### TABLE XI

**EMPLOYMENT IN SOUTH AFRICAN MINES 1946-2000**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mineral</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Projected Employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>5 658</td>
<td>9 744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>2 597</td>
<td>8 515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chrome</td>
<td>2 391</td>
<td>8 960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manganese</td>
<td>3 026</td>
<td>9 005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>51 643</td>
<td>83 814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asbestos</td>
<td>4 263</td>
<td>23 039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>370 959</td>
<td>401 907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamond</td>
<td>19 164</td>
<td>17 415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platinum</td>
<td>3 575</td>
<td>71 999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others**</td>
<td>12 419</td>
<td>20 264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>475 645</td>
<td>668 900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Highest total of miners employed in one year; not a total of miners employed in all the peak years.

** Quarries, salt, tin.

**Source:** Figures extracted from various tables given in N. Bromberger, *Mining Employment in South Africa, 1946-2000*, 1977. In his projections he uses as a basis for discussion the figures of R.P. Plewman, Presidential address to the South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, 1974 which were made in 1970. Bromberger's projections were made in 1977.
clearly do intend to mechanize where possible. Third, the mining houses are diversifying into the extraction of other minerals, none of which will be as labour-intensive as gold-mining. Fourth, they are diversifying into secondary manufacturing industries which (like the more mechanized mines) will increasingly require skilled and semi-skilled workers and therefore a growing proportion of resident rather than migrant workers - that is, South African and not foreign labour.¹

The medium-term indications are therefore that there will be a steadily decreasing demand for Lesotho's fast-growing labour force.

¹ Perrins, op.cit., pp. 22-32.
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CHAPTER V : CONCLUSION : ADMINISTRATION FOR UNDERDEVELOPMENT

1. (APAM) ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM
2. DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
3. ADMINISTRATION FOR DEVELOPMENT OR UNDERDEVELOPMENT?
4. ADMINISTRATION FOR UNDERDEVELOPMENT (BUREAUCRACY AND MIGRANT WORKERS)
The initial research for this work took as its departure point for the study of administration in Africa, the observation of 'what administrators [bureaucrats, for our purposes] do in Africa and why and how they do it'. In order, first, to elicit something of the character of the Lesotho bureaucracy, and, second, the nature of any civil service reform, the investigation concentrated on the planning machinery, and the various tasks it sought to initiate and administer. While conscious of the three approaches to public administration discussed in Chapter I, it did not therefore commence within a framework suggested by any of them. The presentation in Chapter II would satisfy the requirements of the APAM movement, while Chapter IV is couched in terms which accord with the underdevelopment and dependence approach. In both cases, however, it was principally the empirical evidence - the way in which planning was proceeding and the unambiguous direction in which the economy was moving - that led to the material being so presented. Although the investigation was not originally based on any of the three approaches, the purpose of this conclusion is to use those approaches in an attempt to interpret and explain what it is that has been observed.

1. (APAM) ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

Towards the end of the case history, certain improvements in the planning machinery were described and discussed. It was pointed out that the change could to some extent be attributed to

to factors such as the passing of time, the increasing availability of local graduates and foreign advisors, and the growth in domestic resources. It may also be ascribed to the various techniques employed by the Planners (most effectively those resulting from its access to donor agencies) to overcome strong resistance and expand their area of influence. This portrayal of a subunit struggling for power against the opposition of, and in competition with, other subunits of the organization, is a far truer representation than one which suggests the evolution of the planning machinery as part of a planned, systematic exercise in administrative reform.

A further important limitation must be placed on the extent to which the strengthening of the planning machinery amounts to some meaningful reform. Insofar as the CPDO grew in size, increased in expertise, improved the management of some of its tasks and won more acceptance from the ministries, these changes related almost entirely to its aid-eliciting and -negotiating function. Its influence on policy-making (measured in terms of advice sought and/or followed) appeared to have diminished. The advantages which the increase in Lesotho's domestic resources brought the CPDO were noted in Chapter II. But at the same time it served to undermine the influence of the Planners. The spending of this new capital was subject neither to the demands of donor criteria nor to the intricacies of donor procedures. Consequently, the importance to the Government of CPDO expertise in these areas was reduced. From the time when this capital first became available until 1975 (when the research was completed) a number of significant steps were taken without any reference to the CPDO: all of them involved the use of local resources.

1. The Government decided to set up the Lesotho National Bus Service and to furnish it with a large consignment of Mercedes-Benz buses purchased from Iran. Some aspects of this step which would have been of concern to the planning machinery included the terms of the agreement, comparative costs of alternative buses, costs of and provisions for maintenance, and effects of the national service on the numerous local private
transport services which were put out of business.

2. The Government successfully sought the right to construct a Hilton Hotel in Maseru. Planners would have wished to study the terms of the contract (which were generally held to be disadvantageous to the Lesotho Government), the market for such prestige accommodation, profitable accommodation rates, effects on other hotels and the other casino, and the demands for additional physical infrastructure.

3. The decision to build a Palace fits the category of those projects on which a Planning Office is unlikely to be consulted; it may, however, have been useful to consult the CPDO on phasing, costs, contractors and the general effect of this and other buildings on prices of construction.

4. The Minister of Education unilaterally announced an increase in teachers' salaries, again without sounding out Planning or the Ministry of Finance on the repercussions of such a step on the recurrent budget (which were in fact considerable), on the structure of the salaries, and on the relationship of the increase to the rest of the public sector and to the private sector.1

Clearly, in all these cases there was a substantial political and/or prestige element which would be likely to preclude the acceptance of the planners' views on whether to proceed or not. Nevertheless, their advice on the consequences and various aspects of the implementation of these proposals would have been indicative of the policy-makers' regard for the CPDO. For instance, in the case of the decision to proceed with the feasibility study for an international airport, the Government chose to ignore CPDO opposition to the scheme, but at least gave it the opportunity to study and comment on the proposals. Here, however, an aid request was involved (since the Government intended to employ foreign rather than domestic resources) and the Cabinet thus felt compelled to include the Planning Office in

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1. The recurrent allocation for Education, 1975/76, stood at R3 320 500, which was more than that for Agriculture and Works combined.
the negotiations.

The possibility that the political leaders perceived or the planning machinery rather narrowly in terms of its aid-procuring role finds support in two issues of national importance in which the CPDO was included. These concerned the oil crisis - the effects of price increases and the potential effects of South Africa's supply being reduced - and the return of large numbers of workers after troubles on the mines. In both cases one of the principal responses of the Lesotho Government was to seek foreign aid and advice.

A final indication that the increase of domestic resources may ultimately have weakened rather than strengthened the planning machinery was the Planning Office's May 1975 report that documents required for projects included in the Lesotho-financed programme were not forthcoming and were lagging behind those for the donor-financed programmes. This did indicate that ministries were not highly concerned about complying with and submitting to CPDO procedures and criteria on local capital, or even that they had no intention at all of referring this aspect of their programme to the Planning Office.

These points have been made to demonstrate how narrowly the alterations in the planning machinery should be perceived. Nevertheless, the first conclusion of this Chapter is that the changes described in the case study do satisfy the very modest requirements of administrative reform as understood by the African Public Administration and Management movement, if only just. They obviously do not fulfill all the demands of all APAM definitions of reform: for example, it cannot be said that they were 'specially designed' or systematic', nor that they have brought the country nearer the achievement of 'national objectives' (difficult though these may be to determine). Yet

2. See definitions of the 1965 IAPAM Seminar on p. 149; of the Swaziland delegation on p. 211; and of Adedeji on p. 233; all in Rweyemamu and Hyden, op. cit.
if we take the definition of Owusu-Ansah of the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration that administrative reform means

the deliberate inducement, against resistance, of change in structure, process capacity and output of an organization with a view to improving on the status quo in the eyes of its initiators;¹

and add the views of Adedeji that the reforms may be 'general or specific across the board or partial' and 'introduced one by one' over the years,² then we have a meaning which accords reasonably closely with both the APAM attitude to reform, and the changes which have taken place in Lesotho's planning machinery.

2. DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION

The first conclusion is less important for what it says than for what it does not say, or implies. From the introductory discussion in Chapter I, it is more than clear that the type of developments observed would fall far short of the demands of the development administration movement. To illustrate this point, a selection of Schaffer's suggested 'prescriptions' for development administration (or 'research questions' towards this end), and Esmann's 'new norms for development administration'³ will be applied to both Lesotho's planning machinery and the civil service in which it operates.

One of their primary proposals concerns the design of new organizational forms which differ from the centrally-dominated departmental forms, emphasise field and project elements, and show flexibility and task-orientation. The Lesotho civil service has not made any move in this direction. The organizational

¹ K.A. Owusu-Ansah, Administrative reform at the grass roots: the Ghanaian experience, in Rweyemamu and Hyden, p. 177.
² Adedeji, Strategy and tactics ..., op.cit., pp. 223 and 226.
structure is identical with that inherited from the colonial power. The ministries are dominated and controlled from the central headquarters and are served by the same secretarial, accounting and functional divisions. The number of functional divisions has grown, and small personnel and planning units have been added in some ministries. The CPDO itself has not introduced any innovations of this kind. It has not located any of its operations nearer to the field nor in any of the area projects. Its own internal divisions have become more rigid and are based on specific areas of responsibility. It fits into its ministry as a conventional department. In Lesotho, the only examples of organizations with a field-, project- or task-orientation can be found in the few large foreign financed agricultural projects. But these are intended to be only a temporary device. With the ending of the role of foreign assistance in the largest of them - the Thabo Bosiu Rural Development Project - the functions and local personnel are being re-absorbed into the Ministry of Agriculture.

A second structural recommendation stresses the need to investigate alternatives to hierarchical or pyramidal organizational forms. Again, there has been no move in this direction. From the minister at the top, down through the permanent secretary, his or her deputy, the heads of divisions and the numerous levels of their subordinates, the hierarchical ladder remains specifically defined and rigid. The requirements, responsibilities, salaries and privileges are detailed, as are the supervisory relations. After a salary review in 1975 a unified grading structure was introduced, based on 19 grades subdivided into 72 points. The most senior civil servant, the Senior Permanent Secretary, is on grade 18/point 71 (at a salary of R8 424 per annum). The most junior include Office Assistants on grade 1/point 1 (with a starting salary of R600 per annum - or less if they receive 'wages' rather than 'salaries'). ¹ Despite criticism of the pre-independence Skinner Report for reinforcing

the large discrepancy in income between the highest and lowest levels of the service, the 1975 review reduced the difference only minimally: the lowest grades were raised by 25 per cent and the highest by 20 per cent. As far as the CPDO was concerned, it began in 1967 with a small, relatively flat organizational structure. As it grew it instituted changes which made it more hierarchical in structure.

The reform proposals suggested further that new career patterns should be initiated which give greater expression to the prestige of field work. The Lesotho civil service has not only retained the hierarchical structure, but also a career pattern which has the following characteristic: the further away the official is from headquarters and Maseru, the more functional rather than administrative is his job; and the closer and more frequent his contact with the people, the lower his status and salary level and the less comfortable his living and working conditions. An example may be taken from the Ministry of Agriculture: the Permanent Secretary is on grade 16 (R7 992 per annum), the Chief Agricultural Officer on grade 13 (R7 344), Senior Crop Production Officer between grades 9 and 11 (R4 5/2-6 600), Regional Crops Officer on grade 8 (R3 840-4 440), District Crops Officers between grades 6 and 7 (R2 652-3 720), Senior Crops Assistants between grades 4 and 5 (R1 704-2 568), and finally the Crops Assistant — those who make contact with and assist the farmers — between grades 1 and 2 (R600-1 200). Similarly at this lowest level are found Irrigation Field Attendants, Nutrition and Home Economics Assistants, etc. In terms of the needs of bureaucratic administration this undoubtedly makes sense; but in terms of administration for development it does not: those 'contact personnel' are not only the lowest paid and and worst housed, but they are also the least trained, the least

1. Ibid. See too e.g., P.B. Amon, Medical/paramedical training possibilities for Lesotho, 1/2/72. On p. 6 he argues that unless this situation changes there will be no incentive for anyone to become a nurse practitioner, health assistant or public health nurse outside Maseru, and the extra training provided these people — who should be the 'backbone' of the medical services in Lesotho — will be worthless.
informed about departmental intentions and have the least influence on decision-making. As for the planning machinery, it has not managed to post one planner outside Maseru, let alone been able to establish a career structure which would encourage anyone to continue working there.

The suggested reform measures also include the institution of new, more effective and more fluent lines of communication and reporting. From the case study of planning in Lesotho, it was abundantly clear that all attempts at devising forms of regular progress reporting - on which progress evaluation could be based and informed corrective action determined - consistently met with apathy and/or resistance, and consequently failed. The only exceptions owed their success to strong foreign pressure, such as the UNDP-backed reviews of the work of UN personnel in Lesotho, or emanated from some of the large-scale agricultural projects where the reports were prepared by expatriates for both the relevant donor organizations and the CPDO.

Schaffer also urges that attention be given to finding 'alternative forms of district organization and of organizing the relations between market towns and rural areas'. District organization will be dealt with first. The formal structures of district administration in Lesotho are the same as those which existed in the last years of colonial rule. The difference is that all power has been removed from the Districts, and nominated District Development Committees have replaced elected District Councils. The District Administrator has no authority, and exercises very little influence. The Development Committee no longer has a budgetary allocation and has no power of decision-making. The people of the districts who, before independence, participated in the election of District Councils, today exercise no influence on the selection of the Committee members. And the CPDO's attempt to locate planners at district level was thwarted by the Government's choice of non-qualified political appointees to fill the posts. Recentralization, departicipation and misuse of new posts are not the type of district level changes which the development administration movement
had in mind.

The pattern noted earlier concerning civil service salary levels (namely that the proximity of the official to the people is inversely proportional to his earnings, status and influence) is demonstrated here again, even more pointedly. The District Administrator is but one step away from the senior civil servants in Maseru (and still a good distance from the people), yet he is largely overlooked by the ministries' headquarters, and has a very strong sense of being ignored and regarded as irrelevant.

Six District Administrators were interviewed in order to obtain their views on planning and administration. 1 All complained of feeling helpless and useless; of a lack of information from and consultation with the central ministries; of being transferred from district to district far too frequently; of an inability to exercise any influence over ministry officials at district level; and of the District Development Committees having become purposeless, powerless 'talking shops'. All six claimed to have had no contact whatever - no visits, letters, attendance at meetings, queries or answers - with the CMDO. They knew very little about the Office, and had a low regard for the little they knew about it. They criticised the Planners for their failure to make contact with the people: 'I am sure they have not been in three-quarters of the country. They never get out of Maseru': 'they' might be effective with the people abroad 'but' not with the people of Lesotho'. Since their projects were drawn up without consultation with the people concerned, the District Administrators saw them as an 'imposition'.

Concerning the suggestion about market towns and rural areas, there was no serious attempt to pay any attention to the functions and relationships of various-sized towns and villages to each other and to the rural areas they served. In 1969, the Department of Community Development drew up a Growth Centre Plan for the consideration of the CMDO and the rest of Government. 2

1. See Appendix V for a full report on their replies.
2. See Appendix VIII for a fuller discussion of the history of the Growth Centre Plan.
The Plan was based on five primary, eleven secondary and thirty-three tertiary centres. It listed reasons for acceptance of such a plan: *inter alia*, to effect an even and fairer distribution of wealth; prevent or reduce the exodus from the rural areas to the towns; encourage decentralisation of development; and strengthen local administration and self-reliance. In June 1971 Community Development reissued the plan, and in July it made one of a number of requests to the CPDO to respond. The reply it received was very critical in tone. First, the Planning Office took the Department to task for not channelling its communications through the Agricultural Planning Unit which would, it suggested, have provided useful advice. It then listed weaknesses in the document:

1. The preface and some parts of the body need some polishing. ii) Some facts need to be substantiated with figures, e.g. p. 9: Semonkong - "a centre of a thickly populated area" - there is no statistics to back that up. In fact the whole plan will remain weak until it is reasonably backed up by some relevant statistics. iii) No financial implication of the plan is given - funds needed for implementation - source of funds, etc. Unless there are adequate funds to implement the Plan, all the suggestions therein will remain but "very good ideas". iv) Timing and strategy. How and when the programme is to start is not quite clear. v) Some consultation with other Ministries affected e.g. Interior, Works etc. is indispensable if duplication of effort and confusion is to be avoided.1

Community Development acknowledged that the Plan was not 'infallible' - 'That is why we invited constructive criticism of it' - but said that it had expected the Planning Office to support the idea rather than frustrate it. It concluded: 'If we drop this programme ..., what do you give us in its place to implement Government plans and policies among the masses who are our sole responsibility?"2

Despite the CPDO's criticism of the proposal as lacking sufficient data, it did not itself initiate any investigation.

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1. CPDO to Community Development, CPO/AGR/IC/4 5/8/71.
2. Community Development to CPDO, AG/CD/BQUIP/124/1 27/9/71.
aimed at eliciting more information or testing the feasibility of the idea. From time to time a politician would raise the subject or an individual planner see sense in concentrating rather than scattering efforts, yet without sufficiently sustained interest to do anything about it. Between 1969 and 1975 no decision was taken on the Plan, nor was any research started - and it was clear that none would be for some time thereafter.

Although an essential aspect of the development administration programme has still to be dealt with, the above should suffice to prove the second conclusion: that the manner in which Lesotho's planning machinery and civil service have evolved show little evidence of interest in, or capacity for, initiating the type of reforms proposed by the development administration movement.

3. ADMINISTRATION FOR DEVELOPMENT OR UNDERDEVELOPMENT?

This study has been primarily concerned with the internal conduct of the civil service; as such, conclusions along the lines of the first two above might appear to suffice. Yet, while they are certainly necessary, they are not in fact sufficient. For they deal only with the first of the two apparently contradictory processes which have been observed, namely the strengthening of the planning machinery; they do not, however, refer to the continuing retrogression of the economy. It is the juxtaposition of these two trends which demands a broader interpretation, one which relates the conclusions about the internal behaviour of the bureaucracy to its wider external setting, and helps at the same time to explain that behaviour. This will be attempted in a general way first, in terms of the three approaches to African public administration, and then more specifically by furnishing some pointers to the Lesotho situation itself.

The aspect of the development administration which has been
omitted so far is central to it, and provides the justification for equating development administration with administration for development. This concerns the structuring of a totally different type of relationship between the bureaucracy and its clientele, the public. In this new form of association the people of the country should not be regarded as passive recipients of administrative action, but rather as active participants. To this end, novel structures must be fashioned and alternative procedures initiated which aim at the full representation and participation of the people. To back up these structures and procedures there should be an integration of government services at the level of the client and the contacts between civil servants and the public should become strongly educative in nature. According to Owens and Shaw, the 'appallingly poor' majority are not only the ultimate aim of the development process, but they also provide the one resource of which there is an abundance in underdeveloped countries. Development therefore requires the galvanising of local energies, and this in turn demands that the majority participate in decisions which affect their lives closely, and become linked to the mainstream of society.

In few countries in Africa - and certainly not in Lesotho - have there been successful moves in this direction; this has been acknowledged in the IAPAM Seminars: as was said of Ghana, 'the entrenched centralized structures were virtually impregnable'. The breakdown in communication between the bureaucracy and the masses continues. In observing the difficulty of the average official in overcoming the status barrier between himself and the peasant (assuming that he wished to do so), Abercromby quotes an African proverb illustrating the peasant's response: 'I cannot hear what you are saying for who you are is

2. G. Hyden, Reforming the structures in the public service, in Weyermann and Hyden, op.cit., p. 155. See also Painsod, op.cit., p. 7.
Do this attitude and bearing of officials reflect their organizational or their class behaviour or both? This is a crucial point, not only in the contact between the civil servant and the people, but also in the diverging approaches which the three schools of thought have to the role of the bureaucracy in development. The APAM and development administration movements would argue that the failure of administration (for example, to improve the status of the field officer, to involve the people in decision-making) give rise to growing distrust by the people of the bureaucracy and political leadership, growing disparities in standards of living, polarization and even class formation. Nyagah points to corruption, nepotism and exploitation in the civil service as frustrating efforts to establish an egalitarian, participatory and nationally integrated policy. The underdevelopment school sees it the other way round. For Wertheim, it is class interests which frustrate administrative attempts to ‘stage-manage’ development. It is not to the bureaucracy’s advantage to involve the masses, and the interests of the masses are different from and opposed to those of the dominant class of which the bureaucracy forms part. Abernethy, too, follows the ‘proverb’ by pointing out that in terms of income, dress, lifestyle and values the civil servant belongs to a distinct class.

Is it then a question of cause or effect, or are they (class and organizational behaviour) creating mutually reinforcing pressures driving the bureaucrat and the peasant further apart? A related question would be whether it is the organization which determines bureaucratic behaviour, or bureaucratic interests which determine the character of the organization and

retain it to protect those interests. An attempt to answer these questions must be made, for they relate directly to the question of possible progress towards development administration.

Lesotho's case (which will be further illustrated below) together with the APAM approach to reform leads to the following conclusion: that the mutually reinforcing processes which are at present intensifying polarization are originally and primarily founded on class interests. The recent historic origins of this are found in the practices, structures and procedures, salaries, incentives and privileges, and attitudes and values of the colonial administration; and in the strong legacy of respect for, and material interest in, the retention of the bureaucratic style of administration which is found among its post-colonial successors. The forces set in motion have been nourished and sustained in the neo-colonial setting principally by an alliance of international interests and those of the local beneficiary class, which includes the bureaucracy. Thus while the African bureaucracy did not initiate the form of administration, they see its continuation as advantageous. Even where the formal structures might be altered, the bureaucracy will bring to bear its considerable influence to retain the substance of bureaucratic methods, and ultimately block full client participation.

Support for this view of the main determinant of bureaucratic behaviour can be found in Schaffer's conclusion that much of what has been termed 'administrative reform' in Africa has proved to be no more than a disguised 'salary race'. Further confirmation comes from experience in Tanzania. Adamolekun observes that several empirical studies of Tanzania in the post-Arusha era show that it is questionable whether the bureaucrat can ever play a developmental role. One such study commences outside, but concludes in terms of class analysis. Hyden deals with the bureaucratic response to the 1972 decentralisation reforms, moves initiated by the political leadership, of the type proposed by the development adminis-

tration programme. Each year, thereafter, the cost of supporting the more decentralised civil service grew by 20 per cent. The economic and political influence of these officials grew to the extent that they began to replace the local petty bourgeoisie in the small up-country towns, and were able effectively to thwart the intended purposes of the reform measures. Hyden concluded:

A main reason for the meagre results is that any revolutionary strategy is ultimately a class strategy and not a development strategy ... that can be bolstered by, for example, bureaucratic control and technical assistance inputs. The parasitic nature of the bureaucracy is a major obstacle to rural transformation.¹

Writing on Kenya, Hyden concluded that the situation 'is not one of despair, provided one accepts that development can take place without a bureaucracy or in spite of such an institution'.² Gould, too, after a detailed study of the local administration in the Shaba Province of Zaire found that the bureaucracy, rather than acting as a 'spearhead of change' was serving as a 'neo-colonial instrument of a coalition between metropolitan capital and the national bourgeoisie'.³

Herein lies an important part of the answer to the question asked in Chapter 1: why is it that the recommendations of reform advocated by the development administration movement have made so little impact on the African civil service? The reason is that development administration must ultimately be seen as a revolutionary strategy, though it lacks revolutionary terminology and does not require a revolution. In its client-orientation, it is administratively conceived, but the consequences, if effective, would be economic (as well as political).

². C. Hyden, Social structure ..., op.cit., p. 129.
A far more equitable distribution of benefits would seem to be the logical outcome of a thorough, on-going, participatory process.

Thus in asking the bureaucrat to raise the status of the field officer, to emphasise rural development and particularly to bring the people into the decision-making process, it is asking him to alter his internal administrative conduct, to initiate innovations which in terms of manpower, organization and finance are difficult, and, in addition, to do all this at the risk of his own privilege, security and interests. The bureaucracy is not opposed to the improvement of the living conditions of the masses: it may be motivated to assist them because of humanitarian concerns or at the instigation of political leaders, or because it is in its own class interest to diffuse and deflect hostility. In this regard, foreign aid is an extremely useful device: it demonstrates concern for the poor majority, but at no cost to the ruling class. But where there is competition for very limited resources — as there certainly is in Lesotho and most of Africa — the bureaucracy will look first to its own interests. Although their focus is broader — on the local bourgeoisie as a whole, and on a comprehensive (not only administrative) package of reforms — Leys and Godfrey make the same point in regard to an ILO Mission’s recommendations for reform in Kenya. ‘What incentive’, Leys asks, did the Mission think that the privileged class ‘might possibly have for making such sacrifices’?¹ This question, according to Godfrey, ‘remains uncomfortably the first one to be answered by all those advocating basic needs strategies for existing governments, not just in Kenya, but in any country’.²

When left to himself, therefore, the senior African civil servant, so much part of the privileged class, is strongly conservative. This is why the APAM approach to reform is so meek;

¹ Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya..., op.cit., p. 262.
why reform measures which satisfy APAM requirements need have little impact on society; and why APAM in practice opposes so firmly the proposals of development administration. Administration for development, if instituted, might become administration of development, and this he fears.

4. ADMINISTRATION FOR UNDERDEVELOPMENT (BUREAUCRACY AND MIGRANT WORKERS)

It might be argued that Lesotho's economic plight is beyond the redemption of any civil service reforms, plans or projects, but that the bureaucracy (while fighting a losing battle) is nevertheless doing its utmost to uplift the Basotho people. While proponents of this view would acknowledge that economic statistics point clearly to a case of administration of underdevelopment, this alone does not justify classifying it as administration for underdevelopment, that is, a situation in which the overall impact of the civil service is to assist rather than resist the process of underdevelopment.

The counterargument is the concern of the third conclusion to this study. A situation in which a fully-blown civil service exists, functions, grows and draws heavily on national resources while the country's economic predicament and productive capacity deteriorate provides a strong prima facie base from which to commence. In addition, the absence of any move in the direction of development administration in a situation which urgently calls out for an innovative response strengthens the counterargument. But the core of the case is that, in this situation of underdevelopment and increasing dependence, the bureaucracy continues to grow and benefit, and to formulate plans and provide services without the participation of the people. The response of the masses in turn to the privilege which is apparent and to the projects and plans about which they are not consulted is overwhelmingly negative. To support this a brief diversion will be required. Its purpose will be to indicate the nature of the cleavage between the world of the bureaucracy and
that of the class of migrant workers and rural inhabitants.

The bureaucracy

The Minister of Finance himself pointed out that the export of huge numbers of workers exposes the country to the risk of having its national sovereignty undermined. It has been demonstrated in Chapter IV that the numbers are increasing, that the causes of migrancy are intensifying, and that the economy is more dependent on, and vulnerable to, external developments than ever before. Yet Lesotho’s bourgeoisie, in which the bureaucracy predominates, is creating a political, economic and social structure which relies heavily upon the continued steady growth in the number of migrant workers and their earnings. Their remittances, voluntary savings, forced savings, money in circulation, and direct and indirect contribution to the size of Lesotho’s cut of the customs union pool are essential props of that structure.

The recurrent budget and the locally-financed part of the capital budget draw heavily on this source of income. The Government’s ability to maintain and increase the size and salary levels of the civil service, the police force and the teachers depends on the uninterrupted continuation of this situation. This enables it to absorb into paid employment secondary school and university graduates – a small group, but politically problematic when jobs are scarce. The migrant workers’ remittances help balance the huge trade deficit, and the money they bring and send home benefits directly the small commercial petty bourgeoisie. Most important of all is the fact that as long as the majority of the people have access to cash earnings across the border, so long will the possibility of direct and violent class conflict remain unlikely. For the ruling class it eases an otherwise tremendous burden of controlling what would be a large poverty-stricken and relatively highly proletarianized population.

In contrast to the reality of dependence, vulnerability and insecurity, the operating environment in which the ruling political and administrative class functions is permeated by a sense of growing freedom and confidence. This results, among other things, from a feeling of satisfaction at the type of administrative augmentation illustrated by the case of planning, an increase in local resources, rapidly rising donor interest in Lesotho, and the modernisation of Maseru. This sense also derives from an impression that inside the Government offices of Maseru one is not a part of white-dominated southern Africa. The Basotho bureaucrats are surrounded by Africans, British, Scandinavians, Americans etc., and in contact with Africa and the world through correspondence, telex, seminars and conferences. In this rarified atmosphere South Africa's predominant presence is diminished, providing a clear sense of relief and release for the privileged who work within it. Outside in the street, however, South Africa's overwhelming influence continues to assert itself.

The close interaction between Basotho civil servants and expatriates not only serves to distance the former from the facts of dependence, but also from the Basotho people. Like the doctors and decision-makers of Zambia who were urban and western-educated and saw medicine in terms of their own curative needs, the 'reference groups' of senior Basotho civil servants are their peers in other countries rather than their own rural (or urban) poor. Like them too they have been 'assimilated into the international travelling circuses of diplomats, experts, advisers and civil servants'. The local university is expatriate-dominated; innumerable undergraduate and post-graduate courses, scholarships and travel grants are offered and taken up overseas; and there are regular seminars, workshops and conferences on economic, political, cultural and educational topics which have to be attended. The number of expatriates in

Lesotho government service has risen steadily: 165 in 1965 (before independence), 278 in 1972 and 305 in 1973. In 1975 eight of the twenty professional officers in the PDLO were foreigners, and they were carrying out the more professional tasks such as evaluating and designing programmes, while the local planners were providing support. Official aid missions were arriving on average once a week throughout 1975, and there were numerous other consultants, diplomatic missions and voluntary agency representatives floating in and out of the offices. The influx of tourists has increased dramatically. It is this 'transnational system' of values, standards and language, sustained and strengthened by an active international network of organizational and personal linkages and communications, much more so than contact with the rest of the Basotho people, which moulds the 'official mind' of the administrators and planners. All the elements applied by Godfrey and Langdon (except the extent of international investment inside the country — a difference partly balanced by proximity to South Africa) to demonstrate the appropriateness of Sunkel's transnationalisation thesis to Kenya, apply to Lesotho.

A further aspect of the bureaucracy requiring attention is the extent to which it draws on national resources for its existence. Between World War II and Independence there were four salary revisions. The final one, which took place just before Independence, was based on the Skinner Report. This has been criticised frequently by politicians, bureaucrats, advisers and academics for determining a salary level, particularly for high officials, that was well beyond the capacity, and contrary to

2. See the discussion of the abattoir project in Appendix VII for an example of the effects of continuous consultation between local civil servants, foreign aid officials and consultants.
the best interests of the country. Skinner, himself, was aware of the expense involved, but argued that with elections due, none of the political parties was prepared to support an austerity programme, that the purchasing power of civil servants' salaries had declined, and that competing levels in the private sector and in the Republic had to be taken into account.

The outlay on personnel was raised further by the automatic acceptance of colonial-type privileges such as free medical services, subsidised housing, long-leave periods and early pensionable age (45 years). Despite the regular condemnation of the Report, no move whatever was made to reduce the salary levels.

In addition, both the Coutts and Porter Reports found the government structure excessive for a country the size of Lesotho. Apart from a large number of chiefs of different status receiving emoluments, there were 10 ministries with Ministers and full ministerial staffs, 7 Assistant Ministers, a bicameral legislature of 60 in the National Assembly and 33 in the Senate and 9 sets of District Commissioners, District Councils and accompanying staff. 46 per cent of all Government revenues were being spent on staff salaries alone. In 1969 Lesotho's outlay on personal emoluments was 28 per cent of gnp which the Government itself calculated as about double that of other African countries.

After independence, Britain pressed the Lesotho Government to control expenditure in order to reduce its recurrent budgetary dependence. Growth was kept to a modest level. Yet it was

1. The framework of the economic and financial policies of the Government, op.cit., p. 3; see also M. Ward, op.cit., p. 359.
2. T.M. Skinner, Review of the emoluments of the public service, Beaufort, 9/11/64, pp. 11, 14 and 16.
more frequently the service to the client which suffered, rather
than the civil servants. Thus it was common for Community Deve-
lopment to be unable to provide vehicles to transport equipment
and personnel to remote villages.¹ Commerce and Industry would
find itself at mid-year with both vehicles and business exten-
sion officers, but with its travel allowance exhausted, so ren-
dering its services ineffective until the next financial year.²
Similarly, Works, despite having both drivers and graders, would
have to stop maintenance work well before the end of the finan-
cial year because of lack of funds for petrol.³

Immediately it became apparent that Government revenues
were on the increase - from 1973 onwards - the civil servants
demanded a salary rise and accordingly a Commission was set up.
According to the Commission, morale in the civil service was
having a negative effect on performance. This fact, together
with rising incomes in South Africa made the pressure for an
increase 'irresistible'.² The principles of 'comparability'
and 'harmonization' of salaries, so effectively employed for
their own ends by civil servants all over Africa,³ have here
again served the bureaucracy well. And in contrast to the re-
ports of numerous other commissions in Lesotho, the recommenda-
tions of this one were implemented immediately. This meant that
the most senior official received approximately R8 000 per
annum, average civil service earnings were in the region of
R2 000 to R2 500 per annum, and the lowest grades were paid
R600 per annum. But even this R600 is about ten times the value
of the average farmer's agricultural production - a difference
which the farmers compensate for by sending members of their
families to work in South Africa.

The Wage Regulations Order of 1975 laid down minimum wages
for the private sector, and these are used by the Lesotho Nation-

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1. A Request to Freedom from Hunger Campaign from the Department of Community Development, OM/11/8/8/9 CD/PPHC/1 26/5/72, p.3.
2. CPDO, Summary of first day's discussion, Lesotho papers ..., op.cit., p. 6.
3. Cf. Godfrey, The international market ..., op.cit., p.12; and Schaffer, Administrative legacies ..., op.cit., p.192. Also see Chapter I, section 2c.
al Development Corporation and its subsidiaries, and offered to potential foreign investors. Basotho managers earn a minimum of R4 800 per annum and do go up to R8 000 and R9 000. Foreign managers earn from R9 000 up. By contrast, the minimum salary for an unskilled worker is R300 per annum, for a semi-skilled grade III, R360 and semi-skilled grade II, R540. The LNDC is thus in a position to advise investors that Lesotho has 'lower wages and bigger labour reserves than in neighbouring territories'.

If we use R300 per annum as the lowest 'wage' (R600 is the lowest 'salary') the ratio between the top and the bottom of Lesotho's civil service stood in 1978 at 28:1. This is lower than 7 out of the 8 anglophone African countries which Godfrey compared for the year 1971/2. Relating the top of the scale to gdp per head (for 1971/2) the ratio stood at over 100:1 which was higher than all of the countries to which he referred. This means that comparatively, Lesotho's civil service salaries indicated a somewhat greater egalitarianism inside the service itself, but a greater differential in relationship to the country's lowest-paid domestic wage earners and the domestic productive capacity of the population as a whole.

Except possibly for the lowest grades in the civil service, it is true to say that the Maseru-based bureaucracy (including public enterprise non-manual employees) has created for itself a position of privilege which places a heavy burden on the very

2. Winter, op.cit., p. 35.
3. See Godfrey, The international market ..., op.cit., p. 7 (Table 1). In terms of the ratio of top to bottom of the scale, Zambia's was the highest (44) and Tanzania's the lowest (16). In terms of top of scale to gdp per head, Nigeria was highest (98) and Zambia the lowest (32).
scarce national resources, thus reducing capital available for other purposes. In addition, the power which it wields has enabled it to drive its income level - and therefore its standard of living - up and away from that of the very small resident working class and further still from that which the large rural majority can earn at home. The milieu in which it works, lives and spends its leisure time, the standards it pursues, the problems it perceives as urgent and important at work (as illustrated in the Chapter on Participators' Perspectives) and at home are all of a very different character from those of the class of rural dwellers and migrant workers.

Migrant workers

Writing in 1972, Wallman concluded that somewhere between planning and execution every project in Lesotho broke down. She argued that a combination of social and economic factors constrained the migrant worker in such a way that he would make no effort to improve his domestic conditions nor cooperate with any government improvement agency. Her conclusion is based on research carried out before independence and is therefore dated. It is also somewhat exaggerated, for it is not true that he will make no effort at all. Furthermore, in trying to account for the response of the migrant worker one has to consider a broader spectrum of problems than the ones she raises. In addition, one needs to keep in mind that many of the breakdowns in project implementation have nothing to do with the migrant worker; for example, slow project formulation in the CPDO and ministries, lack of implementation capacity in the ministries' divisions, general dearth of construction capacity and a variety

1. This refers to people whose homes are in the rural areas of Lesotho (who may or may not have access to a piece of land), whose agricultural production provides at most a minimal contribution to family requirements, and who therefore find it necessary to send family members off to the mines and factories of South Africa. They are referred to simply as migrant workers because this relates to their principal productive activity.

of donor-related obstacles. Nevertheless in regard to projects which require the participation of the rural people, the overall thrust of her argument is valid and would be acknowledged by many government officials. It is confirmed, for instance, by the decline in agricultural productivity and by consistently indifferent response to, or inability to sustain interest in, the implementation and maintenance of projects.\(^1\)

A recent comprehensive study of village water supplies undertaken by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine has underlined the nature of the problem. A major rationale for constructing water supplies by means of community development projects is that they are supposed to stimulate further development activities; that is, they should have a catalytic effect. The study found that in Lesotho there was no evidence to show that this was the case. The general attitude of the villagers was that in return for fulfilling certain conditions—establishing a committee, collecting a small sum of money, and supplying labour for a brief period—they were able to commit the Government to assist them. They showed no further interest in using this as a base for further efforts. They were unwilling even to carry out maintenance responsibilities; in their view they had made their contribution, and it was the Government’s responsibility to maintain and repair the facilities.\(^2\)

A set of factors will be presented which, it is suggested, are bound to affect the attitudes of the migrant worker class, and cause its negative response to Government projects and agencies, and the personnel who sponsor the schemes.

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1. E.g. Bouscharain and Robinson, op.cit., on the failure of cooperative dairy production schemes because of lack of farmer interest.
The migrant workers' assessment of the distribution of benefits within the country would be the first discouraging factor. Visible advances are concentrated in Maseru - factories, houses, tarred roads, electricity, buildings, shops and recreational facilities. The LNDC is attracting industry and commercial ventures to two industrial sites only, Maseru and nearby Maputsoe, so reinforcing a pattern of polarization characteristic of an 'open door' campaign for foreign investment. In contrast to Maseru - inhabited by the wealthier Basotho - the environment of the migrant workers is characterised by a harsh climate, lack of potable water, unhygienic sanitation, and poorer educational and infrastructural facilities. The very inaccessibility of the mountains discourages development efforts, and the most capable civil servants resist appointments to the rural areas. An indication of the difference in standard of living and infrastructure are figures for the sale of new and second-hand private cars: for Maseru district the figures in 1973 were 393 and 1,056 respectively; for Mokhotlong, a mountain district, the figure was nil in both cases.

The next factor likely to dampen the response of the rural Basotho to development efforts is the marginal contribution of farm earnings to total household income. As shown in Chapter IV, the average household can anticipate earning no more than 10-20 per cent of its income from its fields. Even a significant rise in productivity would not alter the need for the major part of the family income to be earned from off-farm activities. A study undertaken in India is relevant: one category of farmers, those who, with improved practices, could provide up to 75 per cent of their total subsistence needs showed little interest in the proposed improvements. Quite realistically, they argue that the extra effort is not worth their while, because they still have

to find outside work 'in order to fill the gap'. The average Basotho farmer's prospects for self-reliance are far more remote.

Third, his agricultural and rural environment is deteriorating. Fields are becoming smaller and produce less, the number of rural inhabitants without stock and/or land is rising, and the practice of sharecropping is increasing which means that what is being produced is less evenly distributed. Much of the land is 'almost irreparably ruined' and much of the rest 'so shallow as to be considered only marginally productive'. According to the World Bank, about half of the cultivated areas and a substantial part of the mountain pastures are affected by erosion. It estimates that every year perhaps as much as 1 per cent of the country's topsoil washes away, and that if nothing is done crop yields will fall at a rate of perhaps 5 per cent per year.

Furthermore, the political predicament in which these migrant workers find themselves will discourage them further. It is central to the character of the migrant contract that they are precluded from effective expression of either grievances or hopes at their place of work. On the mines they become part of what they see as a complex and arbitrary power structure, in which their interests are not represented. At home, on the national level - where even the minimal participation of a vote has been removed - they witness a divisive and confusing situation, not surprising in view of the negligible potential for satisfying popular expectations. At the district level, the

pattern is the same. Elected councils have been replaced by nominated ones. At the local level, politics intrudes into most of the community garden and water supply projects. The water supply study mentioned above found that most local development committees were not freely elected but appointed by the Basutoland National Party, or were in fact the same as the local party committee, and as such they often failed to win cooperation. Also, despite a strong appeal by the Prime Minister against such practices, members of the ruling Party used projects and food-for-work schemes for party political ends. At the same time members of the Opposition actively discouraged participation in projects, and on occasions damaged facilities. The Prime Minister commented in Parliament:

I observe with deep regret and shame that so much damage is done to our conservation works. I see contour ridges cut through, dam walls trampled, trees broken and uprooted, fences torn down, meadow strips destroyed ...  

Then, the tremendous gap which the migrant worker learns is possible between the South African city and the conditions he knows at home, is also crucial to the 'economic pessimism' which dominates his world view.

Migration to the thriving industrial complex shows him that the poverty of his village is relative as well as absolute, and relative to something as rich as industrial South Africa, what chance can there be of alleviating that poverty? The gap between "home" and "away" is so complete that the possibility of small improvements which are necessarily far below "away" standards provides no incentive to development efforts: the contrast is considered unalterable.

Wallman notes, in addition, that each migration raises his consumer tastes and diminishes his chances of satisfying them at home, and reinforces his perception of his home as a place of rest and recuperation, not work. In addition, the applicant

1. Speech by the Hon. the Prime Minister of Lesotho, moving the 1968/69 development fund estimates of revenue and expenditure, op.cit., p. 10.

migrant worker knows where he stands in terms of access to
mine contracts. He knows the rules of eligibility (unpleasant
though they may be), the location of the recruiting agency,
approximately how long he will need to wait, and the return
on his patience and effort. The contrast with his access to
government services - where he experiences fragmentation, dis-
continuities and (to him) inexplicable delays in response -
will emerge from the points which follow.

On an administrative level, the multiplicity of agencies
(as opposed to the shortage of actual personnel in the field)
which confronts him with developmental and extension functions
is as likely to confuse as to assist; given the frequent fail-
ures to follow up (discussed below) it is more likely to disap-
point him. For example, in the Ministry of Agriculture alone,
responsibilities are divided among livestock, crops, conserva-
tion and cooperatives, each with its own field officers. Simi-
larly, farmers' associations proliferate into specialised groups
dealing with livestock, poultry, wool production and communal
gardens. In addition, other Ministries, such as Education and
Health and the Community Development Department, as well as nu-
merous voluntary agencies and missions, function in rural areas.
This fragmentation of services may have its bureaucratic orga-
nizational justifications, but it is unlikely to accord with
the needs of the rural communities.

They must also become sorely disillusioned by the effects
of their time horizons diverging from those of the civil service
and national planners. The problems in the way of harmonising
self-help schemes with national planning have been generally

1. For a discussion of 'access' and its conceptual framework,
see Schaffer's chapter, "Existence of access". A concept of
For an application of the framework, see B. Harriss, Access
and the cooperative: a study of an intermediate in struc-
tural change in Sri lankan dry zone paddy cultivation, Deve-
underestimated by the Government. Difficulties arise particularly in cases where the Government instigates village enthusiasm for an idea, and then fails to follow up because of lack of manpower or capital. After the 1970 'coup', the Basutoland National Party Government set about gaining popularity through an active campaign to encourage village interest in developing local water supplies. In the process they elicited applications which far exceeded Community Development's capacity to construct. By 1975, the backlog was as follows: 727 villages had collected money and submitted applications; there were a further 100 supplies in need of completion and major repair work; a further 3 had received donor funds and equipment but had not yet been installed. Over the previous seven years Community Development had averaged 29 installations a year. At that rate many villages would have to wait 15-25 years for their water supply projects. The suspicion and negative impression of villagers who have been encouraged to take an interest in a proposal and to make financial contributions, and then see no results for such long periods, can be easily understood.

Another example can be found in the contrasting approaches to the building of a road. A village committee decided to build a road, and having built a very low standard and dangerous track, applied for R13 000 (which the United States Embassy Self-Help Fund had agreed to) to construct certain sections not susceptible to hand labour. The CPDO - fulfilling the requirements of rational and national planning and of encouraging and using aid - waited first for a comprehensive national transport study to determine priorities; then selected for this particular road the most expensive of the three alternatives offered by the consultants (to increase tourism and reduce vehicle maintenance costs); then set out to identify a donor to assist

1. Feochum, op.cit.
2. See Appendix VI for a more detailed study and discussion of this project.
with the engineering study and another to pay for the construction. At no stage did the Planners inform the villagers of what they were doing, or of the causes of the delay. The villagers' self-help undertaking would have been completed by 1972, at a cost of R13 000. The CPDO project might be complete by 1980, and will cost in the vicinity of R1.5 million.

In this overall situation, the rural dwellers and migrant workers of Lesotho must have a strong sense that much of vital interest to them is being decided totally outside their realm of influence or understanding. As strange as the vagaries of the weather, must be the mechanisms which determine their wages and work conditions in the mines and factories of South Africa. They have no control over the prices they get for any products they may produce, and must find exasperating the continually rising prices they pay for their purchases. Political participation has become a very limited exercise, and at the village level - where they may or may not be consulted - concrete results of any participative efforts are very few. They constitute an excluded class, in regard to both active involvement in decision-making, and access to available domestic resources. Owens' and Shaw's conclusion that participation in decisions most important to his life is a precondition to the mobilisation of the individual's energies for development, underlines the unlikelihood of the migrant worker class reacting positively to Government plans.

These glimpses into the worlds of the bureaucrat and the migrant worker have been intended, first, to show how disparate those worlds are; second, to offer an explanation for the failure of so many projects which depend on a sustained,

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1 Owens and Shaw, op.cit., p. 3.
positive response from the people; and, third, to demonstrate how the dynamics of underdevelopment benefit the small privileged class and seriously damage the interest of the overwhelming majority.

It is not suggested that the bureaucracy should be held responsible for every aspect of this state of affairs. As has been said earlier, the structure and process of increasing impoverishment of Lesotho were well-entrenched before its members took up their present position in society. The burden of the argument is rather that those processes are continuing, and that the bureaucracy benefits from and ultimately serves to assist them. The overall impact of the policies determined and implemented by Lesotho's political and civil service leadership has been to increase dependence on South Africa (note, for instance, the huge and growing trade deficit), in particular to raise steadily the number of workers flowing to the mines, industries and farms of South Africa. This reinforces the migrant labour system, bolsters the South African economy, and continues to denude Lesotho of the energies and capacities of its physically active manpower. Senior bureaucrats are aware - in a statistical sense - of the downward trend in local production and the upward trend in reliance on the Republic; yet they have not proposed significant reforms which might reverse these trends. Bureaucratic organizational requirements remain more important than client-orientation; and bureaucratic class interests take priority over client-participation.

This brief sortie from an essentially administrative study into political economy has been necessary in order to locate the earlier conclusions about organizational reform inside a broader framework. The central and major portion of this study showed some strengthening of the CPDO and the planning units and the circumstances in which this took place, and the reasons for
the change. This, it was concluded, amounted to internal administrative reform falling inside the APAM definition, but far short of the requirements of development administration. Trends in the economy demonstrated that this type of change had made no impact on a steadily worsening situation. This in turn called into question the role of the bureaucracy. The discussion of the bureaucracy and the migrant workers indicated that the former was gaining advantage from and serving to abet the forces of underdevelopment and dependence. In the final analysis, the case which has been observed is one of administration for underdevelopment, or underdevelopment administration.
APPENDICES

Appendices I to IV consist of Government Circulars relating to the organization and administration of Lesotho's planning machinery.

I  Cabinet Circular No. 14 of 1967: 'Development Planning'

II  Circular Standing Instruction No. 1: 'Co-ordination and Control of Foreign Aid and Technical Assistance'

III  Establishment Circular Notice No. 26 of 1968: 'Directions for the Organisation of the Department of Planning and Development'

IV  Public Service Circular Notice No. 38 of 1970: 'Directions for the Organisation of the Central Planning and Development Office'

Appendices V to X are short notes or case studies on specific issues of relevance to the main study. The purpose of each will be explained individually, but their principal function is to illustrate and expand upon some selected points contained in the body of the thesis.

V  A record of District Administrators' views on planning and administration

VI  The Ramabanta's-Semonkong Road Project

VII  The Abattoir Project

VIII  The Growth Centre Plan

IX  Notes on the Budget Calendar

X  Notes on the Preparation of the Second Plan
To: All Permanent Secretaries
Director of Posts and Telecommunications

Copy to: Principal Legal Adviser
All Heads of Departments
Economic Planning Unit
All District Commissioners

DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

The Prime Minister has directed that a Central Planning Office should be established immediately to undertake the responsibility for development planning, preparation, co-ordination and evaluation of development projects, control of their implementation, and co-ordination of all external aid and technical assistance. The primary task of the Central Planning Office will be to construct an economic plan for Lesotho in the light of the Government’s development objectives, and see that it is carried out.

2. A Cabinet Economic Planning Committee will be set up with the following functions:
   (a) the determination of overall planning strategy;
   (b) the determination of planning objectives;
   (c) the determination of resource and sectoral distribution of the development plan and planning priorities.

3. The Central Planning Office will fall under the Prime Minister’s Portfolio and it has been agreed that Mr J.W. Biemans will head the office, while retaining for the time being his present function of Permanent Secretary in his Ministry. The Bureau of Statistics will henceforth also fall under the Prime Minister’s office. The Economic Planning Unit will be absorbed into the Central Planning Office.

4. Development and Planning matters, other than those related to commerce, industry and labour, will be transferred to the Central Planning Office from their present Ministry.

5. In consultation with the Ministry of Finance, Mr Biemans should immediately prepare a budget for the Central Planning Office for the remainder of this financial year. It has been agreed that the Central Planning Office should be staffed as follows: -
The professional staff will be responsible for all planning, project analysis and evaluation, implementation and control.

6. The administrative staff will be responsible for the administrative operations of the Central Planning Office and for the administrative co-ordination of foreign aid and technical assistance, all under the direct supervision of the Director of Planning.

7. The Prime Minister has directed that immediate steps be taken to fill all posts.

8. Further details regarding the functioning of the Central Planning Office, inter-ministerial working committees, and the National Planning Board, will be sent to all Ministries/Departments/Districts shortly. The Director of Planning should be added to your distribution list for mail.

(Signed)
Secretary to the Cabinet
The Honourable the Prime Minister has approved the attached Standing Instruction on Coordination and Control of Foreign Aid and Technical Assistance and has directed that the Instruction take immediate effect.

2. In terms of Gazette Extraordinary No. 24 of 8th July, 1967, one of the main functions of the Office of the Minister of Planning and Development is the administration, control and co-ordination of foreign aid and technical assistance. There are many instances, however, where Ministries have secured development aid from aid donors without reference to or without the knowledge of the Director of Planning. There is also some confusion as to who is ultimately responsible for the final approval of aid requests or aid offers. The Instruction referred to above sets out the correct procedures and practices to be followed by all Ministries and Departments without exception.

3. It cannot be overemphasised that all aid is costly to the recipient even when it takes the form of an outright grant of the full cost of a project. Inevitably there is a future recurrent commitment, for example, the cost of maintaining the project once it is completed. Often there is an immediate commitment, for example, the provision of counterpart contribution which may take a number of forms: the free housing, local transportation, office and secretarial facilities for the personnel engaged on the project. Moreover, because aid donors do not always take the same view of economic priorities as the Government does, there is a danger that Government may become committed to expenditure on projects which do not, in its view, agree with the scale of priorities of its Development Plan or Programme or contribute directly to the economy.
4. It is therefore essential that the Central Planning Office keeps full control of all negotiations and acceptances. It cannot be left to individual Ministries and Departments to determine their own priorities and make their own commitments. Requests for aid and the aid programme as a whole should be considered in the context of the allocation of the total financial and economic resources available. It should also be remembered that aid agencies are anxious to ensure that any funds they make available are utilized properly and effectively, and very often they require Government participation in one form or another.

5. The Permanent Secretary for External Affairs is hereby requested to ensure that copies of the Standing Instruction attached hereto are sent to all Foreign Missions, Aid Agencies, the UNDP Resident Representative, etc., requesting their co-operation, in particular with Sections 2, 4 and 5 which deal with correspondence and communications regarding foreign aid.

(Signed)
Director of Planning

KINGDOM OF LESOTHO

STANDING INSTRUCTION ON CO-ORDINATION AND CONTROL OF FOREIGN AID

1. **GENERAL**

   This Instruction sets out the practices and procedures to facilitate more effective co-ordination of foreign aid to the Kingdom of Lesotho.

   These practices and procedures shall be adopted immediately by all Ministries and Autonomous Public Bodies.

2. **DUTIES FOR PLANNING AND CO-ORDINATION RELATING TO FOREIGN AID**

   (a) The Minister for Planning is hereby designated the official spokesperson of the Cabinet Economic Planning Committee on all matters concerning foreign aid. (Note: For the time being the Prime Minister is also the Minister for Planning).

   (b) Effective immediately the Minister for Planning signs all agreements (except those of a purely operational character) involving foreign aid and technical assistance.

   (c) To ensure proper co-operation, Ministries and Agencies of Government shall not initiate or negotiate foreign aid with foreign aid agencies, except with regard to matters of technical detail and feasibility. Discussion of all development projects and technical assistance programmes shall only be held under the auspices of the Central Planning Office.
(d) All requests for foreign aid shall be sent by Ministries to the Central Planning Office. Similarly, requests for modifications or additions to aid programmes shall also be sent to the Central Planning Office.

(e) Ministries may only correspond with foreign aid agencies on matters of a purely technical nature. The financial implications of such correspondence should be cleared by the Ministries in accordance with established procedures. The Central Planning Office, however, must be continually informed on such matters. All other correspondence relating to foreign aid must be channelled by Ministries through the Central Planning Office.

Communications with the external aid agencies or donor countries shall be routed by the Central Planning Office through the Ministry of External Affairs except that where aid agencies have resident representatives or where donor countries have permanent envoys in Lesotho, the Central Planning Office may correspond with their local offices direct on purely technical matters and in such cases the Central Planning Office will ensure that the Ministry of External Affairs is fully informed.

(f) With regard to foreign aid the Central Planning Office is responsible for:

(i) Evaluating and scrutinizing all requests for outside aid;
(ii) Assisting Ministries in the preparation of adequate documentation;
(iii) Ensuring conformity with the regulations and procedures of foreign aid agencies;
(iv) Obtaining outside information on all available sources of outside aid and studying their possible application to Lesotho;
(v) In conjunction with the appropriate Ministry or Ministries, reviewing, adjusting and readjusting priorities according to the progress of development and implementation of the development plan;
(vi) Maintaining a complete and up-to-date catalogue of all foreign assistance already received or under negotiation;
(vii) Maintaining record and files of all correspondence which involve the expression of Government views or decisions concerning development aid.

3. MINISTRIES

The Permanent Secretary of each Ministry will be responsible for assisting the Director of Planning with development planning. His duties will include:

(i) The preparation and maintenance of a catalogue of all foreign aid received or under negotiation by the Ministry;
(ii) Ensuring that the Central Planning Office is kept fully informed on all foreign aid activities.
4. FELLOW EXPERTS

(a) Subject to Section 2(c) above, Aid Agencies shall send nominations of foreign experts to the Central Planning Office; similarly acceptance of nominations shall also be conveyed to Aid Agencies by the Central Planning Office. The Central Planning Office is responsible for ensuring that incoming nominations are routed to the appropriate Ministry and that prompt follow-up action is taken to obtain acceptance of nominees and expedite replies to Aid Agencies.

(b) The Permanent Secretary of each Ministry shall keep an up-to-date record of all foreign international experts in his Ministry, sending quarterly returns of such record to the Central Planning Office.

The record shall show the following data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Title of Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name of expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Title of expert and detailed duties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Title of Aid Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Date of arrival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Duration of assignment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Location of office and telephone number of expert.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. FELLOWSHIP AND SCHOLARSHIPS

(a) Nominations made by Ministries for fellowships and scholarships forming part of approved aid programmes and projects shall only be sent to the appropriate Aid Agencies through the Central Planning Office.

(b) The Central Planning Office will ensure that training under foreign aid programmes is sought only in relation to established needs and priorities.

(c) The Chief Establishment Officer will ensure that an effective system is developed and promulgated throughout the Government for evaluating the merits and qualifications of potential trainees.

(d) The Secretary for Training and Permanent Secretary for Education shall in their respective fields maintain records of each trainee, sending quarterly returns to the Central Planning Office. The record shall include the following data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of trainee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature of training - subject and plan of study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress of training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of departure and duration of the training period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each trainee will sign a statement to the effect that on completion of the training period he or she will serve the Kingdom of Lesotho for a minimum period of three years; in the case of a course lasting one year or less and five years in all other cases. The trainee's signature on the statement will be certified by two witnesses.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(c) The Central Planning Office will ensure that trained returners to the Civil Service are properly assigned so as to make maximum use of their training.

6. **EVALUATION OF FOREIGN AID**

(a) The Central Planning Office shall undertake an annual evaluation of all aid programmes and projects. This evaluation will determine whether or not the projects have proceeded according to plan and whether or not they are yielding anticipated results. Aid Agencies may be invited to participate in the evaluation of their respective programmes and projects.

(b) Similarly, the Permanent Secretary of each Ministry should maintain a continuing evaluation of aid projects and of the activities of each foreign expert, which should be submitted to his own Minister. Where necessary, evaluation reports should also be sent to the Central Planning Office, which may, at the discretion of the Minister for Planning, send such reports to the appropriate aid agency.

THE PRESENT MINISTER
APPENDIX III

ESTABLISHMENT CIRCULAR NOTICE NO. 26 OF 1968

Department of Establishment and Training, Prime Minister's Office, P.O. Box 527, Maseru.

27th September 1968

To: Secretary to the Cabinet
All Permanent Secretaries
Director of Posts and Telecommunications
Director of Planning
Director of Statistics
Director of Audit

Copies to: The Honourable the Chief Justice
Private Secretary to His Majesty
Principal Legal Adviser
All Heads of Departments
All District Administrative Secretaries
Clerk to the Senate
Clerk to the National Assembly
Secretary, Public Service Commission
Organisation and Methods Officer
Secretary, Government Organisation Commission

DIRECTORS FOR THE ORGANISATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT

The Honourable the Prime Minister, in his capacity and in his other capacities as the Minister responsible for the Public Service and as the Minister responsible for planning and development, has directed me to advise you that a new organisation for the Department of Planning and Development, as set out in the attached directions, will have effect from Tuesday, 1st October, 1968.

2. The Prime Minister directs me to ask you to study the details of the new arrangements very carefully, and to require all who are concerned to prepare to implement them in a thorough and efficient manner by the date prescribed under paragraph 1 of this Notice.

(Signed)

(Ag.) Chief Establishment Officer
DIRECTIONS FOR THE ORGANISATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT

The Purposes of the Department

1. The purposes of the Department of Planning and Development are -
   (a) producing a plan for the economic development of Lesotho;
   (b) co-ordinating external financial and technical assistance;
   (c) implementing the development plan and maintaining effective progress;
   (d) compiling an annual economic review;
   (e) giving economic advice on development policy and plans;
   (f) conducting economic research into specific economic matters;
   (g) collecting, analysing, collating and publishing statistical information concerning Lesotho.

Grouping of Functions of Department

2. In order to attain the purposes of the Department of Planning and Development, the functions necessary for those purposes have been assigned as in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 below.

3. The Development Office will be responsible for -
   (i) producing the plan for the economic development of Lesotho;
   (ii) co-ordinating external financial and technical assistance;
   (iii) implementing the development plan and maintaining effective progress;
   (iv) providing departmental administrative services for both the Development Office and the Office of the Economic Adviser.

4. The Office of the Economic Adviser will be responsible for -
   (i) the annual economic review;
   (ii) economic advice on development policy and plans; and
   (iii) economic research into specific matters.

5. The Bureau of Statistics will be responsible for collecting, analysing, collating and publishing statistical information concerning Lesotho.

Administration of the Department

6. The Department of Planning and Development is a department of the Cabinet Office, and accordingly the Prime Minister exercises general direction and control over that department. The Secretary to the Cabinet is the public service head of the department and exercises supervision over it.
7. The Office of the Economic Adviser will be a part of the Development Office, and there will be the closest co-operation between the Office of the Economic Adviser and the Development Office. The Economic Adviser will not be subordinate to the Development Secretary in his professional work. Individual Ministries and Departments may approach the Economic Adviser direct for economic advice which will be given, in writing, through the Development Office.

8. The Economic Adviser and the Development Secretary have joint direct access to the Prime Minister for the purpose of giving him advice on economic and development matters.

9. In respect of the Bureau of Statistics, the present internal administrative arrangements will be maintained (subject to review) and consequently no joint administrative services will be provided in that respect by the Development Office.

10. Officers of the Administrative cadre employed in the Development Office must have appropriate qualifications and experience of economics and related subjects, and their posting to, and transfer from, that office will be subject to consultation with the Development Secretary and with the head of the Department of Planning and Development.

11. The Bureau of Statistics, as part of the Department of Planning and Development, will continue to be subject to the general direction and control of the Prime Minister, and to the supervision of the Secretary to the Cabinet.

Appendix-12: The arrangements laid down in these directions are illustrated by means of an organisation chart (appended).

Establishment and Financial Implications and Accounting Arrangements.

13. A separate communication will be addressed to you in respect of the establishment and financial implications of these new arrangements, and in respect of accounting arrangements.

Amendment of Directions for the Re-organisation of the Prime Minister's Offices

14. The Directions that were appended to Cabinet Circular Notice No. 2 of 1968 (the "Green Book") as amended by Cabinet Circular Notice No. 16 of 1968, are further amended in respect of these new arrangements by deleting paragraph 26. Charts 1 (revised of 15th July) and 2 (original of 5th April) are affected, Chart 5B is replaced by the Chart appended to these Directions, and Charts 1 and 5B must be read with appropriate consequential modifications.

Office Accommodation

15. Until other arrangements can be made, the Development Office and the Office of the Economic Adviser will be accommodated in the building presently used by the Central Planning Office. A survey of accommodation needs under the new arrangements will be conducted separately.

16. The Bureau of Statistics will remain in its present accommodation.
Organisation of the Prime Minister's Office

Chart 5B - Department of Planning and Development

Revised

The Prime Minister
Secretary to the Cabinet

Department of Planning and Development

Development Office
Development Secretary

Office of Economic Adviser
Economic Adviser

1. Annual Economic Review
2. Economic Advice on Development Policy and Plans
3. Research into Specific Economic Matters

Technical Assistance Staff
Planning Implementation Finance, Technical
and Progress Assistance and Administration
1 - P.A.S. 1 - Assistant Secretary 1 - Assistant Secretary
1 - J.S.O.

Office Services 'Pool'
1 - Personal Secretary
1 - J.S.O.
1 - Sh/Typist
1 - C.O.
1 - U/T
1 - Messenger

Prime Minister's Office, Maserei.
23rd September, 1962

Staff Total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Office</th>
<th>12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bureau of Statistics</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key

- Subject to availability of funds
- Subject to review
APPENDIX IV

PUBLIC SERVICE CIRCULAR NOTICE NO. 38 OF 1970

REF: CT/2/7

11 June 1970

DIRECTORS FOR THE ORGANISATION OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OFFICE

The Honourable the Prime Minister has directed me to advise you that a new organisation for the Central Planning and Development Office as set out in the attached directions, will have effect forthwith.

2. The Prime Minister directs me to require you to study the details of the new arrangements very carefully, and to require all who are concerned to implement them in a thorough and efficient manner.

A.S. MOHAN
Permanent Secretary, Public Service Department

LEGEND. DIRECTIONS FOR THE ORGANISATION, ESTABLISHMENT AND PROCEDURES FOR THE CENTRAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OFFICE.

Issued by Order of the Honourable the Prime Minister, in that capacity and in his other capacities as the Minister responsible for the public service and by agreement with the Minister of Finance, Commerce and Industry as the Minister responsible for planning and development.

PART I. PRELIMINARY

AMENDMENT OF GOVERNMENT NOTICE 75/1968

1. The Secretary to the Cabinet will arrange for an amending Order to be made and gazetted, by which the offices of Ministers, Order 1968 will be amended in para. 4(i) in accordance with the new arrangements in these Directions (See Gazette 21 of 19th July, 1968).

REPLACEMENT OF PREVIOUS DIRECTIONS

2. These Directions supersede the arrangements for the Central Planning Office given in the Directions for the Re-organisation of the Prime Minister's Office (Cabinet Establishment Circular Notice 28 of 1968 dated 27th September 1968).

THE BUREAU OF STATISTICS

3. Separate directions will be given in respect of the Bureau of Statistics.

CONCORDANCE OF MINISTER OF FINANCE, COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY

4. The concurrence of the Minister of Finance has been signified in respect of the expenditure of Public Funds – see the Public Service Act 1968, sec. 4 (3).
5. Permanent Secretary, Public Service Department, has provided in the Establishment List 1970-71 for the implementation of these Directions.

5. These Directions have effect forthwith.

7. The main PURPOSE of the Office is prescribed in para. 8 and the FUNCTIONS that are necessary in order to achieve that purpose are determined in para. 9.

7. The purpose of the Office is - a) To co-ordinate and integrate all government policies in the light of national requirements for rapid economic development, and b) to avoid policy inconsistencies and wastage of scarce physical, financial and human resources.

8. The Functions that are assigned to the Central Planning and Development Office in order to achieve the purpose of that Office are - 1) Designing and revising long-term, medium-term and annual national development plans and combining and reconciling sector and sub-sector programmes in the plans. 2) Preparing annual plans for implementing the medium- and long-term plans. 3) Recommending policies, measures and machinery required to mobilise financial, material and human resources for implementing development plans. 4) Maintaining a system of continuing review and evaluation of progress on development plan implementation, identifying factors which are retarding or may retard development and dealing with them in collaboration with responsible Ministries. 5) Co-ordinating the acquisition and use of foreign assistance. In those cases involving technical assistance personnel this will be done in consultation with the Public Service Department. (It should be noted that requests by Ministries and Departments for technical assistance personnel will be submitted in the first instance to the Public Service Department. 6) Conducting or arranging for research into the overall growth potential of the economy of Lesotho and undertaking joint research when necessary. 7) Formulating in consultation with the Ministry of Education and with the Public Service Department educational objectives and policies of the Government of Lesotho in satisfying the trained-manpower needs of the country.

9. The title of the Office is "The Central Planning and Development Office" and code abbreviation is "PLANOFF".

9. The Office is accommodated in the whole of the premises previously shared by it and the Lesotho National Development Corporation.
The Department of Planning and Development is a department of the Ministry of Finance, Commerce and Industry, the Minister of Finance, Commerce and Industry exercising general direction and control over the department. The Permanent Secretary for Finance is the public service head of the department and exercises supervision over it.

13. The financial condition of Lesotho imposes constraints that require, initially, a concentration of staff and simple, flexible organisation, subject to revision in due course if the work of the office grows and if a larger and more specialised staff becomes necessary.

HEAD OF OFFICE

14. The Office is headed by an economist with administrative experience, designated Director of Planning and Development. He is the economic adviser to the Prime Minister. This office is filled by a citizen of Lesotho (if available).

GRADE AND WORKING RELATIONSHIP OF HEAD OF OFFICE

15. The office of Director of Planning and Development is on the grade S6 and will be responsible to the Minister of Finance, Commerce and Industry through the Permanent Secretary for Finance as the head of the department.

PRINCIPAL & ASSISTANT SECRETARY

16. An office of Principal Assistant Secretary is established, to be held by an Officer having experience of both administration and economics, who assists the Director and acts for him in his absence. He is responsible for the administrative tasks of the Office, including the responsibility for ensuring that projects are carried out on time.

OPERATIONAL STAFF

17. Provision is made for offices of 5 Assistant Secretaries (Economics). A statistician with knowledge of economics and other technical assistance may be added as they become available. The technical assistance staff is to be used in an operative capacity rather than in the usual observer reporting role.

SUPPORTING STAFF

18. 1 Junior Executive Officer, 1 Personal Secretary, 1 Audio/Shorthand Typist, 1 Copy/ Audio Typist, 1 Clerical Assistant/Officer.

ESTABLISHMENT TABLE AND PERSONAL EMOLUMENTS

19. The table at the appendix prescribes the establishment of the Office and the details of personal emoluments for the financial year 1970/71.

PROCEDURE OF THE OFFICE

20. As a result of the financial constraints... and the consequently small and flexible nature of the organisation of the office, planning procedures are flexible and require group activity and mobility.
21. The assigned subject areas are determined by the Government on the basis of development priorities.

PART I. PROGRAMMING UNITS

PROCEDURES OF PROGRAMMING UNITS

22. A Programming Unit is the main channel of communication between the Central Planning and Development Office and the operating Ministry. It receives from the Central Planning and Development Office guidance enabling it to prepare projects and programs for incorporation into National Plans. It transmits to the Central Planning and Development Office the information required for formulating overall plans and it provides periodic progress reports on the implementation of its programme. From time to time the Central Planning and Development Office calls meetings of the heads of programming units for consultation and discussion.

FUNCTIONS OF PROGRAMMING UNITS

23. The functions of these units include:

1. To assist the various Departments of the Ministry in the preparation and implementation of the Ministry’s development projects
2. To combine and integrate projects and proposals of the Ministry into sectoral and sub-sectoral programmes for inclusion in annual, long- and medium-term plans of the Government
3. To submit through their Permanent Secretaries prepared projects and sectoral plans to the Central Planning and Development Office within the specified timetable for preparation of annual development plans and the budget of the Government
4. To submit through the Permanent Secretaries at regular and ad hoc intervals progress reports to the Central Planning and Development Office on physical and financial implementation of annual development projects and the national plan
5. To prepare applications for technical assistance personnel and equipment and to advise the Permanent Secretary on their effective utilization to achieve the objectives and targets of the Government.

PROGRAMMING UNITS ESTABLISHED

24. Programming Units of approximately 3 to 4 people will be established initially in the Ministries of Agriculture, Education, Works and Health as soon as possible.

COMPOSITION OF PROGRAMMING UNITS

25. It is desirable to staff the programming units with technically trained personnel and this will remain the long-term objective.

TRANSITIONAL PROVISION FOR PROGRAMMING UNITS

26. Because of the present shortage of such people (25 above) the programming units will be found in the existing staff of Ministries.
TRIANGULAR QUALIFICATIONS
27. The minimum qualifications should be Cambridge 'A' level or Joint Matriculation Board of South Africa, unless the person concerned has the necessary aptitude without these educational certificates.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERMANENT SECRETARY AND PROGRAMMING UNIT
28. Each member of a programming unit (under both these special arrangements and any other long-term improvements as described in the preceding paragraph) is a member of the staff of the Ministry in which he is working. Each unit works in close association with the Central Planning and Development Office. The head of that office is responsible for the professional competence of all members of programming units.

POSITION OF OFFICERS OF CENTRAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OFFICE
29. If an officer of the Central Planning and Development Office is assigned to a programming unit he may be moved from one Ministry to another from time to time, but when he is working in a particular Ministry, he is on the staff of, and responsible to, the Permanent Secretary of that Ministry.

TRAINING OF PROGRAMMING UNITS
30. Central Planning and Development Office staff provide training for people in the programming units in such things as project evaluation, the use of cost benefit analysis and other techniques for ranking projects in order of priorities. Some will be sent to an institute of development and on other short term courses if necessary. Rotational duty in the Central Planning and Development Office as arranged with Ministries from time to time, will give programmers an overall view of Lesotho’s development problems.

APPENDIX. CENTRAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OFFICE ESTABLISHMENTS FOR 1970/71.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSTS/GRADE</th>
<th>ANNUAL COST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUB-HEAD 262 - CPDO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ITEM 01 - SALARIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSTS/GRADE</th>
<th>ANNUAL COST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Director of Planning and Development S6</td>
<td>5,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Principal Assistant Secretary S6</td>
<td>4,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Assistant Secretaries (Economics) A</td>
<td>11,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Junior Executive Officer D5</td>
<td>940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Personal Secretary D1</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Audio/Shorthand Typist D3/2</td>
<td>1,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Copy/Audio Typist D4/3</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Clerical Assistant/Office C4/3-2</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total-Salaries</strong></td>
<td><strong>27,240</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ITEM 02 - WAGES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSTS/GRADE</th>
<th>ANNUAL COST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Messenger</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Telephone</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Cleaners</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total - Wages</strong></td>
<td><strong>780</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ITEM 03 - ALLOWANCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSTS/GRADE</th>
<th>ANNUAL COST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acting Allowance</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>28,320</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDICES V - X

CASE STUDIES

V. A RECORD OF DISTRICT ADMINISTRATORS’ VIEWS ON PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION

The main focus of this thesis has been on central planning and administration. In order to provide some additional indicators of bureaucratic attitudes to reform, attention was given to a few selected aspects of planning and administration outside central government. Research for Appendices V, VI and VIII had this purpose in mind. They therefore relate to the final Chapter’s assessment of the nature and impact of changes observed in Lesotho’s planning machinery.

Appendix V pertains to one of the proposals of the development administration movement which suggests alternative forms of district administration aimed at decentralising responsibility and increasing participation. In Lesotho, the main trends in district administration were in the opposite directions from those proposed by the development administration movement. The pre-independence elected District Councils were replaced by the BNP after its election victory with fully nominated District Development Committees.¹ Their budgetary allocation was removed, and they were rendered powerless. A paper prepared by the CPDO in 1970 listed a number of deficiencies in the operation of these Committees: *inter alia*, that their title was misleading since they were involved in food aid, village-level type projects and not in a broad spectrum of developmental activities; their channels of communication with the headquarters of ministries were very poor and with the Planning Office virtually non-existent; their powers were too limited and their access to funds so restricted that they were rendered ineffective; and they were too large to make or execute decisions.² The repetition of exactly

2. District Development Committees, *op. cit.*
the same list of points in a Cabinet Circular two years later
indicated that no progress was being made with district administra-
tion.1 A year later a visiting adviser on community develop-
ment confirmed this.2

Similarly, the powers of the District Commissioners, drawn up
before independence, were removed when the DCs were replaced
by District Administrative Secretaries. In 1970 these were re-
named District Administrators and their authority was raised, but
only marginally. In the Central Government offices in Maseru,
the proposals of both DAs and the DDCs were given very scant
attention.

In the period late 1969-early 1970, the CPDO prepared and
submitted proposals for the strengthening of the planning capa-
bility of the Districts. It recommended that competent, qualified
District Development Secretaries be posted to each district to
undertake certain planning tasks.3

The Cabinet accepted the recommendation and in August 1970
established the post of District Development Secretary for all
nine Districts.4 The CPDO submitted a list of graduates to fill
the posts. The Cabinet ignored the list and appointed people who
had neither training nor experience in planning,5 so effectively
preventing any planning input from the Districts. As regards
district administration in Lesotho, the process observable could
be described as departicipation, recentralisation and misuse of

1. Sendingram, Cabinet (Personnel) to all DAs, Ref. CAB/DEV/SEC
20/3/72, Annexure C - DDCs and Machinery for Planning and
Development.
2. P. Sommerfeld, District administration in Lesotho. Comments,
24/1/73.
3. The suggested tasks were: (i) preparing reports or ensur-
that this was done for consideration by the Committee;
(ii) ensuring the attendance of the correct people at meet-
ings; (iii) recording and following up decisions taken by
the Committee; (iv) maintaining contact with other District
Development Committees; (v) maintaining contact with the
relevant organs of central government and in particular the
CPDO, submitting regular reports on development to them; and
(vi) preparing inter-sectoral development projects where
appropriate, or ensuring that they were prepared. See CPDO,
District Development Committees, op.cit.
5. S. Montsi, Brief review of plan implementation, 1974, pp. 11
and 16.
newly created posts.

The purpose of this investigation was to elicit the views and perspectives of a number of District Administrators on the obstacles which they saw confronting them in administering and planning for the Districts. Six DAs were questioned. The following is a summary of their responses.

**Question 1**: What were the names of the districts in which you held office and what was your tenure of office in each case?

Two of the six DAs had experienced relatively stable tenures: one had held only one post as DA and that for three years; the other had held three posts at an average of three years. The other four had been transferred considerably more frequently: for example, one was moved seven times between 1965 and 1971 as follows: two years, three months, one year, six months, four months, one month, one year. The average tenure for all DA posts held by these six is just over eleven months which appears (from discussion with many civil servants) to be slightly longer than the norm. In terms of the answers to Question 6(v) below, this is far too short a time to do anything useful.

**Question 2**: Relations with the CPDO: (i) Did the CPDO ever visit you to discuss your ideas or problems? (ii) Did the CPDO ever attend meetings of the District Development Committees? (iii) Did the CPDO ever consult with you? (iv) Did you ever visit the CPDO? (v) Did you ever write to the CPDO or initiate any contact with it? If so, what was the response?

Five of the six DAs answered 'no' to every question. This confirmed a generally-held opinion that communication between the Planning Office and the Districts was virtually non-existent and corroborated the results of an analysis of all outgoing correspondence from the CPDO from June 1965 to June 1975: over the ten years only a handful of letters went to the Districts and these were on petty matters. One DA
commented that while he was serving (in the lowlands) from 1968 to 1971 (which includes the full period of preparation of the First Plan) he had remained unaware of the existence of the CPDO.

The only DA who had been contacted by the Planning Office had not received any communication before 1974. In that year he was visited on three occasions: once to bring a World Bank mission to discuss a proposed project; once to find out his and the District Development Committee's suggestions for the Second Plan (the only time it visited a Committee under his Chairmanship); and once in an attempt to arbitrate in a dispute between two departments on the siting of a post office in his district.

Question 3: How do you view the role of the CPDO? (i) What, in your view, is its intended role?

Only one DA gave a detailed response. He first stressed the necessity for the Planning Office to go beyond the central ministries and link up directly with the rural communities, enabling it to commence planning with a 'real situation assessment' which would provide its policies with a 'meaningful touch'.

On this basis they should draw up lines of direction where development should go. Further it should act as a clearing-house for ideas, evaluate progress or ensure that an evaluation takes place. Otherwise it might deceive itself too easily. It should act as a watchdog to see that plans, programmes and projects are really implemented.

The others were less specific or less certain of its intended role. One admitted that since it had never been explained to him he 'did not know what it was supposed to do'. Another said he thought it was intended to plan 'for the country as a whole and didn't have anything to do with the districts'.

1. In 1974 a CPDO team visited the District Development Committees in connection with preparing the Second Plan - see below, Appendix X.
2. In 1972 the CPDO sent two officers to attend some meetings of these Committees and report on the operation of the District Development Secretaries. Their conclusions were so negative they decided not to prepare a report.
Question 1 (ii) : Does the CPDO understand the Districts?

The response of all six DAs was strongly negative. Two examples are given:

No, they don't understand the districts. That is why in the First Plan the human element does not appear. It's just figures, inputs and outputs... There is no role for the Chiefs... There is something about District Committees, but... it was theoretical - they didn't know if Committees existed...

No, it has no idea. The needs of the districts were not reflected in the First Plan. We didn't know who produced it. It was backed by the PM and the King and we thought it was some holy book produced outside the country.

Question 3 (iii) : Does the CPDO have contact with the people?

Again the answer from all was firmly in the negative. Three examples are given:

I am sure they haven't been in three-quarters of the country. They never get out of Maseru.

Nothing at all. People in the country or even in Maseru don't know them... It is a great pity.

As I thought the CPDO was merely concerned with big government projects and asking for money from abroad. It had no contact with the grassroots and nothing to do with motivating the people to develop themselves.

Question 3 (iv) : Is the CPDO effective and does it provide guidance?

The DAs all considered it ineffective and said that it had provided them with no guidance. One responded that it 'might be effective with people abroad/but/ not with the people of Lesotho', while another felt that it was making 'no conscious effort' to give guidance. He also criticised the CPDO projects as well as the First Plan as 'irrelevant' simply because they were 'not started from the grassroots'. They were regarded as an 'imposition'.

Question 3 (v) : Is the CPDO realistic in its undertakings?

They all said that they saw it as extremely unrealistic. One DA referred to it as 'flying in the sky' arguing, amongst other points, that were it more realistic it would give much more serious attention to the Growth Centre Plan since disruptive social problems would arise from permitting development to be concentrated in Maseru and Maphato. A second said that a CPDO which was attempting to found its policies
on the actual prevailing situation would have made contact with the people through the DAs: 'Having failed to do that, I judge them unrealistic'.

**Question 3(vi):** Is it qualified to do its work?

Except for one of the interviewees who said that 'since we knew nothing about them it was impossible to assess', the general content of the other replies was that the CPDO staff might be qualified academically but their lack of experience rendered them unqualified for the task.

This is where the snag lies. The people were all new, just out of school, they hadn't been in the field long and didn't know what was required.

They are qualified academically, but we are misled by paper qualifications and forget the role of experience - experience of practical situations in Lesotho. They are fresh from school with no practical background.

**Question 3(vii):** How could contact between the Districts and the CPDO be improved?

All the answers placed major responsibility on the CPDO to take the initiative, get out to the districts and meet district officials and DAs and inform them of 'and include them' in new plans and projects. DAs and other field workers who do have the opportunity of meeting people in the rural areas would then be able to convey and explain these ideas. The planners should also go 'to the villages to see what is happening so that when they talk about things, they must at least know what they are talking about'. It was also argued that planners needed to work and gain experience in the districts before joining the CPDO:

They are not given a chance to gain experience before they are given full responsibility in the central headquarters - e.g. you will not find one graduate from UBLS since 1964 in economics or administration who is in the districts - they are all in Maseru fiddling with files and they don't understand the contents. They can't make head or tail of the districts because they have never been there...

It was also stressed that Chiefs needed to be 'made part and parcel of the planning stages' since they were expected to help carry the plans out. In reply to this question only one of the DAs made the point that a strengthening of the role of District Development Secretaries would improve communication between the district and the CPDO. 'But', he
added, 'it would require the District Development Committees
to be taken seriously by Government'.

**Question 4:** The role of the District Development Secretary.

(i) What is he meant to do?

Three answers are quoted which all conform quite closely
with the original intention of the CPDO and the Circular establish-
ing the post.

He was intended to coordinate at the district
level: [Hq] should be a person qualified in economics
in contact with and recommended by CPDO. In this I am
sympathetic with the CPDO because the whole idea was
sidestepped and thus the idea failed. He should have
been the channel between the people and the CPDO.

They were supposed to have a developmental role.
It was not clear that the Government knew what it
wanted because they proposed it without revising or
altering the role of the District Community Develop-
ment Officer... The aim was to coordinate development
projects in the districts, assess them and follow up
their implementation.

DDs should be able to consult with the DA about
any plans to be carried out in the districts, repre-
sent DDs at meetings outside the districts, to take the
lead and deal effectively with meetings of the DDC and
take the initiative re projects, suggestions and matters
connected with agriculture.

**Question 4(i):** In your experience, have the DDs been quali-
ified for the task?

DDs shared the view of other civil servants
that the Secretaries who were appointed were inadequately
trained: 'They are unqualified and redundant. They are ex-
politicians with very little knowledge'.

DDs are at present political men who were either
Assistant Ministers or stood for elections in 1970. It
is a reward in order that these people should not starve
because they cannot get any other post without losing
the salary level they were getting an Assistant Minis-
ters or in the political complex. They have little edu-
cation... Many had previously been teachers at Roman
Catholic schools. The Fathers... allowed them to orga-
nize for elections and assured them that if they lost
they could get their jobs back... My own DDS could do
nothing - it was just completely above him.

**Question 4(ii):** What does he in fact do?

The answers indicated clearly that lack of training pre-
cluded these Secretaries from fulfilling their intended plan-
ning function. One DA said that his District Development Secretary was 'merely a minutes secretary of the DDC and he acts as a DA when the DA is away'. A second DA said that he could use him for certain jobs but that he first had to give him detailed instructions:

He had no initiative. He did not prepare a document or go and speak to people. If I did not tell him what to do he just sat in the office all day.

A third DA, whose Secretary had completed high school and had had extensive experience with accounts, replied that because he, the DA, had advised his Secretary and arranged for him to attend a course on rural development in another African country, he had been useful. In addition to taking minutes and following up on ideas, he visited departments and projects. 'He was an active and very willing man'.

**Question 4(iv)**: Is his role confused with that of the District Community Development Officer?

All the DAs confirmed that there was considerable confusion and overlap, because their roles had not been clearly defined, nor had the Secretaries had their functions fully explained to them.

**Question 5**: The role of the District Development Committee.

1. **What are its primary functions?**

Three extracts from replies are given.

*Its main function is to study the requests from the people and to look at relevant problems, and make recommendations on these.*

*It should implement Government decisions and at the same time ... bring to the notice of the Government the needs of the people in the districts.*

*To coordinate the projects from the village level, sanction then, assess their possibilities and the resources available to make them viable. It is meant to be a sifting and clearing house. The heads of departments in the districts, chiefs and other leaders come together to look at the projects and see if there is no duplication and whether resources are available.*

**Question 5(ii)**: What are its main problems?

Three principal obstacles were identified and repeated in most of the replies: political difficulties, non-cooperation of chiefs and unresponsiveness of the central Government.
Political problems

The main problem was that they were political. Politics still plays the biggest role. They do not want members of the opposition parties to be members of the Committees. They want projects only for BNP supporters. Even food aid they try to use as bait for bringing people into the BNP... despite the PM having issued strong circulars against this practice.

But ultimately it became a political forum. Everybody interested in a project would come along and argue and politicians would clash. People would just talk and talk about their projects and we couldn't stop them and it became absolute chaos in some meetings.

Politics was also said to be 'rife in the villages' making an assessment of some of the suggestions which originated in Village Development Committees problematic. One DA gave the following example:

...If a village suggested a road or dam and I would say they must wait for a surveyor, the politicians would accuse us of blocking development and take advantage of the impatience of the villagers who wanted to get their products to market. They would blackmail us and call us people who block development.

Some of the DAs said that while politics always remained a potential impediment, they had successfully managed to prevent it from disturbing meetings of their Committees.

One response of the BNP Government to the activities of the LCP was the appointment of 'prominent citizens' to the District Development Committees. These were senior BNP people in the districts who were intended to observe and guide the deliberations of the Committees. The two DAs who discussed them were both critical of the role played by these men, particularly of their representation of the village. They were also accused of trying to take political advantage of their position.

They are regarded as political leaders in touch with the villages - they were useful but some of them brought their own ideas without consulting Village Development Committees or the people. We could see it was their own idea - they try and gain credit for this and do take advantage.

Chiefs

While the DAs all disparaged the lack of interest of the
chiefs, and their failure to attend meetings, they did express some understanding for their circumstances.

First they consider it below them to attend. Second, they are not in the Chair, but are under the DA. Their attendance was bad because they want to be given allowances for attending ... but the Government has said no, one can understand them. They are poor and some of them have to come a long way.

Even in the time of the District Councils under colonial rule they did not attend. They did not want to mix with politicians, particularly BCP who were very rough on them. But even now with the BNP, they don't want to attend. They see the challenge as too much.

Partly it is because the Committee is something new, partly because they live in a state of fear that these committees are taking their power and their status is being lowered through political development.

Non-response of central Government

DA's raised this matter here as well as in response to later questions, and their replies will be noted under questions 5(iv) and 6(ii).

Question 5(iii): Do members attend?

Except for the chiefs, attendance was considered to be satisfactory, although it depended on the 'toughness' of the DA. DA's in Namasu experienced more difficulty in this regard since district officials had their own central offices in the town; because they reported directly to, and were in close contact with, their ministries, they felt less need to attend meetings of the District Development Committee.

Question 5(iv): Does it have a developmental role?

One DA's view was that the Committees were 'playing an important, vital developmental role'. The others, however, replied that potentially it definitely had such a role, but for a number of reasons (some noted above, some below) it was not fulfilling this potential.

If the resolutions could be followed up they would have such a role - but they are just talking shops. They need some statutory power so that their resolutions will be attended to.

It just discusses things and cannot implement anything.
Their potential was also said to be limited by their lack of authority over district officials and by the divided loyalties of these officials: 'they felt that by abiding by decisions of the DDC they might conflict with their masters in Maseru'.

**Question 6**: The role of the District Administrator.

(i) What is the DA's intended role?

Some of the replies were brief: 'To represent the Government in the districts - "eyes and ears of the Government"'; 'he should represent the people to the Government'; 'to supervise, head and coordinate all departments'; 'he is in charge of the chiefs'; 'he is Chairman of every district body'.

Two of the DAs, in replying, felt it necessary to place the present DAs situation in its historical context:

This has gone through a process of mutation. Before independence there were District Commissioners responsible to the Resident Commissioner - they were heads of Government in the district and had the powers of a legal magistrate. After independence powers were divided ... and a new cadre was established called District Administrative Secretaries who were intended to be freed of all legal functions and be more responsible for development and service functions. Also the former Assistant Ministers in the Cabinet were sent to the districts as resident Ministers in order to bring Government closer to the people - they were the political heads of Government in the districts. They had no executive power ... (They were) withdrawn in 1970. In 1970 the DA was established and given all the old powers of the old District Commissioner, of the Assistant Ministers and the District Administrative Secretaries.

A second version concluded that the present DA was in a far weaker position than the old District Commissioners:

DAs are today in a weak position. In colonial times District Commissioners were the symbol of authority and coordination in the districts. With independence, we got Ministers, PMs, Assistant Ministers, Principal Administrative Secretaries all with status above the L, and they had around them henchmen who also felt above the DA ... Also in colonial times the departmental officers in the districts had to report to the District Commissioner. Now the district officers ... are for all practical purposes responsible to their ministries.

This DA also mentioned that DAs' contact with the people and his more development-oriented functions were impeded by
the numerous small tasks he was called upon to perform, such as many meetings to attend, dealing with estates and with land disputes, signing affidavits and performing marriage ceremonies.

**Question 6(ii):** What are the principal problems which DAs face in their relationship with central Government?

The foremost complaint of the DAs was the response of the central ministries to their proposals was either very poor or non-existent. This caused a feeling of frustration among members of the Committee who felt they were wasting their time attending meetings.

The tendency is to recognise the DAs as important only in times of trouble. But in normal conditions there is not enough response... The only department which takes us seriously is Community Development.

I would write to Cabinet and never know what happened next... There was no example when we were under Cabinet where anything happened. There was never any proper investigation or study to find out problems, attitudes and views of the DAs.

**Question 6(iii):** Are you able to coordinate the ministries' district officers?

Answers differed in this case, but it appears that while coordination is not easy, DAs through their own efforts may be successful. One DA said because he was a chief, had considerable previous administrative experience and was supported by 'a very good security officer', he had received cooperation and assistance. Without this background, his successor was not managing as well. Other said that despite the 'dual loyalty' and 'the conflict of interests' involved they had managed to coordinate those officials. DAs in Maseru appeared to experience more resistance than others since in the capital the district officers have their headquarters and are usually themselves heads of divisions. (See also Question 5(iii) above).

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1. From 1970 to 1974 DAs were responsible to Cabinet. Questions were put to DAs as well as others about this and the answer from everyone was that this was detrimental to district administration and development. In 1974 a Commission of Enquiry recommended that DAs return to Interior and Government accepted this.
Question 6(iv) : Are you informed or consulted about Government undertakings in your districts?

The experiences of those questioned differed, and accordingly their replies varied from 'In most cases we were informed...' to 'Sometimes they did, sometimes they did not', and 'No, very little, only if a problem arose...'. In general, however, their opinion was that ministries consulted DAs mainly when they depended on their support.

They had to consult us. The reason was, for example, if you want to build a school the DA is the Chairman of the Advisory Board on Education; you had to get his permission and his support to approach the chief about allocating land. Another example: to build a road through a man's land, they would need me to go and explain to him why it was necessary. I would be the one to put the message across to the people and get them to see the value of a project.

Question 6(v) : Why do DAs change so frequently and what is the effect?

The contents of the various answers may be divided into four subsections.

Political reasons

It's to do with politicians. If a DA clashes with a politician he is out. Politicians are wire pullers and they know the people with hands on the levers of power... We are operating a spoils system - jobs for pals - and it is not easy to make people step down. If you are active in your political support for the party, and once we achieved success, then we have to give you the job we promised, and once we appointed you, it is very difficult to demote you... they are prepared to sacrifice administrative objectives for political gain.

It is due to political feelings - there is so much insecurity in Government... if BNP people in the district complain about a DA, the Government will move him because they are scared. They used to investigate complaints, but now they just move him.

Other reasons

This is because people who move them around have no experience or understanding of what goes on in the districts... It would not have happened in colonial times.

The calibre of the DAs today is depressingly low and they can't measure up to the requirements. In these troubled times we need first class men - but we haven't got them, so we keep juggling them around hoping we shall find someone suitable.
Those frequent transfers remained a mystery to me. I suspected personal reasons on the part of those who had power to transfer, or a misunderstanding of district administration and its role. I know that at one time [the person responsible] when he wanted to hide that he was moving one person, he would move a whole team of four or five, so affecting four or five districts.

Required tenure

There were various views on the time it takes a DA to acclimatise himself to a new district and to begin operating effectively.

In my third year I felt as though people knew me, and I knew them, and they were aware of what Government wanted.

Three years should be the absolute minimum period of office.

To get to know the people of an area, and the area, and to let people get to know the DA, requires a minimum of five years. I think an experienced man would take two years to start to become useful.

I think an average of two years is necessary for a DA to get to know his district. If you manage to accomplish anything at all in the first two years it is quite exceptional.

Effects of frequent transfers

As soon as you establish contacts and people to work with, you have to go.

It leads to maladministration because there is no continuity. Each new DA has his own pet project, but he leaves before he can see it through to conclusion and so ultimately nothing at all gets achieved.

I resigned not because of the effects of transfers on me, but because of the effects on the districts and the disadvantages for the people in those districts. It frustrates the people, leaves them uncertain, creates a state of instability and is a waste of resources.

Question 7: What are the major improvements in district administration and planning that you would recommend?

One DA answered that if his replies were studied, his suggestions would emerge clearly, and therefore there was no need to answer. A second said that DAs and chiefs needed to work more closely and use each other to better effect - he felt with the return of the DAs to Interior ('back with the chiefs') the position would improve. The major points from other replies were as follows:
1) There are too many officers - DAs, DGs and DCDOs overlap. One should die and it should be the DA... [however] if they replaced the DGs with persons qualified in economics and able to prepare project memoranda, then they would be a very useful link with COP. 2) At the moment COP's work ends in Maseru. If they could somehow help the villages and their people, that would be a great assistance. 3) DDCs should have their terms of reference properly defined and their composition legally defined - so that they can have the power to exclude people if necessary.

1) We require very high-powered men to be in charge of the districts... Ministries must be told that the DA is the man to look to and work through - he must be as the District Commissioner was in the 'good' old colonial days, except that the emphasis must be on development, not on law and order... 2) I don't think that money should be pumped into the districts. They have not developed to a stage where they can handle money. We should not depart from the present practice where each ministry in the district has a budget from its headquarters. Local government requires very high moral rectitude and the people are not ready for it.

1) DAs should not be appointed politically. They should be judged by their output, not their political affiliations. 2) When they must be given time to settle in their districts. 3) We should go back to the idea of District Councils - I do not agree with centralisation. Those Councils were far more powerful and effective. Since they have been abolished... there is no activity in the Districts - everything happens in and for Maseru. They were statutory bodies and controlled a budget, and as the local body in the district they could deal with needs and requirements as they arose. We handled dams, roads, water supplies, clinics. This has all been taken over by Government and, I am sure, Government has bitten off more than it can chew. This centralisation is also because of insecurity because the majority of members of the District Councils were of the opposition parties. But it took place at the expense of the districts. Improvements are made to Maseru from the money from the taxpayers in the districts. We used to have our own revenue collection... DDC must have a budget - else it can never function... 4) Also the DA is supposed to be the key man in the district but he is not given a status commensurate with that required and so he can't command sufficient acceptance and respectability from the public.

Why can't we do, as in Tanzania, and recognise that the district level is the base of the country's development and therefore we upgrade the standing of the district administration, and its power and resources. Why are there no district budgets? Why can't the DA be given equal power to the PS (because he is expected to do more than the PS) and pay him accordingly? Now there is no inducement to be or stay a DA. Why not
give the DDC enough power to make it work, and in particular, executive power to use some of its resources, instead of the system where having assessed projects it has to refer them to Maseru. Even to buy a pencil and paper we have to apply to Maseru. There is much too much centralisation in Maseru. In the days of the District Councils we could start projects with our own district resources. Perhaps revenue officers in the districts should be left with a percentage of district revenues with which to develop the district. Now it is unfair because we get no advantage for collecting more revenue... Also in making up plans, people should not know about the plan, programme or project only when they are expected to work on it. They must grow up with it - not have it imposed - it must be their own... CPO must get out into the field and get data first-hand and relate it to its own programmes and then follow up and evaluate at regular intervals.

VI. THE RAMABENTA'S - SEMONKONG ROAD PROJECT

A. Brief case history

Semonkong is a mountain village about 110 kilometres from Maseru. In the area there are trading and mission stations, schools receiving World Food Programme food through transport provided by the Save the Children Fund, a Government clinic, a police post and a small tourist lodge. Nearby in the spectacular (630-foot) Maletsunyane (lebihan) Falls, which together with fishing and attractive scenery makes it an area of considerable tourist potential. There is also potential for wool and mohair production, and wheat, peas and beans grow well. A second impressive waterfall in the vicinity has been identified as a possible site for a hydro-electric scheme, and the Lesotho Bank has for some time been interested in building a hotel and developing it as a tourist centre.

In the late 1950's a tractor was transported, partly by road, partly by mule, over the mountains to Semonkong, and this remained the only motorised vehicle to reach the area until 1971. Up to that year, the only links with the outside world were bridle paths and an air connection with Maseru, started in 1952. In 1971 an extremely rough 45-kilometre track was completed by local villagers, joining Semonkong to Ramabenta's, a small village from which there were two poor standard roads to Maseru.
The need for a road had been recognised by the Government, and as early as 1967 a project memorandum was put forward for British financing. This memorandum proposed a road coming from the south – from Mohales'Hack to Kateng through the Ribane Valley to Semonkong (hereafter called the southern route). The British agreed to grants of R25,000 for surveying the road and R250,000 for building operations during the financial year 1968/9. Work commenced and reached a point south of the Ribane Valley, before being called to a halt at a point of no significance. Continuation was scheduled for the first three years of the First Five Year Plan (1970-75) at an estimated further cost of R165,000, and accordingly – if a little belatedly – in early 1971 Lesotho requested the British Government to provide the money for the completion of the road to Semonkong. By this stage, the British had grown dubious about the utility of the road, and they began sending queries to CPDO including a request for a traffic count. The CPDO replied to this that it would be a senseless exercise to conduct on a road that not only went nowhere but of which part was inaccessible since a bridge had yet to be constructed over a major river. During the course of the year the British did give approval in principle, but then soon after decided to shelve continuation of the road. Two reasons were given for this: firstly, there were financial constraints and secondly, the British wanted to await the results of a national transportation study being carried out by Stellenbosch University. This delay proved unproductive since the research team ran out of money and the study never materialised.

1. Interim National Assembly Debates, Hansard, Second meeting, First session, 2/10/73-17/10/73, p. 200.
3. CPDO to British High Commission CPD/WORKS/707 10/1/71.
5. CPDO to British High Commission CPD/WORKS/52/9 2/7/71.
7. Ibid.
The people of the Semonkong area, however, were not interested in the southern route. Although they had been informed about the intended road from the south, their most important links were with Maseru, and in their view it would be advantageous to build a road which linked them with the capital and not with the south. With the advice of a foreman from the Food Aid Programme Office (FAPO), who acted without his headquarters' knowledge, the villagers set about constructing their own rough track (hereafter referred to as the villagers' route) which they completed by the middle of 1971, and which enabled a vehicle to reach Semonkong for the first time.¹

In view of the community's enthusiasm for the road, FAPO instructed its surveyor to report on the state of the track and its required improvements. His report indicated that it was of a very poor standard and extremely dangerous, and should be used only by vehicles attached to a construction unit. To bring this road up to a standard suitable for four-wheel-drive vehicles, he proposed the hiring for three months of compressors and bulldozers and other accessories, at a total cost of R10 000 (this was later re-costed at R13 000).²

In November 1971 Food Aid wrote to the Cabinet Office, enclosing the surveyor's report and mentioning that at a later date the track could be brought up to the standard of a Food Aid access track, at the cost of a further R17 000 (which would include a low-level river crossing). FAPO asked the Cabinet Office for a policy decision on the continuation of the southern road before it could approach the British (who would be unwilling to assist with the villagers' road when they had already been requested to help with the other) or the Americans. It also recommended that the southern route be 'shelved completely', as it had no popular support and no

great economic advantage over the villagers' road. The Food Aid Office would in addition not be in a position to approach food donors for assistance with food-for-work labour, until it had assurances from the Government that it would obtain financial assistance for the machinery. ¹ (A copy was sent to the CPO).

By this stage the villagers had further shown their interest by forming a committee which collected R252 from among themselves, to which the Archbishop donated R100, St. Leonard's Mission R150 and the Anglican Mission R50. In December the Prime Minister expressed support for this road, particularly as he wished to hold a piano in Semonkong, and he contributed R100 to be spent on twenty workers at thirty cents each per day, and two foremen at fifty cents each per day, to work on the road until the money was used up.²

Cabinet Office agreed to the FAPO suggestion to call together interested parties³ (copy to CPO) and did so on 12 January 1972. The meeting decided not to alter the plans to construct the southern road, since it had already been approved for funding by the UK, had been programmed for 1972, and the people along the planned route were anticipating it and should not be disappointed. But in addition it was decided that the R10 000 required for machinery in support of food aid labour on the villagers' road should be sought from a donor other than the UK. It was estimated that the useful life of the track would be about four years, and thereafter, it was thought, traffic to and from Semonkong would find it easier and more economical to use the southern road. (Copies of the record of the meeting were sent to CPO).⁴

Meanwhile on 10 January 1972, a Catholic Father stationed near Semonkong, went on behalf of the committee an appli-
cation for a United States self-help project to the Ministry of Works (with copies to the CBO and the US Embassy), though that Ministry is in fact responsible for larger-scale road projects than those generally dealt with under self-help applications. On 2 February 1972, the Planning Office wrote to Works to ask whether it approved the project.1 It appears that there was no reply, and CBO took no further action.

On 9 April 1972, Food Aid, referring to all the correspondence copied to the Planning Office and to the meeting under the Senior Permanent Secretary in the Cabinet Office (mentioned above), requested the CBO to advise it on a suitable donor and enclosed a memorandum setting out some background to the project.2 As Food Aid falls under the Cabinet complex of departments, the Cabinet Planning Unit pointed out in a letter to FAPC that all requests to the Planning Office should be routed through the Planning Unit.3 The application was then sent to the unit (with a copy to CBO) and the Unit conveyed this to CBO, urging an early reply.4

A full year passed, by which stage Catholic Relief Services had agreed to the villagers' road and scheduled in its annual programme to provide food for 200 workers and a foreman, conditional on the Government obtaining the finance for the necessary machinery. As the CBO had still not responded, Food Aid wrote to the US Embassy, enclosing a memorandum giving background information and expressing the local enthusiasm for the project. It stated that if the Embassy would state that it might be possible to find funds, it would submit a formal application to Planning.5 The US Embassy replied that it had received a copy of the Catholic Father's application to the Ministry of Works, but had not yet received one from CBO. It suggested that Food Aid check the status of the project with Planning or Works.6 If Government approves the project we will immediately put it in the queue of

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1. CBO to Works CPD/AID/10/3 2/2/72.
2. Food Aid Programme Office to CBO, 24/4/72.
5. Food Aid Programme Office to US Embassy, 24/4/73.
approved projects for which we will attempt to find funding. (Copy to CPDO).

Food Aid then wrote to the Planning Office pointing out that it was sixteen months since they had requested advice, and that the state of the track was deteriorating and becoming more dangerous, and asking whether it would support the project. In October 1973 the matter was raised in Parliament, and the Minister explained why the southern road had come to a halt. That same month the District Administrator of Maseru called a series of meetings at the main villages along the villagers' route and raised a further R300 from them. He wrote to all Government departments including FAPO and CPDO and requested, most urgently, assistance with the road and with the causeway over the largest river which could not be crossed during the rainy season. Thus at various stages this project had received the support of the Prime Minister, the Senior Permanent Secretary, Food Aid, the District Administrator of Maseru, the local missions, the Archbishop, Catholic Relief Services, the US Embassy and the local people who had contributed both labour and money. Yet there was still no response from the CPDO.

On 1 March 1974, Food Aid, reminding the Planning Office of the requests of April 1972 and August 1973, and explaining that it was understood that a German aid mission that was visiting Lesotho might be interested in financing the road, asked CPDO to raise the matter with them. There is no evidence that CPDO ever replied to that.

There are a number of reasons why the Planning Office may have been unwilling to support the villagers' road project. First, there was the southern road which was half built, and had received British approval in principle; it may have felt that the chances of the southern road being completed would be compromised were the British to discover that it had no popular support or to realise that the Government

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1. US Embassy to Food Aid Programme Office, 3/3/73.
2. Food Aid Programme Office to CPDO, 15/2/74.
4. Circular from IA, Maseru, 29/10/73.
5. Food Aid Programme Office to CPDO, 1/3/74.
had plans to back a second road project to the same place. In this respect the Cabinet Office decision was unhelpful, because even if the CPDO went to another donor for support of the other road, the word would almost certainly reach the ears of the High Commission. Even if Cabinet Office had accepted Food Aid's suggestion to 'shelve completely' the southern road, the CPDO would have been put in the somewhat embarrassing position of informing a donor that the money which had gone into building a road into the middle of nowhere had resulted from the mistaken judgement of the Government. Second, there was a period of delay in which the CPDO and the British were waiting for the results of the Stellenbosch transportation study which was intended to determine a national order of priorities for road building. As has been mentioned, this eventually did not materialise. No sooner had this failed than another donor was found who was willing to fund a transportation study to be undertaken by a firm of consultants. So once again the Planning Office was in a position of not wanting to make decisions on any road building until the consultants' report was received.

That the potential of Semonkong as an area for development was in the minds of Lesotho's planners - at least from time to time - is clear: the southern road was included in the First Plan, prepared by the CPDO; and when the consultants' draft report arrived, the Planning Office, in pointing out certain weaknesses, said that it failed to relate roads to project areas and gave as one example the road to Semonkong about which the report had neglected to mention tourism and electricity. Further, when the African Development Bank informed the Lesotho Government that it was interested in funding a road project in Lesotho, the CPDO identified the Mamabanta-Semonkong road (i.e. the villagers' road) as the most obvious road qualifying for their assistance: 'It will have a large impact on the lives of the villagers (rural development); it leads to the site of the proposed hydro-electric scheme aimed at decreasing Lesotho's dependence on

1. CPDO to Houghton and Partners, CPD/57/05 29/11/73.
the ITA* (rural development and increasing dependence on South Africa being two of the criteria used by the African Development Bank in deciding on projects for financing). This was taken up with the Bank and consultants requested. Probably because this proposal had been put to the Bank, which the planners considered the most appropriate donor, it would not have accepted Food Aid's suggestion to raise it with the Germans, whom CPDO felt should be asked to assist in other fields.

The final consultants' report, which took into account the remarks of the CPDO, noted in connection with the proposed road to Semonkong the tourist potential, the hydro-electrical potential, the substantial population and the wool and mohair possibilities, and mentions the very poor condition of the road, the difficult climbs, hairpin bends and sharp ascents and descents. It proposed three alternative standards for the road costing R3,2 million, R1,8 m. and R676 000 from Remabonta to Semonkong. The Planning office chose to negotiate on the most expensive of the three and included it in its draft Second Five Year Plan proposals, placed before a conference of donors held in April 1975. The African Development Bank agreed to undertake a detailed feasibility study of this road and one from Lethe to Butha Butha to Oxbow at a combined cost of R1 m., for which a loan agreement would be signed. Its delegate to the conference also indicated that his Bank would consider assisting with the building of the road, once the studies had been completed. Thus barring serious hitches, it was possible that a study would be undertaken during 1976 or 1977 and that a good gravel road might be completed two or three years after that, thus bringing the road to Semonkong in 1979 or 1980.

1. CPDO to Cabinet(SPS) CPO/87/05 4/2/74.
2. CPDO to African Development Bank CPO/35/011/3 23/7/74.
3. Roughan and Partners, Lesotho transportation study, cit.
B. Discussion

A number of points illustrating the contrasting worlds of the bureaucracy and the migrant workers/rural inhabitants arise from this examination. It relates therefore to the final section of Chapter V, concerned with the question of administration for underdevelopment. In addition to showing the divergent approaches to project formulation and execution of the GPCO and the villagers, it also affords an example of the predicament of the 'contact personnel' whose low salaries and status were discussed earlier in that Chapter. They incur the anger of the villagers when they find they are unable to satisfy the demands which their job requires them to stimulate. At the same time they receive little support and even less explanation from the central ministries which undermines their standing and morale even more.

For a start, the road project demonstrates the problem of differing time scales. The local community, their enthusiasm having been excited, wanted to build the road immediately. Though the standard of the road would be poor it would have been completed in three months. The Planning Office, on the other hand, first (in fulfilment of its own requirements of rational decision-making) wanted to obtain the results of a comprehensive transportation survey so as to be able to determine the national priority rating of the road; second, needed to identify a specific donor who would be interested in that particular type of project; third, selected a high-standard road (which is necessary if one wants to raise substantially the number of tourists, and will also reduce vehicle and road maintenance costs) which in turn requires a full engineering study. The self-help project would have been constructed - including a delay in US approval - by the middle of 1972. The good road, as has been noted, might be completed by 1979. This means a delay of seven or eight years. Although this case was an extreme example, the problem of community enthusiasm either waning before confirmation and support arrive or simply being disappointed because there are insufficient resources for the project, arises regularly.
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This case also exemplifies the type of difficulty which arises in consequence of Government having established no policy on or machinery for supervising rural development. Thus at various stages the church, the village committee, the Food Aid Office, the District Administrator and the Ministry of Works became involved in the attempts to get the villagers' road moving. As one person put it:

"There is a general lack of clarity as to who is responsible for what in the provision of support services for development in rural areas... This leads to lack of coordination of effort, overlapping of activity and very weak planning and programming at the district level."

It highlights, too, a few points about costs of projects. Excluding food aid which had been approved by a donor, the self-help project would have required R13,000 from the US Embassy Self Help Fund, and a further R17,000 to bring it up to the standard of a FAPO access track, i.e. a total of R30,000, obtainable as a grant. In comparison, the total cost of the high standard gravel road (including say two-fifths of the expense of the engineering study) will amount to approximately R3,5 m., and this will be on loan. While it is easy to be wise after the event, one can see now that the self-help project which would have cost less than one per cent of the proposed road, should not therefore have compromised its acceptability to a donor, would have provided the village with improved access to Maseru and would have facilitated Government, mission, and trader contact with Semonkong and the villages along the way for the intervening seven or eight years. Finally the fact that the CPDO selected the most expensive of the three alternatives indicates that finding foreign assistance was not a serious constraint, and that in many cases donors prefer to finance large-scale rather than smaller projects.

It also provides a grave example of CPDO's non-responsiveness to letters. Assuming that the CPDO had reasons for not supporting the self-help project, it at no time communicated them to the people concerned. It received at least four direct requests and at least seven copies of correspondence, and it reacted only once (its letter to the Ministry of Works, which it failed to follow up). Thus at no time during this
period of about four years have the Food Aid Office or the villagers been given any idea whatever of the Planning Office's intentions regarding their request for assistance.

VII. THE ABATTOIR PROJECT

A. Brief case history

As early as 1962 the Department of Health condemned the Maseru slaughterhouse as 'decreeit, unhygienic and inhumane'. Based on a quotation by a Johannesburg engineering company, the Department estimated that a new abattoir would cost R30,000. In February 1967 the National Planning Board agreed that an abattoir and cold storage were urgently needed in Maseru, and the project was included in the 1967/68 Development Estimates with the suggestion that the newly-established Leacho National Development Corporation supervise the undertaking. In its submission for the First Plan, Interior listed an abattoir on its proposed programme. Based on the 1962 estimate, but taking into account rising costs, Interior priced the project at R40,000.

In January 1970 a South African mission discussed the idea with Interior, which thereafter notified the CPDO of the meeting and of its intention to proceed with the project during the 1970/71 financial year, at a cost of R40,000. The Planning Office complained of lack of advance notice of the visit and of still insufficient data on Interior's proposals. It informed Interior that Agriculture was also planning an abattoir and that one of the main functions of the proposed Leacho Livestock Marketing Corporation would be to establish one. Its advice to Interior and Agriculture was therefore to consult one another 'before further duplication of activities eventuated'.

Interior replied that it had been in contact with Agriculture which had agreed to await the advice of the South

2. National Planning Board, Minutes of 7th meeting, op. cit.
4. Interior to CPDO S/DEV/1-7 9/6/69.
5. Interior to CPDO LG/ABAT/94-99 22/1/70.
6. CPDO to Interior and Agriculture CPDO/AID/15 10/2/70.
African mission before deciding on supervision. Interior pointed out that it did have responsibility: since it was concerned with operating municipal services, it had inherited from the 'defunct District Councils a number of abattoirs (if indeed they deserve that name)' and it was therefore obliged to improve and expand these services to meet local demand. It did accept, however, that were a large commercial abattoir to be proved economically justifiable, then it should be handled by the Marketing Corporation.

In the First Plan, issued in December 1970, the abattoir project was included under the chapter on Agriculture and the subsection on livestock Production. The Plan explained that for each animal sent to an abattoir in the Republic the marketing costs, plus insurance, slaughterhouse fees, commissions, etc. amounted to about R10. Further, the animals lost considerable weight while travelling which reduced their value. These and other considerations were said to justify a feasibility study for an abattoir large enough to provide for a meat export capacity. The actual plant should only be constructed after a marked improvement in livestock management and feeding had taken place, 'so that an adequate supply of good quality animals could be secured to support a sizeable unit'. The Plan acknowledged, however, that the immediate necessity was to build a small abattoir to cope with Nasaru's growing population. The urgency of this project is underlined by the extremely unsatisfactory state of the present slaughterhouse'. It estimated that the cost of the main project would be R85,000 and scheduled its building during 1971/72. 2

Despite its inclusion under Agriculture in the Plan, Interior still submitted a proposal in April 1971. At the same time it came to the notice of the CMO that the Agricultural Project Review Committee was discussing the subject. Again the Planning Office requested the Ministries to coordinate their efforts. 3 During the discussions which followed

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1. Interior to CMO 16/ARWT/9b-101 16/2/70.
2. First Plan, pp. cit., p. 100 and Table 7.24 on p. 103.
3. CMO to Agriculture CPO/DEV/23 23/7/71.
Interior agreed to shelve its smaller proposal and permit Agriculture to negotiate with Britain. A working party was set up to formulate a proposal on the basis of which the British would consider dispatching an investigating team, and later pay consultants to undertake a study. Meanwhile (in August 1971) Interior continued to voice concern about the lack of suitable facilities in Maseru, and in consequence the Cabinet Office urged Agriculture to hasten progress.  

Based on a report by Lesotho's FAO Livestock Marketing Officer, a meeting was held with British officials in September 1971. It is clear that the British were far from satisfied with the justification provided for one large plant in preference, say, to a number of small ones; and placed on record a number of other queries. 

Again in January 1972 Interior expressed concern at the lack of progress and wrote: 'Meanwhile conditions at the local abattoir have deteriorated further and it is no longer possible to maintain any reasonable standard of hygiene'. 

In May 1972, Lesotho submitted a request to UNDP to send out an FAO expert for one month to carry out a feasibility study of the proposed abattoir. This request stated that while planning for the project was already at a relatively advanced stage, it was considered necessary to have a detailed economic and technical feasibility study before Lesotho could seek finance for the project. It mentioned also that the undertaking would be the responsibility of the Livestock Marketing Corporation, which had been established in 1971 and had already set up a chain of sale-rings throughout the country. 

In June 1972 the Prime Minister paid an official visit to Denmark and was offered a soft loan of 20 million Kroner (roughly equivalent to R2 million). Lesotho's original request to Denmark for assistance with the abattoir proposed a

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1. Cabinet (NoA) to Agriculture 03/11/71/7-5 26/8/71.  
2. Meeting held at Overseas Development Administration, London, to discuss an abattoir project in Lesotho, 2/9/71.  
3. Interior to Cabinet (DSPB) INT/STM/61/2-422 18/1/72.  
4. UNDP project of the Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho, Title: Feasibility study on the Maseru abattoir. No.: L/72/018/A/01/12. Date of submission 18/4/72. Starting date: 1/6/72.
three-stage procedure: 1) an abattoir in Maseru, including a treatment plant, by-product processing, security, roads, etc., costing R376 000; 2) transport and chilling plants in Maseru, Lobatse, and Molepashe for R62 000; and 3) a canning plant, equipment and buildings, costing R100 000. The total cost of the three phases was thus to be R538 000.1 The understanding with the Danish Government, however, was for the R2 m. to be used for three projects, of which R800 000 would be allocated to the abattoir.

In the same month the FAO consultant arrived and carried out an investigation.2 On 23 August FAO sent a provisional report to UNDP3 which forwarded it to the CPDO on 12 September.4 The report recommended that a small abattoir be built immediately regardless of a subsequent decision on a larger complex which might include the processing of by-products, but which should depend on the results of a meat survey. Leboko's Livestock Division found the report unsatisfactory: 'Quite frankly the report tells us nothing new and has not brought the preparation of a project any nearer ...' It saw this two-stage proposal as undesirable since the ultimate objective was to export fully- and semi-processed meat products and argued therefore that the whole complex with all the necessary facilities should have been designed. It agreed, however, that a meat-marketing survey should be carried out and repeated an earlier-stated view that consultants offering multidisciplinary services on the technical and economic planning of abattoirs 'be engaged to prepare a project'.

It is absolutely essential that we guard against establishing a plant without sufficient appraisal of the technical and economic aspects of such a project.

The Planning Office felt that the report had provided a basis for the appointment of consultants to prepare a project in detail and make working drawings - once Government had done...
sided on a site: 'Unfortunately we have no yet made a decision'. The CPDO prepared terms of reference for consultants and sent these to the Foreign Ministry on 19 December 1972. Foreign forwarded these only on 9 February 1973 to the Danish Consulate-General in Johannesburg which sent them on to Denmark on 19 February.

In April 1973, a Danish economic adviser extended a visit to Botswana to include a few days in Lesotho to discuss the matter further. In July the Danish Government notified Lesotho of its formal acceptance of the idea of using the R2 m. loan for three projects, and that the terms of the loan were to be softened further, extending the period of grace from seven to ten years and repayment from eighteen to twenty-five years with no interest.

Denmark also agreed to pay for a pre-investment feasibility study and approached a consultancy firm, A/S Atlan, to carry it out. In July and October, meetings were held to prepare a working schedule and give the consultants basic information. In Copenhagen in November 1973 a schedule was outlined in a protocol signed by the Lesotho Ministry of Agriculture (whose officials visited Denmark after an FAO Conference) and A/S Atlan. The consultants undertook to provide a project description covering in particular: the relationship of the project to the national development plan; availability of raw materials; marketing of meat; technical description of the plant; project size in relation to markets and supplies; time schedules; profitability; impact on the national economy; effect on public health; and a plan of financing.

During January and February 1974, the Atlan team visited Lesotho to collect information, inspect sites and evaluate electricity, water, sewerage, roads and railways. In their report they listed forty-three separate visits or consulta-

1. CPDO to Agriculture CPDO/AGRIC/51/71 13/10/72.
2. CPDO to Foreign CPDO/AGRIC/51/71 19/12/72.
3. Foreign to Danish Consulate-General PR/DEV/1/1/3 9/2/73.
4. Diplomatic Note Ref. no. 122 Lesotho 1, 19/2/73.
5. Letter Verbal from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lesotho, D.4 J.M.O. 104/0.8 Lesotho 1.
tations including agriculture (a few times), UNDC, CPDO, site investigations, private butchers, private architects, Works (Water, Roads and Hydrological Survey Branches), a construction firm, Lesotho Sheepskin Products, Lesotho Electricity Corporation and the railway station. Their finding, submitted in May 1974, concluded that it would be realistic to invest in a slaughterhouse with meat-processing facilities, primarily based on exporting boxed, frozen meat. It recommended a plant with a capacity to handle 40,000 head of cattle a year (160 daily), 66,000 small stock (265) and 10,000 pigs (40). The total investment would amount to R2,64 million.1

This was far above the R800,000 agreed to by Denmark and earmarked for the project by Lesotho in its 1974/5 development estimates and scheduled for construction in 1975/6.2

The CPDO, however, not only accepted the enlarged proposal, but in the cooperative programme which it presented to Denmark, it indicated that it wanted to expand it still further:

... the costs of prospective investments have risen substantially since June 1972. The Atlas estimate of abattoir construction costs at present prices is Kr 27 million (i.e. R2.64 million). An additional amount of over Kr 10 million will be needed for stock purchases to take care of stock turnover. Also a railway spur will have to be constructed. All together, taking account of steel price projections and other inflationary probabilities, we anticipate that the total investment required will come to more than Kr 50 million. Taken together with other sector assistance, we would like Denmark to consider a loan of Kr 60 million.3

At this stage further delay resulted from hesitation and new doubts on the part of both the donor and the recipient. Denmark had definite reservations about a project proposal of R2,64 million (let alone of R5 million) for which it had ori-

1. *Atlas report, Technical and economic pre-investment study for an abattoir in Lesotho, Copenhagen, 1/5/74.*
2. *Atlas estimate of the revenue and expenditure of the Kingdom of Lesotho for the year from 1st April 1974 to 31st March 1975, Part 2, Capital account, 104/Head 207, Project 0039.*
It was thought in Maseru that after the Danish election the new Government was under public pressure to pursue a stricter policy of foreign aid, and hence the continued inquiries being put in Lesotho. From 20-29 August yet another visit took place, this time by the Chief of the FAO Marketing and Credit Service. At this stage the Ministry of Agriculture stressed the urgency of an answer as it was preparing its Second Five Year Plan and then without consulting the Planning Office it mounted its own mission to Denmark in an attempt to clear up any further doubts. It appears that Danish officials, probably on the advice of FAO with whom they work closely, were not convinced that Lesotho had the capacity to supply the stock projected in the Atlas report, which they judged too optimistic and ambitious. Both parties agreed to yet another Danish-FAO mission in January 1975.

On Lesotho's side, many new questions were raised. Commenting on the Atlas report, the sewerage engineer noted that it failed to provide for the treatment of the abattoir sewage and no connection charge was calculated. The quantity of sewage would be considerable and would require pressure six times as strong as was being used in Maseru. He estimated that this would amount to the equivalent of the requirements of 10,000 persons, roughly the total number of those on the Maseru reticulation. He also pointed out that the consultants who were preparing a sewerage study of Maseru had not taken this into account. Works' letter to the Planning Office warned that the effluent from the abattoir would have to be treated before it flowed into the Caledon River which was an international waterway. The Town and Country Planning Department raised questions of siting and public health, and Health, warning of the possible spread of anthrax and brucellosis, urged that further consultations

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1. Agriculture to Foreign 4C/910/13/30 10/9/74.
2. Sewerage Engineer to Works W/WS/15/1 20/6/74.
3. Works to GRA 9/A/6G/2/1/134 2/7/74.
4. Town and Country Planning Department to Interior SP/16/1-2 25/11/74.
be held.

We make a plea that before these development schemes are decided upon Health should always be asked to advise... Take a leaf out of the Maputsoe Industrial complex which now has endless public health problems which the Ministry is being asked to handle, but at the time of planning everybody forgot that human beings were going to work and live in those factories.¹

Health also wrote to the CMO making, amongst other points, the following points: the necessity for a built-in method of disposing of refuse to prevent increased breeding of flies with a serious upsurge in the transmission of diseases; the site under consideration was so placed that winds would carry offensive odours into the town and tourist locations; experts should be sought to study potential environmental effects; and finally it asked where Lesotho intended finding staff to maintain the standards acceptable to importing countries and, if training was contemplated, how long it would take.²

In addition there were criticisms within Lesotho of a number of other aspects of the Atlas report; for instance it failed to indicate price incentives or calculate the economic benefits which would accrue to the producer, or deal with the marketing of abattoir products. Further, according to figures released by the Bureau of Statistics, the cattle population had decreased by about 85,000 to 466,000 between 1970 and 1973. This meant that to utilise the capacity of the abattoir a higher percentage offtake would be necessary than suggested by Atlas.³

As a result, more meetings had to be called to discuss matters of water, sewerage, health, infrastructure, siting and a throughput more appropriate to Lesotho's capacity, and in January 1975 further negotiations were held with a Danish-FAO mission. The donors conveyed their continued

1. Health to Interior H/ADM/1/7-3 12/12/74,
2. Health to CMO H/ADM/1/7-9 20/12/74,
3. Junior Agricultural Economist to PS, Agriculture AG/RO/12/30 2/1/75.
4. Works to CMO W/A/ACC/2/1/154 16/1/75.
willingness to support the project, but sought a more modest undertaking. In the 1975/6 capital estimates, therefore, the project was included at a total cost of R1 377 000 - R200 000 to be spent in 1975/6, and the rest the year after. It seemed, however, unlikely that the project would commence as scheduled and possible that it might not be started for a long time, if at all.

B. Discussion

The course of preparation, coordination, negotiation and consultancy and re-preparation, re-negotiation etc. of the proposed abattoir project has been detailed to illustrate the causes and the nature of obstacles and delays which quite frequently beset relatively large-scale projects in African countries. It thus exemplifies the sort of situation which contributed to the waning enthusiasm and heightened scepticism about the role of Lesotho's planning machinery, discussed in Chapter II. Certain elements in the overall process - growing comprehensiveness and complexity of the project, numerous delays, both necessary and unnecessary; increasing expenditure estimates; and a widening area of consultation - interact upon each other in an accelerating spiral of increasing ambitions, protracted hold-ups, rising costs and further rounds of negotiation.

It is also intended to show how - separately and in combination - the senior Basotho civil servants, foreign aid agencies and consultants can transform a relatively simple proposal into a complex and ambitious project; while in the process the original problem remains unsolved. The project evolved from one aimed at solving a specific problem, namely a health hazard (as originally conceived by the Department of Health in 1962) to include a second and obvious objective, namely satisfying local meat demands (as proposed by Interior in 1967) and then on to encompass a broader array of problems, not only current but anticipated (as Agriculture, the CPDO, donors and consultants were drawn in); and finally to attempt to elicit positive responses and changes in other

1. Estimates of the revenue and expenditure of the Kingdom of Lesotho for the year from 1st April 1975 to 31st March 1976, Part 2. General account, Subhead 201. Project No. 0009.
related sectors such as traditional attitudes to cattle, livestock management and marketing, and the need to increase the country's export earnings.

Second, it shows the tendency for costs to burgeon. Again each of the parties plays its part - the various ministries, the Planning Office, the donor and the consultants. This trend is bolstered by an understanding on the part of the recipient that donors prefer larger projects, and that the only limitation on the use of capital aid which is available is the recipient's own lack of capacity to prepare the documents and execute the project. This inclines planners to the view that since the planning machinery is involved anyway, they might just as well 'go for something big'. Thus one sees the project grow from R30 000 (suggested by Health in 1962) to R40 000 (by Interior in 1969 and 1970), to R85 000 (in the First Plan) to R598 000 (in Lesotho's original proposal to Denmark in 1972) to R800 000 (in the agreement with Denmark, 1972-4) to R2,64 m. (proposed by the consultants in 1974) and to R5 million (suggested by the CPDO in 1974). Although the donor then made it clear that it was not prepared to go beyond about R1,4 m., the trend is apparent. One can only speculate on the communication breakdown or misconception that led to the consultant forwarding a R2,64 m. project when the donors had agreed to a loan less than one-third of that amount.

Each delay - whether between CPDO and Agriculture or the Foreign Ministry and the Danish Consulate-General in Johannesburg or between Danish aid officials and FAO - sustains the process, while each additional step introduces further hold-ups. For example, that a project is postponed, for example, inflation alone adds ten to fifteen per cent to the final expenditure. And similarly each new round of negotiation among the components of the recipient Government or between recipient and donor widens the spectrum of inputs and thus the possible
score of objectives that might be achieved and in turn raises the complexity and cost of the undertaking. As the cost level escalates so as to constitute a change in kind rather than degree, new rounds of feasibility studies and negotiations become necessary.

Planners and their advisers would argue that the above steps embody sound planning techniques. No planning office could get away with a collection of projects which deal merely with small, isolated problems as they arise, nor with neglecting to consult those departments of Government concerned or potentially concerned (as is clear from the correspondence from Health towards the end of 1974); nor would it be considered acceptable to rush into projects without feasibility, engineering and marketing studies.

The experience with the proposed abattoir may be compared with a few other projects. In common with the Ramabanta-Semonkong road are the escalation of costs and the postponed implementation of the project, as well as demonstrating how more ambitious forward planning may actually counteract solving the originally-identified problem. In the first case the villagers did not get their self-help road and are still waiting for the higher-standard road; while in the latter, Maseru still faces a public health hazard and lacks even a simple slaughterhouse adequate for its own meat requirements. In the former instance, however, two different approaches (self-help and central planning) remained operative throughout, whereas here the original conception was transformed.

The abattoir case also has obvious points in common with the National Teachers' Training College project, first suggested in 1964. There, however, delay was partly caused by an elaborate donor input, not experienced in connection with the abattoir. It also differs in that the College had commenced functioning by June 1975, even though its permanent buildings were at a very early stage of construction, whereas the abattoir was a long way from inception.

1. After the research was completed, the Government as an interim measure decided to establish a domestically-financed slaughterhouse in the financial year 1976/77.
A few points emerge from a comparison with the Thaba Bosiu and Thaba Tseka projects, both of which moved rapidly from conception to commencement. These are both area projects where the project documents lay down general guidelines and emphases, but leave much initiative with the project management to experiment and adapt. By its nature this was not possible with the abattoir where detailed plans were a prerequisite to commencement. Those two projects also demonstrate that when donors are enthusiastic about an undertaking they can greatly accelerate the process of negotiation.

VIII. THE GROWTH CENTRE PLAN

A. Brief case history

Early in 1968 a town planning adviser presented a report to Cabinet in which he recommended that attention be given to the identification of growth centres in the country. In April 1968 the Cabinet expressed support for the proposal and called for a more detailed plan. The Ministry of Interior which was then responsible for District Administration and Community Development, considered the matter. It did not formulate a detailed proposal, however, until after the call for ministries to prepare their submissions for the First Plan had been sent out by the CMDO in 1969. Having compiled a draft, Interior called a meeting of all District Administrative Secretaries and District Community Development Officers. Specific areas which showed potential for further growth were identified by these officers, district by district, and area by area, and they outlined the centres in three categories.

In May, a circular containing the draft was sent to the districts. It argued that since funds for development would inevitably be limited, Government would need to 'concentrate its resources on those areas which are best suited for development' and select locations which would ensure that police posts, clinics, water schemes, schools and private stores be assembled as to establish growth centres in the rural areas. The draft plan explained that five criteria had been employed
in selecting and categorising the centres:

1) the existence of a link with the national road system;
2) the requisite population already living in the village;
3) the availability of land for developing residential sites, schools and small factories;
4) the likelihood that people would move of their own free will to the centres when incentives (e.g. fresh water supply) were placed there; and
5) the availability or potential for a supply of water for drinking, development and sanitary services as the population increases. 1

With the backing of the District Administrative Secretaries and the District Community Development Officers, Interior submitted the proposal to the Planning Office in June 1965 for consideration for the First Plan. 2 The accompanying letter contended that since Lesotho was essentially an agricultural country, it should establish a 'satellite framework' of primary, secondary and tertiary centres throughout the country, 'providing an integrated pattern of urban nuclei, each with its dependent rural catchment'. The plan listed thirteen reasons in support of this, amongst them:

- to effect an even and fair distribution of wealth; to prevent or lessen the exodus from the rural to the more industrialised areas;
- to bring essential services, facilities and amenities nearer to the people at the grassroots;
- to assist in the modernisation and development of local government;
- to encourage decentralisation of development and administration towards local self-reliance; and to attract isolated and scattered habitations into consolidated communities.

Three categories of growth centres were identified. Five primary centres were proposed - Maseru, Leribe, Mohale's Hoek, Mokhotlong and Qacha's Nek; eleven secondary centres - 'other towns or villages which are planned to become towns in the very near future'; and thirty-six tertiary centres - rural administrative and commercial centres, very often the administrative centres of wards ... for large villages growing up around strategic road junctions or around mine... 

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establishments'.

An adviser on community development who visited the country in 1959, strongly advised the Government to accept the proposal as a basis for regional and community development. And the Department of Community Development made it clear that, though awaiting a Government response to its plan, it intended using it: this is manifested by the project memoranda which it submitted. Other ministries too began to use or at least refer to it in their memoranda.

The contents of the First Plan, however, ignored the Growth Centre Plan completely. As one officer of Community Development remarked, 'the whole thing had been thrown out and was not considered at all'. In the time at its disposal and with the information available it must be granted that the Planning Office could not have made much progress with the proposal.

In November 1970 (that is just before the First Plan appeared, but well after it had reached the printer) the Planning Office took its first (and, as far as can be gathered, only) step to have the matter investigated seriously. This was prompted by the fact that an engineering firm had started studying the location of groundwater resources available for the anticipated extension of existing water supplies.

The Office asked a number of ministries, the NDC and the Chamber of Commerce to comment on the Growth Centre Plan:

To ensure that the engineers do not waste their time on those places which are likely to suffer heavy out-migration and hence become stagnant economically we have to give them firm guidelines on the areas in which to carry out their studies. Furthermore, the Hon.

1. E.N. Burke, Evaluation of the community development programme of the Kingdom of Lesotho, An interim report, 20/7/68, p. 8; and Community development in Lesotho, A brief report on a visit paid by E.N. Burke, Lusaka, 31/7/69, p. 15.
the Prime Minister has repeatedly encouraged people to consolidate their settlements into larger centres which will enable Government to assist them with services.¹

The deadline for replies was 29 November: that is, the recipients of the request were given eight days to attend to the subject and reply.

Some answers were received which, not surprisingly, contained no detailed analyses or comprehensive counter proposals. Nevertheless some of the points raised were of interest: LNDC issued a reminder that all development should be aimed at the export market and that raw materials would have to be imported. In its view, therefore, 'industrial and commercial development should be close to the developed side of the South African border i.e. from Maseru north to Butha Butha'.²

The Police Department commented that the proposal sent out by the CPDO was now seventeen months out of date and that the 'security situation applicable up to May 1969 had changed considerably after January 1970'. It added further that the Police in their planning had to respond to increases in crime which did 'not necessarily grow as population grows'.³

Justice expressed general approval of the document, and said that its own proposals for future court buildings accorded therewith. It gave an example of one village having been selected for a growth point when one nearby satisfied the criteria more convincingly.⁴

Works also commented positively on the idea, and suggested one additional secondary growth centre, namely Peka/Kolonyama. It also noted that 'mining and water development might provide additional growth centres, particularly at Kao and Malibamte'.⁵

Education drew up a list of established educational facilities and concluded that in view of financial constraints it would not 'encourage the opening of schools at places which lack schools'.⁶

The Chamber of Commerce, after some delay, replied, simply suggesting two additional growth centres.⁷

The Planning Office did not compile these answers for inclusion in any report, and itself undertook no further study of the document.

1. Circular Savinram, CPDO to various ministries, LNDC and Chamber of Commerce, CP/PLAN/INT 21/10/70.
2. LNDC memorandum to CPDO 27/10/70.
3. Police to CPDO CP/IK/8-117 27/10/70.
4. Justice to CPDO J/INV/1/Vol III-1 29/10/70.
5. Works to CPDO L/A/POL/13/J/1A16/11/70.
6. Education to CPDO ED/CPDO/18/11/70.
At a meeting of the Council of Voluntary Agencies in April 1971, the Community Development representative urged all non-governmental organizations (a high proportion of whose work is in the rural areas) to cooperate along the lines set out in the Growth Centre Plan. The comments of two members of the Council are quoted:

For the past 100 years missions had been building schools, and there are few Government schools. These schools are located where they are because that is where people live. It would be wrong to refuse to assist an existing school merely because of its location.

Outside of the Community Development Department there is no ministry in Lesotho which pays even lip-service to this approach... Many of the voluntary agencies wish to support projects which benefit the areas as a whole, but when Government itself does not follow any set policy, it makes it very difficult for the voluntary agencies.

In June 1971 Community Development reissued the plan, and in July it requested the Planning Office to respond. The reply which came the following month was very critical in tone. First, it took the Department to task for not channelling its communication through the Agricultural Planning Unit which would, it suggested, have provided useful advice. It then listed weaknesses in the document:

1) The preface and some parts of the body need some polishing.
2) Some facts need to be substantiated with figures e.g. p. 9: Semonkong - "a centre of a thickly populated area" - there is no statistics to back that up. In fact the whole plan will remain weak until it is reasonably backed by some relevant statistics.
3) No financial implication of the plan is given - funds needed for implementation - source of funds etc. Unless there are adequate funds to implement the Plan, all the suggestions therein will remain but "very good ideas".
4) Timing and strategy. How and when the programme is to start is not quite clear.
5) Some consultation with other Ministries affected e.g. Interior, Works etc. is indispensable if duplication of effort and confusion is to be avoided.

1. Council of Voluntary Agencies, Minutes of a meeting, 20/1/71.
2. Development of growth centres in Lesotho, Department of Community Development, Ministry of Agriculture, 15/6/71.
3. Community Development to CPDO AG/RRV/27-8 2/7/71.
4. CPDO to Community Development CP0/AGMC/4 5/8/71.
Despite this negative response, Community Development continued basing project memoranda on the Growth Centre Plan, copies of which it enclosed with the memoranda. Community Development therefore found it necessary to remind the Department that their plan was 'not official Government policy on this issue (i.e. this document has not been cleared with the Council of Ministers)'.

Community Development noted in reply that the document had been submitted more than two years previously for consideration for the First Plan. 'The omission of this and the part played by Community Development has been a serious one indeed!'.

We should have expected the Planning Office would give this programme support... rather than attempt to frustrate it. We do not claim this plan... to be infallible. That is why we invited constructive criticism of it.

The latter concludes by asking: 'If we drop this programme..., what do you give us in its place to implement Government plans and policies among the people who are our sole responsibility in Community Development?'

This undecided and undirected position continued. Cabinet did not make any decision on it; Community Development could not therefore adopt it, nor did it make any serious effort to have it researched and analysed; Community Development went on using it; and a number of other departments (as will be seen below) made different references to it and attached various degrees of authority to it. Despite the Planning Office's non-acceptance of the plan it did actually refer to it from time to time - either in general terms, or specifically, or only by implication. For instance, in applying for funds for a self-help project at Napatong, it supported its justification for the scheme by stating that this was one of the villages identified as a growth point in the coun-

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2. Community Development to Community Development 69/0/15/23 17/0/71.
3. Community Development to Community Development 09/0/15/23 17/0/71.
4. See British High Commission to Community Development 09/0/15/23 17/0/71.

Where the donor queries the status of the Growth Centre Plan being used by Community Development.
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2. CPDO to Community Development CPO/8023 17/9/71.
3. Community Development to CPDO AG/CH/8040 12/1/72/1 27/9/71.
4. See British High Commission to CPDO 10/134 24/1/73 where the donor queries the status of the Growth Centre Plan being used by Community Development.
try, and planning officers have acknowledged that they have found it advantageous to employ the plan or some of its proposals in negotiations with donors.¹

During 1973 some members of the CMOO prepared a few internal papers concerned with approaches to regional planning and growth centres,² but the Office took the matter no further.

In the second half of 1974, the CMOO officer responsible for Community and Rural Development³ found that a number of submissions for the Agricultural sector of the Second Plan demanded a concentration of effort 'instead of being spread nationwide'. The Cooperatives Division had proposed an 'areas of concentration' approach, while Community and Rural Development persisted with its growth centre plan. In addition, a large project proposal concerned with providing basic agricultural services throughout the country, and which also stressed some degree of concentration of services, was being prepared. Warning of the danger of each department identifying its own growth centres, the officer urged that Government should commit itself to a clear policy. ²²

During 1974 the Cabinet Office also expressed renewed interest, and background information was again requested from and supplied by Community Development. An officer in that Department admitted, however, that its enthusiasm to 'go on pushing has weakened'.³³ After some delay, in January 1975 the Cabinet Office reopened the subject. The PS, Interior was informed that the Budget and Development Planning Committee had decided that the possibility of establishing growth centres should be thoroughly studied by a representative committee consisting of the Ps, Interior (Chairman), Ps, Agriculture, the Director of Planning, the Director of Statistics and the

1. CMOO to US Embassy CPO/AID/10 28/9/71. Also CMOO to Cabinet(Training) CPO/AID/3 28/7/71 provides another example.

2. S. Chidambaram, Methodology for regional planning in Latin America, 6/5/73; S. Chidambaram, A note on growth centres, umated; and Guidelines for even distribution of growth in Latin America, op.cit.

3. The Pto Aid Programme Office and the Department of Community Development were merged into the Department of Community and Rural Development.
the Director of Community and Rural Development. The Chairman was required to submit an interim report after three months and a final report after six months. At the first meeting, held in March, all the above departments (except Agriculture) were represented. Members accepted the objective of stemming the drain of manpower from the rural areas by providing facilities which encouraged people to remain where they were, and stressed the need to diminish the great inequalities in development, to seek a more effectively-concentrated and favourable spatial distribution of growth. They also observed that overcentralization was resulting in district authorities feeling 'left out' and in order to strengthen and involve them, this process should be reversed. At the second meeting held in April, Agriculture was again absent. Those attending decided that since that Ministry would be a 'key factor' in any plan that affected the rural areas, the meeting should be adjourned. Yet again, the effort to have the original proposal or even the general concept attended to had failed.

B. Comments

The above history has set out the background to and the reasons for the formulation of a growth centre plan, and then traced the persistent inability or unwillingness of the Government to confirm, reject or submit it to further study. This exemplifies the chronic inability of Lesotho's civil servants and political leaders to focus sustained attention on any reform measures which go beyond the reorganization of ministerial headquarters. As in Appendix V, the purpose here was to furnish evidence of the Lesotho bureaucracy's approach to a specific suggestion made by the development administration movement. The case is therefore relevant to the second section of Chapter V.

Various people were questioned on the Plan. They were first asked whether they were aware of its existence and if so,

1. Cabinet to Interior, CPUI/11/1/25 24/1/75.
2. Minutes of a meeting on growth centres, 10/3/75.
3. Minutes of a second meeting on growth centres, 8/4/75.
how seriously they regarded it. The following are some of the replies:

Water Branch, Works: We tend to try and adhere to it... I was under the impression till about three months ago that it was Government policy... only in June... I found it had not been officially agreed to.1

Health: I would look at the Growth Centre Plan as one consideration before deciding. I did not know about it when I first came.2

INDC: Decisions about where we would place industries and industrial sites were based on population, access to power and railways and we chose Ficksburg Bridge. No one told us to go there.3

District Administrator: When I was a District Administrative Secretary, the government indicated to us places known as future growth centres - this meant that if we had funds such places should be developed... there must be clusters of development, not just scattered all over the place.4

CEDO: It is acted upon a great deal; but I think for such a thing to become a policy it would require agreement and study at the very highest level and perhaps more data gathering to justify it.5

Town and Country Planning: I wish they would take it more seriously. The only way it affects us is if we have to decide on relative priorities of any of the nine towns we go on the basis of that.6

Agriculture: I only heard about it from a South African researcher. I have never heard of it in Government; the Bantu never mentions it. We don't consider it at all.7

Surveys: We didn't know about it till a volunteer in Town Planning, who came at the beginning of this year discovered it and since she came in we have been using it quite a lot and found it useful.8

Community Development: CEDO just does not react. But we will continue using it until they give us a better alternative... It came up again with the German mission that was here. The reaction of CEDO is that it has not been accepted as a Government policy document. When the Germans were here we spoke of places like Matsieng, Mortaja, etc., at which they may fund projects, and so we implicitly accept the plan.9

Second, interviewees were asked their opinion of the plan as it stood, its relevance and use, and possibilities or experiences in applying it or taking it into account.

1. These are not policy statements by or on behalf of departments, but the personal views of those interviewed. It was judged useful, however, to indicate the departments they serve.
Health: I agree with the rationale of it. But for the most part, when one decides on this kind of thing, it is in relation to other health facilities; that is, we effectively decide on our own growth centres. We can't just adopt it. For example, at place A Health needed a clinic. I had a poor quality clinic at B. A already had a police post and an agricultural centre and it is bigger than B. But it is a lot easier to put up a building next to your existing place because you can use the old building for storage and people were used to the location of the clinic, and the nurse is there and the water supply is there.

I would look at the growth centre plan as one consideration before deciding... But I would also look at their choice of place. They might have just chosen a ward chief's village; on the other hand, if it was a matter of moving to a place that had a good water supply and to which other departments were already moving, the case would be much stronger.

Most clinics are run by Catholic Missions, so they are where the mission is. Catholic Missions are usually spaced apart and distributed pretty well. But they are not necessarily at growth centres - they are often not in a village but on their own. So if you choose a Catholic Mission, but not a growth centre, it may make the choice of other clinics a little more difficult.1

Town and Country Planning: I think it is a joke ... not made in consultation with Surveys and Town Planning department - to see what is feasible, what is possible - it's just a write-up which was distributed.2

Town and Country Planning: (A second view): I think the plan is very sensible and I wish they would take it more seriously.3

Surveys: ... We have found it very useful. It gives us some basis to work on in terms of what we can expect in the way of expansions of towns and therefore what facilities we have to supply in the future.4

CPD: The concept as presented in the paper by Community Development was quite reasonable; the choice of centres was quite reasonable, but it requires further research.5

CPD (second view): There is really not much point in a plan for growth centres. One does not know at this stage which towns are going to develop rapidly and why. In the period 1960-72 ... not one district town has increased its population except Feyateyaneng and that is probably because it is near the Musate industrial estate and there is work for some people. For the rest it is quite simple - there is no work for any people, so they don't grow. Locating itself as a whole is the size of a district in a normalized country, and the idea of developing nine growth centres is not realistic. It appears that water supplies are going to be provided for the district headquarters and a few other towns and that is enough - if you have water then growth will not be held back.6

Worl: It is a very sensible document... There is one thing about that though - a place like Feyateyaneng is growing
for faster and will continue to do so, even though leribe is supposed to be the growth centre in the north... no form of plan is going to stop this because nobody is going to restrict the growth of a town like Teyatoyaeng if it is bringing in money and income to the area.

IX. NOTES ON THE BUDGET CALENDAR

A. Introduction

Observation of the operation of the budget calendar (and more particularly— but not only — the capital budget and project memoranda components thereof) was judged a profitable exercise for a number of reasons. The tasks of preparing and monitoring capital budgets and project memoranda have been referred to throughout the study as among the most time-consuming of those executed by Lesotho's planning machinery; and in the absence of an annual plan the budget assumes added significance. It was therefore decided to add to the brief report made in Chapter II, Section 5, a more detailed Appendix, showing the very gradual pace and incremental— rather than innovative— nature of those improvements which can be discerned; and the obstacles and delays which lingered on. There were also certain specific reasons for the more detailed investigation.

First, the budget process was examined with the purpose of observing the link between timely formulation and timely implementation of development programmes. Absorptive capacity depends on expeditious drafting and execution of projects. In Lesotho utilisation of the largest foreign component of the capital programme (namely the British) depends expressly on completion of undertakings, or phases thereof, within the specified time of one financial year, 1 April to 31 March. Instances were given in Chapter II of projects being approved so late in the financial year that their implementation was highly unlikely or even impossible. In earlier years this meant that the money was lost to Lesotho. More recently, the country's planners and budgetors have become
adapt at substituting projects to use the allocation: although this inevitably means that the programme as implemented diverges from that planned, while the spate of late approvals impedes construction programming by Works and leads to hurried and non-optimal performance. The Planning Office's repeated attempts to expedite the process and set deadlines, and the indifferent reaction of the ministries, has been a persistent thread in the brief history of planning in Lesotho. Thus the aim here was to see at what stages and to what extent the budget cycle fell behind schedule.

Second, attention was directed towards the budget cycle by an unresolved conflict of opinion about the process of release of funds by the Budget Office. As noted on several occasions, the Ministry of Works has attracted severe condemnation for its sluggish execution of construction jobs. Works, in turn, felt that much of the blame should be attached to various failings in the rest of Government service, one of which was the considerable delay experienced in securing the release of funds necessary to carry out its responsibilities. One official complained that 'an enormous amount of time' of a number of senior officers 'is wasted ... trying to find out why we haven't got cash and trying to get cash released'.

The Budget Division denied that delays were serious when ministries followed the correct procedures: 'There are procedures for obtaining release of funds. Any ministry can obtain funds for projects that have been passed under the correct heads'. Works contested this: 'It is just not so for Finance to say that ministries can get release of funds within one day ... I have personally gone up there and waited two days and come away with nothing - and I cannot fathom the delay'. Ledgers were displayed which clearly showed that projects had operated in the red for a whole year, the release of funds coming through on the last day of the year. While this had been done in previous years

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1. As evidenced by the following: Circular Savingram, Finance to Heads of Departments FIN/5.3/11 10/7/67; Finance Circular Standing Instruction No. 22 of 1970 CPO/DEV/12 19/10/70; Finance Circular Notice No. 18 of 1971, CPOO 18/8/71, Development projects for 1972/73; CPO to Cabinet (9/8) CPO/DV/23 31/8/73; CPOO Circular Savingram CPO/79/01 4/1/74; and Cabinet to Heads of Departments CPO/1974/1-20 15/1/74.

2. See for example Chapter III, 8.
'just to keep things going', it would not be repeated because of the Government's threatened surcharge of individuals responsible for overexpenditure. A number of examples, both on the recurrent and capital side, were given; these indicated breakdowns in communication and loss of documents. Apart from the fact that the Budget Division appeared understaffed, however, no general conclusions could be drawn from these cases. It was decided therefore to broaden the scope of the specific enquiries to include that of the budget process as a whole.

Finally, this examination was of interest because the Government had recently formalised a comprehensive budget calendar. In July 1972, an ECA adviser, Mr I.A. Malik, attended a budget-plan harmonisation workshop in Maseru. Arising out of its deliberations, in which most senior civil servants participated, came a proposal for a synchronised timetable for preparing the recurrent and capital estimates, after which a detailed schedule was drafted. According to the ECA adviser, the stipulation that 'certain things be done by certain times' was intended to overcome many of the impediments to effective and punctual budgeting: 'getting things done at the right time is critical'. In 1973, after further consultation, the Calendar was included in a guidebook on budgetary practices which had recommendatory status only. In March 1974 the Cabinet directed that the book be adopted as an official manual, and it was issued later that year. The Government intended, through integrating the two budgetary processes, to tighten financial control, to improve the cost-effectiveness, and to stress the developmental component of its expenditure programmes. It was considered useful, therefore, to observe the process in practice and record some views on the operation of the Calendar.

1. Budget/plan harmonisation workshop, 12-28 July 1972, Suggestions for budgetary reform and improvement of budget/plan harmonisation, Annexure A.
B. Observation and comment

The Budget Calendar lists twenty-one steps (which, when subdivided, total thirty-five steps) which should be taken during the financial year. One may distinguish two cycles operating in parallel: the 'implementation' cycle, concerned with monitoring and reviewing the implementation of the programme, and its constituent projects which should have been prepared in the previous year - this includes four joint reviews by the Budget-Planning Working Group and their consideration by the Budget and Development Planning Committee; and the simultaneously-operating 'formulation' cycle, covering the preparation of the estimates and projects for the year thereafter - this includes projections of the next year's resources, sectoral allocations for expenditure, deadlines for ministries to prepare submissions, dates for various meetings to consider these matters and Cabinet and Parliamentary approval.

In addition to observing the various steps involved, detailed interviews based on the calendar were carried out with personnel of the CPDO, the Budget Office, various ministries, and, on a few particular aspects, with members of the British High Commission. Some of the more important points emerging from this investigation follow:

(i) Economic survey

There was no systematic survey of the state of the economy, nor was there a full examination of the previous year's performance by the ministries, nor did they provide cost information on their operations. A control system therefore lacking for analysis and comparison of the cost-effectiveness of programmes on the basis of which those responsible for managing funds could draw conclusions, interpret those conclusions and then 'put forward options' for future undertakings and 'suggest which options to follow'. In 1974 there was a survey of physical progress on the first four years of the First Plan, undertaken specifically with preparation of the Second Plan in mind. It seemed unlikely, however, that this would be repeated annually.

(ii) Call circular

The Calendar stipulates that a call circular be issued
on 21 June, requiring ministries to return their detailed draft estimates by 31 August (approximately ten weeks). This was done on 29 July (about five weeks late, but earlier than in the previous year) and the deadlines were set at 30 September (for capital estimates) and 15 October (for recurrent estimates). A hitch which was noticed here was that the headquarters of certain ministries retained these circulars for an unnecessarily long time before forwarding them to the divisions. In Works, for example, the circulars remained at the centre for six weeks and were sent only on 9 September; thus instead of having approximately nine weeks for the capital estimates and eleven weeks for the recurrent, the divisions had only three and five weeks respectively which amounts to a considerable reduction in the time available.

In Agriculture, the meeting to launch the exercise was held on 13 August which cut two weeks off the time available; submissions also had to be back with headquarters two weeks before the CPDO deadline, thus reducing the total time by four weeks. Those questioned seemed agreed that the period allotted of two or two-and-a-half months would be sufficient if documents were forwarded punctually and if the departments attended to them promptly; for, as one person commented, it didn't seem to matter how early the call circular was sent out as most departments 'only start reacting about the last day when you start ringing them'.

(iii) Submission deadlines

The deadlines for these submissions were, as stated above, 30 September and 15 October. The following list indicates: a) the names of ministries, b) dates of their submissions, c) number of days overdue on capital estimates, and d) number of days late on recurrent estimates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Submission date</th>
<th>Capital estimates overdue</th>
<th>Recurrent estimates overdue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>9/1/74</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>15/11/74</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>6/11/74</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>23/10/74</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce &amp; Industry</td>
<td>23/10/74</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Circular Savings, Finance to PSs and Heads of Departments FIN/DEPT/1 (75/76)-2 29/7/74.
This is an extremely unsatisfactory response and in addition, the content of a number of these required considerable reworking.

(iv) British programme  

In accordance with an agreement between the two Governments, Lesotho is required to despatch approved estimates to Britain before the end of December. Since agreements with donors are regarded as obligatory (in comparison with local instructions which are not) the necessary documentation was sent off in time. However, it was far from final since (as listed above) many of the ministries' estimates were not yet submitted; nor was it formally approved as the Budget and Development Planning Committee and the Cabinet did not see it till February and March. In terms of the implementation cycle, approvals were delayed by a misunderstanding in the previous year. Lesotho's request exceeded the amount allocated by Britain, and consequently the British did not consider it a final document and did not attend to it. After a few months' delay urgent messages were sent from Lesotho and the matter was cleared up. This hold-up postponed approval of the whole programme and of projects, so delaying execution in the year under consideration. While everyone agreed that such an error did not recur - and it did not, in the formulation cycle under study - its occurrence indicated weak management by both the CPDO and the Budget and Development Committee, either of which should have spotted it earlier.

(v) Progress reports (British)  

Another more specific example of a setback to implementation concerned the failure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Code</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>10/1/75</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>6/1/74</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>His Office</td>
<td>11/11/74</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister to the PM</td>
<td>19/11/74</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>30/9/74</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>10/1/75</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>102</td>
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<tr>
<td>Works</td>
<td>18/11/74</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>8/11/74</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Auditor-General</td>
<td>26/9/74</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>His Majesty's Office</td>
<td>13/11/74</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interim National Assembly</td>
<td>23/10/74</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Service Commission</td>
<td>23/10/74</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Finance Circular Notice No.1 of 1975, FIN/EXPDT/ 5(75/76)-6 Vol. 1, 14/1/75.
of a division of a ministry to submit brief progress reports on two continuing projects to the British High Commission. Four-and-a-half months after the start of the financial year - no money having been released to carry on with the undertaking - the division informally enquired about this and was informed by the High Commission that it was awaiting progress reports before approving continuation. The division sent reports to the CPDO on 19 August, and the CPDO forwarded them only on 18 September (an unnecessary delay in the circumstances). According to a senior person with considerable experience in the division concerned, progress reports had never been required before. An officer of similar experience in another ministry confirmed this, and said he had heard of it purely by chance. The High Commission, however, assured me that this was an established procedure, though occasionally projects may have slipped through. Britain approves annual segments of projects, and for a project which continues into a second year it requires a brief document stating how much has been spent and accomplished in the previous year and will be required for the next year. The CPDO, for its part, acknowledged that it was a recognised procedure, but said that it had not been comprehensively enforced by the British. The Office contended that the breakdown took place in the headquarters of the ministry because it had formally reminded them of the need to submit reports. Because of this particular incident, everyone agreed that the fault would not be repeated. However, there continued to be considerable uncertainty about the required contents of the report. The documents sent by a division in Agriculture to satisfy the British requirement were project memoranda, which are far longer and more detailed than are necessary; while Works sent both project memoranda and progress reports for this purpose: 'This is probably a waste of time', the sender admitted, 'but I was just making doubly sure'.

1. CPDO to British High Commission CP0/36/04 18/9/74.
2. CPDO to RS, Heads of Departments and Planning Units, CP0/5/02 30/5/74; and CPDO to RS CP 0/36/05 20/9/75.
needed necessary that the short list of British requirements for these reports should be clearly defined so as to encourage the ministries to submit them early. This was done by the CMO in March 1975.¹

(vi) **Final accounts** A further obstacle to the timely and satisfactory fulfilment of a number of steps in the Calendar, was the extraordinary delay in the closing of the Government’s final accounts. This would be done, ideally, on 31 March of the previous year, but in the year under examination ministries had to function for most of the year without knowing their exact expenditure for the previous twelve months. This obfuscates the information base for projections of capital and recurrent revenues and expenditures, hinders examination of costs and discourages early expenditure on projects.²

With capital estimates there are many projects which run for more than one year. Now one can only keep within the financial limits of year two if you know what you spent in year one. Every department should know from its own ledgers how much it has spent — but it is not as simple, as there are many red herrings which have to be finalised, e.g. shipping charges which have not arrived, book charges from other departments which filter through to the Treasury... It is very difficult to call for this year’s money for an ongoing project when you don’t know how much you spent the previous year.³

The accounts have not been closed. If you don’t know exactly what you have spent you don’t know what funds you have for the year and how inflation is affecting costs in your branch. Crown Agents’ returns can be very late, also there are delays from the districts on road projects. This would make item 2 on the Calendar/examination of performance and cost information/impossible. It can inhibit implementation as departments don’t know if they should ask for money, particularly if they are verging on overexpenditure — which they should be.⁴²

(vii) **Reviews** The Calendar includes four quarterly reviews of the capital programme: April, July-August, October and January. While it was agreed that the April review was an important exercise, since the programme sent to the British was by then four months out of date, it was conceded that — for the time being at least — the administration was incapable of introducing it. Thus the first review was held at the

¹ CMO to PSs CPO/36/05 20/3/75.
of the second one as listed in the Calendar, and three reviews were carried out during the year instead of four. Most of those questioned felt that this was a satisfactory performance, and that the improvement was due to the more effective functioning of the Budget-Planning Working Group, the more regular meetings of the Budget and Development Planning Committee to consider 'the spade-work' prepared by the Working Group, and the timing of the visits of British advisers from Blantyre to coincide with the reviews:

We attempt to make visits by our experts coincide with the reviews here of the British programme. This is improving. The reviews plus the presence of our experts means Lesotho has to take a much more regular look at outturn and forces them to apply the standards of our advisers. It means they know where they are and it is much easier to switch funds in mid-year. The continuation of this improved trend will, however, depend on the effectiveness of the Working Group and the Budget and Development Planning Committee.

(viii) The Budget Calendar does not set a deadline for the submission of project memoranda but merely states, in parenthesis, early on in the year: 'Formulation of capital projects for stock continues throughout the year'. In most ministries this did not occur and the concept of building up a stock of projects was not accepted by all those responsible for preparing the memoranda. One senior officer was positive about it. In his division, the projects all tended to be large-scale ones involving engineering studies and thus took years to prepare a stock. Memoranda based on engineering studies provided the sort of information that any donor would require: 'What the German consultants will give us will be what all potential donors will want'. On the other hand, an experienced member of a Planning Unit which prepared both large and small projects, disagreed strongly:

I will not prepare projects for a stock. I will not spend hours and hours with this rubbish. Only when I have a pretty sure idea of the donor will I prepare a project. I do write memos up during the year, but with a donor in mind. Different donors have different requirements, need different emphasis, different information and over time you get to know this.
(ix) **Deadlines for Projects**

There did appear to be agreement, however, that a deadline should be set for the submission of projects, which would give the OECD and the Budget Division sufficient time to study the documents, and the High Commission and the British mission in Blantyre to peruse and approve them before the start of the implementation year. A check on the list of projects passing through the High Commission in 1974/5 indicated that projects spent a minimum of one and a maximum of thirty-eight days at the High Commission, while a minimum of twenty and a maximum of 214 days was required before approval was received from Blantyre. The lengthier periods are caused by queries being sent back and further investigations and delays. For projects giving rise to no serious problems, it would appear the High Commission needs no more than ten to fourteen days and Blantyre thirty to forty. Since many projects do raise queries, an extra thirty days should be added making a total of about eighty days allowable. Thus to have memoranda approved by the beginning of the new financial year, the OECD should be able to send them to the High Commission by 10 January. The Government should aim to accomplish this in a way which allows both OECD and the Budget Office sufficient time not only to study the individual projects, but to do so in a way which relates them to the annual programme as a whole (instead of being prepared long after); and enables the demands on the recurrent budget (arising from new development projects) to be considered at the same time, and thus to compete with steadily burgeoning administrative demands. This would require a further sixty days, placing a sensible project deadline somewhere about 10 November. Having projects arrive at this early stage would add greatly to the meaning of the capital budget, which as it stands at present is little more than a contents sheet of projects at every possible phase of preparation and negotiation. One adviser commented:

When I came here I thought the budget meant something. Then I found it meant nothing. They budget for a capital development of N12 m., and an investigation I find they are going to spend between N5 m. and N6 m. They haven’t yet got the donor’s nor the project memorandum. For example, Civil Aviation put up a project [Project 0158, Subhead 501 for N33 000/]. Now in Novem-
Interpretation of British acceptance of their programme, no money can be released by Finance for implementation of British-assisted schemes until the British have approved the individual project memoranda.

(x) Dates of approval. The effect on the implementation year under observation of the tardy returns of memoranda in the previous formulation year, are clear from the following list showing how many projects were approved during each month of the year. (Note that ideally all projects should be approved before April in order that there be twelve months to undertake them; each month after that reduces the time available):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number of Approvals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, eight memoranda included in the original programme did not arrive at all (although the British were informed that most of these were being held back); and seven more did come in but were too late to be approved.

(xi) Project submissions. On the basis of the points raised in (x) above, CPDO attempted to introduce a deadline at 30 November for project memoranda and progress reports in the formulation year under observation. The circular warned that if ministries did not respond by then the Planning Office could not guarantee that their projects would be included and that a delay would lead inevitably to late release of funds. "It is no good blaming the Central Planning Office and the Budget Division for the stop-go implementation which results from delays in submission." Additi-

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1. Circular Savigram, CPDO to Psas CP0/36/05 24/10/74.
tional incentive for early submission was provided by British officials agreeing to study documents arriving early in the formulation year which would increase the possibility of their being approved by the start of the next year. Only one division of one Ministry, namely livestock, expressly tried to take advantage of the British offer, while only two Ministries, Works and Education, reacted positively to the deadline. Thus for the first time the Planning Office was able to forward what one British official described as 'large lumps of logical submissions' in the first half of January. Monthly checks with the four sections of the CPDO revealed, however, that after the earlier start by a few ministries, submissions slowed to a trickle. On 1 April 1975 (that is, the first day of the implementation year by which time all projects should ideally have been approved) only sixteen documents of the required fifty-seven (project memoranda or progress reports) had arrived at the High Commission, and not one project had yet received British approval to go ahead.

X. NOTES ON THE PREPARATION OF THE SECOND PLAN

The purpose of expanding on the report of the Second Plan contained in Chapter XI, Section 5, is similar to that of Appendix IX. The preparation of the Second Plan was the most important task carried out by the Planners in that period. This more detailed discussion indicates the nature of the modest improvements in the execution of planning tasks: again there was little to suggest innovation or even novel adaptations. Rather, observable changes related to heightened efficiency and the increased capacity of a larger CPDO. Finally, this case study, like the previous one, shows the administrative problems and weakness which continued.

A. Schedules and responses

Preparation of the Second Plan formally commenced in May 1974 with a CPDO circular calling on ministries to submit their material for consideration and later inclusion in the Plan. Starting on 1 June the Planning Office's original work schedule allowed for approximately forty-two weeks (until the end of March 1975) to have the documentation
finalised and sent off to the printer.

Not one department or ministry complied with the first deadline of 31 August for submissions of their general draft plan material and `thumbnail sketches' of projects. In the middle of December (three-and-a-half months after the deadline), the following was the position on submissions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Dates of submissions:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, Marketing, Co-operatives</td>
<td>Not in yet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Development</td>
<td>15 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>5 Sept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcasting and Information</td>
<td>25 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Service Bldgs</td>
<td>8 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>18 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisons</td>
<td>8 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>4 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>18 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>12 Sept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Sewage</td>
<td>12 Sept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydrology</td>
<td>12 Sept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical Workshop</td>
<td>12 Sept</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal development</td>
<td>1 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Aviation</td>
<td>4 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td>15 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lesotho Airways</td>
<td>11 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho Electricity Corp</td>
<td>9 Sept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Printer</td>
<td>2 Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lands, Surveys &amp; Planning</td>
<td>16 Sept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce and Industry</td>
<td>Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td>Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNDG</td>
<td>26 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Oct</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, of the ministries, only Works and Education had responded promptly. Works' submissions were very satisfactory and

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>General material</th>
<th>Thumbnail sketches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, Marketing, Cooperatives</td>
<td>Not in yet</td>
<td>Not in yet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Development</td>
<td>15 Nov</td>
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the CPDO was able to proceed with them. Education's were not, and it took many months of redrafting by the Ministry and the CPDO to improve them. Most seriously, Agriculture had not submitted anything, while most other ministries were about ten to twelve weeks late. Further, the standard of many of the documents required far more attention and time than had been anticipated and the eight weeks scheduled for appraisal and discussion proved to be far from sufficient. Communications was an exception, for although late, the CPDO found their material of a standard which permitted it to proceed quickly to an advanced stage of drafting.

In December the Planning Office extended its planned schedule by about four weeks till the end of April 1975. This slight increase was unrealistic in that it was clear that most departments (and this excludes Works, Communications, Mines and Statistics) were already anywhere between twelve and eighteen weeks behind.

At the beginning of each month from November 1974 to June 1975, planning officers were asked for a brief report on progress in the sectors for which they were responsible. The outstanding feature was the change in the section dealing with Agriculture, where the initial optimism turned steadily to disappointment. For example, the following were brief monthly comments on the Crops Division:

- **November**: Nothing has come in.
- **December**: They have one or two big projects, and for the rest it's ideas only.
- **January**: A meeting has been held to discuss their situation.
- **February**: Their submission is poor.
- **March**: Their submission is '100% inadequate'.
- **April**: CPDO decided to work on it as the division is clearly not capable.
- **May**: No more progress because of the Donor Conference in April.
- **June**: CPDO completed a draft; delayed by a typing bottleneck and the absence of the Senior Planning Officer; has just been returned to Agriculture for comments.

The record for the Cooperatives Division reads:

- **November**: A weak submission.
- **December**: The situation is chaotic.
- **January**: No further material - the position is 'very shaky'.
- **February**: Their submission is being delayed so as to relate it better to the material which will be prepared in June.
- **March**: There has been no advance but they have promised
April: Still no progress.
May: No progress because time devoted to the Donor Conference.
June: Somebody drew up a submission after being in the country a few weeks. No one takes it seriously and there is no one to work on it.

In contrast, the section dealing with Works and Communications progressed punctually through the phases of negotiation, re-drafting and re-negotiation and by April had pre-final drafts ready. It delayed finalising documents because other ministries were still far behind, and meetings to polish and edit went on for a considerable time.

In the case of Commerce and Industry, there arose possibly the largest divergence between the Planning Office and a ministry on policy and evaluation of capacity. In consequence, monthly reports recorded that drafts were being prepared by one or the other party for reconsideration, and ultimately a compromise couched in relatively generalised terms was reached, with which neither was perfectly happy. Given that there was no body to arbitrate, this was a reasonably satisfactory solution.

The first document arrived from Education promptly, but the material was considered to be very raw. Discussions and re-drafting by both the Ministry and the Planning Office over a lengthy period brought the Education section of the Plan to a relatively advanced stage (which still required further financial analysis) by June. With Health, even more so than with Education, the CPDO was required to take a large share of the workload, with the process dragging on till June when a draft, including Health's latest comments, was being prepared.

Justice and Interior both produced weak submissions, and for month after month one saw little response from these Ministries. Many of their proposals concerned buildings which were prepared by the Cabinet Planning Unit, and these two Ministries were considered to almost totally lack direction or policy or plans for the training of personnel.

In June 1975, the research for this thesis ended. Allowing for a two-month delay, even on the second CPDO sche-
dula, this had been thought sufficient to cover the conclusion of the plan preparation process. However, the proceedings dragged on for a further twelve months; the Plan being finally issued in June 1976 instead of June 1975.

E. Discussion

(i) Late Start From the outset it was clear that Lesotho's planners had left the start of the exercise too late, and in consequence had allowed themselves too little time. As the staffing position was strengthened only in April 1974, they probably could not have begun much earlier than they did. Yet a senior member of the CPDO admitted that the 'time factor' had been 'neglected'. As a result they allowed the ministries only twelve weeks to prepare their first submissions which was regarded by many as too short.

That is unrealistic. We were not given enough time to think about it. We hadn't thought about the First Plan's achievements yet. And now we were immediately plunged into the Second Plan.*

The CPD hasn't the faintest idea of how long this takes to put together. They didn't give us enough time.*

(ii) Lack of Guidance At this early stage, further, ministries felt that the Office should have provided considerably more meaningful guidance about the intended content of the Plan and direction of development.

They gave us some guidance about format but not about substance - nothing about what the CPD would like to see in the Plan - that is a wicked evasion of responsibility.*

At the first meeting they told us to write something - as much as possible - that is all the guidance we got from them. The fact that there is no guidance in the beginning is very annoying.*

A third person said that the CPDO approach of 'the sky is the limit' is 'eye wash not policy. We did not get guiding parameters. How do we know where to put things'.

(iii) Appraisal of Plan Preparedness The fact that Works was able to submit satisfactory documents within two weeks of the deadline, indicates that both above complaints
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(iii) Overestimation of plan preparedness. The fact that Wiesa was able to submit satisfactory documents within two weeks of the deadline, indicates that both above complaints
were as much a reflection on the planning preparedness of many of the ministries, as on the adequacy of the twelve week period or the guidance of the Planning Office. Clearly, the Office erred in overestimating the material and information available for ready use by departments, as also their capacity to use it. For example, one planner felt (at an early stage) that the cooperative programmes being worked out with donors would form 'perhaps the bulk of the first two years' and therefore that they had a 'good head start... We'll have projects identified in many sectors for five to ten years!'. Another confirmed this:

The project content of the next five year plan in many sectors is nearly pretty well worked out because they are either already in the pipeline or funded... In the Ministry of Agriculture we are in much better shape than any of the other ministries... we've got so much long-term projects actually under way, we are ready to move. I could start organizing it. We've got lots of projects and lots of vision where we want to go.

In Works a similar mood of optimism proved justified; in Agriculture it did not. It would appear that the CPDO's overall perception of the state of planning in Government had been buoyed up by a number of large projects already under way or negotiated, and the availability of a number of studies and reports. It underestimated the numerous areas which were un- or ill-prepared, and overlooked the fact that in some departments planning capacity remained so paltry that they were hard put to translate the studies into sectoral plans and projects.

(iv) Planning Units. A further factor in which the CPDO confidence proved misplaced was the contribution of the planning units. The last section of Chapter II showed that planning unit capacity actually diminished at the very time when an expansion in its output was most needed. One planning adviser whose evaluation of the plan preparation was generally favourable, conceded that these units were 'essentially quite weak. It is only with great difficulty that the CPDO has been able to get contributions from them for the plan.' Interior's one-man Unit existed only from August...
1974 to February 1975, and the person concerned said that he did not, and had not been in a position to 'prepare any submission for the Plan'.\(^1\) In Education, the planner was promoted to PS and succeeded in November 1974 by a man who held another post simultaneously. Not only could he not devote his full attention to planning but he admitted that having arrived at that stage, he lacked the background to participate effectively in the formulation of his Ministry's programme.\(^2\) An expatriate adviser to another division of the Ministry undertook a considerable share of responsibility for the Education submissions. In Health the Planning Unit, while generally kept in contact with proceedings, was neither centrally involved in nor fully consulted on the Ministry's drafts or negotiations with the Planning Office. The most serious disappointment was the performance of the Agricultural Planning Unit from which much had been anticipated, and which in the event made a meagre contribution to the Plan. Tragically, the livestock planner who had been particularly productive, died, and with his death the tedium of agricultural planning was exposed. For lengthy periods, no communication on the Plan was forthcoming from this Planning Unit and the arrival of documents from the divisions of the Ministry bypassed the Unit.

On the other hand, the Works Planning Unit operated effectively and linked up well with both the Planning Office and the divisions. While there were material differences of opinion between the Unit in Commerce and Industry and the CEDO, that Unit did bear the brunt of its Ministry's work on the Plan. Finally the Unit in the Cabinet complex, with responsibility not only for its divisions but also for public service buildings, enacted a wide array of Plan preparation tasks. On occasions, however, the Unit's non-planning duties were felt by the Planning Office to be postponing progress on the drafting and negotiating of the Plan documents themselves.

(v) Continuing activities The Planning Office also underestimated the time which it and the rest of the planning
machinery would need to devote to its continuing activities such as project formulation and budget preparation (discussed in Appendix IX) and the numerous jobs involved in keeping up with the largest number of donor missions ever to visit Lesotho in one year.

(vi) Minis­trical response Before the exercise got under way, a planning officer was asked for his evaluation of the political support for the CPDO, and its standing amongst the ministries. He replied:

"We shall find out when people are told to drop what they are doing and get on with the Five Year Plan - we shall see how much there is foot-dragging and work not getting done - and see what disciplines are imposed. If the CPDO has to convince everybody like they did last time, there is apt to be neither a good plan nor a plan on time." 1

As it turned out, there did prove to be considerable 'foot-dr­agging' and the Planning Office did have a struggle to elicit timely responses from most (but not all) divisions and ministries.

For a start the ministries were reluctant to devote time to the physical progress questionnaires and many reminders, phone calls and visits were required before they were completed and returned. 2

Also, the reaction of many departments to the CPDO request for all ministries to appoint contact-men - people who were chiefly responsible for plan preparation and with whom the Planning Office could communicate directly, 3 was sluggish. 4 Finally, as noted above, many of the first set of submissions were two to three months late. In December 1974 the Office complained that the ministries lacked appreciation of the importance of the Plan:

"Some ministries have simply told the CPDO they are too busy when attempts were made to discuss some of their problems and submissions. Those who prepared something did so as a result of numerous visits by the CPDO." 5

(vii) Staff turnover The Planning Office also blamed the continuous turnover of senior officers in the ministries for the slowing down of progress. This not only 'disrupted work but led to changes of approach on certain critical issues'. 6 The problem of turnover continued throughout the period.

1. CPDO to Planning Board of Departments 618/37/93 14/3/74.
3. Ibid., p. 7.
of plan preparation at PS, Head of Department and Planning Unit level and with those people appointed as contact-men. The CPDO itself lost its Director, Deputy Director, a Senior Planning Officer, and a few expatriates and Planning Officers, giving rise to complaints on the part of the ministries.\(^1\)

(viii) Visits abroad The CPDO also found that the frequent visits abroad both of its own senior members and of 'policy level officers' of the ministries were undermining the work on the Plan. 'In most cases, no arrangements for a fully-briefed senior official to follow up work on the Plan was made', and as a result 'nobody would touch anything on the Plan with policy implication during the absence of the head concerned'.\(^1\) This obstacle and its delaying effects were observed throughout the period researched. In particular the Director of Planning had regularly to attend conferences of an economic or developmental nature and participate in aid missions and even diplomatic visits, such as the King's state visit to Tanzania. His absence often resulted in a loss of direction and urgency in the Office. For example, one planning officer's attempts to encourage a policy reorientation in a particular department were hindered in this way. Background papers were prepared and a Planning Office meeting held. 'It was discussed, but not very usefully, and no policy decision made partly because the Director has been away a lot and he alone can make a decision.'\(^2\)

(ix) District involvement The Planning Office did not succeed in effectively involving the district authorities in the exercise. Aware of the criticism\(^2\) that the districts had been totally ignored in preparing the First Plan, the Office organized a tour (accompanied by representatives of LNDC and Interior) during 1974 to meet with DAs and District Development Committees. The officers reported that the meetings were useful, while the DAs were encouraged by the interest shown. In accordance with the CPDO's suggestion, over the next two months the Districts submitted their list of proposals for the Plan. In addition, the Interior Planning Unit compiled a report containing the requests of the District, mainly concerned with abattoirs, cooperatives, dams, schools, clinics, water supplies, tourism, markets, roads and bridges.

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1. Ibid.
2. See, for example, Appendix V.
which it sent to the CPDO. Having made a promising start, however, the Office found itself too busy to follow up. A promised round of further meetings was first postponed and eventually not held, while the documents submitted by the Office did not receive serious attention. One DA said: "The CPDO once came last year to ask our advice on the Second Plan - we have no idea what happened to these ideas and have not heard from them again," while Interior got no reaction from the CPDO on its report. A member of the Planning Office felt that the district recommendations came in too late, that is, after most ministries had prepared their thumbnail sketches, and therefore that they were not being taken into account. A second planner commented that in his view the CPDO simply did not have the capacity 'to handle an input of ideas and projects' from the districts. 'As it is, it can't meaningfully communicate with all the ministries. How can it also handle communication with the districts?'

(x) Typing capacity The Office's typing capacity proved to be unequal to the increased demands. In addition to the vast quantity involved in preparing and re-preparing drafts and tables for the Plan, the various other tasks of the Office (referred to in (v) above), notably project formulation and preparation for visiting missions, were all expanding and with them the typing load. The very fact that the Office had twenty planners in place of twelve added to the burden, as did the increased appreciation of the importance of recording and reproducing minutes of meetings, producing and distributing extra copies, etc. The increase of typing staff proved insufficient, and the production of the Plan fell hopelessly behind schedule. Eventually an experienced expatriate typist-cum-editor was required full-time for lengthy periods to work on the Plan, while the other typists continued with other tasks. The various points raised in the rest of this discussion would explain why the whole exercise fell six months behind; the typing bottleneck explains why it was delayed a full year.

(xi) Improvements Despite the faults in the Planning Office's management and the obstacles which it confronted in the preparation of the Second Plan, these few officials who could recall the
preparation of the First Plan felt that there had been substantial improvement.

Preparation is much better this time. There is a definite idea that the Plan is being prepared. This time we have been asked questions in plenty of time by [our ministry] and we have given our answer ... and the Planning Unit has come back with a series of questions. There have been two meetings at headquarters ... The thing has been handled in a logical way. This Plan is going to be a lot more logical than the last and a lot more use.1

The Planning Office was also complimented on its efficient organization of a donor conference, held in Maseru in April 1975, which was timed to coincide with a fairly advanced stage of Plan formulation. The interaction between donors' representatives and the recipient ministries and departments was regarded by both as extremely useful.

The meeting with the donors was a good step. We are able to understand how donors see projects and how best to present projects.2

It is important, furthermore, to note that the undertaking was a far more ambitious one than was the First Plan — and not only in terms of total capital expenditure. This time the CPDC aimed to avoid one of the principal weaknesses of the 1970-75 Plan, namely the lack of specific projects to back up objectives and targets. The Second Plan was thus conceived as two volumes, the first to include general analyses and statements of policies, objectives and targets, and the second the outlines of all the projects with their approximate costings. Thus participants generally thought that the content of this document would be far superior to that of the First Plan.
The following people were interviewed. Formal and informal, and structured and unstructured interviews were used. Many of the interviewees were consulted on numerous occasions. The posts listed next to their names were held at the time of the first interview. Similarly the dates (given in parentheses) are those of the first interview.

Ashford, R.S., Adviser to the Chief Water Engineer, Works (23/9/74)
Riemen, J., First Director of the Central Planning Office, 1967-8 (25/1/74)
Blare, I.C., Economist, Works (11/2/75)
Bofelo, J.S., Department of Extramural Studies, UBLS, previously DA (24/2/75)
Brewis, F., Assistant Secretary, Planning Unit, Health (20/3/74)
Burke, S., Planning and Evaluation Unit, Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project (9/10/74)
Cone, F.J., Institute of Development Management, UBLS (2/3/75)
Chidambaran, S., CPDO (19/6/74)
Cobbe, J.H., Department of Economics, Central University of Lesotho (11/1/75)
Cooley, I.S., Planning Officer, CPDO (2/3/74)
Creed, F.J., General Manager, LNDC (4/3/75)
Doggett, C., UN Special Adviser to CPDO (20/3/75)
Fletcher, R.W.Y., English Teaching Adviser, Education (10/12/73)
Paycker, D., Town and Country Planning Department, Interior (13/7/74)
Green, R., Manager, Lesotho Electricity Corporation (1/5/75)
Haissed, D., United States Embassy (15/3/74)
Heiman, C., Senior Economist, Planning and Evaluation Unit, Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project (22/1/74)
Hurst, J., Project Development Officer, Department of Community and Rural Development (20/6/74)
Jennex, J., Planning Officer, CPDO (4/6/74)
Johnson, H.R., OSARAC Representative, US Embassy (12/12/73)
Jones, D., Deputy Director, Peace Corps in Lesotho (28/11/74)

Jordan, A., Project Manager (Building Contracts) Works (15/3/74)

Kelley, J.F., Programme Director, Catholic Relief Services (9/7/74)

Khesake, T.B., Labour recruiting organization, previously DA (11/3/75)

Khechane, T.E., Planning Officer, CPDO (9/10/74)

Khosii, P.E., Higher Executive Officer, Planning Unit, Works (14/3/74)

Kirkor, R., Adviser to Budget Controller, Finance (13/12/73)

Klein, C., Programme Officer, UNDP, Lesotho (4/6/74)

Laubstein, K.H., Department of Government and Administration, UBLS (30/4/75)

Lebona, P., Assistant Secretary, Planning Unit, Education (30/4/75)

Lekana, T.P., Executive Officer, CPDO (13/7/75)

Lennh, E.W.J., High Commission of the United Kingdom (11/12/73)

Lester, J., Assistant Secretary, Finance, and Planning Officer, CPDO (18/6/74)

Letlanana, T.S., Junior Executive Officer, CPDO (20/11/74)

Leys, T.E., Institut for Samfundsfag, University of Copenhagen (2/1/75)

Lovu, A.K., Planning Officer, CPDO (2/1/75)

Mabitle, W.T., Department of Community and Rural Development, formerly DA (19/10/74)

Macham, V.P., Assistant Secretary, Department of Community and Rural Development (8/6/74)

Malhaha, P.M., Chieftainship Officer, Interior, formerly District Commissioner and DA (14/3/75)

Makhalola, C.T., Senior Executive Officer, CPDO (29/10/74)

Malik, I.A., Economic Commission for Africa (22/11/74)

Maseche, S., Assistant Secretary, Planning Unit, Interior (23/2/75)

Mavholyi, T.J., PS, Foreign Affairs (4/6/74)

McLennan, S., Town and Country Planning Department, Interior (9/7/74)

Modiano, P., Planning Officer, CPDO (2/3/75)

Modimo, A.J., PS, Interior (8/6/74)

Motte, J., Pro-Vice Chancellor, UBLS, formerly PS Education and in CPDO (25/1/74)

Mokhathu, U.M., Housing Officer, Prime Minister's Office, formerly Higher Executive Officer, Planning Unit, Works (9/5/74)

Molapo, H.L., Assistant Secretary for Scholarships, Education (9/1/74)

Molapo, J.L., Director of Health Services, Health; interviewed later as PS, Health (14/3/74)
Molapo, D.C., Principal Assistant Secretary, Interior; formerly DA (6/3/75)
Montlu, S., Director, CPDO (5/6/74)
Mosheshoe, B.K., Assistant Secretary, Agriculture (29/3/74)
Motselane, A.G., Principal Assistant Secretary, Justice (17/1/74)
Motselane, N.C., Assistant Secretary, Planning Unit, Health (24/7/74)
Mugabe, A.L., Principal Assistant Secretary, Works (20/12/73)
Nchoda, A.N., Planning Officer, CPDO (10/12/74)
Makhetset, M., Planning and Development Division, LND (11/2/73)
Moleli, L.F., Assistant Secretary, Planning Unit, Works (31/5/74)
Mtswe, M.T., Deputy Director, CPDO (24/12/74)
Mokone, K., Adviser to Director, CPDO (5/6/75)
Moore, W., High Commissioner of the United Kingdom (1/4/74)
Pitera, E.M., Education Officer for Scholarships, Education (9/1/74)
Pitera, P., Assistant Secretary, Planning Unit, Education (Inter Interviewed as PS, Education) (28/1/74)
Radford, P., Planning Unit, Agriculture (8/10/74)
Ratnapole, N.N., Deputy PS, Agriculture, formerly PS, Agriculture and Director of Livestock Division (8/1/74)
Rehbandery, S., Programme Officer, UNDP, Lesotho (9/1/74)
Reval, H., Administrative Officer, UNDP, Lesotho (1/3/75)
Reynolds, F., Deputy High Commissioner, High Commission of the United Kingdom (16/1/74)
Rigall, R., Director, CARE, Lesotho (20/2/75)
Roberts, A., Acting Chief Surveyor and Acting Town Planner, Interior (10/7/74)
R. V., Controller of Works Services, Works (2/10/74)
Sebitane, B.M., Assistant Secretary, Planning Unit, Commerce and Industry (20/3/74)
Seerai, O.K., PS, Education (17/12/73)
Sejanamane, N., Senior Planning Officer, CPDO, previously in Planning Unit, Agriculture (20/9/74)
Sello, L.M., Manager, Kolonyama Candle Factory (14/3/74)
Sen, K.C., UN Senior Economist, CPDO (1/3/74)
Shearer, T., Treasurers Adviser, Foreign Affairs (28/10/74)
Sixhane, D.T., Press Officer, Prime Minister's Office (28/3/74)
Tanner, B.K., DA, previously District Commissioner (3/3/75)
Tanner, S., Senior Administrative Assistant, Food Aid Programme Office (17/1/74)
Taylor, D., Officer in Charge, Food Aid Programme Office (1/4/74)
Molapo, P.C., Principal Assistant Secretary, Interior; formerly DA (6/3/75)
Montsi, S., Director, CPDO (5/6/74)
Mohobohoe, S.M., Assistant Secretary, Planning Unit, Agriculture (29/3/74)
Motselane, A.R.G., Principal Assistant Secretary, Justice (17/1/74)
Mphutlane, N.C., Assistant Secretary, Planning Unit, Health (24/7/74)
Munroe, A.L., Principal Assistant Secretary, Works (20/12/73)
Murphy, J., Representative, World Food Programme (22/4/74)
Mchodu, A.N., Planning Officer, CPDO (10/12/74)
Nisbett, M., Project and Development Division, INDC (11/2/75)
Ntoll, L.P., Assistant Secretary, Planning Unit, Works (31/5/74)
Ntsane, M.T., Deputy Director, CPDO (24/12/74)
Okodu, K., Adviser to Director, CPDO (5/6/75)
Palmer, M., High Commission of the United Kingdom (1/4/74)
Pitso, P.M., Education Officer for Scholarships, Education (9/1/74)
Pitso, P., Assistant Secretary, Planning Unit, Education (later interviewed as PS, Education) (28/1/74)
Radford, P., Planning Unit, Agriculture (8/10/74)
Raditsepole, N.N., Deputy PS, Agriculture, formerly PS, Agriculture and Director of Livestock Division (8/1/74)
Rejabhandery, S., Programme Officer, UNDP, Lesotho (9/1/74)
Ravni, H., Administrative Officer, UNDP, Lesotho (1/5/74)
Reynolds, F., Deputy High Commissioner, High Commission of the United Kingdom (16/1/74)
Rignall, R., Director, CARE, Lesotho (20/2/75)
Roberts, A., Acting Chief Surveyor and Acting Town Planner, Interior (10/7/74)
Scott, W., Controller of Works Services, Works (2/10/74)
Sebatsane, B.N., Assistant Secretary, Planning Unit, Commerce and Industry (20/3/74)
Sechi, O.K., PS, Education (17/12/73)
Sejanesane, M., Senior Planning Officer, CMO, previously in Planning Unit, Agriculture (20/9/74)
Sello, L.N., Manager, Kolonyama Candle Factory (11/3/74)
Sen, K.C., UN Senior Economist, CPDO (1/3/74)
Shenner, J., Treaties Adviser, Foreign Affairs (28/10/74)
Sixtsha, D.T., Press Officer, Prime Minister's Office (28/3/74)
Tacona, B.K., DA, previously District Commissioner (3/3/75)
Tanner, S., Senior Administrative Assistant, Food Aid Programme Office (17/1/74)
Taylor, D., Officer in Charge, Food Aid Programme Office (4/4/74)
Taylor, N.B., UNDP Resident Representative in Lesotho (25/2/74)
Tiele, H., Senior Planning Officer, CPDO (10/6/75)
Tsai, W.S., Embassy of the Republic of China (8/1/74)
Van Gyltenfelt, J.S., Planning Unit, Commerce and Industry (21/3/74)
Van der Galts, G., Senior Economist, Planning Unit, Agriculture (19/3/74)
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