POWER AND KNOWLEDGE: A FOUCAULTIAN PERSPECTIVE ON LIBERAL OBJECTIVITY AND EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE.

Michael Philip Kissack

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ABSTRACT

This project considers the implications of the later work of Michel Foucault for the liberal concept of objectivity, which informs liberal educational practice. Initially surveying how the liberal concept of objectivity emerged from the work of the Enlightenment thinkers, the project continues with a criticism of this concept in the light of recent developments in the philosophy of science. These developments have produced a novel and radically different conception of objectivity, which can generally be described as a pragmatic or instrumental one. It is shown how the concept of objectivity in Foucault's examination of the social sciences has affinities with the one emerging from the recent work of the philosophers of science. The liberal concept of objectivity in both the natural and social sciences is exposed as discredited. The project concludes with a brief survey of the implications of Foucault's concept of objectivity for the relationship of educational practice to political change.
DECLARATION

I declare that this project is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Master of Education in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.

Michael Kissack

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INTRODUCTION

Liberal educational theory and commitment reflects the legacy of Enlightenment expectations. The Enlightenment thinkers believed that rationality could disclose the regulating laws of the natural world, rendering it amenable to human control, and thereby promoting the welfare and happiness of all. The exercise of rationality would not only subjugate the natural world, but would facilitate the harmonious integration of the social one. It would dispense with superstitious dependence on divine invocation for both material welfare and justifications of the social order. Rationality appeared to these thinkers as a panacea.

To the Enlightenment thinkers, rationality may be a distinctive faculty of human existence, but its development is not natural. It is a faculty whose acuity must be fostered by sustained effort and training. For the Enlightenment tradition, this is of course the function of education. Ignorance, error, and superstition characterize the pernicious natural state into which men are born. Educational activities clarify for men his position in, and his relation to, both the natural and social environment. Knowledge guarantees control, control provides security, and security promotes happiness.

Pervading the Enlightenment perspective was a concept of objectivity. This emphasized the importance of observational detachment, and fostered an empiricist epistemology. The latter espouses a correspondence theory of truth. To understand the natural world, men must commit themselves to observation and experimentation to confirm their assumptions about how the world functions. The individual observer is merely a recording agent; neither his personal preferences, nor his emotional dispositions should affect his conclusions, which are dictated by events in the world. There is an objectively verifiable correspondence between his recorded formulations, and events in the natural world. Personal detachment and meticulous observation provide the guarantee of objectivity.
The extension of this methodology into the field of social studies produced the tradition of naturalism. The objective acquisition of knowledge about the natural world provided the observer's formulations with epistemic status. It was assumed that if social studies were to enjoy the same status, their methodology would have to comply with that constructed for the natural sciences. All knowledge about the numerous facets of phenomenal existence would be scientific.

Such simplistic optimism about methodology and control did not endure. Although it is true that man's current control of the natural world has surpassed the expectations of his scientific predecessors, the methodological assumptions of this accomplishment have been radically impugned. It has been demonstrated how the positivist approach to the natural world neither appreciated the theory-ladeness of its observational statements, nor acknowledged the presuppositions of its own operations, namely agreement in definitions (about terms) and in judgments (the appropriate circumstances in which to apply them). Positivism could not account for its existence in social terms. (1).

The transference of a positivist methodology from natural scientific to social studies has been denounced as misconceived. Hermeneuticists particularly have emphasized that the entire effort is inappropriate to the subject matter, which is conscious social existence. They have concentrated on the necessity for the development of a methodology concordant with the nature of the discipline itself.

The challenge to the assumptions of the scientific method, and the rejection of its application to social studies, has shattered complacency and questioned progress in all fields except the successful intervention by men in the control of natural phenomena. One of the most contentious issues within current debate is that of objectivity, and to this extent, one of the Enlightenment's fundamental tenets persists into the modern period. The issue is pursued with such tenacity because it is
upon this concept that claims to knowledge are based; without it, assertions may be classified as mere conventionalism, imagination or fabrication.

Consequently, the ideal of objectivity (complex and qualified as it has now become) is fundamental to educational programs. Belief in its necessity, and hope for its attainment, indicate the extent to which Enlightenment aspirations permeate our educational institutions, discredited as these may be for those who examine the current philosophical foundations on which these hopes rest.

Both natural and social scientists have frequently been portrayed as purveyors of "the truth" about their respective disciplines since their inauguration by the Enlightenment movement. Their vocations have been presented as commendable in their impartiality; they seek the truth for its own sake, honestly adhering to their objective methodologies. If their accomplishments are abused by men with partisan motives, they cannot be considered as culpable.

Such a perspective informs liberal educational practice. Both teachers and pupils are involved in a disinterested quest for the objective truth about features of their world. The school is of course the institution in which this impartial activity is conducted.

The French philosopher, Michel Foucault, has been involved in the study of institutions; clinics, mental asylums and prisons. His early work evinced a methodological preoccupation, focussing on what he termed the "Archaeology of Knowledge". This unusual phrase refers to his early attempts to study the conditions for the possibility of particular forms of knowledge, embodied in specialized discourses. The term "discourse" refers to a set of formal statements about the world, or to what Dreyfus and Rabinow prefer to describe as Serious Speech Acts. (2). One of the interesting features of discourse for Foucault is its dichotomies; healthy/ill, sane/mad, normal/deviant, and it was an examination of these in particular societies which produced his unconventional historical studies Madness and Civilization,
The Birth of the Clinic and Discipline and Punish. His examination was conducted on a meta-level: what conditions produced the criteria for these dichotomies, the conditions of possibility for particular discourses?

For numerous, complicated, and for the present purposes, irrelevant reasons, Foucault's early project is considered to be a failure by both himself and others. (3) From the mid 1970s, his concentration has been devoted to a study of the relationship between power and knowledge in society, a preoccupation which was latent in his earlier studies, as he himself notes. Reconstructions of institutional life and assumptions contained within his earlier writings now provide illustrations for the theme, power/knowledge.

The concept of the detached observer, faithfully recording and conveying his findings about the natural and social world is seriously modified or discredited by the notion of power/knowledge. It implies that formulations with epistemic claims are not neutral knowledge, but contribute towards the maintenance of a particular power structure. A dialectic between the two is operative; knowledge buttresses power, and power generates knowledge.

The intention of this project is to examine the implications of power/knowledge for the liberal concept of objectivity, which is the foundation for liberal educational practice. Should the concept of objectivity be discredited, liberal educational practice would be subverted. In particular, its claim to political neutrality, and investigative detachment, would be seriously challenged.

Chapter one will outline Foucault's innovative concept of power, which is distinctive from both the traditional Liberal and Marxist formulations. Foucault believes that power is decentralized, located within the diverse institutions of society.

In Chapter two, discourse is analyzed as the fulcrum of power, within these institutions. Attention is devoted to the relativist epistemology implicit in Foucault's concept of discourse. The function of discourse in the constitution of social individuals is
also considered, comparing it with Althusser's theory of ideology.

In Chapter three, the relativist epistemology implicit in Foucault's discussion of discourse is considered within the context of recent developments in debates about objectivity. It concludes that Foucault's position continues a radical tradition which effectively demolishes classical liberal objectivity.

The consequences of this position for educational institutions and their potential for political transformation are considered in Chapter four. It is suggested in outline that Foucault's genealogy of knowledge can, in principle, make a contribution towards perspectival reorientation, but that this is dependent upon the tolerance of his adversaries.
CHAPTER ONE

In Discipline and Punish, The History of Sexuality Vol. 1, and a collection of articles and interviews under the general title Power/Knowledge Foucault explicates his concept of power. It is significant for two reasons; firstly, it rejects the Liberal and Marxist conceptions of power, both of which deplore its exercise in society, because of its repressive and dominating effects respectively; secondly, Foucault's concept depicts the exercise of power as both necessary and productive. A positive, or constructive, effect emerges from the exercise of power within Foucault's formulation. A brief digression into the history of European political thought clarifies these distinctions.

The concept of Sovereignty during the Ancien Regime focussed exclusively on the rights of the Monarch. In a social structure which viewed kingship in patrimonial terms, the legal system was considered as an extension of the monarch himself. Any legal violation was an assault on the person of the monarch. Consequently, retribution assumed the form of a brutal physical reprisal (described by Foucault in the first chapter of Discipline and Punish), to reassert the rights of the Monarch over his subjects.

In the wake of the French Revolution, and within the turmoil of the Industrial one, liberal political theory was developed. As a political doctrine, Liberalism preceded both momentous events, but attained maturity within the 19th.c. European industrial crucible.

The contractual fiction devised by classical liberal theorists like Hobbes and Locke to explain and justify the exercise of authority was incorporated into the 19th.c. formulation of the state - civil society dichotomy in liberal capitalist society. The Sovereign power, articulated as the State rather than as the Monarch, provided the legal security or canopy within which the private (primarily economic) activities of civil society could be
conducted. Within civil society, the individual could pursue any activity which was not harmful to another or to society generally. The legal or judicial system was conceived as a set of prohibitions. Foucault consequently describes it as a repressive system, indicating what the citizens may not do (thereby exposing the erroneous presuppositions of former theorists of power).

Legal transgressions by the individual were punished to reclaim him for the society which the social contract had constructed. The individual was no longer a target for the retribution of the Sovereign (as he had been during the Ancien Régime), but an object for rehabilitation and reassimilation into civil society.

In the middle of the 19th c. Socialism emerged as a challenge to the Liberal perspective. Within Liberal theory, the State exists to preserve and promote the welfare of civil society. Socialists denounced this as either pernicious deception or delusion. They believed that this formulation concealed the reality of domination; the State was controlled by, and existed to foster, the interests of those members of civil society who owned the means of production.

Liberal formulations are more modest than Socialist ones. The liberal tradition regrets the endemic exercise of power, but declares its ultimate necessity. It would be inaccurate to describe the Liberal's conception of power as "ineluctable", because his preoccupation is with the construction of a legal system which mitigates its repressive character. Power may be an indelible feature of all societies, but effort and vigilance can minimise its detrimental effects. The Liberal emphasis is on control and restraint, allegedly for the benefit of the entire society.

The Socialist definition of power as domination generates a more ambitious project, particularly in its 19th c. Marxist formulation. Unlike the Liberals, for whom power has a qualified positive effect (the creation of order, through selective prohibition, to promote the prosperity of civil society), the Marxists denounced power as domination, and as a completely negative social phenomenon. Marxists believed that their analysis exposed the
partisan nature of power in capitalist society. To them, the Liberal description of power as a regrettable, but necessary (albeit controllable) feature of human society, was contemptible hypocrisy. Power must be discarded. (They envisaged an historical evolution in which the government of men would be replaced by the administration of things, an almost chiliastic expectation which would eliminate power as a social phenomenon).

Both the Liberal and Socialist traditions accorded primacy to the State as the repository of power. For the Liberals, control of the State enables them to impose their vision of the commendable society; for the Socialists (or more specifically, the revolutionary Marxists), seizure of the State precedes the transformation of society, so that ultimately power itself can be dispensed with. (The latter formulation is particularly nebulous; Liberal theorists have usually had a more precise conception about social transformation and administration in a post-transitional phase, than have the Marxists).

Foucault rejects the concept of the State as the locus of power, and consequently distances himself from both the Liberal and Marxist positions. He denies that control of the State is fundamental to political analysis. His work involves a conceptual shift from power as concentrated in the State, to power as dispersed throughout the society, located within its diverse institutions with their numerous discourses.

Foucault has stated that he is involved in writing a "history of the present." By this he means that he has identified the "technologies of power" currently operative, and is concerned with their historical evolution. He believes that the Liberal preoccupation with sovereignty, rights, legitimacy and obedience obscures the reality of domination, operative in the "technologies of power." This may seem to align him with a Marxist critique, but he distances himself from the Marxist position, claiming that Marxists err in their location of power in the State apparatuses alone. For Foucault, a conception of concentrated power (susceptible to seizure through revolutionary action) is misleading; it portrays power as a
transferable entity. Instead, one must understand power as relations of force, dispersed throughout the entire fabric of society, in a complex nexus of control and domination.

Society's institutions are the fulcrums for the exercise of power. Foucault's study of the emergence and evolution of various institutions like mental asylums, clinics and prisons warrants his claim to being an historian. The techniques and procedures employed by these institutions constitute the "technologies of power", which structure the possible field of action for the members of the society. This "field of action" is an important concept because it implies minimum recourse to physical violence. Relations of force within carefully demarcated fields of possible action refer to numerous strategies employed by diverse individuals and groups to attain particular ends.

Force must be understood as pressure to comply with particular social norms, which are prescribed by the dichotomies articulated in institutional discourse. Such discourse indicates what is right or wrong, normal or deviant, mad or sane. These normative epithets envelop the individual, marking out for him the bounds of acceptable attitudes and conduct; they structure a field of action within which he is to conduct his life. The existence of forces, or pressures, implies the permanent possibility of challenge and resistance. In one of Foucault's most recent statements he indicates how the exercise of power, and the existence of resistance are inextricable. They establish a delicate balance of social equilibrium, which entails a minimum recourse to physical coercion. Society is constituted by the intricate imbrications of power relations; without them society could not exist, and it is in this sense that Foucault describes power as constructive. (4)

Our attention then is directed to discourse, and its attendant epistemology, within the endemic, and diverse, fulcrums of power in society, the institutions themselves.
CHAPTER TWO

According to Foucault, the development of Western Society since the 18th.c. has been characterized by both totalization and individualization. The 18th.c. marked the moment when man became both the subject and object of study; this conflation inaugurated a period of increased control, augmented by the expanding knowledge which administrations acquired about the inhabitants of the State. Approximation to total control necessitates maximum information about each individual. The individual is no longer the anonymous, distant, one of the pre-modern period, but carefully identified, and closely surveyed one. Totalization involves particularization, establishing the disciplinary society. The latter must not be construed as a disciplined society; a disciplinary society is one in which individuals are subjected to meticulous surveillance, whereas a disciplined society would be a vigorously regimented one, in which perpetual interference by, and immediate contact with, authorities was evident. The disciplinary society evinces greater subtlety, founded upon conditioning, docility and normalization. (5)

As an integral part of the organizational dimension of society, each institution articulates its function and normative preferences through a particular discourse, which is appropriate to its purpose. Institutions are an important component of the disciplinary society. Conditioning, docility and normalization, or access to the "soul" of man (as Foucault graphically expresses it) must be attained through discourse. It is discourse which describes, explains, prescribes and justifies, provides the parameters of acceptable behaviour and opinion, structures the possible field of action.

To accomplish this, discourse implicitly makes certain epistemological claims, and it is these which are the object of investigation. It is important to emphasize at this point that we are concerned with what Foucault has described as the "dubious sciences". These are the social studies, whose
findings are an essential component in institutional operations. The knowledge acquired through social studies enables institutions to exercise power. Foucault demonstrates that studies like psychology, demography and criminology emerged concurrently with the establishment of hospitals, asylums and prisons. It is more difficult to identify the precise relationship between the more respectable sciences and the exercise of power. Foucault explains this: "If we pose to a science like theoretical physics or organic chemistry the problem of its relations with political and economic structures of the society, haven't we posed a question which is too difficult? Haven't we raised the threshold of explanation at too high a level? If, on the other hand, we take a science like psychiatry, wouldn't the possibility of answering the question of its relations to society be much easier to pose? The "epistemological profile" of psychiatry is low and psychiatric practice is linked to a series of institutions, immediate economic exigencies, political urgencies and social regulations. Isn't it the case that in as dubious a science as psychiatry one could seize with more certainty the intertwining of the effects of knowledge and power." (6).

This does not imply that the respectable sciences can be omitted entirely from consideration, merely that the social sciences' relationship to the exercise of power is more easily demonstrable. What is the epistemological status of these "dubious sciences"?

Posing this question may seem incongruous within the Foucaultian project (since effects, rather than epistemological foundations are Foucault's primary concern), but it is a legitimate one in focusing on the implications of Foucault's conceptions for the notion of objectivity.

Foucault considers the relationship between discourse, practice and effect within institutional contexts. Two points are pertinent here; firstly, Foucault insists that there is an invariant discrepancy between the three. Discourse embodies a formal statement of intention, practice implements this to a greater or lesser degree
of approximation, but effects seldom reflect the initial intention. Secondly, the area with which Foucault is concerned is really "effects, the relations of force within a particular society."

This formulation may appear to discredit Foucault's endeavours, for one may ask why the relationship between discourse, practice, and effect is considered if only the latter is significant. This impression is however only created if a discourse-practice-effect sequence is considered in an insulated chronological manner. Discourse is important not only within a disjointed, or discrepant, causal sequence, but also in a retrospective analysis of action and its consequences i.e. the role of discourse within a prescriptive formulation must be considered in conjunction with its function in a critical one. A theory-practice dialectic is evident here; theory (discourse) informs action and action modifies theory. Both intentionality and reflexivity is articulated in discourse.

Although the role of discourse is vindicated, the centrality of effect is not thereby displaced. Intended effect itself must be related to strategy which is deliberate action for specific purposes within the incessant struggle inherent in social existence. Discourse is employed to facilitate the attainment of particular objectives (although the concordance between the two is seldom realized). Discourse is thus partisan, with no universal validity, (as some objective formulations would prefer to claim). Foucault is not deterred by the relativist consequences of this position, which appears to subordinate truth to strategy. In Foucault's view strategy is primary, truth subservient to it. Foucault's insistence on this is evident from his concept of the "Régime of Rationality".

Foucault's neologistic phrase is very expressive; it conveys his conviction that power and knowledge are inseparable. Rationality is not usually associated with any form of hegemony, but for Foucault, a particular rational articulation implies a particular form of domination . . . this sense that Foucault considers power to be positive or productive, not in any morally commendable way, but in a merely constitutive sense. A regime of rationality is positive in three ways; firstly, it structures a possible field of action (as explained above); secondly, it produces
(acceptably) true discourse; and thirdly it constitutes individuals within society.

Discussions about "régimes" usually involve discussions about legitimacy. An aspect of the régime of rationality is the status of those who utter the truth, and the manner in which truth is acquired. It certainly appears as if Foucault is adopting an unqualified form of conventionalism; greater clarity on his position is obtained if we refer to what shall count as legitimate or authoritative in a particular society, or what shall count as criteria for the acceptance of a body of propositions as true. This conventionalism is fundamental to any study of effects within society: for Foucault, the epistemic status of the propositions appears to be irrelevant, an effete preoccupation of liberal intellectuals (Foucault's conception of intellectuals will be discussed in a subsequent chapter).

If the "soul" of man is to be penetrated and accommodated within the disciplinary society, he must assimilate the current régime of rationality. The subject is produced and defined by the internalization of knowledge. The affirmation of a particular régime of rationality is necessarily the exclusion of another, and for this reason, any exercise of power or claim to knowledge is implicitly normative:

There is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives (7).

Compliance locates one within the precincts of acceptability: discourse itself demarcates normality. As indicated above (8) one of the constitutive features of discourse is its dichotomies: within each pair (sane/mad, healthy/ill), one component is commended, the other deprecated or condemned. The current, prevalent discourse describes normality, and indicates what shall count as acceptable.

Foucault's position has interesting similarities with Althusser (9) who wrote about how ideology (a concept avoided by Foucault because of its implicit distinction between truth and falsity) interpellates individuals: individuals are initiated into the dominant ideology of the State via the Ideological State
Apparatuses like the Churches and Schools. Many entertain the illusion that their perception of the world (which reflects the dominant ideology) is one which is acquired autonomously. Foucault's regime of rationality appears to function in the same way as Althusser's interpellating ideology; it produces conformity, docility, conservatism and social cohesion, a constrictive field of possible action, which appears to those within it as normal and acceptable. Foucault's position does not however envisage the attainment of an objectively verifiable scientific position, which will necessarily endure as a critical vantage point for the social investigator. Althusser strove to establish this position, believing that Marxism itself provided the needed scientific corpus of knowledge.

Developing his concept of ideology, Althusser also referred to it as a lived, but imaginary relationship to the world. The fact that it constitutes part of a lived relationship to the world means that it must reflect aspects of an objective reality, otherwise its illusory quality would be transparent to those immersed in it. Although Althusser believes that Ideology, as a necessary and fundamental force for social cohesion, cannot be dispensed with finally, he anticipates that social illusion will be more beneficial for the state's inhabitants generally under a "Socialist Ideology" than under a "Capitalist" one. Uncontaminated knowledge (assumed by Althusser's very analysis of Ideology i.e. his distinction between science and ideology, truth and falsity) is the privileged acquisition of a few men like himself.

For Foucault, no such position exists. The individual is permeated by the regime of rationality, one in which the critic like Foucault is himself immersed. No privileged meta-position exists into which the critic may elevate himself to observe the "truth" about reality. Althusser's position does seem more credible by comparison, for although Foucault makes no universal claims, he must claim that his "history of the present" i.e. his articulation of the evolution of contemporary technologies of
power, is an accurate description of how institutions function within particular political structures. There is a definite suggestion of a social ontology in Foucault’s work. One may, however, criticize Foucault’s failure to explain how his own status is possible, rather than his concept of the regime of rationality, which, if construed (with qualifications) as similar to Althusser’s interpellating ideology is very illuminating.

The discourses, or knowledges, with which Foucault associates the exercise of power within social institutions, are the “dubious sciences”, or social studies. These are an integral part of the regime of rationality. Foucault is primarily interested in the effects of their articulation, but their epistemological presuppositions are an important concern of my project.

These presuppositions have been described as relativist. Within conventional debates about objectivity, such a classification would be sufficient to discredit the entire formulation. Attention should therefore be given to recent conceptions of objectivity within a radical tradition with which Foucault can be contrasted. This provides us with greater clarity on the consequences of the concept of power/knowledge for liberal objectivity.

In referring to liberal objectivity, it is important to reiterate that this concept is the one which emerged from the Enlightenment tradition. Its repudiation by contemporary radical epistemologists (amongst whom one can include Foucault), does not imply that they do not have an alternative formulation of objectivity. (Such alternatives are considered in Chapter Three). In rejecting the Enlightenment concept of objectivity, they do not reject the concept of objectivity itself.
CHAPTER THREE

The objectivity envisaged by the liberal tradition is based on a correspondence theory of truth; the observer's formulations reflect the state of affairs in the world. This assumption was considered particularly pertinent to natural scientific investigation, and social scientific endeavours were expected to emulate it, if they were to attain authentic epistemic status.

This perspective has been impugned. Critics have argued that this positivist approach is based upon a distinction between observation language and theoretical language which cannot be maintained. Natural scientists developed a methodology which initially posited a hypothesis, and then sought confirmation for it in the natural world. The hypothetical formulations constituted the theoretical language, while the articulations of empirical investigation, which either confirmed or refuted the hypothesis, constituted the observational one.

Radical philosophers of science deny that this distinction is tenable. They insist that the allegedly neutral observation language is in fact theory-laden; the theoretical language of the hypothesis determines what shall count as evidence for the confirmation or refutation of its tenets. The observers' direct contact with "reality" through empirical investigation is in fact a chimera. Michael Matthews has indicated (10) that the positivist disdain for metaphysics is very myopic; no scientific enterprise can be conducted without assumptions about the nature of reality. Aristotle's enquiries assumed that physical reality operated according to the principles of potentiality and actuality. These assumptions constitute a metaphysical position: hypotheses and observations are regulated according to these, and one must acknowledge these assumptions if one is to be fully aware of the nature and limits of one's activities i.e. theory laden-ness must be recognized.
Having exposed these misconceptions about the nature of objective scientific investigation, philosophers of science posited an alternative formulation, based on the distinction between the theoretical object, and the object of knowledge (or the real object). The theoretical constructs of natural scientists must be reassessed continually, to ascertain their internal consistency, and their adequacy when compared with other theories in a similar field of investigation. There must be no assumption of an isomorphic relationship between the theoretical object and the real object, articulated by an observation language.

Such a suggestion generates a profound unease amongst traditional objectivists, who retort that the theoretical object cannot be distinguished from fictional constructs. This radical repudiation of traditional assumptions must reduce the natural scientist to a specialized fictionalist; without an attempt to demonstrate a correspondence between theory and reality, theory degenerates into an elaborate fantasy.

Writers like Charles Taylor (11) claim that no such disruptive conclusion is warranted, for the simple reason that scientific theories are validated by their success. Theories do not exist in isolation from the world; they are verified by their application to the world.

Taylor's comment is particularly pertinent to the realm of technology. It is quite possible that the theory, upon which the successful technological interventions in the world are based, is in fact erroneous i.e. scientists' explanations for their practical successes are incorrect, but Taylor would probably argue (together with those who share his perspective) that this is inconsequential. The purist pursuit of a certainty that one's theoretical constructs embrace, specify and exhaust the extent of material reality as it is, is quite futile, and in principle probably impossible. In reply to the objectivist's question "Is your theory true?" the technological reply must be that one is not concerned with a definition of truth against which to assess a theory, but rather with a criterion of truth, which is efficaciousness.(12). This accords with the
Wittgensteinian repudiation of a quest for essences (the truth, the perfect definition) in language, and the substitution for it of a concentration on linguistic usage (meaning as use replaces meaning as essence). Extended into the scientific realm, one is concerned not with theoretical veracity, but with theoretical practicality.

As an "historian of the present" Michel Foucault has described how the social sciences emerged from a strategy by governments in the early modern period to secure greater control over their subjects. An objective truth about psychology and society was irrelevant to such a strategy (what is the "true" nature of the human psyche, the "true" foundation of social order and dynamism?). Foucault's work suggests that manipulation underlies any quest for "the truth"; practical issues of control are cardinal.

The discussion, therefore, about objectivity in science, and the manipulative potential of social science explicated by Foucault, converge on the notion of epistemological instrumentality.

Reference to the instrumental value of both natural and social scientific activity reinforces Foucault's concept of power/knowledge. He himself has described in detail how social scientific knowledge has abetted the social programs of governments in Western Europe since the 18th.c. (despite the frequent discrepancy between intention and effect). The technological innovations since the industrial revolution have augmented the manipulative capabilities of these governments.

Natural scientific objectivists have been compelled to concede the cogency of the philosophers' arguments about the viability of their epistemological assumptions; those who propound a simple correspondence between theory and world are considered naive or obstinate (and hence irrational). What effect does Foucault's insistence on the instrumental applicability of the social studies have on the objectivist's perception of the social disciplines?

Although the objectivist may acknowledge the credibility of Foucault's analysis, he may attempt to salvage some features of social studies for a traditionally objective status. He may argue that information about the correlation between dietary improvements
and longevity is objective information, as is a description about demographic movements in a particular period. Unfortunately for the objectivist, this objective information is to him what the simple facts are to the historian - objectively true in a conventional sense, but completely useless. What social studies generally and history particularly, are concerned with is explanation; having conceded this, all are embroiled in a hermeneutic exercise, interpreting the interaction between man, nature, and society, and other men's conceptions of the same.

Charles Taylor has shown (13) how this portrayal has resulted in an interesting inversion. During positivism's, pre-eminence, social studies were pressurized into complying with its methodology; failure to do so placed its epistemic status in jeopardy. The positivists provided the scientific model, and only disciplines conforming to it could qualify as knowledge. The assault on positivism's complacency, and the deprivation of its objective certainties, have resulted in its incorporation into the hermeneutic enterprise. Pure scientific knowledge (the accumulation of information) is an obsolete or irrelevant activity. Science's approximation to objectivity is effected through the practical demonstrability of technology, which cannot be conducted in isolation from the societies out of which it has emerged. Technological applications are considered in relation to social needs, and this effectively subsumes technology under social studies.

This formulation eschews technicist possibilities (the attempt to portray social decisions are preoccupied with the means to achieve particular, "incontrovertibly salutary", goals). The application of both technological and social knowledge to society must be considered by the members of the society who will be affected. These decisions will be susceptible to continual reassessment. Issues arise about how these decisions will be made, the form which distribution will take, and the nature of equitable treatment during conditions of scarcity.

Such concerns are raised by Habermas (14) in his consensus theory of truth. According to Habermas, these decisions, founded upon
both technological and social discourse, become objective only in conditions of free discussion - when members of the society are not constrained by any form of threat or coercion. If each participant is acknowledged as a source of claims, progress can be made to an acceptable course of action, which is objective because of the manner of its formulation i.e. consensus through rational discourse.

It is not clear from Habermas's exposition whether his concept of rationality has universal applicability, or merely a logical pertinence or coherence within the concrete situation out of which it emerges. The former possibility entails the obligation to respect general principles such as consistency and the law of contradiction; the latter is probably the alternative on which he relies.

If so, Habermas's consensus theory of truth accords with Foucault's regime of rationality. The main difference is that Habermas's formulation is idealistic (in the colloquial sense). Historical experience does not testify to the attainability of such a consensus and ignores an almost inevitable resort to force when the dictates of rationality are inconvenient for a group which has the resources to flout them. Foucault is describing a mechanism which can obviate recourse to violence by structuring "fields of action" within which people will conduct their lives according to acceptable procedures. For Foucault, there must always be members of the society who are disaffected from the regime of rationality, but their resistance can be contained with coercive measures if necessary. Foucault is probably more iconoclastic than both Althusser and Habermas. This emerges from the brief comparisons between Foucault's concept of the "regime of rationality" and Althusser's concept of ideology, as well as between Foucault's "regime" and Habermas' consensus theory of truth. All three however are noted for their significantly novel concepts of objectivity.

Althusser depends extensively on the distinction between the real object and the object of knowledge, the latter produced through theoretical practice which, for highly contentious reasons, is considered by him to be scientific (15). He also insists on
maintaining a clear distinction between science and ideology, primarily to vindicate Marxism’s claim to scientific status, and thereby to prevent its reduction to an expression of a particular social formation’s ideological level. Althusser wishes to demonstrate its permanent validity as science. Whether or not Althusser succeeds in this project is a controversial matter. The point here is that he maintains the science-ideology distinction while repudiating any resort to traditional objectivity, which he rejects as discredited empiricism. (16) (Habermas’s consensus theory of truth indicates the extent to which he too has distanced himself from traditional objectivist concerns).

For Foucault, objectivity consists in the formulation and adherence to the “régime of rationality”. This objectivity is not sacrosanct (and no universal claims are being made) but merely a social reality with which one is circumscribed. This is evident from Foucault’s political program (examined in the final chapter), which is essentially constructed around the creation of a new “régime of rationality”.

Foucault’s position is reminiscent of Gadamer’s (17) Reflecting upon hermeneutical issues of understanding, and their function as a foundation for human society, Gadamer asserts that understanding is embedded in tradition. Tradition provides the intersubjective agreement, which is the prerequisite for social cohesion and development. Gadamer argues that the social theorist cannot extricate himself from this tradition in order to assess it. He denies the existence of an independent position from which to evaluate the tradition or understanding upon which society is erected. Foucault too repudiates the concept of an independent vantage point, leaving the theorist only with the tenets of the “régime of rationality”.

Habermas opposes Gadamer, because he rejects the relativist implications of his position. Similar criticism would be levelled against Foucault by Habermas. One can infer that the independent critical position upon which Habermas insists is provided by his concept of rationality. Although Habermas’s concept is problematic because of its imprecision and apparently
contextual limitations, it enjoys the theoretical advantage of providing a critical space for the philosopher to assess his subject. Gadamer and Foucault's positions preclude this, depriving them of an account of how they can become critics. Their relativism also fails to explain how a critical intellectual apparatus can be formulated, given that they are constrained by the tradition or regime in which they are immersed.

Foucault's concept of power/knowledge is an integral part of the "régime of rationality", and consequently of his notion of objectivity. His portrayals are part of a general assault on the classical liberal formulation of objectivity, beginning with the radical criticism of the philosophers of science, who rejected the distinction between theoretical language and observation language, substituting for it the distinction between the real object and the object of knowledge. The instrumental verification required by this new formulation was conceived as pertinent to the social disciplines too. The application of both technological and social knowledge to society is subordinate to the perceived requirements of those who are directly affected by it. Consensus about this application constitutes a novel concept of social objectivity, articulated by Habermas.

Foucault's "régime of rationality" resembles Habermas' social consensus; it is more circumspect in that it does not anticipate the degree of homogeneity which Habermas does, but more extreme in its relativist consequences.

Foucault's concept of objectivity may be distinctive, but it is clearly located within a radical tradition, whose luminaries include Althusser, Habermas and Gadamer. As one of the most prolific and imaginative current theorists, he can be described as delivering the coup de grâce to the liberal concept of objectivity.

It remains to examine how Foucault's concepts influence considerations about the socially transformative potential of educational institutions.
CHAPTER FOUR

Foucault's insistence on the partisan origins and evolution of the "dubious science" has a pessimistic connotation. Modern man appears to be ensnared in an ineluctably sophisticated manipulative process.

Such a depiction corroborates the perspective adumbrated by Althusser in his article, *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses* (18); teachers who teach the social sciences convey the "regime of rationality" to their pupils, perpetuating the power structure in which they operate.

However, like Habermas and Althusser, Foucault does not accept the impotence which is suggested by his descriptions of the interdependence of contemporary knowledge and political power.

For Habermas, the prospect for liberation resides in *Ideologiekritik*, which can be conducted in the Ideal Speech Situation (19). Within this situation, questions about equity and legitimacy can be raised and resolved, so that consensus about the justice of the social order can be attained. Should these conditions obtain, liberation can be said to exist.

Determined to vindicate the scientificity of Marxism, Althusser seems to have been compelled to adopt a Leninist position, in which the liberating scientific knowledge of committed Marxists is disclosed to the oppressed by the Party. Foucault's hope for liberation emerges from his concept of genealogy.

Foucault's early work was concerned with the archaeology of knowledge, in terms of which he identified discourses, and the conditions for the possibility of their emergence. As the intricate relationship between power and knowledge became more apparent, his attention shifted to the genealogy of knowledge, concerned less with identification than with an examination of the use and role of knowledge. This is explicated in *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality Vol. 1*.

Fundamental to the role of knowledge in the organization of society,
is the arrangement of discourses into a scientific hierarchy. At the summit are the "respectable sciences" of physics, chemistry etc., descending to the "dubious sciences" of history, sociology, psychiatry etc. The legitimacy of this hierarchy, and the assumptions upon which it is based, are irrelevant here. Two points are pertinent; firstly, theorists like Habermas and Foucault have indicated how this hierarchy has been intimately related to the exercise of power in society; secondly, Foucault has indicated how this hierarchy necessarily excludes certain discourses, which are neither respectable nor dubious, but discredited. It is with these excluded discourses that Foucault is concerned in his genealogical studies; it is upon them that he bases his hope for transformation and his concept of liberation.

As an historian, Foucault is interested in the historical status of the intellectual. Focussing his attack again on the Liberal tradition, he exposes and denounces the liberal myth of the impartial, or universal intellectual, whose self-conception is founded upon his role as the champion of universal ideals like virtue and justice. Adherence to this nebulous apotheosis is pernicious, because it perpetuates the particular system of domination in which the intellectual is situated. His general criticisms do not affect the situation, his prescriptive pronouncements may endow him with a sense of rectitude, but in fact his insistence on the clear distinction between knowledge and power permits the untrammelled exercise of the latter. The universal intellectual's uncontaminated knowledge is a chimera; he must either commit himself and his knowledgeable resources to a particular cause, or acknowledge that his abstinence implicates him in the continuation of existing power relations. (20)

Foucault's specific intellectual is a committed intellectual, one who recognizes and acknowledges the power/knowledge nexus, and who is determined to contribute his expertise to the construction or maintenance of particular "fields of action", or relations of force. In the contemporary world of specialization, in both the natural and social scientific spheres, the specific intellectual must become a partisan. He must examine the concrete
power (and knowledge) relations in which he is located and decide whether or not to endorse or resist these. In accordance with Foucault’s preoccupation our attention must focus on the "dubious sciences". Within Foucault’s formulation, what role would the specific intellectual perform within an educational institution?

Having established that the concept of power/knowledge demolishes liberal objectivity, the specific intellectual can preserve and fortify existing power relations in his presentation of social sciences, or he can resist them. If he resists them, his strategy consists in the employment of the genealogy of knowledge.

If the genealogy of knowledge indicates the extent to which certain discourses have been excluded or subjugated, the subversive or oppositional specific intellectual must concern himself with the revival or restoration of these discourses. Although they may not qualify as knowledge (assuming that the criteria regulating the organization of epistemic discourse in the hierarchy of knowledge are acceptable to the critical, specific intellectual), they are important because they embody a particular perspective, which is relevant to the general political struggle. A subjugated discourse is usually the attribute of an oppressed people; part of their liberation consists in the reaffirmation of their perspective, and in their assertion that it is a legitimate criticism of the triumphant or prevalent discourse. (21)

The strategy of reviving subjugated knowledges has been referred to as one of "reverse discourse" (22) an opposite expression, capturing the extent to which one is involved in formulating new definitions (of patriotism, for example) to restructure perspectives on a particular social issue.

The specific intellectuals are capable of resisting the effects of discourses by reviving and articulating subjugated ones. One can infer from Foucault’s position that specific intellectuals can convivially operate within educational institutions, performing an oppositional role, particularly within the social disciplines, or the "dubious sciences".

Foucault’s distinction between universal and specific intellectuals is reminiscent of Gramsci’s one between traditional and organic
intellectuals (23) Gramsci's concept of "hegemony" seems to approximate Foucault's one of the "regime of rationality". The organic intellectuals, fostering the interests of the proletariat, are responsible for countering the ruling ideology (or hegemonic consensus within civil society).

Gramsci emphasized the importance of education in creating the "potential state" i.e. the ideological predisposition amongst the oppressed, prior to the revolutionary action which would secure political control for them. For Gramsci, as for Foucault the exercise of power cannot be reduced to simple coercive relations. The extensive dissemination of ideas which either ensures or challenges social cohesion is vital.

Gramsci does not believe that the struggle for a general transformation is confined to the ideological level. Material conditions must be propitious for a successful revolutionary seizure of power, but the ideological preparation is a crucial preliminary to this action. Foucault is quite reticent on the issue of revolutionary action - he does think that revolutionary seizures can be inauthentic if the "regime of rationality" is not concordant with the political regime. His attention seems to be focussed on the former, without indicating how this concordance can be accomplished or guaranteed.

Although Gramsci's historicism (his belief that the knowledge, both socially and naturally scientific, is reducible to the context out of which it emerges, and is consequently ephemeral) is as relative in its implications as Foucault's regime of rationality, he differs fundamentally from Foucault in the priority which he accords to consciousness. Gramsci's Marxism is humanist, focussing on the self-liberating subject; it implies the attainability of an autonomous perspective by disaffected members of the society. His work suggests that within the limits of a concrete historical situation, the needs and interests of the proletariat can be ascertained through the exercise of reason (Gramsci's definition of rationality, like Habermas', seems to be formal i.e. respect for fundamental principles like consistency. The "objectivity" of the
proletariat's needs and interests is not demonstrable universally, but only within the circumstances in which the analysis is being conducted. To this extent, Gramsci's theoretical position is more consistent than Foucault's. As indicated above, one of Foucault's major interests is the manner in which the individual is constituted in society, how identity is derived from the assimilation of the "regime of rationality". Foucault does not explain how an individual like himself can elevate himself above the "regime of rationality" to assess and describe its mechanism, and to suggest how it can be countered. How is his extraordinary perspicacity constituted? Gramsci does not have to contend with this problem, since he concedes the possibility of autonomous criticism within any social formation. Foucault's idea of a strategic revival of subjugated knowledges not only implies an autonomous conception by those who realize their strategical value, but an acknowledgement of the cogency of rational discussion i.e. it must be possible for the specific intellectual to impress his audience with his new perspectives (revived discourses). He must be capable of formulating and conveying to his audience a critical intellectual apparatus, despite the constraints of the "regime of rationality". It is possible to articulate a new discourse, or revive an old one, to present a different perspective which will influence actions. It is difficult, however, to explain this, when one concentrates on the "constitution of the subject".

Although both Gramsci and Foucault are critical of liberal systems, it is interesting to note that both the attempt to create the "potential state" and the possibility of a critique, if not a supercession of, the "regime of rationality" by the genealogical method, presuppose a liberal political system. Within an autocratic or totalitarian system, no such endeavours would be feasible. At this point, it is appropriate to consider Foucault's work in relation to traditional liberal preoccupations with the neutrality and autonomy of educational institutions.
The concepts of neutrality and autonomy are, as Crittenden has indicated, (24) intimately associated with that of liberal objectivity. Critics like Freire suggest that educational neutrality is either devious or deluded. References to neutrality either deliberately conceal the institutions' commitment to a particular political system, or reflect the delusion of those individuals who sincerely believe in the detachment of their educational efforts. Such a perspective concurs with Foucault's concept of power/knowledge, which has politically tendentious implications. Within Freire's position, there are certain significant political problems, which are pertinent to Foucault's as well.

In Crittenden's view neutrality is to be understood as non-alignment, and autonomy as freedom from interference. Neutrality is considered by liberals to be a prerequisite for autonomy; unless the existing authorities are assured that the educational systems are non-aligned, they will be inclined to interfere with them.

For Freire (and Foucault), neutrality is a myth. The educational institutions convey particular values from generation to generation, buttressing the existing order. Knowledge contains a normative preference and a manipulative capability.

It is clear from the tenor of Freire's work that commitment is essential. He does not deplore the fact that the educational institutions in capitalist society are subordinate to that system. It is the system which he denounces, as well as the duplicity of those educationalists who profess their neutrality within it. Freire believes that alignment is necessary; he clearly advocates educational support for a socialist system (the precise nature of which does not receive close attention). Foucault's support for the specific intellectual indicates a similar sympathy for commitment.

However, it is quite probable that Freire's denunciation of neutrality is at variance with his pedagogical preferences. He favours dialogical education, by which he means that teachers
must initiate discussions with pupils, who pursue the argument where it leads. Teachers are not the sources of knowledge, which is then deposited by them in the minds of their pupils (the "banking" concept of education).

Such a depiction implicitly raises the question of limits and tolerance. If educational institutions are committed to a political system, the dialogical method can be pursued only under the auspices of a sympathetic government. If the institutions are consciously, and willingly, subordinate to the perpetuation of a particular system, its authorities will interfere, should adverse opinions be generated by the institutions' activities. If alignment is embraced, autonomy must be relinquished, and constraints accepted. This is a debilitating limitation, if not an overt negation, of the dialogical method.

Liberal theorists like Crittenden associate neutrality, autonomy and objectivity. They believe that a commitment to neutrality will induce political authorities not to interfere with the quest for academic objectivity.

The objectivity envisaged is the one rejected by writers like Habermas, Gadamer and Foucault. They would argue that the impartiality of the liberals' objective propositions is spurious, and would defend an alternative concept of objectivity, emphasizing the importance of commitment.

A liberal would argue that autonomy promotes objectivity because it enables intellectuals to consider as many perspectives as possible. Foucault would deny the apolitical pretensions of liberal academics, denouncing their duplicity or confusion, and insisting upon a commitment by them. (He would probably claim that continued adherence to a liberal concept of objectivity precludes this commitment; a political orientation must be preceded by an epistemological reformulation).

Such a position clearly places Foucault in a dilemma; active commitment entails the relinquishment of neutrality, with the probable loss of autonomy. Academic heteronomy (through the identification of intellectuals with, and subordination to, an
acceptable political regime) precludes alternative formulations; it prevents a specific intellectual from reviving subjugated discourses, impedes the activity to which Foucault is committed. (It is assumed that Foucault would never anticipate the perfect conjuncture of a political system and regime of rationality, one so satisfactory as to preclude further reassessment). For this reassessment to occur, educational institutions cannot be subordinate to the political system i.e. they must be autonomous. The extent to which neutrality is an official pre-requisite for this would apparently depend on the tolerance of the political authorities; the extremes of total neutrality or total commitment (with its concomitant intellectual subordination) cannot realistically be considered as the sum total of possibilities.

If it is true that Foucault would not accept intellectual subordination to political policy, both he (and Gramsci) are conspicuously dependent on the tolerance of their adversaries for the realization of their aims. Gramsci's theories were formulated within a Fascist prison, under a regime which successfully prevented any construction of a "potential state". Foucault writes within one of Western Europe's liberal societies, in which "reverse discourses" can be articulated. Whether or not liberal tolerance is practised because liberal governments believe that radical criticism can be absorbed and emasculated is debatable. Perhaps tolerance flourishes when criticism is impotent. Whatever the case, radical criticism's dependence is clearly evident.
NOTES


2. Dreyfus, H.L. and Rabinow, P. Michel Foucault : Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Harvester Press, 1982

3. ibid.

4. ibid.


8. Supra Page 3


10. op. cit.


12. Matthews, M.R. op.c.t


16. Critics like A. Callinicos and N. Geras (Althusser's Marxism and "Althusser's Marxism: An Assessment" respectively) suggest that despite Althusser's assiduous attempts to dissociate his formulations from traditional epistemology - the Enlightenment tradition - he ultimately lapses into (Enlightenment) objectivity with his insistence on a distinction between ideology and science, falsity and truth, and on the attainability of an enduring, universally valid vantage point from which to analyse social formations. This vantage point is, specifically,
the science of Marxism, which provides a permanently valid and incisive critique of society, according to Althusser. A Marxist understanding must counter the erroneous ideology which prevails in capitalist society, and which is responsible for the interpellation of subjects within this society, through the medium of numerous Ideological State Apparatuses like the Churches and Schools. The abstruse nature of Marxist understanding implies that it is comprehended only by a small group of "theoretical practitioners" who are responsible for its dissemination to dispel the influence of a capitalist ideology. This perspective has generated the conclusion that Althusser is essentially Leninist. He also encounters problems in explaining how the "theoretical practitioners" emerge as independent agents from the decisive influence of interpellating institutions to convey their revolutionary alternative to deluded (interpellated) subjects. These latter criticisms, or reservations, about Althusser's work are, however, a digression within the present context. What is relevant about his formulations is that they posit an absolute and detached critical epistemological position, reminiscent of the objective stance sought by the Enlightenment theorists. Any Althusserian educational program must therefore be conceived as truth countering order.

A Foucaultian educational program would not have the same epistemological implications. This chapter indicates that Foucault's concept of objectivity, implicit in the regime of rationality, is concurrent with (if not identical to) the instrumental and consensual concepts of objectivity, explicated respectively by radical philosophers of science and Habermas.

If Foucault's regime of rationality and Althusser's Ideology constitute subjects in a similar manner, they differ in that Foucault repudiates any concept of the truth, which will dispel the mystifications of the current regime. Although Foucault would experience difficulties in explaining how he has extricated himself from the regime which has constituted him (as would Althusser in explaining his liberation from an interpellating ideology), he advocates the substitution of one regime of rationality for another. The possibility of articulating an
alternative régime does not receive extensive theoretical consideration; he is however emphatic that the régime does not constitute the truth.

These theoretical problems, however, will not be the focus of the final chapter. Attention will be devoted to Foucault’s concept of the specific intellectual and the conditions necessary for the intellectual to perform his self-appointed task, namely the articulation of an alternative (but not truthful) régime of rationality.


18. op. cit.


21. It should be noted here that the term "discourse" is being employed in a very general sense. Foucault formulated his concept of discourse in his early works, with which I have not been concerned, and may have a precise definition of it. This definition (if it exists) is not provided in his later works; the reader receives a general impression of the concept within the context in which it is employed.

Foucault noted that one of the prominent features of discourse is its dichotomies. These are obviously definitional, and it is the normative import of these definitions which contributes significantly to the construction of fields of action. Within a particular society, for example, terms like patriotic/treasonous, security forces/terrorists, have an effect on the perceptions and actions of its members; their political dispositions are constituted by the dominant political discourse. The claims of treasonous people or terrorists are excluded from consideration, because their status within the prevalent political discourse is automatically discredited. In the present discussion, I am
assuming that the revival of subjugated discourses involves the assertion that excluded discourses must be rearticulated and presented as claims which are entitled to serious consideration. Those who have been subordinated must be acknowledged as sources of claims, whose legitimacy must be reviewed within a new discourse. A new discourse creates a new perspective, which facilitates the construction of a new field of action.
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