Chapter Three
THE 1998 US EMBASSY BOMBINGS

Introduction
International terrorism has come to constitute the most serious threat to global peace, security and development. It has always been a major area of concern in the international system nevertheless it has regained international attention following the attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. The events of that one day elevated terrorism to a new global level.

Africa is by no means immune to terrorism. It has been drawn into this global agenda and is particularly vulnerable given its combination of weak and failing States, its porous borders, insecurity, poverty and poor governance. East Africa has been susceptible to terrorist attacks as witnessed in Kenya and Tanzania. In 1998 the US embassies in these two countries were bombed, and in 2002 an Israeli owned hotel was attacked in Kenya and missiles launched at an Israeli flight departing from Mombasa. According to Barkan and Cooke (2001:1) Kenya is seen as the gateway to East Africa and the Southern part of the Horn of Africa due to its sea port in Mombasa, its infrastructure and relative stability in the country.

Kenya is in a precarious position in the Greater Horn of Africa, as it is surrounded by countries torn by civil strife. Despite being the regional powerbroker, it has immense influence over countries that are regarded as harbouring terrorists mainly Sudan and Somalia,(Dagne 2002:6) who neighbour Kenya on the North West and East respectively. In geo-political terms, Kenya emerges as a relatively stable country.

This chapter seeks to address the issue of terrorism in Kenya. It will first look at the meaning of terrorism before proceeding to address the issue of Kenya and her neighbours. The impact of Somalia and Sudan’s conflicts along with their links to terrorists will be analysed especially the effect this has had on Kenya. The events of the embassy attacks in 1998 will be reviewed alongside the responses by both the Kenyan
and US governments. The chapter will also analyse the implications, claims and counter claims that arose from the attacks.

**Defining Terrorism**

The definition of the term terrorism is contested and a standard definition has yet to be formulated. Terrorism is an old occurrence, but how it is carried out has changed over the years. As stated by Cindy Combs (1997) and Andrew Sinclair (2003:71-2) the word terrorism originated during the French Revolution that began in 1789 and the Jacobin reign of terror in France (between 1792 and 1794). During colonial rule, the term was used to describe liberation movements that fought against the colonialists. ‘One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ summarises the problem of defining terrorism. The adage claims that a freedom fighter cannot be involved in terrorism while on the other hand that a terrorist or terrorist organisation can not be a movement of national liberation. According to Boaz Ganor the concepts terrorist and freedom fighter in this cliché are not mutually contradictory. This assertion illustrates the historical continuity of conflict under which terrorism is operationally defined.

The definition of terrorism is vague. Walter Lacquer (1987:2) argues that those trying to define it should use a ‘minimum theory’, this means outlining the characteristics of terrorism and terrorist activities. A number of scholars explain terrorist activities as those that are characterised by the loss of innocent lives, deeds that evoke emotional reaction from the victims and have profound political and social effects. In essence, a terrorist wants to pass a message that the group exists and let others know its underlying principles. Cindy C. Combs (1997) states that terrorism is a synthesis of war and theatre, a dramatisation of the most proscribed kind of violence which is perpetuated on innocent victims and played before an audience in the hope of creating a mood of fear for a political purpose. This is what makes terrorism effective, given that no one knows

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23 In her definition she stresses on the words ‘violence’, ‘innocent victims’, ‘an audience’ ‘mood of fear’, and ‘political purpose’, as important factors in acts of terrorism, both in the past and in the present day.
when and how it will occur. It is unpredictable, thereby creating a sense of fear and points out the vulnerability of those affected by it.

The lack of a standard definition has been seen as the reason for the sluggishness pace of tackling terrorism. A.P Schmid and A.J Longman argue that in order to avoid the simplification of the term terrorism and the actions taken against the perpetrators their needs to be a standard definition of the term. It is impossible to formulate or enforce international agreements against terrorism without a definite definition. The United Nation (UN) itself has yet to come up with a model definition of terrorism, though it has gone ahead and defined what constitutes terrorist activities. According to John Dugard (2004) in November 1937, the UN attempted to define terrorism in contemporary international law with the formulation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, which was drafted in response to the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia in 1934. It defined acts of terrorism as criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or the general public but the causes of terrorism were not addressed. The Convention was signed by twenty four States but ratified by only one, India, thus it never came into force.

During the Cold War other Conventions were introduced, addressing issues of the era. There were Conventions addressing the hijacking of airplanes and of terrorising diplomats. In December 1972, following the kidnapping of Israeli athletes during the Munich Olympic Games the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution providing for the setting up of an ad hoc committee to study issues relating to international terrorism. The report forwarded by the committee led to the adoption of four international conventions by the General Assembly leading to the UN condemning international terrorism as a criminal act. (Dugard 2004:2)

The end of the Cold War resulted in a radical change of attitude towards international terrorism. The international community was no longer concerned with the causes of terrorism, and the motives of the terrorists, but with the most effective ways of eliminating terrorism. The UN General Assembly resolutions in the 1990s contrasted sharply with the deliberate inaction of the Cold War. In December 1994, in its *Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism*, the General Assembly declared that member States of the UN should condemn all acts of terrorism. Following this, in 1996 an ad hoc committee was established to elaborate on an international convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings and thereafter to address means of further developing a comprehensive legal framework or convention dealing with international terrorism. The committee came up with the *International Convention for the Suppression for Terrorist Bombings* the most comprehensive anti-terrorism convention to date.

In the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted two resolutions, resolution 1368 (of 12 September 2001) and resolution 1373 (of 28 September 2001), which condemned terrorism in the strongest terms and called on States to work together to fight terrorism.\(^{25}\) The Security Council also committed itself to take up steps to combat all forms of terrorism.

In July 1999 the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) adopted a *Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism*. The convention came into force in December 2002; Kenya became a signatory on 28 November 2001 and ratified the Convention on 10\(^{\text{th}}\) December 2001.\(^{26}\) To augment the Convention, the African Union (AU) has established the Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism; it is intended to enhance the capacity of the AU in the prevention and combating of terrorism in Africa.

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\(^{26}\) African Union ‘List of Countries which have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the OAU Convention’  
Terrorism in Kenya
Kenya and Her Neighbours: Sudan and Somalia
Somalia and Sudan have been torn by conflict for years, especially after the end of the Cold War, destabilising the Horn of Africa. They have both been implicated to have terrorist ties and are seen as breeding grounds for terrorist activities in the region. Such activities along with the insecurity in these countries have trickled down to Kenya and affected the country in one way or the other.

Sudan
Since its independence on 1 January 1956, Sudan has been involved in one of Africa’s long standing internal conflict, making national building in the country complicated. Over the years the conflict has claimed millions of lives and displaced many others. The conflict has been between the Khartoum Islamic government, under the leadership of President Omar El-Bashir, which controls the northern region, and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), in the south under the leadership of Dr. John Garang.27

Sudan was for a long period considered a ‘rogue State’ because of its support for international terrorism. In 1993 the Clinton Administration placed it on the list of States that sponsor terrorism; it was the only Sub-Saharan country on the list. Over the years it was noted by the US State Department (1999) that Sudan ‘continued to serve as a central hub for several terrorists groups’. According to Special Report 113 (2004) in 1989, the National Islamic Front (NIF), now known as the National Congress Party (NCP), seized power in a military coup and set out to build an Islamic State, a home for radical Muslim groups.28 The NIF, under its spiritual leader and Islamic militant Dr. Hassan al-Turabi invited Osama bin Laden into Sudan in 1991, where he rented facilities in the country

27 Between 1972 and 1983 during President Jaafar Numeri’s term there was a period of peace as both parties signed the Addis Ababa agreement on sharing power and greater autonomy of the South. In 1983, this agreement was abrogated leading to a resurgence of the civil war, and the call for self-determination by the SPLM/A.
which he used as business premises and training grounds for the members of his group Al-Qaeda.

Sudan provided a haven to bin Laden and his associates from 1991 to 1996. According to Nicholas Huangin (2001) a government must be willing to facilitate activities carried out by such organisations and support them either because they are compatible with the country’s own foreign policies or because the terrorists can buy protection. The government of Sudan, Islamic in nature, was willing to accommodate bin Laden and gave him the protection and security he needed to function.

In Sudan, Al-Qaeda was able to recruit more members from the Islamic north and other neighbouring Islamic nations. In his look at the inside of Al Qaeda Rohan Gunaratna (2003:43) states that Bin Laden played the role of both a businessman investing in the country and a terrorist, recruiting and training others. He left Sudan in May 1996 for Afghanistan due to intense pressure on the Sudanese government by the Egyptian and US governments. The Sudanese government has since said that they offered to hand over bin Laden but the proposal was turned down. In the wake of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 President Clinton is quoted in the Sunday Times (6 Jan. 2002) as going on record stating that his refusal to accept the Sudanese offer was ‘the biggest mistake’ of his presidency. As of 2003, US authorities had evidence that Sudan still harboured terrorist groups long after bin Laden had left. Militant Islamic extremist organisations such as Hamas, Hezbollah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Al Gamaat al Islamiyya were identified to be in the country, and continued to support other terrorist groups in the region as of 2003. (State Department 2003) Due to the weak borders caused by the Sudan conflict, members of these groups have been able to penetrate to neighbouring countries and set up terrorist cells.

**Somalia**

29 In June 1995 members of an Egyptian Islamic group tried to assassinate President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The assassins were said to have fled to Sudan where they were given safe haven and where the preparations of the assassination had been thought-out hence leading to Egypt calling for his expulsion in the region.
Since the ouster of the government of Siad Barre in 1991, Somalia has been without a central government leading it to being declared a collapsed state. (Rotberg 2002:133) Warlords and political factions controlled various territories and had no effective way to exert authority within the borders. In 1991, the Somali National Movement (SNM) declared the north region of the country independent and renamed it Somaliland. In the northeast, another group had taken charge establishing a putative state called Puntland, while in the south a number of political warlords claimed legitimacy but no single group remained in control. According to Rotberg (2002:134) in 2000, a transitional government was formed however it was not recognised by the international community as it was unable to project its power against the several warlords who controlled sections of Mogadishu and large parts of the countryside. The recent peace talks in Kenya brought the various warring factions together in the hope of establishing a transitional government as a workable solution along with peace in the country.

Islam is the predominant religion in Somalia. Ted Dagne (2002:10) states that in the mid 1990s Islamic courts that functioned as the government began to emerge in parts of the country and governed using Sharia law. Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia was viewed as the most active of all the Islamic groups to integrate into the courts, its principal objective was to establish Somalia as an Islamic State. He further adds that it did this by attempting to build up its activities in the courts, the education system, media, and business. In September 2001, President Bush placed the group in its list of terrorist groups stating it had links to Al-Qaeda, though there have been debates whether the group is affiliated to Al-Qaeda or not. On one hand there appears to be no significant ties to the group, though some individual members have been known to have linkages to it. While on the other hand two top officials are suspected by US authorities of harbouring non-Somalia Al Qaeda terrorists. (Special Report 113 2004:10) Supporters of Al-Ittihad are widely believed to have infiltrated into some of the refugee camps in the north-eastern province of Kenya and to have made their way to Mombasa and Eastleigh the Somali neighbourhood of Nairobi. According to the Institute of Strategic Studies (2003:331-2) the group is thought to have gained support among the many unemployed youth in the
Coast province and especially Mombasa who have been hit by the decline of Kenya’s tourist industry, the main economic activity in the province.

In December 2001, the Bush Administration raised concerns over the instability of Somalia and feared that Al-Qaeda operatives would flee from Afghanistan into the country (Dagne 2002:16) following the US invasion of Afghanistan. The Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Walter Kansteiner, pointed out that the US had three objectives regarding Somalia. First, the US would work with neighbouring countries to make Somalia “unreceptive” to terrorist groups, secondly it would ensure that any activities in Somalia would not affect its neighbouring countries and finally, the US would work towards a lasting peace and economic development in Somalia. It is under these three main objectives of US policy towards Somalia that the US has pushed for the Somalia Peace talks.

The Threat Posed by Failed States
The occurrence of State failure is not new, though it has become more significant and disturbing than ever before owing to an increase since the end of the Cold War. Failed States have implications for peace and security to themselves and the international system as a whole. Robert Rotberg (2000:127) argues that failed States are incapable of projecting power and asserting authority within their own borders, leaving their territories governmentally empty. Such countries have been left open for any transactions and the flow of all manner of illegal goods, they have become breeding grounds of instability and exporters of terror through their porous borders, thus endangering peace not only in the region but also internationally. John Gray (2003) and Robert Rotberg (2003) point out that international security relies upon countries to protect their territory against chaos and limit the spread of anarchy beyond their border; it depends on national governments to be stable and authoritative at home as well as deliver a sense of stability in their region. The domestic anarchy in such countries makes the rise of terrorist groups more likely in the country and the region, thereby threatening international security.
The lack of a stable government in Somalia has left the country with porous borders leading to the flow of displaced citizens and illegal goods into Kenya and other neighbouring countries, and also threatening the stability of the region. State capacity has been weak and key interests groups like the warlords of Somalia have shown very little loyalty to the State. Consequently, the people have been aligned to the different warlord’s factions since the social contract that binds the citizens and central structures to the government are relinquished. In the case of Somalia and Sudan, the existence of Islamic extremist groups has led to the rise of terrorist groups, creating a threat in the region. The result of the internal turmoil in the two countries has spilled into Kenya, where illegal arms are prevalent in the northern region of Kenya. Over time, the illegal arms have found their way into other parts of the country, especially Nairobi, increasing urban crime. Kenya houses a great number of refugees from the two war-torn countries and around the region. In a survey carried out by the Institute for Strategic Studies (2003:331) Kenya has poor refugee screening mechanisms and terrorists have utilised this loophole to infiltrate the refugee camps in northern Kenya and eventually the interior of the country.

Due to the concern of security in the region and the threat of terrorist cells growing in the country, Kenya has continuously been involved in brokering peace in the two countries under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the support of other Western countries. The Somalia peace process has yielded positive results, in August 2004 over 200 members of parliament were nominated in Nairobi. While on 10 October 2004, Somali nationals were in Nairobi voting for a new leader, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed emerged the winner and was sworn in as the new president of Somali. In May 2004 there was a break through in the Sudanese peace. The warring factions signed three protocols towards a comprehensive peace agreement to share power and resources, in hope of ending the civil war that has ravaged the country for years, this occurred after the US became highly involved in the peace talks. In December the same

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30 In January 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powel travelled to Kenya to witness the signing of the peace agreement. The agreement was not signed then but three months later a power sharing deal was signed. This move was applauded by the US.
year the warring factions signed a comprehensive peace agreement that was witnessed by US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, among other leaders in Nairobi.

Peace in these two countries is of paramount importance for the region. The countries will be able to take a central role in ensuring security within their borders and fighting any terrorist threat within. They will be able to project power and assert authority within, the stability of these two countries would improve the security in the region as a whole and minimise the exportation of terror through porous borders. The perpetrators of the 1998 attacks crossed through these porous borders to penetrate into Kenya and carry out the embassy attacks.

**Al Qaeda Strikes the US Embassy**

Kenya has been hit by terrorists three times. On all of these occasions the attacks have been aimed at foreign establishments in the country. On December 1980, sympathisers of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) left a bomb on the eve of New Year at the ballroom of the Israeli owned Norfolk Hotel (in downtown Nairobi). It killed at least fifteen people and left another 100 injured mainly Israeli tourists.

The attack was an explicit target of a terrorist attack by the Palestinians retaliating against Kenya’s supposedly role in the Entebbe raid in 1976, Kenya offered logistic support to an Israeli commando team on their way to rescue Israeli hostages in Entebbe, Uganda. (Chege 2002, Williams 2004) During the successful raid the Israeli used bases in Nairobi, Kenya’s involvement in the raid angered the group who chose to retaliate with the hotel attacks.

On Friday 7 August 1998, two bombs went off in downtown Nairobi.31 Over 250 people died in the incident, among them twelve Americans, while thousands of others were left injured. The US dispatched emergency response teams to Kenya and Tanzania.

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31 Almost simultaneously in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, a car bomb exploded outside the US embassy killing 12 Tanzanians and injuring over 80 others. No American died.
Immediately after the attacks the US sent out a warning to all its embassies in the region and around the world to be on high alert. Reports later showed that there had been prior warnings of the embassy attacks, the US State Department warned that Osama bin Laden had reportedly threatened "some type of terrorist action in the next several weeks," and less than two months later the attacks in Kenya and Tanzania were carried out. Although security was tightened in several US embassies around the world, the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were not considered as possible targets.

The international community was appalled by the attacks, the UN’s Secretary General Kofi Annan termed the acts as ‘heartless terrorism’, while the Security Council passed and adopted Resolution 1189 (1998) condemning the attacks. The resolution called upon States and international institutions to provide support for Kenya and Tanzania, it also asked States to adopt, in accordance with international law, effective and practical measures for security cooperation for the prevention of such acts of terrorism, and for the prosecution and punishment of their perpetrators. This was in accordance with the resolution on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism that was passed in December 1994 which called on all UN member States to condemn all acts of terrorism wherever and by whomever they are carried out by.

**US and Kenya’s Reactions to the Embassy Attacks**

**US Attitudes and Responses**

One of the first responses by the US towards the attacks was to send out a travel advisory from the State Department asking US citizens to reconsider travelling to Kenya. This advisory attracted widespread condemnation from the Kenyan media and the tourism industry who argued that it was insensitive and unfair of the US to take such an action. They argued that Kenya was an innocent party in the attacks and was merely taking a blow meant for the Americans and the advisory was a clear statement that Kenya was insecure for US citizens. (East African Standard 20 Aug. 1998) The US State Department eventually withdrew the travel advisory but asked its citizens to be cautious when travelling to Kenya. According to an editorial in the East African Standard (15 Aug. 1998) tourism accounted up to ten per cent of the country’s GDP during this period.
and the advisory would have had a major negative impact on the industry and a devastating blow on the economy generally.

The US sea-launched cruise missile attacks against selected targets in Afghanistan and Sudan on 20 August 1998, they were in retaliation to the embassy attacks. The target in Sudan included the El Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, which the US claimed was producing chemicals used for VX nerve gas.\(^{32}\) This response according to Walter LaFaber (2002:544) also marked the first time a US president had called on the massive use of US military power to destroy an individual and part of his stateless organisation as opposed to a country. The world was no longer facing threats from a State but from an individual and his stateless group, thus making it harder to fight.

Though the US government stated that these targets were linked to bin Laden, they were widely voiced doubts about his (bin Laden’s) connection with the pharmaceutical plant. According to the Sudanese government the plant produced every day goods. A. Ahmed (1998:256) argues that the actions carried out by the US illustrated the difficult choices involved in responding to terrorism, for the attacks were seen by Muslims as an attack on them and not just a factory. Though the US saw the attacks as justifiable the response on the pharmaceutical factory in Sudan was inadequate. The US government was unable to show enough proof that the factory was in any way involved with bin Laden.

**Kenyan Attitudes and Responses**
The investigations on the attacks were carried out in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), anti-terrorism specialists, explosive experts and the Kenyan Criminal Investigative Division (CID). Under US Federal law, the FBI is mandated with the responsibility of investigating certain crimes committed against American Persons and property abroad.\(^{33}\) The attacks against the embassies in the region fell under this

\(^{32}\) Nerve gas is among the most dangerous chemical weapons in chemical warfare; the gas affects the transmission of nerve impulses in the nervous system, and can kill its victims. Strategic Survey (1998/1999) op. cit p.62

mandate. An FBI Declassified Executive Summary (1998) concluded that towards the end of 1993 individuals associated with bin Laden’s group, Al Qaeda, began to move into Kenya, especially Mombasa and Nairobi, while the initial planning of the attacks begun in early 1998, when key operatives of the group had already settled in the country.

Following the attacks several Muslims in Kenya were harassed and picked up by the police for no apparent reason. These arrests were greatly condemned by the Supreme Council of Muslims and human rights organisations as the arbitrary arrests were in violation of human rights. (East African Standard 19 Aug. 1998:6) They were later released. The Muslim population comprises of about ten to fifteen per cent of the total population in Kenya\(^{34}\) and are mainly concentrated in the Coast and North Eastern Provinces. The government has acceded to integrating part of the Islam religion in the educations system and the law. Though according to David Sperling (2000) and Mutahi Ngunyi (1995:144) the Muslims feel that their social and educational needs are disregarded and that their cultural and religious values continue to be disrespected additionally they feel neglected and marginalised politically and economically. They have been systematically discriminated against in the provision of State jobs and assets.

The people of Kenya felt angered by the violence committed on them, and were of the view that the country had been made an arena between America and its rivals. Demonstrations were held in Nairobi city condemning the bombings. Following the embassy attacks there were claims and counter claims from both sides, creating tension in the Kenya-US relations.

Immediately after the attacks the US marines took up position at the attacked embassy and strung barbed wire around the site. These actions provoked reactions from Kenyans who accused the marines of being insensitive and being more concerned with Americans and the security of the premises as opposed to the victims in the rumbles. The American Ambassador to Kenya, Prudence Bushnell, defended the actions. Her justification angered the public further as she accused Kenyans of being looters as pointed out in an

interview with Macharia Munene (2004). This brought about tension in the two countries relations, as Kenyans felt neglected by the US in a conflict that did not concern them. In turn the US had to defend the marines’ actions. This led to the Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, visiting the country to calm the situation.

The visit by Madeline Albright was expected to demonstrate the US’s sympathy with Kenya and Tanzania in mourning and pacify the people. In an editorial in the East African Standard (19 Aug.1998) she is quoted as having admitted that the US had not ‘acted perfectly’ after the bombings, though defended the marine’s actions stating they were prompted by panic and safety measures for all in the possibility of another attack and the building collapsing and trapping more victims. Although her visit was welcomed by Kenyans the marines actions were not excused.

The aftermath of the blast saw massive humanitarian aid, money and materials donated by various international organisations, governments and the private sector to the victims and the Kenyan government. Though later there was dismay by the disparity in compensation given by the US government to US versus Kenyan victims, this led to lawsuits for additional assistance from the US being brought forward by the victims and families.35 The US government denied the responsibility of compensation and instead shifted the responsibility on Al Qaeda, the group that was responsible for the attacks.36 This further agitated the Kenyan public and especially the victims who clearly saw themselves as the innocent party in the attack that was targeted for the Americans. However over a period of three years after the attacks the US had given a total of over forty million dollars on humanitarian grounds toward victims and survivors and paid all medical expenses for the seriously injured, nevertheless the victims were unsatisfied.

Conclusion

The 1998 US embassy bombings brought about a new aspect in the Kenya-US bilateral relations. The chapter first looked at the definition of terrorism and concludes that in

order to formulate or enforce international agreements against terrorism there is need to first define it. Though various resolutions passed by the UN addressing the issue of terrorism were looked at in an effort to help identify the UN’s definition of the concept. Failed States pose a great danger to the international system in general; Somalia and Sudan pose such a threat to the system as well as its neighbours. Both countries have been known to harbour terrorists and due to their warring status have been unable to protect its borders. Thus, these terrorists have managed to penetrate into Kenya. The corruption within Kenya and the decay of government institutions in the country has also facilitated the terrorists to penetrate into Kenya and set up terrorist cells that carried out the 1998 embassy attacks.

The chapter also looked at the US embassy attacks. The citizens of Kenya felt angered by the attacks and the actions taken by the US marines. Following the US embassy attacks a number of claims arose from the populace who felt angered by the attacks which they claimed did not concern them and the actions taken by the US marines, erecting barbed wire around the embassy, following the attacks. These claims though did not have a major effect on Kenya-US relations. Thus the attacks might have brought a new aspect to Kenya-US relations but it did not change it. The US continued to call on economic reforms in the country, calling on the government to deal with issues of corruption.

American interests continued to be attacked all over the world in acts of terror in the subsequent years. This though did not bring about great changes from the US until they were attacked in their own home front in 2001. The attacks of 11 September 2001, in New York and Washington brought about the war on terrorism led by the US. It not only affected the US but the world over and created new policy avenues for Kenya and US relations.