THE FOREIGN POLICY OF SWAZILAND

P. Frankel

A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, for the Degree of Master of Arts.

Johannesburg
July 1975
DECLARATION

This is to certify that this dissertation is the result of my own unaided work and has not previously been submitted to any university for any other degree.

P. Frankel
DECLARATION

This is to certify that this dissertation is the result of my own unaided work and has not previously been submitted to any university for any other degree.

P. Frankel
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER 1</th>
<th>INTRODUCTION</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PART ONE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2</td>
<td>NATION-BUILDING AND ITS INFLUENCE UPON THE FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES, PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES OF THE DEVELOPING STATES - A THEORETICAL MODEL</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Nation-Building and the Definition of Foreign Policy Objectives</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Choice in the Developing State</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. The Application of Foreign Policy to the International Environment</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART TWO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3</td>
<td>DOMESTIC SOURCES AND FACTORS IN SWAZILAND'S FOREIGN POLICY</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Swaziland's Economy: its Relevance to Foreign Policy</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Swaziland's Social Composition and its Effects on Foreign Policy</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. The Political Identities of Swaziland's Leadership: The Psycho-Ideological Bases of Swaziland's Foreign Policy</td>
<td>71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. The Strategic Dimensions of Swaziland's Foreign Policy</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Political Development and Swaziland's Foreign Policy</td>
<td>91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4</td>
<td>SWAZILAND'S FOREIGN POLICY IN APPLICATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Swaziland as an International Economic Actor</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Swaziland as an International Political Actor</td>
<td>138</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART THREE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 5</td>
<td>SWAZILAND AS A NATION-BUILDING STATE AND THE EFFECTS ON ITS FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES, CHOICES AND STRATEGIES</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDICES

- **APPENDIX I** - SWAZILAND'S TREATIES ...
- **APPENDIX II** - DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN SWAZILAND ...
- **APPENDIX III** - SWAZILAND'S REPRESENTATION ABROAD ...
- **APPENDIX IV** - SWAZILAND'S MEMBERSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS ...
- **APPENDIX V** - SWAZILAND'S DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: DOMESTIC ORGANISATION AND PERSONNEL AS AT NOVEMBER 1973 ...
- **APPENDIX VI** - PROJECTED INVESTMENT PROGRAMME 1973/74 to 1975/76 ...
- **APPENDIX VII** - MAP OF SWAZILAND ...
- **SWAZILAND - A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY**
- **A.** Swaziland as a Nation-building Polity 176
- **B.** Swaziland's Foreign Policy Objectives and Strategies in the Context of the Nation-Building Task ... 180
- **C.** Politico-Economic Conflict and Choice in Swazi Foreign Policy ... 192
- **D.** Conclusion: The Future of Swaziland's Foreign Policy? ... 209

**APPENDICES**

**APPENDIX I - SWAZILAND'S TREATIES** ... 222

**APPENDIX II - DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN SWAZILAND** ... 236

**APPENDIX III - SWAZILAND'S REPRESENTATION ABROAD** ... 238

**APPENDIX IV - SWAZILAND'S MEMBERSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS** 239

**APPENDIX V - SWAZILAND'S DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: DOMESTIC ORGANISATION AND PERSONNEL AS AT NOVEMBER 1973** 239

**APPENDIX VI - PROJECTED INVESTMENT PROGRAMME 1973/74 to 1975/76** 240

**APPENDIX VII - MAP OF SWAZILAND** ... 252

**SWAZILAND - A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY** ... 253
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The study of foreign policy can be viewed from a number of perspectives: thus, certain research focuses on the process whereby foreign policy decisions are made; other analyses seek to explore the relationship between foreign policy behaviour and the capabilities and influences internalised within societies; whilst further approaches are geared towards an examination of foreign policy-making and action under specific circumstances, such as crisis conditions, or at particular levels of social development and modernisation. Basically however, the foreign policy process reflects an integral characteristic of all policy-making processes, namely, that the inputs fed into, and the outputs derived from the policy-making process, are a product of certain defined mechanisms or structures, formally or informally constituted, in interaction with a broad social context. The analysis of foreign policy is, in this sense, systemic in orientation, and what foreign policy is, the manner in which it is formed, and the nature of its application, cannot be divorced from this interaction between mechanisms and structures, which respond to, and in turn inject stimuli into a social environment of which they are a constituent part. It is, in short, the interplay between mechanisms and context which imparts to foreign policy its features.

In a more specific sense, foreign policy-making can be seen to involve three distinct yet interrelated sets of activities. In the initial instance the foreign policy-maker is a conceptualising creature; the form which the eventual output of the foreign policy-making process assumes, is predicated to a considerable degree on the assessment of prevailing situations by those individuals and groups involved in the policy-making process itself. These
individuals and groups may or may not be formally vested with the prerogative to articulate and apply the foreign policy of the state, and the influence which each as a unit may bring to bear on what is sought through foreign policy action will be effected by a variety of cross-cutting factors reflecting inter alia, the centralisation of power in the state, its foreign policy tradition, its value-systems as well as administrative role-requirements.

In any event however, the making of foreign policy requires the performance of an initial interpreting function in terms of which, through the medium of the perceptions of those involved in the policy-making process, what is desired through foreign policy action is defined and articulated. Over and beyond this moreover, the making of foreign policy implies a set of formulatory functions or activities, in terms of which identified objectives are integrated with categories of available social resources, and evaluated in terms of costs, benefits and risks. The social capacities, both human and material, which can be employed in support of defined foreign policy ends is always finite, whilst the very pursuit of these ends is constantly an endeavour whose returns and dangers can never be accurately and precisely pre-determined. Under such circumstances, the foreign policy-maker is obliged to involve himself in a series of choices, characterised by a pattern of trade-offs between objectives, and an allocation of priorities and emphases between possible foreign policy ends. Finally, and in the ultimate instance, foreign policy-making embodies an applied dimension wherein an operationalisation of chosen priorities is attempted: this involves the translation of subjectively desired goals into substantive realities, through the implementation in the international environment, of strategies which in the perception of policy-makers are deemed to be the most appropriate to the realisation of chosen ends. It is at this point that policy-makers must give attention to tactical considerations, and must seek to identify those results which constitute the visible
output of the foreign policy-making process.

Viewed in these terms, foreign policy-making is at once a conceptual, formulatory and implementing endeavour, wherein goals are defined, preferences allocated, and strategies identified and applied. What is of major significance however, is that all of these operations which in their totality constitute the mechanism of foreign policy-making, are intimately affected by the broad social environment within which they take place. This environment may be seen as being composed of both the intra-state environment of which the policy-making process is an integral part, and of the international context within which the state itself functions. In any event, it is the combination of domestic and inter-state influences, pressures and patterns which constitutes the ecological setting within which foreign policy is always applied and made, and which establishes the parameters which determine limitations on, and options open to the policy-making process. The values whose realisation is sought through foreign policy action, the hierarchy of foreign policy priorities, as well as the means which are utilised by states to achieve those priorities, is, in this sense, a direct product of the broad social, economic, political, cultural, ideological and psychological context within which foreign policy-making takes place.

In current terms, this relationship between the mechanisms of foreign policy and the social context within which they operate, is relatively well understood: thus, it is readily appreciated that the means, ends and preferences of foreign policy are conditioned by a variety of influences located both within and outside of the state. It is also currently recognised that there exists certain functional commonalities in the foreign policy-making structures of states: thus, all states are similar in that their foreign policy-making mechanisms are oriented
4.
towards the threefold operation of goal-definition, preference-allocation and strategy-identification and implementation. What is less appreciated however, is the fact that the nature of goals, foreign policy choices and tactics vary from state to state in accordance with the differing social contexts within which discrete foreign policy-making processes operate. This tendency is particularly noticeable in comparative analyses of the foreign policies of developed vis-a-vis developing states, where little attention is often paid to the generic features of the social context within which foreign policy in the case of each is made. The developing state is, after all, both an economically and politically pre-modern social entity: it is a society which is, for the most part, characterised by economic backwardness, socio-cultural fragmentation, and endemic shortages of both information and skilled manpower. The developing societies of the international community are at present at a stage of political experimentation where institutions and structures are neither relatively established, consolidated nor set. Internationally the developing state is, in its individuality, a relatively powerless entity, and, in a manner which reflects this fact, policy tends to be made within a psychological environment whose main characteristic is insecurity, anxiety, and, in many cases, simple fear: it is this that partially underwrites the emphasis placed on ideological values of a group-determined character. The combination of incapacities has moreover induced political leadership in these states to attribute priority to the so-called ‘nation-building’ task and to orientate policy and action towards injecting formal political independence, juridically-defined, with real and substantial meaning. All in all, the environment within which foreign policy of the developing state is made, is, in many major respects, qualitatively different from that of the more industrialised and established members of the international community: it can therefore be logically deduced that the goals, choices
and tactics which are generated by the structures of foreign policy in the developing state will be qualitatively different from those in their more developed counterparts.

From an analytical point of view, this element of difference has gone largely unnoticed. On the contrary, there exist two distinct trends in interpretation of the foreign policy processes of the developing states, both of which tend to obscure the context-mechanism relationship within a developing state framework.

First and foremost, research focused on the foreign policy-making processes of developing states has tended to be dominated almost entirely by the application of theoretical constructs drawn from the experience of the older and more established developed states of the international community, to their counterparts in the less-developed regions of the world. The validity of this, as has been suggested, is most questionable. This is true in two senses. Firstly, available evidence tends to suggest that the policy-making process in the developing state is sub-system dominant. In other words, although policy is a product of pressures and influences which originate both external and internal to the state, in a manner which is unparalleled in the case of the developed state, and which reflects the introspective concerns of political leaderships intimately involved in internal social construction, domestic influences in the developing state play a considerably greater role in what foreign policy seeks to achieve and the means used thereto. It is therefore far more valid to infer the nature of foreign policy in the developing state from internal circumstance, than would be the case at higher developmental levels, where values related to actual nation-building are accorded a lower priority and significance by mass publics and the policy-making
elte. Secondly, it should be borne in mind that research concerned with the developed polity relates to structures, institutions and processes which operate within a relatively established framework and upon a relatively consolidated social basis: research concerned with the developing polity does not. In the former case, political behaviour reflects a situation where the nation-state is a deeply rooted set of social facts: in the case of the developing polity, characterised as it is by the diffusion of loyalties, economic under-development and socio-political experimentation, the dynamic under consideration derives from a situation which is witnessing the nation-state-in-becoming. This is no less true at the level of foreign policy, where the attitudes underlying policy-making, the choices integrated into the policy process, and the behavioural orientations adopted in relation to the external environment, reflect the particular politico-economic demands associated with the nation-building task. Such analytical distinctions are however seldom drawn: the consequence is expressed in the continued use of conceptual categories reflecting the nature of established systems, which do little justice to the element of fluidity which underlies goals, preferences and tactics in those states primarily concerned with the expansion of their political and economic capacities, and with the consolidation of their newfound independent existence.

Apart from limited reference being made to the different social contexts within which mechanisms of foreign policy operate, even where attempts have been made to integrate these particular social features into modular constructs of foreign policy operations in developing states, these have tended to be partial insofar as they stress certain of these factors at the expense of others. In general, research on the foreign policy of developing states has tended to identify either personal-
7. idiosyncratic or long-term historic and geographic factors as the sources of foreign policy. These variables are not irrelevant; on the contrary the idiosyncratic orientations of a charismatic political leadership must significantly affect the form which foreign or domestic policy assumes, whilst even though geographic and historic givens tend to affect the outcome of policy choices rather than the nature of choices themselves, they do constitute parametric givens which influence the range which policy can assume. In the ultimate instance however, over-emphasis of the personal, geographic and historic elements in the foreign policy-making ecology can lead to an obscured perspective where the foreign policy of the developing state becomes 'little more than a game played by a single performer, or by a small band of elite players at the expense of the nation's real interests' or, alternatively where foreign policy goals, priorities and tactics become a product of a certain situational determinism which does not fully accord with the range of options actually available to the policy-maker of the developing states. An insightful view of the foreign policy of the developing state cannot be gained through the view that it is merely an extension of the personal characteristics of political leadership, or a mere reflection of the geographic and historic realities confronting the state. What is additionally required is recognition of the fact that foreign policy also reflects the influence of the prevailing social, economic, ideological, cultural, political, and psychological configuration within the state, which tempers idiosyncrasy and the interpretation of environmental givens.

It seems relatively clear on this basis, that the relationship between the foreign policy mechanisms of goal-definition, priority-allocation and strategy-implementation, have not, in the case of the developing state, been adequately correlated with the broad nature of the domestic environment.
within which the policy-making processes of these states operate. It is important that this analytical gap be, to some degree, eradicated and that models be developed which will interrelate the value placed by political leadership on the nation-building task - and the political and economic consequences which flow therefrom - with the foreign policy goals of the developing state, the value which it attributes to certain of these goals vis-a-vis others, and the means which it employs in order to attain its preferred ends. The following thesis is framed in precisely these terms. In Part I a model is developed which indicates how the objectives, choices and strategies of the newly-independent developing state are an integral function of those political and economic conditions which orientate political leadership in these states towards involvement with the nation-building task. In Part II, an attempt is made to explain the economic and political variables which function to gear the foreign policy of Swaziland in specific directions: particular emphasis will be placed on the domestic sources of Swaziland's foreign policy, and the operational dimensions of Swaziland's role as an international political and economic actor. In the final concluding section i.e. Part III, an attempt will be made to integrate the material referent i.e. Swaziland, with the theoretical propositions articulated in Part I. It is hoped that this effort in its totality will generate a more intimate knowledge of Swaziland's international role, and that it will concurrently throw light upon the still relatively unexplored, yet intimate, relationship between nation-building and the conceptual, formulatory and applied dimensions of the foreign policy of developing states.

2. This would, to one degree or another, include all of the works listed above. A useful critique of some of these is to be found in F.B. Weinstein. 'The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia: An Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy in Less Developed Countries': World Politics. XXIV. No. 3, April, 1972. P.356.


5. F.B. Weinstein, Ibid.

6. This is strongly suggested by H.I. Zartman, Ibid. p.80 and p. 144.
CHAPTER 2

NATION-BUILDING AND ITS INFLUENCE UPON THE FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES, PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES OF THE DEVELOPING STATES - A THEORETICAL MODEL

In many ways the contemporary era is characterised by action rather than contemplation, and, in the political sphere, this emphasis is particularly marked in the case of the developing states of the world, currently deeply involved in the processes of political restructuring and modernisation.¹

The form of new political institutions is as yet in many cases neither clear nor defined. There is however a deep appreciation on the part of the nation-builders of the developing world, that political development requires the promotion of mass participation in government, increments in the social capacities of government, and the increased specialisation of governmental structures.² It is moreover recognised that the realisation of these objectives depends not simply on the mobilisation of power by the institutions of state, but, more substantially, on the ability of these institutions to exert power which is recognised by society at large as authoritative and ethically acceptable.³ In this sense, nation-building as a form of political modernisation is intimately related to the translation of power into authority, and with the legitimisation of the institutions of state.

Within this comprehensive framework, nation-building can be seen to imply two sets of legitimating activities. Internally, the nation-builder seeks to promote the authority of the state in the perceptions and sentiments of the local populace; he seeks to promote and consolidate the right of the institutions of state to formally regulate the allocation of political values
within the boundaries of society. Externally, nation-building seeks to establish the state as a viable and significant participant in the processes and activities of the wider international community of which the state is a part. Nation-building is thus geared to both domestic and international audiences, and is oriented towards bolstering the subjective and objective position of the state in both a local and external constituency.

(i) Nation-Building as an Internal Activity

In the case of the developing nation, legitimation of the institutions of state is hampered by the social framework within which nation-builders operate. Instead, in contrast to the emergence of the modern nation-state in Western Europe, the thrust towards political modernity in the developing areas has neither been preceded nor accompanied by the emergence of common political sentiments, identities and loyalties. Genuine nations emerge when the ideas and customs of discrete social groupings of a particularist nature are defined in overarching and collective national terms. In most developing states this has not yet happened, and the result is that the nation-builder and nation-building must operate in an atmosphere of social stress which is far more pervasive, intense and fissiparous in its effects, than anything experienced in the more developed areas of the world.

In practice, the fragmentation of political identifications in the developing areas is a product of two factors. In the first place, most developing societies are characterised by a high degree of racial, cultural and ethnic pluralism which does not lend itself easily to the processes of social unification which nation-building implies. In the second place, and in a manner which has not conformed with initial expectations, social and economic modernisation has operated to aggravate social conflict in the developing systems. It can well be argued that in the long-term social and
13.

economic development will lead to the emergence of cohesive social structures which will make the concern of the nation-builder with the establishment of legitimately-recognised political institutions somewhat easier.\(^7\) In the short-term however, the limited modernisation which the developing states have experienced has created serious discrepancies between social demands and capabilities, and between material aspirations and the possibilities for their fulfilment.\(^8\) Limited socio-economic modernisation has tended to lead to vast population increases, uncontrolled urbanisation, progressive unemployment and under-employment of a widespread nature. And in the short term it has, in many ways compounded the social tensions normally associated with the state of under-development.\(^9\)

Defined in these terms, the nation-builder in the developing state must needs operate under relatively adverse conditions where traditional social divisions and the processes of modernisation have, in interaction, created an environment of conflict and stress. Under such circumstances the integration of political loyalties and identifications which are part and parcel of the political modernisation or nation-building task, becomes extremely difficult. The capacity of leadership to manipulate unifying and common political symbols is reduced, as is the capacity of this leadership to lay claim to recognition as the legitimate formal regulators of territorial socio-political processes. It is indeed precisely because of this situation, that the major task which currently confronts the nation-builder is not simply the construction and operation of modern governmental institutions per se, but, more fundamentally, relates to the promotion of centralised political identities, and the diffusion throughout the polity of recognition of the legitimate existence and functioning of prevailing national authority structures. It is the fact that the developing polity is a 'state-nation' rather than a 'nation-state' which gives to nation-
building in these systems a qualitatively different set of priorities than those where the political institutions of state are widely recognised and accepted as legitimate political facts.

(ii) Nation-Building as an External Activity

Nation-building is not however only a domestically-oriented task concerned with the promotion of the legitimacy of the state on a local or internal basis. On the contrary, it has external or international aspects as well. It is for example relatively clear that distinctions can be drawn between the juridic and actual or substantive equality of the actors in the international community. In practice, the status of any state in the international system is less a function of legalistic prescription than it is of power, capability and wealth. In reality, the current international system is a highly stratified social entity which in broad and general terms is composed of those states which are established and powerful, and which can legitimate their claims to prestige and a system-influencing role through reference to heritage and current politico-economic resources, and those states which cannot. From another perspective, the contemporary international system is composed of a large category of states whose participation in international life, and whose role in the international system, is questionable, the doctrines of sovereign equality notwithstanding. These states are largely the developing states which have neither a history of participation nor vast power resources to underpin recognition of their vital, credible and significant involvement in international life.

This fact is currently appreciated in the policy-making circles of developing states. In these states, leadership is inclined to believe that the small and developing international actor is not devoid of the capacity to exercise international power and, in doing so, to influence
building in these systems a qualitatively different set of priorities than those where the political institutions of state are widely recognised and accepted as legitimate political facts.

(ii) Nation-Building as an External Activity

Nation-building is not however only a domestically-oriented task concerned with the promotion of the legitimacy of the state on a local or internal basis. On the contrary, it has external or international aspects as well. It is for example relatively clear that distinctions can be drawn between the juridic and actual or substantive equality of the actors in the international community. In practice, the status of any state in the international system is less a function of legalistic prescription than it is of power, capability and wealth. In reality, the current international system is a highly stratified social entity which in broad and general terms is composed of those states which are established and powerful, and which can legitimate their claims to prestige and a system-influencing role through reference to heritage and current politico-economic resources, and those states which cannot. From another perspective, the contemporary international system is composed of a large category of states whose participation in international life, and whose role in the international system, is questionable, the doctrines of sovereign equality notwithstanding. These states are largely the developing states which have neither a history of participation nor vast power resources to underpin recognition of their vital, credible and significant involvement in international life.

This fact is currently appreciated in the policy-making circles of developing states. In these states, leadership is inclined to believe that the small and developing international actor is not devoid of the capacity to exercise international power and, in doing so, to influence
the pattern of international events. This sentiment is, however, balanced by the realisation that the political options available to the small developing state are strictly limited by the human and material resources at its disposal, and that as a direct result of the power disparities which are internalised within the current international system, its structures and operations are not conducive to the performance of viable small power roles. Together these factors create a policy-making environment for the small developing state, whose major characteristic is an endemic sense of anxiety, caution and insecurity. In a more positive sense however, the weakness of the small and developing state encourages the view on the part of policy-makers that the participatory role of the state in international life cannot be guaranteed by legal notions of international equality per se, but requires conscious effort specifically designed to remedy the position of the developing state in the international community. In these terms, the projection of the state into the international community as a substantial and significant entity in its own right becomes an objective sought through policy action. The translation of legalistic notions of participation into operational terms is thus an additional integral feature of the nation-building enterprise.

A. Nation-Building and the Definition of Foreign Policy Objectives

In the ultimate instance, all values are social rather than personal, and as such policy-making values are rooted in the nature of society. This means that in the developing state, foreign policy must to some degree reflect the concerns of leadership with the nation-building task. More specifically, the goals sought through the medium of foreign policy action must be conditioned by leadership’s involvement with the legitimation of the state domestically, and in the wider international environment.
(i) Nation-Building as an Internal Activity: The Economic Objectives of the Foreign Policy of the Developing State

From an internal perspective, nation-building suggests promoting the institutions of statehood as the legitimate focus for domestic political identifications and concerns. This means that leadership in the developing state must adopt a set of policies which are, in their perceptions, most appropriate to containing the fragmentation of loyalties which reduces the capacity of the state to function as a central mechanism and unifying symbol. These internal policies may assume a number of forms. Yet by and large policy-makers in developing states have come to an appreciation of the role of rapid social and economic modernisation as a factor in the nation-building process: the result is that in current terms, accelerated socio-economic modernisation has become defined as the primary means for promoting the social mobilisation required by the integrated national community. Substantial improvements in material life on a mass scale are seen as a means to channel diffused identities towards central institutions, and the expansion of social facilities and opportunities to facilitate the loyalty-transference process.14/

This ethos, which is deeply ingrained in the post-independence philosophy of most leaders of developing countries, has important implications for both domestic and foreign policy. Explicitly, it suggests involvement in an exceedingly complex and multi-dimensional task geared towards the complete transformation of society, and requiring vast expenditures of both human and non-human social resources.15/Socio-economic modernisation implies infrastructural construction, agricultural development, industrialisation, the exploitation of mineral wealth and the promotion of national tourism. It implies the mobilisation
of capital and technology, shortfalls in which can seriously impede the development effort and the realisability rate of those objectives associated with modern social and economic life. Indeed, to the degree that the system does not have at its disposal financial and human resources sufficient to meet the appetitive demands of rapid socio-economic growth, the nation-building task, in both its economic and political connotations, must suffer.

This is an important proposition which directly links domestic to foreign policy. The fact of the matter is, as has been noted, that the pattern of current international relationships is profoundly asymmetrical: from a developmental point of view, this means that stockpiles of capital and technology which are required to meet the demands of accelerated socio-economic modernisation tend to be concentrated not at the point of employment i.e. in the developing states, but rather in those areas of the international system which are already highly industrialised, and have achieved levels of economic growth to which developing states still aspire. In effective practice there is no developing society which can effectively and fluidly meet the resource-demands of rapid development purely on the basis of indigenous human and financial capacities. The sustained economic growth of these societies comes to depend directly on externally located resources, and the capacity of leadership in the developing state to mobilise these in the interests of the domestic development endeavour.

This economic fact has important political implications, particularly for the foreign policy of the developing state. In the first place, it is relatively clear that in terms of the current distribution of international development resources, the more industrialised states of the international community function, at a minimum, as a peripherally potential source of such
development resources as are required for the socio-economic modernisation of their more penurious counterparts. Insofar as this factor is recognised by policy-makers in developed and developing states, the distribution of economic and political influences in the relationships between these states, becomes appreciably tipped in favour of the former. It is the policy-maker in the developed state who can determine the range of policy-making options open to his counterpart in the developing state rather than vice versa, and although this does not negate the capacity of developing states to influence developed states, it does nonetheless introduce an element of imbalance into the reciprocal pattern of interaction.

In the second place, the incapacity of the developing state to domestically sustain its economic modernisation operations, directly affects the definition of foreign policy objectives within the policy-making processes of the developing state itself. In practice, where policy-makers are intimately concerned with shortages of capital and skill which are needed for rapid economic growth, they must to some degree become concurrently concerned with the means by which these deficiencies can be offset, through the importation and use of such human and financial resources as are located external to the boundaries of the system itself. The logic of the situation demands that the policy-maker in the developing state give at attention to issues related to the transfer of capital and technology from outside the state into the state, and to the establishment of international markets, from which revenue to fuel the development process can be derived.

In these terms, a variety of economic factors become integrated as criteria into the foreign policy-making process, which in turn becomes geared towards the goal of maximising the infusion of internationally-located development resources into the local development effort. The ends of foreign policy are
thus directly conditioned by the pattern of domestic demands motivated by leadership's commitment to nation-building through rapid socio-economic growth.

(ii) Nation-Building as an External Activity: The Political Objectives of the Foreign Policy of the Developing State

The foreign policy goals sought by policy-makers in developing states is not only a function of the economic demands of the ‘internal’ nation-building endeavour, but is additionally a product of the concern felt by these individuals with the translation of the juridic notion of sovereignty into something of operational substance and meaning. Nation-building as we have defined it, refers to a set of legitimation activities geared to both a domestic and international constituency, and, insofar as it is the latter which is concerned, the primary objective sought by the nation-building policy-maker relates to the promotion of the state as an autonomous, credible, functional and influential international entity.

In order to fully appreciate the relationship between ‘external’ nation-building and the political objectives sought through foreign policy by the developing state, it is important to appreciate two variables, namely, the ‘permeable’ nature of developing state systems, and the relationship between the indigenous and international political cultures within which policy-makers in developing states operate. Each of these variables generates a certain set of political consequences for the direction of foreign policy, and it is the interaction between them which describes the features of the broad policy of international legitimation.

First and foremost it should be appreciated that, insofar as developing states are concerned, profound discrepancies exist between the conceptual
and actual connotations of the principle of political self-determination. There can be little doubt that this principle with its emphasis on political freedom in decision-making is deeply ingrained in the social codes and political philosophies of the post-independence developing world. Indeed, there is considerable evidence to suggest that sensitivity to the prerogatives of newly-won independence is considerably more endemic and widespread in the policy-making circles of the developing vis-à-vis developed world. On the other hand, the universalisation of international relations (which has created a wide range of power gradations in the international community), and the integration of the international system (which has heighted the element of interdependence between states), has led to a situation where it is increasingly difficult for any state to be completely autonomous and for the policy-making processes of any state to exclude exogenous political influences. Indeed, the social conditions of most developing states tend to make them ideal candidates for the category of 'penetrable' political systems where external political influences of a volitional or unconscious nature can operate with relative freedom of action. In assessing the situation of the developing state one should bear in mind the high level of social fragmentation within these societies, and the profound discontinuities occasioned either by traditional inter-group tensions or by the current clash between the values, institutions and structures of traditional and modern society. Few developing states too, embody the technological capacity to offset the politically limiting forces of disadvantageous strategic location, whilst, as has been emphasised, no developing society concerned with economic growth can afford to be immune from the involvement of externally derived economic factors in its domestic processes. In toto, the geographic, economic and social circumstances of most developing societies create a situation which is particularly conducive
to the operation of foreign influences and pressures within the framework set by the internal or domestic social dynamic.

It is under such circumstances that developing systems have come to be regarded as exceptionally vulnerable to environmental forces: and it is precisely as a result of the realisation of this situation on the part of policy-makers in the developing states that a conscious and visible concern has developed with strategies specifically designed to reduce the permeable character of those systems with which they are associated. It is increasingly appreciated by policy-makers in developing states that the capacity of the state to project itself as a legitimately independent participant in international life is a direct function of its capacity to independently determine policy, and to be seen to be doing so by the international community. This requires that policy be geared to strengthening the boundaries of the system to withstand the onslaught of external political influences which, fortuitously or in a conscious manner, seek to limit the exercise of the right of political self-determination in the broadest possible manner. In the economic field, policies oriented towards the regulation and nationalisation of foreign investment are a reflection of this concern, whilst in the realm of political organisation the centralisation of power may be seen as as much a response to a socially fragmented situation providing unique opportunities for external political manipulation, as of individual leadership styles and dispositions. In this sense the distinguishing lines between domestic and foreign policy in the developing state become somewhat obscure: the category of foreign policy actions includes not only outward-directed behaviour, but in addition a variety of policies which are internally applied in response to foreign influences and pressures which penetrate the system and intrude upon its political decision-making processes. The
objectives sought through foreign policy action therefore have a much stronger domestic flavour than would be the case where the permeable nature of the state is less intimately related to its capacity to be recognised as a credible and vital international actor.

Apart from its permeable nature, the developing state is also one whose policy-makers tend to place an exceptionally high premium on multilateral action. The reason for this is to be found in two facts, namely the impotence of the developing state as an individual international unit, and the pattern of historic, political, economic, ideological and cultural similarities between most developing states, which facilitate effective communication between their policy-makers. Tactical and sentimental considerations thus combine to underwrite mutual associations within the developing state category. What is perhaps of even more significance than the motivations underlying joint action is the outcome of such action and its implication for the definition of foreign policy objectives. It should be borne in mind that the fact that most developing states are ex-colonial, poor, non-White and non-aligned, tends to cause their policy-makers to perceive each other rather than states outside of the developing state category as 'natural' allies in the international competitive process. This means that insofar as the developing state seeks to compensate for its lack of individual international influence through multilateral action, it becomes associated with, and integrated into the Third World political culture which is in turn an outgrowth of common social concerns. Ultimately moreover, to the degree that the policy-makers of unit states become socialised into the Third World group, and to the degree that they seek status within that group, the group political culture must intrude upon the political values, sentiments and prerogatives which underlie foreign policy action.
on the part of the unit state itself. The concern felt by policy-makers in developing states with extending the international influence of the state, and legitimating its participation in international affairs, thus leads indirectly to exogenous political values being absorbed into the process whereby the political goals of foreign policy action are defined.29/

In these terms the political objectives of foreign policy are of two broad types. In the first place policy is concerned with reduction of the permeability of the system and with enhancing the resilience of the system's boundaries to withstand the challenge posed by exogenous political forces. In the second place policy is related to the promotion of the values of the Third World political culture, with which policy-makers in developing states, to differing degrees, identify. In the ultimate instance the developing state is a status-seeking social entity, and this is reflected in its external political goals concerned with the consolidation of independence and the extension of influence in the international system. The international political objectives of the developing state indeed reflect a subtle blend of both passivity and activity, of action and reaction: they mirror both the vulnerability of the state and the subjective orientations of policy-makers concerned with remedies to alleviate the disadvantageous circumstances under which developing states must operate. And it is the combination of objective weakness with the emphasis placed by policy-makers on the political value of autonomy which conditions policy to give attention to the state of system boundaries and the political prerogatives of the Third World group as a whole.

B. The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Choice in the Developing State

The functionality of foreign policy is a product of its capacity to maximise the realisation of valued ends,30/ and in any state, irrespective
of the level of development, the optimal gains to be derived from foreign policy action reflects the effectiveness with which foreign policy-making is organised. In practice, the organisational demands of foreign policy-making stem from the relationship between defined objectives on the one hand, and social resources and costs, on the other. In many cases, the values sought through foreign policy action can be achieved only at a cost which is prohibitive or disproportionate to potential benefits: the foreign policy-maker is thus continually called upon to trade off certain aspirations in favour of others.\textsuperscript{31} Foreign policy also exacts a price in terms of sophisticated manpower and money,\textsuperscript{32} and since any foreign policy is supported by only a finite amount of human and material resources which can be mobilised in support of foreign policy action, an effectively organised or functional foreign policy must establish some sort of equilibrium between the objectives sought and the social facilities, human and non-human, which are available for employment in this direction. The realisation of certain foreign policy objectives also involves an element of risk which may be greater or lesser in the case of certain objectives vis-a-vis others, and this must additionally be incorporated into the foreign policy calculation. What this implies in short is, that the foreign policy-maker must constantly be concerned with issues pertaining to costs, resources, benefits and risks, and that, more specifically, he must seek to relate these variables to perceived objectives in such a manner as to elicit optimal or maximal results from the foreign policy endeavour. This in turn requires that the foreign policy-maker adjust and trade-off perceived objectives in relation to each other: it requires that he define the priorities of foreign policy action, and in many ways it is this series of choices, in terms of which the foreign policy-maker determines which of the totality of foreign policy goals receive more or less attention and energies than others,
which constitutes the very core of the foreign policy-making process.\textsuperscript{33}

This is no less the case with the developing state where foreign policy is geared to the achievement of broad economic and political goals. On the contrary, given the particularly limited material and human resources which can be integrated into the foreign policy-making process in these states, the distribution of resources amongst foreign policy objectives would seem to be an even more salient task than in the case of those societies where a relatively larger stockpile of social energies can be employed in the pursuit of a variety of international goals.\textsuperscript{34}

It is moreover of importance to note that foreign policy objectives need not be complementary to each other, and in the developing state in particular, a direct contradiction may exist between the economic objectives of foreign policy associated with the 'internal' nation-building task, and the political objectives of foreign policy action which are generated by nation-building in its 'external' aspects. Economic development and political independence need not of course be antithetical: indeed, the values of independence and development tend to be inextricably linked in the minds of the elite of the new states, so that 'development is a means of guaranteeing independence (whilst) it is widely believed that real development is impossible without independence'.\textsuperscript{35} The processes of international integration have also served to blur the 'internal' and 'external' aspects of nation-building and state political behaviour, so that the capacity of a state to consolidate its domestic legitimacy may be a function of the economic resources which it can mobilise on the basis of its international credibility, and alternatively, its domestic consolidation can contribute to the functionality of its international role.\textsuperscript{36} In the ultimate instance however, the internal demands of nation-
building, with their emphasis on economic development, establish economic efficiency as a main criterion of behaviour, irrespective of whether this leads to the increased permeability of the boundaries of the state-system by exogenous political forces: this directly contradicts the orientation towards the consolidation and extension of political independence, the central element of which is the reinforcement of systemic boundaries and the exclusion of external influences and pressures from the domestic dynamics of the state. In the former case, priority is assigned to the material development of the state, in the latter, to the capacity of the state to function in an independent political manner.

The result of this situation is that in the developing state the foreign policy-maker is perennially confronted with the question: should energies, social resources and attention be essentially directed to realization of the internal nation-building objective i.e. of promoting the domestic legitimacy of the state through rapid socio-economic growth, or alternatively, should the major concern be with the international significance of the state i.e. with the 'external' nation-building endeavour? In the formulation of foreign policy, should preference be given to the task of reinforcing the boundaries of the system, and the extension of the system's influence internationally, even though this may detract from the socio-economic growth-rate of the system, or should predominance be given to the promotion of domestic legitimacy through socio-economic development and the introduction into the system of external economic inputs, even though this may serve to limit the range of independent political options open to policy-makers, and their capacity to extend the international influence of the state through multilateral group value-oriented action? These basic dilemmas may naturally be overcome through simple exclusion of the one or the other; i.e. the policy-maker becomes totally concerned with economic
development at the expense of political independence, or vice versa. In reality however, in no developing state do policies designed to mobilise economic resources and those concerned with political independence, cancel each other out: in all developing states, where one is dominant, undercurrents of the other are always visible. On the contrary, in developing states, as in other states, each of these policy categories tend to become associated with particular role perceptions and performances, and in many ways it is the basic cleavage between the values and actions of the politician and economic administrator which personify the political independence/economic development dichotomy in the foreign policy processes of the developing state.

The dynamics of individual and social choice are exceptionally complicated, despite the considerable attention given to the construction of modular frameworks appropriate to these processes by numerous social scientists. In the case of the policy-maker in the developing state, the distribution of priorities within the political independence-economic development nexus would seem to be ultimately related to the attitudinal dispositions of members of foreign policy-making elites, and as such, could be indicated through empirical surveys of this social group. In practice however, data of this nature, relating to discrete sets of policy-makers, is usually unavailable, and it is in any case questionable as to whether the foreign policy choices of states can be validly derived solely through an evaluation of elite attitudes, the element of political centralisation in a system notwithstanding. What would seem to be required are a set of inferential propositions, which may be refined, verified or rejected by empirical research, and which are intrinsically related to the broad social environment within which foreign policy-making in the developing state takes place.
Foreign policy reflects the influence of a dual environment i.e. the domestic and wider international environments of which the state is a part. Most fundamentally however, the character of foreign policy, its goals and its means, is a product of the domestic context. It has, for example, been pointed out that 'decision-makers in foreign policy are much more intimately connected with their domestic than with their foreign environment. Through internalising its values, through partaking in the national culture and characteristics, through being constantly exposed to the influences and pressures in the play of domestic politics, they are actually part and parcel of it.' This view has in fact been reiterated in a number of major works. In the specific case of the developing state moreover, this is especially so. In these systems the immediacy and importance of local socio-economic and political problems significantly detracts from the formulation of policy with reference to extra-systemic variables. The developing society is in fact in the midst of the 'agonies of domestic transformation', and this leads to a situation where 'external policies are merely instrumental to internal purposes' and where, in the ultimate instance, foreign policy 'is domestic policy pursued by other means: it is domestic policy carried beyond the boundaries of the state'. Under such circumstances, the definition of foreign policy priorities in the developing states, must significantly relate to the character of domestic circumstance.

Any appreciation of the relationship between the conditions within states and the defined priorities of foreign policy action must, in the first place, take into account the fact that the pattern of domestic politics directly impinges on the policies which are adopted by policy-makers concerned with the pattern of inter-state relations. Foreign policy, for example, can be used to promote domestic political cohesion
in directing public attention to real or artificially created threats of an external nature. Foreign policy can also be used to create patriotic symbols, which in validating the credentials of the ruling elite, can be used against domestic political adversaries. Foreign policy can also be used to stifle domestic criticism through reference to the international image of the state, and insofar as external policies can win the approval of the international community they can be used to counter claims by the domestic political critics. Foreign policy and the political configuration within the state are thus clearly related, and it would seem, under these circumstances, that the involvement of the policy-maker in the domestic political process, his concern with the maintenance of status in that process, and with the mobilisation of political power, must impinge to some degree on the priorities of foreign policy action. In these terms therefore, foreign policy choices are a function of the involvement of the policy-maker in the dynamics of domestic political competition.

It is however of importance to recognise that whilst the pursuit of political power, by social groups or individuals, is an integral feature of all social systems, the actual intensity of political competition may vary from system to system. Political rivalry is a characteristic of even the most monolithic regimes: yet in some systems the number of social groups which can be considered as serious contenders for political power is relatively greater than in others, and, as a direct result, inter-group political interaction tends to embody a greater element of fervency, immediacy and intensity than would be the case under circumstances where the political system is dominated by a single or limited number of political parties or institutions whose hegemony cannot be fundamentally challenged. In the latter case the policy-making process is considerably less integrated with the broader social fabric, and the definition of foreign policy goals
and priorities can be affected by policy-makers in an atmosphere of relative freedom, qualitatively different from a highly pluralised and competitive political environment. The freedom which policy-makers enjoy in making policy choices— including foreign policy choices—is, in this sense, a function of the intensity of political competition within the system, and it is this variable which conversely establishes the framework from which limitations on foreign policy action are derived. This is no less true in the case of the developing state, where the pursuit of policies designed to encourage the infusion of external developmental resources can be more easily justified to a domestic political audience under conditions of relatively less competitive intensity, than in a situation where there exist powerful and credible oppositional elements which can manipulate symbols of national independence in reaction to such policies.

In the developing state therefore, the choice to seek the realisation of economic vis-a-vis political foreign policy values and the distribution of priorities and emphases between these values, is intimately related to the nature of political opposition, and the capacity of counter-elites to intensify the political pressures brought to bear on governing authorities.

It should be borne in mind that insofar as policy-making operations reflect domestic circumstance, they reflect the totality of these internal conditions. This means that the dynamics of foreign policy choice are not only influenced by domestic political considerations related to the intensity of political competition within the system, but, inter alia, by domestic economic variables as well. In the developing state for example, governing elites can more easily justify emphasis being placed on the pursuit of a development-oriented foreign policy which allows for the increased involvement of foreign elements in the national economy, under conditions where large proportions of the population have not experienced
significant improvements in standards of living. In this situation the limitations placed on national political freedom as a result of economic dependence can, in a sense, be offset by the benefits derived from progressive economic modernisation: the endorsement of politically disadvantageous policies are legitimated by reference to the penurious circumstances under which large segments of the population must labour. Alternatively, to the degree that economic growth takes place and material benefits are distributed throughout the system, it becomes increasingly difficult for policy-making authorities to follow this logic. Progressive economic satisfaction can generate an increased popular concern with abstract political values, and, to the extent that this takes place, it becomes difficult for policy-makers to justify the neglect of these values through reference to the economic developmental level of the society of which both they and the wider populace are a part. Under such circumstances pressures are generated which tend to gear foreign policy choices in a political rather than economic direction.

What this implies is that, in general, foreign policy choices are conditioned by two major variables, namely, the intensity of political competition within the system, and the rate of economic growth and diffusion of economic benefits throughout the system. Indeed, it is possible to construct a four-fold matrix in terms of which, as a direct result of domestic political and economic circumstances, it in turn become possible to indicate the priorities underlying foreign policy action on the part of the developing state. The four possible situations which may exist are characterised by:

(i) High Intensity Political Competition/High Economic Returns
(ii) High Intensity Political Competition/Low Economic Returns
(iii) Low Intensity Political Competition/High Economic Returns
(iv) Low Intensity Political Competition/Low Economic Returns.
In terms of our description, it seems relatively clear that the economic goals of foreign policy i.e. those goals defined by the internal nation-building task of promoting domestic legitimacy through rapid socio-economic development, will be the foci of foreign policy attention under situation (iv). In other words, to the degree that policy-making elites in developing states are relatively free from constraints placed upon them by competitive counter-elites, and to the degree that economic development has not succeeded in improving the material existence of the majority of the population, a foreign policy concerned with maximising the infusion of external development resources will be the main concern of policy-makers in these states. By the same token, in situation (i), the major concerns of foreign policy will be dictated by the external element of nation-building i.e. by the goals associated with reducing the penetrability of the state, and extending the state's international political influence. Under conditions of relatively intense elite-counter-elite political competition, oppositional elements can effectively manipulate symbols of national independence which will be accorded relatively more significance by a relatively materially satisfied mass public: the governing policy-maker will thus be considerably more constrained in emphasising the pursuit of foreign policy objectives which enhance the permeability of the system and detract from its politically independent and politically significant international role. Situations (ii) and (iii) represent median cases. In the case of situation (iii), the relatively low level of political competition will allow governing elite to monopolise the symbols of national independence: relative material satisfactions will however encourage a sensitivity to the politically independent and significant status of the state. Similarly in situation (ii), the relatively high level of political competition will place constraints on the governing elite's capacity to
follow a development oriented foreign policy, although counter-claims that this involves a sacrifice of national independence can be met through reference to the prevailing low level of economic returns in the society. In both situations (ii) and (iii) therefore, the priorities distributed between the internal and external foreign policy demands generated by the nation-building task will be considerably more equitable than in either situation (iv), (where the emphasis of foreign policy will be on maximising international economic aid for development) or situation (i) (where the major objectives of foreign policy will relate to the reduction of systemic penetrability, and the promotion of the political influence of the state in international life).

In conclusion it should be stated once again, that effective foreign policy requires a co-ordination of defined goals with available resources: a functional foreign policy demands that choices be made, priorities assigned and emphases located. This is no less true in the case of the developing state where, given strict limitations on the human and non-human social resources which can be integrated into the policy-making process, decisions must be taken as to the relative importance to be assigned to often competing political and economic ends. This process is both complex and dynamic: yet it can be seen to operate within a framework of domestic economic and political circumstance. Under such conditions, the character of political and economic factors within the state operate to influence not only the definition of foreign policy objectives i.e. the goals sought through foreign policy action, but the weight or salience attributed to each of these individual objectives as well.

C. The Application of Foreign Policy to the International Environment

All social action is subject to schematization, and in recent years
social scientists in various disciplines have sought to categorise the component elements of the decision-making process. On the basis of these studies, (particularly the work of Snyder, Bruck and Sapin), it becomes possible to interpret foreign policy-making as having an analytically-distinctive pre-operational and applied dimension. In the pre-operational sense, foreign policy-making is a set of activities centred on the definition of the situation in which the state is placed, and in this light, the formulation of categories of objectives or goals towards whose realisation foreign policy action may be directed. It is at this level that the values underlying foreign policy action are articulated, the concerns of policy-makers and mass publics integrated into the policy-making process and foreign policy is rationalised as a productive and utilitarian social activity. In order to substantively contribute to the protection and promotion of what is perceived to be the national interest however, foreign policy must be applied to the inter-state system of which the state is a part. Foreign policy must be implemented in the international environment, and it is in fact operations of this nature which give substance and meaning to the defined objectives of the foreign policy system. Any systematic analysis of foreign policy must therefore focus not only on the ends towards which foreign policy is oriented, but additionally on the strategies or means which are used by foreign policy-makers to convert those subjectively defined ends into objective realities.

The strategies which may be employed by foreign policy-makers are numerically vast, and analysis is further complicated by the fact that these strategies may be significantly altered under the impact of circumstances of such issues as arise from time to time. The dynamism of foreign policy action thus makes any evaluation of the range of strategies
employed by states to achieve certain goals, a profoundly complex task. Two hypotheses would seem nonetheless to be of particular relevance in explaining or describing the mechanisms of foreign policy action. In the first place, whilst 'the ends-means relationship constitutes the most frequently analysed aspect of decision-making ... the main criterion for the evaluation of means, one which is never disputed in principle, lies in their effectiveness or suitability for the achievement of the ends. If the means employed do not at all lead towards the specified ends, they are obviously unsuitable, even if the agent is unaware of their uselessness'. In other words, a direct relationship exists between the objectives chosen by foreign policy-makers and the strategies employed in foreign policy action. Effective foreign policy strategies are chosen with reference to their appropriateness to objectives, and this in turn means that some knowledge of the nature of the objectives which underlie foreign policy action can provide an indication of the strategies which will be used by foreign policy-makers in their application of foreign policy to the international environment. In the second place, whilst it is the interaction between states which makes up the broad international system, each state is also a member of a more specific regional sub-system. All states are, in this sense, multi-system actors in that they function in a regional as well as a universal context, and this implies that in evaluating the strategies which are employed by foreign policy-makers it is possible to draw analytical distinctions between region-oriented and universal (or extra-region-oriented) mechanisms of foreign policy action.

In terms of our model, foreign policy objectives in the developing state are conditioned by the commitment of policy-makers to the nation-building task. The concern with promoting the legitimacy of the institutions of state before the domestic community generates the economic
criteria of foreign policy i.e. the goal of maximising the infusion of externally-located developmental resources into the local economic modernisation process. Similarly, the policy-making interest in legitimating the participation of the state in the international community i.e. the so-called 'external' nation-building task leads to reduction of the permeability of the state and promotion of the political values of the Third World culture, being defined as political values to which foreign policy is oriented. In terms of the objectives-strategies relationship this means that the strategies pursued by developing states are of three broad types:

(a) Strategies designed to maximise the infusion into the system of scarce development resources;

(b) Strategies designed to reduce the penetrability of the system by exogenous of external forces;

(c) Strategies designed to promote the political values of the international political culture with which the state's policy-makers identify.

In practice Strategy-Category (a) reflects the economic developmental demands of the developing system. Strategy-Category (b) is indicative of the fact that 'for the first generation of leaders (in the developing state) the past is the present, and their memories make them jealous guardians of their nations' newly-won independence', whilst Strategy-Category (c) is indicative of what has been called the 'macro-nationalist' spirit in the political dynamics of the developing state. It should moreover be borne in mind, that as noted above, each of these strategy-categories is applied in both a regional or universal (or extra-regional) context. The general application of Strategy-Category (a), for example, is balanced by the fact that, from the point of view of the developing state, regional economic
co-operation 'is an important avenue ... to achieve the possibilities of a more fully self-sustained economic growth'. This leads to the implementation of strategies designed to tap both regional and wider universal developmental resources. The developing state is therefore concerned not only with the inter-territorial transfer of goods, capital and technology within the particular regional system within which it is situated, but additionally seeks to broaden its wider international economic contacts, particularly with states and organisations which embody the propensity to export such developmental resources as are required for local economic modernisation. Similarly, with regard to those strategies in category (b), political consolidation requires policies which reduce the capacities of both regional and extra-regional actors to exploit the vulnerabilities of the developing state in a manner conducive to their own political purposes. Finally those strategies in category (c) are also operationalised in both the regional and universal contexts: the developing state will seek to promote group political values not only in the region of which it is an integral part, but additionally, on the wider international stage.

In practice, the relationship between operational contexts, the objectives of foreign policy derived from the nation-building task, and the strategies pursued by the developing state, can be expressed in diagrammatic form:
The Foreign Policy Strategies of the Developing State in Relation to Operational Environments and Defined Objectives.

A Concluding Note

The purpose of the above model is to demonstrate that the foreign policy objectives pursued by developing states, the priority which they attribute to certain of these objectives at the expense of others, and the strategies which are employed in order to realise chosen foreign policy ends, are, to one degree or another, related to the current involvement on the part of leadership in developing states, with the nation-building task. In order to demonstrate this proposition, a number of sub-propositions have been built into the model, and it would seem opportune at this point to briefly summarise the major statements.
which underlie the conceptual framework, and are incorporated into it:

(i) The nation-building enterprise implies a set of activities oriented towards legitimation of the institutions of state in both a domestic and international capacity: internally, the nation-builder is concerned with counteracting the social discontinuities which arise from a situation of fragmented loyalties and partial modernisation; externally, the nation-builder seeks to translate the juridic notion of state sovereignty into actual and substantive terms, and to project the state as a credible and functional participant in international affairs.

(ii) The integration of the national political community is sought through the medium of accelerated socio-economic development, and given the limited developmental capacities internalised within developing states, the mobilisation of external economic assistance becomes defined as a major objective of foreign policy action. The 'internal' dimension of the nation-building enterprise thus generates the economic criteria for foreign policy behaviour.

(iii) The consolidation of the international political position of the state requires that the state function as a relatively autonomous entity: given the international weakness of the developing state and the susceptibility of its boundaries to exogenous influences, this causes emphasis to be placed on reduction of the permeability of the state, and association with other like-states in the developing world. The political objectives of foreign policy, with their emphasis on the affirmation of autonomy, are thus a direct product of the 'external' nation-building task.
(iv) Since the economic and political values sought through foreign policy are essentially contradictory - the former tend to increase the role of external influences in the national system, the latter are specifically oriented towards enhancing its independence - choices which reflect an emphasis on either economic or political foreign policy ends must be made. In practice, these are conditioned by the interaction between the intensity of political competition within the domestic system, and the rate and manner of its economic growth.

(v) Finally, the tactics employed by states are always those most appropriate to defined economic and political foreign policy ends: as such, the strategies of the developing state tend to be oriented towards maximising the infusion of scarce developmental resources into the system, reducing the permeability of the system to external political forces, and promoting the political values of the set of developing states with which policy-makers associate and identify.

A more total appreciation of this set of relationships can moreover be gleaned through the presentation of the model in diagrammatic form (see page 41). In these terms it becomes possible to clearly observe the relationship which exists between the performance of specific foreign policy functions - notably, conceptualisation, formulation and implementation - and the broad concern with nation-building in the developing state. The diagrammatic perspective also facilitates an appreciation of the dynamic factor inbuilt into the model, and in terms of which the application of certain defined economic and political strategies to the international
environment, acts in a feedback manner to condition the functions of internal and external legitimization, and in so doing, the form which foreign policy objectives, choices and strategies subsequently assume.

### Nation-Building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Internal Legitimation of the Institutions of State</th>
<th>External Legitimation of the Institutions of State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.</strong> Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Economic Development Through the Mobilisation of External Development Resources</td>
<td>Assertion of Political Autonomy Through:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conceptualisation.</td>
<td></td>
<td>i. Reducing Permeability of System.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal Definition</td>
<td></td>
<td>ii. Promotion of Group Political Values.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate of Economic Growth and Distribution of Benefits.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.</strong> Foreign Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formulation: Priority Allocation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies to Promote Regional Economic Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies to Reduce Permeability to Political Forces of an Extra-Regional Nature.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nation-Building and its Influence upon the Foreign Policy Objectives, Priorities and Strategies of the Developing States - A Theoretical Model

2. These criteria of political development are drawn from L. Pye 'The Concept of Political Development' (Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Sciences, March, 1965).


5. Emile Durkheim has suggested that the pattern of loyalties in any society is a function of national development; see, E. Durkheim 'The Division of Labour in Society' (New York, Free Press, 1947).

6. It has been repeatedly suggested that the dynamics of developing societies can be directly inferred from the pattern of racial, ethnic and cultural inter-group competition: see, inter alia - R. Emerson 'From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of the Asian and African Peoples' (Boston, Beacon Press, 1960); C. Geertz, (ed.) 'Old Societies and New States' (New York, Free Press, 1968); J. Coleman 'The Problem of Political Integration', Western Political Quarterly, March, 1955.

7. See, Kelman, ibid.
8. No matter how co-ordinated socio-economic modernisation is, it inevitably has disruptive effects on socio-economic structures: see N. Smelser 'Mechanisms of Change and Adjustment to Change' in: B. Hoselitz and W. Moore, (eds.) 'Industrialisation and Society' (The Hague, UNESCO, 1964).


11. This is clearly emphasised in D. Vital, ibid, and in I.W. Zartman, ibid, p.33 et seq. and p.48 respectively. See also M. Brecher 'India and World Affairs: Krishna Menon's View of the World' (New York, 1968, p.306).

12. See G. Lagos, ibid.

13. See in particular Kenneth Boulding's 'The Image' (1956) p.72/73. This view is also articulated in J. Frankel, ibid., p.136.


43.


21. For a definition and discussion of the notion of the 'penetrated' system, see J. Rosenau 'Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy' in : J. Rosenau 'The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy' (New York, Free Press, 1971). For the 'penetrated' nature of developing systems in particular, see F. Riggs 'The Theory of Developing Polities', World Politics, October 1963.

22. The technological incapacities of developing states are noted in numerous works; see, for example 'Possible Non-Military Scientific Developments and Their Potential Impact on the Foreign Policy Problems of the United States'. Study prepared by the Stanford Research Institute for the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, GPO. 1959.

23. The economic vulnerability of developing societies is indicated in, inter alia, A. Kamark, ibid.; M. Singer 'Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relations' (New York, Free Press, 1972); D. Vital, ibid.


25. W. Zartman, ibid., p.48. It has also been suggested that these orientations can be linked to the personal anxieties of policy-makers themselves: see, for example, L. Pye 'Politics, Personality and Nation-Building: Burma’s Search for Identity' (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); R. Lystad 'Cultural and Psychological Factors', in : V. McKay, (Ed.) 'African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy' (New York, Praeger, 1966).


27. For definition of the concept of 'effective communication' see K. Deutsch 'Nationalism and Social Communication'. For the emphasis placed on multilateral international action by policy-makers in developing states see D. Vital, ibid., p.33; G. Liska 'Alliances and the Third World'.

28. G. Liska, ibid. For a useful study of the differences which exist between Third World states, and the effects of these on their international relations, see G.H. Jansen 'Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment' (London: Faber and Faber, 1966).
29. The distinction between the operational and psychological environments within which foreign policy is made is drawn by the Sprouts in their works. Ibid. For a specific discussion of the psychological dimensions of policy-making, see, inter alia, F.F. Kilpatrick "Explorations in Transactional Psychology" (New York University Press, 1961); K. Deutsch 'Nationalism and Social Communication' ibid. More specific works geared to foreign policy-making in particular include: M. Singer, ibid.; G. Klineberg 'The Human Dimension in International Relations'; J. de Rivera 'Psychological Aspects of Foreign Policy'. The psychological atmosphere which prevails in developing states is explicated in: I.L. Horowitz 'Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification'.


31. For the 'economics' of foreign policy choice, see J. Frankel, ibid. p.144 et seq.

32. D. Vital, ibid., p.15.


34. D. Vital, ibid.

35. F. Weinstein, ibid.

36. H. Johnson, ibid.

37. F. Weinstein, ibid.


39. R. Lystad, ibid.

40. J. Rosenau, ibid.

41. J. Frankel, ibid., p.71.

42. The role of domestic factors in foreign policy-making is discussed in J. Rosenau, 'Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy', ibid., and 'Linkage Politics' ibid. See also D. Hindley 'Indonesia's Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives', Asian Survey, June, 1964; D. Lerner 'The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernising the Middle East' (New York, 1953).


45. R. Rosecrance, ibid., p.299.
46. R. Good, ibid.

47. The dynamics of decision-making in general are discussed in K. Arrow 'Social Choice and Individual Values', 1951. Policy decision-making is analysed, inter alia, in C. Rothwell's preface to D. Lerner and H. Lasswell 'The Policy Sciences', 1951. The major work relating foreign policy to decision-making is R. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and B. Sapin 'Foreign Policy Decision-Making', ibid. See also, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin 'Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics', 1954.

48. Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, ibid.

49. J. Frankel, ibid., p. 142.

50. J. Spanier, ibid., p. 386.


DOMESTIC SOURCES AND FACTORS IN SWAZILAND'S FOREIGN POLICY

Until fairly recently foreign policy has tended to be seen as a response to the international environment, and the analysis of foreign policy behaviour has focused upon the nature of those inputs into the foreign policy-making process which are derived from this source. In this sense the foreign policy-maker is defined as an international role-player, whose attitudes and actions are essentially influenced by a variety of forces and pressures originating outside of the boundaries of the state system with which he is associated, and whose representative he is within the realms of international life. It has however come to be increasingly appreciated that this view of foreign policy is somewhat restricted and circumscribed. Indeed, current research affirms the view that the means and goals of the foreign policy of states can neither be systematically evaluated nor understood in the absence of reference to conditions which pertain within states and bear relevance to the policy-making process. From this perspective, the behaviour of states represents the reaction of the policy-making process to stimuli derived from its total environment i.e. both the international and domestic environment, the foreign policy-maker performs a dual role as both a national and international creature, and his actions represent a subtle blend of such influences as operate both within the state and in its wider international setting. The pattern of relations between two states is therefore to be seen not solely in terms of the interaction between policy-makers in each: in a wider sense it must take into account such social, political, economic cultural and ideological conditions which are internalised within each of the states under analysis.
The extension of the category of variables salient to the foreign policy-making process to include factors which are essentially of a domestic character, has significantly blurred traditional analytical distinctions between the disciplines of international relations and comparative politics. Equally importantly, where the international relations scholar is forced to delve into the interplay of social forces within states in order to extract data which will facilitate his understanding of the pattern of relations between states, the analysis of foreign policy becomes intrinsically more complicated. The fact of the matter is, that logically-speaking, everything contained within a society bears some relevance to the foreign policy-making process, and a systematic analysis of the domestic sources of the foreign policy of a state is thus predicated on a total appreciation of the workings and operations of society. At this point in time, models which allow for this type of knowledge do not exist, and this is especially the case with regard to developing societies whose dynamics are still relatively misunderstood.

From this perspective it would seem that the analysis of the domestic sources of Swaziland's foreign policy can best be approached through recognition of one fundamental fact, namely that Swaziland is a developing society, and that the nature of such societies generates specific implications for foreign policy operations. All developing societies are in the first place characterised by relatively low levels of social and economic development. The leadership of these societies is intimately concerned with the task of consolidating the newly-established institutions of states upon a firm, stable and expanding socio-economic base, and it would therefore seem logical to assume that the involvement of leadership in the domestic developmental task must have certain implications for the objectives which are pursued through the medium of foreign policy action.
In the second place, all developing societies are, to one degree or another, characterised by a pattern of decentralised loyalties, and the majority contain social groupings who either do not fully identify with the symbols and substance of the state, or identify with fraternal groupings external to the system's boundaries. The fact that affiliations can transcend legally defined territorial boundaries is of obvious foreign policy relevance, and this suggests that the social composition of the state can be employed as a further indicator of the domestic sources of its foreign policy. Thirdly, underdevelopment implies a relative scarcity of human skills which can be integrated into the policy-making process: it is this that underlies the centralisation of policy-making in the developing state, and enhances the role of personality factors in the policy-making process. Any consideration of the domestic sources of foreign policy in the developing state must thus focus much more specifically on the political orientations and identities of the governing leadership elite, than would be the case in more developed polities where policy is filtered through a variegated and diverse pattern of institutional devices. The developing state also seldom embodies technological capacities to counteract or offset the political of disadvantageous strategic location: the geographic situation of the state thus emerges as an additional variable which is particularly salient to the domestic dimensions of foreign policy-making in the developing state. Finally, recent research has tended to suggest a definite correlation between foreign policy and the level of political development: it is thus incumbent on the researcher concerned with the domestic sources of foreign policy in the developing state to articulate and clarify such relationships as exist between the element of political modernity in the state, and state behaviour in the broad international system.
In these terms, the domestic sources of Swaziland's foreign policy can be evaluated through reference to five specific and fundamental social factors:

(a) The nature of Swaziland's economy.
(b) The social composition of Swaziland.
(c) The orientations and identities of Swaziland's political leadership.
(d) The geographic location of the Swazi state.
(e) The political modernity of Swaziland.

It is as a result of the combination of these factors which reflect the economic, strategic, social, political and psychological environment within which Swazi foreign policy is made, that Swaziland's foreign policy is impregnated with its basic character and features.

A. Swaziland's Economy: its Relevance to Foreign Policy

Swaziland is a territory with fertile soil and an abundancy of water and mineral resources, and, since the mid-50's has experienced considerable economic growth. \(^1\) Today the economy is growing at a rate of five per cent per annum, \(^2\) the Gross Domestic Product is rising from year to year, \(^3\) and per capita income is one of the highest on the African continent. The healthy state of the economy is also reflected in the national budget and balance of trade; since 1970/71 Swaziland has been able to dispense with British budgetary assistance, and it is currently hoped that annual additions to the Capital Fund will be raised to some R3 million by 1978. \(^4\) Swaziland's exports have not only kept pace with rising imports over the last few years, but have in fact increased at a relatively more rapid rate: this is reflected in a positive trade surplus which has more than doubled in the last ten years.
In evaluating Swaziland's economic position it is moreover of importance to bear in mind, that notwithstanding apparent overall economic improvement, economic modernisation has led to a variety of tensions, strains and problems, which in the present and in the future, seriously impinge on the stability of the Swazi system as a whole.

The Swaziland economy is, in the first place, a dual economy which is characterised by small pockets of advanced technology and material prosperity surrounded by subsistence standards of life. From a social point of view it is the minority European community which has benefited most from economic growth, while geographically, economic improvement tended to devolve on specific regions, and in so doing create a situation of serious spatial imbalance. In general, the standard of living of the majority of Swazi has not been significantly raised in the post-independence period, and the relatively high per capita income level tends to reflect disproportionately high European incomes rather than general real prosperity. As a result of improved health standards which have progressively reduced mortality rates, Swaziland is also experiencing rapid population increases: the crude birth rate is currently estimated at close on five per cent per annum, and, as a result, development planners have been forced to admit that 'the rapid rate of growth of the population puts a heavy pressure on available resources and makes the improvement of economic welfare more difficult.' A further socio-economic problem relates to significant increases in the wage-earning population and subsequent alterations in mass expectations, attitudes and values. If one takes into account the number of Swazi employed in the South African economy, then some 30 per cent of the total working population is involved in the monetary sector i.e. that sector of the economy where traditional passive subsistence attitudes are most easily eroded. The social importance of this pattern of now
material expectations must be viewed finally within the context of a further socio-economic problem with which Swaziland's leadership is confronted, namely, the lack of employment opportunities in the modern sector of the economy. The working-age population is in fact increasing at a rate of some 10,500 persons per annum, and even if one makes allowances for the fact that a significant proportion of these are women who are not seeking employment, it is relatively evident that, at its level of economic development, Swaziland cannot provide for a labour market sufficiently wide to absorb the demands placed upon it.10/

Problems of this nature are not unique to Swaziland: on the contrary, rapid population increases, large-scale unemployment and substantial alterations in patterns of mass material demands, are all integral features of the social dynamics of systems which have experienced a modicum of socio-economic modernisation. Development-induced social discontinuities in Swaziland are thus fully in accord with those social features common to the developing state. What is equally similar moreover, is that in Swaziland, as in other developing states, policy-makers have not reacted to the social problems generated by partial modernisation by limiting socio-economic growth. On the contrary Swaziland's leadership has come to specifically gear policy to the promotion of rapid growth, and accelerated development has come to be recognised as the very key to the consolidation of the newly-established institutions of state upon a firm and stable social basis.11/

This orientation on the part of the Swaziland leadership, has necessarily led to the involvement on the part of the Swazi leadership in a broad-based pattern of developmental activities. Accelerated development, after all, requires enterprise on all fronts. The socio-economic modernisation of systems is predicated not only on such major sectoral
activities as industrial development, agricultural modernisation and infrastructural construction, but additionally on a vast host of specific endeavours, such as improvements in the quality of livestock, the standardisation of industrial measures, and the development of postal communication systems, all of which, inter alia, contribute to the success of development programmes as a total effort. Accelerated development requires concurrent and integrated effort at the highest levels of policy making and at the grass-roots level of the community: it permeates the entire constellation of interactions which in their aggregation constitute the national society.

This is currently reflected in Swaziland's development programme. It is, for example, acutely appreciated that social and economic modernisation cannot be effectively promoted in the absence of a basic infrastructure of services and facilities. This has in turn led to considerable emphasis being placed on the promotion of education and training. As a result of improvements that have been made in the post-independence period, some 65 per cent of children in the primary school-going age are currently accommodated in government, government-aided or independent schools; specialised and technical training is currently promoted by the National Council for Industrial Vocational Training, and the Lutheran Farm Training Centre. The William Pitcher College has been instrumental in providing facilities for teaching training, the Sebenta National Institute is involved in literacy extension and adult education, whilst the Swazi affiliate of the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland at Luyengo, offers a variety of practical courses at the university level.

Although the development of a broad-based educational system is currently regarded as being the primary activity at the level of infrastructural
construction, Swaziland's development plans also include the development of communications services, water resources, health services and housing facilities. In the field of rail communications in particular, the 139-mile Goba-Kadake railroad has been in operation since 1964: this enterprise is the core of Swaziland's transport system, and has provided great stimulus to the expansion of the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy, and contributed significantly to the integration of Swaziland into the Southern African industrial pattern. In the area of road transport, Swaziland is currently in the process of improving her 870 miles of main roads and 500 miles of secondary roads, whilst plans have been mooted for the construction of a new international airport to supplement the main air terminal at Matsapa, constructed during 1961. The extension and improvement of postal, telephone and telex services has taken place since the early 60's, (between 1960-1966, some R1.3 m was invested in the modernisation of these facilities), and is ongoing at the current time.

Swaziland's rivers embody a high potential for both irrigation and hydro-electric use; this has become increasingly appreciated in the last 20 years and has led to both the establishment of a number of large-scale irrigation projects throughout the territory, and a power station at Edwaleni. In the face of demands for cheap and reliable electricity from the more urbanised areas of Mbabane and Manzini, a supplementary hydro-electric scheme was established at Magunduza during 1967, and since 1970 efforts have been made to extend the Edwaleni network - which is integrated with the ESCOM network - throughout the territory. Health services, both for humans and animals, have been improved over the last few years: widespread bovine diseases which have hindered the agricultural development of the territory have to some degree been controlled, whilst the promotion of human health has been facilitated by the establishment
of a number of hospitals, rural health clinics, and a Public Nursing Unit. In the area of housing, rapid urbanisation has led to the creation of a National Housing Authority, which announced during 1970 and 1971, the construction of low cost housing units near Mbabane, and in the Manzini, Piggs Peak and Big Bend areas.

Apart from the construction of an infrastructure of services and facilities, socio-economic modernisation additionally requires the development of the agricultural sector of the economy. This has been specifically noted by the Swazi government, which has placed emphasis on "the progressive transformation of traditional agriculture from subsistence to semi-commercial farming, both to create more opportunities for gainful employment and to raise incomes in the rural areas". The fact of the matter is, that in Swaziland, some 75 per cent of the Black population is either partially or completely dependent on agricultural activity, that agricultural production contributes significantly to both the Gross National Product and to Swaziland's export sector, and that most current industrial development is based on the processing or refining of agricultural goods.

Swaziland's highly diversified agricultural economy, (founded on sugar, citrus, rice, tobacco, cotton, forestry and livestock production), further contributes to the view expressed by King Sobhuza, that it is the agricultural sector which is "the backbone of the economy", and that the socio-economic modernisation of the territory must give specific attention to this integral feature of national economic life. To this end, Swaziland's development plans have emphasised the consolidation of such agricultural lands as are currently dispersed between individual European and Swazi Nation ownership: the establishment of Rural Development schemes; the promotion of cash crop farming; the creation of agricultural research and training facilities (such as the Manganja Agricultural Management Centre and the Lowveld Experimental...
Station); and the initiation of institutions to co-operatively control marketing procedures and to mobilise capital for investment in the agricultural sector.24/

Industrial development is also regarded as an integral feature of the development effort, and in current terms Swaziland's industrial base consists of both a variety of agro-industrial enterprises as well as a small number of factories engaged in the production of secondary or manufactured goods. Mention must in particular be made of the USUTU pulp mill at Bhunya,25/ two major sugar refineries at Mhlume and Big Bend (which together employ one-fifth of Swaziland's wage-earners),26/ the Libby's citrus canning factory at Malkerns, the Swaziland Meat Corporation's meat canning factory and the Cotona Cotton Ginning Company plant established at Matsapa in 1965 to process the Swaziland cotton crop. In the manufacturing field, there currently exist a number of enterprises which can provide labour outlets for Swaziland's burgeoning wage-earning class.27/ Swaziland is in fact a producer of both industrial chemicals and fertilisers,28/ whilst textile factories have been established at both Matsapa and Mbabane. Two breweries currently exist, whilst plans have been laid for a new R100,000 liquor industry to produce a variety of liquors under German licence. The Swaziland manufacturing sector also includes a wire, sweet and plastic container factory, the NEOPAC packaging plant at Matsapa, and a .arm equipment factory established in 1972 to produce some 2,000 tractors per month for both the domestic and export market. At present the manufacturing sector contributes some 15 per cent to the Gross Domestic Product,29/ and in order to further promote the economic viability of this small but growing secondary industrial base, institutions such as the National Industrial Development Corporation,30/ the Small Enterprises Development Corporation (which is specifically concerned with small-scale
enterprise)\(^3\) and the Swaziland Credit and Savings Bank, have been created to foster, diversify and encourage increased investment in Swaziland's industrial endeavours.

The multidimensional character of Swaziland's development programme is finally expressed in the areas of mining and tourism, both of which are seen as of vital importance to national economic growth. The fact that Swaziland has at its disposal a stockpile of mineral resources disproportionate to its territorial size has, in particular, contributed to the development of a wide range of important financially-viable mining endeavours. In current terms, mining activity is focused on the exploitation of iron ores at the Ngwenya-Kadaka deposits: the activities of the Swaziland Iron-Ore Development Company have, since 1964, been of vital importance in the mobilisation of foreign exchange, and in the stimulation of complementary activities in the agricultural and industrial sectors of the national economy as well.\(^3\) This is no less true of the Havelock asbestos mine which until recently constituted the mainstay of the economy, and which has continued to make a vital economic contribution in spite of rising production costs and falling asbestos prices over the last few years.\(^3\) Swaziland is also rich in natural beauty as well as mineral resources, and this has led to a massive increase in the tourist industry in recent times. Since 1969 the number of tourists visiting the territory has increased by an estimated 100,000 per year, and has resulted in an influx of some R5 million in foreign exchange. This has in turn led to the promotion of tourism becoming recognised by governmental authorities as an integral part of the development effort, it has led to the extension of a number of tourist facilities available to visitors, and to the establishment of a new Ministry of Tourism to promote and co-ordinate further activities in this realm.\(^3\)
In these terms it can be clearly appreciated that Swaziland is currently involved in a major multidimensional effort to thrust itself into social and economic modernity. From another perspective, it is relatively clear that the leadership of Swaziland is a modernising leadership which is intimately involved in the development enterprise, and which, as such, must constantly synchronise its attitudes and actions with the processes of domestic socio-economic growth. It is only to be expected therefore that the attitudes and actions which specifically relate to foreign policy issues are accommodated within the same framework.

In order to fully appreciate the direct linkage between domestic development policies and those policies which are pursued by Swaziland in its relationships with the external world, it is necessary to take cognizance of two vital facts. First and foremost it should be borne in mind that even at the best of times accelerated socio-economic development places severe strains on the stockpile of social resources, human and non-human, which are concentrated within the state. In the case of Swaziland no less than any other, realisation of the goals associated with infrastructure construction, agricultural modernisation and industrial development, are a direct function of the investment in the Swazi economy of large amounts of capital, and of the integration into the local development effort of a wide and sophisticated range of technical skills and capacities. In the second place it is questionable whether at this point in time, and at its level of economic development, the Swazi system internalises or contains sufficient financial and technical resources to meet the special demands of the modernisation endeavour. To the degree that it does not, it becomes incumbent upon Swaziland's leadership to specifically orientate foreign policy towards the mobilisation of externally-located capital and technical resources, and towards the integration of these resources into the domestic
developmental effort. Foreign policy in this sense becomes a mechanism specifically designed to compensate for domestic economic shortages, and financial and technical factors become the variables which interrelate internal with external policy.

In effective practice, since the end of World War II large amounts of capital have been poured into the Swaziland economy, both by governmental institutions and private investors who have come to increasingly appreciate the economic potential which the territory embodies. Capital accumulation has also been stimulated by the establishment of a variety of local financial institutions whose specific task it is to promote the stockpile of domestic savings: in this regard such indigenous institutions as the National Industrial Development Corporation, the Swaziland Credit and Savings Bank and the Small Enterprises Development Corporation must be mentioned. In current terms the public debt of R17 million is relatively low, whilst in the financial year 1972/3 only five per cent of total recurrent revenue was devoted to interest repayment on loans. Then too, the relatively healthy state of Swaziland's finances is indicated by the fact that since 1970/71 external budgetary assistance has been dispensed with and a significant surplus accumulated on national account.

When all is said and done however, the fact remains that the Swaziland economy, as the economy of other developing states, is still far from that point of development where it can generate quantities of capital sufficient to meet the vast financial demands of the development process. It should for example be borne in mind that the rapid improvement in Swaziland's budgetary situation in recent years is not so much a result of significant development within the Swaziland economy itself, as of the conditions of the renegotiated Southern African Customs Union Agreement of 1969 which made provision for a series of back payments to be made to
Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho until 1974. Recent improvements in the Swaziland financial situation also reflect the favourable prices which Swaziland's exports have enjoyed on the world markets since 1969, and the bolstering effect of the recently devalued Rand. It should finally be borne in mind in assessing Swaziland's financial situation in relation to its development goals, that it is estimated that development expenditures will rapidly accelerate over the next five years, that in the period 1973-1976, some R42.7 million will be required to meet projected demands, and that allowing for inflation this amount will increase substantially in the 1976-78 period. To meet these demands, at mid-1972 Swaziland had a Capital Fund of some R10.2 million, whilst the Second National Development Plan of 1973 makes provision for an annual transfer from the recurrent budget to the Capital Fund of R1.6 million in the period 1973-76.

The conclusions are quite inescapable; simply, that even though the Swaziland economy currently basks in the light of relative financial prosperity, it is highly improbable that even under optimal circumstances Swaziland can, or will in the future be able to finance its development programme purely by virtue of its domestic capital resources. It is precisely at this point that internal economic development meets foreign policy. The fact of the matter is that notwithstanding increased budgetary surplus and irrespective of the increased role of domestic savings in capital accumulation, the bulk of Swaziland's development capital is still imported from abroad: in future terms moreover, the financial basis of Swaziland's development aims is directly related to the continued infusion of international financial resources, and this is perennially emphasised in the statements and pronouncements of Swaziland's governing elite. It is this that underpins an acute realisation on the part
of this elite that foreign policy is not merely peripherally concerned with certain financial ends: on the contrary, it has been clearly stated that a major objective of foreign policy is 'to diversify and expand the sources of foreign capital for investment, from both bilateral and multilateral institutions and commercial sources.' Swaziland's leaders not only welcome foreign capital and investment: in the face of domestic capital shortages, foreign policy is intentionally designed to attract foreign finance and facilitate its involvement in the local development enterprise.

The same dynamic which links internal to foreign policy can also be detected with regard to the factor of technology. Development in the new states demands not only capital but a technological infrastructure composed of skills, plant and services; and this is recognised in the Swazi state where the most recent national development plan specifically points that the capacity to design, implement and operate development projects is a direct function of technical skills. It is also clearly appreciated at the policy-making level, that at this point in time Swaziland does not contain a sufficiently large quantity of professionally and technically skilled citizens to plan and man development projects and programmes, and that, for the foreseeable future 'Swaziland must rely on an expanding flow of technical assistance if the pace of development is to be accelerated', or, for that matter, maintained. The issue is of course not only economic, insofar as national self-control has tended to suggest the exclusion of foreign personnel: Swaziland has in fact already promulgated legislation making it relatively more difficult for foreign technicians to seek employment within the state. Yet the importation of technology demands not only the physical transfer of personnel, but the transfer of information, machinery and advice: it is in these areas that Swaziland's development programme suffers acute shortages. At the personnel level too, it is
recognised that policies of exclusion can only be pursued at the expense of development goals, and, as a result, political considerations apart, Swaziland must, and does, welcome the involvement of professionally skilled foreign individuals and groups in the modernisation effort. In fact, numerous statements have been made 'gratefully accepting assistance of this nature as is offered from time to time' and the mobilisation of international technical assistance has indeed become defined as a major value in Swaziland's foreign policy-making operations.

A final economic variable linking domestic with external policy relates to Swaziland's pattern of international trade. Accelerated development requires finance, and in Swaziland, as in other developing economies the major source of revenue derives from international trade. Swaziland conforms to the generic features of developing economies also insofar as she is an exporter of primary goods and commodities, and an importer of such manufactured products which cannot be domestically created. More specifically, the Swaziland economy is dependent upon a relatively small number of international markets. In the export sector, although Swaziland has recently increased her trade with Zambia, Canada and Italy in particular, some 50 per cent of Swazi exports are absorbed by either the British or South African economies: in the import sector practically all of Swaziland's goods originate in South Africa, which in 1970 provided the territory with R39,3 million of a total of R42,7 million imported produce. Swaziland's foreign policy-makers are exceptionally sensitive to this fact, namely that Swaziland's major source of revenue is dependent on the attitudes and actions of a minuscule number of externally based actors, and, as a result, have embarked upon a foreign policy course which is specifically geared to diversify Swaziland's markets and trading partners. It is questionable whether in current terms this policy has met
with appreciable success: it can for example be statistically demonstrated that while Swaziland has established a number of alternative trading contacts over the last few years, and whilst her exports to the United Kingdom have somewhat declined, her level of trade with South Africa has not only been maintained, but has increased in both the import and export sectors. It is nonetheless a fact that in principle the political leadership in Swaziland is concerned with increasing Swaziland's trading relationships with the international community, and in a manner which will allow the economy to maximise revenues which can be fed into the local development process. The extension of Swaziland's markets to allow for greater sales contacts and a wider range of import sources thus comes to constitute a further domestic and economic factor in Swaziland's category of defined foreign policy objectives.

In conclusion, it seems relatively clear that the Swaziland economy is similar to that of other developing economies where the material demands of rapid economic modernisation cannot be accommodated within the framework of available domestically located resources. Swaziland is in fact a state whose leadership has committed itself to what amounts to a major restructuring of society, and this transformation cannot, it seems, be achieved in the absence of external support. This would in fact conform to the view of development economists that the Swazi economy has not yet reached a 'take-off' point for self-sustained economic growth; thus, a recent analysis points out with regard to Swaziland that 'for its type of economy, its stage of development and the size of the country, Swaziland is dependent for its continued economic growth upon a whole series of external supporting relations.' This is also a fact which is realised by the Swazi government itself: thus 'the realisation of the rate of growth demands greater national effort, and depends in no small measure upon continuing
access to ... the developed world ... as well as expanding assistance from aid donors. It is this that accounts for the translation of the socio-economic values associated with the internal task of state-building into salient criteria in Swaziland's foreign policy-making process: and it is this which specifically conditions the nature of the economic objectives towards which Swaziland's foreign policy is oriented. The realisation of Swaziland's developmental goals is intimately related to the creation of relationships between Swaziland and the external world which allow for Swaziland to mobilise international developmental resources, and maximise their infusion into the local developmental effort. Foreign policy thus becomes directly geared to exploiting the capital, technical and market resources of the international community in a manner most conducive to the internal economic needs of developing Swazi society.

B. Swaziland's Social Composition and its Effects on Foreign Policy

An outstanding feature of the social make-up of the developing states of Africa is the fact that, in the majority of cases, legally defined territorial boundaries do not conform to patterns of ethnic, racial or cultural distribution. This means that most developing states are of an ethnically plural nature, or alternatively, that ethnically similar peoples are divorced and separated from one another by arbitrarily defined juridic divisions. This has important political effects in both the formulation of domestic and foreign policy. Domestically, the major problem facing the African nation-building is in the creation of a relatively centralised set of institutions, identities and symbols which transcend those associated with traditional ethnic groupings; nation-building policies are specifically geared to the establishment of a unitary set of loyalties which offset or, at the minimum, counteract those directed towards the component tribes of
which the nation is a part. From the point of view of foreign policy-making, the ethnic diversity of the developing state is of both positive and negative importance. Positively, the political options available to many policy-makers may be increased by the existence of a fraternal ethnic grouping in a neighbouring state: these individuals can, in a sense, be employed as the agents of the state, and can be manipulated in order to create domestic pressures in the state of which they are a part. From a negative point of view, it is precisely because of this dynamic that foreign policy-makers in developing states must constantly give attention to the impact of policy upon the ethnic groupings within their states, and their relationships with fraternal counterparts external to state boundaries.

In evaluating the relationship between the social composition of Swaziland and the foreign policy of the Swazi state, it is important to bear in mind that Swaziland is a uni-tribal society, and, additionally, that its traditional institutions continue to exercise political authority in a manner which is, in many ways, unparalleled in the rest of developing Africa. It is certainly true that the Swazi political system is not as highly centralised as the traditional political systems of the Ashanti or Xhosa or Bemba tribes. It is also true that the absolute power of the Swazi king, or Ngwenyama is, in theory, limited by a Liquoquo or inner council of chiefs and commoners and the Libandla Lako Ngwane, or Swazi National Council, which consists of all adult males born into the Swazi tribe, and to whom the Ngwenyama is, in the ultimate instance, responsible. All available evidence however, suggests that the traditional institutions of the Swazi tribe have maintained considerable resilience in the face of modernisation, and that, insofar as there is a single focus of political identities for overwhelmingly large numbers of Swaziland's population of Black inhabitants, it is the Ngwenyama and the traditional institutions
of the tribe. That this is so is a reflection of many factors. It is a product of the personality and sophisticated political skills of the king, and of the fact that these individual features are reinforced by symbolic magico-ritual factors which connect the nation with the king in a metaphysical manner. The continuation of a profound sense of traditional identification, also reflect the social recruitment patterns of the Swazi tribe, which based on achievement rather than ascriptive criteria, have allowed the traditional institutions to both absorb opposition and mobilise the very best of Swaziland's human talents on their behalf. In many ways it is this element of social mobility within the Swazi tribe, which underpins the predominant political role of the king, and which has allowed the tribal institutions to continue to fulfil a socially-integrative role in the post-independence period, and in a manner which confounds accepted theories of the relationship between tradition and modernity in the rest of Africa.

The fact that Swazi society is uni-tribal, and that the tribal framework continues to maintain a considerable degree of cohesion in the contemporary era, has important implications for foreign policy. It means, most fundamentally, that Swazi policy-makers can operate in an environment which is relatively free of the possibility that intra-societal differences and group tensions can be manipulated by external forces concerned with political gain. The fact of the matter is that, to all intents and purposes, there do not exist in Swaziland pockets of ethnic discontent. In general therefore, the foreign policy-maker in Swaziland does not have to give considerations to the effects of external policy upon the opinions and attitudes towards leadership on the part of ethnically-dissimilar groupings contained within the state, nor alternatively need he take into his calculations the external implications of domestic policy as applied to groupings within the state who are ethnically linked to similar groupings outside of the boundaries of the polity.
This thesis is however, subject to some serious qualifications. In the first place it should be borne in mind that although Swaziland is a unitribal society, not all Swazi are concentrated within the territorial boundaries of the Swazi state, nor are all Swazi citizens members of the Swazi tribe. There is, for example, a large concentration of Swazi tribesmen who have during this century existed permanently within the territorial boundaries of neighbouring South Africa. In current terms the political future of this group, which is situated near Swaziland's borders in the Eastern Transvaal, is uncertain. Plans have been mooted by the South African authorities for the creation of a Swazi 'homeland' within the framework of the separate development policy. It is however not inconceivable that, in the future, the South African Swazi will be integrated into the Swazi state and the boundaries of Swaziland extended to include this pocket of individuals. In present terms however, there can be little doubt that Swaziland's policy-makers have a direct interest in this externally-situated Swazi grouping, and that the policies adopted in relation to it by the South African government, directly impinge upon the state of Swaziland-South African relations. It should also be borne in mind that a significant number of Swazi are itinerant and are temporarily in employment either in South Africa's mining or agricultural sector. The treatment of these individuals during their sojourn in South Africa also constitutes an issue-area in Swazi foreign policy which directly expresses the relationship between ethnic affiliation and the operations of foreign policy.

Of equal importance is the fact that not all residents or citizens of Swaziland are members of the Swazi tribe. There are, for example, some 25,000 non-Swazi Blacks within the territory; the majority of whom are either
of Zulu or Shangaan extraction. On the basis of available evidence it seems that few of these 'foreign' Blacks are either politically aware or involved in the dynamics of Swazi politics: it is however of significance that the more politically sophisticated elements of this grouping have never fully identified with the policies of the Imbokodvo, and have, to all intents and purposes aligned themselves with the oppositional forces of the Swaziland Progressive Party or the Pan-Africanist NNLC (i.e. Newane National Liberatory Congress). This may well reflect a heightened political modernisation on the part of these individuals, who being drawn from either Zululand or Mozambique cannot fully associate themselves with the essentially tribal ethos of the INN. Whatever the reasons, Swaziland's attitudes towards, and treatment of non-indigenous Blacks may well become an important foreign policy issue-area with the independence of a neighbouring Kwazulu, and the establishment of a Black independent Mozambique.

The relationship between social composition and external policy is however perhaps most visibly expressed through the medium of Swaziland's European population who, in all, make up a quantitatively small but disproportionately influential element of the local political community. In practice, the European presence in Swaziland dates back well into the last century, from which time on this minority element has played a vital role in the social and economic life of the territory. Politically-speaking, the European community has been responsible for the articulation of conservative and colonilist values in Swazi life: until fairly recently, this community has tended to emphasise the importance of social segregation and racial discrimination. During the decolonisation process the majority of Europeans supported the idea of a 'multi-racial' federation, which to all intents and purposes, supposed the maintenance of White minority rule.
In spite of these facts however, present race relations in Swaziland are exceptionally good, so much so that, in many ways Swaziland can lay claim to being a true and functional multi-racial society. The reason for this is to be found in the fact that during the last ten years some fundamental alterations in the social and political attitudes of the European population have taken place. The European element today seems to accept as valid the provisions of the Anti-Discrimination Proclamation of 1961 and the Race Relations Act of 1962, the effects of which are to outlaw all forms of social segregation conducted on a racial basis. Politically speaking, the European community has to all intents and purposes fully rejected the emphasis on White minority domination in favour of a low-key political profile, in terms of which all political power is vested with the moderate elements of the Black population of the territory. In the post-independence period, Europeans have been members of Swaziland's legislature and executive: yet the Europeans have not created political parties, have tended to associate themselves with the existing Black Imbokodvo party, and have neither publicly objected nor attempted to alter their minuscule representational role in Swaziland's law-making and executing bodies. The Europeans have, in short, come to terms with the existence of a unitary Black-dominated political system.

This should not however obscure the fact that the existence of the European community impinges very significantly on the making of Swazi foreign policy. In the first place, it is important to appreciate the fact that the fundamental readjustments in White Swazi political and social attitudes have been promoted by the realisation, on the part of the European community, that its economic importance to Swazi society can adequately compensate for its lack of formal political influence, and - perhaps more
significantly - that it can, to some degree or another, continue to rely on the support of its racial counterparts in the neighbouring White South African state. This calculation may not necessarily be valid. What is important however, is that it is largely perceived to be valid by the European community and by political leadership in the Swaziland government. As far as the latter is concerned, some anxiety continues to exist that the European population continues to more fully identify with their South African counterparts than with the newly-established symbols and institutions of the Black Swazi state. Correctly or incorrectly, the sentiment is also present that South Africa will not quiescently witness the pursuit of policies by the Swazi government which will seriously - or be seen to be seriously - prejudicial to the material interests of the Swazi European community. The result of these orientations is expressed at two levels. In the first place, Swaziland's policy-makers are extremely sensitive to the fact that Swazi policies towards South Africa can fundamentally affect the attitudes on the part of Swaziland's Europeans towards the Swazi state: there is some evidence to suggest that relatively more militant policies directed against the Republic might well promote an unfavourable reaction on the part of the domestic European community, and in the process, mobilise them against either prevailing leadership or even against the state. Under such circumstances the potential political weight of the European community acts as a moderating influence on Swazi policy towards South Africa. Secondly, the perceived relationship between Swaziland's Europeans and South Africa, introduces into the realms of domestic policy an element of caution which would be unlikely to exist in the absence of the Swazi-South African racial interlinkage. Swaziland's government is undoubtedly sensitive to the fact that South African intervention in Swaziland's internal affairs could well become a function
of the character of policies pursued in relation to the territory's European minority community: in many ways it is the fear of the potential pressures which South Africa could bring to bear, that has moderated Swaziland's domestic policy, particularly her concern with reducing the disproportionate economic role of the European minority community in Swazi social life.

Social composition relates to foreign policy, and it seems that this is no less the situation in the case of Swaziland, the element of social cohesion notwithstanding. From one perspective, the essentially uni-tribal character of the society substantially widens the range of options open to policy-makers, who can afford to be relatively unconcerned with the penetration of external subversive influences into the tribal structure. From another perspective however, the presence of the European community seems to have a distinct limiting effect: the Swazi foreign policy-maker it seems can never entirely exclude this variable from his policy-making calculations. And it is because of this that both domestic policy, and foreign policy towards South Africa takes on a distinctively moderate quality and form.

C. The Political Identities of Swaziland's Leadership: The Psycho-Ideological Bases of Swaziland's Foreign Policy

The foreign policy of any state reflects the domestic political culture of the state i.e. the set of values, attitudes, beliefs and sentiments which are internalised within, and condition the operation of, the institutions and processes of the political system. In the case of the developing state therefore, the political identities and orientations of both political leadership and politically-aware and involved citizens of the state, impinge directly upon the definition of foreign
policy objectives, and in any analysis of the domestic factors which condition foreign policy in these states, it becomes necessary to evaluate this attitudinal base upon which foreign policy operations are constructed.

In doing so in the case of Swaziland, it is of importance to bear a vital fact in mind, namely that Swaziland is a state whose historic heritage is similar to that of those states who in current terms constitute the entity deemed the "Third World" whilst the racial and cultural characteristics of Swazi society, together with the general concern of its politically-relevant citizens with problems relating to development and modernisation, consolidate the pattern of linkages which exist between Swaziland and the newly-independent, developing non-White states of the international community. Under such circumstances, it is to these states that Swazi policy-makers will turn in their search for "natural" allies in the international system, and alternatively, it will be through the articulation of the political values of this international grouping that Swazi policy-makers will seek to legitimate their association with these states. It must be emphasised that this is not to suggest that Swaziland's international alignments can be automatically inferred from the similarities in development levels, history and race which exist between Swaziland and the Third World states: nor is it to suggest that the political values which are filtered into Swaziland's foreign policy-making process are not also a product of independent definition. Rather it should be borne in mind, that perceived common identities founded on race, culture, history and political and economic circumstance perform an important coalescent function in inter-state relations, that to the degree that states become socialised into an international group political culture, group political values will intrude upon the political values indigenous to the state itself, and that this dynamic cannot be excluded from the systematic analysis of the foreign policy of discrete states, Swaziland no less.
The question to be posed at this point is quite simple i.e. to what degree have the values of the Third World political culture been absorbed into the Swazi political system? Alternatively, to what degree do the set of political attitudes underlying current Swazi foreign policy-making indicate the socialisation of Swaziland into that international group of states with which the politically-relevant strata of Swaziland society are sentimentally and psychologically associated?

In answering this it is significant to note that, to the degree that it exists, Swazi identification with their racial and political counterparts external to the Swazi state is a relatively recent phenomenon. In large part this is attributable to the geographic situation of Swaziland in the heartland of South Africa which during the colonial era and well into the last years of the decolonisation process constituted an insulating buffer against the inflow of political ideas and concepts from the international system and Black Africa into the Swaziland polity. As late as the early Sixties, by which time ideas associated with African nationalism and Pan-Africanism were firmly entrenched on the African continent as a whole, the political philosophies of Swazi politicians continued to be dominated by ethnocentric and pre-modern conceptions of political society and organisation. The legacy of this situation is expressed in the fact that even today, Swaziland's politically-aware element approach the concepts of modern nationalism and supra-nationalism of the Pan-African variety with an element of extreme caution, and even deep suspicion on the part of the less urbanised and tribally oriented members of the political community. Contemporary ideologies and belief-systems have, in short, experienced considerable difficulty in establishing themselves in the minds of many, even politically-sophisticated, Swazi who have continued to define their attitudes and political interests in essentially traditional tribal-oriented terms. This
is true not only within the domestic political context, but in the external context as well: there is for example an appreciation of the ethnocultural merits of South Africa's separate development policy amongst many members of the Swazi political leadership, which contrasts sharply with the political attitudes and opinions which currently prevail in most Black African political circles. And insofar as these values are brought to bear on the foreign policy-making process, criticism and opposition to South Africa's internal policies - criticism which is so deeply internalised in the feelings of the rest of Black Africa - becomes blunted. In many ways the fulfilment of Swazi national political aspirations is still defined in what would be considered in the rest of Black Africa, as conservative terms; it is the tribe which is the nation and the erosion of tribal affinities continues to be viewed with a sense of disquiet uncommon to political thinking in Black Africa as a whole.

When all is said and done however, it cannot be denied that the participation of Swaziland in a modern international environment has not left her sense of political values either untainted or untouched. Indeed, the communications revolution, which has facilitated the flow of innovative categories of ideas into Swaziland, and Swaziland's involvement in the international exchange of goods, services and people, has in many ways served to break down the ideological gap between Swaziland and the outside world, and in others, served to cement the relationship between political elements within Swaziland and perceivedly similar elements in the external system. The ideals of modern nationalism, of racial equality, Black solidarity and economic and political independence have undoubtedly succeeded in penetrating the Swazi system, have attracted the attention of political actors within it, and have, in the process, served to promote a redefinition of political values and attitudes which stand in sharp contrast to the traditional dispositions of the past.
The intrusion of innovative political ideas into Swaziland can be traced back to the early sixties when a certain amount of liaison began to occur between a number of important individual Swazi, and external international institutions: it was this which was to promote a new acquaintanceship on the part of the former with contemporary political values prevailing within the latter. Dr. Zwane, for example, was to be present at the Conference of the Heads of States and Government of Independent African States (May 1963) which was to lead to the creation of the OAU, as well as a variety of other international conferences at which Third World and Black African viewpoints were to be articulated. John Nquku was a participant of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held in 1964, whilst in 1967, for example, it was pointed out that the SPP was recognised not only by the AASO in Cairo, but additionally by the OAU, the United Nations, the Tri-Continental Conference of Africa, Asia and Latin America, the World Assembly of Youth and the Pan-African Solidarity Organisation of the three High Commission Territories: individual members of both the SPP and NNLC were to be known for their itinerant character during the 60's, whilst both of these organisations were responsible during this period for the establishment of party offices abroad. Over and beyond this it should be noted that Ghanaian influences were to play an important role in the ideological alignment of both these parties, and the tactical procedures - with their emphasis on mass mobilisation apart from formal constitutional arrangements - which they subsequently adopted and which strongly reflected the experiences of the Ghanaian Convention People's Party. Dr Zwane himself was to undertake a number of trips to Ghana where he established relations with the Bureau of African Affairs, which in turn was to provide a number of scholarships for the training of Swazi in Ghanaian institutions such as the Ideological Institute at Winneba (which was attended by a number
of Swazi including Arthur Khosa who was to become the Deputy-Chairman of the NNLC. As far as the SPP is concerned, it is of interest to note that the decision to establish the party followed directly upon a visit to Swaziland, in May 1960, of Aloysius K. Barden (then-director of Ghana’s Bureau of African Affairs) - who in consultations with Nquku seems to have convinced the latter of the need to move beyond mere pressure group activity in the SPA (to which most members of the Swazi intelligentsia then confined their political role) - whilst in the years that followed the Ghanaian authorities were to make available to the SPP facilities similar to those extended to the NNLC itself. This of course suggests that the Ghanaian influence in Swazi internal politics was by no means committed to one party or movement - Nkrumah was indeed to later throw support to the Imbokodvo itself: nonetheless the linkages established undoubtedly not only contributed to the development of modern political thought in Swaziland itself, but, more subtly to the conditioning of that thought in particular African nationalist and Pan-African directions.

Over and beyond the influence of international organisations and of particular Black African countries such as Ghana on the intrusion and development of international thought categories into and within the Swazi political system, it is of importance to take note of the South African influence in the same regard. Indeed, if the Swazi-South African geographic relationship has on the one hand served as an insulating factor in the process whereby ideological forces have penetrated the Swazi state, ironically on the other, this relationship has at the same time served to allow for the infusion of these forces in a variety of ways. In the first place the "haven" nature of the Swazi state in terms of which South African political refugees have become both attracted to and involved in the Swazi political system is an important factor in the development of modern and articulated political
conceptions on the part of the indigenous participants in that system itself. The year 1960 - with the Sharpesville incident and the subsequent banning of the PAC and ANC in South Africa - is of importance in this regard, witnessing as it did the influx of a variety of South African political refugees who were in subsequent years (when the refugee community was to be swelled by both more South Africans as well as refugees from Mozambique) to play important roles in Swazi political life; mention must be made in particular of such individuals as Jordan Ngubane (a member of both the Liberal Party and ANC) and i.a. Macdonald Maseko, an official of the ANC who was to become a leading figure in the NNLC itself. In the second place mention must be made of the role of South African educational institutions, which, attended by numerous Swazi, served through the 20th century as contact points for the integration of and introduction to modern ideological thought; institutions such as Fort Hare, the University of the Witwatersrand (of which Dr. Zwane was a graduate), and St. Chad's College in Natal (which was attended by Nquku) should be mentioned in this regard. Finally, the Swazi/South African interchange of labour is another important element that should be noted with reference to the South African role in the ideological modernisation of the Swazi state; the presence of a sizeable non-Swazi African community - composed mainly of Zulu and Shangaan - in Swaziland has constituted an important channel for the flow of ideas across territorial boundaries, whilst the presence of a Swazi labour-force in South Africa itself has similarly served as a means for the communication of ideological categories from the one system to the other. In the latter regard it is of interest to note both the role of South African based Swazi in the formation of the NNLC and a splinter group within the Swaziland Progressive Party, and, during the early sixties, the influence of this group in the radicalisation of the NNLC.
The influence of nationalist political and racial thought systems has tended to be most felt and visible in the more modernised sector of the Swaziland socio-political system, amongst the more urbanised and educated members of the money economy, where in fact, since the early sixties, they have found institutional expression in the belief and activities of a number of political entities who in one manner or another have demonstrated a degree of commitment to doctrinal categories whose source of origin is rooted rather in the external international environment rather than within the Swazi indigenous system itself. This is especially true with regard to the SPP - Swaziland's first modern political party, which with its establishment in 1960 was to be responsible for the introduction of Pan-Africanist ideas into Swazi political life - and, following the breakaway from the SPP in the early sixties, the NNLC which henceforth was to become the prime articulator of modern African political values within the Swazi political system. It was, more explicitly, the latter which was to be responsible for both the introduction of African Socialist and the development of Pan-Africanist thought orientations within this system; thus it was the NNLC which was to propose a relatively coherent plan for the nationalisation of Swaziland's industries and infrastructure during the 1964 election campaign, popularise the frequent manipulation and use of such ideology-laden symbols as "imperialism", "Colonialism", 'neo-colonialism" etc. and present to the Swazi electorate the concepts of Pan-Africanism and their differentiation from the liberal multi-racial socio-political ideal. (In the latter regard for example, a statement to the effect that, in Dr. Zwane's opinion "multiracialism and Pan-Africanism are like two parallel lines and will never meet. Pan-Africanism recognises the existence of only one race anthropologically referred to as homosapiens ... If multiplicity of races is rejected, also rejected is the theory of superiority of one race over another."
What is perhaps of even greater significance is the fact that foreign modern political influences have not only effected those political parties which are, in a sense, on the periphery of Swazi politics, but the predominant and governing Imbokodvo National Movement itself. The Imbokodvo never has been, nor is it today, a militant Pan-Africanist or African nationalist party defined in the strictest sense: on the contrary the Imbokodvo is still essentially a conservative movement which operates in close relation to the tribal framework, and within the context of traditional political beliefs and values. There is no doubt however that in the last decade, and particularly since independence, the actions and attitudes of the Imbokodvo have come increasingly to reflect the impact of modern African nationalist thought, and that this fact has led to some reappraisal on the part of the Imbokodvo leadership of the policies to be pursued within Swaziland and within the wider international environment of which Swaziland is a functioning part. Insofar as the latter in particular is concerned, the basis of political values which underpin the conceptualisation of foreign policy seems to have perceptibly shifted in the direction of internationalisation and modernity.

This shift, which is indicated by some form of attitudinal convergence between the political sentiments of Swazi policy-makers and those of their counterparts in the rest of Black Africa, is the result of a combination of domestic and external considerations. From a domestic point of view it should be borne in mind that the early sixties witnessed considerable political co-operation between the Swazi tribal authorities, (who subsequently established the Imbokodvo National Movement) and the minority European settler element. The co-operation was largely motivated by common opposition to the modern Swazi nationalist movement which began to emerge during this period. It did nonetheless create the public image, both domestically and abroad, of a set of tribal authorities more concerned with their own narrow interests than
those of the Swazi people as a whole, and of a political grouping
determined to preserve these interests even at the expense of collusion
with a racially exclusive settler minority. The modernist parties of Swaziland
were naturally prone to manipulate this symbol both domestically and abroad,
and the result of this situation was the emergence within the Imbokodvo of
an acute sensitivity to charges of Black "sell-out". As early as 1963 for
example, it seems to have become realised within the Imbokodvo that if the
movement desired to maintain its credibility as the legitimate representative
of all the Swazi people, it would be necessary to draw a clear distinction
between its political position and that of its European allies. It was also
appreciated by the tribal authorities that its capacity to draw off support
from the nationalist movement would require a closer identification with the
political values of modern African nationalism. It was this which was to
underline the refusal of the Imbokodvo to continue to support the idea of a
multi-racial federation following the elections of 1964. From this point on
Imbokodvo political demands were geared to a non-racial unitary state, and by
1967 such issues as labour localisation, trade unionism and the immediate racial
integration of Swaziland were integral features of the INM political platform.
From the foreign policy point of view what is perhaps of even more significance
is the fact that even after it became clear - in the 1964 and 1967 elections -
that it was the INM which occupied a position of virtually unchallengeable
domestic authority, the leadership of the INM did not revert to the more
conservative political stance which it had adopted in the pre-1964 period.
In the post-independence period it has continued to be felt that the
international vis-a-vis national image of the party requires demonstrable
proof of its identification with Black Africa. It is this that underlies
the increased number of personal contacts made by members of the Swaziland
government with officials of Black African states, Swaziland's concern
with its ability to participate in Black African forums, such as the O.A.U. and to establish a variety of Black African technical and economic contacts in the post-independence period. These actions have in turn promoted closer identity ties between Swaziland leadership and Black Africa, and have facilitated the introduction of the modern political values of the latter into Swazi foreign policy-making circles. In a cumulative and self-reinforcing fashion the concern with an international image has acted to affect the political perceptions of the Swazi policy-maker.

The absorption on the part of Swaziland's policy-making process of innovative exogenous political values is not however only a product of the sensitivity of Swaziland's leadership to the image of European clientship. It is also a reflection of Imbokodvo attitudes and political style. It is of importance to emphasise that the Imbokodvo has never been an exclusivist party, and that it has tended in the past to adopt an extremely conciliatory position towards its domestic political opponents. The Prime Minister has, for example pointed out that Imbokodvo welcomes its erstwhile political opponent "like the prodigal son", and that the Imbokodvo philosophy does not exclude membership even on the part of individuals who have been its most vehement critics and opponents. It is this 'open-door' policy which has allowed the Imbokodvo to fully exploit Swazi political talents. This emphasis has however also allowed for the incorporation of individuals into the INM who have in the past been closely associated with the modernist nationalist movement. Many of these individuals have in fact been placed in important policy-making roles, and this implies that within Swaziland's governing party today, at the highest levels of policy-making, there exist a number of individuals who articulate a set of political dispositions which are distinctly modern and African nationalist in character. It is important to emphasise that emergent policy is not only conditioned by these policy-
makers, but represents a subtle blend of traditional and modern political thoughts in this regard, insofar as King Sobhuza and persons such as Mr. Simon Mxumalo (ex-leader of the Swaziland Democratic Party, and now Minister of Industries, Mining and Tourism) interact at the policy-making level, foreign policy represents a combination of both traditional and more modern perceptions and perspectives. In another sense foreign and domestic policy represents the integration of the modernist bureaucratic ethos with that of the traditional tribal authorities. That the attitudes which underlie policy-making must to some degree be conditioned by the influences exerted by individuals of modern ideological persuasions, is an important variable which cannot be excluded from the analysis of the political culture on which Swazi foreign policy is based.

In conclusion therefore, it seems that although the domestic political culture of Swaziland still contains a potent element of traditionalist values and beliefs, domestic and international considerations, subjective and objective circumstances have combined to erode some of the political conservatism of Swazi society. Today, Swaziland's leadership cannot be considered militantly nationalist or Black-oriented in the strictest sense: yet international pressures and the capacity of the Imbokodvo to include in its operations individuals of a more politically modern orientation, have led to a situation where policy, both internal and external, is sensitive to the political values currently articulated in the developing world.

D. The Strategic Dimensions of Swaziland's Foreign Policy

The state of modern technology allows for the rapid transportation of material goods and the communication of ideas in a manner which often bears little relevance to the pattern of legal boundaries amongst states. As a result the geographic location of states is often interpreted as a
variable whose political relevance is today significantly less than has been the case in past international systems. There can be no doubt however that factors related to geographic location still impinge on political behaviour: access to maritime outlets, the capacity to independently controlled communication routes, the spatial relationship between politically similar or dissimilar systems - all these continue to be factors which must be taken into account by the policy-makers of states. In the developing areas in particular, the level of technology is relatively low, so that in many cases states cannot offset the political disadvantages which derive from geographic circumstance: the communications structures of developing states still continue to be subject to the ways and wiles of spatial emplacement. This is no less the case with Swaziland. Indeed, given the landlocked character of the Swazi state, and the fact that it is almost completely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa, except in the East, it would seem to be invalid to ignore the relationship between geographic situation and the making and operation of Swazi government policy. Swaziland has no direct physical access to the outside world except via the territory of her immediate neighbours, and this fact must to some degree condition the attitudes and actions of the Swaziland policy-makers.

In the past, the geographic positioning of Swaziland in relation to South Africa has undoubtedly served to facilitate the role of South African political influences in the Swaziland system. This is not to suggest that Swaziland is a mere political client-state of South Africa or has been so in past years: there seems little doubt however, that South African influences have profoundly affected the pattern of political events in Swaziland and that they continue to do so, irrespective of the conscious intentions of South Africa or its policy-makers. The juxtapositioning of the Swazi and South African systems i.e. the geographic relationship between the two territories,
makes the flow of influences from South Africa into Swaziland all but inevitable.

In evaluating the role of geographically-induced South African influences in the Swaziland political system, one can in fact distinguish between the pre- and post-colonial periods. In the former, South African participation in the Swazi polity was largely expressed through the activities of a variety of individuals, either of South African citizenship or extraction, who were to become involved in Swaziland's politics of decolonisation. It has for example been estimated that no less than 60 per cent of the membership of Swaziland's major pre-independence white political party, the United Swaziland Association, was drawn from South African citizens, and this was to substantially condition both the political values and tactics which were endorsed by this organisation. Under such circumstances, the concern which the U.S.A. was to feel for such issues as dual voting privileges in both Swaziland and South Africa, and the incorporation of Swaziland into the framework of the Bantustan programme, can readily be understood. The pre-independence period was also to witness a number of personal contacts between leading Swazi and South African political personalities: specific examples of this would include the meeting between Mr. Vorster and King Sobhuza at Ehlanzeni in July 1962, and between representatives of the Swazi National Council and Mr. van Wyk de Vries just prior to the 1964 Swaziland general election. Finally, there is some evidence to suggest that South African support was instrumental in the establishment of such political entities as the National Convention, and the Nbandzeni Party whose leader, Dr. George Msibi, was on a variety of occasions accused of collusion with members of the South African Special Branch. Whether or not these conspiratorial activities can be substantiated is perhaps of less importance than the fact that even if Swazi-South African political transactions in the pre-independence period
were not a direct result of geographic contiguity, they were nonetheless facilitated by it.

In the post-colonial period, with the existence of a sovereign and independent Swazi state, South African influence - conscious or unconscious - in the Swazi polity has become at once less tangible and direct. Nonetheless, the Swazi-South African geographic relationship continues to be politically relevant insofar as it touches upon both the territorial permeability and communications structures of the newly-established Swazi state. It should be borne in mind - and it is in fact constantly borne in mind by the Swazi leadership - that not only is South Africa a politically dissimilar neighbouring state, but that she is a state whose military and economic capacity vastly exceeds that of Swaziland, and which can, virtually at will, adopt policies and postures which can fundamentally and negatively alter the course of Swazi society. From a military point of view, although Swaziland has recently established its own defence force, it is not only beyond contemplation that this force could launch an offensive attack upon South Africa, but even beyond question as to whether this force could defend Swaziland in the face of a South African attack. Swaziland does not have the military capacity to maintain the territorial integrity of the state, and although there is no evidence to suggest that either South African or Swaziland foreign policy-makers think in terms of a military confrontation between the two states, the complete incapacity of Swaziland to defend her national security in the face of her more powerful neighbour, constitutes a perennial backdrop to the making and implementation of Swazi foreign policy. In practice moreover, the activities of South African security officials in Swaziland in the post-independence years has consolidated these feelings of extreme vulnerability. South African authorities have, it seems, become increasingly aware of the political ramifications involved in the 'hot pursuit' of South African
political refugees into Swaziland, and actions of this nature have tended to decline in recent years. This has not however been paralleled by a corresponding decrease in the anxiety felt by Swazi policy-makers as to the extreme vulnerability of the boundaries of the Swazi state. Nor has it reduced the potential influence which can be exerted by South Africa through manipulation of the symbols of massive military preponderance.

Geo-political relationship between Swaziland and South Africa is also reflected in the current fact that, with the exception of its outlets through Mozambique in the East, Swaziland's communications with the outside world are directly dependent upon facilities which are provided by its South African neighbour. The situation is of course partially offset by the routing of the Swaziland railroad, through Lourenco Marques: nonetheless, with this exception the major flow of Swaziland's transactions is still through South Africa, and it is through South Africa that Swaziland's aerial linkages, imports and telecommunications connections with the outside world, must pass. In practice, Swaziland's leaders are acutely aware of this fact: they also fully realise the ease with which South Africa can sever or hamper the transportation of goods or personnel into Swaziland, a fact which has been demonstrated on numerous occasions in recent years, by the denial of transit rights to numerous individuals who have either sought to leave or enter Swaziland via the medium of South African facilities.\(^{60/}\)

The foreign policy relevance of this situation is fairly obvious, and in practice it seems that the South African-Swaziland geographic relationship has implications for both the psychological and operational dimensions of the Swazi foreign policy-making process.

First and foremost, the geographic juxtapositioning of Swaziland and
South Africa directly limits the range of actual political options open to the Swazi policy-maker. In practice, the South African-Swazi geographic relationship partially offsets the political effects of the discrepancy in political values in the Swazi and South African systems. The close geographic ties between South Africa and Swaziland do not necessarily produce an amicable relationship expressed through the convergence of political sentiments: nonetheless, these ties do facilitate interaction between the two systems and in so doing produce an element of interdependency in their relations. From the Swaziland perspective, to the degree that geography leads to the integration of communications systems, and to the degree that geography leads to economic integration as well, it becomes relatively more difficult to pursue a foreign policy based on hostility, political differences notwithstanding. This is clearly evident in any comparison between Swazi-South African and Swazi-Rhodesian relationships. In both cases the roots of inter-state enmity are to be found in differences pertaining to issues on the relationship between politics and race. In the case of the latter however, the states in question are geographically remote, and the rate of social transactions between them, essentially non-existent. In the case of the former, geographic proximity has facilitated, if not created, a high level of inter-territorial transactions of both an economic and political nature, and this has tempered Swazi attitudes towards South Africa and its internal policies, in a manner which is not paralleled in the Rhodesian case. That this is so directly reflects the range of foreign policy options open to Swazi policy-makers in each instance.

The limitations imposed on the range of options open to Swazi policy-makers is also indicated by its attitude and actions in relation to the guerrilla movements directed against the South African state. From a military perspective, the strategic situation of Swaziland, in the very heartland of
South Africa, creates an ideal staging point for operations directed against South Africa. Geography, in this sense, substantially enhances the military value of the Swazi state. Alternatively, it is precisely the geographic relationship between Swaziland and South Africa which reduces the probability that this potential military value will be operationalised. Swaziland's policy-makers are aware of these facts: they are cognisant that foreign policy cannot be geared to the promotion of guerilla activity against South Africa, except at the risk of jeopardising the material and economic interests of the state. With alterations in the political status of Mozambique they are also aware that the potential military value of Swaziland will increase, and that as a result, whereas Swaziland will reap the advantages of being, for the first time in its history, bordered by an independent Black state, its foreign policy will at the same time be confronted with issues related to the translation of potential into actual military value. The strategic position of Swaziland bordered by an independent Mozambique thus poses serious challenges for Swazi foreign policy.

Viewed in these terms Swaziland's geographic position is undoubtedly a limiting factor in the manipulation of foreign policy, and one which serves to severely circumscribe the psychological and operational possibilities of the foreign policy-makers. It should not however be thought that these strictures cannot, to some degree, be offset. It can for example be argued that through, the application of technology, even in the case of a developing state such as Swaziland, strategic disadvantage can be partially overcome through the establishment of a pattern of politically advantageous communication links. This has in fact been clearly recognised by Swaziland's policy-makers who, in the last few years have sought to increase their political options through the establishment of aerial linkages between Swaziland and the outside world.
It can also be justifiably argued that the geographic disadvantages confronting the Swazi state can be reduced in political terms as a result of the fact that she is surrounded by two vis-a-vis a single state.

There is in fact a further aspect of Swaziland's geographic location which has not as yet been dealt with, although it has definite important foreign policy effects i.e. that Swaziland is not completely surrounded by South Africa, but is bordered by Mozambique on its eastern side. This does not alter the land-locked character of the Swazi state, nor does it reduce its total dependence on external actors for physical contact with the outside world: on the other hand, the participation of a second state in the Swaziland's geographic environment does create possibilities which would not exist in a situation of total confinement within the realms of a single state. More explicitly, the existence of Mozambique to the East allows for Swaziland to partially compensate for its geographic dependence on the Republic of South Africa: it provides for a set of transactional alternatives which can partially offset the limitations imposed by the South African relationship. In a sense it allows Swaziland's policy-makers to diffuse their geographic dependence in a manner which is uncontemplatable in the Lesotho situation: trade relations with South Africa can be 'balanced' by the routing of trade through Mozambique, and physical communications can similarly be equilibrated in this manner. Thus, whilst almost all of Swaziland's imports find their source in South Africa almost all of her exports are routed through Lourenco Marques. Similarly, whilst Swaziland's aerial communications are almost totally dependent on South African facilities, and whilst her land and telephone connections with the outside world are transacted through the South African exchange, her sole rail link is directed eastwards through the Portuguese territory. It can of course be validly argued that this 'balance' is not necessarily a product of political
circumstance and calculation: nonetheless it is a factor which has political effects, and which substantially increases the range of political options and possibilities available to the Swazi policy-maker. There can be little doubt moreover, that with the establishment of an independent Black Mozambique the political saliency of the Mozambique-Swaziland territorial relationship will be vastly enhanced, and it is in fact currently argued that this relationship and its development, is of sufficient relevance to bring about fundamental alterations in the total pattern of Swaziland's foreign policy operations.

The geographic relationship between Swaziland and South Africa, between a military and economic midget and a military and economic giant, can never be entirely eradicated from the calculations and operations of the Swazi foreign policy-making process. What would seem to be of even more importance is the fact that whether or not South Africa would seriously contemplate military or economic action against Swaziland, is less relevant to Swazi foreign policy-making than the fact that in the perceptions of the Swazi policy-maker, the possibility of such action can never be fully discounted. In other words, the significance of the locational relationship between South Africa and Swaziland, insofar as the foreign policy of the latter is concerned, is to be found not only in the objective character of Swazi-South African relations, but in the subjective orientations of the Swazi policy-makers themselves. In this sense, geography is translated into a politically-limiting foreign policy variable through the perceptions of Swaziland's foreign policy-making elite. These perceptions are dominated by feelings of anxiety and apprehension, and it is as a result of these sentiments, that an element of extreme caution becomes injected into the Swazi policy-making process, and often to a degree which would not seem necessary in the light of objective circumstance.
In conclusion it is inescapably clear that Swaziland's land-locked location in the heartland of the Southern African sub-continent is a vitally important factor in both the set of attitudes which underlie Swaziland's foreign policy-making process, and in the nature of the actions which flow therefrom. Geo-politics may well be of less relevance in certain international situations vis-a-vis others: in the case of Swaziland however, it seems that an evaluation of the relationships between geographic location and political behaviour is central to an understanding of foreign policy orientations and operations.

E. Political Development and Swaziland's Foreign Policy

Although the amount of research done on the relationship between the level of political development and foreign policy is, to date, minimal, the stockpile of existing evidence is sufficient to suggest that such a relationship in fact exists, and that in the making of foreign policy, particularly at the level of foreign policy formulation, the degree of political modernisation must be included in the category of domestic variables which impinge on the foreign policy-making process. Alternatively, the low degree of authority rationalisation, structural differentiation and political participation within a polity, imparts to that system's external policies, certain distinctive qualities which would be absent under conditions of relatively more heightened political modernity.

The formulation of Swaziland's foreign policy directly reflects the influence of the level of political modernity defined in terms of the above three criteria.

First and foremost, it is of importance to note that the operations of Swazi government do not manifest an exceptionally strong element of structural differentiation, and that as a result, in Swaziland as in other developing
states, the concerns, powers and prerogatives of specific governmental institutions often overlap and are not clearly defined. This lack of differentiation is clearly expressed in the case of Swaziland's Department of Foreign Affairs, whose operations as distinct from other institutions in the governmental structure, are as yet relatively unclear. This is expressed in two sets of relationships of an institutional nature. In the first place, Swaziland's Foreign Affairs Department is directed to concern itself purely and only with the political aspects of external policy, and this limitation means that a number of other structures and departments of the public service are integrated into the foreign policy-making process in a manner which would not apply were Foreign Affairs be granted somewhat wider prerogatives. In effective practice, departments and individuals outside of Foreign Affairs are often deeply involved in negotiations which would normally fall within the operational realm of the foreign ministry, and this leads not only to a certain inter-departmental competitive element in foreign policy-making, but also to breakdowns in communication and co-ordination in the policy-making enterprise. In the second place, the low level of structural differentiation is reflected in relationships between Foreign Affairs and the executive arm of government. It should be borne in mind that it is the Prime Minister who is ultimately formally vested with responsibility for Swaziland's foreign policy, and that although he operates on the advice of the Permanent Secretary and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs - and on issues of major importance will consult the Council of Ministers - it is the Prime Minister who is the major individual actor in the foreign policy-making process. This situation is not necessarily unusual and in many states, particularly developing states, the office of Foreign Minister is often absorbed into that of the Prime Minister himself. This arrangement does however lead to a blurring of the dividing lines between bureaucratic
and executive operations, and can give rise to a situation where administrative and political perceptions of foreign policy can come into direct conflict. There is some evidence to suggest that this is the case with regard to Swazi foreign policy-making, where considerations of operational efficiency as articulated by the Department of Foreign Affairs have not entirely conformed with political attitudes and opinions expressed either by the Prime Minister, or by those members of the Swaziland Cabinet with an interest in foreign affairs. Bureaucracy-executive relationships thus tend to consolidate and aggravate intra-bureaucratic variables which detract from maximum efficiency in the policy-formation process.

The rationalisation of authority is also central to any definition of political modernity, and if this factor be taken to mean, inter alia, that ultimate decision-making capacity in policy-making is vested in the formally established institutions of state, then certain implications for Swazi foreign policy-making arise. It should be borne in mind that not only is King Sobhuza the focus for domestic political sentiments and policies, but that additionally he is extremely interested in foreign affairs. It is this orientation, in combination with the political authority wielded by the King, which tends to encourage the transmission of major foreign policy decisions on the part of the Council of Ministers, prior to implementation, to the King himself. Indeed, since the suspension of the Swaziland Constitution in April 1973, and the subsequent concentration of political power in the office of the King, this process has tended to increase: in current terms the capacity of King Sobhuza to influence foreign policy, and his frequency in doing so, seems readily evident. It is moreover of significance that the circle of monarchical advisers includes not only members of the modernised sectors of Swazi society, but in addition members of the tribal hierarchy who can, and so it seems, do, exert influence on the royal decision-making process. The
King is also known for his tendency to utilise the services of individuals outside the formal governmental circles in the negotiation of foreign policy issues. Under such circumstances, policy-conflicts can often arise between modernised bureaucrats, politicians, tribalists and outsider individuals all who seek to capture royal attentions. Foreign policy-making and the output of the policy-making process thus often reflects factional considerations which do little to enhance efficiency, and which would normally be phased out or offset within a more structured institutional framework.

Swaziland's foreign policy is finally affected by the level of participation in domestic politics. This is true in two senses, i.e. within the formal realms of governmental service, and within the wider social environment of which governmental institutions are a part. In the former case 'participation' refers to the categories of human skills which are integrated into government work, and, in this regard, Swaziland in common with other developing states, suffers extreme shortages of skilled manpower which can be employed in the public service. This is reflected in the Department of Foreign Affairs which, excluding clerical staff, currently consists of less than a dozen individuals. Staff shortages are in fact an endemic feature of the operations of the Department, and can in many cases only be overcome through the importation of foreign personnel. At present, for example, there is no treaty officer in the department, and treaty work has always in the past been performed by foreign officials. The Department has no visibly-evident structured procedures for the collection of information, whilst its information resources are in any case limited to discrete and disparate elements of data haphazardly gleaned from a small number of diffuse sources. The individual members of the executive, political and protocol sections of the department are both experienced and have, in many cases, enjoyed the benefits of sophisticated overseas training. Yet these
individuals lack the support services which are integral to the formation of effective foreign policy, and it seems that until such time as these services are created and manned by larger numbers of skilled staff, the making of Swazi foreign policy, in common with that of other developing countries, will continue to be very much of a hit-or-miss venture.

Participation in policy-making can also however be defined in a wider context, and can be taken to refer to those structures, groups and institutions outside of the formal realms of government, whose interests and influences impinge upon the policy-making process. It is of importance to note however, that the capacity of these entities to penetrate the formal policy-making process is a function of organisation, and that the growth of organised social associations of this nature is in turn a result of the movement of the polity towards higher levels of political modernisation. Under such circumstances, the role of modern pressure group activity on the policy-making processes of the developing state is considerably more restricted than in relatively more developed pluralised societies, and alternatively, policy-making, domestic, and particularly, foreign policy-making, becomes a far more centralised activity than would be the case where the policy-maker must constantly refer his actions to the ways and wiles of an interested and aware element of public opinion. This is no less the case in Swaziland where, with the exception of political parties, organised extra-governmental entities do not play a role in the foreign policy-making process. It is difficult to detect or identify any coherent interest groups in Swaziland which are to any degree concerned with foreign policy issues: as such, the foreign policy-maker operates within an atmosphere of freedom of action unparalleled in the more politically developed polity.

Insofar as the foreign policy role of Swaziland's political parties
are concerned, two factors should be taken into consideration. In the first place, the number of political parties which can in any way significantly effect the domestic political process is exceptionally small. The decolonisation process did indeed witness the emergence of a plethora of parties: yet the majority of these - which would include such entities as the Swaziland Progressive Party, the Swaziland Democratic Party and the Mbandersen National Convention - have either disappeared from the political scene, or continue to exist in such attenuated form as to be, to all intents and purposes, politically meaningless. In fact, in current terms there are only two political parties or organisations which can in any way be defined as functional and as interested in foreign policy issues. These are, in the first place, the governing Imbokodvo National Movement, and, in the second instance, the minority opposition constituted by the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress. The major difference between these two parties lies in the difference between an essentially conservative traditional political entity and a modern African nationalist, Pan-Africanist political actor. This is reflected in the contrasting attitudes brought to bear by the INM and NNLC on domestic and foreign policy issues respectively. On external policies the NNLC has, for example aligned itself with the postures of the more militant Black African states: thus it has pressed for the 'liberation' of South Africa and Namibia, the eradication of Portuguese colonialism and the immediate establishment of majority rule in Rhodesia. The party has also publicly expressed its recognition of the South African National Congress, and has on numerous occasions called for the release of the imprisoned yet 'legitimate' leaders of South Africa's Black peoples. The INM on the other hand has articulated a much more moderate set of external political goals: thus whilst it has publicly identified itself with the movement for the self-determination of the Black peoples of Southern Africa, it has
at the same time emphasised its conviction that this should be brought about by non-violence, compromise and negotiation. Similarly, the INM has emphasised the need for neighbourly co-operation upon the basis of non-interference in domestic affairs, and the material and economic benefits which dictate a policy of realism irrespective of the differences in the political values of territorially-adjacent states.

Apart from the small number of foreign policy-oriented politically salient parties in the Swazi system, it is important to bear in mind the overwhelming predominance of the Imbokodvo in the dynamics of that system. The truth of the matter is, that tribal loyalties continue to dominate the political values of the average Swazi, and as such it is the Imbokodvo which is, to all intents and purposes the extension of the tribal system into modern Swazi politics, which emerges as the political focus of the majority of Swaziland's Black population. The political acumen of King Sobhuza, together with an intricate web of familial connections which are diffused throughout the Swazi political system, have further acted to consolidate the traditionalist position. It should also finally be noted, that the modernist parties in Swazi politics have failed to demonstrate a capacity to utilise modern political techniques, and that insofar as situation-definition, organisation and the manipulation of symbols is concerned, it has been the INM which has constituted the font of modern political acitivity. The modern nationalist parties of Swaziland - i.e. the SPP, SDP and NNLC - have all tended to appeal to the Swazi electorate in terms which are unfamiliar to a tribalised and traditional environment: they have failed to maintain a sense of cohesion adequate to the demands of modern highly-competitive electoral politics, and they have failed to grasp a variety of political opportunities for the mass mobilisation of support. The result is expressed in the political hegemony of the Imbokodvo, and the virtual elimination of all the modernist parties as
political forces. In the 1972 election for example, the NNLC (which has been defined as the major modernist party) acquired a mere 3 of the 24 contested House of Assembly seats, and even though this represented an improvement over its 1967 electoral position, the decision on the part of the King to suspend the constitution in 1973, elicited virtually no support for the oppositional NNLC movement.61/

The fact that Swaziland's political development has led to a situation where the system cannot easily accommodate the political participation of the forces of modern African nationalism, has important implications for foreign policy formation. In the first place, and obviously so, it introduces into the values which underlie policy-making an element of conservatism and moderation which cannot easily be reconciled with the militant sentiments articulated either by the rest of Black Africa, or by the opposition within the Swazi system itself. This is not to say that the NNLC cannot influence the policies adopted by the government: but it cannot do so directly, and the absorption of the values which it articulates into policy-making, can only be effected through the filtering medium of the Imbokodvo itself. This sharply contrasts with the INM, which as governing party, has direct and immediate access to the policy-making process. In the second place, the low level of political competition in the inter-party sense allows the Swazi foreign policy-maker to operate with considerably greater freedom and flexibility than would be the case were constant reference needs to be made to the values, attitudes and opinions internalised within a diverse and dynamic inter-party structure. The foreign policy values of the Imbokodvo are known, and insofar as the INM continues to dominate the domestic political process, and the policy-maker to work within the broad framework of these values, foreign policy formation in Swaziland can alter and adjust with a facility which would be unknown in
a less static domestic political environment. In this sense, the largely
cossilised character of domestic political competition does not automatically
lead to a static foreign policy orientation. The hegemony of the forces of
traditionalism may well deprive the policy-making process of the element of
sophistication which would necessarily grow out of a rapid interchange of
pressures and opinions in a more intense domestic political context: the
predominance of a single political party does however act to broaden the
options available to the Swazi foreign policy-maker, it reduces domestic
limitations on his actions, and it gives to the formation of Swazi foreign
policy a dynamic, if unrefined, quality.

In conclusion, it seems relatively clear that the foreign policy
pursued by Swaziland is neither analytically nor operationally distinct from
the domestic conditions of the Swazi state. On the contrary, it is this
pattern of domestic social, economic, political, ideological and strategic
circumstances, which directly conditions the form which Swazi foreign policy
assumes, the processes by which it is made and the objectives which it seeks.
From an alternative perspective, it is these sets of circumstances which
function in a parametric manner to largely determine the conceptual and
forrulatory dimensions of the Swazi foreign policy-making process. In
certain ways the nature of domestic circumstance limits the alternatives
available to the Swazi policy-maker and detracts from the efficiency of
the policy-making endeavour: in other ways it broadens the range of possible
means and imparts to policy-making a number of distinctively positive
consequences. In either event, the definition of Swaziland's foreign policy
, and the operation of the institutions which convert ideas and
concepts into operational realities, is linked to, dependent on, and
inextricably interwoven with the dynamics internal to Swazi society.
1. Unlike most other Black African states, Swaziland has a relatively well-balanced economy based on industrial, agricultural, mining and tourist sectors. On this point see, inter alia, Government of Swaziland - 'Industrial Opportunities in Swaziland' (Mbabane, Government Printer, n.d.)


3. Swaziland's Gross Domestic Product is one of the highest in Africa, and it is estimated that by the mid-seventies it will exceed R70 million: see Second National Development Plan, ibid., p.4.


10. Second National Development Plan, ibid., p.3 and p.15/16. The social effects of these labour problems are also specifically dealt with in the International Labour Organisation's 'Report to the Government of Swaziland on Manpower Assessment' (Geneva, 1965).
11. See for example, King Sobhuza's Speech From the Throne at the opening of the 1972 session of Parliament (Times of Swaziland, 9.6.72): also Second National Development Plan, ibid., p.15.


17. On the development of power facilities see Financial Gazette, 11.9.70: The Star, 27.3.74 and Rhodesian Herald, 22.3.73.


19. See Financial Gazette. 23.1.72.


23. Quoted in News From Swaziland, 2.6.72.

25. See, for example, Times of Swaziland, 14.7.72.

26. Financial Gazette, 30.6.72 and Commonwealth Development Corporation: Annual Reports - both deal with the Swaziland sugar industry.

27. See Financial Gazette, 8.10.71.


30. For the functions of the NIDC see the National Industrial Development Corporation Bill, 1970.

31. See, for example, News from Swaziland, 8.5.72.


33. Works on Swaziland mining sector include 'Industrial Opportunities in Swaziland' ibid.: Annual Reports of the British Colonial Office: Financial Mail, 2.11.62: Rhodesian Herald. 22.2.73: Financial Gazette. 6.2.70.

34. Swaziland's tourism development is referred to in The Star 22.12.73; Financial Gazette. 6.8.71; and The Star 20.5.72.

35. See for example Financial Mail, 30.6.67.


37. The 'artificial' character of Swaziland's current economic growth is recognised in the Second National Development Plan, ibid., p.39, et seq.

38. See for example Times of Swaziland, 9.6.72, and The Star, 10.5.73.

39. Second National Development Plan, ibid., p.44.

40. Second National Development Plan, ibid., p.27.


42. For a description of the international trading role of developing states, see A. Kamarck, ibid: for Swaziland in particular, see Leistner and Smit, ibid.
43. The 'take-off' conception is attributed to W. Rostow - 'The Stages of Economic Growth'.

44. Fair, Murdoch and Jones, ibid., p.8.

45. Second National Development Plan, ibid., p.16.


47. For the European community's social and political role before and since independence see, inter alia, R.P. Stevens - 'Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland: The Former British High Commission Territories in South Africa': C. Potholm, ibid.; also newspaper reports including the Times of Swaziland 23.12.60, 13.4.62, 6.4.62, 29.5.64, 12.6.64, 22.5.64; Rand Daily Mail 3.6.60: The Star 16.9.61.

48. See Times of Swaziland, 31.5.63.

49. Times of Swaziland, 3.2.67.

50. Swaziland Progressive Party.
52. Ngwane National Liberatory Congress.
53. See C. Potholm, ibid.
54. See Times of Swaziland, 23.3.62.
55. Times of Swaziland, 14.12.62.
56. Times of Swaziland, 9.12.66.
57. Times of Swaziland, 5.8.66.
58. See Rand Daily Mail, 4.10.63.
60. Incidents related to the question of transit rights through South Africa appear in the Times of Swaziland, 11.11.66 and 20.7.73: see also The Star, 10.7.73.
The output of the foreign policy process represents the operational dimension of foreign policy i.e. the application of foreign policy to the international environment of which the state is a part. This is no less the case with regard to Swaziland, which through the application of the output of its foreign policy process seeks the realisation of certain defined economic and political goals in the inter-state context.

A. Swaziland as an International Economic Actor

Swaziland, as all other developing systems, is intimately concerned with accelerated social and economic growth, and this is the case even though there is not internalised within the domestic system itself, adequate supplies of capital, technology and such other developmental resources whose integration into the development effort, in sufficient quantities, directly determines the rate at which the goals associated with modernisation will be achieved. A major function of Swaziland's foreign policy is therefore to compensate for such shortfalls as occur in domestic development capacities, and to do so through maximising externally-located development resources which can subsequently be infused into the local development effort.

In practice this leads to two broad sets of policies which are currently pursued by Swaziland's foreign policy-makers, and which reflect the value attributed to the realisation of foreign policy objectives of an economic nature. Firstly, within the Southern African regional context, the objective of external resource maximisation is reflected in policies specifically designed to enhance regional co-operation, regional trade and
the inter-territorial transfer of capital, labour and technologies. Secondly, outside of the regional environment, the demands of resource mobilisation, condition foreign policy in the direction of establishing and expanding Swaziland's economic links with such international actors, (states, multinational organisations and private groups and interests), who have at their disposal such human and material resources as are required by Swaziland's development programme, and can be integrated with it. It is through such policies, pursued in the Southern African region and external to it, that Swaziland seeks to sustain and promote her processes of socio-economic modernisation.

(a) **Swaziland as a Regional Economic Actor**

(i) **Swaziland-South African Economic Relations**

In current terms, geographic, political and economic circumstance combine to make relations with South Africa, the primary concern in the pattern of Swaziland's diplomatic activity. In current terms moreover, there exists amongst Swaziland's leadership an acute awareness of Swaziland's vulnerability, weakness and defencelessness vis-a-vis South Africa, as a result of the geographic and economic relationship to South Africa. This is constantly alluded to in justification, domestically or internationally, of the particular policy positions taken by Swaziland in relation to South Africa from time to time, and indeed, acts to create a situation, where through necessity if nothing else, Swaziland must continually liaise with South Africa on matters of common concern, and, more substantially, follow 'a policy of friendship and co-operation towards the Republic of South Africa, differences in political values notwithstanding.' Domestic political calculations further act to reinforce the tendency or orientation in this direction: leaders of the Imbokodvo National Movement are deeply sensitive to the
fact that economic decline within Swaziland can only operate to the advantage of the opposition MNLC, that South Africa plays a major role in Swaziland's economic growth, and that, subsequently, the maintenance of a workable economic relationship with South Africa is of primary importance in creating that situation of political and social stability which underpins the political predominance of the current ruling party. It is also deeply felt that given Swaziland's negligible economic, political and military resources, direct action by Swaziland cannot, in current terms, bring about appreciable change in South Africa's forms of internal socio-political organisation: to directly confront South Africa would only serve to jeopardise the territory's favourable socio-economic future. It is this combination of factors which gives to Swaziland's policy towards South Africa a notable pragmatic flavour, with emphasis not on confrontation and revolutionary change, but rather on peaceful 'mutual understanding' and economic co-operation.

The result of this orientation is expressed in the broad-based character of Swazi-South African economic relations, with the latter, deeply involved in the processes of Swaziland's socio-economic growth, the discrepancy in political values between the two states irrespective. In fact, South Africa is currently the single most important factor in the economic life of Swaziland.

This pattern is expressed, in the first instance, in the field of technical assistance, where the climatological and geological similarities between South Africa and Swaziland in combination with South African experience in the requirements of African technical assistance (gleaned from its own domestic conditions and participation in such organisations as CCTA and the CSA) make specific South African assistance of this nature of particular importance to Swaziland's developmental process.
In current terms South African technical assistance is of importance in the development of health and sanitary facilities in Swaziland; today a number of South African medical specialists, operating either as individuals or under such group arrangements as 'Harry's Angels' work on a part-time basis in Swaziland, whilst South African organisations such as the National Food Research Institute - which has done research, inter alia, on improving food supplies with technological development - likewise contribute to healthier conditions in the territory. In the area of infrastructural creation as well, Swaziland's post and telecommunications system was operated as an integral part of the South African system until 1953, whilst in current terms, all of Swaziland's international air and surface mail is handled by South African postal authorities, as is all international telephone and telex traffic, which is routed through Johannesburg's International Trunk Exchange, and Pretoria's International Telex Centre, respectively. South African Railways Road Motor Services have operated in the territory since 1928, and in transporting goods within Swaziland and between Swaziland and South African railheads near the border eliminated the need for Swaziland to expend local resources on such facilities and aided the distribution of produce from market to consumer, and vice versa, in a manner conducive to economic development. South Africa has also played an important role in the development of the Swaziland railroad - rails being provided by ISCOR and construction being undertaken by a consortium of South African firms, whilst in the field of air transportation, Swazi Air currently operates in conjunction with South African Airways.

Turning to Swaziland's educational system, and the development of its natural resources to meet the territory's power needs, the influence of South African technical assistance is also noticeable. Until recently, for example, the entire Swazi teaching community was trained in South
African institutions, and although local teacher training facilities have now been established, many of the current leaders of the Swaziland community are a product of South African educational institutions. A number of Swaziland's schools continue to use South African syllabi. In the field of power and water resource utilisation, following an agreement between ESCOM and the Swaziland Electricity Board in August 1970, Swaziland became the first of South Africa's neighbours to have an electric power system integrated with that of the RSA. South African firms have provided machinery and equipment for the construction of the Edwaleni hydro-electric scheme, liaison has taken place between ESCOM and the SEB regarding the proposed construction of a coal-fired thermal power station in Swaziland, whilst contacts have been made between Swazi and South African officials regarding the establishment of water resource utilisation projects on the Usutu and Pongola Rivers.

South African technical assistance has also contributed to Swaziland's agricultural development. In the veterinary sciences field, technical assistance has been filtered through such organisations as the Inter-Territorial Foot and Mouth Disease Advisory Committee, the South African Foot and Mouth Research Institute and the Onderstepoort Veterinary Research Institute, which has distributed both veterinary data and animal vaccine in Swaziland. During 1964 South Africa was to play a leading role in combating an outbreak of foot and mouth disease which threatened to disrupt the entire Swaziland economy; in 1965 South Africa acted to contain a further outbreak, whilst in 1969/70 a large number of South African veterinary officials visited the territory to further efforts in foot and mouth disease control. South African services have also been employed to combat both redfinch and locusts, and, until 1970 Swaziland was a member of a Southern African inter-territorial locust control organisation. Agricultural development also requires the
fulfilment of certain administrative functions, and at this level, such organisations as the South African Citrus Board, have provided advice on both production and marketing to their Swazi counterparts, and have in some instances undertaken the sale of Swazi produce both regionally and abroad. Finally, both before and since independence, considerable liaison has taken place between officials of the South African Department of Agriculture and their counterparts in the Swazi Government.

South African technical assistance, both public and private, has also made an important contribution to the development of Swazi industry. In the sugar industry, Natal producers played a vital role in the initial stages of development, whilst although the Swaziland sugar industry is no longer administered by the South African sugar industry, relations continue to remain close, especially at the research level, where the Swaziland sugar association continues to draw on the advice of South Africa's Sugar Milling Research Institute. The woodpulp industry at Bhunya, tends to draw most of its personnel from South Africa, whilst the plant of the Usutu Pulp Mill is largely of South African origin. South African private enterprise has also constituted a useful source of managerial talent, and this is true not only of such large-scale enterprises such as Anglo-American, but of smaller South African concerns, such as South African Preserving Company Ltd. and Metal Box Company of South Africa, both of which have provided significant administrative advice to the Swaziland canning industry. South Africa also constitutes a source of research data. The South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research with its numerous specialised institutes has played a major role at this level: the National Institute for Personnel Research has, for example, trained a number of Swazi in the administration of the General Adaptability Battery, whilst Swaziland also draws upon the South African Bureau of Standards in the development of a local system of industrial specifications.
Rational development also finally requires a rational system of administration, and in this regard there has been concluded (in January 1909) an agreement between Swaziland and South Africa, in terms of which South Africans may be seconded to work in Swaziland's local administration, and in terms of which South Africa undertakes to train municipal personnel: it was in terms of this agreement that a number of South Africans were employed in the Swazi public service during 1971. In the specific field of legal administration South African influence is expressed in the dominance of South Africans, in Swaziland's High Court of Appeal, and in the private legal profession. Close co-operation also exists between the Swaziland and South African Police, with the former often using the forensic science facilities of the Republic. Finally, it has been recently reported that the South African army has been approached by Swazi officials in regard to the proposed establishment of a Swazi national army.

Over and beyond technical assistance, Swaziland's policy-makers see South Africa as an important source of investment capital, and, although it is reciated that the domestic development of the South African economy, in combination with South African sensitivity to charges of 'imperialism', limit the amount of public investment which can be infused by South Africa into the Swaziland development effort, investment derived from private South African sources is seen as vital to Swaziland's socio-economic growth. In practice, governmental aid by South Africa to Swaziland, in the form of capital grants, has tended to be both sparse and far between, a notable exception being that until 1970, South Africa provided Swaziland with an annual subsidy to meet Swaziland's importation of South African maize. This contrasts sharply with the exportation of South African capital derived from the private sector, where factors of economics and politics have combined to both promote South African investment in Swaziland, and to encourage Swaziland's policy-makers
to seek to sustain this vital source of financial support. One should note in this regard that the common currency area provides an ideal environment for the exportation of South African capital to Swaziland, that the political stability of Swaziland acts as a magnet for South African enterprise, and that South Africa's limited capital outlet in Africa induce South African entrepreneurs to view Swaziland both as a useful market for South African capital investment in Africa, and as a means to partially counteract African trade boycotts through the exportation to Black Africa of South African goods manufactured under Swazi auspices. One should also mention the investment opportunities which Swaziland has to offer in general, and which have acted as an attractive lure to South African private capital: her vast mineral wealth (which has promoted investment by the large mining companies, South African and otherwise), her agricultural fertility (which has attracted South African investment in processing activities), her tourist potential and her rising standards of living (both of which have underpinned South African participation in the tourism and commercial sectors) should all be considered within this framework. In quantitative terms the influence of these factors on South African entrepreneurship and the flow of their investment capital is expressed in the fact that in the period 1960-66, of the estimated R70/R80 million private investment as a whole, some 60/70 per cent derived from South African sources. In the post-independence period the South African role seems somewhat to have declined in favour of British investment; nonetheless South African private investment in Swaziland continues to remain of primary importance to the Swazi national economy in all its facets.

Swaziland's policy of encouraging South African private enterprise is particularly expressed in the mining and agro-industrial sectors of the Swazi economy. In the mining sector the Ngwenya iron-ore enterprise is
controlled by the Swaziland Iron Ore Development Company, which is an Anglo-American enterprise, whilst Swaziland's coal industry near Siteki is controlled by Swaziland Collieries, which is a subsidiary of Rand Mines. In the agro-industrial sector, although the role of South African capital in the sugar industry has been eliminated with the purchase of the Mhlume sugar mill by the Commonwealth Development Corporation, South African investment is of major importance in the fields of forestry - where Peake Timbers is a subsidiary of Anglo-American and where the Rand Mining Timber Company owns the Goedgegun Sawmill recently opened in Southern Swaziland; in meat canning (where the Swaziland Meat Corporation is owned by Imperial Cold Storage); and in cotton ginning and milling, both Swaziland Cottona Ginning Company and the Swaziland Milling Company being backed by South African interests.

The role of South African private capital is also evident in the manufacturing sector. Swaziland's packaging factory, NEOPAC, is partially owned by South Africa's Amalgamated Packaging Industries Ltd., whilst the Mobamech tractor-assembly plant constitutes a joint venture between South Africa's Diesel Electric Group and the NIDC. The Swaziland Laboratories pharmaceutical plant is partially owned by South African interests, as is Swaziland Wire Industries' new wire and nails endeavour. South African private investment is also in the Turnwright's sweet factory at Matsapa, the Luyt's Brewery, Pretoria Portland Cement and the African Oxygen plant. Insofar as future ventures are concerned, the proposed new cigar and tobacco factory to be established by Swaziland Tobacco Ltd. is to be controlled by the NIDC and the Rembrand Tobacco Manufacturing Company, whilst the still unoperational TV assembly plant is to be a joint South African-Japanese venture between the Fram Group of South Africa and the Sharp Company of Japan.
In the fields of commerce and tourism South African interests are also noticeable. In the commercial sector such South African trading enterprises as O.K. Bazaars are represented in the territory, whilst in tourism both the Holiday Inn and the Royal Swazi Spa are owned by Ezulwini Properties (Pty) Ltd., which is in turn held by the Swaziland Development Company, in which Amalgamated Hotels of South Africa has a 90 per cent share. South Africa has also played an important role in capitalising Swaziland's transport infrastructure: South African organizations such as Anglo-American, the Rand Selection Corporation and the South African Mutual in all provided more than half of the loan capital for the construction of the Swaziland Railroad. Finally, it should be noted that Anglo-American has expressed interest in the development of a high capital-intensive pig-iron project in Swaziland, and although this would be partially financed by the Salzgitter Group of West Germany, the establishment of this venture would vastly increase the already dominant role of South African private investment in Swaziland's economic growth.

The promotion of South African-Swaziland trade is another facet of Swaziland's policy of regional co-operation. Two points should however be noted with regard to this pattern of transactions. Firstly, Swaziland-South African trade, has, in general been significantly hampered by the fact, that in current terms there does not exist a rail linkage between the two states; the development and conduct of trade is thus dependent on road transport facilities - which in the nature of things are provided by South Africa - and this seriously limits both the type and quantity of products (especially bulk products) which can be exchanged between the two countries in practice, and if more intangibly, from the point of view of South African producers, reorientates attention away from the limited Swazi market with its enhanced and unfavourable transportation costs. In the second place, from
an analytical viewpoint, it should be borne in mind that because of the free interchange of goods in the customs union, it is difficult to obtain completely accurate trade statistics and investment flows on the transactions between the two states.

Within this framework it nonetheless seems that some 20 per cent of Swazi exports are in effective practice routed to South Africa. In 1967 the revenue earning-capacity of these products being in the region of R6,3 million. Specifically, the bulk of this is derived from the export of asbestos - which conveyed by the aerial rope-way from Havelock to Barberton thus avoids the transportation problems incurred by other goods - and cattle products. Over and beyond this, the entire Swazi tobacco crop is exported to South Africa, joint marketing arrangements having been concluded between the Swaziland Tobacco Co-operative Ltd. and the RSA's Tobacco Industrial Control Board; South Africa absorbs a substantial proportion of Swaziland's cotton (expected to be in the region of a third of total production during 1973), almost the total Swazi rice production, (some 5,500 short tons in 1971), and a variety of forestry products. Additionally Swaziland is a member of a butter pool with South Africa, (Swaziland's butter surplus being marketed by the South African Dairy Board), and until recently exported its entire output of molasses to the South African market.

There can be little doubt that the South African trading connection is of vital importance to the Swaziland economy. In the first place, in the export sector, apart from the export of material to South Africa, Swaziland also exports a substantial amount of labour, whose income remittances, and non-involvement in the local employment market, facilitates the development of the Swaziland economy, characterised as it is by insufficient foreign exchange and limited employment opportunities. In the second place,
in the import sector, some 80 per cent of Swaziland's imports (valued at R31,10 million in 1968) derive from South Africa, and these imports include not only mechanical equipment and other goods without which the economic development would be impossible, but in addition, large quantities of maize, which, from time to time, are essential to alleviate such food shortages as occur in Swaziland's subsistence economy. It is factors such as these which make trade with South Africa of vital importance to Swaziland, and which induce Swazi policy-makers to continue to maintain and expand these particular trading ties as integral elements in national economic growth.

The pursuit of a development-oriented foreign policy at the regional level is additionally expressed and consolidated, through Swaziland's membership of South African-dominated organisations concerned with regional economic interaction.

First and foremost, Swaziland is a member of the Southern African Customs Union established in 1910, and providing for a common external tariff, the free interchange of manufactured goods, mutual adjustments of duties, and the allocation of equitable percentages of customs duties between four participants, namely, South Africa and the former High Commission Territories. As a result of pressures on the part of the three minor partners concerned with the improvement of their economic lot, this agreement was subsequently renegotiated in 1969, and, in current terms provides, inter alia, for free exchange of goods without quantitative control of domestic products, free interchange of duty-paid goods imported from outside the area, the levying of uniform customs, excise and sales duties, consultation on the amendment and imposition of customs duties, the imposition of additional duties for protective purposes by the BLS states, the maintenance of external tariffs for the protection of specified industries
in the latter states, regulation of the marketing of agricultural produce, a revised method for calculating the division of customs, excise and sales duty revenues, and for the establishment of machinery for inter-governmental consultation through the Customs Union Commission.\(^{25/}\)

From Swaziland's point of view, participation in the customs union carries with it a variety of distinct economic advantages. At the lowest level, it eliminates the need for administration of the long and penetrable Swaziland-South African border. Additionally, and especially in terms of the renegotiated agreement of 1969, participation in the arrangement provides Swaziland's industrial activities with a degree of protection from South African competition, which would not exist in the absence of an agreement and without which industrial development in Swaziland would be seriously undercut. The customs union also allows Swaziland to benefit directly from the dynamic growth of the South African economy: it provides Swaziland with export markets for a variety of products which could not be as profitably sold elsewhere, and it provides import markets for goods which could only alternatively be acquired by Swaziland from geographically distant and more costly sources. Membership in the customs union, which allows Swaziland to draw from the customs union revenue pool, also constitutes an important source of immediate income for the territory. The size of this income has, in the past, been a source of contention, and justifiably so, given the fact that until 1965 allocations were based on the trade statistics of 1906-08; in terms of this arrangement Swaziland received a mere 0.149 per cent of the total pool throughout most of the colonial era. In 1965 however, a rearrangement was effected which raised the Swaziland proportion of the pool to 0.53 per cent and which resulted in Swaziland's receipts rising from R383,000 in 1964/65 to R1,393,000 in the 1965/66 financial year; in terms of the renegotiated agreement of 1969 moreover, based
as it is on a formula involving annual production rather than on a superannuated fixed percentage arrangement, Swaziland's share of customs union revenues has increased considerably, from R5.4 million in the 1969/70 financial year to R10.5 million in the financial year of 1971/72. This dramatic rise in annual returns has in turn allowed Swaziland to balance its budget, and to significantly reduce the dependence of the territory on external budgetary assistance. Certainly, it must be conceded that this vast increase in revenues in recent years, is essentially attributable to the series of back-payments agreed to under the 1969 agreement, and that by 1973/74 these initial adjustments in revenue calculation will be largely completed, and Swaziland's share will revert to a more real rate of return based directly on the growth of the economy as a whole. However, customs union revenues do constitute a major source of invisible imports - currently close to 60 per cent of revenue is derived from this source - and it is therefore relatively clear that Swaziland has a direct material interest in remaining party to the union which is vital to the operation of the Swaziland economy, and that in economic terms, the concern of Swaziland's policy-makers with involvement in institutionalised regional co-operation of this type, is backed by powerful justifications.

All of the former High Commission Territories also enjoy the use of South African currency and banking facilities, and, as with the customs union, the monetary union offers to Swaziland a number of distinct economic advantages which underwrite her policy of regional economic interaction. Participation in the monetary union, for example, allows Swaziland to draw upon the expertise of the South African Reserve Bank, both on domestic and international monetary matters, and in so doing saves Swaziland from diverting local human and material resources towards the establishment and administration of a domestic banking system. Membership of the monetary union also
facilitates Swaziland's access to the developed South African capital market, whilst the use of the Rand currency i.e. of a currency of noted international stability, vastly improves Swaziland's position on the international trading and monetary market. It is in any case questionable as to whether Swaziland has a sufficiently viable economy, or a high enough level of foreign trade to warrant the establishment on an internationally-viable indigenous currency issued by a local national central bank.

Swaziland's policy of regional economic co-operation is also manifest in Swaziland's membership of the Southern African Regional Commission for the Conservation and Utilisation of the Soil (SARCCUS), which, since its establishment in 1950 has concerned itself with promoting 'closer technical co-operation amongst the territories comprising the Southern African region in all matters relating to the control and prevention of soil erosion, the conservation, protection and improvement and rational utilisation of the soil, the vegetation and the sources and resources of water supply in the countries concerned'. Over and beyond SARCCUS, Swaziland is a member of the Southern African Regional Tourism Council (SARTOC) - established in 1971 to co-ordinate the promotion of tourism in Southern Africa - and the South African-directed Inter-Territorial Foot and Mouth Disease Advisory Committee, which in liaison with SARCCUS, has acted timeously on a number of occasions in the past in handling stock disease on the sub-continent. Regarding possible future institutionalised regional economic co-operation, the March 1972 announcement of a possible international road transport agreement between Swaziland and the former High Commission Territories, and the 1970 opening of negotiations on the establishment of principles governing the utilisation of the common water resources of Swaziland, South Africa and Mozambique, are important indicators of the lines along which interaction is envisaged.
(ii) Swazi-Portuguese Regional Economic Co-operation

Despite discrepancies in political values, Swaziland's concern with maximising externally-located developmental resources has led to a pattern of economic co-operation with South Africa, at the regional level, which is at once broadly-based, institutionalised, and, in such sectors as private investment, technical assistance and inter-territorial trade, relatively intense. This pattern is to some degree paralleled in relations between Swaziland and the Portuguese colonial authorities in Mozambique, and, as in the case of Swaziland-South African relations, reflects the influence of geographic and locational factors which serve to underpin an element of economic interdependence between adjacent territories.

Mozambique is of considerable importance to Swaziland in the first place, in that it sits astride Swaziland's nearest outlet to the sea: it is in fact in Lourenco Marques that Swaziland's sole railroad facility is terminated, and it is along this railroad that some 95 per cent of Swaziland's exports, and 20 per cent of her imports, flow. It is also of importance that the rolling stock of the Swaziland railroad is largely owned by the Portuguese Caminhos de Ferro e Transportes de Mocambique, and this factor together with the Swaziland/Mozambique trade pattern and geographic relationship must necessarily serve to blunt the influence of political vis-a-vis economic considerations in Swazi-Portuguese interactions. This is not to deny that there exists in Swaziland policy-making circles today a strong sense of antipathy towards the nature of socio-political organisation in the Portuguese East African state, nor is it to deny that (though to a limited degree) Swaziland has at its disposal certain economic resources which can be employed in bringing pressure to bear on Mozambique in the direction and interest of some form of change. Swaziland, for example, provides employment
opportunities for large numbers of Mozambique workers whose exportation is regarded as vital to the development of the Mozambique economy. Swazi policy-makers are also aware that with the possible establishment of a Black African government - or at least an alternative to the current Portuguese government - in the Mozambique territory, the range of political options open to Swaziland would be immeasurably increased, and her capability to assert her status independent of South Africa vastly enhanced; Swaziland has therefore a direct interest in political change in the Portuguese East African state. It is however felt by Swaziland's policy-makers that in current terms such advantages as lend themselves to maximisation are essentially economic, and that, under the circumstances priorities be placed on fostering amicable relations with Portugal, both in the economic - and to a lesser degree - political realm, the political disadvantages accruing therefrom notwithstanding. It is moreover appreciated by Swazi policy-makers that the establishment of a radical Black regime in Mozambique is not without its negative aspects; in particular it is realised that such an eventuality would thrust Swaziland into the frontline of the Southern African liberation struggle with all the dangers, political and economic, which this situation implies. This further serves to introduce an element of ambiguity into Swaziland's attitudes towards Mozambique, conditioning it in the direction of co-operation as much, if not more so, than in the direction of political change.

The results of this situation are currently expressed in a rapid rise in Swazi-Mozambique economic transactions over the last few years. In recent years Swaziland has been represented at all the major trade fairs held in Lourenço Marques, whilst the level of trade between the two territories has significantly increased over this period. A Portuguese investment presence has also been established in Swaziland - in the form of the Portuguese firm
of Matola Cement - whilst Portugal has provided technical assistance to Swaziland, and has, for example, undertaken to tar the Mbabane-Namacha international road. Since 1970 moreover, discussions have taken place between Swazi and Portuguese officials with regards to the establishment of joint policies on the use of common water resources, whilst in 1970 proposals were mooted by the Portuguese authorities for the construction of a new rail link between Swaziland and Lourenco Marques, and the establishment of new port facilities to handle Swazi bulk exports. Insofar as the future industrial development of Swaziland is concerned, the fact has not been lost on Swaziland's policy-makers that there exists in Mozambique, near to the Swaziland border, extensive lime deposits which would be required for the development of the proposed pig-iron venture in Swaziland itself. It is in fact, variables such as these which have caused Swaziland's foreign policy-makers to place emphasis on the establishment of close economic associations with Portuguese Mozambique.

(b) Swaziland as an Economic Actor Outside of the Southern African Sub-System

The foreign policy objective of maximising externally situated development resources in order to counteract such deficiencies as exist within the Swazi system itself, and which operate to hamper desired rapid social and economic growth, necessitates the implementation of policies which emphasise Swazi participation in economic endeavours in the Southern African region of which Swaziland is a part: the self-same economic prerogatives have also induced Swazi foreign policy-makers to emphasise the importance of economic contacts outside of the Southern African region, and, in pursuit of capital aid and investment, markets and technologies, this has led to the establishment and promotion of a pattern of international economic contacts embracing a number of actors, of various types, on the international scene.
Mr. Simon Nxumalo has pointed out that 'one of the most important facets of our policy ... is to develop intra-African trade relationships to the maximum extent. ... We want to expand the scope of (African trade) agreements and to establish many more agreements of a similar nature. Despite our wealth of natural resources and our rapid industrial progress we will continue to need materials and finished products which other African countries could supply. On the other hand, there are a number of items which we in Swaziland could provide to other African countries.' Indeed, the establishment and promotion of trading ties with Black Africa is currently attributed much importance by Swaziland's policy-makers, and participation in continental economic co-operation, particularly in the fields of trade and technical assistance, is seen as a vital complement to Swaziland's economic activities at the regional level.

As a result Swaziland has sought over the last few years to widen its economic interactions with Africa North of the Limpopo. In particular Swaziland has repeatedly expressed interest in membership of the East African Common Market, and Swaziland was in fact represented at the 1972 All-Africa Trade Fair in Nairobi. Bilateral trade agreements were in fact signed with Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Malawi during 1969, and in 1968 an important and valuable five-year trade agreement was signed between Swaziland and Zambia, in terms of which the latter has undertaken to purchase some 25,000 frozen beef carcasses and 900 tons of offal annually. Zambia has in fact emerged as an important trading partner of Swaziland which exports some 14,500 tons of sugar to Zambia per annum.

In the technical assistance field, Swaziland receives a small amount of aid from Black African countries: indeed the idea of importing trained
personnel from Black Africa is currently seen as an important intermediate means to be utilised in application of the labour localisation policy in the face of limited Black human resources at home. It is moreover felt that from the point of view of administrative efficiency, imported Black personnel can afford to exercise considerably more discipline over subordinates than is the case with imported White public service officials who are continually sensitive to charges of racial domination. These two factors have in practice combined to produce a strong inclination towards the importation of skilled Black labour to be employed in the public service - although it is recognised that the arguments for localisation can be used, if not as effectively, even in these cases: in current terms a Nigerian is head of Swaziland’s tax administration, and a Kenyan, its Director of Agriculture.

Over and beyond the importation of personnel for employment in the local administration, other avenues exist for technical co-operation between the Swazi government and the states North of the Limpopo. Liaison has taken place between the NIDC and the industrial development departments of the governments of the East African states: in March 1972, for example, officials of the NIDC undertook a tour of these complementary organisations, holding discussions and exchanging information. In May of the same year, Swazi government officials, including the Training Co-ordinator in the Department of Establishments and Training, visited Zambia (which has also provided training for officials of the SBS), whilst in the same month Swazi officials visited Nigeria in order to further technical assistance contacts. Following the visit of the Prime Minister to Mauritius in January 1971, the Mauritian Government agreed to provide scholarships for the training of Swazi sugar technologists at the Mauritian university and sugar research institute, whilst in the educational field, the Association of African universities, in conjunction with the African-American Institute, has established a
programme for undergraduate and postgraduate studies, tenable at African universities - in the 1972-3 academic year, this programme awarded scholarships to some 30 Swazi students. Mention should finally be made of the large number of OAU-sponsored seminars, conferences, symposia and training programmes, whose facilities have been used by Swazi on a number of occasions. 

(ii) Swaziland-British Economic Relations

As most developing states, Swaziland has continued to maintain an intensive set of both political and economic contacts, with its former metropolitan power. Indeed, as a technologically sophisticated and highly industrialised entity, Britain is seen by Swaziland's policy-makers as a vitally important element in the post-independence development dynamic. Close economic ties with Britain have thus been maintained since 1966, and in fact, in many areas economic relations have been significantly expanded.

The current significance of economic relations with Britain reflects, in the first instance, the fact that Britain is the main source of Swaziland's foreign aid in the forms of both public and private capital investment. With Britain's general withdrawal from Southern Africa in recent years, the injection of British public capital into Swaziland has, to some degree, been scaled down, whilst in the light of the renegotiated 1960 Southern African Customs Union agreement, annual British budgetary assistance is no longer required by the Swaziland economy. Britain nonetheless continues to be the primary source of governmental capital assistance to Swaziland: in 1969 she agreed to grant the territory some £2.95 million in economic aid, at the beginning of 1970 it was announced that Britain would give to Swaziland a further R10.9 million to be spread over three years, whilst Britain has
subsequently agreed to provide £5.5 million additional loan aid to cover the period 1973-76. The effects of this aid can be seen at the level of specific projects. It was British public monies which financed the establishment of the Swaziland Broadcasting Service in 1966, and partially capitalised Swaziland's University Centre and Agricultural College at Luyengo. The government of the United Kingdom also provided some R415,000 in loans during the period 1969-72 which made possible the development of Swaziland's Industrial Training Institute; it was a United Kingdom loan of some R100,000 which provided for the first phase of the development of the Matsapa Industrial Estate, whilst Britain has similarly provided large amounts in capital grants which have directly underwritten the creation and operation of both SEDCO and the NIDC. British capital assistance was also instrumental in the establishment of the SCSS, and has facilitated the development of Swaziland's educational system.

The British capital input into the Swaziland economy is also reflected at the level of private and quasi-private investment, where the activities of the Commonwealth Development Corporation are especially noticeable. This organisation has been active in Swaziland since the late forties, and has underwritten a variety of projects which have contributed significantly to Swaziland's economic growth: its investment in Swaziland in 1970 alone, was estimated to be in the region of £1.1 million - which constituted 97 per cent of its total investment in the three former High Commission Territories - and it is estimated that by 1972 the CDC had pumped no less than a total of £26 million into Swaziland's economic development. In particular, the CDC has played a major role in the capitalisation of Swaziland's agro-industrial development. In the field of forest products processing, it is the CDC (in conjunction with Courtaulds) which is the owner of the Usutu Pulp Company, and which partially financed expansion
of this venture's activities during 1971/72. The CDC has also played an important role in financing complementary afforestation projects in the South of Swaziland, where it has presently invested some R1,4 million, to be spread over 10 years, and established the Shiselweni Forestry Company. The CDC is finally the owner of the Mhluum Sugar Mill, and in conjunction with the British company of Libby (Pty) Ltd., holds 10 per cent of the share capital of the Malkems Canning Factory.

British involvement in Swaziland's industrial development is also to be found in the Swaziland Sugar Milling Company's sugar refinery at Big Bend - in which the Lonhro Group holds 52 per cent of share capital - and in British capital investment in the mining industry. In the asbestos mining field, e.g. the Havelock mine is owned by New Amianthus Mines (a subsidiary of the British firm of Turner and Newall) and where both the CDC and the British organisation of Guest, Keen, and Nettlefield Ltd. hold shares in the Swaziland Iron Ore Development Company (5.7 per cent and 10 per cent respectively). The CDC has also played an important role in financing mineral extraction ventures, whilst in October 1968 the Lonhro Group signed an agreement with the Swaziland Government granting the British company prospecting rights near Havelock (which may in the near future lead to a new second asbestos mine whose development capital expenditure, it is estimated, would be in the region of R15 million. British investment has also played a role in the development of manufacturing industries, (CDC holds a share in the WEOPAC venture), in the expansion of tourism, (CDC having invested some R500,000 in Ezulwini Properties (Pty.) Ltd.), and in the development of the economic infrastructure, where CDC loans were an important element in the construction of the Swaziland Railroad, and where CDC has sponsored the Vuvulane Irrigated Farms project.
Britain’s important role in financing Swaziland’s development effort is complemented in the sphere of technical assistance, where the United Kingdom is by far the main source of technical aid. During 1966-67 for example, Britain provided some £177,000 in technical aid, whilst in 1970 technical aid worth some £452,000 was injected in the Swaziland economy. In practice, British technical assistance has been employed throughout the economy.

At the level of infrastructural development, private organisations such as OXFAM have been active in the donation of vaccine, and in the promotion of preventive and nutritional services. In the development of non-physical communications, the establishment of the Swaziland Broadcasting Service was both funded and facilitated by British aid, whilst in current terms the operation of the service is aided by the British provision of training courses - such as that offered at the BBC training centre - which have been attended by numerous Swazi officials. The United Kingdom has also played an important technical role in the development of Swaziland’s natural resources to meet the power and irrigation needs of the expanding economy: in November 1969 for example, it was announced that the British Ministry of Overseas Development was to employ three firms of consulting engineers, to undertake the feasibility study for Swaziland’s proposed thermal power station, whilst such organisations as the South Eastern Electricity Board have seconded engineers to aid facility-maintenance, expansion and on-the-job personnel training. The British Ministry of Overseas Development has also been responsible for the employment of the British company of Watermeyer, Legge, Piesold and Uhlman to undertake the planning of the Umbuluzi River Basin Project. Britain has finally played an important role in the development of the Swaziland educational system through the planning of syllabi, (the Cambridge Overseas School
Certificate is used in a number of Swazi schools, the provision of staff of educational facilities: member of the British Volunteer Service Overseas \(^{50/}\) and the British International Voluntary Service have taught in a number of Swazi secondary schools: during 1972 the British Council donated a mobile library to Swaziland, and British advice has been of importance in educational planning at UBLS, where the Academic Planning Mission has been headed by Sir Norman Alexander of Britain.

British technical assistance has also been of importance in agriculture and industrial development. The CDC for example, has established facilities for training agricultural managers i.e. the Mananga Centre near Mhlume, during 1972 a crop laboratory and irrigation workshop valued at over R40,000 was donated by the British government, whilst numerous Swazi have attended the Ministry for Overseas Development's International Co-operative Training Institute. In the field of industrial development, the CDC manages such ongoing enterprises as the Malkerns pineapple factory, and, in the sugar industry, provides training for personnel in administrative, financial and technical work. The Ministry for Overseas Development has recently sponsored the coal exploration programme at Mpaka, whilst in April 1972, for example, it engaged a firm of British consultants to investigate the feasibility of establishing a Swaziland ceramics industry. Britain has finally also provided personnel, (19 in the period 1969-72) to the Swaziland Industrial Training Institute, to aid the training of skilled technicians.\(^{51/}\)

In the technical assistance field, one must finally mention British aid designed to improve the quality of Swaziland's public and industrial administration. In terms of its Overseas Service Aid Scheme and Special Commonwealth Assistance to Africa Programme, Britain has provided training to numerous Swazi in a variety of tasks from crime detection to immigration
control, and has also seconded officials to Swaziland governmental departments. Additionally the British Department of Employment has offered courses in the training of trade unionists, which a number of Swazi have attended.

The important economic role of Britain in post-independence Swaziland is finally reflected in the pattern of British-Swazi trading relations, where, from the Swazi point of view, the United Kingdom constitutes a vital export and import market. In practice, despite the considerable sale of Swazi goods on the South African market, Britain is the main customer for Swaziland’s exports. According to figures issued by the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry, Swazi exports to Britain in 1971 totalled over £9½ million, whilst though these experienced a decline in the following year, they nonetheless totalled some £7.9 million for 1972. In specific categories, these exports consisted mainly of sugar, (in terms of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, the United Kingdom is a major market for this important Swazi export, whose value was some £4½ million in 1971); also exported were fertilisers and minerals (worth over £2 million in 1971), forestry products which are sent mainly to the Courtaulds processing plant in Northern Wales (The United Kingdom is also a primary market for such products), and fruit and vegetables (these being valued at £1.8 million in 1971). With regard to Swaziland’s imports, although goods brought in from South Africa constitute the bulk of products imported into the Swaziland economy, the United Kingdom is still of importance in that some 20 per cent of Swaziland’s imports, valued at some R630,000, were derived from this source in 1972. These imports consist mainly of electrical and non-electrical machinery and of transport equipment.

(iii) Swaziland’s Economic Relations with the non-British non-South African World

Although the promotion and expansion of economic relations with Britain,
and to a lesser extent, Black Africa, constitute the major foci of Swaziland's economic foreign policy outside of the Southern African region, Swaziland's foreign policy-makers also attribute importance to the establishment of economic contacts with a variety of other international actors, who with capital and technology at their disposal, can, it is felt, enhance and promote the domestic developmental process. Policies designed to maximise externally-based developmental resources thus go well beyond the establishment of economic relationships in the region, on the continent and with the former metropole, and this is expressed in a current situation where Swaziland has established and seeks to expand its economic interactions, of both a bilateral and multilateral nature, with the international system at large.

At the bilateral level, the United States is, for example, an important source of investment capital and technical assistance, whilst Swazi-United States trade is also of importance to the Swaziland economy. In current terms, American private investment in Swaziland is concentrated largely in only two ventures, namely the NEOPAC enterprise (which is partially owned by the St. Regis Company of New York), and Radio Swazi (which is 80 per cent an American venture). The United States is however an important source of public capital aid, directed into Swaziland via the Agency for International Development, which provided a R1,5 million loan for agricultural development (1971), which provided a grant of over R70,000 for the establishment of SCGB, and which in April 1972, agreed to donate some R300,000 for the extension of UBLS facilities in Swaziland and Botswana. It is also important to bear in mind that domestic pressures brought to bear on United States firms to dis-invest in South Africa, may well lead in the future to United States enterprises transferring their activities to Swaziland, from which they can still take advantage of the lucrative South African market without incurring
accusations of financing apartheid in South Africa directly.

Turning to United States technical assistance, this is expressed through the work of the Peace Corps, and the Agency for International Development, both of which have participated in a number of local projects. Members of the Peace Corps have been active in promoting education and health, and have also aided in the codification of Swaziland's laws, whilst during 1971 American agriculturalists arrived in Swaziland to conduct feasibility studies on agricultural development projects to be carried out with AID finances. Individual American educational experts have participated in the Academic Planning Commission of UBLS, whilst such private organisations as the American National Baptist Convention, and the African-American Institute, have contributed to the development of education.

With the development of the Ngwenya mine, Japan has also become of importance to the Swaziland economy. In terms of the 14-year contract between Anglo-American and the Japanese steel producers of Yawata and Fuji Steel, it is Japan which currently absorbs the bulk of mined iron-ore, and, as a result of an extension introduced into the initial contract in 1970, its total value has been raised to some R35 million. Plans have also been mooted to fuel Japanese steel mills with Swazi coal, and this should further increase the importance of the Japanese market. Japan is in any case an important source of private investment, the main venture at present being the construction of an electronics assembly plant at a cost of close on R1 million. Japanese investors are also interested in the exploitation of Swaziland's coal resources, and it would seem, given the visit to Swaziland of representatives of the Toyota Spinning Company in June 1972, the establishment of a local cotton spinning industry.

The encouragement of West German investment and trade is also regarded
as being of importance in Swaziland's international economic policy. In the past, during 1973, West German financiers provided a R1.5 million loan to assist Swazi entrepreneurship, whilst in current terms West German investment is involved in the proposed new liqueur industry, and especially, in the promotion of Swaziland's tourism potential, where such German firms as Salzgitter and Hausch International, have either planned, or are currently involved, in hotel construction activities. It should also be mentioned that Salzgitter has entered into negotiations with Anglo-American regarding the establishment of a possible pig-iron plant in Swaziland, whilst, in what was an important breakthrough for Swaziland trade in the European market, West Germany purchased some 65,000 tons of iron ore during 1970.

Swaziland has also established important economic relations with Taiwan. A Sino-Swazi Technical Agreement has in fact been concluded in terms of which Swazi citizens are provided with training in Taiwan, whilst Chinese technicians engage in work in Swaziland itself. Numerous Swazi have in fact availed themselves of scholarships to study at such institutions as the Sino-African Technical Co-operation Centre in Taiwan, whilst the Chinese have established agricultural missions at Malkerns and in the Shiselweni District, have sent industrial missions to Swaziland, and have provided both personnel and advice on the promotion of small-enterprise industrial activity. Nationalist China is also an important source of capital investment for Swaziland: it is, for example, Taiwanese investment which has backed the local textile industry, and it is Chinese finance which is currently involved in the construction of a new luxury hotel in the Ezulweni Valley near Mbabane.

Swaziland has also succeeded in promoting a number of lesser international economic contacts with a large number of other states. Italian private interests are currently behind the proposed ureaformaldehyde resin plant.
and the newly-established Swaziland mushroom industry, whilst the proposed ethyl alcohol plant will involve French capital. Denmark has provided a R1.5 million loan for the development of telecommunications (in 1972), whilst some R1 million has been received from Sweden for educational purposes. Israel has sent agricultural technicians to Swaziland, and sponsored Swazi who wish to study at Israeli technical institutes, whilst Australia has trained members of Swaziland's foreign service, under the Special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan.

As other small, developing states with limited economic resources and constricted international economic contacts, Swaziland has developed a deep appreciation of the economic advantages of membership of such international organisations as can provide the capital and technical resources necessary for rapid social and economic growth. As a consequence the policy of maximising externally-located development resources has involved not only the establishment of economic relations of a bilateral nature but, additionally, participation in multinational institutions, concerned, partially or totally, with the task of promoting socio-economic modernisation and development.

The first of these organisations, most obviously, is the United Nations, whose socio-economic activities are seen by Swaziland's policy-makers as being of major importance to the local development process.

In current terms, the importance placed on United Nations socio-economic activities by Swaziland is manifest in its participation in a variety of institutions operating within the United Nations Specialised Agency framework; in terms of the International Financial Organisations Act No. 27, 1969, Swaziland is a member of IMF, IBRD, IFC AND IDA, under the Aviation Act No. 31 of 1968 Swaziland is a subscriber to both the Convention on International Civil Aviation and the International Air Service Transit Agreement of the
Swaziland has also made its influence felt in UNCTAD deliberations - where it has supported moves to increase free trade and establish general preferential trade agreements - and has participated in a number of UN sponsored conferences and conventions, such as the UN Environmental Conference held in Stockholm in 1972, where the Swazi delegate, Dr. Gamedze, was elected the conference's vice-president.

The material returns on the policy of UN involvement, is expressed, inter alia, by the important technical assistance which has been offered to Swaziland, by the United Nations in the post-independence period. In the area of infrastructural construction, World Health Organisation has been active in Swaziland, and has sent personnel to the territory to promote the development of health facilities. A United Nations-sponsored Regional Science Teacher Training Project has been established at Manzini, both UNICEF and UNESCO have played a role in the development of education, whilst the United Nations Fund for Population Activities has established, equipped and staffed a health centre at Siteki, and granted fellowships to Swazi nurses. It was the United Nations which undertook the initial survey for the 15-year programme of developing Swaziland's major river basins, whilst the IMF has provided expert advice on the rational and efficient operation of the local fiscal system.

In agriculture and industry, the United Nations, has also fulfilled an important technical assistance function. In the agricultural sector for example, the Rural Development Area Project has been assisted by FAC technicians, whilst to facilitate the collation and dissemination of agricultural statistics, a United Nations Agricultural Statistician has been located at Mbabane. In the development of Swaziland's industrial potential, at the level of research and training, the UNDP has undertaken a major feasibility study on mineral development, and, through such
institutions as the United Nations Statistical Training Centre, provided facilities for the training of local statisticians. Advice is often supplied through the United Nations Industrial Advisory and Consultancy Project, to officials of the NIDC. The United Nations has moreover played a leading role in the development of Swaziland's light industrial sector: it was the United Nations which established the Swaziland Handicrafts Industry in 1967, and it was the UNDP in conjunction with the ILO which subsequently created the Project for Small Enterprises and Handicrafts Development, which was to lead to the establishment of SEDCO. In current terms SEDCO works closely with the ILO and UNDP, which supply experts in the small-enterprise field, basic equipment for enterprises of this nature, and technical, managerial and financial advice. It was also in terms of this operation that, for example, the ILO established a Tannery Training and Leatherworks Centre at Platikulu in March 1972.

Swaziland's concern with the socio-economic activities of the United Nations is also underwritten by the ability of the United Nations to finance development projects, and, in effective practice, the United Nations has in the past injected considerable capital into Swaziland's developing economy. As early as 1963 the IBRD loaned R3 million for the construction of the Swaziland electricity system, an extension of R1.95 million was acquired from the same source during 1967, and in 1969 a further R2 million; the IBRD was to finance the construction of the Edwaleni Dam, and has continued to play an important financial role in the further development of Swaziland's hydro-electric resources. The World Bank Group has also been involved in the capitalising of road development, whilst in December 1971 it was announced that World Bank finances were to be employed in the construction of Swaziland's thermal power station. The United Nations, through UNDF and ILO has also played a primary role in the development of small-enterprise light
industry; thus during 1971 the UNDF was to underwrite SEDCO to the value of R635,000 spread over a three-year period, whilst in May 1972 it was further announced that the United Nations would provide SEDCO with a further 1 million dollars over a further three year period. Over and beyond this, the United Nations Fund for Population Activities has provided funds for the construction of rural clinics and health centres, whilst UNDP, UNICEF and WFP have all agreed to make small sums available during 1973-76 for financial and commodity assistance. The UNDP has in fact established a permanent representative in Swaziland, and it is expected that during 1973-76, UNDP aid will be in the region of some 5.7 million U.S. dollars.58/

In the promotion of her international economic contacts Swaziland has also sought to avail herself of the resources of regional institutions, outside of South Africa, both on and outside of the African continent. In recent years, Swazi foreign policy-makers have repeatedly expressed interest in associate membership of the European Common Market, and indeed, by 1971 some sort of accord on this matter seems to have been reached, which has further stimulated Swazi interest in this important European market as an exporter of development resources. Insofar as multilateral organisations on the African continent itself are concerned, Swazi policy-makers have in the past sought to promote Swazi membership of the East African Community, which in turn has expressed an interest in Swazi membership, and Swaziland is in fact a member of the African Development Bank, which she joined in 1971, and which in the subsequent year provided a loan of close on R1 million for the development of Swaziland's telecommunications system. Mention should also finally be made of such non-governmental international organisations, such as the Lutheran World Federation, which has established a farm training school, and whose work is seen as a useful complement to the technical and financial activities of those international inter-governmental
institutions with whom Swaziland has established contacts in the past.

B. Swaziland as an International Political Actor

Swaziland's foreign policy seeks the realisation of political as well as economic goals: as such Swaziland functions in the international system in a political as well as an economic capacity.

(a) Swaziland as a Defensive Political Actor: Policies Designed to Reduce the Role of Exogenous Political Influences in the System

In the first instance it has for example been pointed out that 'a principal aim of government since independence has been to create the institutions and instruments for the more effective guidance and control of the economy'. It is this orientation which underwrites the so-called 'localisation' policies in Swazi political life i.e. policies specifically designed to concurrently enhance the role of the indigenous Swazi in the local processes of socio-economic growth, and to reduce the political influence which can potentially be wielded by exogenous entities as a result of their participation in the Swazi economic system.

The localisation policies, which are analogous to 'Africanisation' policies employed in other parts of the continent in the consolidation of political independence, are expressed in various areas of economic life. In the case of foreign investment, for example, while the general demands of economic development have prompted the Swazi government to encourage foreign private investment\(^{60}\), there exists in government circles today, an acute realisation of the need to regulate external capital inflows and to promote greater participation by local inhabitants in the direction of industrial commercial and mining activity. It has been clearly pointed out, by Mr. Khumalo, for example, that while the Swazi Government desires rapid
industrial development in principle it is committed to the view that this should take place in a manner which 'will enable a smooth evolution to take place at the rate decided by the leaders of the country', and in a manner which 'will preserve the independence of the nation'. The King himself has emphasised that investors must be prepared to accept a policy of 'partnership for mutual benefit', the Second National Development Plan has identified as a major objective of policy 'increase in the degree of national control over, and participation in, foreign private investments', whilst even in moderate government circles disquiet has occasionally been expressed at the 'economic colonisation' of the newly-independent Swazi state. The result of these sentiments is moreover manifest in a number of statutory devices which limit the freedom of operation of foreign investment and seek to widen local participation in how external capital is to be allocated and used. Provisions have been made to place local inhabitants on corporate management boards, to allow for the purchase of shareholdings by local public and private entities, to promote joint action between government and foreign investment in the establishment and operation of foreign-backed enterprises, and to allow for government supervision of production and output. Swazis are in fact today on the directing board of Mhlume Sugar, whilst Turnwrights, NEOPAC and the Royal Swazi Hotel group have set aside large shareholdings for local participants. A number of foreign-backed ventures have been incorporated in Swaziland, including the Havelock Asbestos Mine, whilst the NIDC is an important shareholder in a number of major ventures, including Usutu Pulp, the Swaziland Iron Ore Development Corporation and Swaziland Laboratories. In the tourist industry, the government has holdings in the Royal Swazi Hotel group, the government owns half of the major private wholesale company in Swaziland, and has minority interests in several other commercial enterprises.
SEDCO (which is specifically directed towards promoting locally-backed small-enterprise industrial development) and the SCSB (which was specifically established to promote domestic investment) constitute two further expressions of the concern with regulating foreign investment capital.

The desire of the Swaziland government to control the inflow of foreign financial resources is paralleled at the personnel level, where it is conscious government policy to maximise the number of responsible economic and administrative positions open to Swazi nationals, and in so doing to reduce the dependency of the economy on imported technical skills and advice. The policy of labour localisation has in fact been pursued with some vigour since independence; in February 1970 the King was to call for the promotion of labour localisation policies 'as rapidly as possible', whilst the Second National Development Plan emphasises 'the highest rate of localisation consistent with the maintenance of efficiency' and envisions 'full localisation throughout the economy' within the next decade. Statutorily-sanctioned localisation committees have been established by the government to accelerate the localisation effort in both the public and private sectors of the economy, and, it is as a result of these combined pressures and activities that, by the end of 1972, some 93 per cent of public service positions were held by indigenous Black members of the population. In the private sector, government sensitivity to White commercial and industrial opinion has prevented comparable results from being achieved, whilst it is inevitable that the rate of labour localisation must decline in future years if residual posts of a high-level technical nature do not lend themselves to local skills and human resources. There seems little doubt however that Swaziland government policy is strongly oriented towards the ideal of labour localisation in all sectors of economic life: both private employers and such public bodies as the Public Service Commission have been repeatedly urged to emphasise government employment policies, and the Government is currently
involved in a rapid expansion of training facilities in the interests of complete localisation of the public sector in the short-term future.

The implementation of policies of the localisation brand relate not only to governmental regulation of the activities of foreign capital and to the promotion of wider employment opportunities for the local populace, but, in those societies, where national lands are either foreign-owned, or owned by an expatriate population, encompass issues concerned with local participation in land ownership as well. The localisation of land ownership thus becomes integrated into that category of policies designed to reduce the penetration of the system by exogenous forces. This would indeed seem to be particularly pertinent in the Swaziland case, given the fact that in 1971 some 2,224,000 acres of the territory's 4,290,000 acres of land were owned by the Swazi Nation, virtually all of the remainder being owned by the territory's minority European community. In percentage terms this means that 2.3 per cent of the population own some 44 per cent of the land. This situation has moreover not substantially changed since the end of the Second World War (and the result is expressed in the fact that, in the post-independence period, the land distribution question has become a fundamentally important issue in Swazi political life and in the process whereby the Swaziland government seeks to inject the status of political independence with substance and meaning.

The political importance of the land ownership issue is however not only a reflection of the maldistributed character of land apportionment: its political salience is in fact reinforced by a number of other factors. In the first place, agricultural development, particularly that involving the implementation of regional development plans, is made virtually impossible by the fragmented pattern of ownership, with communally owned
Swazi Nation land being mixed in at random with freehold land throughout the territory. In the second place, considerable population pressures exist within the Swazi-owned areas, where, in terms of the 1966 Census, concentration was in the region of 75 persons per square mile, vis-a-vis 27 persons per square mile in, what are euphemistically called the 'alienated settler areas'. In the third place, a considerable discrepancy exists in production levels in the freehold, and largely European-owned areas, and those in the Swazi Nation areas: in 1966-67 for example, Swazi Nation land produced some R8 million in agricultural exports, vis-a-vis R18 million in the case of the freehold areas, and, although this may reflect the higher state of technology in the European areas - which, for example contain 96 per cent of the territory's irrigated lands - it nonetheless means that the majority of the population is sustained by low productivity lands, whilst the high productivity land provides for the livelihood of a small minority of the population. In the fourth place, vast tracts of land in the freehold European areas are held purely for speculative purposes, or by absentee landlords who have no interest in the agricultural development of their property: in 1960, for example, there were no farm owners or managers living on 35 per cent of the freehold properties. With rises in land prices over the last few years, many European farmers have become increasingly interested in financial rather than agricultural considerations, large tracts of potentially high-yield land have been left fallow, and this has resulted in a situation which is generally recognised as being disadvantageous to Swaziland's agricultural development.

This combination of factors have caused Swaziland's policy-makers to regard the issue of land reform as being of vital importance to the development of Swaziland's economy. They have also come increasingly to an
appreciation of the political implications of a situation where a minority community, through ownership of virtually half of the territory's land, can exercise influence in the dynamics of the state vastly disproportionate to its numbers. In practice moreover, the politicisation of the land ownership questions, is stimulated and compounded by two other factors. The one is the historically-rooted political importance of land ownership issues in the Swazi past. The very first act undertaken by Sobhuza following his assession to the throne in 1921 was to challenge the validity of the 1907 Proclamation, which effectively barred the Swazi from ownership of two-thirds of the territory. Throughout the colonial period it was the question of land ownership which was to dominate the pattern of Swazi-British political relationships, it was this matter which was to play a disturbing role in independence negotiations, and it was to be matters pertaining to land ownership, more than any others which were to be responsible for Swaziland's politicisation in the years preceding the political 'take-off' of the territory at the beginning of the 1960's.

Under these circumstances, land reform designed to enhance the role of the indigenous Swazi in the pattern of ownership, was to become deeply integrated into the scale of Swazi political values, to become closely associated with the demand for political freedom and independence, and to become viewed as a major variable in the capacity of the system to function in a self-determining manner.

The political relevance of the land reform issue is not only bolstered by historic sanction, but additionally by the fact that a considerable proportion of non-Swazi-owned land is owned not by European citizens of Swaziland, but by South Africans who have little interest in the economic development of their land, situated across the border, in an alien state.
From the political point of view, South African ownership of large tracts of Swazi national land, is seen to constitute a significant and direct if unconscious intrusion into the sovereign and independent status of the Swazi state. This symbolic variable in combination with the historic concern with extending Swazi ownership of Swazi land, has led to the feeling in current terms, that what is at stake is not simply a question of agricultural productivity and economic development, but, more fundamentally, the political independence of the Swazi state. Politics and history have thus operated to reinforce economics, and, at the operational level, the result has been expressed by the adoption and implementation of a number of strategies specifically designed to increase Swazi ownership of the land resources of the territory, and in doing so, to reduce the influence of foreign land-owners in the dynamics of the state.

The policies of land localisation have ranged from government attempts to purchase European freehold land to the negotiation of arrangements with the former metropole for financial assistance for the land repurchase programme. Thus the £6 million British aid agreed to in 1970, made specific provision for some £1.5 million to be allocated to government purchase of 'alienated' lands over a 3-year period. The reluctance on the part of the Swazi government to outrightly nationalise certain segments of land, and the immense financial demands of the land repurchase endeavour, have however, seriously limited the effectiveness of the programme. The government has in fact come to appreciate that the large-scale transference of ownership is not a realisable short-term goal. At best, the further alienation of Swazi land can be controlled, and it is this motivation which underlies the controversial Land Speculation Control Bill of 1972, in terms of which, with certain limited exceptions, all land owned by non-citizens must be registered, and any transactions in such land must be approved by specially-created
governmental authorities. Ultimate decisions regarding the disposal of non-citizen-owned land is made the prerogative of a Land Control Board, composed of government officials, and specifically responsible not to the High Court of Swaziland, but to a government Land Control Appeal Board. It is important to emphasise that this Bill makes no provision for the state expropriation of lands: it does however establish strict limitations within which the purchase and sale of Swazi lands must be effected, and, subject to a number of clearly-defined exemptions, specifically seeks to control such land transactions as would involve the alien elements economically active in the Swazi state. As such, the Land Speculation Control Bill, constitutes a direct and conscious attempt on the part of the Swaziland government, to limit the role, and control the activities, of external economic influences whose participation in the Swazi economy is occasioned by virtue of that economy's demand for labour and skills. The Bill is thus an integral part of that category of policies reflecting the concern of Swaziland's decision-makers with the economically penetrable nature of the Swaziland system.

(b) Swaziland as an International Political Activist

It is however of fundamental importance to emphasise that Swaziland's international political action is not purely passive in the sense that it merely reacts to stimuli originating in the external environment in a 'blocking' manner. On the contrary, there are elements of foreign policy which are distinctly activist and essentially outgoing in an initiatory rather than responsive manner.

(i) Multilateral Political Action: Swaziland's Relations with the Former High Commission Territories

At the regional level such policies are expressed in the establishment
and promotion of political relations with the former High Commission territories of Botswana and Lesotho. These policies are specifically designed to compensate for the particularly disadvantageous strategic situation in which Swaziland finds herself.

It is important to note that in current terms the idea of some sort of federal arrangement between Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana, is, in Swaziland, not seriously contemplated, historic ties notwithstanding. In fact Swaziland does not even have formal diplomatic relations with either Lesotho or Botswana, and this suggests that there exist in the BLS group-relationship, certain differences which detract from the coalescence of these states, even though the tendency has developed for them to be considered as a single political and analytical unit. In the case of Swaziland in particular, its differences with Botswana and Lesotho are of an economic, political and tactical nature. In the economic field, there is currently very little in the way of economic intercourse between Swaziland and these two states: in fact an element of economic competition exists between Swaziland and Botswana, both of which seek to tap the Zambian beef-import market. Differences also exist at the political level, where political developments in Lesotho and Botswana — witnessing as they have a radical decline in the political role of traditional authorities — have generated some criticism on the part of Swaziland’s powerful traditionalist ruler. Finally, in all three territories, and in Swaziland no less, there exists a strong belief in the greater political productivity of diverting time and resources to fostering Black African continental ties, rather than political linkages between similarly 'captive' states in Southern Africa.
and promotion of political relations with the former High Commission territories of Botswana and Lesotho. These policies are specifically designed to compensate for the particularly disadvantageous strategic situation in which Swaziland finds herself.

It is important to note that in current terms the idea of some sort of federal arrangement between Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana, is, in Swaziland, not seriously contemplated, historic ties notwithstanding. In fact Swaziland does not even have formal diplomatic relations with either Lesotho or Botswana, and this suggests that there exist in the BL5 group-relationship, certain differences which detract from the coalescence of these states, even though the tendency has developed for them to be considered as a single political and analytical unit. In the case of Swaziland in particular, its differences with Botswana and Lesotho are of an economic, political and tactical nature. In the economic field, there is currently very little in the way of economic intercourse between Swaziland and these two states: in fact an element of economic competition exists between Swaziland and Botswana, both of which seek to tap the Zambian beef-import market. Differences also exist at the political level, where political developments in Lesotho and Botswana - witnessing as they have a, dical decline in the political role of traditional authorities - have generated some criticism on the part of Swaziland's powerful traditionalist ruler. Finally, in all three territories, and in Swaziland no less, there exists a strong belief in the greater political productivity of diverting time and resources to fostering Black African continental ties, rather than political linkages between similarly 'captive' states in Southern Africa.
Despite these negative influences however, there has tended to develop within policy-making circles of all three BLS states, an increased appreciation of the possibilities of co-operative action. It has for example become increasingly recognised that the differences between the BLS states are complemented by certain common interests which can serve to underwrite concerted action. In the first place, all three states are developing states, and in each, the realisation of socio-economic goals is intimately related to the South African connection. There is also a common heritage of British colonial administration which has conditioned administrative attitudes and procedures in a like direction, and which has, in all three territories, fostered a profound resistance to the possibilities of South African incorporation. There is, finally, a certain consonancy of political values - particularly those relating to race relationships - a common antipathy to the current South African political system, and a common desire for social and political change in the South African society.

Factors such as these have induced Swaziland's policy-makers to give somewhat more attention to closer political relations with Lesotho and Botswana. This in turn has led to some significant changes in Swaziland's historically-rooted policy of isolation from its two counterparts in Southern Africa. In 1970, for example, President Khama was invited to Swaziland to deliver the address at the UBLS annual graduation ceremony, and in 1971 President Khama met Prime Minister Dlamini, and a joint communiqué was issued which emphasised 'the closest possible consultation
on all matters of mutual interest' and a common commitment to the 'eventual triumph of self-determination, human dignity and equality through Southern Africa'. During 1970 the Queen Mother of Lesotho was to visit Swaziland, during 1972 Botswana's Acting High Commissioner for Nigeria, Mr. Udoh, visited Swaziland, whilst during 1973 King Moshoeshoe of Lesotho was a guest at the Fifth Swaziland Independence Day celebrations held at Lobamba.

This interchange of prestigious individuals has been accompanied by increased substantive functional co-operation between Swaziland and Lesotho and Botswana respectively. In the educational field, the Swaziland Government has encouraged Swazi participation in the activities of UBLS, and has looked favourably at the development of educational facilities at the Luyengo campus, which currently hosts a variety of conferences and symposia involving students and officials from Lesotho and Botswana. In 1972 a Swazi delegation visited Botswana to negotiate the establishment of a regular Swaziland-Botswana air service. More substantially however, increased personnel interchange and functional co-operation has laid the ground-work for inter-governmental political co-operation at a number of various levels. In this regard it is of importance to note that, as yet, no formal institutions for consultation, least of all policy co-ordination, have been established by the BLS group, and that under the circumstance, political co-operation is of an ad hoc issue-based nature. Within this framework however, Swaziland has concluded an extradition agreement with Lesotho (which has been used on a number of occasions in the past against 'undesirable' members of the Lesotho opposition). Swaziland, along with Botswana and Lesotho, is a member of the Organisation of African Unity, the United Nations and the Commonwealth, and on a number of occasions - the most notable being the promulgation of a Joint Memorandum to the OAU in 1969 - liaison leading to the adoption of common strategies in these international institutions, has taken place. This is
no less true, and considerably more evident within the Southern African institutional framework, where in 1969, the BLS states presented a united front to South Africa in a call for the renegotiation of the Customs Union agreement. The success which this multilateral venture achieved has served to stimulate, in Swaziland as well as in Lesotho and Botswana, a recognition of the potentialities of co-operative action. Swaziland's decision to participate in the establishment of a joint commission to investigate BLS participation in the Rand monetary area, during 1971, is a further indication of the growing emphasis placed by Swaziland's policy-makers on multilateralised action by the small Black states of the Southern African region.78/

(ii) Culture and Political Identification: Swaziland and Black Africa

Swaziland's concern with broadening its pattern of international political contacts is also reflected in its political relations outside of Southern Africa, on the African continent as a whole. Indeed, given the racial, cultural and experiential affinities which exist between Swaziland's policy-makers and those of the Black African states, this particular set of political relations is vested with important symbolic value, which adds to the importance attributed to the goal of expanding Swaziland's international political contacts as a whole.

In practice however, Swaziland's desire to establish political communication with Black Africa, and its attempt to project itself to Black Africa as an independent and fraternal political actor in continental developments has been fraught with considerable difficulties in the past. This reflects the fact that in Black African perceptions, and even in more moderate Black African political circles, Swaziland has been regarded as a
manipulable and obedient client-state of racist South Africa. Past relationships between Swaziland and the rest of the African continent North of the Zambezi have, until recently, been characterised by a strong defamatory element in terms of which, as Mr. Simon Nxumalo has put it, Black Africa 'has called us stooges, sell-outs and other insulting names'. The task confronting Swaziland's policy-makers in establishing channels of political communication to Black Africa, has, as a result been perennially dominated by the attempt to promote an altered image of Swaziland, i.e. of Swaziland as a politically independent Black African state. It was this factor which was to underlie the first significant political contacts made with Black Africa, during the few years immediately preceding independence, when numerous important Swazi dignitaries visited the newly-independent states of the African continent. Towards the end of 1964, for example, Mr. Simon Nxumalo visited Central and East Africa, Ghana and Ethiopia at the behest of the King himself, whilst in 1965, Dr. Msibi and Prince Makhosini undertook extended visits to Ghana, Nigeria and a number of other states. Their concern was specifically to promote a new image for Swaziland, and this concern, upon which the success of Swaziland's political contacts with Black Africa depends, has continued to be an important variable in Swazi-Black African relations throughout the post-independence period.

Personal contacts, alterations in Black African political leadership, Swazi-Black African economic contacts, and the demonstrable support given to a variety of causes close to Black Africa's heart, by Swaziland, have combined to underwrite the success of Swaziland's dialogue with Black Africa. In current terms, Swaziland has, to a considerable degree, succeeded in presenting herself as Black, African and independent, and in doing so, in breaking out of the atmosphere of continental political isolation in which she found herself in the early sixties. Swaziland has managed to impress
upon Black Africa both the difficulties inherent in her geographic and economic position and her commitment to the Pan-African cause. The result is expressed today in the fact that Swaziland has diplomatic relations with many African states, including the East African states, Malawi, Zambia and Ethiopia. It is expressed in the fact that on his 1969 state visit to Zambia, Prime Minister Dhlamini, was lauded by Dr. Kaunda as 'a great son of Africa', and that similar accolades were heaped upon King Sobhuza as a stalwart upholder of human values and the principles of humanity.

The nature of Swaziland's political communication with Black Africa is also reflected in the fact that Swaziland has been accepted as a sovereign and equal member of the Organisation of African Unity, in which, despite frequent criticism, especially in the early years, it has played a constructive participatory role. Swaziland's policy-makers have in fact always placed considerable emphasis on the need to supplement bilateral inter-state contacts with membership of multilateral international organisations and this has been no less the case with regard to Africa, where membership of the Organisation of African Unity is not only viewed as being of symbolic significance, but as an important means to counteract Swaziland's strategic isolation from the Black African continent. The OAU, as a major regional organisation, is also viewed as an important guarantor of the sovereign independence of its member states. It was this combination of factors which led to Prince Makhosini and Dr. Msibi being specifically instructed, during 1965, to make contact with the Organisation, to present Swaziland's case, and to seek the admission of Swaziland to the organisation as a fully-fledged African member. The problems confronting Swaziland reflected those of her bilateral relations, namely that her credibility as an independent Black state was in question. In the case of the OAU moreover, these problems were compounded by the activities of Swaziland opposition party leaders, who fostered the view that
the Imbokodvo was no more than an extension of South Africa on Swazi territory. The Swazi delegation was however to make headway, and as early as 1966, for example, seems to have been able to win some support. The Joint Memorandum, submitted by the BLS states, outlining their particular problems, was generally well received, and as such demonstrative of the headway that Swaziland was making.

In the post-independence period, Swaziland has further succeeded in establishing her position in the ranks of the OAU. Some radical elements continue to adhere to the view that the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress constitutes a freedom movement concerned with the overthrow of the South African-backed Imbokodvo regime; yet in general Swaziland's policy-makers have been able to establish workable political relations with the African multilateral body, where Swaziland is today recognised as a valid and independent Black African political actor. The state of political relations is reflected in the participation of Swaziland in OAU activities and operations. Swaziland has regularly attended OAU summit meetings (such as the 1972 Rabat Conference) and high-level ministerial conferences (such as the 20th Ministerial Council Meeting held in Addis Ababa in February 1973), and she has also sent delegates to OAU-sponsored seminars on such functional matters as local administration, university education and home economics. The election of Swaziland as Rapporteur at the 20th Ministerial Council Meeting is indicative of its new found political status in Black African circles.

(iii) The Establishment of International Political Contacts: Swaziland and the Global System

Outside of continental Africa, Swaziland's pattern of political relations is manifest in her maintenance of political contacts with her former metropole, the establishment of diplomatic ties with a fairly large number of individual
states, and Swaziland's participation in the political activities of the United Nations Organisation.

The important post-independence economic role of Britain in the Swaziland system, has consolidated and underwritten Swaziland's maintenance of cordial political ties with the United Kingdom. It is however of significance to note that whilst Swazi-British relations have in the last few years been generally close, their intensity has somewhat declined, and there are considerable grounds to believe that this pattern will prevail into the near future. Swaziland's foreign policy-makers continue to regard ties with Britain as being of economic and political importance: economically, Britain can provide substantial amounts of capital and know-how for Swaziland's socio-economic development, whilst politically, she is seen as an internationally important guarantor of Swaziland's independent political status. There are however, a number of outstanding issues which contrast with, and balance the political and economic rationale for closer Swazi-British ties. In the first place, Swaziland has continued to regard Britain as responsible for the alienation of Swazi lands, and has adopted the position that Britain's obligation to maximise Swazi land-ownership has not been eliminated by the formal grant of political independence: the issue of land-ownership thus formed a dominant part of formal negotiations held between Swaziland and Britain during 1968 and 1970. Secondly, Swaziland has perceived an element of discrimination to exist in the British aid pattern to the former High Commission Territories, and has, as a result, pressed for a greater proportion of this aid to be diverted to Swaziland than British policy-makers are prepared to allow. At the political level moreover, Swaziland has seriously criticised two aspects of British policy towards Southern Africa: namely, Britain's inability to impose majority rule in Rhodesia, and the tendency of some British governments to continue to supply arms to
South Africa. This latter issue was to be a dominant element in Prime Minister Dhlamini's speech to the Commonwealth Prime Minister's conference in 1971.

The passage of time has succeeded in blunting the land ownership issue as a negative factor in Swazi-British relations, whilst the important contributions of British aid to Swaziland's economic development in the last few years has reduced the salience of the economic aid question. The refusal of Britain's Labour government to sanction South African arms sales has further improved Swazi-British political relations, although the Rhodesian issue remains outstanding. What is however of major importance in current terms is the fact that British relations with Swaziland cannot be conceived of apart from British policy towards Southern Africa as a whole, and that in this regard recent years have witnessed a pattern of gradual disengagement in terms of which the United Kingdom is seeking to limit its responsibilities in the region as far as is possible. In the case of Swazi-British relations this orientation towards withdrawal is reflected in economic terms, where British aid and trade with Swaziland, whilst still of major importance, has significantly decreased in the last few years. At the political level this has led to the feeling on the part of Swazi policy-makers that Britain has neither the inclination nor ability to continue to fulfil a vital role in Africa, and that as such the reliability and importance of Swazi-British relations must be viewed in decreasing terms. British entry into the European Common Market, which will deprive Swaziland trade of important markets, (particularly the sugar market) has only served to reinforce Swazi doubts on this matter. Britain has of course requested the EEC that special trading privileges between herself and the Commonwealth African states be maintained until renewal of the Yaounde Convention in 1975, whilst Swaziland has been specifically assured that the EEC will continue to
admit large quantities of Swazi sugar even after the expiry of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement in 1974. This has however, not allayed the currently growing Swazi view that political relations with the United Kingdom are not quite as valuable as has been the case in the past.

Under these circumstances it has become necessary to supplement Swazi-British relations with as wide a range of political contacts, bilateral and multilateral, as is possible. As some sort of alternative to the United Kingdom, Swaziland's policy-makers place emphasis on expanding and improving relations with the United States, which it is felt has a direct interest in promoting Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana as multi-racial alternatives in Southern Africa. Currently, the United States is represented at the ambassadorial level, (by a BLS ambassador stationed in Gaborone), by a Peace Corps contingent, and by the Office of the Southern African Regional Activities Co-ordination (OSARAC) which has moved from Lusaka to Mbabane in 1971.

Swaziland has also established bi-lateral political relations with a number of other states. In May 1972, for example, diplomatic relations were established with Sweden, this being followed by the establishment of Swazi-Swiss diplomatic contacts in May, and the arrival, in December, of an Israeli charge d'affaires (who is also responsible for Botswana and Lesotho). Diplomatic relations also exist between Swaziland and West Germany (which has a roving ambassador in Malawi) and between Swaziland and Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Iran, Austria and the Netherlands. Swaziland also has diplomatic missions stationed in Belgium, Canada and France. Finally, Swaziland has established political relations with Portugal, which is regarded as a useful political counterweight to South Africa in the region: Portugal was in fact the first state after the United Kingdom to establish ambassadorial relations with Swaziland after independence, and on numerous occasions since then important Portuguese officials have visited the territory, (including the
Portuguese foreign minister, Mr. Rui Patricio, in March 1973). Swazi-Portuguese relations have also been reinforced by a number of Swazi-Portuguese conventions, including one on the Swaziland Railroad, and one on the elimination of visa restrictions on movements between Swaziland and Mozambique.

At the multilateral level, Swaziland's foreign policy-makers, as is the case with the policy-makers of all small states, attribute great importance to Swaziland's membership of the United Nations. Participation by Swaziland in United Nations political activities, in fact pre-dates the achievement of independence: during this period the United Nations was frequently used by those intent on achieving the decolonisation of Swaziland and the attainment of independent rule. As early as 1963, John Nquku of the SPP attended meetings of the United Nations 4th Committee (on Non-Self-Governing Territories) to demand United Nations intervention against British rule, whilst in subsequent years United Nations action on a variety of issues related to the Swaziland independence struggle was demanded.

In the post-independence period, Swaziland's participation in United Nations political activities are no longer characterised by attempts to mobilise international support for the domestic liberation struggle. Yet membership of the United Nations is seen not only as a vital symbol of Swaziland's independent political status, but more substantially as an important international guarantor of that status. Insofar as Swaziland's policy-makers are concerned, participation in the United Nations political system allows Swaziland to project itself into the international community, to articulate its views and opinions before an international audience, and to establish workable political relationships with a variety of other actors in the international system. Reciprocally, to the degree that Swaziland engages in such activities and is seen to be doing so, the international community
becomes, in a sense, sensitised to the existence of the territory, and involved in the maintenance of its sovereign status. In these terms therefore, the United Nations constitutes an important international mechanism to be employed in counteracting the effects of Swaziland's strategic and political isolation.\textsuperscript{81/}

(iv) The Promotion of Group Political Values: Swaziland as a Regional Actor

As a result of racial affinities, the relatively low level of economic development of the Swaziland system, and an historical heritage dominated by the experience of colonial rule, Swaziland's policy-makers have deemed the states of the so-called 'Third World' as 'natural' allies in the task whereby Swaziland seeks to extend her influence in the international system. Moreover, as a means to legitimate participation in the multilateral activities of the Third World group, the Swaziland policy-makers have been obliged to integrate into their system of political values, the values of the Third World political culture: as a result of the concern with group acceptance, Swaziland has become, to one degree or another, socialised into the Third World political culture and, at the foreign policy level, this is expressed by the concern of Swaziland's policy-makers with the promotion of those political values regarded as intrinsic to the causes and concerns of the Third World group of states. This means that the international political role of Swaziland cannot be evaluated solely in terms of categories of foreign policy action designed to consolidate political independence through reduction in the economic and strategic penetrability of the Swaziland system, but must additionally take into account a second category of international political actions, namely those concerned with the promotion of the political values of that multi-state group with which Swaziland's policy-makers identify.
Swaziland's commitment to the promotion of group political values is expressed most cogently through its relations with South Africa, particularly through the implementation of a variety of policies conceivably designed to facilitate and promote social and political change in the Republic. The political culture of South Africa is naturally seen by the Third World states as unacceptable: Swaziland's socialisation into the political culture of the Third World must thus directly lead to the society's involvement in the movement for political alteration in South Africa, and this is so notwithstanding Swaziland's dependence on the South African system as a result of geographic and economic circumstances. This does not necessarily mean that Swaziland is engaged in direct confrontation with South Africa. It does however imply, that in principle at least Swaziland's policy-makers are concerned with such change in South Africa as will enhance the political role of the majority Black population, and this has in fact been recurrently emphasised by leading Swazi politicians who see the main source of conflict in South and Southern Africa to lie in the socio-political structure of the South African state. In the interests of regional stability, if not in the interests of morality, Swaziland's policy-makers would like to see some short-term solution to the South African racial problem, and from this perspective it is felt that whilst Swaziland is forced by circumstances to adopt a relationship with South Africa, which, in the words of King Sobhusa, requires 'wisdom, patience and tact', Swaziland has nonetheless, both vested and substantive interests in promoting South African political change.

The result of these considerations is that while Swazi-South African relations have generally been characterised by economic co-operation and political amity, Swaziland has nonetheless adopted a variety of political postures vis-a-vis South Africa, which reflect both its concern with change, and its conformity to general Third World political conceptions regarding the
South African situation. It is believed in Swaziland, that through such postures, it can contribute to change in South Africa, and to the degree that it is seen to be doing so, consolidate Swaziland's membership of that international political culture with which her policy-makers identify. To the degree that this is in turn achieved, Swaziland will increase her credibility as a substantive actor in the international community long accustomed to the image of Swaziland as a mere South African appendage.

Swaziland's foreign policy to promote group political values vis-a-vis South Africa manifests itself in a number of ways.

In the first place, Swaziland has not established formal diplomatic relations with South Africa, and, although such relations may be technically necessary, current South African-Swazi diplomatic contacts tend to take place either by telephone, or through occasional ad hoc meetings between South African and Swazi officials, from time to time. It is also of importance to note, that with the exception of such meetings as that between Prime Ministers Vorster and Dhlamini in Cape Town during 1971, and the periodic meetings of the governing commission of the Customs Union, most of these contacts take place in a low-profile atmosphere in the absence of publicity: this arrangement is perfectly suitable to Swazi officials who are reluctant to provide evidence of contacts with their South African counterparts, which can be used as international or domestic political capital. In current terms, there also exists amongst Swaziland's policy-makers very little enthusiasm for more institutionalised political ties with South Africa: thus following a press conference in 1969, Prime Minister Dhlamini stated that formal contacts with South Africa were unnecessary in the light of the geographic proximity between the two states, and the 'unnecessary expense' which would be involved in establishing such ties. Similarly, following the Vorster-Makhosini meeting of 1971, at a time when it was widely speculated
that formal Swazi-South African diplomatic relations would shortly be established, a statement was issued by the Swazi Government which emphasised its opposition to apartheid, and its firm refusal to take any 'unilateral action on the dialogue question, particularly if such action is unconnected with the Lusaka Manifesto'.

This raises the second manifestation of Swaziland's policy of promoting group political values vis-a-vis South Africa, namely, Swaziland's attitude to the question of 'dialogue'. Swaziland is officially committed to peaceful rather than revolutionary change in South Africa, and as such recognises the need for consultation with South African authorities at the political level, albeit within an informal framework. Minister Nxumalo has for example point that - 'If difficulties arise between nations and governments, as they are bound to arise, let these be thrashed out through ... discussion and through the mutual exchange of ideas ... (This) is the sort of approach to Africa's problems which we are trying to uphold and pursue. In doing this we need the goodwill of Africa; we need the understanding of our neighbours. Given that, I believe that there are no problems which we in Southern Africa cannot solve together.'

Notwithstanding this however, Swaziland is a signatory of the Lusaka Manifesto of April 1969, and is officially committed, as has been reiterated from time to time, to dialogue only on the basis of the Lusaka Manifesto with its emphasis on demonstrable change. Swaziland is as such concerned with peaceful change in South Africa and recognises the utility of contact with South Africa in the processes of such change; it does however believe that fruitful contacts cannot take place at the formal political level in the absence of South African willingness to effect measures in the direction of eventual African majority control in South Africa.

Swaziland has in the third place identified itself publicly with certain
international pressures concerned with both the solution of the South West African dispute and the question of international sanctions upon South Africa. As far as the former is concerned Swaziland policy-makers have expressed their conviction that the South West African issue is a matter of concern for the United Nations, and that it is only on the basis of a solution acceptable to the United Nations that the issue can be effectively resolved. On the question of the latter, Swaziland has forcefully expressed itself on the question of British arms sales to South Africa, to which it stands opposed on the basis that such sales can only serve to harden mutually hostile attitudes and thus increase mutual tensions in the Southern African sub-continent; speaking on a resolution against the proposed resumption of British arms sales to South Africa at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London during 1971, Prime Minister Dhlamini thus pointed out 'We cannot see arms promoting the safety of Southern Africa or that of the ocean surrounding that area. But we can see arms hardening the attitudes of those who otherwise could, even at this late hour, lend the voice of humanity and reason an ear. Indeed we can see arms from the West attracting arms from the East and turning Southern Africa into an ideological and racial battleground - precisely the type of thing we want to see avoided.'

Fourthly, Swazi policy-makers also believe that if Swaziland can be presented to South Africa as a working multi-racial society, it will provide South Africa with visible evidence of the feasibility of such forms of social organisation, and in doing so, contribute to the process of change. The pursuit of the multi-racial ideal in the geographic heartland of racial segregation is thus encouraged as an important technique to concurrently promote Third World political values in Southern Africa, and promote political alteration in South Africa.
itself. Alternatively, the promotion of a working multi-racialism in Swaziland is evaluated not only in terms of domestic stability, but in terms of its value as an instrumentality of foreign policy as well. Swaziland has, for example, subscribed to the United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, (and has submitted reports on its own internal situation to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination). Domestic legislation, dating back to the Race Relations Act. "a. 6 of 1962 further attempts to give expression to the multi-racial ideal, and the self-same commitment has in fact been endorsed as a cornerstone of the Imbokodvo party policy. The commitment to non-racialism has been repeatedly emphasised publicly by the Imbokodvo leadership: thus, at the opening of Parliament during 1968, Prime Minister Dlamini pledged the government to full support of the ideals of non-discrimination and racial peace, which were to be reiterated in the Prime Minister's broadcast to the nation on the occasion of the first independence anniversary celebrations in September 1969.

Mr. Simon Nxumalo, has additionally pointed out that 'The Swazi National Council is a conservative body ... But in accordance with the traditions of my people, Imbokodvo also rejects racial discrimination... Today, Imbokodvo's significance lies in the fact that in an age of great changes it recognises the need to go forward with the times ... All our peoples must retain their vigour, they must stimulate each other in building a truly non-racial state ... We believe we can establish a fully integrated non-racial society ... We think that it is possible that Black and White can belong to one society and be brought together by one political loyalty.'

The use of internal multi-racialism as a symbol for promoting political change in neighbouring South Africa, is a tactic whose possible validity has long been recognised. In 1965, e.g. Madonald Maseko, (then one of the
leaders of the NNLC) pointed out ⁹⁰/ - 'I wonder, why does Dr. Verwoerd fear a democratic Swaziland? Because a free Swaziland in which all races live together on the basis of real equality is the greatest threat to his system and belief in race mastery. Nothing would be more undermining to Dr. Verwoerd than to have a Swaziland on his boundaries in which Whites are equal to Blacks, and in which Whites are not swamped, beaten up, or discriminated against in any other way. In other words, where Whites and Blacks live happily together. This would destroy his last justification for the last White Laager in Africa.' This view has, in practice, been incorporated into the foreign policy perspectives of the ruling Imbokodvo Party. ⁹¹/

Today, Swazi policy-makers believe that the position of South African Blacks can be ameliorated through the maintenance of multi-racial values in the territory adjacent to South Africa itself. They also believe that it can be useful to bring indigenous White South Africans into direct contact with the values of a working multi-racial society, and this has reinforced economic considerations in Swaziland's promotion of South African tourism in Swaziland. The increase in South African tourism to Swaziland has tended to generate a number of social side-effects which have caused some domestic concern. ⁹²/ the belief nonetheless continues to exist that in offering a multi-racial alternative with which White South Africans can make substantial contact a contribution to South African attitudinal and hence political change is being made. Actions such as the refusal by South African governmental authorities to allow multi-racial football as part of Swaziland's anniversary celebrations during 1969 which would have involved the participation of two White Johannesburg teams as well as a number of Black South African teams - and other efforts to limit contact between White South Africans with the Swazi way of life, are viewed as confirming the telling effect which the pursuit of this strategy can manifest.
Closely related to this is the feeling that political purposes can be fulfilled through promoting the use of Swaziland's educational facilities by both White and Black young South Africans. Insofar as the former group is concerned, it is strongly felt that institutions such as the multi-racial Waterford school and, at the level of university education UBLs, can, to the degree that they involve White South Africans, play an important role in conditioning South African attitudes towards political change. Insofar as young Black South Africans are concerned, it is believed that institutions such as UBLs can provide facilities not otherwise available to Black South Africans upon South African territory. It is however recognised by the Swazi authorities that the potential White South African constituency for participation in activities at Waterford or UBLs, is composed, in a sense of the already 'converted'. It is also recognised that the reluctance on the part of South African authorities to grant travel documents to South African Blacks interested in Swaziland educational institutions, also undermines the effectiveness of such a strategy. Then too, the still-developing Swaziland educational system has difficulty in catering even for the indigenous population, and this must seriously limit the facilities available to those of non-Swazi citizenship. The policy of promoting Swazi-South African educational relationships is nonetheless regarded as being a valid means in principle, for the promotion of social change in the South African political system.

A fifth issue-area of Swaziland's foreign policy designed to promote socio-political change in South Africa in a manner conforming to the political values of the Third World political culture, relates to the contentious issues of asylum for South African political refugees, and the provision of facilities for guerilla operations against the South African regime. This issue is in fact a product of the South African-Swazi geographic
relationship: Swaziland does not enjoy a direct geographic link with Black Africa as does Botswana, yet it is an independent Black state with a geographic outlet through Mozambique, on its East, and as such, is a potentially favourable location point for illegal emigrants from South Africa, and for the staging of military activity directed at the overthrow of the South African state. Swaziland's governmental authorities are thus placed in a situation where they must constantly balance their economic and political interests in maintaining a neutral position of matters relating to refugees and liberation movements, and the prerogatives set by radical groupings in the international system concerned with violent change in South Africa.

In Swaziland the government is not committed to maintaining the status quo in South Africa. However, it is equally committed to the belief, both by necessity and choice, that change in the South African situation cannot be best brought about by revolutionary and violent means. In practice this view is reinforced by a number of variables. From an economic perspective it is deeply appreciated by the Swazi government that both the present and future economic well-being of Swaziland is directly related to South African economic support: combined with the South African-Swaziland strategic relationship, this underwrites Swazi reluctance to support a variety of political activities directed towards South Africa which are, or might be interpreted by South Africa, as being designed to alter the South African situation by revolution, violence and force. The educational and technical qualifications of many South African political refugees in Swaziland in the past, have tended to surpass those of the indigenous labour force: it is appreciated by the Swaziland government that in an already overburdened employment market, an influx of additional workers, 'freedom fighters' or not, cannot be encouraged except at the expense of local dissent.
From a more political point of view, the relatively radical political views of the South African exile community have often in the past been seen to have a disturbing effect on Swaziland's domestic political dynamics: members of the refugee community have tended to gravitate to the opposition rather than to the ruling Imbokodvo Party, and given the relative sophistication which the refugee community has in many cases brought to the opposition cause, governmental authorities have tended to look askance on the influx of elements whose commitment to the existing Swazi order may be in doubt. The harbouring of refugees and guerilla elements also increases the possibility of South African intervention, directly or indirectly, in domestic Swazi affairs. This is in fact a deep-rooted fear in Swazi political life, one which has been articulated on a number of occasions and which tends to further condition the attitudes of Swazi policy-makers to the whole liberation question, in a negative direction.

Under such circumstances it is not surprising that the Swaziland government has adopted a position in terms of which it has made it publicly and explicitly clear that it is unable to provide sustenance and territorial support to guerilla movements seeking to use Swaziland as a staging point for a South African assault. On the matter of asylum for South African political refugees however, policy is by no means as clear-cut. It is certainly true that the belief prevails in opposition circles that Swaziland is openly hostile to these individuals, whilst evidence exists that co-operation has taken place between South African security forces and Swaziland's police authorities regarding the return of political refugees to South Africa. There is also adequate legislation which can be used to statutorily justify the return of South African refugees, political or otherwise, particularly the Deportation Act of 1961, the Immigration Act of 1964, the Citizenship Act of 1967 and the Immigration (Amendment) Bill of
In reality however, in the past Swaziland has not proved unsympathetic to the refugee plight. In 1970 for example, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Khumalo was to point out to a United Nations meeting in Lusaka, that despite Swaziland's economic and geographic position, South African refugees were 'sometimes' afforded asylum in Swaziland provided that they did not indulge in local politics, and that even when this did occur, these individuals were not returned to South Africa, but transported to areas outside of the South African orbit. This position seems to be borne out statistically by the fact that since 1966, while few refugees have actually been allowed to remain in Swaziland, of some 1,212 individuals declared 'prohibited immigrants' some 1,024 have been deported either to Zambia or Tanzania. There is also some evidence to suggest that liaison between the Swazi and Portuguese authorities on the refugee question has taken place, and that the latter have been prepared to sanction the extradition of South African refugees via Mozambique, provided that the individuals concerned were not wanted by the Portuguese authorities as well.

In conclusion therefore, it seems that whilst economic, and geographic circumstances have conditioned Swaziland policy away from actually providing support for guerilla movements against South Africa, Swaziland's policy regarding the question of South African political refugees can be clearly related to those position and prerogatives of the Third World political culture with whom Swaziland identifies in its attempt to promote the international political influence of the Swazi state.

(v) The Promotion of Group Political Values: Swaziland as a Political Actor in International Organisation

Swaziland's concern with group political values is finally reflected outside of the Southern African region, in her activities in such organisations as the United Nations and the Organisation for African Unity. In both of
these institutions, Swaziland has recurrently identified herself with the policy positions of the Third World states on Southern African issues. In the OAU for example, Swaziland has endorsed dialogue with South Africa only on the basis of the Lusaka Manifesto, has made it clear that formal diplomatic links would not be established with South Africa under present circumstances, and has condemned the sale of British arms to the Republic. Swaziland has also taken a fairly clear stand in the OAU on the issue of the Portuguese presence in Africa, and has called upon the organisation to do 'all in its power' to achieve independence for 'those areas still under foreign domination'.

Swaziland's public position on South Africa and Portugal is necessarily tempered by the nature of Swazi-South African and Swaziland-Mozambique geographic and economic relations, and this interplay of political and economic influences has, in practice, tended to introduce an element of ambiguity into Swaziland's position at the OAU and into her attitudes on anti-Portuguese and anti-South African resolutions: the element of constraint is however less evident on Swaziland's position vis-a-vis Rhodesia and given the fact that formal Swazi-Rhodesian transactions are practically non-existent, Rhodesian issues at the OAU are seen by Swaziland's policymakers as a useful opportunity to demonstrate Swaziland's 'hard-line' commitment to the Black African cause. Considerably less restraint is therefore evident in Swaziland's attitude towards Rhodesia, the fulfilment of this surrogate type of diplomacy being readily evident on a number of occasions in OAU activities, when Swaziland has associated itself with the more radical positions of the African community. In current terms, Swaziland has fully endorsed the embargo on Rhodesian trade, has called for immediate African majority rule in Rhodesia, and has associated herself with condemnations of Britain and her 'departure from her usual political principles'.

99/ 
100/
Within the United Nations, Swaziland has also recurrently lent her support to the Afro-Asian position on Southern African matters. During 1971 for example, Swaziland supported a variety of issues concerned with the eradication of the vestiges of colonialism in the Portuguese African territories, and the promotion of socio-political change within South Africa itself. With regard to the latter, Swaziland lent significant support to Resolution 2775 positively affirming the distribution of educational material on apartheid, the work of the Special Committee on Apartheid and condemnation of apartheid in sport. During 1971 Swaziland also publicly expressed her association with the United Nations demand for political change in Rhodesia and South West Africa, and supported the establishment of a United Nations Fund for Namibia. During 1972 Swaziland supported Resolution 2908 referring to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries, the condemnation of 'foreign economic interests impeding the implementation of this declaration' (i.e. Resolution 2979), and the establishment of an educational programme for the political refugees from the Southern African sub-continent. During 1972, Swaziland again sided with elements in the United Nations concerned with the elimination of the Portuguese presence in Africa.
NOTES ON CHAPTER 4


2. See speech by Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs 'The Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of Swaziland' (Delivered at Swaziland Student Union Conference. Luyengo, April, 1972. Reported in News from Swaziland, 29.4.72).

3. See statement by Prime Minister Dhlamini following talks with Mr. Vorster in Cape Town in 1971 (Rand Daily Mail, 26.3.71).

4. Times of Swaziland, 30.7.65.

5. Speech by Mr. Simon Nxumalo (Minister of Industry) to Department of African Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 26 July 1968. It should also be noted that South Africa itself is most interested in the promotion of economic co-operation and development on a regional basis, see, for example, G.M.E. Leistner - 'Co-operation for Development in Southern Africa' (Paper presented at Conference on Accelerated Development in Southern Africa, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, March 1972.)


9. Both King Sobhuza and Prime Minister Dhlamini were students at the Lovedale Institution, whilst other leading figures in Swazi political life - including Mr. Polycarp Dhlamini and Dr. Allen Nxumalo - were trained in South Africa.

10. The Star, 18.9.72 and 22.8.70.

11. Swaziland Electricity Board.

12. The Star, 22.8.70.

13. Times of Swaziland, 13.8.65.


17. The Star, 24.3.73.

18. The Star, 20.3.74.


22. The Star, 20.5.73.

23. The export of labour to South Africa is not of such economic importance to Swaziland as it is to Lesotho or Botswana: It is nonetheless still of economic significance: refer to G.M.E. Leistner - 'Foreign Bantu Workers in South Africa: Their Present Position in the Economy', South African Journal of Economics, Vol. 35, No. 1, March, 1967 : C. Potholm in Potholm and Dale, ibid: W.J. Breytenbach - 'Migratory Labour Arrangements in South Africa'. (Communications of the Africa Institute, No. 20, Africa Institute, Pretoria, 1972.) It should also be noted that in recent years the Swazi government has become increasingly concerned with the treatment of Swazi nationals in South African employment: see, for example, Rand Daily Mail, 6.10.73.


26. See The Star, 21.2.70, 23.4.71 and 10.5.73.

27. 'South African Customs Union' - Standard Bank Review, ibid.


29. The totality of activities on the part of South Africa in the Swaziland economy is recognised by the Swazi government as making 'a considerable contribution to national development', The Star, 7.9.71.


32. The Star, 21.9.73.
33. East African Standard, 1.3.72: During 1973 an EAC delegation also visited Swaziland to discuss increased Swaziland-EAC trade:
Times of Swaziland, 19.1.73.

34. News from Swaziland, 2.1.68.

35. Formal trade ties have also recently been established with Ghana and Nigeria: Times of Swaziland, 13.7.73.


37. News from Swaziland, 4.3.72.

38. Swaziland Building Society.

39. News from Swaziland, 2.3.72.

40. Swaziland is also a member of the African Development Bank and the Economic Commission for Africa. It has received a substantial loan from the African Development Bank for telecommunications development, and ADS officials have also visited the territory. (Times of Swaziland, 16.3.73). Swaziland has also been appointed to the Committee of Experts of the ECA, and her Minister of Industries, Mr. Simon Nxumalo, has served as a Vice-President of the Executive Committee (Times of Swaziland, 29.6.73.).

41. News from Swaziland, 2.6.72.

42. Swaziland Credit and Savings Bank.


44. The Star, 27.10.72.


47. News From Swaziland, 25.3.68.


50. News from Swaziland, 23.3.72.

51. News from Swaziland, 2.6.72.


53. Financial Gazette, 30.6.72.

54. See Statutes of Swaziland, ibid.
56. Financial Gazette, 26.4.72.
58. News From Swaziland, 4.3.72.
60. Low tax incentives, depreciation allowances and special manufacturing rights are all emphasised as inducements to investment in the Second National Development Plan.
61. Mr. Z. Khumalo (Deputy Prime Minister) in New Commonwealth - 'Focus on Swaziland', January, 1972.
64. See, for example, speech to House of Assembly by Senator Nhlabatsi - The Parliamentarian: Parliamentary Reports (Swaziland). Vol.L. 1969, p.154.
65. Times of Swaziland, 16.2.73.
66. Swaziland Credit and Savings Bank.
69. A number of 'warnings' have however been given to employers in the private sector: see, for example, Times of Swaziland, 23.3.73.
70. See 'Agriculture in Southern Africa' ibid.
71. See J.B. McI. Daniel, ibid.
72. Leistner and Smit, ibid.
73. R.P. Stevens, ibid.
74. C. Potholm - 'Swaziland: The Dynamics ...' ibid.
75. Times of Swaziland, 9.7.71. President Khama has reiterated the call for joint BLS action on a number of subsequent occasions: see, for example, Rand Daily Mail, 4.10.73.
77. See, for example, Government of Swaziland: Ministry of Education Newsletter, No. 16, July 1971, p.3.

78. Joint discussions have taken place regarding the economic implications of British entry into the European Common Market (Times of Swaziland, 19.1.73). Subsequently it was decided to establish a joint consultative commission to meet regularly to discuss matters of common interest. (The Star, 13.11.73 and 22.4.74).

79. S. Nxumalo (Speech to Department of African Studies, ibid.).

80. Times of Swaziland, 9.2.73.

81. It should also be noted that Swaziland is an active member of the Commonwealth, has participated in many of its prime ministerial meetings, and has expressed its position on many matters pertaining to Southern Africa and the wider international scene, which are of interest to the Commonwealth: see, for example, Times of Swaziland, 27.7.73.


83. Times of Swaziland, 31.7.70.

84. S. Nxumalo (Speech to Department of African Studies, ibid.)

85. "

86. "

87. Times of Swaziland, 31.12.65.


89. S. Nxumalo (Speech to Department of African Studies, ibid.)

90. Times of Swaziland, 13.12.65.

91. See communique issued following meeting between Prime Ministers Dlamini and Khama in Gaborone, July 1971 (Times of Swaziland, 9.1.71).

92. These include significant increases in immorality, prostitution and juvenile delinquency.

93. News from Swaziland, 13.4.72.

94. Times of Swaziland, 8.3.63 and 3.5.63.

95. See statement by NNLC in Times of Swaziland 19.1.68.

96. C. Potholm in Potholm and Dale, ibid.

97. Statutes of Swaziland, ibid.

98. Times of Swaziland, 31.10.69.

99. Die Transvaer, 3.9.70.

100. News from Swaziland, 25.5.72 and 29.4.72.
PART THREE
CHAPTER 5

SWAZILAND AS A NATION-BUILDING STATE AND THE EFFECTS ON ITS FOREIGN POLICIES OBJECTIVES, CHOICES AND STRATEGIES

The accumulation of knowledge in international relations reflects the concern on the part of social scientists with constantly integrating theory with fact: thus, the evaluation of descriptive data in terms of modular constructs gives rise to series of hypotheses, conceptualisations and ultimately theories, whilst alternatively, the re-application of theories to material realities stimulates the search for basic idiographic data supplementary to that incorporated into existing theories themselves. Abstract and substantive data thus go hand in hand, and as a result, systematic inquiry on the part of the international relations scholar involves a constant interrelation between what is seen to exist and its interpretation in programmatic form. From another perspective it is incumbent upon international relations research to integrate theory with fact, in the interests of a total appreciation of the phenomena under consideration.

It is upon this basis that it is necessary, at this point, to clearly integrate the material referent of this work i.e. the foreign policy of Swaziland (as described in Part II), with the original model of foreign policy behaviour within the developing state context (as originally enunciated in Part I of this dissertation). More specifically, it is necessary to consider whether the prototype used in this analysis i.e. Swaziland, conforms to the propositions incorporated into the model i.e. to the effect that the objectives sought by developing states, the priorities which they attribute to certain objectives vis-a-vis others, and the strategies which they employ in the realisation of preferred goals, is directly conditioned by the domestic concerns of political leadership with the nation-building task.
In order to do this it is necessary to consider a number of specific questions which directly impinge on the character of foreign policy-making and application in the Swaziland case. First and foremost, the verification of the modular proposition is directly dependent upon the existence within the Swazi policy-making-circle of the ethos of nation-building: in other words the question must be posed - on the basis of available evidence, to what degree is Swaziland's political leadership intimately concerned and involved with nation-building, or, in terms of the definition articulated above, with legitimating the institutions of the Swazi state in the perceptions of both a domestic and international audience? Assuming such an orientation to exist, it is necessary to consider the economic and political exigencies which are generated as a result, the manner in which these variables impinge upon the definition of the foreign policy goals of the Swazi state, the strategies which are employed by Swazi policy-makers in the attainment of these goals. Finally, since it is an integral part of our initial proposition that the economic and political values of the developing state may conflict, some attention must be given to the element of contradiction which is present in Swazi foreign policy, and to the context within which Swazi foreign policy priorities are determined, choices made, and trade-offs operationalised.

A. Swaziland as a Nation-building Polity

The first of these issues i.e. the involvement of Swaziland's political leadership with the nation-building task, can be easily resolved. Historical experience tends to suggest that political leadership is, at a minimum, concerned with the maintenance of the political system, and that in the case of developing states, the capacity of leadership to realise this end, is directly dependent upon its ability to promote both the economic and
The motivations underlying the concern of Swazi policy-makers with the nation-building tasks are a reflection of Swaziland's domestic and international circumstances. From an international perspective, the geographic situation of Swaziland in the heartland of Southern Africa, in combination with the disparities in power between Swaziland and the Republic of South Africa, have combined to produce an international image of the Swazi state as a "client" state, or even "hostage" state of its
immediate neighbour. The natural economic involvement of Swaziland with the Republic which has induced Swazi policy-makers to adopt a relatively moderate attitude towards South Africa's internal policies, has further reinforced this perception, and in the process has geared the international community to seriously question the credibility of Swaziland as an autonomous and sovereign political actor. This has been recognised by Swazi policy-makers, who have as a result, constantly sought to effect some re-orientation in international attitudes of this nature as adopted towards the Swazi state: they have sought to project Swaziland as a political entity which, although confronted with disadvantageous geo-political and economic circumstances, nonetheless embodies the capacity to determine both its internal and external policies in as self-determining a manner as any other developing state.

Swaziland's foreign policy in the post-independence period has sought to emphasize the reality of Swaziland's position, and her conscious attempt to broaden her political options despite her economic and geographic dependence upon the South African system. It has sought to project Swaziland as a credible state nonetheless, and to affirm the view that, as such, Swaziland can participate, in a vital and contributory manner in the operations of the international system.

The concern of Swaziland with nation-building is not however, only a product of the past ambiguity of Swaziland's international image. On the contrary, it also reflects the influence of domestic circumstances, particularly the element of modernisation which Swaziland has experienced, and the relatively cohesive character of the territory's social composition. It has been pointed out above, that despite the relatively high level per capita income level in Swaziland, and her Gross National Product which in per capita terms is one of the highest in Africa, the Swazi economic system is characterised by a number of discontinuities which are prevalent in other
developing societies as well. The Swazi economy is, after all, a dual economy wherein serious discrepancies in the distribution of income and skills exist: it is an economy which is witnessing an increased unemployment rate, expanding population growth, and progressive urbanisation in a manner which places serious strains on social resources and stability. The Swazi leadership has come to associate itself with accelerated socio-economic growth as the natural response to this situation, and has sought, through the operationalisation of a broad programme of socio-economic modernisation to cement society into both a more coherent and functional entity. It is moreover of importance to note that Swazi society is, unlike most societies in Africa, a uni-tribal society i.e. based on a single pattern of ethnic identities. This is not to ignore the vital social role of Swaziland’s European community, nor the presence of a minority element in the form of Black groups whose origins are not Swazi in character; nonetheless, the fact that the predominant social group in Swaziland, is, in population terms, overwhelmingly the Swazi tribe, does attribute to the society an element of basic and general integration which is largely unparalleled in most other areas of the developing world. And it is precisely because of this, rather than in spite of it, that the concern with maintaining social coherence is attributed considerable value by Swaziland’s policy-making elite.

Swaziland is in these terms both similar and dissimilar to other developing states. It is dissimilar in the sense that its peculiar environmental situation has made the task of internationally legitimating the state far more difficult than has been the case in other developing states of the international community, which have, at the minimum, been automatically accepted as credible and sovereign by other developing states of the international system. In the Swazi case the task of projecting the status of the state into the system, has been complicated by the fact, that not only has it required the recognition of the developed industrial world,
but of most states of the developing world as well. Swaziland is also
dissimilar from other developing states in the light of her uni-tribal
character, which functions, in practice, to reduce the role of culture-
clash and competition in the operations of the system: internally therefore,
the task of nation-building and legitimation has been considerably eased.

In other respects however Swaziland can easily be fitted to the category
of developing states. It is a state which has not yet experienced these
social forces which are associated with the condition of economic modernity,
and it is one where such modernisation as has been experienced, has in many
respects, undermined the unity of the social order. Internationally,
Swaziland's role is hampered by the relative lack of power and capabilities
which is common to the international action of most developing actors:
Swaziland's military power is negligible, and her economic self-sufficiency
profoundly limited. As a result, serious limitations are placed on both her
international political weight and status. It is this factor, in combination
with domestic circumstance that underpins the concern on the part of
Swaziland's leadership with the nation-building task, in a manner not
fundamentally different to that of other states in the developing-state
category.

B. Swaziland's Foreign Policy Objectives and Strategies in the Context of
the Nation-Building Task

The involvement with nation-building has in turn disposed Swazi
policy-makers towards the realisation of a set of economic and political
foreign policy objectives geared to economic modernisation and the
affirmation of political autonomy respectively. This has in turn caused
policy to be geared to the operationalisation of strategies concerned with
internal economic growth, political consolidation and the extension of
international political influence. Let us consider these economic and
political foreign policy values in turn.
(a) Economic Foreign Policy Objectives and Strategies

From a purely economic point of view, Swaziland is currently confronted with a number of major problems. Indeed, as a recent study pointed out, the problems confronting the Swazi economy are not purely economic problems, but social, political and physical as well: thus the strain placed on Swaziland's human and material resources by the directly-economic demands of infrastructural development, agricultural and industrial modernisation etc, are complemented by such issues as increased urbanisation under conditions of limited employment opportunities, the political aspirations of an increasingly sophisticated and cosmopolitan urban populace, and such physical problems as relate to integrating the social framework into a spatially cohesive unit through the promotion of a relatively dense system of territorial communications. In a more general sense, the Swaziland economy is characterised by a serious imbalance between a developed core area and a backward periphery i.e. between a segment wherein past developmental activity has been concentrated, and one where economic modernisation has largely been ignored. This is of course not an unfamiliar pattern in developing societies, many of which are characterised by a dualistic structure ... imprinted upon the space economy, comprising a 'centre' of rapid, intensive development and a 'periphery' whose economy, imperfectly related to the centre, is either stagnant or declining. Swaziland is in fact a prototype of what has been deemed a 'second-stage transitional economy': as such, it has as yet not attained the point of self-sustained economic take-off, and, in current terms, is engaged in the process of radical economic transformation which may, with vast expenditures of social resources, enable it to reach the level of self-sufficiency sometime in the near future.

At present Swaziland's policy-makers have committed the system to a wide-ranging and multi-dimensional development effort, and there is little
reason to expect that this will not be continued in the future. Projected expansion plans already make provision for a large number of enterprises throughout the economy, the aggregation of which will require vast expenditure on the part of public finance and private enter-prise, and the mobilisation of considerable amounts of technical resources. In particular, mention should be made of the proposed R5 million cotton fabrics factory at Nhlangano, a new R30 million sugar mill in Northern Swaziland, expansion of the pulp factory at Bunya, the establishment of a SASOL-type oil-from-coal plant, the new R160 million thermal power plant at Mpaka, and, in the longer-term future, a pig-iron plant which will initiate the Swaziland economy into the realm of capital goods production. Each of these projects will make significant contributions to national economic growth: the Nhlangano factory, for example, will eventually employ 6,000 people, and with the eventual use of Swazi cottons will give the agricultural sector a welcome boost; the oil-from-coal plant will do much to reduce the economy's dependence on external energy supplies, as is similarly the case with the thermal power plant, which, with its sale of electricity to ESCOM, will enhance the value of Swaziland's export sector. All of these contemplated projects are however capital-intensive endeavours, which will place serious strains on national finance. It should also be borne in mind that alone of the three former High Commission Territories, Swaziland is currently in the process of establishing a national army to supplement the Royal Swazi Police in the maintenance of order and the protection of territorial integrity. The reasons for this action are as yet obscure, although it is generally accepted that the rationale is to be found in domestic rather than in international circumstances. One thing is however, relatively clear, and that is, that the expenditure on this venture will place a further strain on national economic resources: the police budget in 1970-71, for example, was already over R1 million, and
it is expected that the initial defence budget will be in the region of double this amount.

Under these circumstances, and in the light of the fact that in current terms the Swaziland economy has not succeeded in accumulating sufficient capital to sustain the developmental effort, it is unlikely that in the near future Swaziland will be able to substantially dispense with external development aid. This is clearly recognised in a recent survey conducted by the South African merchant bankers, Hill Samuel, which suggests not only that Swazi finances will not be able to meet expenditure which is necessary to ensure a rapid rate of growth, but that its capacity to do so may well decline in the short-term. It is pointed out, in particular, that South African investment in Swaziland has fallen far below expectations, and that transport problems, (notably the absence of a rail link), uncertainties engendered by the localisation policy and the fact that financial incentives in South Africa's 'border' industries are greater than those offered by Swaziland, have combined to reduce South African entrepreneurial interest in the Swaziland economy. There is also some evidence to suggest that the role of South African technical assistance to Swaziland is on the decline, and the combination of these factors means that a vital source of financial and technological aid to Swaziland may well decrease in importance in future years.

What is perhaps even more fundamental in terms of Swaziland's future economic growth is the fact that, as a developing economy Swaziland's main source of revenues are export-oriented, and that in current terms, the future of her two major exports are in doubt.

The first of these exports is, of course, sugar. It is, in fact, the sugar industry which is at the heart of the Swaziland economy.
contributes a quarter of the nation's foreign exchange earnings, it provides employment for one-fifth of all people in wage-earning employment in Swaziland, it provides significant income for the Swaziland railway and Swaziland Electricity Board, it provides technical training schemes and finances, educational development, and through wages, rations and other benefits, generates substantial purchasing power in the hands of the people. The problem with the sugar industry, as any other agro-industrial processing industry in developing states, is that it is essentially an export-industry (the local market takes only 10 per cent of production), and that as such, its progress depends on an international trading economy where prices for primary products fluctuate violently, and are often below the cost of production. It is this that has led the Swaziland sugar industry to seek special international arrangements to guarantee its economic base, and this in turn has led to Swaziland's accession to the International Sugar Agreement and the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, and to the conclusion of quota arrangements with the United States, to which Swaziland exports some 35,000 tons. It is however the CSA, in which Swaziland has a quota of 86,000 tons, which is the mainstay of the industry, and which has largely contributed to its development over the last 20 years. With British entry into the European Common Market the future of this arrangement, which is due to expire in December 1974, is in considerable doubt, and although Swaziland has been 'firmly assured' that her sugar exports to the enlarged European community will adequately compensate for the losses incurred with the demise of the CSA, it may well be questioned as to whether this will in fact be the case. In the first place, the Common Agricultural Policy of the EEC specifically excludes the importation of certain agricultural products, one of which is sugar itself. In the second place the EEC is currently self-sufficient in sugar, with the exception of Britain which herself intends to phase out sugar imports from the Commonwealth,
to 1.4 million tons over the next few years; and thirdly, the EEC itself has a significant beet sugar industry which will, in the short-term future, exert efforts to meet total British sugar requirements under favourable conditions. It is in fact the immediate fate of the sugar industry which underlies Swaziland's current concern with Common Market associate membership: in the absence of some sort of agreement with the EEC, the future of the sugar industry is highly problematic, and the current period has been defined as a 'make-or-break period for the sugar industry', and, one might well add, in many ways, for the Swaziland economy as a whole.

The problems of Swaziland's export sector are moreover compounded by the fact that the capacity of the economy to function as a long-term iron-ore exporter has not lived up to initial expectations. It has recently been realised, for example, that at a minimum rate of 2.5 million tons per year, most high-grade ores will have been exhausted by 1975. As far as medium-grade ores are concerned, unfavourable international currency alignments as well as unexpectedly high production costs, make it unlikely that initial hopes that sales to Japan will continue until 1978 will be realised, unless a massive price increase can be negotiated with Japanese buyers. There is as yet no indication of this possibility. In addition, no market has as yet been found for the remaining low-grade deposits, and the current belief is that profits from the mine will radically decrease during 1973 and 1974, prior to the closure of the mine during 1975. The future short-term is likely to witness the phasing out of foreign exchange derived from the export of Swaziland's iron-ore resources.

Under these circumstances, progressive increases in national revenue as a result of the sale of Swaziland's major export products, cannot be taken as a forgone conclusion over the next few years. There is reason to believe that the loss of receipts which will occur with the closure of the Ngwenya
mine, and which may occur in the sugar sector may be compensated for by the export of coal, which could develop into an important foreign exchange earner, particularly in the light of the world energy crisis: at present, firmly assessed coal reserves of 164 million tons are reported at Mpaka, with a further 70 million tons at Mtendakwa, and although it appears that only some 10 million tons can be economically mined on open cast, world price rises may make the rest a viable proposition as well.\textsuperscript{18/}

The exploitation of Swaziland's asbestos reserves are also estimated to be economical for the next 20 years,\textsuperscript{19/} whilst there is reason to believe that Swaziland may possess deposits of diamonds and kimberlite whose sale could also add to national revenues in the short or medium-term future.\textsuperscript{20/}

The progressive expansion of agriculture, industry and tourism should further aid the accumulation of capital and the diffusion of technical skills, although a prolonged oil crisis and fuel restrictions will undoubtedly have negative effects on industry and tourism in particular, and may well slow down the growth rate in these two sectors.\textsuperscript{21/}

When all is said and done however, when the future growth of the economy is related to projected demands which are likely to be placed upon it in the future, it seems relatively clear that Swaziland is still a substantially long way off from that point of economic development and growth, where her dependence on external human and material developmental resources can be significantly reduced. The Swaziland economy has experienced intense activity during the 50's and 60's, especially since the attainment of independence in 1966: it is this that allows Swaziland to be validly categorised as a transitional economy in the process of radical transformation. The Swaziland economy is however still in what have been deemed 'the stages of pre-conditions' which over a comparatively long period of time prepare the country for self-sustained development.\textsuperscript{22/}
mine, and which may occur in the sugar sector may be compensated for by the export of coal, which could develop into an important foreign exchange earner, particularly in the light of the world energy crisis: at present, firmly assessed coal reserves of 164 million tons are reported at Mpaka, with a further 70 million tons at Mtendakwa, and although it appears that only some 10 million tons can be economically mined on open cast, world price rises may make the rest a viable proposition as well.\(^{18}\) The exploitation of Swaziland's asbestos reserves are also estimated to be economical for the next 20 years,\(^{19}\) whilst there is reason to believe that Swaziland may possess deposits of diamonds and kimberlite whose sale could also add to national revenues in the short or medium-term future.\(^{20}\) The progressive expansion of agriculture, industry and tourism should further aid the accumulation of capital and the diffusion of technical skills, although a prolonged oil crisis and fuel restrictions will undoubtedly have negative effects on industry and tourism in particular, and may well slow down the growth rate in these two sectors.\(^{21}\)

When all is said and done however, when the future growth of the economy is related to projected demands which are likely to be placed upon it in the future, it seems relatively clear that Swaziland is still a substantially long way off from that point of economic development and growth, where her dependence on external human and material developmental resources can be significantly reduced. The Swaziland economy has experienced intense activity during the 50's and 60's, especially since the attainment of independence in 1966: it is this that allows Swaziland to be validly categorised as a transitional economy in the process of radical transformation. The Swaziland economy is however still in what have been deemed 'the stages of pre-conditions' which over a comparatively long period of time prepare the country for self-sustained development.\(^{22}\)
For the foreseeable future the Swaziland economy will continue to be intimately related to the external economic environment, the latter will continue to play a vital role in the development of the former, and Swazi foreign policy will continue to emphasise, as a major value, the importation of extra-systemic financial and technical resources into the system. The promotion of public and private investment in Swaziland, the mobilisation of foreign aid from bilateral and multilateral sources, the infusion of international technical assistance, and the expansion and diversification of external trading contacts - these are most likely to continue as major variables and issues in the pattern of Swaziland's relations with the world.

(b) Political Foreign Policy Objectives and Strategies

The political dimension of Swaziland's foreign policy objectives are expressed by leadership's concern with reducing the permeability of the system in the face of external political influences, and, more positively, with extending the international political role of the Swazi state through multilateral association with, and promotion of the political value of the Third World political culture with which Swazi policy-makers are sentimentally and substantively linked. These concerns, which together underpin leadership's involvement with questions of political autonomy, reflect the fact that Swaziland, as other developing states, constitutes a system whose resilience to external political pressures, and whose unit-strength is strictly limited. As we have noted, the realisation of Swaziland's development aims, and indeed, economic growth as a whole, is inextricably interwoven with the capacity of Swaziland's political leadership to mobilise international development resources and integrate them with the local development effort. From another perspective, the pace of domestic economic expansion is to a considerable degree dependent upon the attitudes, actions and initiatives of other states, who can, through the exportation of capital and skills to Swaziland, and through
trade relations with Swaziland, bring pressures to bear upon the Swazi policy-making process, and place strict limitations upon its outcomes. This is not to say that Swaziland is consciously and perennially penetrated by exogenous political pressures, for there is not automatically an element of volition in the process whereby the economic vulnerability of the Swazi system allows for the operation within the system of externally originating influences. Rather it is to suggest that the permeable nature of the Swazi system is the result of the natural interplay of economic forces between Swaziland as a developing state, and the more industrialised and developed world. Swaziland, as other developing states, performs the role of a primary goods exporter and importer of manufactured goods in the international economy. Swaziland is also an importer of capital and skills, and, within the context of the international economy, is, under such circumstances, in a situation of relative economic disadvantage which may be converted to political gains by the more unscrupulous actors in the international system. This is not however an inevitable process.

Apart from the economic disadvantages under which the Swazi political system must labour, Swaziland's capacity to resist external political influences i.e. her political permeability, is also a product of her geographic and social situation. From a geographic perspective, Swaziland is - as has been recurrently emphasised - placed in a position which seriously detracts from the range of options available to her policy-makers. The Swazi state is a land-locked state whose pattern of physical communications is dominated by two neighbours i.e. the Republic of South Africa and Mozambique, both of whom have, up to the present instance, articulated a set of political values which are sharply different from those internalised within the Swazi policy-making process itself. In many ways therefore, the restrictions placed on Swazi policy by geographic circumstance are far more acute than those
confronting developing states which have relatively independent means of communication, and politically similar immediate neighbours. In geo-political terms therefore, Swaziland’s position is seriously prejudiced.

Strategically-based political restrictions are however to some degree offset by the relative cohesion of Swazi society, which seriously limits the maneuverability of exogenous influences within the internal Swazi system. It must be emphasised once again, that the pattern of ethnic, cultural and race-based group competition so prominent in most developing states of the international community, is not paralleled in the Swazi case, and that with the exception of a small foreign Black community, and a European element sentimentally linked to actors outside of Swaziland, Swazi society is considerably less of a differentiated entity than is commonly experienced in the developed world. It must be emphasised, that the loyalty of the European community to the institutions of Swazi statehood is not in the opinion of some elements of the Swazi leadership, beyond doubt, and sentiments of this nature have tended to be aggravated by the economic predominance of the European community which allows it to exert a potential political influence, albeit in an informal manner. And insofar as these perceptions are incorporated into the policy-making process, measures designed to reduce the linkages between internal and external European elements are a natural result. In general however, issues related to European loyalties have seldom been infused into policy-making actions, governmental attitudes on these issues remain obscure, vague and devoid of concrete form, and, as a result, the pattern of intra-societal group competition which provides unique opportunities for political manipulation by external elements, is largely lacking.

In terms of permeability therefore, the relationship between Swaziland and the developed world as a whole, is again one which embodies both elements
of dissimilarity and similarity. Swaziland is similar to other developing states by virtue of her economic vulnerability and dependence on foreign economic resources: and, as in the case of practically all other developing states, the perception of this fact on the part of political leadership leads to the articulation and implementation of a category of policies specifically designed to reduce the political impact of foreign participation in the national economy. As with all developing states moreover, the Swazi system does not contain a level of technological capacity adequate to offset the effects of strategic disadvantage, and, as in the case of some developing states, lack of access to maritime outlets except via the territory of adjacent states, places restrictions on the conditions of freedom under which Swazi foreign policy is made. It is this that underpins a set of policies which are specifically designed to counteract or negate the politically limiting effects of geographic location. Finally, Swaziland is dissimilar to other developing states by virtue of her level of social integration, and it is precisely because of the compact nature of Swazi society, that policies designed to fundamentally and drastically sever linkages between internally and externally-located identity groups, are not, with a few minor exceptions, readily evident. It is thus essentially economic and geographic factors which underpin the concern of Swazi policy-makers with the permeable nature of the Swazi state.

It is however, of major importance to emphasize: that policies geared towards the affirmation of autonomy, are not only of an essentially negative character, and are not only concerned with consolidating the political boundaries of the state. On the contrary in the case of Swaziland as in other developing states, the passive policies related to permeability-reduction are complemented by a more activist category of policies specifically oriented to not only maintaining, but additionally
extending Swaziland's political legitimacy, credibility and participation in the international system. In effective practice, in Swaziland as in other developing states, individual impotency tends to be compensated for by a strong emphasis on the technique of multilateralised action. In common with the developing states as a whole, Swazi policy-makers have come to the recognition that association with racially, politically, and culturally-similar actors in the international system, can provide for a set of leverages of an international political nature, which would, under other circumstances, be denied to the Swazi state. It is this that underpins Swaziland's association with the political culture of the Third World states, and which causes the political values, sentiments and concerns of the Third World states to be defined as criteria for Swazi foreign policy. This is not to suggest that Swaziland seeks to broaden her international political contacts with the non-White and non-Western developing states of the international community at the expense of contacts of a similar nature with the industrialised, White, Western world. Nor is it to suggest that the indigenous values of Swazi foreign policy i.e. those articulated by policy-makers in response to the local social realities confronting Swaziland, are subordinated to Third World values and political demands. On the contrary the economic developmental pressures confronting Swaziland strongly suggest both economic and political contacts with as many international actors as possible, whilst in the calculations of Swazi policy-makers, national interests of a parochial nature can never be entirely sacrificed to those demands generated by Swaziland's international affiliates and allies. Rather it is to suggest that the positive dimensions of the affirmation of political autonomy, involve policies which place a special emphasis on the cultivation of Third World relationships and associations. It is this situation, which reflects the set of political, economic and cultural commonalities between the developing states, which gives rise to the sensitivity displayed by Swazi policy-makers to the need to support and promote the political values of
the Third World culture, on both a regional and universal basis.

C. Politico-Economic Conflict and Choice in Swazi Foreign Policy

(a) Conflicting Priorities as a Feature of Swazi Foreign Policy

It seems relatively clear that, in these terms, Swazi foreign policy is geared to the realisation of both specific political and economic ends, related to the affirmation of an independent political existence, and the promotion of domestic economic modernisation respectively. In practice, this situation tends to lead to an element of contradiction in Swazi foreign policy. It should be borne in mind that, in principle, policies concerned with political autonomy of the developing state, and those concerned with its economic modernisation cannot be reconciled with one another: insofar as the former emphasises reduction of the permeability of the system, it contains and exclusive dimension which cannot be readily and positively related to the value of domestic economic modernisation with its emphasis on the importation of foreign economic resources - and hence political influences. This is no less true in the Swazi case. As in other developing states moreover, foreign policy in Swaziland is conducted in an environment of limited human, material and time resources. The number of skilled individuals who can be used in the foreign policy task is limited, and the quantity of officials who are allocated a role in this endeavour vis-a-vis the perceivedly more immediate enterprise of domestic policy administration, is still relatively small. The limited financial resources of Swaziland also means that the number of officials who can be employed to direct foreign policy activity on a full-time basis is small, and it is upon this limited collection of bureaucrats, politicians and diplomats that the vastly complicated exigencies of foreign policy administration devolves.

Under these circumstances, the articulation and application of a
maximally effective and productive foreign policy requires that the limited resources which can be employed to back Swaziland's foreign policy, and which can be integrated into the foreign policy system, must be distributed in such a manner as to, objectively or seemingly guarantee the largest possible returns. This in turn requires that in considering the objectives to be realised through foreign policy action, Swaziland's policy-makers act to determine the value, importance or priority of certain discrete objectives vis-a-vis others, and conduct foreign policy upon this basis. In Swaziland as in other developing states, the response to a situation of broad political and economic foreign policy objectives under conditions of scarce available resources, is discrimination in favour of certain foreign policy goals at the expense of others. In Swaziland's foreign policy moreover, there exists, as in other developing states, a basic contradiction between such foreign policy objectives as are derived from the 'internal' demands of the nation-building task, and those as are derived from the 'external' nation-building task respectively. In Swaziland, no less than in other developing systems the promotion of domestic legitimacy through the infusion of foreign economic resources in the interests of rapid socio-economic growth, contrasts sharply with the demands of political consolidation with their emphasis on reducing the penetrability of the state in a manner which perceivedly allows it a greater degree of independent political action. Thus the economic demands of development contradict such political demands as are associated with the value of political freedom, sovereignty and self-determination.

In the Swaziland case moreover, this dichotomy is complicated by Swaziland's concurrent role as a regional actor and as a participant in the wider international system of which Swaziland is equally a part. In general the concern with rapid socio-economic modernisation conditions Swaziland's foreign policy-makers to view the promotion of regional economic co-operation.
as an important value underlying foreign policy action. And given the regional economic hegemony of the Republic of South Africa, this necessitates the maintenance, if not expansion, of contacts of both an economic and political nature with the South African state. Swaziland's international political credibility however demands that Swaziland function in as independent a manner as possible, and particularly as independently as possible from South Africa which has traditionally been regarded as the political director of both Swaziland's internal and external behaviour. The identity linkages between Swaziland's policy-makers and those states which in aggregation compose the Third World group, has also served to socialise Swaziland's political value system into that of this wider international group, and given the profound distinctions between this political culture and that of South Africa itself, further stringent pressures are placed on Swazi foreign policy to adopt an anti-conformist stance vis-a-vis the South African system. The political demands on Swaziland's foreign policy thus originate from the wide international arena, whilst the economic demands are to a considerable degree the product of Swaziland's role within the South African region. In practice these factors cross-cut the political independence/economic development dichotomy, and make the definition of priorities in Swazi foreign policy a continual and vitally important task.

The saliency of these factors is expressed in current terms in a number of issue-areas in Swazi foreign policy, all of which express the Swazi-South African relationship in terms of the conflicting relationship between the demands of political independence and those of economic development.

At the lowest level, there is the issue of South African technical assistance to Swaziland. In a positive sense, South Africa's involvement
in development in the same region allows it to constitute a particularly relevant source of information for the Swaziland development programme, whilst the fact that South African machinery and plant can be obtained considerably more cheaply from South Africa than from alternative overseas sources, is also deeply appreciated in Swazi policy-making circles. In the case of the direct involvement of South African personnel in Swazi development however, the matter is somewhat problematic and tends to touch directly on the political vis-a-vis economic sentiments of the Swazi policy-making elite. In current terms there is a profound reluctance to accept the operations of South African personnel in Swaziland itself, except in circumstances of dire need, and where alternative sources of aid are unavailable. It is interesting to note for example, that notwithstanding the 1969 Swazi-South African agreement providing for the secondment of South Africans to the Swazi public service, no South African was to be employed in this capacity until 1971, and then only when the Department of Customs and Excise urgently required a small number of short-term personnel to meet the administrative demands of the renegotiated 1969 Customs Union Agreement. This is in fact the sole occasion upon which the 1969 technical assistance agreement has been operationalised. Insofar as the training of Swazi technicians is concerned, the treatment accorded to persons of colour in South Africa has been sufficient to direct the flow of Swazi technicians to overseas institutions where racial discrimination is less likely to be encountered. It must be emphasised that both the technical underdevelopment of the Swazi system and the role which South African assistance can play in this area, seems beyond doubt. In current terms, it seems equally beyond doubt that Swazi policy-makers are confronted with the choice of rationalising economic development, insofar as human skills are required, and accepting the offers of a donor state, whose activities are in many ways seen to be inimical
to the sovereign and independent status of Swaziland.

This raises a second and considerably more important issue-area of the South African-Swazi relationship which expresses the political-economic independence-development dichotomy. This refers to the Customs Union upon which so much of the economic development depends. The fact of the matter is, that notwithstanding the considerable economic benefits to be derived from participation in this arrangement, there exists in Swaziland policy-making perceptions today, a distinct awareness of certain negative factors in this institution, which do, or seem to, impinge upon the independent and sovereign status of the Swazi state.

The first of these factors refers to the decision-making processes of the Union, particularly the role of Swaziland (and of the two other participants) in the making and taking of institutional choices. In practice, the distribution of decision-making power has been a perennial problem in the history of the customs union arrangement. Indeed, prior to 1969 it was South Africa alone which was responsible for the taking of the Union's decision. Constitutionally, it was South Africa which was vested with control of payments from the customs union pool: similarly no provision was made for joint consultation between states. In practical terms, whilst the external customs tariff could not be altered by legislation enacted by any member state, it was South Africa alone which during the period 1910-69 made such alterations, and did so in a manner often insensitive and unrelated to the economic interests of her smaller partners. These circumstances were to condition the demand for joint participation in decision-making: the demand for a renegotiated agreement in 1969 was in fact to be occasioned by just such demands, the immediate issue being the unilateral decision on the part of South Africa to raise sales taxes in the union in a manner which would have negative effects on the Swazi tax structure.
The renegotiated agreement makes provision for quarterly meetings of the governing commission of the Union, consultation with regard to the conclusion of trade agreements with outside states, and restrictions on South Africa's capacity to introduce amendments to duty rates in the absence of adequate notice and consultation. As such, the renegotiated agreement goes far to alleviate the demands of the minor partners for an equal decision-making role. In practice however, whilst Swazi authorities concede that the new constitutionally-sanctioned opportunities for joint consultation represent an improvement over the position prior to 1969, it is also pointed out that the mere existence of a consultative framework does not automatically in itself increase the decision-making role which Swaziland and her two minor partners can play. It is strongly felt that union decisions still do not adequately reflect a mutual exchange of opinions and a mutual concern with economic interests, and that until such a time as decision-making in the customs union reflects a dialogue between stages who accord each other an equal, independent and sovereign status, joint participation in any meaningful and democratic sense cannot be taken to exist. It is pointed out that on many occasions Swaziland and her minor partners are summoned to meetings merely to be informed of South African decisions and that such treatment is not in accord with that customarily prevailing in diplomatic contacts between equal states. The pattern of negotiations within the customs union is therefore seen as not only disadvantageous to Swaziland's economic interests, but as deleterious to her sovereign and independent status as well.

A second issue within the customs union framework which is seen to impinge on Swaziland's political interests, relates to the question of the industrialisation of the territory. Here again one is dealing with a set of problems which are historically-rooted, and whose legacy continues to impinge
Considerable debate exists as to the precise influence of the South African economy on past attempts at industrialisation in the former High Commission Territories. There seems little doubt however, that to one degree or another, South African actions in the period 1910-69 have been inimical to the industrialisation of the minority areas. During this period for example, the 'free interchange of goods' within the Union was largely a euphemism, and taken in conjunction with the natural disadvantages of the small territory's economies, this was to have an extremely depressing effect. During this period South Africa created tariff barriers for the protection of domestic nascent industries, whilst refusing similar protective devices to the High Commission Territories. The 1969 agreement, with its provisions allowing these states to impose duties to protect new industries, and to specify major industries for 'margins of protection', is a direct response to this situation, and has contributed in some degree to its alleviation.

The renegotiated agreement has not however removed all the problems, and a number of outstanding issues continue to remain. In Swaziland these tend to centre, somewhat ironically, not so much on the matter of inadequate protection for the establishment of new industries, but rather on the perceived refusal of traditionally protected South African industry to accept competition from those industrial ventures which have been established in Swaziland, and which can, or will in the near future, productively compete with older and more established South African enterprises. In justifying this point, Swaziland's policy-makers refer to the conflict which has surrounded the decision to establish a local fertiliser industry catering to both a regional and domestic market: the resistance on the part of the South African Board of Trade and Industries to this venture, and the fact that it has contemplated blocking actions which may not be constitutionally
sanctioned by the customs union agreement, have further served to reinforce the Swazi view that South Africa is concerned with maintaining Swaziland in some sort of position of industrial backwardness and decay. The opposition of certain South African industrialists to the proposed electronics assembly plant, and to the Mobamech tractor venture, have further reinforced this syndrome.

From the South African point of view it can validly be argued on economic grounds that industrialisation of the customs union area can best be promoted through the concentration of resources in specific areas where facilities already exist, and that as such the establishment of certain industrial ventures in Swaziland itself cannot be rationalised insofar as the broader economic interests of the region are concerned. It can also be argued that problems regarding the location of industries on a regional basis are natural to relationships between developing and developed economies, and have virtually nothing to do with inter-territorial politics whatsoever. These are however not the dominant considerations as far as Swaziland is concerned. The position of Swazi policy-makers is that the economic and political connotations of the issue are inextricably entwined. It is argued, more explicitly, that whether or not industrial ventures are to be established and operated within Swaziland's territorial boundaries is a matter to be decided upon by Swaziland's governmental authorities alone. Decisions of this nature, it is emphasised, lie within the prerogative of independent government, and to the degree that South African interests or authorities seek to effect the content of these decisions, they prescribe or limit the sovereign status which Swaziland enjoys. In these terms therefore, issues relating to the industrialisation of Swaziland within the customs framework, are a further instance of the independence-development dichotomy in Swazi-South African relations.
Turning from the customs union to the monetary union which currently exists between South Africa and the three former High Commission Territories, one is again confronted by a delicate balance between economic benefit and perceived political disadvantage. Firstly and foremostly, Swaziland's policy-makers are concerned with current arrangements in terms of which they receive no revenue from investments backing the Rand currency in circulation, whilst restrictions limiting the access of the Swazi economy to capital markets in South Africa are also seen as indicators of an unequal arrangement. Another point of contention concerns currency readjustments, the determination of foreign exchange rates and the authorisation of foreign exchange transactions: the unilateral decision by South Africa to devalue the Rand in 1970 generated steep price increases in Swaziland (and Lesotho and Botswana), and this has served to stimulate the view that 'foreign exchange and exchange rate policies are determined in the light of conditions facing the Republic of South Africa, and may conflict with the interests of Swaziland'. It must be emphasised that such unilateral actions on South Africa's part have not always proved disadvantageous to the Swaziland economy, (the 1970 devaluation, for example, gave Swaziland's exports a welcome boost): nor should it be thought that in terms of the monetary union structure Swaziland cannot exercise some independent control. Thus in the past Swaziland's credit policies have not always paralleled those employed in South Africa. Swaziland's policy-makers do however, feel that participation in the Rand currency area places serious limitations on their independent action: it is pointed out that in the absence of a national central bank and with Swaziland's gold and foreign exchange reserves held by the Reserve Bank, this could not be otherwise.

The limiting effects of the monetary union have reflected themselves in a number of ways on recent occasions. Most importantly, Swazi policy - as
that of Lesotho and Botswana—has become increasingly concerned with promoting increased participation in the deliberations and decision-making operations of the South African Reserve Bank. The pattern of ad hoc consultation regarding monetary matters is neither regarded as effective nor in accord with Swaziland's status as a sovereign member of an international inter-state economic arrangement, and the nature of dialogue in these meetings is seen as analogous to that in the customs union, where mutual interaction and concern is sacrificed to South African dominance. Swazi policy-makers feel concerned that such meetings are usually summoned only for the purpose of acquainting the minor partners in the monetary arrangement with decisions which South Africa has already taken, and complaints have been raised that Swazi objections have often been simply and blatantly ignored.31/

In the light of these circumstances, Swazi policy has become geared to the creation of formal joint-participatory decision-making facilities within the monetary union. It has come to be felt that only such institutions are consonant with the sovereign status of Swaziland in the monetary union, and that only through such institutions can 'the legitimate interests of all countries (be) taken fully into account in the management of the common currency area'.32/ It is on this basis too that Swazi officials have consulted with officials of the IMF regarding the costs and benefits of continued participation in the monetary area, and have liaised with their counterparts in Botswana and Lesotho on similar matters.33/ As yet Swaziland's policy-makers have not yet reached the point where they believe the disadvantages of membership of the currency area outweigh the gains to be derived from participation:34/ the belief however is strongly prevalent that continued participation under existing arrangements is contradictory to the urge towards independence and maximum self-control.35/
The discontinuities generated by the concurrent commitment to the goals of economic development and political independence are finally reflected in a series of issues derived from Swaziland's involvement with the institutions of international organisation at the regional, continental, and universal levels.

Firstly, whilst Swaziland's policy-makers do not at this stage seriously contemplate resignation from the Southern African Customs Union and monetary union despite their criticism of these organisations, the desire to bring about alterations within the context of existing membership is considerably less evident in Swazi attitudes to a number of other South African regional organisations which fulfill less vital and less importantly beneficial functions. In practice, the political dispositions of the policymakers of all of the three former High Commission Territories, have precipitated a distinct concern with seeking membership of alternative international institutions, apart from South African dominance and control. In current terms these sentiments have not been substantially translated into operational realities, the one most notable exception being the decision on the part of the BLS states to leave the International Red Locust Control Service, in December 1970, for a new organisation which excludes South African, Rhodesian and Portuguese participation.

The policy-makers of Swaziland have however seen it to be in their interest, both economically and politically, to balance their economic dependence on South Africa by attaining membership in other regional economic organisations whose activities seem to offer distinct benefits insofar as Swaziland is concerned. In particular, Swaziland has sought membership of the European Common Market, which it sees as an especially important element in its attempts to diversify its economic relationships. The
reaction of the EEC is of special interest in that it has been made clear that until such time as Swaziland can make suitable arrangements to reconcile its current membership of the South African Customs Union with that of the EEC, Swaziland's application for associate membership will be confronted with a number of major difficulties. The announcement by the chairman of the representatives committee, in January 1971 that the BLS states could accede to the Common Market as associate members with the renewal of the Yaounde Convention in 1975, provided that they agree to certain formulae similar to those endorsed by other associated African states, is an important breakthrough. In practice however, Swaziland is still confronted with the task of reconciling its economic interests and commitments on a regional basis with those generated by the European organisation. The fact that South Africa has as yet done little to facilitate the dilemma in which Swaziland finds itself placed has done little to convince Swazi authorities that South Africa has little interest in the matter other than to maintain a sense of Swazi economic dependence on South African dominated regional arrangements. This in turn has contributed to the politicisation of the issue, in terms of which it is believed that South Africa is consciously concerned with preventing Swaziland from exercising her right as a sovereign and independent state to select her international economic partners in a manner in which she sees fit, and independently of external considerations and pressures. The establishment of links with the EEC has thus rapidly come to be seen as an issue in that category of issues where the political independence of Swaziland must be balanced on her economic relationship with South Africa, and insofar as South Africa fails to recognise, and indeed even encourage Swazi participation in the EEC, Swazi policy-makers have come to associate the South African position as a direct intrusion on the prerogative of national independence with which the Swazi state is imbued.
The foreign policy discontinuities generated by the concurrent concern with political independence and economic self-interest are also manifest by the ambivalent role of Swaziland in the political activities of such international organisations as the OAU and the UN, where pressures of Swaziland's foreign policy-makers to fulfill the demands of political independence and involvement with the concerns of the Third World group are most acute. In the OAU in particular, Swaziland has been forced to tread a narrow path and this can be seen, for example, in Swazi actions at the June 1971 meeting of the OAU at Addis Ababa where Swaziland voted with the minority against anti-dialogue resolutions vis-a-vis South Africa in plenary sessions but was subsequently to abstain at the summit.

In the United Nations, where international pressures driving Swaziland to dissociate itself from the regional political environment conflict directly with Swaziland's economic stake in that context, the situation is similar, and has also served to introduce an element of inconsistency into Swaziland's organisational participation. On a number of occasions Swaziland has clearly sided with those United Nations forces concerned with short-term social and political change in South Africa, South West Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories. On a number of other occasions however, Swaziland has not seen it to be in her interest to support resolutions of this nature, and has either voted against measures of this nature, or, more commonly abstained herself from voting proceedings. During 1971 for example, Swaziland either absented herself or abstained from voting on issues relating to South African credentials at the UN, the establishment of a UN Trust Fund for South Africa, the arms embargo on South Africa, and the direction of international trade union activities against apartheid. During 1972 moreover, Swaziland tended to adopt a very low profile on South African
questions in general;42/ with regard to the South West African issue, Swaziland merely called for the continuation of UN-South African negotiations, whilst even though it condemned the actions of the Rhodesian White minority government, and the Portuguese role in Angola and Mozambique, it absented itself from directly voting on the major Rhodesian resolutions, i.e. Resolutions 2945 and 2946. Within the UN, Swaziland has been careful to emphasise that in no way does it support the current racial situation in Southern Africa, and that it would like to see, by some means and at some time, substantial changes. Swaziland has however also been careful to emphasise that it is engaged in a necessary working relationship with Lisbon and Pretoria, and that the economic and geographic realities of the Southern African system do not allow it to endorse the more radical measures directed against the South African and Portuguese regimes. Political sentiment thus tends to directly conflict with material calculations, and it is this which has caused Swaziland, in the United Nations, to recurrently emphasise the force of persuasion.

(b) Political Competition, Economic Development and Foreign Policy Choice

Under these circumstances, contradiction within a politico-economic nexus, is not alien to Swazi foreign policy: policy-makers must therefore constantly trade-off or revalue the values associated with political autonomy to those linked to domestic economic development and modernisation, and the manner in which they do so determines the degree to which Swazi foreign policy emerges as a relatively coherent and effectively operational entity. In terms of our initial model this process, which reflects the dynamics of foreign policy-choice and priority-allocation, is directly affected by the total political and economic domestic context within which Swazi foreign policy-makers operate. Swaziland's foreign policy preferences, distributed along a politico-economic
spectrum, are thus an outgrowth of domestic political and economic conditions.

In the above sections it has been clearly suggested that political competition within Swaziland itself, is not of a particularly intensive nature. In the post-independence period the minority European community, which played a vital political role during the early sixties, has, to all intents and purposes, surrendered this position in favour of a low-key political profile bolstered by economic weight. At the level of formal political participation therefore, the involvement of the European element in Swazi politics has been significantly reduced. This is not however a particularly unusual situation in the post-independence politics of newly-independent states, where the demise of the colonial system has led to profound redistributions of political power amongst elements indigenous to the local colonial communities. What is perhaps unusual about the case of Swaziland however, is that in contrast to most other developing states, the actor which has emerged as being of primary political importance in the post-colonial period, has not been the modern African nationalist movement, but rather the tribal or traditional structures and institutions. To all intents and purposes the latter have continued, to the present day, to remain the focus of mass identifications and loyalties, and in combination with the past incapacity of the modernist Black movements to utilise contemporarily relevant political techniques for the mobilisation of power, large segments of the more sophisticated political elements in the system have continued to perceive the traditional institutions as the only form of viable political organisation in Swaziland, and to channel their allegiances in this direction. In effective practice, the seemingly better adaptability of Swazi traditional institutions to the demands of modern political competition, and the failure of the modernist Swazi African nationalist opposition to manipulate symbols and engage in actions to undercut tribal
loyalties, have served to depress political competition in the Swazi system, and to lead to a virtually unprecedented situation for the developing state, where the most conservative elements within the state have managed not only to capture, but to overwhelmingly dominate, the main instruments of national political power.

In combination with these political features is the economic fact that Swaziland is a developing system, which through experiencing a relatively high rate of economic growth has not yet attained a position of economic self-sufficiency nor of egalitarian economic reward-distribution. As all developing economies, the Swaziland economy is a dual economy characterised by small areas of advanced wealth and technology surrounded by primitive peasant society based on subsistence agricultural standards. This is reflected demographically and geographically, by the fact that it is largely the minority European population which has benefitted from recent economic development growth, and that with the exception of certain specific and minor areas of Swaziland, the territory as a whole has remained relatively untouched by the forces of economic modernisation. It has, for example been estimated that in current terms 88 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product accrues either to the urban area or to the European population, and that only 24 per cent of Swaziland's population and 15 per cent of its total territorial area has appreciably gained from economic development in recent years. Swaziland's economy is, in comparison with the economies of most developing states, a generally prosperous one, and this has tended to lead some less perspicacious observers to conclude that, within the broad context of Third World economic development, Swaziland is somewhat an aberrant case, whose economic present and future is considerably brighter than most. A more penetrating look however, suggests that this is not entirely the case: indicators of a macro nature relating to Swazi production and trade point undeniably to progress and development,
yet micro-indicators focussed at less than the general level clearly indicate that the material position of the average Swazi has not substantially improved in recent years, and that in many cases, urbanisation, limited labour opportunities and population growth has created an economic situation where the lot of many Swazi has in fact worsened. In many ways the Swazi case underlines the need to clearly distinguish between the statistical economic growth of developing societies as a whole, and the substantive benefits of economic growth as they are expressed at the grass-roots level. It is this distinction that underwrites the concern among Swazi leaders with the fact that the benefits of economic development be 'more evenly spread', and that, economic development notwithstanding, more emphasis be placed on 'a balanced and equitable distribution of development'.

In these terms Swaziland emerges, in terms of our initial model, as a member of the 'Low Intensity Political Competition/Low Economic Returns' category. In terms of our initial statement moreover, this suggests that in the foreign policy value-confrontation between political autonomy and domestic economic development, issues related to the latter will tend to be emphasised and given priority by Swazi policy-makers in general. In these terms, in a wider sense, the internal demands of nation-building with their emphasis on the promotion of domestic socio-economic development, will tend to be given precedence by the policy-maker, over the political values associated with the external nation-building task, geared as it is to internationally legitimising the state, consolidating its political independence through the reduction of its permeability, and extending its influence into the international system. It must be stressed that this is not to suggest that the foreign policy of Swaziland is entirely dominated by economic considerations, and that the only criteria for foreign policy-making are those related to internal socio-economic development. Were this
the case, the making and application of foreign policy would constitute a far more simple task. This would however suggest a serious decline in the ability of Swaziland to maintain itself as a politically independent actor in the international system, and it is precisely as a result of this factor, and of its realisation by a leadership which is motivated by political as well as economic concerns, domestically and internationally-rooted, that Swaziland, as any other state, is involved with politics as well as economic issues, and with the political dimensions of foreign policy action. What is rather suggested here, is that choice is an inexorable element of the foreign policy-making process, that choices between economic and political values which impinge on domestic development and international autonomy are integral features of the policy-making processes of the developing state, and that within this framework, when confronted with situations which require a definition or allocation of preferences, the Swazi policy-maker will be conditioned to favour the economic values of domestic modernisation by the character of local political and economic conditions.

D. Conclusion: The Future of Swaziland's Foreign Policy?

It is however, of considerable importance to emphasise that the process of foreign policy choice and priority-allocation, within the political-economic nexus described above, is a highly dynamic one, whose shifts reflect the element of alteration which is constantly present in all societies, and particularly in developing societies, where the pattern of political and economic structures and institutions are relatively unconsolidated or set. This is no less true with regard to Swaziland, which although a fossilised and obscure developing polity in some respects, is nonetheless a polity which is inextricably involved in the process of both economic and political modernisation. Swaziland is, as other developing societies, in a process of
social change: the momentum which is created in this regard must fundamentally alter the context within which the policy-making process operates, and, under these circumstances, it would not seem inappropriate, in conclusion, to consider in terms of our model, some factors which it seems, will influence the direction of Swazi foreign policy in the future.

Two of these seem to be of particular importance. In the first place, although on the basis of current developments it seems unlikely that Swaziland will experience an economic growth rate which will bring her to the point of self-sufficiency in the indefinite future, there is good reason to expect that her strategic position will be fundamentally altered within the next few years. More explicitly, the establishment of an independent Black government in Mozambique will fundamentally alter the political and geographic situation with which Swaziland policy-makers are confronted: it will allow Swaziland access to a maritime outlet which is controlled by a political regime whose values and political predispositions are more closely akin to those internalised within Swaziland itself, and it will substantially reduce Swaziland's dependence on the communications system of the Republic of South Africa. As such, the impact of geographic factors upon Swaziland's political actions will be significantly blunted, and the system's permeability as a result of strategic circumstance will be reduced. It must however be emphasised that an independent Frelimo-dominated government in Mozambique is not without certain economic and political disadvantages for Swaziland. Economically, the fluid and effective transportation of goods and material into Swaziland, is directly dependent on the capacity of Frelimo to assume and maintain political control in the new Mozambique state, and in practice the civil strife which has occurred in Mozambique during the transitional period to political independence, has caused severe dislocation in the importation of goods,
destined for Swaziland, from Lourenco Marques. Politically, to the degree that the new independent government in Mozambique lends itself to support of the guerilla struggle in South Africa, increased pressures will be placed on Swaziland by very virtue of its strategic position, to identify itself with the 'liberation'movements'more strongly than it has done in the past: This could well generate severe economic and political repercussions, especially if a strong reaction is experienced on the part of the Republic of South Africa itself. The future political independence of Mozambique insofar as it touches upon the strategic and political position of Swaziland is by no means clear, and the effects, at this point in time, are still tinged with an element of ambiguity which in the dynamic prevailing situation, does not lend itself to precise analysis. What is clear however, is that, positively or negatively, alteration in the political status of Mozambique will have profound effects on Swaziland's international position, will fundamentally alter the regional political and economic configuration with which Swaziland's policy-makers are confronted, and, in so doing, bring about basic changes in the objectives, strategies and preferences of Swazi foreign policy.

Apart from these factors which will affect that strategically-induced permeability of the Swaziland system, Swaziland's future foreign policy behaviour is also likely to be affected by internal political developments, particularly in the character of political competition within the system. It has, for example, been noted that at present Swaziland constitutes a political system where the continued resilience of the tribal system has operated to depress the level of political opposition which can be offered by the more modern African nationalist parties of Swaziland. Whether or not this situation will continue to prevail into the short-term future is open to debate, and, it would seem, depends on two factors. It is in the first place of
importance to note that the recent suspension of the Swaziland Constitution (in April 1973) has led to Swaziland becoming, what is to all intents and purposes, an absolute monarchy, and that in current terms, the role played by the oppositional elements in Swazi politics, (particularly the NNLC) has been to a large degree eradicated: the level of political competition is today even lower than has been the case in the past. On the basis of past experience moreover, there is every reason to believe that the proposals to be announced by the Royal Commission, which is currently involved in drafting a new constitution, will suggest that the highly centralised monarchico-tribal system which exists at present, be maintained. In fact, even the more modern elements of Swaziland's government have reiterated this position: they have, in the post-independence period, supported a number of measures designed to consolidate the position of the governing party as the overwhelmingly predominant element in the system. These measures would include amendments introduced into the Standing Orders of the House of Assembly which effectively muzzle opposition speakers, the Immigration (Amendment) Bill, and, just prior to April 1973, the Constitution Amendment Bill which would have increased the number of royal nominees in Parliament. A number of traditional-minded Swazi have indeed expressed admiration for the attitude towards political opposition on the part of the South African government, and this would further seem to indicate the likely emphasis on centralisation in the new future constitution. One should also bear in mind the terms of reference of the current constitutional commission, which is specifically directed to define a political structure expressing, what is vaguely defined as 'the Swazi national character', i.e. political domination by the King: It is also implied that 'divisive and destructive' oppositional activity should not be part of the new order, that the political role of
the trade union movement will be 're-examined', and that the new constitution must limit the capacity of the judiciary to overrule the government at the appeal level.49/

In evaluating the future level of political competition in Swaziland, a second fact should however be borne in mind; namely, that the level of political competition within a system cannot be inferred simply from the opportunities provided for political opposition to express itself through a constitutional framework. On the contrary, political processes largely transcend formal institutional structures, and in many ways operate independently of legally sanctioned patterns of government organisation. In the case of Swaziland, this suggests that certain broad socio-political forces may well operate to generate new political patterns notwithstanding the restrictive character of the proposed new constitution. In the more politically sophisticated urban and industrial areas for example, there is some evidence to suggest that support for the modernist and nationalist counter-elites is on the incline, and that the forces of political modernisation and anti-tribalism are already making significant inroads amongst the non-Swazi Black population, the industrial workers, and increasing numbers of young and more educated detribalised Swazi who cannot readily be absorbed into the still-constricted developing economy.50/ What is perhaps of even more significance is that similar forces tend to operate within the Imbokodvo National Party, i.e. within the bastion of Swazi tradition, itself. The Imbokodvo is, as has been noted, a relatively cohesive organisation where the combination of tribal loyalties, efficient organisation and centralised structure depress the possibilities for intra-party conflict and competition. In current terms however, these factors have not in themselves proved sufficient to completely preclude an element of intra-party competition, which derived
from several sources, augurs of considerable importance for the political development of Swaziland in the future.

In the first place, an element of intra-party stress is derived from the highly personalised charismatic character of leadership, which, in the case of the INM, as in the case of other African political parties, seriously limits possibilities for the fluid transfer of leadership, under conditions where such proves necessary. There seems little doubt that those factors which make for the intra-party predominance of the King will continue to allow the latter to remain at the heart, and in control of the party system so long as he is mentally and physically able. It should nonetheless be borne in mind that the advanced age of Sobhuza places severe limitations on his ability to continue to function in an integrating capacity into the long-term future, and, in practice, the effects of this are already being felt in the internal dynamics of the party, which are increasingly becoming characterised by a jockeying of personalities and groupings intent upon establishing themselves in a position whereby, in the event of the death of the King, positions of leadership can be monopolised. The fact that the heir to the throne (who according to Swazi custom is only chosen with the actual death of the king) is unlikely to possess the political education and expertise of the present Ngwenyama, and, as a result will not be able to dominate Swazi political life to the extent that Sobhuza has done in the past further aggravates the position as numerous individuals and groups seek to consolidate or gain power at the expense of the next Ngwenyama. The dysfunctionalities precipitated by charismatic leadership seek thus to wreak effects in the INM no less than in analogous situations in African party politics.

The level of intra-party competition derived from the struggle for
future power tends to be further enhanced by the existence within the party of conflicting attitudes regarding the processes of modernisation, the role of the INM in these processes, and the form that the party should assume in their face. It is of importance to recognise that, common tribal identifications notwithstanding, social and economic modernisation in Swazi society has led to the emergence of elements within the Swazi system who perceive political modernisation - especially the political modernisation of the governing party, the INM - to be a vital and necessary concomitant to the patterns of development expressed throughout Swazi society as a whole. In practice, the INM is a broad-based party with an 'absorptive' character, and this has meant, that there exists within the INM today a growing number of 'modern' politically aware Swazis, who desire greater political participation, who resent the dominance of the INM by the traditional chiefs, and who as such constitute an important source of internal conflict within the party itself. What one sees developing within the INM reflects a pattern of intra-party competition experienced in a modernising context by a variety of African political parties as a whole. What one sees, is a growing sense of competition between an emerging group of bureaucrats, (concerned with the development of operationally-efficient mechanisms to meet the demands of socio-economic realities), and older tribal authorities with an emphasis on and orientation towards traditional procedures which have proved effective in the past. There exists in the INM today a growing breed of vigorous young politicians - such as Senator Polycarp Dlamini (Minister of Justice), Elias Dhladhla (Minister of State for Establishment and Training), Simon Nxumalo and Dr. Allen Nxumalo etc. - who are increasingly impatient with the Imbokodvo establishment as it currently exists, and who seek the rationalisation of the party, of its objectives and operating procedures, in the face of modernity. It is to be expected moreover, that the death of Sobhuza will radically
enhance these strains outgrown from the modernisation process; the new
Ngwenyama, inexperienced as he is, will be faced with an on-going political
system led by elites of experience and confidence, most of whom have been
involved in political manoeuvering for over a decade, and few of whom will
accept the dominance of the traditional institutions, and of the next
Ngwenyama, as they have done in the past.

This pattern of strain, is - though to a still limited degree - already
evident, as sentiments that the current nature of the INM is leading
Swaziland to a position of political immobility and cultural obscurantism,
become articulated, and as the gap between the more modern elements in the
party and the Throne backed by conservative rural support, become more
distinct. In practice divergencies of opinion have occurred in the realm
of two major issues. Firstly, antagonism have been generated within the
INM with regard to the question of the relationship between the maintenance
of traditional patterns of Swazi culture and the demands, and modernising
influence, of socio-economic development; thus, on the one hand, younger
members of the INM establishment who emphasise the primacy of development
(such as Mr. Simon Nxumalo) have come into direct conflict with more
traditional members of the Establishment (such as Prince Mfanasibili Dhlamini,
a nephew of the King), who have publicly expressed fears as to the long-
term effects on Swazi culture of accelerated development, and who have
pressed for a closer integration of the two variables with each other. 51/

Second of these issue-areas concerns the question of land reform, which
intimately related to the traditionalist-modernist debate within the INM,
by virtue of the terms of the Swazi Constitution giving full and sole authority
for the control of Swazi Nation land to the SNC. Traditionalist elements in
the SNC have strongly resisted suggestions that alterations in processes of
land be effected - and necessarily so since the current sole ability of the
chiefs to allot Swazi Nation land constitutes the basis of their political power - and this has necessarily created antagonisms between this group and more modernised elements within the party concerned with rational economic development.

What does this suggest insofar as the future of Swazi Foreign policy is concerned? Most bluntly, it suggests the possible demise in the face of modernisation of the political role of the traditionalist elements in Swazi policy-making, and the increased incorporation into the policy-making process of political values which are more closely related to the ideological categories currently articulated in the rest of Black Africa, and throughout the Third World as a whole. This does not imply an automatic transformation of Swazi foreign policy into a set of social actions whose major feature is a radical militancy, and whose major emphases are political, rather than economic, as in the past. It does however suggest that, in terms of our model, Swaziland may be moving towards the 'High Intensity Political Competition/Low Economic Returns' prototype, where the commitment to foreign policy values related to the issues of political autonomy rather than domestic economic development, is at once both more pronounced and evident. It is thus not inconceivable, that with an increased element of differentiation and conflict within the political system, with a greater balance between the political weight which can be exercised by traditional and modernist elements, the symbols of national political independence will become far more salient to the political process, and the capacity of policy-makers to articulate positions which tend to emphasise economic development, and the subsequent necessary involvement of foreign economic forces in the national economy, substantially undercut. The freedom which Swazi policy-makers currently enjoy in following a development-oriented policy may, under these circumstances,
become somewhat restricted, and the demands on government to justify this position in relation to political self-determination, increased.

In conclusion therefore, Swaziland is in many ways different from other developing societies. Swaziland is a state whose internal social composition and cohesion serves to enhance the range of options available to foreign policy-makers in the definition of objectives, the making of choices and the articulation of strategies for implementation in the international environment: it is however also a developing state whose political options are limited by a particularly acute set of geographic circumstances. In common with other developing states, Swaziland is dependent for its economic development on external initiatives and supports, it is, as a unit, devoid of stockpiles of national power which automatically legitimate its claims to international status, and it is a state whose racial characteristics, historical past and political affinities integrate its political leadership with the general culture prevalent in those states which are neither White, Western nor highly-industrialised in character. It is this that underpins Swazi foreign policy behaviour with its emphasis on the assertion of political autonomy and the modernisation of domestic society and economy. Internally, the rate of economic growth, and the relative absence of a credible political counter-elite which can effectively manipulate the symbols of national independence, allows Swazi policy-makers to emphasise the latter foreign policy values i.e. those of an economic nature, rather than those of the former. Swazi society is however, both in a state of modernisation and social change: it cannot therefore be assumed that the particular preferences of the current policy-making elite will remain constant into the indefinite future.
NOTES ON CHAPTER 5

1. See Chapter 3 above.
2. Fair, Murdoch and Jones, ibid.
3. Fair, Murdoch and Jones, ibid.
5. Friedmann, ibid.
6. Rostow, ibid.
7. See Chapter 3 above.
8. The Star, 7.1.74.
9. The Star, 19.3.73 and 10.5.73.
10. The Star, 19.3.73.
11. The Star, 17.11.72.
12. The Star, 17.11.72.
13. The Star, 17.11.72.
14. Times of Swaziland, 16.3.73.
15. Times of Swaziland, 16.3.73.
17. The Star, 7.1.74.
18. The Star, 7.1.74.
20. The Star, 7.1.74.
21. The Star, 7.1.74.
22. Rostow, ibid.
23. For a description of some of the political instruments which can be used by Swaziland to influence South Africa, see C. Potholm in Potholm and Dale, ibid.

27. For a description of South African resistance to this project, see Financial Mail.

28. It should also be noted that South Africa has not favoured the establishment of a television assembly plant in Swaziland: see Times of Swaziland, 9.2.73; The Star, 31.8.73, 23.9.73, 20.7.72; Financial Mail, 4.2.72; Financial Gazette, 21.4.72.


30. Sentiments of this nature were recently expressed at a joint currency conference held in Swaziland during March 1973 (Times of Swaziland, 25.3.73).


35. In 1974 moreover, a decision was taken to establish a local currency to be used in domestic transactions in parity with the Rand (Rand Daily Mail, 23.3.74).

36. Other issues which have brought about an element of conflict in South African-Swaziland relations include South African refusal to countenance the screening of the controversial film 'Last Tango in Paris' in Swaziland. (Rand Daily Mail, 26.7.73); and the question of compensation for the loss of territory occasioned by the construction of the Strijdom Dam on the Pongola River near the Swaziland border (Rand Daily Mail, 5.6.73).

37. See S. Nxumalo - 'Swaziland and Intra-African Trade' ibid.; and S. Nxumalo - 'International Trade and Investment ...', ibid.

38. This fact has been recognised in some South African business circles (The Star, 13.12.72).

39. The invidiousness of Swaziland's position between the OAU and South Africa is typified in the case of the recent decision by the OAU to support oil sanctions against South Africa: this has generated profound political and economic problems for all of the former High Commission Territories (See, for example, Rand Daily Mail, 19.11.73, and The Star, 18.12.73, 29.11.73 and 5.12.73).

41. D. Hirschmann, ibid.

42. D. Hirschmann, ibid.

43. Times of Swaziland 20.4.73. For background see The Star, 20.4.73 and 18.4.73.

44. See speech by Prime Minister in News From Swaziland, 25.3.72: The Star, 20.4.73, 14.4.73, 29.8.73: The Times of Swaziland, 14.10.60: the issue is also dealt with in the standard works on Swaziland's political history, i.e. Potholm, ibid., Stevens, ibid. and van Wyk, ibid.

45. The Parliamentarian, Parliamentary Reports (Swaziland), Vol. LIII, 1972, p.353.

46. The Star, 18.11.72.

47. The Star, 28.7.72 and 4.12.72.

48. Rand Daily Mail, 6.9.73.

49. The Star, 29.8.73 and 18.4.73.

50. See The Star, 29.8.73.

APPENDICES
APPENDIX I SWAZILAND’S TREATIES.

+ The Swaziland Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not have a Treaty Officer nor a fully up-dated Treaty Register: the following - which is transcribed directly from the existing Treaty Register - does not therefore represent a fully-complete list.

1) BILATERAL TREATIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Treaty/Agreement</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALBANIA</td>
<td>Extradition Treaty</td>
<td>1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARGENTINA</td>
<td>Extradition Treaty, Air Services Treaty</td>
<td>1889/1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Services Treaty</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal Proceedings Treaty, Exchange of Notes of Legal</td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proceedings Treaty</td>
<td>(Terminated 1971.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Services Treaty</td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consular Treaty</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>Extradition Treaty, Legal Proceedings Treaty,</td>
<td>1907/1911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supplementary Convention on Legal Proceedings,</td>
<td>1922/1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Services Treaty</td>
<td>1932/1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exchange of Notes on Air Services, Exchange of Notes on</td>
<td>1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Services Treaty</td>
<td>1953/1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Treaty on Civilian War Victims</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arrangements to Facilitate Travel</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consular Treaty</td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Receipt of Compensation for War Damages Treaty</td>
<td>1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOLIVIA</td>
<td>Extradition Treaty</td>
<td>1892/1911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAZIL</td>
<td>Commercial Relations Treaty</td>
<td>1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Services Treaty</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exchange of Notes on Air Services</td>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Agreement/Convention</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bulgaria</strong></td>
<td>Settlement of Financial Matters Agreement</td>
<td>1955 (Terminated 1970)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exchange or Notes on Financial Matters</td>
<td>1959 (Terminated 1970)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Burma</strong></td>
<td>Air Services Treaty</td>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exchange of Notes on Air Services</td>
<td>1953/1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chile</strong></td>
<td>Exchange of Notes on Air Services</td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extradition Treaty</td>
<td>1897/1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>China</strong></td>
<td>Customs Tariffs Treaty</td>
<td>1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Treaty on Extra-Territorial Rights</td>
<td>1943 (Terminated 1970)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Columbia</strong></td>
<td>Extradition Treaty</td>
<td>1888/1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Services Treaty</td>
<td>1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cuba</strong></td>
<td>Extradition Treaty</td>
<td>1904/1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Services Treaty</td>
<td>1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exchange of Notes on Air Services</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Czechoslovakia</strong></td>
<td>Extradition Treaty</td>
<td>1924 (Continued 1970)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal Proceedings Treaty</td>
<td>1927/1931 (Modified 1971)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supplementary Convention on Legal Proceedings</td>
<td>1937 (Modified 1971)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commercial and Navigation Treaty</td>
<td>1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exchange of Notes on Commerce and Navigation</td>
<td>1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Treaty on Mutual Upkeep of War Graves</td>
<td>1949 (Terminated 1970)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Services Treaty</td>
<td>1960 (Terminated 1971)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naturalisation and Compensation Treaty</td>
<td>1949 (Terminated 1970)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Denmark</strong></td>
<td>Extradition Treaty</td>
<td>1873/1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supplementary Convention on Extradition</td>
<td>1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal Proceedings Treaty</td>
<td>1932 (Modified 1971)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Visa Abolition Treaty</td>
<td>1947/1948 (Superseded 1969)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Services Treaty</td>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exchange of Notes on Air Services</td>
<td>1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consular Treaty</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dominican Republic</strong></td>
<td>Air Services Treaty</td>
<td>1951</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ECUADOR
Extradition Treaty 1880/1910

EGYPT
Exchange of Notes on Commerce 1930
War Graves Agreement 1952
Agreement on the Resumption of Diplomatic Relations and British Property in Egypt 1959 (Terminated 1970)
Exchange of Notes on British Property in Egypt 1962 (Terminated 1970)

EL SALVADOR
Extradition Treaty 1881/1909

ETHIOPIA
Air Services Treaty 1958

FINLAND
Extradition Treaty 1924
Legal Proceedings Treaty 1933/1935
Convention Regarding the Suppression of the Illicit Importation of Alcoholic Liquor into Finland 1933 (Terminated 1970)
Visa Abolition Treaty 1961 (Superseded 1970)
Air Services Treaty 1965 (Terminated 1971)

FRANCE
Extradition Treaty 1876/1910
Supplementary Convention on Extradition 1896/1908/1910
Legal Proceedings Treaty 1922/1932
Air Transport Treaty 1946
Consular Treaty 1951
War Graves Treaty 1951 (Terminated 1970)
Exchange of Notes on Air Services 1953
Exchange of Notes on War Damage Claims 1954 (Terminated 1970)
Abolition of Consular Fees on Bills of Health Agreement 1939

GERMANY
Extradition Treaty 1872/1911
Convention Reaplying for Extradition Treaty 1960
Legal Proceedings Treaty 1923/1930/1959
Monetary Agreement 1953
Air Services Treaty 1955
Consular Treaty 1956
Exchange of Notes on Air Services 1962
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Treaties and Agreements</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GREECE</strong></td>
<td>Extradition Treaty</td>
<td>1910/1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal Proceedings Treaty</td>
<td>1936/1939 (Modified 1970)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consular Treaty</td>
<td>1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Visa Abolition Treaty</td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agreement on the Recognition of Tonnage Measurement</td>
<td>1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Certificates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GUATEMALA</strong></td>
<td>Extradition Treaty</td>
<td>1885/1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Additional Protocol on Extradition</td>
<td>1914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HAITI</strong></td>
<td>Extradition Treaty</td>
<td>1874/1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HUNGARY</strong></td>
<td>Extradition Treaty</td>
<td>1873/1911 * (Continued 1971)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supplementary Declaration on Extradition</td>
<td>1901/1911 (Continued 1971)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supplementary Convention on Extradition</td>
<td>1936 (Continued 1971)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal Proceedings Treaty</td>
<td>1935 (Modified 1971)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Services Treaty</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ICELAND</strong></td>
<td>Extradition Treaty</td>
<td>1873/1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supplementary Convention on Extradition</td>
<td>1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Visa Abolition Treaty</td>
<td>1947/1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Services Treaty</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arbitration Convention</td>
<td>1905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exchange of Notes Renewing Arbitration Convention</td>
<td>1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INDONESIA</strong></td>
<td>Air Services Treaty</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IRAQ</strong></td>
<td>Extradition Treaty</td>
<td>1932 (Continued 1970)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Services Treaty</td>
<td>1951 (Terminated 1970)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ISRAEL
Air Services Treaty 1950
Exchange of Notes on Air Services 1959
Extradition Treaty 1960 (Continued 1970)

ITALY
Extradition Treaty 1873/1911
Legal Proceedings Treaty 1930/1932
Exchange of Notes on Italian Assets 1947/1948
Visa Abolition Treaty 1947/1948
Air Services Treaty 1948
Agreement of Carriage of Dangerous Goods in Aircraft 1951
Consular Agreement 1954
Exchange of Notes on Air Services 1962/1963

JAPAN
Agreement on Tonnage Measurement of Merchant Ships 1922
Air Services Treaty 1952
Consular Treaty 1964

KUWAIT
Air Services Treaty 1960
Exchange of Notes on Air Services 1963

LEBANON
Air Services Treaty 1951
Exchange of Notes on Air Services 1953/1962

LIBERIA
Extradition Treaty 1892/1903

LIBYA
Air Services Treaty 1953

LUXEMBOURG
Extradition Treaty 1880/1910 (Continued 1970)
Agreement on Compensation for War Damages 1954 (Terminated 1970)
Agreement on Arrangements to Facilitate Travel 1960 (Terminated 1970)
MEXICO
Treaty on Reciprocal Exemption from Compulsory Military Service 1943
Consular Treaty 1954

MONACO
Extradition Treaty 1891/1931

NETHERLANDS
Extradition Treaty 1898/1914
Legal Proceedings Treaty 1932/1934
Commercial Treaty 1935
Exchange of Notes on Air Services 1947
Agreement on Carriage of Dangerous Goods in Aircraft 1951
Agreement on Arrangements to Facilitate Travel 1960 (Superseded 1970)

NICARAGUA
Extradition Treaty 1905/1909

NORWAY
Extradition Treaty 1873/1909
Agreement Relating to Extradition 1907
Legal Proceedings Treaty 1931 (Modified 1970)
Visa Abolition Treaty 1947/1948 (Superseded 1969)
Consular Treaty 1951
Air Services Treaty 1952 (Terminated 1970)

PANAMA
Extradition Treaty 1906/1909
Air Services Treaty 1951

PARAGUAY
Extradition Treaty 1908/1913

PERU
Extradition Treaty 1904/1909
Air Services Treaty 1947
Exchange of Notes on Air Services 1961

PHILIPPINES
Air Services Treaty 1955 (Terminated 1971)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Treaties and Agreements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **POLAND** | Legal Proceedings Treaty 1931/1933  
Extradition Treaty 1932  
Agreement on Tonnage Measurement Certificates 1934  
Agreement on Naturalisation Compensation Against British Claims 1948 (Terminated 1970)  
Agreement on Settlement of British Claims Against Polish Government 1954 (Terminated 1970)  
Air Services Treaty 1964 |
| **PORTUGAL** | Extradition Treaty 1892/1921  
Treaty on Demarcation of Swaziland-Mozambique Boundary 1927  
Agreement on Tonnage Measurement Certificates 1926  
Legal Proceedings Treaty 1931/1933  
Agreement on Flag Discrimination in Portuguese Ports 1933  
Treaty on Commercial Relations Between Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland 1938  
Agreement on Identity Documents of Aircraft Personnel 1940  
Treaty on Air Services Between Territories 1945  
Exchange of Notes on Air Services 1952/1955  
Treaty on Commerce and Navigation 1914 |
| **RUMANIA** | Extradition Treaty 1893/1909  
Agreement on Settlement of Financial Matters 1960 (Terminated 1970) |
| **SAN MARINO** | Extradition Treaty 1899/1910  
Visa Abolition Treaty 1949 |
| **SOVIET UNION** | Agreement on Reciprocal Notification of Arrest and Imprisonment 1937  
Payments Agreement 1947 (Terminated 1970)  
Air Services Treaty 1957  
Exchange of Notes on Air Services 1960  
Abolition of Consular Visa Fees Agreement 1964 |
| **SPAIN** | Extradition Treaty 1878/1910  
Supplementary Declaration on Extradition 1889  
Treaty on Commerce and Navigation 1922  
Exchange of Notes on Customs and Tariffs 1923  
Convention Revising Treaty on Commerce and Navigation 1927 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Treaty/Agreement</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUDAN</td>
<td>Air Services Treaty</td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
<td>Legal Proceedings Treaty</td>
<td>1930/1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Services Treaty</td>
<td>1946 (Terminated 1971)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Visa Abolition Treaty</td>
<td>1947/1948 (Superseded 1970)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consular Treaty</td>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exchange of Notes on Air Services</td>
<td>1952 (Terminated 1971)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agreement on Double Taxation</td>
<td>1960/1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWITZERLAND</td>
<td>Extradition Treaty</td>
<td>1880/1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supplementary Convention on Extradition</td>
<td>1904/1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal Proceedings Treaty</td>
<td>1937/1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Services Treaty</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exchange of Notes on Air Services</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arrangement of Declaration of Death Duties in the Canton de Vaud</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exchange of Notes on Air Services</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arrangements to Facilitate Travel</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYRIA</td>
<td>Air Services Treaty</td>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THAILAND</td>
<td>Extradition Treaty</td>
<td>1911/1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Services Treaty</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TONGA</td>
<td>Amity Treaty</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKEY</td>
<td>Legal Proceedings Treaty</td>
<td>1931/1933 (Modified 1971)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Services Treaty</td>
<td>1946 (Terminated 1971)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exchange of Notes on Air Services</td>
<td>1946/1947/1948/1951 (Terminated 1971)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agreement on Commercial Debts Owed by Residents of Turkey</td>
<td>1959 (Terminated 1970)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

- Agreement on Real and Personal Property: 1899/1907
- Extradition Treaty: 1931 (Continued 1970)
- Air Services Treaty: 1946
- Exchange of Notes on Air Services: 1955/1956
- Agreement on the Financing of Programmes of Cultural and Educational Exchange: 1965

### URUGUAY

- Extradition Treaty: 1911
- Air Services Treaty: 1947

### YUGOSLAVIA

- Extradition Treaty: 1904/1909 (Continued 1971)
- Treaty on Commerce and Navigation: 1927
- Legal Proceedings Treaty: 1936
- Air Services Treaty: 1959 (Terminated 1971)

### YEMEN

- Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation: 1934

### UNITED NATIONS

- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation: Agreement on Aid: 1956
- Protocol Amending World Health Organisation Agreement: 1964
11) MULTILATERAL TREATIES

Convention on Protection of Submarine Cables
Convention on Copyright
Declaration on Protection of Submarine Cables
Protocol on Protection of Submarine Cables
Agreement on Additions to Copyright Convention
Agreement on Opium
Treaty Renouncing War (Kellogg Pact)
Convention on Road Traffic
Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents
Convention on the Limitation of the Employment of Force for Recovery of Contractual Debts
Convention: Opening of Hostilities
Convention: Laws and Customs of War on Land
Convention: Conversion of Merchant Ships into Warships
Convention: Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines
Convention: Bombardment by Naval Forces in Times of War
Convention: Restrictions on the Exercise of the Rights of Capture in Maritime War
Convention on Copyright
Agreement on Obscene Publications
Protocol on Copyright
Convention on Liquor Traffic in Africa
Convention on the Freedom of Transit
Convention on the Regime of Navigable Waterways in International Commerce
Declaration on the Right to a Flag of State Without Seacoast
Convention on Obscene Publications
Convention on the Simplification of Customs Formalities
Protocol on the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare
Convention on Slavery
Convention Revising Copyright Conventions of 1886 and 1908
Convention on the Rules of International Aerial Transport
Convention and Protocol on the Suppression of Counterfeit Currency
Convention on the Conflict of Nationality Laws
Convention on Military Obligations in the Case of Dual Nationality
Protocol on Statelessness
Convention on the Regime of the Straits
Convention on Stamp Laws in Connection with Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes
Convention on Stamp Laws in Connection with Cheques
Convention on the Protection of Fauna and Flora
London 1933
Convention on the International Status of Refugees
Geneva 1933
Convention on Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace
Geneva 1936
Convention on the Status of Refugees From Germany
Geneva 1938
Protocol on the Status of Refugees From Germany
Geneva 1939
Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation
Chicago 1944
Agreement on International Civil Aviation
Chicago 1944
Convention on International Air Services
Chicago 1944
Agreement: Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations
Quebec 1945
Agreement: International Monetary Fund
Washington 1945
Agreement: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
Washington 1945
Agreement on Reparations
Paris 1946
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations
London 1946
Protocol on Amendments to the Civil Aviation Convention of 1944
Montreal 1947
The General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs
Geneva 1947
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialised Agencies of the United Nations
New York 1947
Convention: The World Health Organisation
Washington 1947
Protocol on Obscene Publications
Washington 1947
Convention on the Control of Red Locusts
Washington 1947
Protocol on Amendments to the 1910 Agreement on the Suppression of the Circulation of Obscene Publications
New York 1949
Convention: The Red Cross
Geneva 1906 & 1909
Convention on the Amelioration of the Conditions of Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field
Geneva 1949
Convention on Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Force
Geneva 1949
Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War
Geneva 1949
Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War
Geneva 1949
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Rome 1950
Convention on International Sanitary Regulations
Geneva 1950
Convention on International Sanitary Regulations and Aerial Navigation
Paris 1926
Convention on International Sanitary Regulations and Aerial Navigation
Hague 1933
Agreement Dispensing with Bills of Health
Paris 1934
Agreement Dispensing with Consular Visas on Bills of Health
Paris 1934
International Sanitary Convention Modifying the 1926 Convention
Washington 1944
Protocol Prolonging the Sanitary Convention of 1944
Washington 1946
Convention on the Status of Refugees
Geneva 1951
Protocol Cancelling the 1906 and 1929 Agreement on Drugs
Geneva 1952
Protocol Amending 1949 Convention on Red Locusts
London 1953
Protocol Amending 1926 Salvery Convention
New York 1952
Articles of Agreement: International Finance

Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons
Supplementary Convention on Salvery
Convention on the Nationality of Married Women
Postal Convention
Convention on the High Seas
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
Convention on the Continental Shelf
Protocol on the Compulsory Settlement of Maritime Disputes
International Sugar Agreement
Convention on Amendments to the Charter of the World Health Organisation
Convention on Diplomatic Relations
Optional Protocol on the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes
Protocol on Amendments to the International Civil Aviation Convention of 1944
Convention on the Legalisation of Foreign Public Documents
Convention on Discrimination in Education
Protocol on Additional Regulations to International Sanitary Regulations of 1951
Convention on Conflicts of Laws Relating to the Forms of Testamentary Dispositions
The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
The Opium Convention
Convention on Dangerous Drugs
Convention on Narcotic Drugs
Protocol on the Control of Drugs Outside of the Scope of the 1931 Convention
Convention on the Rules of Submarine Warfare
Convention Revising the 1886 Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
Universal Copyright Convention
Protocol Relating to Amendments to 1944 Civil Aviation Convention
Additional Regulations to 1951 International Sanitary Regulations
Amendments to 1951 Sanitary Regulations
Protocol Prolonging the International Sugar Agreement of 1958
Convention on Unemployment
Convention Concerning Labour Organisation and Employment
Convention Concerning Holidays with Pay in Agriculture
Convention on Unemployment
Convention: Minimum Age of Children in Industrial employment
Convention: Rights of Association of Agricultural Workers
Convention: Workmen's Compensation in Agriculture
Convention: Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery

Washington 1955
New York 1954
Geneva 1956
New York 1957
Ottowa 1957
Geneva 1958
Geneva 1958
Geneva 1958
Geneva 1958
Geneva 1958
New York 1959
Vienna 1961
Vienna 1961
Montreal 1961
Hague 1961
Paris 1960
Geneva 1960
Hague 1961
New York 1961
Hague 1912
Geneva 1925
Geneva 1931
Paris 1948
London 1936
Brussels 1948
Geneva 1952
Montreal 1954
Geneva 1960 & 1965
Geneva 1963
London 1963 & 1965
Washington 1919
San Francisco 1948
Geneva 1952
Washington 1919
Washington 1919
Geneva 1921
Geneva 1921
Geneva 1928
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Convention</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Convention on Forced and Compulsory Labour</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention on Workmen's Compensation for</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
<td>1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational Diseases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention: Regulation of Certain Special</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
<td>1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systems of Recruiting Workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention: States of Wages and Hours of Work</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
<td>1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention: Freedom of Association and the Right</td>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Organise</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention: Protection of Wages</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention: Migration for Employment</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention: Application of Principles of Right</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Organise and Bargain Collectively</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention on the Abolition of Forced Labour</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention and Statute on Freedom of Transit</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked States</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Convention on the Elimination of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Forms of Racial Discrimination</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the Status of Refugees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Convention on Diplomatic Relations</td>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
iii) SPECIAL JOINT TREATIES CONCLUDED BY
SWAZILAND IN CONJUNCTION WITH BASUTOLAND,
(LESOTHO) AND THE BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE,
(BOTSWANA).

1910 - Customs Union Agreement Between Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland with the Union of South Africa.

1931 - Exchange of Notes Providing for the Temporary Modification of the Customs Union Agreement Between the Union of South Africa, Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland, in Respect of the Free Interchange of Maize.

1932 - Agreement Providing for the Elimination of Double Taxation of Farmers Carrying on Business Both in the Union of South Africa and in the High Commission Territories.


1939 - Payments Agreement Between Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland.

1944 - Agreement Between the Officer Administering the Government of the Union and the High Commissioner for Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland for the Prevention of the Laying of Death Duties Under the Laws of the Union of South Africa and the Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland in Respect of the Same Assets.

1946 - Exchange of Notes Amending Customs Union Agreement of 1910 Between the Union of South Africa and the Territories of Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland.

1949 - Agreement Between the Governments of the Union of South Africa and the United Kingdom for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion in Regard to Income Imposed in the Union and in Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland.

1969 - Customs Union Agreement Between the Governments of Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho and South Africa.
## APPENDIX II

### DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN SWAZILAND (November 1973)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
<th>BASE</th>
<th>LOCAL STAFF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>High Commission</td>
<td>Mbabane</td>
<td>High Commissioner: First, Second and Third Secretaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Commission</td>
<td>Mbabane</td>
<td>Charge d'Affaires.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Embassy and Consulate</td>
<td>Mbabane</td>
<td>Ambassador Extraordinary &amp; Plenipotentiary: Consul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Gaborone</td>
<td>Charge d'Affaires: Second Secretary: Director in the Office of Southern Africa - Regional Coordinator of A.I.D.: Acting Director. OSARAC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>High Commission</td>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>High Commission</td>
<td>Gaborone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>High Commission</td>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATE</td>
<td>STATUS</td>
<td>BASE</td>
<td>LOCAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Blantyre</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>High Commission</td>
<td>Lilongwe</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>High Commission</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>High Commission</td>
<td>Gaborone</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>High Commission</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>High Commission</td>
<td>Gaborone</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS**

United Nations Representative: United Nations Development Programme

Resident Representative

U.N.D.P.: Country Representative. F.A.C.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
<th>BASE</th>
<th>LOCAL STAFF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Blantyre</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>High Commission</td>
<td>Lilongwe</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>High Commission</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>High Commission</td>
<td>Gaborone</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>High Commission</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>High Commission</td>
<td>Gaborone</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Representative</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
<td>Mbabane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resident Representative</td>
<td>U.N.D.P.: Country Representative. F.A.C.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX III

**SWAZILAND'S REPRESENTATION ABROAD (November 1973)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATES/ORGANISATION</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
<th>STAFF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Consulate</td>
<td>Honorary Consul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Consulate</td>
<td>Honorary Consul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of China</td>
<td>Consulate-General</td>
<td>Honorary Consul-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Consulate</td>
<td>Honorary Consul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Ambassador Plenipotentiary Counsellor: First and Third Secretaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>High Commission</td>
<td>High Commissioner: Counsellor: First and Third Secretaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>High Commission</td>
<td>High Commissioner: Counsellor: First and Third Secretaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (E.E.C.)</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Ambassador: Economist: Third Secretary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX IV

SWAZILAND'S MEMBERSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

Swaziland is currently a member of three major international organisations -

a) The Organisation of African Unity;
b) The Commonwealth;
c) The United Nations and its Specialised Agencies (including the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation, and the International Development Association.

APPENDIX V

SWAZILAND'S DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: DOMESTIC ORGANISATION AND PERSONNEL AS AT NOVEMBER 1973

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: Prince Makhosini Dlamini

1. EXECUTIVE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
   SECTION The Honourable S.M. Matsebula

   PERMANENT SECRETARY: M.N. Dhlamini

2. POLITICAL UNDER-SECRETARY
   SECTION C.V. Kuhlase

   ASSISTANT SECRETARY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (2 Further Assistant Secretaryships Vacant)
   Miss H. Mhlenga Prince Tshekedi

3. PROTOCOL CHIEF OF PROTOCOL
   SECTION M.B. Mdziniso

   PRINCIPAL DEPUTY-CHIEF OF PROTOCOL
   Z.L. Mkhonza

4. ADMINISTRATIVE SENIOR ACCOUNTANT & CLERICAL STAFF
   SECTION
APPENDIX VI

PROJECTED INVESTMENT PROGRAMME 1973/74 TO 1975/76


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>Total Cost</th>
<th>1973/74</th>
<th>1974/75</th>
<th>1975/76</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Block</td>
<td>360 000</td>
<td>200 000</td>
<td>160 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Office Block</td>
<td>200 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>100 000</td>
<td>90 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.W.D. Maintenance Depots</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbabane</td>
<td>225 000</td>
<td>45 000</td>
<td>75 000</td>
<td>55 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outstation</td>
<td>40 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>30 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFFICES: DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>25 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEHICLES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swazi National Courts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>150 000</td>
<td>150 000</td>
<td>150 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Residence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lozitha State House</td>
<td>2 000 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precise Levelling Project</td>
<td>125 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>25 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Plant Depot</td>
<td>110 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>60 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIRING GOVERNMENT HOUSES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>13 500</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Equipment: Building</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branch</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERAL ADMINISTRATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Branch Equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>13 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOZITHA STATE HOUSE</td>
<td>2 000 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>500 000</td>
<td>500 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRECISE LEVELLING PROJECT</td>
<td>125 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>25 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEAVY PLANT DEPOT</td>
<td>110 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>60 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIRING GOVERNMENT HOUSES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>13 500</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADIO EQUIPMENT: BUILDING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOZITHA STATE HOUSE</td>
<td>2 000 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>500 000</td>
<td>500 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRECISE LEVELLING PROJECT</td>
<td>125 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>25 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEAVY PLANT DEPOT</td>
<td>110 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>60 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIRING GOVERNMENT HOUSES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>13 500</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADIO EQUIPMENT: BUILDING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERAL ADMINISTRATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Branch Equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>13 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOZITHA STATE HOUSE</td>
<td>2 000 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>500 000</td>
<td>500 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRECISE LEVELLING PROJECT</td>
<td>125 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>25 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEAVY PLANT DEPOT</td>
<td>110 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>60 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIRING GOVERNMENT HOUSES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>13 500</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADIO EQUIPMENT: BUILDING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERAL ADMINISTRATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Branch Equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>13 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOZITHA STATE HOUSE</td>
<td>2 000 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>500 000</td>
<td>500 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRECISE LEVELLING PROJECT</td>
<td>125 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>25 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEAVY PLANT DEPOT</td>
<td>110 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>60 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIRING GOVERNMENT HOUSES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>13 500</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADIO EQUIPMENT: BUILDING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sub-Total 532 500 1 258 000 1 093 000
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>(Rand)</th>
<th>Total Cost</th>
<th>1973/74</th>
<th>1974/75</th>
<th>1975/76</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LAW AND ORDER</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Staff Housing</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>66 718</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisons Staff Housing</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>81 580</td>
<td>40 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Prison</td>
<td>215 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>145 000</td>
<td>70 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisons Minor Improvements General</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>56 800</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malkerns Prison Sewerage</td>
<td>31 754</td>
<td>30 246</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications and Training equipment</td>
<td>36 000</td>
<td>36 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Minor Improvements</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>28 000</td>
<td>23 000</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court Buildings - Mbabane</td>
<td>68 000</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>43 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Communications</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>40 000</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Stations</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Guard for H.M. the King</td>
<td>140 000</td>
<td>140 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigg's Peak Prison</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borstal Facilities</td>
<td>65 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witness Accommodation</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>544 344</td>
<td>471 000</td>
<td>290 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The investment programme lists projects in the same way as they appear in the capital budget. The presentation thus differs from the summaries of sectoral investment plans given at the end of each chapter, since the latter generally group projects by programmes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>Total Cost</th>
<th>1973/74</th>
<th>1974/75</th>
<th>1975/76</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMMUNITY SERVICES -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Sewerage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manzini Sewerage</td>
<td>170 500</td>
<td>14 797</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manzini Water</td>
<td>600 000</td>
<td>108 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbabane Sewerage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping Complex</td>
<td>98 395</td>
<td>18 395</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outfall Sewer and Ponds</td>
<td>512 800</td>
<td>250 000</td>
<td>237 800</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Msunduza Reticulation</td>
<td>346 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>84 300</td>
<td>97 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Outfall Sewer</td>
<td>293 200</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>148 200</td>
<td>102 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbabane Water</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterworks</td>
<td>228 147</td>
<td>11 400</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reservoir and Mains</td>
<td>572 000</td>
<td>290 000</td>
<td>262 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dams and Pumps</td>
<td>231 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>131 000</td>
<td>100 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipelines</td>
<td>226 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>135 000</td>
<td>91 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siteki Water</td>
<td>200 000</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>150 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigg's Peak Water</td>
<td>139 500</td>
<td>109 500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwaluseni Sewerage</td>
<td>230 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>130 000</td>
<td>100 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwaluseni Water</td>
<td>150 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>75 000</td>
<td>75 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Water Reticulation</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>20 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Sewerage Reticulation</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>60 000</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>20 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boarder Gauging Stations</td>
<td>36 450</td>
<td>16 500</td>
<td>16 050</td>
<td>3 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigation</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1 000</td>
<td>1 000</td>
<td>1 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Hydrants - Matsapa</td>
<td>2 000</td>
<td>2 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nhlangano Water Supply</td>
<td>100 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>40 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KaHlatsi Water Supply</td>
<td>200 000</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>75 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Unit</td>
<td>75 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sub-Total                     1 001 592 1 480 350 936 700
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>Total Cost (Rand)</th>
<th>1973/74</th>
<th>1974/75</th>
<th>1975/76</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Housing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site and Service Schemes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakhele</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Housing Units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outstation Housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings Branch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce and Cooperatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posts and Telecommunications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Branch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract Officer Housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverside Drive and Manzini</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministerial Housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aided Self Help Schemes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Commissioner's House and Alterations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>870 600</td>
<td>1 125 000</td>
<td>1 045 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT</td>
<td>Total Cost</td>
<td>1973/74</td>
<td>1974/75</td>
<td>1975/76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER COMMUNITY SERVICES</td>
<td>(Rand)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Centre Complex</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Centre200 000</td>
<td>180 000</td>
<td>40 000</td>
<td>90 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcasting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td>15 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmitter</td>
<td>200 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td></td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Development</td>
<td></td>
<td>65 000</td>
<td>70 000</td>
<td>75 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity Supply</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KaHlati and Nhlangano</td>
<td>530 000</td>
<td>400 000</td>
<td>130 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Planning Study</td>
<td>330 000</td>
<td>180 000</td>
<td>90 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP Special Projects</td>
<td></td>
<td>60 000</td>
<td>60 000</td>
<td>60 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Authority Loans</td>
<td></td>
<td>200 000</td>
<td>200 000</td>
<td>200 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Works: Small Towns</td>
<td></td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manzini Library</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Libraries</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>25 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Parks and Monuments</td>
<td></td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total</td>
<td>1 110 000</td>
<td>980 000</td>
<td>625 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SOCIAL SERVICES -

#### Education and Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Total Cost (Rand)</th>
<th>1973/74</th>
<th>1974/75</th>
<th>1975/76</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary Schools</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classrooms, furniture and Equipment</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>30 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Mark's Infants</td>
<td>52 050</td>
<td>27 050</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Curriculum Reform</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>7 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshops</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15 000</td>
<td>30 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evelyn Baring Primary</td>
<td>60 000</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>40 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Phillips Deaf School</td>
<td>23 540</td>
<td>23 540</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary Schools</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>150 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evelyn Baring</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>31 500</td>
<td>53 000</td>
<td>60 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mhlatane</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>19 850</td>
<td>77 000</td>
<td>60 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manzini Central</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsapha National High School</td>
<td>1 483 740</td>
<td>825 000</td>
<td>398 740</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science Teaching</td>
<td>62 216</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbabane Central</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12 000</td>
<td>20 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Marks</td>
<td>15 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubombo Central</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>41 500</td>
<td>47 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cana</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>10 500</td>
<td>21 000</td>
<td>22 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhunya</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>10 500</td>
<td>22 500</td>
<td>22 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mhlume</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>7 000</td>
<td>15 000</td>
<td>22 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric Rosenberg</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7 000</td>
<td>13 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngwane</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7 000</td>
<td>13 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekukhanyeni</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7 000</td>
<td>25 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Agriculture</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>30 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrading (New Schools)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>60 000</td>
<td>40 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversification (Other Schools)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33 500</td>
<td>22 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT</td>
<td>Total Cost (Rand)</td>
<td>1973/74</td>
<td>1974/75</td>
<td>1975/76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Teacher Training</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>27 500</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>60 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical subjects</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum Development Centre</td>
<td>40 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Swaziland Industrial Training Institute</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Development</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>80 000</td>
<td>80 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>238 000</td>
<td>160 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Staff Training Institute</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.A.C.U.C. Farm</td>
<td>40 000</td>
<td>35 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Youth Training Programme</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bamboo Inn</strong></td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>English Language Project</strong></td>
<td>51 446</td>
<td>24 528</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.B.L.S.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwaluseni Site</td>
<td>160 000</td>
<td>80 000</td>
<td>80 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Development</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>115 000</td>
<td>75 000</td>
<td>75 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Degree Studies</td>
<td>231 900</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100 000</td>
<td>131 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Health and Management Diploma</td>
<td>215 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>165 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sub-Total**                           | 1 829 488         | 1 505 240 | 1 062 400 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>Total Cost</th>
<th>1973/74</th>
<th>1974/75</th>
<th>1975/76</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Improvements</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>75 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Equipment</td>
<td>170 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbabane Hospital Extensions</td>
<td>513 200</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>200 000</td>
<td>200 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hlatikulu</td>
<td>40 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigg's Peak</td>
<td>40 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsapa Mental</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsapa T.B.</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Clinics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>51 593</td>
<td>36 300</td>
<td>36 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renovations and Improvements</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>20 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health Centres</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>22 854</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>25 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Medical Store</td>
<td>9 800</td>
<td>9 800</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Sanitation and Water Supplies</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>22 000</td>
<td>33 000</td>
<td>44 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health Training Centre</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total</td>
<td>251 247</td>
<td>464 300</td>
<td>365 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT</td>
<td>Total Cost</td>
<td>1973/74</td>
<td>1974/75</td>
<td>1975/76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMIC-SERVICES -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Forestry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Census of Agriculture</td>
<td>93 742</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea Project</td>
<td>267 000</td>
<td>85 300</td>
<td>66 800</td>
<td>70 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crop Promotion</td>
<td>247 458</td>
<td>78 548</td>
<td>62 000</td>
<td>70 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed Multiplication</td>
<td>187 000</td>
<td>84 000</td>
<td>103 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Extension Project</td>
<td>75 000</td>
<td>35 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock Improvement:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>43 000</td>
<td>17 500</td>
<td>8 000</td>
<td>8 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiselweni LEC</td>
<td>40 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hhohho LEC</td>
<td>41 000</td>
<td>16 000</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpisi Farm and FTC</td>
<td>112 820</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highveld Demonstration Ranch</td>
<td>160 000</td>
<td>75 000</td>
<td>65 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle Holding Grounds</td>
<td>68 940</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowveld Cattle Breeding Station</td>
<td>128 000</td>
<td>60 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinary Diagnostic Unit</td>
<td>74 416</td>
<td>15 000</td>
<td>13 000</td>
<td>7 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock Disease Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot and Mouth Disease Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Fence</td>
<td>135 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>60 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarantine Camps</td>
<td>66 000</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>26 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Purchase and Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Purchase</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>350 000</td>
<td>350 000</td>
<td>350 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General RDA Overheads</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>140 831</td>
<td>100 000</td>
<td>100 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern RDA</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>103 478</td>
<td>70 000</td>
<td>70 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central RDA</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>24 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern RDA</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>40 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahlangatsha, Sipocosini and Ebulandzeni RDA's</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>20 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soil Conservation Units</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>475 000</td>
<td>500 000</td>
<td>500 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operatives</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>6 000</td>
<td>12 000</td>
<td>24 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland Credit and Savings Bank</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>250 000</td>
<td>300 000</td>
<td>350 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Plan and Equipment</td>
<td>1 350 000</td>
<td>350 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Officers Housing</td>
<td>12 000</td>
<td>12 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial Photography and Mapping</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>179 340</td>
<td>140 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor Development Project</td>
<td>225 000</td>
<td>140 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain Storage Project</td>
<td>110 554</td>
<td>40 000</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>20 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pineapple Diversification Project</td>
<td>135 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot Marketing Project</td>
<td>17 500</td>
<td>6 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Schemes: Irrigation</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>33 000</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>30 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishery Development</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>13 900</td>
<td>14 200</td>
<td>14 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensive Feeding and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Dairy Enterprises</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>12 500</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>40 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock Marketing</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>35 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT</td>
<td>Total Cost (Rand)</td>
<td>1973/74</td>
<td>1974/75</td>
<td>1975/76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers Training Centre:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big Bend</td>
<td>117 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>7 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manzini</td>
<td>180 000</td>
<td>40 000</td>
<td>90 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nhlangano</td>
<td>26 430</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngonini</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mapobeni Irrigation Scheme</td>
<td>5 000 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>500 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sifunga Sugar Scheme</td>
<td>200 000</td>
<td>200 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artificial Insemination Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry: General</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Purchase</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ortho-photo Mapping</td>
<td>150 000</td>
<td>125 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total</td>
<td>3 313 057</td>
<td>2 326 000</td>
<td>2 480 800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT</td>
<td>Total Cost</td>
<td>1973/74</td>
<td>1974/75</td>
<td>1975/76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transport and Communication</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Roads</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpaka-Nomahasha-Siteki</td>
<td>800 000</td>
<td>220 000</td>
<td>110 000</td>
<td>110 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malkerns</td>
<td>1 000 000</td>
<td>1 000 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>500 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Sugar Road</td>
<td>750 000</td>
<td>60 000</td>
<td>300 000</td>
<td>450 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manzini-Sidvokodvo and Usutu Bridge</td>
<td>100 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>90 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nglangano-Mahamba</td>
<td>200 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hlatikulu-Nhlangano</td>
<td>130 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>100 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigg's Peak Sawmill</td>
<td>400 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigg's Peak Hotshane</td>
<td>200 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helehele-Siphofaneni</td>
<td>150 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15 000</td>
<td>135 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>District Roads</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme</td>
<td>175 000</td>
<td>190 000</td>
<td>210 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Improvements Roads</td>
<td>22 000</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance Unit Plant</td>
<td>65 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Telecommunications</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic Exchanges</td>
<td>783 000</td>
<td>14 000</td>
<td>692 000</td>
<td>12 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automation of Circuits</td>
<td>230 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>190 000</td>
<td>40 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cables</td>
<td>170 000</td>
<td>170 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telex</td>
<td>242 000</td>
<td>95 000</td>
<td>142 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph and Telephone Links</td>
<td>116 000</td>
<td>116 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension of Internal Open Wire Routes</td>
<td>32 000</td>
<td>7 626</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subscribers Equipment</td>
<td>147 350</td>
<td>69 350</td>
<td>39 000</td>
<td>39 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultancy</td>
<td>297 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>161 000</td>
<td>124 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Posts</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Office Replacements</td>
<td>15 000</td>
<td>15 000</td>
<td>7 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Office Extension</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Matsapa Airport Extensions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Works</td>
<td>596 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>381 000</td>
<td>1 005 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>230 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>200 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>225 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>165 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 028 976</td>
<td>2 957 000</td>
<td>3 182 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Industry and Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Total Cost 1973/74 (Rand)</th>
<th>Total Cost 1974/75 (Rand)</th>
<th>Total Cost 1975/76 (Rand)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NIDCS</td>
<td>550 000</td>
<td>600 000</td>
<td>700 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Enterprises Development Estate Expansion</td>
<td>95 000</td>
<td>110 000</td>
<td>115 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Trading Estates</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>25 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rental Purchase Financing</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased Equity Capital</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Loan Fund</td>
<td>160 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining Exploratory Equipment</td>
<td>9 000</td>
<td>15 000</td>
<td>21 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsapa Industrial Estate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15 000</td>
<td>15 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal Prospecting Studies</td>
<td>400 000</td>
<td>400 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining Laboratory Equipment</td>
<td>8 000</td>
<td>8 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mapping of Coalfield</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>25 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>55 000</td>
<td>40 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thermal Power Station</td>
<td>1 336 000</td>
<td>3 813 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total</strong></td>
<td>1 342 000</td>
<td>2 231 000</td>
<td>4 779 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Commerce

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Total Cost 1973/74 (Rand)</th>
<th>Total Cost 1974/75 (Rand)</th>
<th>Total Cost 1975/76 (Rand)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amadoda Distributors</td>
<td>56 000</td>
<td>40 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swazi Craft</td>
<td>27 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handicraft Centres</td>
<td>2 000</td>
<td>3 000</td>
<td>2 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Traders Training Project</td>
<td>1 055</td>
<td>1 055</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total</strong></td>
<td>86 055</td>
<td>43 000</td>
<td>4 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Total

|           | 11 909 859 | 14 740 890 | 15 862 900 |

251.
SWAZILAND - A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY


Arnheim, J.W. 'Swaziland: A Bibliography' - University of Cape Town, School of Librarianship, 1950.


Batson, E. 'Swaziland Agricultural Survey' - University of Cape Town, School of Social Studies, 1953.


Carter, W.M. 'CDC's Swaziland Investment.' - Swaziland Recorder. No. 7, July. 1962.


Gardiner, R.K.A. 'From Colonial Grievances to a National Challenge.' - Swaziland Agricultural College. 1967.

Garson, N. 'The Swaziland Question and the Road to the Sea, 1887-95.' - Johannesburg University of the Witwatersrand, 1957.


Great Britain. 'Publications of the High Commissioner's Office.' - Cape Town. n.d.


Great Britain. 'Aid to Developing Countries.' - London. HMSO. 1963.


Great Britain. 'Commercial Agreement Between the High Commissioner for South Africa and the Governor General of Mozambique Regulating the Commercial Relations Between Swaziland, Basutoland and the Bechuanaland Protectorate and the Portuguese Colony of Mozambique.' - London. HMSO. 1930.


Great Britain. 'Notes Exchanged Between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Portugal for the Settlement of the Boundary between Swaziland and the Province of Mozambique.' - London. HMSO. 1938.


Hunter, G.R. 'Geology of Swaziland.' - Geology Society of South Africa. No. 60. 1957.


Khama, S. 'The Role of the University.' - Speech delivered at the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland Graduation Ceremony. Aug. 29. 1970.


Marwick, B. 'Abantu Baku Ngwane.' - Cape Town. Cape Town University Press. 1939.


Murdoch, G. and Andrieske, J.P. 'A Soil and Irrigability Survey of the Lower Usutu Basin (South) in the Swaziland Lowveld.' - London. HMSO. 1964.

'New Commonwealth Trade and Commerce' 'Focus on Swaziland.' - Feb. 1970

'New Commonwealth Trade and Commerce' 'Focus on Swaziland.' - Jan. 1972.

Ngwane National Liberatory Congress. 'Constitution.' - Mimeograph. n.d.


Nquku, J.J. 'Geography of Swaziland.' - Bremersfort Servite Fathers. 1936.


Nxumalo, S.S. 'Address to the Department of African Studies.' - University of the Witwatersrand, 26 July. 1968.


Rautenbach, J.M. 'Reflections on Swaziland's Bill of Rights.' - Speculum Juris. No. 4. 1968.


Royal Institute of International Affairs. 'The High Commission Territories and the Union of South Africa.' - London. 1956.


Swaziland Agricultural College and University Centre. 'Annual Reports.'


Swaziland Democratic Party. 'Minutes.' - Mimeograph. 1962-64.

Swaziland Democratic Party. 'Sibani.' - Mbabane. n.d.


Swaziland: Department of Agriculture. 'Annual Reports.' - Mbabane. 1963.


Swaziland: Department of Education. 'Annual Reports to the Director of Education.' - Mbabane.


Swaziland: Department of Finance and Development. 'Report on General Economic Development.' - (by B. Trevino.) n.d.


Swaziland: Ministry of Health. 'Annual Medical and Sanitary Report.' - Mbabane.


Swaziland: Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs. 'Recruent Budget: Estimates for the Financial Year as Approved by Parliament.' - Mbabane.

Swaziland: Registrar for Cooperative Societies. 'Annual Report.' - Mbabane.


Swaziland: Statistical Office. 'Swaziland Census, 1956.' - Mbabane. 1960

Swaziland: Statistical Office. 'Swaziland Directory.' - Mbabane.


Swaziland: Department of Land Utilisation. 'Annual Reports.' - Mbabane. 1962.


Swaziland: Department of Railways. 'Developing the Human Resources: Discussion Groups.' - Swaziland Agricultural College. 1967.

Swaziland: Department of Railways. 'Developing the National Economy: Discussion Groups.' - Swaziland Agricultural College 1967.


Swaziland: Director of Audit. 'Report by the Director of Audit on the Audit of the Accounts of Swaziland for the Financial Year Ended the 31st March.' - Mbabane Govt. Printer.
Swaziland: Director of Public Works. 'Annual Report.' - Mbabane, Govt. Printer.

Swaziland: Director of Public Works. 'Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure for the Financial Year 1st April 19 to 31st March.' - Mbabane, Govt. Printer.


Swaziland: Director of Public Works. 'History of Public Health in Swaziland.' - Mbabane. Govt. Printer.

Swaziland: Director of Public Works. 'Constitution, 1963.' - London. HMSO.

Swaziland: Director of Public Works. 'Proposals for a Swaziland Constitution.' - Mbabane. 1962.


Swaziland: Land Settlement Department. 'Annual Reports.' - Mbabane. Govt. Printer.

Swaziland: Land Settlement Department. 'Customs Union Agreement Between the Governments of Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho and South Africa.' - Mbabane. Swaziland Government Gazette. 1969.


Swaziland: Central Statistical Office. 'Swaziland Statistical News and Economic Indicators.' - Mbabane. Govt. Printer.


Swaziland: Central Statistical Office. 'Swaziland Statistical News and Economic Indicators.' - Mbabane. Govt. Printer.


Swaziland: Ministry of Education. 'Newsletter.' - Mbabane. Govt. Printer.


Swaziland Student Union. 'A Brief Review of the Political Situation in Swaziland. 1960-63.' - Mbabane. Mimeograph. n.d.

Swaziland, Times of. 'Politics in Swaziland.' - Edited by S. Nxumalo. n.d.


Trevino, B.M. 'Developing the National Economy.' - Swaziland Agricultural College. 1967.


Webster, J. and Mohome, P. 'A Bibliography of Swaziland.' - Syracuse. Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. 1968.


Author  Frankel P
Name of thesis  The foreign policy of Swaziland: Nation building and the objectives, priorities and strategies of the developing policy  1975

PUBLISHER:
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg
©2013

LEGAL NOTICES:

Copyright Notice: All materials on the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg Library website are protected by South African copyright law and may not be distributed, transmitted, displayed, or otherwise published in any format, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner.

Disclaimer and Terms of Use: Provided that you maintain all copyright and other notices contained therein, you may download material (one machine readable copy and one print copy per page) for your personal and/or educational non-commercial use only.

The University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, is not responsible for any errors or omissions and excludes any and all liability for any errors in or omissions from the information on the Library website.