Chapter Four
KENYA AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM

Introduction
11 September 2001 came as a big surprise to the world and especially the US. Members of the terrorist group Al Qaeda hijacked aeroplanes and flew them into the World Trade Centre in New York and into the Pentagon in Washington, killing thousands of people. The events of that one day were to play a major role in influencing the international political scene.

Terrorism became the main international focus. LaFaber (2002:543) states that terrorism is an old stratagem and has been on the increase especially after the Cold War however this has been attributed to globalisation. Additionally, he notes that the world is no longer threatened by a particular State or State leader as was the case before; it is threatened by terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda that have no State base, no State allegiance, and adhere to no rules set by international political or economic organisations but adhere to their own religious interpretations. Osama bin Laden and his organisation are an example of globalisation where they use State of the art equipment to carry out their attacks and send out messages (Bergen 2001) and turn the power of technology into weapons of mass destruction. 11 September showed that terrorists can now inflict levels of destruction that only States wielding military power used to be able to accomplish. It is debatable whether the strategies of the Cold War are likely to work towards fighting this threat because they assumed the existence of identifiable States with identifiable leaders. According to John Gray (2003:51-2) and J. Lewis Gaddis (2002:51-2) the events of that day marked the end of Cold War strategies, deterrence and containment. Al Qaeda is a global organisation which has spread tentacles all over the world.

Bin Laden became the main focus of the international community soon after the attacks. His attacks in the US led to President Bush waging a war on terrorism and stating to the world that ‘you are either with us or against us’. (LaFaber 2002:553) Thereafter US foreign policy was focused on combating terrorism all over the world including Africa.
In the wake of 11 September, the Horn of Africa gained renewed salience in US geopolitical strategy as had been the case during the Cold War. The new US strategy to combat terrorism has created new opportunities and continuities for Kenya-US relations.

The objective of this chapter is to analyse the security collaboration avenues between Kenya and the US that arose after 11 September, as well as to analyse US policy towards Kenya and by extension the Horn of Africa in tackling terrorism. The chapter will look closely at the problem of the Kenyan anti-terror legislation and the problem of travel advisories that the US government has continuously placed on Kenya.

**US Policy towards Kenya following 11th September**

LaFaber states that when the Bush Administration came into power in 2000 it demonstrated little interest in international cooperation during its first months. (2002:547-8) Though on 11 September 2001, this took a turn as the Administration’s priorities changed, fighting terrorism took precedence and the ‘Bush Doctrine’ was formulated in response to this. The doctrine’s objective was to destroy terrorist groups that targeted the US. On 17 September 2002 President Bush laid down his county’s National Security Strategy (NSS). J. Lewis Gaddis (2002:50-7) avers that the strategy has been seen as the most important grand strategy since the end of the Cold War. It mainly set out three tasks for the Administration; to defend the peace of the nation by fighting terrorists and tyrants; to preserve peace by building good relations among the great powers; and to extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent. Its ultimate goal was to encourage free and open societies on every continent by spreading democracy world wide.

In his strategy President Bush emphasised the need to spread democracy to help fight terrorism. According to Stanley Hoffman (1995:159) the spread of democracy is believed to eliminate wars of aggression. The NSS argued that undemocratic and failed States had become breeding grounds for terrorists and it is in such States that terrorist

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37 The doctrine pledged to go after both terrorists and those who harbour them. The doctrine arose from the country’s national interest, a domestic need to find the culprits of the attacks after 11th September. Walter LaFaber cites the formula American exceptionalism plus US power (military power) equals America’s unilateralism. 2002: 548-550
groups have been able to recruit its members. This is supported by John Gray (2003) who argues civil wars have left States weakened and that failed States have become the normal condition in the post-Cold War era. He points out that it is in these States that Al Qaeda has had its breeding grounds. Failed States pose a grave danger to international security for they are unable to control their borders and territories thus becoming safe sanctuaries for terrorists. In such States the people are underemployed, unrepresented and as a result have become easy targets for recruitment into terrorist groups.

In order to achieve its goals the NSS laid down various objectives to go about combating terrorism and spreading democracy. One of its key strategies was to work with partner States to resolve regional conflicts especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the National Security Strategy NSS the Administration stressed the need to strengthen the continent’s fragile States as well as help secure porous borders and more importantly help build the law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure to deny havens for terrorists. It set out to build up sub-region policies for Central, East, South and West Africa. According to Jendayi Frazer (2004) the Administration looked at the population of a country, its military influence especially in peacekeeping in the region, how the country related with its neighbours and the US interests in that country. Nigeria, South Africa, and Kenya were selected as anchor countries in their respective sub-regions. On the other hand Ethiopia was proposed by the Defence Department for reasons of counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa. She further stated that due to the various conflicts in Central Africa no particular country was identified in this particular sub-region.³⁸ Kenya is a major hub of international companies and organisations in the region and has always had good relations with the US. The country has participated in various peacekeeping missions worldwide especially under the auspices of the UN and has continuously played a major role in brokering peace in the region.

³⁸ Ambassador Jendayi Frazer was the US Ambassador to South Africa. She served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for African Affairs at the National Security Council making her a key official in the formulation of the African policy. These quotes are from a lecture that she gave on US-Africa relations on 27.Oct.2004 at University of Witwatersrand.
In reaction to the events of 11 September the government and the people of Kenya sympathised with the US having been victims of such terror attacks. According to Ghirmazion (2001), the government fully supported the war against terrorism and offered logistical help to the US. He adds that Kenya became the only African country to hold a demonstration, led by President Moi, to protest against acts of terrorism in a move to show solidarity with the US. Security was tightened on Kenya’s borders with the government placing a ban on planes arriving at Wilson Airport; it is one of the busiest airports in the Greater Horn of Africa for small carrier planes. President Moi came under heavy criticism from the public and civil society who took issues with him for offering logistic support without first seeking parliamentary or public approval by stating that even President Bush consulted with congress before taking steps towards actions that would involve the whole nation. (Ghirmazion 2001) The attacks on the World Trade Centre had an impact on economies the world over, Kenya included. One of the main areas to be affected by 11 September was the Kenyan tourism sector. As Ghirmazion noted, hundreds of tourists cancelled planned visits to the country mainly due to the standstill in air travel following the attacks.

Though Kenyans sympathised with the victims of the attacks they felt the attacks had vindicated Kenya and Tanzania from the blame of the 1998 attacks on the US embassies. The two countries had been blamed for poor security and intelligence to detect terrorist activities within their own borders and yet terrorists were also able to infiltrate the US without detection from their more advanced security and intelligence capability. (Ghirmazion 2001) Slightly over a year after 11 September Al Qaeda was to attack again in Kenya, this time on Israeli interests.

**The Kikambala Bombing and Aftermath**
On the morning of 28 November 2002 a car carrying explosives drove into an Israeli owned hotel in Kikambala, Mombasa, killing sixteen people and injuring at least eighty others. On the same morning two stringer missiles were fired at a plane carrying passengers bound for Israel. Islamic militants groups sympathetic to Al Qaeda had warned of an attack on Kenya a week before on internet chat rooms and emails.
A group calling itself the ‘Army of Palestine’ claimed to have carried out the attacks to mark the 55th anniversary of the 29 November 1947 UN Resolution partitioning Palestine between Arabs and Jews. The attacks in Kikambala, the first by Al Qaeda since 11th September, put Kenya once more on the limelight on the issue of terrorism, with questions of why Kenya was a regular target arising.

According to Mutuma Mathiu (2002) Kenya is a ‘soft target’ due to the many western investments and interests in the country. The country faces high levels of corruption within the government and security forces. According to Transparency International’s *The Kenya Bribery Index* (2004) the Police and Defence Departments have been identified as the two top most corrupt institutions in the country. The fraying of State institutions under Moi’s regime had a major role to play in this. There were immense levels of corruption to add on the high level of poverty that compounded the country during his 24 years of rule. The implication of corrupt security institutions has led to the easy penetration of foreigners into the country and the high level of poverty has made it easier for terrorist cells to find followers in Kenya, especially among the youth. Terrorists have been active on the Kenyan coast since 1994 and have been known to establish businesses to camouflage their activities in the country. However the attacks in the US were an indication that even with tightly secured borders and world class security and intelligence, it is difficult to deter terrorists as their cells are active world wide.

Once again the tourism industry suffered the most from the attacks. Before the attacks it was on an upward trend and there was hope for continuous growth. The new attack triggered panic within the Kenyan tourism sector and the local financial markets with tourists cancelling their bookings. Just like in 1998, Kenya faced the full brunt of the attacks with the majority of the dead being Kenyans. This attack intensified Kenya’s role

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40 ‘Australia was warned of Mombassa attack’ *East African Standard* 29.Nov.2002 p.1
in the war on terrorism as it stopped viewing itself as a target but a likely source of terrorism.

Coincidentally the attacks took place just a month before Kenyans went to the polls to elect a new president following Moi’s end of term. The bombings though did not have an impact on the outcome of the election. A new government came into power under a coalition party, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), with Mwai Kibaki as the leader. The new government was faced with the issue of security and safety in the country from the beginning. It had inherited a country that was highly corrupt from the previous leadership and the people of Kenya expected much more from them. Soon after taking up office they introduced an anti-terror legislation that faced stiff opposition and was seen as US backed.

**The Terrorism Bill**

After a terrorist activity has taken place, what matters thereafter is how a government reacts in order to prevent further terrorist attacks. Thomas Phillip (2003:119) propounds that governments more often than not move to enact emergency legislation in reaction to such attacks. They have often over ridden both established process and rational action of establishing such legislation and this in turn has a negative effect on the vulnerable and disenchanted sections of society. In matters of national security governments are obligated to protect their citizens. Such legislation can result in the enhancing of powers given to security agencies, a deviation from established principles of law and can lead to the alienation of innocent affected people. As Kibungu (2004:2) notes prior to 11 September most governments had nearly no legislation to address terrorism, soon after the attacks governments were in a hurry to enact new laws addressing it. In Kenya, the *Suppression of Terrorism Act 2003* (SOT) was introduced to parliament in April 2003.

Kenya is a signatory of all twelve UN instruments on terrorism and has ratified the OAU Convention on the ‘*Prevention and Combating of Terrorism*’. The UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of 12 September 2001 called on all UN members to enact legislation dealing with terrorism and as a member state Kenya was bound to come up with
legislation to combat terrorism within its borders. Accordingly the SOT Bill was introduced in parliament. The Bill evoked a great out cry from the public, human rights organisations and parliamentarians in general as it was seen to be in violation of human rights. It was categorised as ‘incompatible with international human rights standards’ by Amnesty International. (East African Standard 9 Oct. 2004) Joseph Kibugu (2004:2) states that the Acts passed by the US, Tanzania, Uganda and proposed by Kenya among others world wide violated the rights to individual liberty, especially the freedom of conscience, association, expression, the right of to secure protection of the law, protection against arbitrary arrest and the rule of law among others.

The SOT Bill empowered the police and security agents to conduct arbitrary arrests, and detain in the guise of apprehending persons suspected of involvement in terrorism. It also gave the Minister of Internal Security the mandate to declare a specific organisation as a terrorist group. This in the long run could include political parties as has been the case with the Ugandan Anti-Terror Act which Kibugu notes has been used to repress political dissent.41 Section 6 of the Bill made it illegal for one to wear or display an item of clothing or any article in such circumstances as to arouse suspicion that one is a member of or supports a terrorist organisation. This section was seen to be directed at Muslims and people of Arab dissent who expressed fears that the whole Bill would target them as wearing their religious regalia would make them suspects. Similar sentiments have also been expressed by the Muslims in Tanzania who feel the Tanzanian Anti-Terror Act (2002) targets them.42 The SOT Bill set out to give more power to the government and its machineries, especially the police, as well as discriminate on certain persons in the society.

The government was accused of having drafted the Bill to suit donors and giving them supremacy over Kenyan forces as opposed to suppressing terrorism as the Bill was seen

to echo the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. The US Act allows for American citizens engaged in civil disobedience or other forms of civil protest being charged with ‘domestic terrorism’. According to Thomas Philip (2003:17-8) it allows for the monitoring of peoples phone calls, emails, bank transactions and even reading habits and allows for secret searches on residences. Generally just like the Kenyan Bill the US Act gives the government and security forces immense powers, to act on their suspicions unconstitutionally.

It is such similarities that have led the Kenyan Bill to be perceived as a foreign document influenced by the US. The US Ambassador to Kenya, William Bellamy, denied though that his government had played any role in the drafting process, and emphasised that it had been drafted out of Kenya’s own needs. According to the Justice and Constitutional Affairs Assistant Minister Robinson Githae (2004) the drafters looked at the US Act as well as the OAU convention, to inform the Bill and denied that the US had played a major role in the drafting process. Nevertheless, the US was involved in pushing for the Bill to be passed in parliament as it was.

According to Paul Wilkinson (2004:9) draconian measures such as those that were proposed in the Kenyan Bill and are in the US Act help terrorist groups recruit more followers, and get financial backing. Liberal democratic States are expected to respect human rights and the government is held accountable for its actions to the citizenry who elected them to power. Liberal democracies subject governmental power to checks and balances to prevent abuse of power and on infringing on citizens rights.

Laws are enacted to govern the people and protect them not discriminate, or violate their rights. The law should reflect the people’s needs and not be foreign to the people. According to Greg Mills (2004:12) terrorism today presents a global threat to democracy,

\[43\] ‘Rights Group Launches Drive against Bill’ Daily Nation Monday 17.Nov. 2003
The Act was introduced by the Judiciary Committee Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner on October 2nd, and was made law by October 26th. Only one senator voted against the Act. It stands for the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act

\[44\] ‘Terrorism Suppression Bill to be drafted Afresh’ Daily Nation 18.May.2004
the rule of law, and human rights. He argues if democracies adopt responses to terrorism which are at odds with their basic values of human rights and rule of law they will lose the moral high ground and help create new generations of terrorist. The drafting and passing of these legislations in various parts of the world, Kenya included, has been done by national legislatures that have shut out the governed from the process. In the NSS (2002) President Bush emphasised the need to spread democracy to help fight international terrorism as democracy is believed to reduce acts of aggression. However on the other hand Bush’s Administration passed the USA PATRIOT Act and has encouraged other countries to pass anti-terror laws that go against the basic principles of a democratic State. Terrorism does not legitimise disregarding democratic principles and other constitutional rights that protect the citizens and limit the powers of the government. Mills states that the language of most anti-terrorism legislation as well as the powers it authorises undermines the whole democratic process it goes against the principles of liberal democratic States that most of these countries declare to be. The passing of these laws curtails the democratic process that has been part of US’s foreign policy for decades.

Eventually the Kenyan Bill was rejected as it was and though it was not fully withdrawn it was sent back to the drawing board. This move was not well received by the US as perceived when they began to punish Kenya with travel advisories. Kenya had stood up against foreign pressures to pass the SOT Bill. According to Macharia Munene (2004) Kenya proved to be more democratic than many by standing against passing such an oppressive legislation. In the Daily Nation Michelle Kagiri (2004) states that the country is faced with the challenge of coming up with counter-terrorism measures that strike a balance between the need for national security and the protection of human rights in a democratic State. To tackle this problem the country must first address the root cause of terrorism in the county.

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46 Interview held with Macharia Munene on 01.Dec.2004. He is a Professor of History and International Relations at United States International University in Kenya.
Tony Smith (1994:6) described the enthusiasm by the US for democracy especially after the Cold War as the closest it had come to seeing its own foreign policy agenda reflected on an international scene and though this still remains an important part of its policy especially towards Third World countries, the same can be said on the war on terrorism. The war has become an international policy. Bush’s commitment to not only fight terrorism abroad but to bring peace and perhaps democracy in various corners of the world is a clear reflection of US foreign policy on the rest of the world. Kibugu (2004:6) argues that the US has been able to impose its philosophy on the war on terrorism on the rest of the world, especially because it dominates the UN. This was reflected in the US invasion of Iraq.

The Kenyan government refused to endorse the invasion of Iraq without a UN mandate. According to Macharia Munene (2004) the refusal to join the coalition of the willing led to its punishment, the US and UK governments issued travel advisories for their citizens not to visit Kenya reportedly because it was unsafe.  

The Problem of Travel Advisories and Their Impact upon Kenya-Us Relations
Western governments imposed new travel advisories in early 2003. The UK being the first advised its citizens not to visit Kenya and banned British Airways flights into the country citing the country to be unsafe. This action was followed by the US and the Australian government issuing similar warnings. Germany, France, Switzerland and Denmark also issued notices cautioning their citizens against travelling to the country. By February 2004, all but the US had lifted their warnings.

The core complaint by these governments was increased insecurity in the country. According to an editorial by the Daily Nation (1 Dec. 2004) major security improvements especially in the airports, the seaport and the country’s borders were taken up by the Kenyan government with the backing of these governments who provided financial and 

47 Macharia Munene ‘A Historical Perspective on Kenya’s Foreign Policy’ Paper Presented at the Conference on Foreign Policy for Ambassadors and High commissioners. 16-17 August 2004, Nairobi, Kenya.
technical backing. As other countries lifted their advisories the US remained adamant that the country was still insecure and continued to renew their advisories towards Kenya.

In the same editorial, it noted the continuous advisories seemed to be designed to inflict political and economic damage on Kenya. This became clear especially after the Madrid, Spain, bombings in early 2004. Following the attacks tourists were encouraged to travel to Spain in a show of solidarity and yet a new advisory was passed on Kenya. The Kenyan government noted that the country was being treated unfairly by the US government. In November 2004, a new advisory was issued on Kenya citing continuous indicators of terrorist threats in the region aimed at American and Western interests in the country. Prior to the new ban Kenya hosted various international activities that put it in the lime light among them the UN Security Council, the international summit for a mine free world and various heads of States who assembled in the country to witness the historical inauguration of Somalia’s new president. The travel advisories though did not stop the US Secretary of State, Collin Powell, from visiting the country. In early 2004, he travelled to Kenya to encourage the signing of a peace accord by the Sudanese warring factions and in December the same year he was in Kenya to witness the signing of the peace deal.

According to Macharia Munene (2004) and Njoki Ndungu (2004) the continuous travel advisories are punishment on the country for not passing the controversial terrorism Bill, along with refusing to sign Article 98 of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and refuting the establishment of an American military base in the country. The US was one of the only seven nations to vote against the Rome Statute of the ICC in 1998, the Statute came to force in 2002. Since then the US government has been pushing for impunity bilateral agreements, otherwise referred to as ‘Article 98’, with various governments world wide. This agreement is an effort by the US to shield US citizens

48 ‘Club to scan travel advisories’ Daily Nation 25may.2004
49 ‘Kenya Urges US to replace advisory’ op cit.
50 ‘Visitors pour in despite new alert’ Daily Nation 01 Dec.2004
51 Interview with Macharia Munene and with Nominated Member of Parliament Njoki Ndungu who sits on the defence parliamentary committee on 16 Dec.2004
from prosecution by the international court. Unlike its neighbours Tanzania and Uganda who signed the impunity agreement in January and April 2004 respectively Kenya has declined to do so.

Ndungu observes that the advisories are likely to continue as long as the Kenyan government has not conceded to the US demands. One daily editorial (Daily Nation 1 Dec. 2004) described the US as unhappy with Kenya because it was giving a wrong example of a country struggling to rebuild its institutions and economy without acceding to others demands. These observations elucidate the incessant advisories imposed on the country long after other Western countries lifted their warnings and Kenya put in measures to enhance its security. It also explains why a new ban was issued on Kenya after the Madrid bombings and tourists were encouraged to travel to Spain as opposed to Kenya or why even after hosting the UN Security Council along with other major international conferences a new advisory was issued. The US has other reasons for continuously issuing travel advisories to Kenya.

The advisories were geared to hurt Kenya’s tourism industry; a move that would have negative implications on the economy in a whole. The industry contributes up to 13 per cent of the country’s GDP and 16 per cent of the country’s export earnings. (Sunday Nation 16 May 2004) Following the advisory lift by the other countries the industry recorded a positive growth of up to forty-six million Kenyan shillings, and a high in US tourists visiting the country despite the travel advisories issued by their government. This is an indicator of the irrelevance of the advisories. They have had no major impact on Kenya-US relations but only created some form of tension as Kenyans try to understand the reasons behind them and the US tries to pressurise Kenya to concede to their demands.

New Avenues of Security Collaboration: Counter Terrorism Measures
The Greater Horn of Africa has been identified as a transit point and haven for Al Qaeda members’. As it was during the Cold War the geographic proximity of the region to the Middle East has gained salience. The identification of Kenya as an anchor country in the sub-region in President Bush’s 2002 NSS opened new security avenues between the two countries. Security cooperation has long been an important aspect of Kenya-US relations since the Cold War. Following the war on terrorism Kenya’s military partnership has gained salience with the US proposing to establish a military base in Kenya. The proposal was not welcomed by Kenyans who opposed such a move. Philip Ochieng (2003) pointed out that such a move would make Kenya more vulnerable to terrorists’ attacks. The military bases were not established but the US renewed port, airbase and over flight agreements with the government.

Since 1998 the US has sent over three million dollars for anti-terrorism training in Kenya, and after the Kikambala attack in 2002 it has contributed another 750,000 dollars to improve the countries airport security. (Strategic Survey 2002/3:333) Subsequent to the 1998 attacks Kenya viewed itself as a target and not much action was taken however following the 2002 attacks in Mombasa the government took up measures to fight terrorism within its borders and the region. Gilbert Khadiaghali (2004) states that there was evidence Kenya was not only a soft target but a source of terrorism. The government formed the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit composed of officers trained in anti-terrorism and later set up a Task Force on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism that sought to review existing legislation and recommend a policy on combating the financing of terrorism.

In 2002, the US created the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA). The force encompasses military personnel from Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, Yemen and Djibouti which is the headquarters. Militaries from member States work with
US troops in counter terrorism measures. They work at disabling terrorist threats emanating in the region and is part of the US Central Command.54

Cooke and Throup (2003) point out that US bilateral relations with Kenya have become among the most active in Sub-Saharan Africa encompassing in addition to counter terrorism, regional peacemaking and stability. In agreement with this Joel Barkan (2003) states that Kenya has become the operation base for the US operations in the Greater Horn of Africa. According to Cooke and Throup (2003) Kenya houses the largest US embassy in Sub-Saharan Africa which was officially opened in 2003 along with the largest US Agency for International Development (USAID) mission. The embassy is the regional host of US activities and agencies, including security and military assistance, the Department of Agriculture, the Library of Congress and the Centre for Disease Control. The war on terrorism dominates Kenya-US relations among other issues like good governance and both governments have been working hand in hand to come up with counter terrorism measures for the region despite other concerns like high levels of corruption expressed by the US.

In October 2002 US Congress authorised the disbursement of twenty million dollars to strengthen counterterrorism in Africa, fifteen million was earmarked for Kenya. Cooke and Thoup (2003) aver that this attests to US recognition not only of Kenya’s regional importance but also to the country’s acute vulnerability as a soft target and conduit for terrorist activities. In order to enhance the ability of Kenyan and US forces to work together effectively in counter-terrorism they have been holding joint military exercises on the Kenyan coast.

Kenya’s strategic position in the Greater Horn of Africa has resurfaced as a major interest to the US in the war on terrorism policy. Kenya is a great recipient of military aid from the US as was the case during the Cold War.

**Conclusion**

The war on terrorism gave US policy makers a reason to take a look at Africa’s growing security challenges. The identification of anchor States in sub-regions of the continent was a policy decision by the Bush Administration to work with partners in the campaign against terrorism on the continent. As one of the identified anchor States in the NSS Kenya has taken decisive actions to address terrorism issues within its borders and the region. Although terrorism cannot be totally eliminated, effective counterterrorism measures and strategies have to be undertaken to deter terrorists from striking. The country has suffered under terrorist attacks and understands the need to deal with terrorist activities within her border. This in turn has drawn Kenya and US closer together as they share a partnership to fight terrorism.

The partnership has come along with some differences. Kenya adhered to the requirement that all UN members enact anti-terror legislation as stipulated in the UN Security Council Resolution 1373. The legislation that was introduced to the Kenyan parliament was seen as a violation of the citizens’ rights, there were accusations of the US manipulating the government as the SOT Bill was seen to resonate the USA Patriotic Act. Eventually the Bill was not passed but sent back for redrafting after immense pressure from the public, the civil society, and some parliamentarians.

The US has continuously placed travel advisories on Kenya. In the beginning these advisories had clear concerns of insecurity of which the Kenyan government in partnership with other Western government improved on. The US government though did not lift the ban but continues to impose travel advisories on the country with no specific reason other than cited terrorist activities in the region. This has led to various speculations as to why the continuous advisories have persisted, being the hegemony the US has used its power to pressurise governments to compel with its demands. It is this power and the pressure that has led to the travel advisories been seen as a punishment on the country for not budging to US pressure to pass the terrorism Bill, sign Article 98 and allow the establishment of a military base in the country. This though has not deterred

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55 The horrors of 11 September did not produce limits on the use of US power. Walter Lafaber postulates that in the post-11September world the US are at danger of being a nation so strong that others could not check it, and so self-righteous that it could not check itself. Walter Lafaber op cit p.558
Kenya from working closely with the US in the fight on terrorism in the region. Soldiers from both nations along with others from the region have come together for training measures.

The war on terrorism is ongoing and as long as the threat of terrorists attacking is perceived President Bush will continue in his doctrine to root out all terrorists and make the world a safer place. This in turn means that the US will continue to work with its anchor countries in Africa to fight terrorism. Accordingly even with the various differences Kenya and the US will continue to work in partnership to root out terrorist activities in the country and the region. The next chapter will look at the future of these relations.