishing the act, they all agreed and referred to the five objectives stated in the act. The researcher observed that the policy makers that were interviewed displayed a common understanding of why the act was established.

#### **4.10. POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS AROUND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ARF**

Political debates and consensus around the establishment of the act can render the policy void or valid. Various authors argue that consultation in policy decision making may allow various opinions to be debated while at the end it could promote consensus about policy choices [Freeman, 2013; Bridgman, 2003; Weible, et al, 2012]. Policy makers at DIRCO are of the opinion that the process of the act had no major parties opposing it during the discussions in parliament. Respondent D maintains that “the initiative of the act would have been only ANC but the final editing would have involved all political parties because this was done through legislation and the process would be that they would submit it to parliament and all political

parties would be involved; to the best of my knowledge all political parties participated in parliament". Respondent C added that "ARF was understood. I mean the DA didn't even, conceptually it did not have the problem with the fact ARF was the pillars for SA foreign policy set the central African agenda because it meant so much, even if you are representing the constituency, it was good for everybody". Respondent F alluded "it was good for everybody, there was no opposition parties opposing it". Views varied in support of the creation of this act as Respondent A argues that "the interim committee included parties like ANC, DA and UDM, these parties supported the Bill, ACDP and FF did not support the establishment, they were concerned that the ANC might use the fund for their personal interest. During this time Civil society representatives were there, but did not play part in the founding of the bill. Only government officials founded the Bill". On the contrary, Respondent D's opinion was that "there was no debate about the form of action of the act, it was entirely government who decided, the decision was not debated in parliament and there was not really a debate from other parties. The ruling party took a decision from the conference, that indeed they need ARF and they asked the government to consider the matter, the government, only government, decided to amend the previous act".

In summary, about 90% of policy makers somehow agree that debates about the formation of the act appeared to run smoothly, while about 10% of policy makers claim that the ruling party and government decide on its own with no inclusion of other parties's opinions.

#### **4.11. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM**

In relation to the analysis of the process, literature stresses the importance of a system's capacity and its good governance to be put as priority in the success of the policy process [Dunn, 1994; Smith, 1997]. The respondents were asked what method they have followed in analysing the policy. Almost all policy makers interviewed did not remember any model used in the analysis of forming the policy. Respondent B "So, the long discussions and a whole lot of people, in fact, by the time the legislation was drafted, it was two people, between me and respondent A, so I was from the leadership SA, by then respondent A was involved in Africa

division, so he was familiar with the concepts, so we drafted and we took it up and then it was approved”.

#### 4.12. PARTICIPATION IN POLICY DECISION

Respondents were asked who the stakeholders were who were involved in the development of the idea of ARF. They all spoke the same language. For instance, Respondent B said “Treasury and DIRCO”. While Respondent D mentioned that “It was us (DIRCO) and Treasury”. Respondent B added that “I think from government side there were different departments involved. It was DIRCO, presidency, the parliamentary committee and both the department of finance and, I think those were the key stakeholders. In general there is consensus that government was the key stakeholder in decision making”.

#### 4.13. CONSULTATION AND CO-ORDINATION

Policy makers were asked if consultation was done in the establishment of the act, Officials from DIRCO believe that the process of consultation while making the act was absent. As such, Respondent C commented “No, not really, ARF was operating slightly different, I can’t even think of the model similar to that, it was a more of targeted to SA, because we wanted to be more aggressive in advancing the African agenda so actually people found that it would be easy to amend that Act, they looked at that act and see that something’s were relevant, crafted the new act and then it became the ARF”. Those were the views of officials about the art of forming the act.

#### 4.14. ARF CAPACITY

Dunn [1994] and Smith [1997] stress the importance of a system’s capacity and its good governance to be put as priority in the success of the policy. When policy makers were asked if ARF had full capacity to run its funds, the bulk of policy makers were agreed that the capacity of the act needed some boosting.

##### Financial Resources

Respondent E added “a big pause, No , we do we have the funds”. While Respondent C lamented that “Ja (yes) no, for the act ARF, the way it was structured, it had the capacity to reach the goals of the Act. So you would say actually about 99.9% of the money used from the ARF was actually for the goals of the act while..... ARF did not have huge amounts of money, so we would offer money for

the small part”. Respondent D added “The ARF never had problem with the budget, normally we will fund the project for the initial payment and it was done on time and the payment afterwards was normally a problem, provided that there was a problem with the equipment in the project, so, but I will imagine, but I know that we never funded all of them, we always funded a part of it and the expected other funding were excluded”.

□ Human Resources

“No, not from ARF, the experts were from DIRCO. DIRCO will identify the experts, if the projects required for instance civil services, the experts are not from DIRCO, and they are from DPSA. The biggest problem we’ve encountered is discontinuity in leadership, because people will refuse to go back where they were posted during the running of these projects so people did not have defined roles, this was the issue.....a lack of continuity both in terms of the people” commented Respondent C. Respondent E added “I don’t think we have the personnel, we don’t have the Human resources, I think the financial risk is the human resources and all of that, Yes, yes we’re short staff, there are not even full time people in ARF you must remember, because ehh I mean ARF is a public entity that is based at DIRCO and does not have personnel so we get everything, the entity uses people from DIRCO sometimes, we are employees of DIRCO not like other public entities, the issues are the personnel” Respondent A added “ARF was run by four people. They were working with number of things”. While Respondent D said “There’s never enough people, you had the skills to do the administration in terms of capacity to do that...”. Respondent B “No, it was ok, they did ok, no body complained there, they need to advance human rights, they need to advance their democracy and so on and those skills resided within the departments and those were there”. Respondent F “were they skilled? No, no, well, not specific, there were general skill there, they were just sent there for three months, they were not sent there to monitor the projects”. Respondent H added “Yhu (Oh no) ! Jack of all trades master of none. I doubt if they know”.

□ Infrastructure

Respondent D “No, It was never the intention of the ARF to run the projects, the intention of ARF was to provide funding. Our project management task was to see

that these projects are run according to plan”. Respondent E “but the actual project management part of it, the capacity was really lacking”.

There was a general view that some improvement on the capacity of ARF will make the projects run quicker than it does.

#### 4.15. CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED BY ARF

Respondent C “My view is that not so much challenges during the establishment, it was so much of challenges during the operation, and it all had to do with the accountability”. Moreover, Respondent D lamented “Yes! many, many challenges, first of all the accountability challenges” Respondent A “At the Polokwane conference, it was discussed that ARF had challenges; it did not have a project management”. Respondent E “The Act was enacted years ago I don’t think they look 10 to 30 years, over the years the need for assistance has grown in fixed proportions I mean giving funds of R100M and all of that, is a lot of money so you need to account for it how, so the policy didn’t look far ahead, also the administrative and issues involved are not quoted for quite in the act, you got to follow the money and account so that kind of thing. So those are one of the things that needs time but we’re good, its fine”.

##### Project Management

“I mean so, no you’ve got so much, people don’t have the same energy in the countries that you’re helping that was becoming difficult to manage” lamented Respondent C. In addition “at the Polokwane conference, it was discussed that ARF had challenges; it did not have a project management. The decision was taken to establish SADPA” Respondent A lamented. In fact the question asked is how we know that indeed those projects are taking place. Now, you needed an arm, the ARF was not able to do that, but we needed an arm maybe an inspecting arm or a professional arm to actually go and look at all the projects that have been assisted by SA development assistance and actually see through that it ran from start to conclusion that was feasible for ARF to do. The second thing is that, we will never know for instance provided two hundred million rand how it was managed, in fact the question asked is how we know that indeed those projects are taking place, lamented Respondent D. Respondent B added “I think whoever implemented the project. There would be an independent project implementer and eh so the embassy now and there will go and check because they needed to give a report about that so



they don't run necessarily the running of the project, it will depend on the nature of the project, so yes, there were areas where we did the area where the area needed a commander".

□ Monitoring and Evaluation

"The challenges was that which is not, but the bill was nice and simple only after the bill has been implemented, the question was how then do you do monitor and evaluate, does the committee do monitoring and evaluation? No, who's doing the monitoring and evaluation? What happened in the event that the money has been disbursed and has not been used, what's the recourse was", commented Respondent B.

#### 4.16. POLICY OPERATION

Officials were asked their view about the implementation of the policy. Respondent A "ARF gave us an instrument to measure". "The bill was amended into act 51 of 2000 and implemented on the 22 January 2001. On the 22 January 2001 the implementation of the bill started. The interim committee needed a strategic plan for the implementation as this was not part in the establishment process. Immediately after the adoption of the fund, tragedy started" said Respondent F. Respondent A added "The team who formed the committee, there was a rotation of teams to posts, the first team was the interim committee, this team knew what to do amid of the absence of project management". Respondent G added "There was new team to rotate with the first team. However, this team did not know what to do. The challenge with operations of the fund was that we lost the ability to be creative and support". In support, Respondent A said "African Renaissance Fund started with millions, this thing became big".

□ Institutions involved in operation

Respondent D "Ok, so, the project can come directly to the department (DIRCO) or to the ARF directorate, or it can come to one of the other departments, when it comes to one of the other departments. When the project comes directly to ARF, for instance International relations, our ARF is responsible, we did not have a project manager, who will run with that project to ensure that it was implemented that it's run according to its plan..." Respondent E added "It should be DIRCO, and then it should be the recipient country or NGO that is given the grant and we as funder also oversee that the so then our embassies also act as an oversight in the country that

ask for a grant for assistance ja (yes), or...., sometimes it's also the institution from SA that is asking for funding that is going to be implemented maybe in Lesotho or maybe Namibia.. Well, the implementing agent would be, in this case uhm... with DPSA and they will report them to the fund, depends to what they agreed between the fund in and quarterly or six months, so ja”.

□ Influence of power

A question was asked from the policy makers, if power influenced the implementation of ARF. Respondent G “No not as far as you mean political influence? yes, it has happened last year, Namibia has this drought and the president had to help about Hundred million in terms of drought and the humanitarian assistance and ARF came and kicked in”. Respondent F “Well, the ruling party was here and there, well, during those days, within government there was between ruling parties”. Respondent H “Did the political power influence the implementation of these projects? Everything that was dealt with outside the country has an element of foreign policy, foreign policy resides with political principles for example Malawi was having huge difficulties with regards to its economy, the president then took a decision that he will assist in funding the government with hundred million to provide the necessary support for the government so that was a political decision, in 2002 when the African cup of nation was supposed to take place in Mali and when our president Thabo Mbeki at that time Mali was not in a position to host the cup of nations and he (Mbeki) took a decision on that, this *is an* “African nation’s cup, we cannot allow it not to take place” (Thabo Mbeki), so then the president decided that SA will support the world cup with the value of twenty million to support that project, so you’ll find out that the political influence is largely on the foreign relations”. Respondent F “Well, uhm, I cannot say; now I have to be careful. The process where, one will argue that the influenced by the presidency but again there it was logically and it was far much more the process, now we had to, for example when we were dealing with elections in the Congo, president Mbeki was the main facilitator of this, at some point there was an issue of whether the ballots were going to be printed, people were delaying the process and SA took a decision that because it was very important for the Congo to continue to go to the elections otherwise it would have gone to war, that was underway. The other big one, again, was that President Jacob Zuma was the main facilitator in Burundi during president

Mbeki's time, he had to close the deal, the UN was moving slowly about putting a peace keeping force and SA decided to assist. Those were very important".

□ **Processes**

Respondent E "Yes, it's not easy, information is not easy, sometimes it's not easy for instance let's say uhm Guinea Conakry, when you implement the project there become too many actors sometimes the implementing agent is from the certain country and therefore the recipient country has to take responsibility because it is the implementing agent and we as a funder, has our own expectations and so those actors there so we have a lease agreement so because we are the funders we need to follow the money up until it reaches the intended purpose or the intended recipient in that particular country, I mean it is not that easy, sometimes you have to look and the contact and you see debtor and you don't understand why you must consult through them, all those kind of things and because the money needs to be even if the recipient country uses the implementation agent in their own country but we need to follow them, where are they buying the goods, they have to buy their goods in SA first or in the region or the region they may buy from Europe whatever the you know, *ja* (yes), or you found those things, we had to deliver aid to Kenya about two years ago. If they use our money, they have to buy within the continent it's not negotiable".

□ **Reporting channels**

"Yes, reporting is a challenge sometimes, we don't get to report on time and, sometimes monies released in countries for instance money for their public service project so what happen is" said Respondent E. Respondent B "Eh what treasury wanted was simply that they wanted that the ministry to run funds, to simply release money willingly they wanted to be able to have a stake on, and so they insisted on the provision that for any disbursement there must be concurrency from their ministry that's all they wanted and then it made sense though that their members to be in the board so that they can approve, and they can see the process from its inception and approve it. First, in that way you don't have the foreign ministry cooking on itself and approving projects, himself, in that way you don't have the foreign ministry and then when it goes to concurrency, they say no, because they were parties in its approval they are able to explain to their minister that yes we were in the board and yes we did approve so that is the way they did things". Respondent B added "What I know about the reporting lines, even the setting up of this, the

secretary (Respondent E) it was an afterthought, afterthought because basically how it suppose to be is a, there is an intent the manner in which how the money is going to be disbursed. So how would this be done, should it be done through the board and then, what happens after the board, then the board then take it to the minister, then it goes to the minister of finance, when they agree, the money is disbursed and that's it, who reports to whom afterwards.....". Respondent D added "There were major challenges in reporting. Reporting did not take place as it should be until the system of reporting was introduced two to three years ago. They will take for instance instead of two to three years it will take five years. Secondly, the approach of the fund was to release funding as long as funds are given to the authorities with accountability requirements and then we found that you need a possibility of luck for that to happen; only when there were challenges, then you needed to report to ARF. So it was quite a bit of challenge when you need the process to run according to requirements". Ultimately, Respondent C said "If it was about the civil service we will send the money to DPSA which was done by the DPSA, then we had a project in Guinea-Bissau or in guinea Conakry where they needed agriculture events so it was like that so each project they would be a government department that would come".

#### 4.17. ENABLERS AND CONSTRAINS OF RUNNING THE FUNDS.

The African Renaissance fund's objective of supporting the other countries in the continent continues to assist. However, South Africa itself has its own challenges in developing its own country. By assisting the continent with funds using its tool ARF it has experience constraints and enablers in putting the policy into action. Some of the questions raised to policy makers included asking them what enablers and constraints have they experienced during the operation of this fund. As such, respondent E said "It has the good intentions but it's the issue of accountability you see. You need to have all possibilities, talent, regulations of public sector". Respondent F added "Well, I would think eh, the main challenge is that it has to support for the intent and then the temptation to be used as a state fund, and an institutional framework is not simple because like so and so, it's not going to be allowed because you get along with Thabo Mbeki, so that was the main challenge. People that releases the funds are officials so to have a backbone to say to the minister no we don't understand, so was a number one challenge I would say. The other challenge was that most of the time setting up the monitoring and evaluation,

setting up the record keeping so that you have a record precedent of knowledge so that you can apply to others, so those were the challenges”

Respondent H added “It was a very simple legislation. The challenges was that which is not but the bill was nice and simple only after the bill has been implemented, the question was how then do you do monitoring and evaluation? Does the committee do monitoring and evaluation? No, who’s doing the M&E? What happened in the event that the money has been disbursed and has not been used? What’s the recourse? ”. Respondent F agreed “The uhm problem was the political decisions are difficult sometimes, of course for a good purpose did not follow the process. Now, if the president says, I’m going to fund for instance the fire that took place in..... you can’t wait overnight, it needs funding now, of course that decision does not follow the administration process of the fund, now, if the president phoned the minister and the minister asking for the funds, there is not recorded evident, it becomes a huge difficulty to write a request to the minister, so we can take copies of that and keep as an evidence. The administrative process become difficult when there is an emergency. The second constraint was the process that we had to follow, and I can tell you, besides the case of Lesotho where they say, the real emergency of the need for food, the ARF had to approve a fairly amount of money that they need, but because of the process that we had to follow when the food needs to be provided the next day but because of the process we need to follow, a month later, food is still not provided. So more often than not we found the project overwhelmed by the time. Very seldom will the problem be completed within the time frame. So those were the constraints”. Respondent F “On the 22 January 2001 the implementation of the bill started, we needed a strategic plan for the implementation, this was not part of the act. Immediately after the adoption of the fund, “tragedy” started. There was a rotation of team to posts. The first team was the interim committee; this team knew what to do amid of the absence of project management. There was new team to rotate with the first team. However, this team did not know what to do”. Respondent A lamented “The challenge with operations of the fund was that we lost the ability to be creative and support”. Respondent C alleged “..... it was so much of challenges during the operation, and it all had to do with eh accountability, I mean it’s difficult sometimes you fund a project in another country and now you need accountability of how the funds, I mean so, no you’ve got so much, people don’t have the same energy in the countries that you’re helping that

was becoming difficult to manage”. “The monitoring and evaluation was the part that was difficult. The biggest problem we’ve encountered is discontinuity in leadership, because people will refuse to go back where they were posted during the running of these projects so people did not have defined roles, this was the issue, those were the challenges, a lack of continuity both in terms of the. People will feel frustrated, poor souls are running all sorts of adrenaline, this is not the only emergency that they are dealing with the other work they do and we expect them to focus on this thing, so it was difficult to appreciate people when they were there”. In contrast, Respondent B believed “In most of the countries we have embassies, so most of the time the embassies will do the monitoring. For example there was a long running of a project in Guinea Conakry, so the embassy monitored that, there was a project in Rwanda, where we had some medical doctors from ehh Cuba to assist them, when there was a genocide there, so the embassy was monitoring the projects, so they will provide a monitoring report, so usually we will use our embassies for monitoring”.

It is the view of the policy makers that ARF’s intention was good and it was a simple and straightforward policy, however, because it had no forward looking plan and it lacked a strategy, there were a lot of challenges. They also stress that in the presence of project management the challenges it encountered would have been avoided. Unfortunately the act did not provide for strategic direction. Respondent B “we had to look at the next project, without even needing to see the report” Respondent E “Yes, yes, so there are members and there is also alternative members” Respondent H “There are two parts of answers to answer this question: One is that we should have, you see the difficulty you have in this, is that any administrative or professional processes has impacted on the funding for the actual development itself”.

#### 4.18. SUGGESTIONS FROM POLICY MAKERS

ARF Act did not provide an open platform for policy makers to bring suggestions to counter problems that were missed at the establishment of the act. Nevertheless, policy makers had ideas how to mitigate the problems; however, there was no unit to look at these.

These were the views of policy makers:

**Respondent B** alluded “the board that is going to evaluate the projects or the project manager; A proper guide to guide the independent board; The process by which the monitoring and evaluation report it must be able to sit and look at the monitoring and evaluation ; there must be a record kept for all these projects it must be in e booklet form and be processed in a website so that people may know what kind of projects that SA so I think those are the kind of changes that need to be made”.

**Respondent E** “I ... going forward with SADPA because there is a constraints within the ARF system, now we are working a fully fledged developing agency and hopefully SADPA will close all of those gaps, and the people would be working with SADPA will work hopefully closely most of the time. So SADPA is meant to be the answer. She added Yes, I mean if you’re a civil servant you have to follow what PFMA says. We prevent them by silence appointing service providers in SA”.

**Respondent D** “what we need to recruit in your projects professionals who are very, very skilled, project management, project implementation in particular areas of the project, but that should be part of the protocol. ARF should actually allocate one of its people work with these organisations and to give that person authority to make decisions where things are not happening as they should, because more often than not you’ll find the time the project comes to implementation, it took so long for implementation, most of time was used in planning you must be given authority so that you can take decisions, regularly auditing during the course of the project must take place, there should be inspectors tell to say you are suppose to finish this project at this time. Even the project manager, you’re given a project plan, tell us what have you done, and if not why. You have this high level project manager to make sure that indeed the project has taken place. We must come up with the proper mechanism, more importantly, the implementation of the project”.

**Respondent C** “I mean I think the idea of SADPA came out, like we would like to do things like abo (the) China, to have like DPSA”.

#### 4.19. ANNUAL REPORTS

In addition to what the policy makers have said, information was extracted from the annual reports and the Auditor General Report regarding the performance of ARF for the past five years. The table below reflects the issues raised by the AG on ARF annual reporting.

The Auditor General has drawn attention in the matters of governance arising on an annual basis from 2005 to 2009. Below are the issues raised by Auditor General:

These matters below could lead to the Auditor General qualifying the Audit report:

**2005:** The ICT was not performing up to standard and AG instruction to the department was that, it had to be re-engineered and build a management capacity that is adequate for strategic financial management. Improvement on monthly and quarterly management and performance reports were raised. Motivate and encourage the culture of risk management and compliance to policies and procedures. Review and enhancement of the Human Resources Function.

**2006:** The fund did not have an effective monitoring, evaluation and reporting on its performance in information consequently, the fund did not submit its performance information for auditing within the stipulated timeframe, as required by the National Treasury Guide for the Preparation of Annual Reports. AG has instructed the ARF to create an M&E system and submit a report at the end of each Financial year as required by National Treasury.

**2007:** R29.9 million exceeded the initial amount pledged and contrary to section 5 of the African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund Act 2000 (Act No 51 of 2000), these payments had not been regularised by the advisory committee and confirmation by the Minister of Finance was not obtained. AG requested regulated payments by the advisory committee and confirmation by the Finance Minister to be recorded

**2008:** The financial statements submitted for audit were not subject to any material amendments resulting from the audit. In this financial year the AG was pleased with the good financial year reporting and reported no irregularities.

**2009:** A risk assessment was conducted on a regular basis and a risk management strategy, which includes a fraud prevention plan, was documented and used as set out in Treasury Regulation 27.2. At this financial year end, AG reported no inconsistencies on ARF's performance.

The matters above were concerns prevailed from the annual reports of ARF highlighted by AG from 2005 to 2009. There were inconsistencies as reported by AG. However, the last two years, 2008 and 2009. ARF showed an improvement in its reporting pertaining to financial reporting and governance issues. The AG reported for the last two years.

#### 4.19. CONCLUSION

This chapter has focused on the presentation of data that was provided by policy makers from the Department of International Relations and Co-operation. Their responses based on the questions they were asked relating to "What the policy process was that led to the establishment of ARF, in relation to exploring the policy process leading to the establishment of the ARF Act from 2000 to 2009. The responses relating to those questions raised their concerns relating to accountability, consultation and co-ordination, governance, human resource management, monitoring and evaluation, project management, participation in policy makers, power influence and enablers and constraints based on their experience working for DIRCO. In summary, the process which started from the initiation of the Act to the implementation stage, according to policy makers has its own good intentions and in



the process of implementing it, has suffered challenges relating to its administration, incapacitated human resources, a lack of monitoring and evaluation process, accountability and project management. In the next chapter, an intense analysis of the findings is given, relating to the literature in chapter two. After intense interviews with policy makers, data were transcribed for analysis in Chapter five.

## CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

### 5.1. INTRODUCTION

Chapter four presented data received from DIRCO policy makers. Policy makers included three ARF committee members, a legal advisor, a chartered accountant and three officials within DIRCO. It also offered themes derived from the experiences of policy makers in implementing Act 51 of 2000. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis of data presented from the preceding chapter. The analysis provides a discussion of the themes thereby interpreting findings of the processes of establishing ARF. The findings from the analysis are directly linked to the theoretical reconsideration of chapter two. Chapter one described the purpose of this paper, which explored the policy process when Act 51 of 2000 was established. Furthermore, the research findings and conclusion are given. A quantity of themes explored follow in sequence such as: Accountability, consultation and coordination, Governance, Human resource management, Monitoring and evaluation, Participation in policy makers, power influence, Project management and enablers and constraints. The transcribed data provided the themes above and they were coded according to their grouping.

#### 5.0.1. FINDINGS

#### 5.1. SETTING THE AGENDA

##### **The birth of ARF**

In summary, the post 1994 democratic government triggered a concern for Africa's development. It is in this regard that the former president, Thabo Mbeki, stood behind the creation of the African Renaissance. South Africa is seen as "hope" by the Western countries; President Mbeki articulated a strong commitment to assist in the revival and renewal of the African continent through the "African Renaissance" concept [Van Nieuwkerk, 2006]. Almost all Policymakers remembered the former president as a passionate force behind the creation of ARF. As a result, their views were that "the Act was motivated by former president Thabo Mbeki's idea of African Renaissance".

However, the former Economic Loan Fund at the time which was utilised by the apartheid government was used to favour their friends and needed to be replaced with a Fund that would focus on the development of an African agenda [Respondent C]. Because of all the economic, political and social challenges in Africa, the ARF came into existence. The intention of the fund was good, as described by Respondent E. However, the process by which the Act came into existence, was not a thorough process for policy decision making which could render the act ineffective when the act was put into practice, this process involves individuals, institutions and agencies to make it an effective process [Shepherd, 2011].

### **Policy process for ARF**

The policy process, according to Dunn [1994], revealed five different stages in which a policy can be established. The stages included: agenda setting, policy formulation, policy adoption, policy implementation and policy assessment. Within each stage of the process, an intense engagement should be followed to ensure that there is no list of weaknesses when the act becomes a law. However, in the case of ARF, government needed a “quick” bill to be drafted in order to accelerate the process. Looking at what the literature says about establishing an Act, it appears that the constitution and the ANC conference support a thorough process in forming an act. The advantage about the bill is that it was simple and easy to follow. As a result, one could not complain about the complexity of the information. However, be that as it may, a “simple and quick” bill comes with a number of challenges. For instance, it may exclude attention to detail. A simple example is that the bill was silent about project management. Furthermore, the necessary steps that need to be followed by policy makers - some were skipped because of the urgency and “uniqueness” of ARF Act.

#### Political debates

Dunn [1994] and Dye [2007] agree that a mutual agreement has to be met and that setting of an agenda precedes the process of making a policy. If this is not the case, the stakeholders may try to push their own agenda [Eustis 2000]. The majority of respondents mutually agree that the heated debates on setting the agenda were healthy. Only two parties seemed to differ with the rest, which were the FF and ACDP. Their argument was the concern that the ANC government may create the ARF to serve their own personal interest. Respondent C described that the heated

debates “were very constructive not very antagonistic”. Although ACDP and FF were worried that government might use the fund for their personal interest, the rest were very supportive and they all reached consensus in the end. Nonetheless, the ANC government at the time was a majority and because the previous fund did not support development on the continent, the minority parties did not have the vote to influence the decision. Furthermore, they were in support of building relations with other countries and therefore agreed to the decision.

□ Participation of stakeholders

Public officials, mass media, interest groups and bureaucracy, the president, parliament, the ministries and courts contribute in bringing issues to the policy agenda [Tosun, 2008]. When the respondents were asked who participated in development of the idea of ARF, they all spoke the same language. For instance, Respondent B said “Treasury and DIRCO”, while Respondent D mentioned that “It was us (DIRCO) and Treasury”. Respondent B added that “I think from government side there were different departments involved. It was DIRCO, presidency, the parliamentary committee and the department of finance and, I think those were the key stakeholders”. In general there is consensus that government was the key stakeholder in decision making. The findings at this stage reflect a lack of participation by civil society, mass media, and interest groups. Therefore, the majority of the society in SA is not aware of the existence of ARF. The participation of mass media would have publicised the establishment of the act to the general public and civil society would have brought other constructive contributions to the monitoring and evaluation, consultation and strategic direction. An absence of various groups and even the targeted group from African countries projects a lack of understanding in policy decision making process.

## 5.2. DECISION MAKING/ALTERNATIVE POLICIES

### **Consultation and co-ordination**

Consultation is key to successful policy implementation [Althaus, et al. 2013]. In general, it improves quality of the policy decisions through access to information and perspective [Freeman, 2013]. Policy consultation is important when an act is established. ARF operated slightly differently from other policies that have involved a lot of consultation. Because the act was targeted more “aggressively in advancing the African agenda”, there was a belief that it would be easy to amend. On the other hand, the process of establishing the act did not involve consultation outside government. Looking at UK, US, Africa and in other countries to compare knowledge and to be aware of how other countries have failed and succeeded in their policy making process would have been the best tool in preventing challenges of implementation of the act.

Shepherd [2011] argues that better co-ordination in policy must contain three elements, i.e. strategic control from the centre of government, ministries with capacity for co-ordination and lastly, there must be a mechanism for a parallel co-ordination. As a result, two problems have been identified that could impede effective performance in policy such as the growing size and complexity of government and coherence and control in policy [Shepherd, 2011]. It appears that DIRCO, ARF and Department of Finance (DF) were the main institutions that were involved in internal and external co-ordination when funds were disbursed. Nevertheless, concurrency as the act requires, was lacking. The absence of a DIRCO member when projects were run outside the country could lead to money not being used for the purpose for which it was paid. As long as the recipient country is not officially required to account for the funds received from DIRCO, ARF and DF, there is a possibility that funds will not be entirely utilised for economic, political and social development. There must be proper strategic control where there is coherence from the stage of submission of proposal until the development project is finished. This will improve the effectiveness of policy implementation.

Smith [1997] and Tosun [2008] argue that formulation of policy directly deals with elaboration of alternatives of actions and encourages building on the policy

confidence. In addition, Halsworth [2011] and Barkenbus [1998] agree that policies brought closer to the real world and the real world closer to the policy process brings the added value of expert knowledge to increase policy space and enhances potential formulation of a win-win policy situation. This is one of the fundamentals in consulting on how experts choose the best practical policy from several alternatives. In ARF case, there was a lack of policy alternatives in establishing ARF. Only one policy was used as a basis which did not suit the values of a democratic government. This indicated a lack of knowledge in development aid policy which could lead to poor engagement for a good policy direction.

### 5.3. POLICY ADOPTION

The condition of the budget puts more weight in the cabinet meeting, the lower the budget, the lower possibility for policy adoption [Subroto, 2011]. A clear and constant consultation for alternatives and criteria of the agenda ensures understanding, acceptance and legitimacy of the proposed policies [Freeman, 2013]. The previous amended economic loan fund had millions in the budget. There was no negative gesture in the cabinet for the adoption of ARF bill. On the other hand, because there was no other alternative to ARF which could have cost less or more than ARF, there was a common interest from the policy makers to adopt the bill into an Act with no financial challenges, and the balance of money from the previous fund made it easier for ARF Act to be adopted.


### 5.4. IMPLEMENTATION

Literature in policy implementation says logical choices, actors with capacity and access to knowledge, time, attention, are able to act logically when the act is put into action [Smith, 1997; Anderson, 2003]. It goes on stressing the importance of capacity with good leadership, and opportunity to adopt and proper implementation of policy is significant to ensure success of the policy [Halsworth, 2011; Smith, 1997; Tosun, 2008].

After the act became law, the interim committee did not have a strategic plan for the implementation; it was not part in the establishment process. Respondent F lamented "Immediately after the adoption of the act, tragedy started". There were two teams to put the policy into action. The two teams rotated the posts. The first team had an idea of what is expected in operations and were armed with a strategic plan.

However, the second team did not know what to do. Policy makers raised the challenge of losing the ability to be innovative. The graph below shows the flow of funds from year 2000 to 2009.

Fig.4 Source: [DIRCO, 2011]



The ARF has received funds from Treasury and assisted the African continent with donations for development. The Graph above shows funds donated to the African continent in US dollars from years 2000 to 2009. The funds donated were contributions for humanitarian assistance, technical co-operation and programs for human resources and administration costs for development. From 2000 to 2003 there was a gradual increase in funding. However, from 2004 and 2005 there was a decline in fund assistance. From 2006, 2008 and 2009 the assistance in funding showed an increase in funding except 2007 which dropped about R282M. The declined in funding is the result of rejecting of project proposals which did not meet the requirements for funding [DIRCO, 2014], while the gradual increase in funding shows the proposal accepted by ARF because of meeting the ARF requirements. The fact that ARF started with millions of Rands led to it becoming big and unwieldy. The lack of innovation is the result of deficiency in access to knowledge, attention and logic. However, the department did send the teams to Norway for training during the implementation of the act. Conversely, a poor policy direction did not improve the implementation of the effectiveness of policy. The success of implementation

depends on how well bureaucratic structures implement government laws. It was reported that the first team consisted of leadership and had an idea of what was expected but that the second team had less knowledge on policy implementation. As a result, the lack of opportunity for proper implementation of policy, led to poor implementation.

#### Institutional capacity

Institutions with sufficient resources are able to translate policy objectives into an operational framework and are accountable for their actions [Gerston, 2004, cited by Tosun, 2008].

ARF did not have permanent staff that stayed in ARF. They borrowed personnel from DIRCO, to this day it does not have its own staff; they still depend on rotation of personnel. In addition, there is no project management team who are able to manage the administration of the fund. This showed weak institutional capacity. With the absence of permanent, skilled staff and experts, the translation of policy objectives into action becomes a challenge. In 2005, the AG raised concerns around governance issues involving motivation and encouragement of the culture of risk management, compliance to policies and procedures, and enhancement of the human resources function. Therefore, there was a lack of good governance and also poor capacity in human resources.

#### □ Reporting lines

Hallsworth [2011] argues that the lack of realistic reporting processes leads policy in ad hoc solutions to problems.

There is a lack of reporting on time frames. For instance, between when the project proposal is submitted, the time when money is disbursed by Treasury and the completion of the project there is no time allocated, although respondents stressed the importance of concurrency between Treasury and DIRCO ministry before approving the funds to be disbursed. This process is a tool of preventing one of the ministries in “cooking on itself and approving projects”. In addition, setting up of the ARF secretariat was “an afterthought”, “the money is disbursed and that’s it, who reports to whom afterwards.....” said Respondent H. The policy makers reported that the system of reporting was introduced only two to three years ago. The project took longer than the expected time. “You will need a possibility of luck for that to happen” warned Respondent D. It was a challenge when a process was expected to run



according to a plan. A lack of a proper reporting structure has led the ARF institution to create an ad hoc approach to solutions. Thus, a realistic, coherent approach is needed to improve reporting structure.

- Political influence

Geoffrey [2011] claims that politicians can easily influence civil servants when they implement public policy. In addition, those who are administrators of policy are charged with the responsibility of carrying out the dictates of policy [Barkenbus, 1998]. The implementers of policy have reported an insignificant political influence in implementation. Official 3 lamented “everything dealt with foreign policy resides with political influence”. Political influence was largely on foreign relations, where the president was the main facilitator. Power influence in government institutions remained a challenge in policy implementation, particularly in African countries where accountability is overlooked. The method by which reduction of political power can be applied, is in providing the embassy with independent authority in influencing development in the country that needs development assistance.

## 5.5. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

According to Hallsworth [2011], Subroto [2011] and Tosun [2008], monitoring and evaluation leads to policy revision, it assesses policy objectives versus the achieved goals, it must be carried out by experts who are knowledgeable and understand the processes and objectives of the evaluation. In agreement, Barkenbus [1998], Tosun [2008] and Geoffrey [2011] mention that policy evaluation is most often a *forgotten* element; the two questions must be answered when evaluating policy, “how has the policy worked?” and “how can implementation of policy be improved?” The feedback will identify new problems that have arisen during the implementation process. This tendency explains the reason why evaluation is often ignored by decision makers. Evaluation of policy enables decision makers to draw lessons from the operation; that the growing size and complexity of government could become overwhelming to weak institutions and would impede successful policy results [Geoffrey, 2011].

The challenges with ARF were that the process of forming the bill was simple; however, there was no M&E project management system in existence in the ARF. Therefore, there was no revision on how the implementation versus policy objectives had performed. A lack of experts and policy process also led to failure in creating an M&E system. Because this process was overlooked in policy decision making, it

explains the ignorance and lack of knowledge when Act 51 of 2000 was formed. Because of the monitoring and evaluation system, the growing size of ARF projects can incapacitate weak institutions and result in failure in policy objectives.

#### □ Governance Issues

Literature stressed the importance of a system's capacity and its good governance to be put as priority in the success of the policy process [Dunn, 1994; Smith, 1997]. Problems like the growing size and complexity of government, coherence and control in policy may result in impeding effective performance in policy [Shepherd, 2011]. Issues of poor governance were raised by the AG in the annual reports dating from 2005 to 2007. The AG has drawn attention to management capacity, strategic financial management, management reporting and culture of risk management, HR, compliance to policies and procedures were poorly reported. The fund did not have an effective monitoring, evaluation and reporting system on its performance in information, there were no time frames for the projects as required by the National Treasury Guide. For instance, the quality of the implementation and execution of adequate control and work procedures were not of an acceptable standard. As such, there was often reported evidence on non-conformity with prescribed internal controls and best practices. In addition, there was concern over significant weaknesses in controls. For example, the Auditor General called for the internal audit committee to ensure good governance in scheduling target dates for implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the planned and agreed KPIs. Formalising of the appropriate policies and procedures, strategic management of missions, co-ordination with departments and capacity building were important to ensure that planned targets were achieved at the end of the financial year. Management was encouraged to follow the PFMA procedures to improve the quality and content of monthly and quarterly management and performance reports. Risk management, human resources and compliance to policies and procedures are key to good governance. These were issues of governance in running the ARF. These issues prevailed because of poor capacity in strategic direction which requires good leadership, capacitated human resources and a strong institution with prioritised systems of control [DIRCO, 2005; 2007] .

#### □ Accountability

Government institutions have a responsibility to introduce order where appropriate and holding implementers to account when something goes wrong [Halsworth,

2011]. Anticipation of challenges in decision making processes must provide transparency, accountability and opportunities for involvement [Freeman, 2013]. During the interviews with policy makers at DIRCO, the good intentions of the policy were highlighted. While they all raised concerns about the silence of the act in accountability during its implementation, they all agreed that one of the challenges in its operation came about in administration and during reporting. As a result, the ANC conference in 2009 started to discuss solutions on how to close this gap. Respondent E said “I mean giving funds of R100M and all of that, is a lot of money so you need to account for it how, you got to follow the money and account”

There is a need to review the act as a matter of urgency. The act was “short sighted”, it did not have a long term and a short term goal. As a result, implementation of the policy suffered. Had it been reviewed in the short term, the issue of accountability would have been noticed, a strategy to close this gap would have been put in place to prevent future unaccountability in its operation.

## 5.6. ENABLERS AND CONSTRAINTS

The African Renaissance fund objective of supporting other countries in the continent continued to exist. However, South Africa itself has its own challenges which include its administration, governance issues and human resources. Below are enablers and constraints highlighted by policy makers from ARF.

### **Constraints**

- Issues of accountability
- The temptation to be used as a state fund for the political interest
- Institutional framework not simple
- No autonomy for officials
- Absence of monitoring and evaluation
- No record keeping and knowledge
- Influence of political power
- Difficult administration system for emergencies
- No timelines
- No project management.
- No ability to be creative and supportive
- No strategic plan

### **Enablers**

- Budget availability
- An advisory committee
- The embassies
- Simple legislation
- Regulations of public sector

Looking at the above factors, although ARF have enabling tools to implement the policy, the constraints far outweigh the enablers. With so many constraints mentioned above, it will be difficult to achieve the objectives of the policy. This reflects the poor policy framework when the ARF act was established. The constraints are the weaknesses in running the fund.

## 5.7. SUGGESTIONS FROM POLICY MAKERS

- An independent board to evaluate the projects or the project manager and a proper guide to guide the independent board;
- A monitoring and evaluation report and a record kept for all projects in an e - booklet format to be processed in a website;
- SADPA is the answer, a fully pledged developing agency and full time employees for SADPA;
- Public officials to follow what PFMA says and private service providers to agree with these rules;
- High level skilled project managers and project management and, lastly,
- ARF should allocate one of its people authority to make decisions and provide inspectors with proper mechanisms for implementation

A lack of co-ordination and information sharing in ARF led to poor performance in policy implementation.

## 5.8. CONCLUSION

The chapter analysed the data that was presented in the previous chapter. The literature review was linked to what the policy makers said in context related to setting the agenda, Policy formulation and alternatives, Policy adoption, Policy implementation and Monitoring and Evaluation of Policy. The policy making process in which data was analysed used Dunn's [1994] policy making cycle tool with which the ARF findings were analysed.

The Department of International Relations and Co-operation's objective is to govern the foreign affairs of South Africa. African Renaissance and the international co-operation fund within DIRCO holds the development aid foreign policy for DIRCO. However, after an intensive review of ARF from 2000 to 2009, it was discovered that it had administrative, human resource and project management challenges to achieve its mandate of implementing act 51 of 2000. The new agency (SADPA) is expected to counter all the challenges suffered by ARF. However, ARF institutional capacity was found to be weak, as a result it impacted on the implementation policy process.

The next chapter provides a conclusion for this study and recommendations in order to capacitate the establishment of the new agency (SADPA).

## CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 6.1. INTRODUCTION

The research problem stated in this research report was that the development aid policy of South Africa is inconsistent, not well co-ordinated, lacks proper implementing mechanisms and often diverts from policy objectives. The aim of the study was to explore the policy process leading to the establishment of ARF, Act 51 of 2000, from 2000 to 2009, with the intention of adding more knowledge of public policy decision making processes. In order to provide answers to the aim of the report, the main question of what the policy process was that led to the establishment of ARF was asked with its sub-questions. Recommendations are made to help DIRCO in developing a strategic direction on how they will close the gap in the weakness of the foreign policy making process.

The first, second, third and fourth chapters provided a theoretical viewpoint on the policy decision making process. Using policy concepts and frameworks from the previous chapters on how the act becomes law, from the viewpoint of different scholars, it was found that there is a body of literature applicable to the research problem. Dunn's policy process was used for the analysis of ARF policy process. His policy cycle model was used in chapter five to reach the findings of this study. Recommendation for the SADPA policy making process is given below.

### 6.2. RECOMMENDATIONS

The weakness in incapacitated institutions, barriers in implementation and lack of strategic direction is a result of poor decision making process in policy. The deficiency in proper consultation and rushing into establishing an act has deprived policy makers of an opportunity to see how other development aid policies are formed. The constraints in policy implementation such as issues of accountability, political influence, absence of monitoring and evaluation, poor human resource management, and a strategic plan need knowledgeable leadership and skills to remedy. Implementation is an act of putting policy into action, conversely, it is normal to observe a gap in what was planned and what actually occurred as a result of

policy [Buse, et al. 2005]. It is the researcher's opinion that in putting the act into action, the root of the problem lies in a weak policy process followed in the establishment of the act. Following what appeared to be poor policy making process in ARF, the following recommendations are suggested:

- **Strategic plan**

There must be a strategic plan that is forward looking, detailed for how the implementation should be done with time frames, the right skilled employees with target and actual performance indicators.

- **Participation of stakeholders**

Public officials, mass media, interest groups and bureaucracy, the president, parliament, the ministries and courts contribute in bringing issues to the policy agenda [Tosun, 2008]. There is a lack of participation by civil society, mass media, and interested groups. Therefore lack of various groups and even the targeted group from African countries projects a lack of understanding in policy decision making processes. At the initiation stage, various stakeholders should be involved to ensure contribution of experts throughout the policy process.

- **Human Resources**

Education and training should be provided for employees of SADPA. A permanent team for SADPA should be hired and offered education and training about the foreign aid policy. Employees should be rewarded when they have delivered according to expectations and beyond. This will motivate them and improve implementation of the policy.

An easy to follow manual/booklet for officials should be given to each employee of SADPA with the objectives of the policy. The booklet should have important information on how the policy is put into action. There must be people working within the teams available to interpret the implementation process. Autonomy should be delegated to embassies so that they can make decisions without political influence. They must also have an alternative system where there are emergency projects. All the above will improve service delivery.

- **Project Management**

There should be a contract management in place who are experts in development aid. Three people are needed. The first one should be the one who leads the whole team in project management; the second one should be the one who sees that the

projects run on time and the technicalities of running these. The third person should be an independent person that monitors and evaluates various stages of the project.

- Accountability

Information communication technology systems must be adopted that record the funding process from the proposal stage to the monitoring and evaluation stage. This will help to ensure that the money disbursed to projects has been utilised for the purpose intended. Timelines should be allocated for the running of the project. This will assist in recording how long such projects take to finish so that estimations can be done for similar projects.

- Reporting Channels

There should be clear reporting lines from the project proposal to the monitoring and evaluation stage.

A good supporting system from management must be available to help those who get stuck in the process implementing the policy.

- Monitoring and evaluation

There should be a monitoring and evaluation team within SADPA to check the progress and completion of the project and the problems encountered to be handled within the time frame.

- Regulations

Regulations of PFMA, DPSA and the constitution should be observed. This will improve good governance in DIRCO. The personnel should attend workshops and be made aware of the regulations of these institutions to strengthen the foreign development aid policy.

- Consultation and Co-ordination

Consultation in policy discussion and the decision making process balances the formation of a good policy. However, the lack of consultation and co-ordination in ARF led to poor decision making.

## CONCLUSION

The aim of this study was to explore the policy making process of ARF with the purpose of adding more knowledge in policy decision making processes, with the use of primary and secondary data gathered to highlight the strengths and weaknesses in the ARF policy making process. This research study has discussed



the conclusion based on the knowledge gap, the views of the policy makers and the findings. The research offers recommendations to DIRCO policy makers.

The act was enacted in 2000 and has many loopholes. It is time to revisit the act and make necessary adjustments where the act is silent or lack details. Credit must be given to the dedicated policy makers who put this act together and implemented it for the development of the African continent. It is critical to do stock taking to unpack the success and failures of act 51 of 2000 in order to improve policy implementation in future.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Agency, A. R. (2007). *Annual Report 2006/2007*. Johannesburg: African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund.
- Ajulu, R. (2000). "Mbeki's African renaissance in a globalising world economy:*The Struggle for the Soul of the continent*. *Review of African Political Economy*, 1-17.
- Alonso, J. A. (2012, September ). From Aid to Global Development Policy. *Economic and Social Affairs: DESA Working Paper No. 121 ST/ESA/2012/DWP/121* , pp. 3-36.
- Anderson, J. E. (2003). *Public policymaking: An introduction*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, pp. 1 – 34.
- Baehr, P. (1997 ). *Problems of Aid Conditionality. The Netherlands and Indonesia*: 2nd Edition. The Netherlands:Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
- Barber, J. (2005). *The new South Africa's foreign policy:principles and practice*. *International affairs*, 81(5), 1-18.
- Barkenbus, D. J. (1998). *Expertise and the Policy Cycle*. *Energy, Environment, and Resources Center*, University of Tennessee, September. 1-11.
- Besharati, N. A. (2013, August). *South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA): Strategic Aid or Development Packages for Africa? Economic Diplomacy Programme: Research Report 12*, South African Institute of International Affairs.
- Braude, W., Thandrayan, P., & Sidiropoulos, E. (2008). *Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance: The South Africa Case*. Canada: IDRC & CRDI.
- Bridgman, P. (2003). *What use is a policy cycle? Plenty, if the Aim is Clear*. *Controversy* , Australian Journal of Public Administration, (62)3, 99-102.
- Bryman, A. (2012). *Social Research Methods: 4th Edition*. New York: Oxford University Press Inc.
- Bryman, A., & Burgess, R. G. (2002). *Analyzing Qualitative Data*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Buse K, M. N. (2005). *Mays Making Health Policy*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
- Casoo, S. (2012). *The South African Development Agency (SADPA)*. ODI Cape Conference (pp. 1-11). London: Department of International Relations and Co-operation.
- Colebatch, H. K. (2002). *Policy: 2nd Edition*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
- Congress, A. N. C. (2012). 53rd National Conference. *53rd National Conference Resolutions* (p.1- 82). Mangaung: ANC.
- Creswell, J. W. (2003). *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among the Five Approaches; 3rd Edition*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

- Department of Public and Administration, SA (2014, August 9). *Public Service Legislation*. Pretoria: Public Personnel Management.
- Diop, C. A. (1996). *Towards the African Renaissance: Essays in Culture and Development, 1946-1960*. London: Trans. Egbuna P. Modum.
- DIRCO. (2004, February 13). *Establishment of the African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund*. Retrieved from Department of International Relations and Co-operation: <http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/profiles/arfund.htm>: Accessed 20/10/2013
- Dunn, W. (1994). *Public Policy Analysis: An introduction*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Dye, T. (2007). *Understanding Public Policy*: 12<sup>th</sup> ed. New Jersey: Pearson/Prentice Hall.
- Edigheji, O. (2007). *Rethinking South Africa's*. Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies.
- Eustis, J. D. (2000). *Agenda-Setting: The universal case*. Virginia: Blacksburg.
- Freeman, B. (2013). Case study: development of the University of Melbourne policy on policy, delegations policy and delegations register. *Association for Tertiary Education Management and Tertiary Education Facilities Managers' Association*, 49.
- Fukuda-Parr, S. (2007). *Rethinking the Policy Objectives of Development Aid From Economic Growth to Conflict Prevention*. Research Paper No. 2007/32. Tokyo: United Nations University.
- Geoffrey, S. (2011). *Monitoring and Evaluation in the Public Policy Cycle*. Chile: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
- Groenewald, T. (2004). A Phenomenological Research Design Illustrated. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 3 (1) , 1-26.
- Hallsworth, M. (2011). Policy Making in the real world. *Evidence and analysis* , 104.
- Hall, R. (2004). *A political economy of land reform in South Africa*. *Review of African Political Economy*, 31(100), 213-227.
- Hamann, B. L. (2003). *Constructing Policy: A Framework for Effective Policy Implementation*. Chicago IL: American Educational Research Association.
- Hargovan, J. (2012). Presentation on the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA). *Post Busan Development Cooperation: New Architecture, Actors and Opportunities* (pp. 1-26). New Delhi, India: Department of International Relations and Cooperation .
- Herbert, S. (2012). *Shaping policy for development*. London: ODI Research.
- Hewlett, M., & Ramesh, M. (2003). *Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Janina Onuki, P. F. (2009). Political parties, Foreign policy and ideology: Argentina and Chile in comparative perspective. *Brazilian political science review* , 28.

- Landsberg, C. (2012). The Jacob Zuma government's foreign policy. *Association or dissociation?*
- Levinson, B., & Sutton, M. (2001). *Policy as in practice: A Socio-Cultural Approach to The Study of Educational Policy. Toward a Comparative Socio-Cultural Analysis of Educational Policy*, 1-22. Greenwood Publishing Group.
- Mandela, N. (1993). *South Africa's Future Foreign Policy*. Cape Town: South Africa Foreign affairs.
- Manitoba. (2003, January). A Guide To Policy Development. *Office of the Auditor General* , pp. 1-54.
- Mbeki, T. (2012). *Celebrating ANC President Oliver Reginald Tambo*. Pretoria: Thabo Mbeki Foundation.
- Merriam, S. B. (1995). What Can You Tell From An N of 1? Issues of Validity and Reliability In Qualitative Research. *Theory to Practice: PAACE Journal of Lifelong Learning: Vol. 4*.
- Michael Halsworth, S. P. (2011). Policy Making in the real world. *Evidence and Analysis* , 1-104.
- Neuman, L. (2011). *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. 7<sup>th</sup> ed.. Boston: Pearson Education, Inc.
- OECD. (2012). Trade-Related South-South Co-operation. *Co-operation:India* (1-14). India: OECD.
- Online, S. A. (2014, September 6). <http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/transition-democracy-timeline-1984-1994>. Retrieved September 6, 2014, from Sahistory.org.za: <http://www.sahistory.org.za>
- Parliament, S. A. (2014, June 15). *How a law is made*. Cape Town: Government Printer..
- Poon, D. (2013). *South-South Trade, Investment, and Aid Flows*. Canada: The North-South Institute.
- RSA Government. (2000, November 24). *African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund Act 51 of 2000*. pp. 1-5.
- RSA. (1996). Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. Government Gazette, 378.
- S.A. (2007). *Cooperation between The European Union and South Africa*. Pretoria: South African Government.
- Shepherd, G. (2011). *Demina: Monitoring and Evaluation in the Public Policy Cycle: The Experience of OECD countries*. Paris: OECD.
- Sidiropoulos, E. (2009). *South Africa's Foreign Policy in the Post Mbeki Era*. *Auslandsinformationen* 4 , South African Journal of International Affairs, 127-132.
- Smith, G. E. (1997). *Analysis and assessment of the policy process of the Non-Profit organizations bill*. Johannesburg: University of Witwatersrand.
- Sotero, P. (2009). *Emerging powers:India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA)*. Woodrow Wilson International Center for scholars, Special Report, August.

- Subroto, A. (2011). *Understanding Complexities in Public Policy Making Process through Policy Cycle Model. A System Dynamics Approach*, University of Indonesia, Graduate School of Management Research Paper, 1-30.
- Tapula, T., de Kock, P., & Sturman, K. (2011, October 21). *South Africa's development partnership agency: A burden or blessing?* Retrieved from South African Institute of International Affairs: <http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/south-africas-development-partnership-agency-a-burden-or-blessing>: Accessed 20/10/2013
- Thipanyane, T. (2011). *South Africa's Foreign Policy under*. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.
- Tjonneland, E. N. (2013, February). Providing development aid to Africa : comparing South Africa with China, India and Brazil. *South African Foreign Policy Initiative : SAFPI Policy Brief No 25*, pp. 1-8.
- Tosun, C. K. (2008). *Policy Making*. Germany: University of Konstanz.

## **APPENDICES**

### **APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE**

The interview process started with an Introduction whereby the researcher introduces herself and the topic and continued with warm up questions. This paved the way for the research questions to be asked.

#### **Purpose of Research**

The purpose of this research was to explore the policy process leading to the establishment of ARF bill from 2000 to 2009.

1. Would you kindly narrate the policy processes that have been followed by the South African government in the making of the ARF Bill between 2000 and 2009?

- Probe: Has the process been as intensive/transparent/ objective/constructive as it should be?
- Probe: If yes: Would you kindly describe the processes
- Probe: If not: What would you recommend should be done

2. What steps are being taken by the South African government in improving its development policy aid through the ARF Bill?

3. In your view, what policy model has been adopted in the Bill's deliberations

Probe: Is it viable in strengthening policy weaknesses which haunted ARF?

4. What steps would you recommend need to be taken by government to ensure a credible and acceptable policy making process in the drafting of the bill?

## APPENDIX 1[A]

### TECHNICAL INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

#### POLICY AGENDA

- Why Act 51 of 2000 was establishment?
- What was the political discussion around the ARF policy?
- Were there any particular policy process followed in establishment of the bill?
- If any, will you break them out please?
- Were there any challenges encountered in making of the bill?
- What different parties say about policy before decision is made?
- What are the different points of view, assumptions and contradictions?
- Who were the actors involved and what were their views?

#### POLICY FORMULATION

- Did power influence the choice of policy alternative?
- Were the people involved in choosing the right policy alternative knowledgeable?
- How did the policy formulation take place?

#### POLICY ADOPTION

- What role has civil society actually played in ARF?
- How has policy changed over time?
- Give me a brief overview of how adoption of policy takes place?

#### IMPLEMENTATION

- What institutions are involved in implementation?
- How are responsibilities divided?
- Is policy efficiently implemented?
- Are there enough resources?
- Is the institution capable of achieving the objectives of the policy?
- Does political power influence implementation?
- Is there room for interpretation on implementation level?
- Who are the people to be served?
- Is the implementation programme easy to follow?
- Did you have any challenges in budget provided?
- Are the personnel in place with the right qualification?
- Is the technical equipment and infrastructure enough to run the programs?
- Is there any difficulties arising in reporting?
- How is the reporting line?
- Are the responsible managers supportive?

- Do you think there were any challenges in implementing the bill?

## EVALUATION AND MONITORING

- What measures were put in place in evaluating the policy?
- Has policy been effective?
- What are the enabling and constraining factors?
- Where are the problems situated, in what phase?
- What has been done so far to fix the problems?
- Has the output of policy attained the intended goals?
- Do you have any recommendations how things should be done to improve service delivery?



## APPENDIX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

The following policy makers formed part of the interviews:

<b>Name</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Date of interview</b>
1. Mr. Short	Director	01-Jul-14
2. Mr. A. Moodley	Former Chartered accountant	03-Jul-14
3. Mr. S. Maqungo	Former Advocate	18-Jul-14
4. Dr. A. Ntsaluba	Former Director General	23-Jul-14
5. Ms S. Rubushe	Director and Secretary	02-Aug-14
6. 3 X Public officials	1x Deputy Director	06-Aug-14
NB: Anonymous	2x Assistant Directors	15-Aug-14