DECLARATION.

I hereby declare that this dissertation is my own work and that it has not been submitted to any other university.

MARIAN DE SAXE
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ABSTRACT

The aim of the present study was to investigate the effect of a multi-racial media programme on the racial attitudes and ego-identity of black and white seven to eight year old children. This study took place against the social structure of a segregated South African society. On a theoretical level, the study attempted to provide a framework for race attitude research from the work of Erikson (1965, 1966, 1968), Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg (1966, 1971). The study also utilized this three-dimensional theoretical background to investigate a possible relationship between racial attitudes, ego-identity and moral development. The experiment was based on Solomon's (1949) four-group before-after design: half of two experimental groups (one black group and one white group) and half of two control groups (one black group and one white group) were pretested, while all eighty children were posttested. Selection of subjects was based on scores obtained on the Coloured Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1956). Subjects were tested on the Clark Doll Test, the "Show me" test and the Categories Test. The multi-racial media programme consisted primarily of twelve books showing multi-racial contact, translated into Sotho for black subjects. Children were exposed to the books for a period of two months.

Three hypotheses were investigated: Firstly, it was hypothesized that the racial attitudes of two groups of seven to eight year old children would change after a multi-racial media programme; secondly, that white children would have more positive self-concepts than black children before the multi-racial programme and thirdly, that after the intervention programme there would be a change in the ego-identity of black children. Results showed that the multi-racial media programme was ineffective in changing children's racial attitudes. No differ-
ence was found between the self-concepts of black and white children, nor did the self-concepts of black children change after the intervention programme. In terms of Solomon's design, pretesting was found to have no effect on posttest results. A significant negative correlation was found between racial attitudes and ego-identity. This was discussed in terms of the theoretical link postulated between racial attitudes, ego-identity and moral development. Weaknesses of the multi-racial media programme were examined and suggestions made for the creation of specifically South African material for use in South African schools. Erikson's theory of ego-identity was seen to provide an historical basis for studies of the child within a changing social order. The chief methodological criticism concerned the necessity for an adequate operational and functional interpretation of Erikson's ego-identity concept. The study confirmed the need for continued psychological research into race relation problems in South Africa and highlighted the lack of tools available for a future educational desegregation in South Africa.
## CONTENTS

1. **INTRODUCTION** ......................................... 1
   1.1. Psychology and Race: a psycho-history ........ 2
   1.2. Aims and Hypotheses ............................. 12

2. **A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF EGO-IDENTITY AND MORAL JUDGEMENT** ............. 13
   2.1. Erikson's theory of identity ................ 14
   2.2. Cognitive aspects of Erikson's theory of identity .... 19
   2.3. Erikson and moral development ............. 27
   2.4. Piaget's theory of moral development ...... 24
   2.5. Kohlberg's theory of moral development .. 28

3. **DEVELOPMENTAL THEORIES, EGO-IDENTITY AND RACIAL ATTITUDES** ..................................... 31
   3.1. Erikson ........................................ 31
   3.2. Erikson's ego stages and cognitive-development theory ... 36
   3.2.1. Piaget .................................... 38
   3.2.2. Kohlberg ................................. 40

4. **EMPIRICAL FINDINGS** .................................. 44
   4.1. Determinants of racial attitudes ............ 44
   4.1.1. Parental influences ....................... 45
   4.1.2. Social influences .......................... 48
   4.1.3. Cultural influences ....................... 50
   4.2. Self-concept research .......................... 52

5. **RACE ATTITUDES AND EDUCATION** ................. 55
   5.1. The cult of the disadvantaged child ........ 55
   5.2. The failure of early intervention programme .... 58
   5.3. Schools and poor children .................... 60
   5.4. Moral education and educational change .... 63

6. **RACE ATTITUDES IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT** ... 65
   6.1. Education in South Africa ..................... 66
   6.2. Race attitude research in South Africa ...... 67

7. **EXPERIMENTAL METHOD** ................................ 69
   7.1. Design .......................................... 69
   7.2. Subjects ........................................ 71
   7.3. Description of tests and scoring procedures ... 73
   7.3.1. Clark Doll Test ........................... 74
   7.3.2. "Show me" Test ................................ 75
   7.3.3. Categories Test ............................ 77
   7.3.4. Colouring-in Test ........................... 78
   7.3.5. "Where are you game" ...................... 79
# CONTENTS

8. RESULTS .............................................. 85
   8.1. Statistical analysis ........................ 85
   8.2. Chi Square Test .............................. 91
   8.2.1. "Show me" Test ............................ 92
   8.2.2. Categories Test ............................ 93
   8.2.3. Clark Doll Test ............................ 93
   8.3. Conclusion ................................... 95

9. DISCUSSION ......................................... 97
   9.1. General discussion of findings ............ 97
   9.2. Theoretical criticisms ..................... 101
   9.3. Methodological criticisms ................. 107
   9.4. Design ....................................... 110
   9.5. Suggestions for further research .......... 111
   9.6. Conclusion .................................. 114

REFERENCES ................................................. 117

APPENDIX 1a ............................................... 130
APPENDIX 1b ............................................... 131
APPENDIX 1c ............................................... 135
APPENDIX 1d ............................................... 139
APPENDIX 2 ............................................... 143
APPENDIX 3 ............................................... 145
Happiness

Happiness is the moving picture
Which a certain percentage
Of us failed to see
Because of bitter experiences
In this just and right world...

(Fanyana Mokaleng, Staffrider, 1978, 1(3) p. 46).
CHAPTER I

Introduction

The present study employs an historical perspective to investigate theoretically and empirically race attitudes and ego-identity in children. The value of such a perspective in psychological research lies in an examination of the child in toto: the child is not born into a vacuum, nor does he progress through society vacuously. His own mental and physical growth interacts with a changing society and he becomes an active participant in, and influential member of, his environment. It is also the development of the child that contributes to the flux or stasis of a particular societal order. This study will thus represent the dynamic relationship between the child and his environment inherent in an historical perspective, and will juxtapose a theoretical examination of the child's cognitive and affective growth with an investigation of the society in which such development occurs. The interdisciplinary nature of this study represents a growing trend in Child Development towards cross-cultural research which, by its very nature, examines the role of different societies in aiding the child's development.

The theories of Erikson (1965, 1966, 1968), Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg (1966, 1971) will be critically examined as they focus directly on the interaction between stages of development and changing environments. Such an examination should provide the necessary theoretical parallel to much research into the development of race attitudes. The latter is investigated empirically and an attempt is made to change possible racial attitudes in children. The unifying theme underlying the theoretical and empirical issues of the study is concern for psychology's role in race relations research, this being an instance of psychology's responsibility to society as a whole.
1.1. Psychology and Race: a psycho-history

The history of psychology as a scientific discipline is fraught with evidence of psychology's concern with issues of race and race relations. A history of the development of racial attitudes must therefore take into account psychology's role in providing scientific sanction for studies which have today been disputed and contradicted. It was largely the desire to create a scientific psychology that distracted the social scientist from examining the philosophical and ideological assumptions underlying the direction of his research; and it is now, in the face of increasingly difficult race problems both within and without of psychology, that the psychologist must reassess his contribution to the study of racial attitudes, its concomitant, racism, and its effect on both the people who practice it and the people who receive it. It was possibly with this in mind that in 1978 the U.S. National Institute of Mental Health pledged to

"support research into racism and mental health with particular attention to identification of the deleterious psychological consequences of racism for the entire population and the development of specific interventions designed to reduce racist attitudes and behaviours" (U.S. Dept. of health, education and welfare; 1978, p. 1).

In America and the United Kingdom, black psychologists have questioned the basic assumptions of much psychological research in what has been called the "black backlash" (Comer, 1970). Milner (1973) sees the direction of race relations research as hinging on whether the social psychologist will study mainly the white community or whether his research in the black community will institute a course of change to improve the conditions of such communities. In South Africa the need for research of the latter kind is especially great.

Past studies of race problems have to a certain extent represented the social reality of a specific class of people - the middle-class white psychologist. Terminology that has arisen from such studies
such as "disadvantaged child", "the Negro's negative self-esteem", have in turn reflected the frame of reference held by psychologists for whom the norm is their own social reality. One of the few psychologists who urged the recognition of different cultural and social patterns, the "wider identity" of the Negro American, is Erik Erikson (1966). In his concern with the development of ego-identity in the child, Erikson (1964, 1965, 1966, 1968) continually stresses the historical and social relativity of stages of development. He has rejected the popularized concept of "identity crisis" in favour of a broader application of the term which he sees as representing

"something in the psychological core of the revolution of the coloured races and nations who seek inner as well as outer emancipation from colonial rule and from remnants of colonial patterns of thought" (Erikson; 1966, p. 145).

Erikson offers us a theoretical basis with which to examine not only the development of ego-identity within the person, but also the growth of that black consciousness which now questions traditional psychological studies concerning black identity and white prejudice.

With colonial expansion came the beginning of slavery in America and Africa. MacCrone (1957) traces the development of race relations in South Africa from the seventeenth century when Portuguese and Dutch traders arrived in the Cape. The major factor influencing the direction of race relations in those early days was religion: only a heathen could become a slave; as soon as he was baptized he would become a free man. Colour prejudice was firmly established by the end of the eighteenth century. The laager mentality of frontier society was responsible for the equation of inferiority with black skin. MacCrone (1957) claims that it is this period in the history of race relations that is now making "an adjustment satisfactory to both races, the most difficult problem of twentieth century South Africa" (p.136).
Acting on the belief of the inferiority of the black slave early psychologists used physiological differences to account for psychological differences. The next logical step in this development was to view human beings as part of a continual process of biological evolution. G. Stanley Hall, the founder of child psychology, was a proponent of this phylogenetic theory of race. He saw the development of the child’s mind as mirroring the development of the human race. Hence derived the idea of the childlike primitive people incapable of reaching the levels of thought which pertained to the “civilized” world. Piaget’s structural theory of genetic epistemology also tries to find a parallel between the development of thought in the child and growth of knowledge within a society. He sees the former as a means of studying the development of collective thought and proposes an interaction theory of development. Piaget, unlike G. Stanley Hall, views the environment as a contributing factor to the development of thought, the most important relationship is between the knower and the known.

A refutation of this comes from the anthropological work of Lévi-Strauss who denounces the so-called superiority of the technological mind and contrasts the logic of mythical thought with the logic of modern science (Leach, 1970). He calls the supposedly "savage" mind, the "multi-conscious" mind which conceives of reality in terms of the individual’s encounter with the world; it too is a structuring device. Hawkes (1977), discussing Lévi-Strauss’s structural anthropology points out that

"By its undermining of what Lévi-Strauss calls 'sterile empiricism', that is, the notion that the 'real' world consists of a single undeniable reality which, in their ignorance or perversity the lesser 'savage' minds do not recognize, such anthropology opens the door to the notion that all societies construct their realities in accordance with mental or psychological principles that determine forms and function, and that they thin covertly
project these upon whatever the real world may in fact be" (Hawkes; 1977, pp.55-56).

The instinct psychologist William McDougall also rejected "the crude idea... that the development of civilization and of nations implies a parallel evolution of individual minds" (McDougall; 1920, p. 203).

But McDougall (1920) was imbued with the colonial mentality of his time: not only did he believe in an instinct of submission, he also believed that European nations had a moral obligation to raise the "lower" black people of Africa to the level of European culture.

Psychological studies of Blacks have either chosen to ignore differences in reality construction or have interpreted these differences in terms of the psychologist's own values. Thus the IQ controversy did not argue in terms of physical evolution but in terms of inferior social experiences. That the instruments of measurement, the test-situations and the interpretation of findings have since been exposed as inaccurate both methodologically and philosophically', cannot eradicate the harm caused to psychology's role in race relations research. Brigham (1923), who came to the conclusions that immigrants and Negroes were mentally inferior to American Whites on measures using the Army Alpha and Beta tests, was to refute his own work as "unsound" in 1930. Goodenough, (Thomas and Sillen, 1972) reconsidering her Draw-a-man test, also came to the conclusion that it is impossible to have a culture-free test.

Cautioning white psychologists James Comer (1977) wrote:

"... it is not responsible science to make assumptions about the meaning of black and white differences when the 'scientist' does not know the implications of the experiential differences. Few researchers have made a systematic appraisal of the impact of inequitable and traumatic social policy" (Comer; 1970, p. 44).

One of the major criticisms now levelled at studies of black personality, is the implicit assumption and acceptance of a "black" pathology.

The most enduring theoretical stance in this respect has been the psychoanalytic model. The theory of repression was responsible for the growth of the concept of the unconscious: ideas which are repressed become unconscious and do not reach consciousness because of a "continuing pressure" (Wollheim; 1971, p. 161). Freud (1973) identified this "pressure" as the ego, a force whose function is "reality-testing" (Freud; 1973, p. 108). The ego is responsible for the anxieties associated with repression: Freud (1973) saw the ego as using an "experimental cathexis" which "starts up the pleasure-impleasure automatism by means of a signal of anxiety" (p. 122). The implication of this statement is that the libidinal forces of the id, or the pleasurable energy charges, are sanctioned by the ego which works as "the better organized part of the id" (p. 125). Thus, as the child becomes more aware of reality, that is, as he develops a form of "ego-awareness", he also grows more aware of his aggressive and instinctual impulses which are not wholly unconscious. A typical example of this is the Oedipus complex: here the mother is the object of the boy's libidinal forces, and the anxiety of castration gives way to the repression of those forces.

Freudian theory also compares this development of the mind of the child with the historical stages of development of the Negro personality. Years of compliance and passivity are thought to distort the Negro's affective capacity. This "mark of oppression" (Kardiner and Oversey, 1951), is thought to lead to defence mechanisms such as aggression (Proshansky and Newton, 1973). Conversely, psychoanalytic theory looks at racial prejudice as an example of infantile sexuality: the frustration of unfulfilled libidinal instincts are re-acted against a presumed inferior

---

1. "... we are in a position to attribute to the id characteristics other than that of its being unconscious and you can recognize the possibility of portions of the ego and super-ego being unconscious without possessing the same primitive and irrational characteristics" (Freud; 1973, p. 107).
group of people. Viola Bernard (1953) points out that the psychoanalytic stereotype of repressed hostility against whites forming the basis of the Negro personality, has now become a racial stereotype. The importance of this is that such hostility is presumed to be pathological.

According to Thomas and Sillen (1972) early case studies epitomized "a misevaluation of the objective cause of black anger - the real oppression" (p. 63). Erikson (1960) questions the assumption of a negative Negro identity:

"And yet, is 'the Negro' not often all too summarily and all too exclusively discussed in such a way that his negative identity is defined only in terms of his defensive adjustments to the dominant white majority?" (Erikson; 1960, p. 155).

Generalizations were based on the limited number of Negroes committed to mental institutions: Lind (1914) discusses psychotic delusions in Negroes in terms of the "colour complex". In the first volume of Psychoanalytic Review Lind (1914) writes that "this complex is based upon social subordination of the negro in the United States" (p. 404). He interprets the dreams of his patients as "proofs of the repressed wishes present in the negro, i.e. to be white," (p. 405) and as evidence of a failure to adapt to reality. In the same volume, A.B. Evarts (1914) discusses another favourite myth, namely that emancipation from slavery was more harmful than beneficial for the stability of the Negro mind: "It has been said by many observers whose word can scarce be doubted that a crazy negro was a rare sight before emancipation" (Evarts; 1914, p. 394). The perpetuation of many stereotypes started with these early psychoanalytic studies. "This [the African] race has no mythology" (Evarts; 1914, p. 392); these "strong, patient, childlike savages" (Evarts; 1914, p. 393); "... sexual instincts are peculiarly unrestrained..." (Evarts; 1914, p. 397) and so forth.

Later Theodore Lidz (1968) propounded the view of maternal domination in the black family being fundamental to the problems of the
black male. Similarly "culturally deprived" come to equal the poor black, a reflection of the shift away from the objective concern for poverty to the attributes of those people who are poor (Thomas and Sillen, 1972). The Joint Commission on Mental Health of Children in the U.S. identified "the most important single factor associated with family breakdown" as being "poverty itself" (Thomas and Sillen; 1972, p. 86). So too psychoanalytic theory detracted from the real causes of black hostility and black anger. Erikson (1964) anticipated this flaw and developed a theory of ego-identity which sees the growth of ego-identity as inextricably linked to "the sameness and continuity of one's meaning for others" (Erikson; 1964, p. 31). Such continuity can only develop when one's reality is given meaning by one's culture: "... societies confirm an individual at this time in all kinds of ideological frameworks..." (Erikson; 1964, p. 33).

The mid-1920's saw the first empirical studies of race attitudes. Before this date, the general acceptance of scientific research meant that prejudicial attitudes were a norm considered to be quite legitimate. By 1920 Negroes in America had started to expose the depressed living conditions of Negroes in the South and had begun to participate in political and literary fields. The structure of American society changed: Negroes were placed on an equal footing with Whites during the first World War, and after the war, immigrants from many different countries poured into America. As a result of the latter, Emory Bogardus (1928) wrote Immigration and Race Attitudes. This book characterized the social problems approach to the study of race prejudice as prejudice was studied as a social evil. Bruno Lasker's Race Attitudes in Children also appeared in 1928. He approached his subject as a study in human relations. Race attitudes were seen as part of the development of other social attitudes. He also outlined a programme for a deliberate
educational method designed to modify racial attitudes, a suggestion largely ignored until the 1960's.

After the second World War interest focused on group prejudice and minority groups. An explanation was sought in the kind of personality type that perpetrated acts of racial violence: in 1950 Adorno et al. published *The Authoritarian Personality* and stated in their introduction that

"...the political, economic and social convictions of an individual often form a broad and coherent pattern, as if bound together by a 'mentality' or 'spirit' and... this pattern is an expression of deep-lying trends in his personality" (Adorno et al.; 1950, p. 1)

This approach only served to relieve society of responsibility for institutional racism. Seeking the basis of adult race attitudes in childhood experience, the authors found that certain factors (for example, an authoritarian upbringing) could lead to the formation of an authoritarian personality. Taking its tenets from Freudian theory was the frustration-aggression hypothesis which once more focused on the individual's personality exclusively of institutionalized or social prejudice.

Experimental research into the development of racial attitudes in children began with the Horowitz (1938) and Clark (1939) studies. R. Horowitz (1938, 1939) developed Attitudinal Choice Tests and Portrait Series in order to investigate children's attitudes to another racial group. These tests are still the basis of those used today and in themselves allow for a great deal of flexibility of content depending on the population studied. Horowitz's (1938) theoretical framework, namely "race-consciousness conceived as a function of ego-development" (Horowitz; 1939, p. 91) is also the preoccupation of the Clark studies. V. Clark and M. Clark (1939) first studied the development of racial awareness as a function of the development of consciousness of self or ego-identity. They (Clark & Clark; 1940) extended Horowitz's testing techniques to in-
clude a Colouring-in-Test and the famous Clark Doll Test. Clark and Clark (1939) found that children possessed a clear race-and self-consciousness by the age of four. Goodman (1964) was to confirm this: she found that race awareness was present in children of four years old. The Clark findings were cited in a footnote to a U.S. Supreme Court desegregation decision in 1954 as evidence of the effect of racial prejudice on self-esteem. It was this decision that led to the racial desegregation of schools in the U.S.A. Later K. Clark (1965) concluded that race attitude research had reached a stage of methodological and theoretical sterility and stagnation.

Today research into racism once again employs the social problems approach, examining the development of race consciousness in a broader socio-cultural framework. The philosophical assumptions underlying the work of early psychologists have been questioned by Blacks themselves (e.g., the idea of black pathology is seen to lead to dehumanization) and the focus has shifted from the personality of black people to the socio-cultural climate in which racial prejudice flourishes. Psychologists must now attempt to redress the damage caused by, firstly their assumptions of pathology specific to the black psyche, secondly, the scientific sanction given to much I.Q. research, and thirdly, the premise of early intervention programmes that black children are products of a deprived environment. An increasing number of psychologists are questioning the usefulness of the white researcher in black society:

"under the guise of scientific objectivity a small but powerful group of modern psychologists has fully participated in an attempt to impose their reality onto a group of people having a totally different frame of reference..." (Clark; 1973, p.7);

or "The maintenance of the status quo by contemporary psychologists has brought about a crisis in American society..." (Thomas; 1973, p. 60).

One of the means of redress is educational change; not in terms of
compensatory "head-start" programmes which attempt to "help" the black child reach a level comparable to a white middle-class child regardless of differences in standards of living, but programmes of "intercultural and race-related research aimed at changing the education system and the larger society" (Sedlacek and Brooks; 1973, p. 194). In this way, a further form of institutional racism is avoided. Most societies are "multi-cultural" yet most educational systems cater for the dominant culture of that society. The misunderstanding caused by ignorance of alternative perceptions of the environment and the harsh social realities which often give rise to such perceptions, is the cause of some of the major social problems of the world.

Thomas and Sillen (1972) stress that psychological expressions of racism are consequences and not causes of racism, and in order to be able to alleviate social problems, the cause of racial attitudes must be identified: "the psychological consequences reinforce the social institutions of racism" (Thomas; 1972, p. 120). The idea of action research began with the work of Kurt Lewin who postulated that it was possible "not only to further the scientific understanding of man but also to advance the cause of human welfare at the same time" (Ring; 1967, p. 48). The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues was founded in order to support the dictum "no research without action, no action without research" (Lewin, in Ring; 1967, p. 49). Ring (1967) claims that today there is a division between action-oriented and scientifically-inclined social psychologists, while experimental social psychology is dominated by "frivolous... value... and a "fun-and-games approach" (p. 49). Social psychology has moved into the educational field in order to rectify this fun-and-games approach - however it lacks that "good theory" Lewin found so necessary to applied research. A logical conclusion is to merge developmental, educational and social psychology, especially with regard to the developmental study of race.
attitudes in a multi-cultural society.

1.2. Aims and Hypotheses

The aim of this research study is to assess the effects of a multi-racial media programme on the racial attitudes and ego-identity of two groups of eight year old children - one black group and one white group. The development of racial attitudes and ego-identity form an important link in explaining the adult's social reality and self-consciousness. This study investigates whether a programme designed to show regular multi-racial contact between blacks and whites will change the racial attitudes children might hold. It attempts to examine the self-concepts of black and white children in order to see whether the development of a wider Black identity has counteracted the effect of institutional racism on the development of ego-identity. Such a study takes place against the socio-political climate of South Africa in which racial attitudes are reinforced by the established norms of society.

It is hypothesized that:

1. The racial attitudes of two groups of eight year old children (one black group and one white group) will change after a multi-racial media programme;

2. White children will have more positive self-concepts than black children before the multi-racial programme;

3. After the intervention programme there will be a change in the ego-identity of black children.
CHAPTER 2

A Developmental approach to the study of ego-identity and moral judgement

While empirical studies of race consciousness in children have tentatively examined racial identity in terms of the child's development of self (Horowitz, 1939; Clark and Clark, 1939, 1940; Goodman, 1946, 1964; Clark, 1955; Proshansky and Newton, 1968; Porter, 1971; Milner, 1975), there has seldom been a cogent theoretical stance to substantiate the conception of race awareness as a function of self-identity. No theoretical justification exists for statements such as "racial identification has been assumed to be indicative of a phase in the development of consciousness of self" (Clark and Clark, 1940, p. 159) and "racial awareness functions as a critical variable in ego-development" (Gregor and McPherson, 1966, p. 219) and as such race attitudes research lacks a base in developmental theory. That such research lends itself to a developmental approach might not appear self-evident: the development of race prejudice is all too often easily explained away by recourse to social learning theory (internalization of socializing norms) and questions still remain. How is self-identity rooted in the social order? Is the growth of self-identity related to the development of morality? Developmental theory employs an historical perspective: it views the cognitive and affective growth of the child in terms of the effect of past environments on further development. Stage theorists (Piaget, 1929, 1952; Erikson, 1965) emphasize the interaction of the child with these environments and thus view child development historically without merely concentrating on the interplay of forces within the child (psychoanalytic theory). Any study of the development of race awareness in children must be historical: social forces in the child's immediate environment have their beginnings in
past environments and the child's interaction with his social reality is a result of his developmental process and that of his society. An examination of Erikson's theory of identity and the cognitive-developmental approach to moral development (Piaget, 1932; Kohlberg, 1966, 1972) will attempt to find an historical root for empirical studies of race consciousness.

2.1. Erikson's theory of identity

Due to its popularization general confusion surrounds the use of the word "identity". This confusion was generated independently of Erikson's reworking of his own implications for the term by a change in young people's conception of their role in society in the 1960's. It is most persistent in describing the "identity" crisis of adolescents or the "negative identity" of oppressed groups. It has resulted in a multitude of associated words such as self-identification, self-concept or self-esteem, all of which are operational conceptions of a more specific unit. Erikson himself recognizes the usefulness of such conceptualizations in social psychology but warns against the over-usage of a term which can detract from "the more vital implications of the concept" (Erikson; 1968, p. 16). These implications cannot be conceived of solely in terms of adolescent identity-crisis for they extend from the initial mother-child interaction to the adult's ethical interaction with his society in terms of his ego-strength. Erikson's own changing perspectives, from initially viewing identity as a sense of continuity and sameness to "identity means what the best in you lives by, the loss of which would make you less human" (Erikson in Roazen, 1976, p. 164), are a reflection of his preoccupation with an historical process in which mankind moves towards more universal identities based upon the cyclical growth of the child.
It was this preoccupation that led Erikson to revolutionize psychoanalytic thought by firmly basing the ego in the social order. He rejects the defensive nature of Freudian theory which emphasizes the protective mechanisms the ego constructs to defend itself and instead stresses the adaptive nature of the ego: "ego-synthesis" is the individual's means of mastering experience and it is by recognizing that his ego-synthesis "is a successful variant of a group identity and in accord with its space-time and life-plan" that "the growing child must, at every step, derive a vitalizing sense of actuality" (Erikson; 1965, p. 228). The crucial point here is that society is responsible for meeting the individual's ego-requirements, and only when these are met, and the ego is able to integrate stages of development, can the individual be assured of 'coherent individuation and identity" (Erikson; 1965, p. 31). Identity is thus seen to depend firstly, on the ego's mastery of the environment and secondly, on societal recognition of this mastery. Erikson conceives of ego-identity as "...awareness of the fact that there is a self-sameness and continuity to the ego's synthesizing methods, the style of one's individuality, and that this style coincides with the sameness and continuity of one's meaning for significant others, in the immediate community" (Erikson; 1968, p. 50).

For Erikson this is the only possible means of human growth (Erikson; 1965, p. 269).

The sense of continuity which he regards as crucial to the development of a sense of self begins when the child is able to maintain an inner certainty of his mother's existence, even in her absence. Although this is reminiscent of Melanie Klein's (1926) object-relation's theory, Erikson (1965) rejects the biological conceptions of the outer-world as all that is physically outside the infant. Erikson actually see this naïve definition of the environment as being responsible for the fail-
ure of early psychoanalytic thought to develop the concept of identity in terms of a psychosocial process. Erikson (1965) calls the environment the macrosphere, "the world shared by others" (Erikson; 1965, p. 214) and sees play as emerging to bridge the gap between the microsphere (objects) and the macrosphere. Erikson first regarded play as a function of the ego, as "the royal road to understanding the infantile ego's efforts at synthesis" (Erikson; 1965, p. 202). Later (1978) he saw in play a means of understanding reality: imagination "is placed in the service both of an inner ordering of experience and of ritualization of everyday life which introduces the growing individual into functioning institutions" (Erikson; 1978, p. 167). It is thus through play that Erikson sees the ego as entering into its interaction with the social environment. Yet as an interactionist Erikson (1968) is careful to point out that identity is not defined solely in terms of the ego's relation to social reality, but is also embedded in the individual life-cycle of the child:

"we cannot separate personal growth and communal change, nor can we separate the identity crisis in individual life and contemporary crises in historical development because the two help to define each other and are truly relative to each other" (Erikson; 1968, p. 23).

It is identity though that provides equilibrium between the individual and the social order.

Erikson (1968) distinguishes between identity, identification and identity formation. Throughout the stages of his development (Erikson, 1965, postulated eight stages of man) the child forms identifications with basic social and cultural models which in turn reinforce his ego's attempts at mastery. But none of these childhood identifications result in "a functioning personality" (Erikson; 1968, p. 158). The reason for this is that during adolescence identity formation begins to
incorporate and replace all previous identifications. This is a formative period when the adolescent must come to grasp a unity between himself and society and recognize continuity over and above role confusion. He must select "self-images" (Erikson; 1968, p. 210) derived from childhood identifications and integrate them with his present attempts at ideological clarification. What Erikson is stipulating is that the period of adolescence is characterized by a search for ideals which necessitates an ideological base, and yet the ego must somehow unite past identifications with the new conscious awareness inherent in the individual. To this end Erikson (1968) distinguishes between self-and ego-identity. The latter is characterized by "the actually attained but for ever to-be revised sense of the reality of the Self within social reality" (Erikson; 1968, p. 211). It is the knowledge of the integration of several selves, or several identifications that result in self-identity. Erikson thus distinguishes between the environmentally-based ego-identity and the individually-based self-identity as a natural development from the simple postulate that society reinforces "the values by which the ego exists" (Erikson; 1965, p. 269).

Roazen (1976) levels his major criticism of Erikson's theory of identity at the strength of the ego's mastery in uniting the inner and outer worlds: "we will want to question whether or not ego psychology need lead to a complacency which justifies the social status quo" (Roazen; 1976, p. 27). His criticism arises from the faith Erikson seems to place in the established social order as a signpost to guide the growing child and in Erikson's belief in a universal identity for all mankind, achieved without any change in social institutions. Erikson's own moral code led him to explain oppressive societies in terms of what he calls "pseudo-species" (Erikson; 1965, p. 402). Such groups set themselves up as demi-gods and sanction individuals' choices of negative social roles which
result in the development of negative identity or pseudo-identities. In an examination of the Sioux Indian tribe, Erikson (1965) found a negative group identity, an identity destroyed by the arrival of the white man:

"...step for step, the Sioux has been denied the bases for a collective identity formation and with it that reservoir of collective integrity from which the individual must derive his stature as a social being" (Erikson; 1965, p. 148).

While Erikson's stages involve both positive and negative elements (basic trust versus basic mistrust; autonomy versus shame and doubt), he sees oppressed groups as incorporating the negative images of the pseudo-species (or the majority) in their own negative identity. Where actual roles become unattainable, individuals may identify with stereotyped fragments of their historical identity. In attempting to overcome the problem of pseudo-identities, Erikson maintains that all mankind is searching for a universal identity; and it is on this point that Roazen (1976) calls Erikson an idealist who proposes no institutional change and is therefore conservative in outlook.

Such criticism is undoubtedly justified: Erikson views each stage as a crisis in development, but the ego is responsible for restoring equilibrium between the individual and the social order. Therefore, at for example, the second stage of development, autonomy versus shame and doubt, the ego is responsible for establishing a "sense" of self-control without losing its self-esteem (Roazen, 1976, also criticizes Erikson's continual use of the word "sense" of; he asks whether the ego actually does establish self-control). As this is a further stage in the growth of ego-identity the environment is already at work on the young child:

"...an environment which, in turn, feels called upon to convey to him its particular ideas and concepts of autonomy and coercion in ways decisively contributing to the character and the health of her personality in his culture..." (Erikson; 1965, p. 263).
This is a definite buttressing of a stable, continuous environment which, while plausible, does not mean that the culture inculcated into the child is necessarily "good" (Roazen, 1976). Not only has this stage immediate conformist implications, it carries these into the future life of the adult in that "the sense of autonomy fostered in the child and modified as life progresses, serves (and is served by) the preservation in economic and political life of a sense of justice" (Erikson; 1965, p. 246). Thus the moral development of the child begins in the early stages of the development of identity. Roazen (1976) asks whether Erikson "has not put too much trust in the benign functions of the social order" (Roazen; 1976, p. 44) and this trust actually seems to account for Erikson's idealistic belief in the fact that once all stages are successfully resolved a "new manner of man" (Erikson; 1965, p. 406) will begin to develop a judicious way of life. Towards the end of Childhood and Society (p. 402), Erikson (1965) cautions against a misinterpretation of the concept of ego-identity. He states that the ego does not merely conform to social roles, but "adapts these roles to the further processes of his ego, thus doing his share in keeping the social process alive" (Erikson; 1965, p. 402). The question is whether or not certain social processes should retain their sameness, or should they be changed by that "judicious man"?

2.2. Cognitive aspects of Erikson's theory of identity

Erikson's eight stages of man are anchored in what he calls the epigenesis of individual development, that is the growth of organisms from the uterus in accordance with a "ground plan" (Erikson; 1964, p. 92). The epigenetic principle is the basis of stage theory in that the child is said to follow inner laws of development which, while varying from culture to culture, remain within "the proper rate and proper sequence"
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which governs all epigenesis" (Erikson; 1968, p. 93). Erikson has relied on the work of Jean Piaget to bolster his predominantly affective theory just as Piaget (1929) sees a necessary correspondence between cognitive and affective aspects for the development of reality orientations (Kohlberg, 1966). Erikson (1964) acknowledges that "it is the joint development of cognitive and emotional powers paired with appropriate social learning which enables the individual to realize the potentialities of a stage" (Erikson; 1964, p. 225), and that "cognitive orientation forms not a contrast but a complement to the need of young people to develop a sense of identity" (Erikson; 1968, p. 245).

Erikson has extracted from cognitive theory a concentration on the healthy ego (ego-identity) which is responsible for the functioning personality or what Piaget (in Erikson; 1964, p. 135) calls the "unity of personality". Cognitive developmentalists themselves regard the ego as a central regulator and integrator of the personality: they "recognize the organizing role of the self, or ego, in social development" (Kohlberg; 1966, p. 125). Piaget though sees cognitive-structural change and not affective change as responsible for reality orientation. Erikson (1964) cites Piaget as rejecting the claim that he (Piaget) had found the structural unity underlying the functional unity of a healthy child. Erikson (1964) himself asserts that such unity is found in the strengths of the ego in its relation to epigenetic development. Erikson (1964) calls "conflict" (Piaget's term to denote the need for structural change) between the ego and the environment a "crisis" and acknowledges that only by understanding the "functional unity of the personality" (that is, the ability to integrate physiological, mental and emotional functions) can the over-all stages of development be grasped (Erikson; 1964, p. 141).

The egocentric style of speech the child uses at the early stages
of cognitive development finds its parallel in Erikson's (1965) micro-and macro-spheres. At first the child's speech resembles a continual monologue, regardless of the presence of others. Yet as he grows older, society demands a more communicative speech pattern from him and the child is forced to adapt his egocentric speech to a pattern recognizing the outer world (Erikson's macrosphere). This functional aspect of cognitive growth is paralleled by the individual's conception of his ego-strength: the child decentres from Self towards a greater understanding of the external world which at the same time results in increased comprehension of Self. For Erikson (1964) this means the resolution of a crisis and further integration of identifications for ego-identity development. Just as the child learns to react according to "whatever connotation this happens to have in the coordinates of his culture's space-time" (Erikson; 1965, p. 227), so too does he develop the necessary cognitive structures to be able to assimilate those environmental factors necessary for further structural change.

Erikson's (1965) initial identification of play as a function of the ego is synonymous with Piaget's (1929) idea of the young child's symbolic play which Piaget sees as providing an adaptation towards reality. Symbolic play involves the use of mental symbols which are, however, embedded in physical reality. Similarly the development of symbolic thought arises from concepts which have their basis in the social order (Kohlberg, 1966). Piaget, as a genetic epistemologist, is also aware of an historical perspective which links cognitive development with socio-geneisis, collective development. For Erikson (1968) it is "mutuality", a mutual affirmation of egos between the individual and his society, that accounts for a psychosocial identity; for Piaget (1954) it is the child's cognitive construction of reality that affirms such an identity.
2.3. Erikson and moral development

While Erikson's theory of identity is complemented by aspects of cognitive developmental theory, it is in the field of moral development that Erikson's ideas need much amplification and clarification: although he sees in the growth of ego-identity the rudiments of moral development, he does little to amplify his ideas, except as they relate to his own moral code. Each of Erikson's stages exemplify the concepts of a "good" and an "evil" and it is by resolving the crises of the stages that the "good" is incorporated into the individual's identity development. At the same time ego-identity only gains real strength by societal recognition. Therefore the individual's morality must be society-based. Erikson (1968) regards moralities as outliving themselves and it is for this reason that he places more stress on the ethical stance of adulthood.

Erikson (1968) distinguishes between childhood morality, the ideological pattern of adolescence and the ethics of the adult. He states that only "a gradually accruing sense of identity" makes for "a sense of humanity" (Erikson; 1968, p. 402). Rozen's (1976) criticism of Erikson's use of "sense of" extends to a criticism of whether Erikson has not placed ethical concepts in the idea of ego-strength by postulating an ideal form of development rather than an actuality. While at the second stage of his ego development the child is "in constant need for new everyday ritualizations of moral discrimination in words and sounds truly corresponding to a shared moral climate which the child can comprehend - and experiment with" (Erikson; 1978, p. 95). The child thus develops autonomy of self. However, in the third stage of development (initiative versus guilt) he is confronted with the destructive drives of sexual guilt. It is because of this guilt that the child searches for identifications with the good, or with ideal types that his parents can
present to him in the form of, for example, fairy-tales. His initiative in this search is governed by conscience, an inner voice, and Erikson (1968) calls this "the ontogenetic cornerstone of morality" (Erikson; 1968, p. 119). The child is governed by moral rules which he incorporates for fear of retaliation.

It is this initial division between conscience and guilt that leads to the ideological basis of adolescence. At this stage, in order to consolidate his identity, the individual is placed in the position of having to choose between his own ideals, with their ideological connotations, and the social goals of his society. He attempts to find social values to guide his identity but a crisis arises when he feels "that the environment tries to deprive him too radically of all the forms of expression which permit him to develop and integrate the next step... in his development" (Erikson; 1968, p. 130). Erikson (1968) states that although society may not recognize the adolescent's inner identity (identity crisis), it grants him a moratorium in which to resolve crises such as ethnic and sexual confusion. Erikson (1968) postulates that "the social institution which is the guardian of identity is what we have called ideology" (Erikson; 1968, p. 133). Yet at no stage does he suggest changing institutions to improve the general plight of mankind.

It is at this point that Erikson's concern with ethical values begins. Ethical rules, as opposed to moral rules, are concerned with ideals and these can only arise from "an informed and inspired search for a more inclusive identity" (Erikson; 1964, p. 242). While conceptualizing the judicious world of adults as a ritual of "meaningful regularity" Erikson (1978) states that it fails to provide the next generation with workable rules:

"the judicious ritual at large, with its task of establishing objective moral guilt as a threatening
example to potential culprits, is all too often too far removed from the subjective process which makes a person feel morally liable" (Erikson; 1978, pp. 96-97).

In such an instance, an adult should be able to discount societal morals in favour of his own ethical principles. Once more, there is no suggestion of changing the judicious ritual. It is instead pseudo-species that hamper the quest of mankind for a universal identity based on ethical principles. From this one could draw the conclusion that for Erikson, people with negative identities are not able to achieve the ethical ideal of a wider, human identity. As Roazen (1976) points out, in Erikson's later writings the term "identity" itself takes on ethical connotations. Erikson (1968) begins to equate identity with ethical convictions.

Where Erikson's ideas on moral development fail is in his inability to provide a structural unity for the development of morality across cultures. Since ego-strength is reinforced by societal norms, changes in these norms suggest a corresponding change in the developmental process of identity. Yet at no stage does Erikson actually proffer change in societal institutions - he places his faith in human infancy as being "the bedrock of ethics" (Roazen; 1976, p. 155) but does not broach the role of the ego in structuring moral development. A cognitive-based theory of moral development considers the structure underlying moral judgement, and is found in the work of Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg (1969, 1971).

2.4. Piaget's theory of moral development

According to Erikson, ego-identity is the knowledge of the self within social reality and the child's morality is a product of identity development. Piaget (1932) traces the progress of moral development in the child in terms of the development of an autonomous self, an ego able to differentiate the external thoughts of others from his self.
A similarity exists between Piaget’s concept of cooperation, the child “will learn to understand the other person and be understood by him” (Piaget; 1932, p. 90), and Erikson’s theory of ego-identity as “the accrued confidence that the inner sameness and conformity are matched by sameness and continuity of one’s meaning for others” (Erikson; 1965, p. 253). For Piaget, cooperation between children, and between adults and children is the distinguishing feature of an autonomous person for whom the development of a sense of justice proceeds naturally. Unlike Erikson, Piaget finds a parallel between cooperative social relations and the development of a cooperative individual; the characteristics of the former “create within people’s minds the consciousness of ideal norms at the back of all rules” (Piaget; 1932, p. 402) and it is a system of rules that Piaget sees as basic to all morality. Thus while Erikson conceives of cooperation between the ego and society as resulting in a broad, common identity for mankind that is ethically “ideal”, Piaget actually distinguishes a society of constraint from one of cooperation, the development of the latter mirroring the growth of autonomy in children. Erikson’s autonomous child (stage two) is still dependent on the affirmation of his ego by the adult world while for Piaget, cooperation or consciousness of self as separate from others, arises from the liberation of oneself “from the thought and will of others” (Piaget; 1932, p. 87). This is more realistic than Erikson’s postulation of an ideal ego-identity as Piaget traces the moral development of the child in terms of the growing separation of the ego from its dependence on the social order: there is not the continuity and sameness between ego and society found in Erikson’s theory of identity.

In fact Erikson’s second stage (autonomy versus shame and doubt) is paralleled by Piaget’s idea of heteronomy (or morality of constraint) in which “society is not so much a successful cooperation between equals as
a feeling of continuous communion between the ego and the World of the Elder or Adult” (Piaget; 1932, p. 49). The child is centered around self (egocentrism), and although he is able to imitate rules, he plays alone independently of others. Yet egocentrism is dependent upon adult constraint and moral realism which involve unilateral respect for authority. Adult constraint reinforces egocentrism: the outside world is presumed to be outside the concern of the child’s mind and is thus accepted as such. The child tends to materialize and project into the universe the realities of social life” (Piaget; 1932, p. 184) and moral laws are "conceived as existing in themselves, independently of the mind, and in consequence independently of individual circumstances and of intentions" (Piaget; 1932, 196). Adult constraint thus functions independently of the child and is thus complied to, though without comprehension of the link between the child’s own actions and the external rules. It is only when the child separates his own ego from the outside world that he is able to develop a morality of cooperation as opposed to a heteronomous concept of morality.

For Piaget, a sense of justice develops independently of adult examples and "require nothing more for its development than the mutual respect and solidarity which holds among children themselves" (Piaget; 1932, p. 196). A sense of autonomy can only arise when equality takes precedence over authority, when the child does not, out of duty and fear of punishment, conform to adult authority. For Erlanson, this would be the point of division between the morality of the child and the ethical position of adulthood. Piaget, however, by distinguishing between societies of constraint and cooperation, recognizes that children can confuse authority with justice:

"The ethics of authority, which is that of duty and obedience, leads, in the domain of justice, to the confusion of what is just with the content of
established law and to the acceptance of expiatory punishment" (Piaget; 1932, p. 324).

Erikson too has perhaps confused authority with justice when he states that the child's autonomy finds its "institutional safeguard in the principle of law and order" (Erikson; 1965, p. 246). This is not the case with Piaget for whom only peer group cooperation results in a true knowledge of equality over authority: "but for true equality and a genuine desire for reciprocity there must be a collective rule which is the sui generis product of life lived in common" (Piaget; 1932, p. 317). While this has hypothetically, much in common with Erikson's idea of a collective identity, Piaget is more explicit in delineating the structural development of morality in terms of a "law of evolution" (1932, p. 225). He found that as the moral development of children proceeds "the desire for equality... seems... to grow more acute" (p. 274) and he sees peer group cooperation as the main reason for this. However, the moral solidarity that exists between children can also be held responsible for the development of group consciousness based on moral content and not moral form. A society of constraint will in all probability result in the formation of group consciousness based on the principle of constraint or expiative justice. Yet "the more complex the society, the more autonomous is the personality and the more important are the relations of cooperation between equal individuals" (Piaget; 1932, p. 336). A conformist society is more likely to further constraint among individuals, and thus an objective as opposed to subjective sense of responsibility is fostered. Rules are handed down to individuals and it is their duty to preserve the morality inherent in such rules. A comparison could possibly be made here with Erikson's pseudo-identities, negative identities developing in terms of the rules of the larger pseudo-identity. Piaget's social cooperation is the
ideal of a democratic community; for Erikson, a democratic community will not give rise to pseudo-identities.

2.5. Kohlberg’s Theory of Moral Development

Kohlberg’s (1970) theory of moral development is, of all such theories, the one most frequently applied to empirical research. The applicability of his theory rests in his clear delineation of moral stages, six in all, and yet his concept of morality is basically philosophical. His stages form a hierarchy in moral adequacy, the last stage which is principle orientated towards justice is a personal choice on Kohlberg’s part. Of course, the same criticism has been levelled against Erikson. Where the value of Kohlberg’s approach lies, is in his emphasis on role-taking opportunities for moral growth. He takes greater cognizance of the effect of social forces on stages of moral thought than does Piaget, and by studying the relation of moral thought to moral conduct and emotion, incorporates the theories of ego-psychologists into his work. Each of his stages is dependent upon the level of maturity reached by the child’s moral judgement, or level of ego-identity on which the child’s moral judgement is based.

In a study of how the cognitive learning of sex-role concepts lead to the development of masculine values, Kohlberg (1966) emphasizes five points: firstly the child tends to schematize interests that are consistent with old ones - this is of course allied to Piaget’s concept of assimilation. Secondly value judgement were found to be consistent with self-conceptual identity. Although Kohlberg (1966) concludes that:

"the moralization of sex-role differences... is not part of a general identification-internalization process through which sex-roles are reputedly learned, but is only one of several mechanisms through which developing sex-role concepts influence attitudes" (Kohlberg; 1966, p. 123)
he does state that the child tends to value his own gender-identity positively as he values anything similar to himself positively - or in terms of "good". This is similar to the two polarities of Erikson's stages. The child tends to identify with the good as a prototype of his ego-identity. Like Piaget, Kohlberg (1966) states that it is the objectification of the ego that results in more objective value-judgements: "increased tendencies toward objective and consistent conceptualizations of the self" result in "increased tendencies towards objective and consistent values" (p. 113). Kohlberg (1966) thus synthesizes Piaget and Erikson's theories. There is a move towards a cognitive balance between self-concept and value judgements. This balance results in the equation of the self with the good, and the subsequent performance of activities that the self judges as good, and at the same time those activities that are judged as good are a part of the self. Thus gender-identity develops from a "basic physical reality judgement made relatively early in the child's development" (Kohlberg; 1966, p. 164). Sex-role stereotypes develop in children at about the age of four.

The third of Kohlberg's (1966) conditions for masculine-feminine values has been alluded to, positive values such as prestige or competence are related to sex-role stereotypes. Kohlberg (1966) maintains that White's (1959) theory of competence motivation accounts for this: the child is motivated to achieve in what is recognized as a competent role. In this way stereotypes such as masculine power come to be conceived of as good. This also elucidates Erikson's idea of ego-identity being confirmed by society: it is possible that society confirms the adaptation of the individual to conformity, or stereotyped roles. Kohlberg (1966) notes fourthly the "tendency to view basic conformity to one's role as moral" (p. 111), in other words "conformity
to a general socio-moral order" (p. 111). Thus if it appears that society conceives of masculinity in terms of power, "power" takes on moral implications as one is conforming to societal values. The final category is the tendency towards imitation. People who are valued as been prestigious or competent, or who are perceived to be similar to self, are imitated because they are associated with "good".

This leads to Kohlberg's (1970) level of conventional role conformity in which the individual maintains the expectations of his peers and the social order. This respect for authority is a parallel to Piaget's heteronomous stage, except for Kohlberg, his levels underlie six stages: adjustment rather than development occurs when an individual's end-point is this level of conventional role conformity. Thus what Piaget (1932) saw as child-based, Kohlberg (1970) views as adult conformity to principles of law and order.

The final level of moral development, the post-conventional level, relates to Erikson's (1968) ethical stage and Piaget's (1932) autonomous individual. For Kohlberg (1970), the moral reasoning at this stage is abstract and involves, unlike Piaget's stage, conflict with conventional standards rather than cooperation. Cooperation for Kohlberg (1970) involves a social contract between members of a society for the common good of that society, and can also be related to the post-conventional level. But personal principles morality views rules as subject to change, even if this involves conflict as to what is right or wrong—conflict between personal principles and the social contract. Keniston (1970) reports that Kohlberg has found that the post-conventional stages "are never reached by most men and women in American society who remain at the conventional stage" (Keniston; 1970, p. 442).
CHAPTER 3

Developmental theories, ego-identity and racial attitudes

The theories discussed above are important for a specific reason: empirical research into ego-identity and racial attitudes in children has been described as "fragmentary and incomplete" (Proshansky and Newton, 1973). Not only have research tools been responsible for this, but there has also been a lack of theoretical justification for empirical findings. Erikson's theory elucidates much "identity" and "self-concept" research, while Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg's (1966, 1970) theories provide a framework for the relation of moral development to racial attitudes.

3.1. Erikson

Erikson's theory of identity is a useful frame of reference to explain the findings of many empirical studies that black children exhibit a negative self-identity (Clark and Clark, 1939; Horowitz, 1939; Porter, 1971). The applicability of his theory adds weight to an historical and developmental approach to the study of negative self-identity, a concept which has been criticized as merely "reinforcing the syndrome which it suggests exists" (McCarthy and Yancey; 1971, p. 197). Yet Erikson (1966) himself is careful not to read into the concept any suggestion of pathology and states that the Negro's negative identity is not to be viewed "only in terms of his defensive adjustments to the dominant white majority..." (p. 155). A further criticism often levelled at empirical investigations of black self-concept is their failure to incorporate African conceptions of self. Nobles (1973) states that while the Western conception of self is individualistic, the African conception is of an extended self without a
clear dichotomy between "I" and "we". Erikson's concept of ego-identity actually provides for a continuity between the "I" and the "we", the final collective identity representing a fusion between egos - that of society and that of the individual.

The cornerstone of Erikson's theory of ego-identity is the crisis of each stage which the individual must resolve. The child is offered prototypes of good and evil and his ego-strength usually involves the mastery of the good as opposed to the evil. Erikson (1966) postulates that the Negro child is presented with a good defined in terms of the dominant white majority, while the evil is actually the majority's conception of the Negro in terms of derogatory stereotypes. Thus black per se is represented as evil and the Negro child develops an awareness of the majority culture's conception of his skin-colour: "he is inferior because he is black" (Ziajka; 1972, p. 252). Erikson (1968) maintains that an "estrangement from national and ethnic origins" (p. 173) leads to the adoption of a negative identity. Yet it is an identity based on "all those identifications and roles which, at the critical stages of development, have been presented to them as most undesirable or dangerous and yet also as most real" (Erikson; 1968, p. 174). The identifications presented to the Negro child are in terms of an undesirable ego-identity, yet as this is part and parcel of the individual's actual self (that is, his skin colour), he develops a negative self-identity. By accepting a negative identity, the Negro's role is affirmed by the white majority. If the individual's ego-identity only gains strength from the meaning it has in a certain culture, the Negro child is compelled to adopt a negative ego-identity in order to achieve some recognition within his culture. That the negative identity is dependent on an oppressive culture is evinced by the more positive self-images now being demonstrated by Blacks in terms of the growth of black consciousness (Hraba and Grant, 1970).
In terms of the historical perspective embedded in Erikson's approach, negative ego-identity must also be examined in relation to the history of a society that has produced such identities. Erikson's theory is embedded in psychosocial relativity. He states that "to discuss the identity problem... means to play into cultural history, or, perhaps to become its tool" (Erikson; 1968, p. 27). Erikson (1964) asserts that under slave conditions three Negro identities emerged: firstly the oral-sensual tradition related to music; secondly an evil identity related to the subjugation of the Negro by the white man and thirdly the identity of the "white man's Negro," the Negro who adapted himself to the slave owner's demands, the Uncle Tom's of American slave history. What Erikson maintains is that these stereotypes have become fragmented and incorporated into the white man's conception of the Negro, and it is these fragments that in turn form a negative ego-identity. Ziajka (197-) suggests that after slavery, Negroes had no conscious awareness of the past as this was destroyed by Whites. What Ziajka might mean is that the Negro had no awareness of a past identity independent of Whites as he was defined in terms of the White man's need, a view which then came to dominate stereotype conceptions of his role in American society. The system of slavery and its implications for ego-identity were carried into the policy of segregation which is tantamount to encouraging the growth of negative ego-identities in Blacks; in South Africa such identity is defined in terms of second-class citizenship.

According to Erikson (1968), ego-identity is dependent on but not defined by past identifications. Adolescents integrate these identifications in terms of their future role in society. The adolescent crisis of role confusion often presents itself much earlier in black children. Erikson (1964) relates the story of a Negro girl who could only conceive of something white as something good. Erikson maintains
that this example

"points to the depth of the identity disturbance caused in people who are made to feel so inexorably 'different' that legal desegregation can only be the beginning of a long and painful inner re-identification - not to speak of true participation in a more inclusive new identity" (Erikson; 1964, p. 94).

It is important to realize that for the Black American "feelings of inferiority are entirely natural" (Milner; 1975, p. 146) as the majority role for the Negro is one of inferiority. Jahoda (1961) found inferiority to be an intrinsic part of Ghanaian's conceptions of themselves before independence. Fanon (1968) conceives of the black man's inferiority as being the creation of a racist majority. It would, perhaps, be easy to ignore empirical research and assert that the idea of a negative self-identity is itself a majority stereotype, but this only detracts from the destructiveness and harm an oppressive society can perpetrate: Erikson recognizes that pseudo-societies create individuals with negative identities, both the oppressor and the oppressed are party to such identities in a pseudo-society.

It is the development of a group identity based on negative identities that Erikson maintains results in a positive group identity:

"If we wish to find witnesses to a radically different awareness of the relation of positive and negative identity, we have only to change our historical perspective and look to Negro writers in this country today" (Erikson; 1968, p. 25).

He sees in the Negro's affirmation of a negative identity the means of a "collective recovery" (Erikson; 1968, p. 25) and states that this is "a universal trend among the exploited" (p. 25). Thus in India, identity formed the psychological core of liberation from colonial rule, resulting in an internal and an external emancipation. Fundamental to the development of a positive identity is the ability to confront one's own ego-identity. Thus Thomas (1970) sees social competence resulting from "a new black ethic based upon psychocultural factors, racial
awareness, identity and pride" (p. 265) the basic posits of Erikson's (1968) "wider identity". The new black consciousness can create a positive group identity independent of the white man: "the struggle of black men has become symbolic of the struggle of all oppressed groups to achieve dignity and respect in the face of bigotry and discrimination" (Proshansky and Newton; 1973, p. 209). Thus the quest for a group identity is ideological, a fact that predominates Erikson's theory of identity:

"identity and ideology are two aspects of the same process. Both provide the necessary condition for further individual maturation, and with it, for the next higher form of identification, namely, the solidarity of linking common identities" (Erikson; 1964, p. 37).

Just as the black child's consciousness of self develops in terms of racial identity, so does the ego-identity of white children develop according to the roles most accepted by the dominant culture. Unless the child develops into Erikson's ethical adult, in a conservative society he will confirm the conservatism of Erikson's ego-identity by developing at one with his society, and by eventually reinforcing the ideology of his ego-identity within a particular society. Erikson (1965) is concerned with just such an ideology in his discussion of the American identity:

"The middle class, preoccupied as it is with matters of real estate and consumption, or status and posture, will include more and more of the highly gifted and fortunate, but if it does not yield to the wider identity of the Negro American it obviously creates new barriers between the few and the mass of the Negroes (Erikson; 1968, p. 317).

It is not surprising that there has been a burgeoning of studies investigating the development of racial attitudes in white children as an antidote to eradicating racial prejudice in adults. Since the basis of identity formation is ideological there develops a polarity between the ego-identity of white children and that of black children. According to
Erikson (1968), it is the duty of the middle-class to "yield to the wider identity of the Negro American" (p. 317), and surely the starting point for such a move is the eradication of discrimination in society and thus of racial prejudice in children. Erikson does not draw such a conclusion. It is in the development of the young white child's ego-identity that society has the chance to change its demands on the child, and at the same time incorporate aspects of the wider identity into its own collective identity. Only in this way will Erikson's idea of an identity for mankind materialize.

Roazen (1976) points out that Erikson does not elucidate the harmful effects of a white middle-class upbringing on the ego-identity of the young child but only points to the benefits "in terms of the internal dynamics of the individuals" (Roazen; 1976, p. 35). Such benefits may at the same time be "socially harmful and noxious: one has only to think of the positive role many racist institutions play in overcoming individual guilt and anxiety" (Roazen; 1976, p. 36). Roazen (1976) points out that Erikson's moral code does little by way of postulating societal improvements; it is a code in which the child will be morally "good" if he resolves each stage in his ego-development; what then of the Negro child who develops a negative identity? Such issues, Roazen (1976) maintains can be resolved to the satisfaction of our conscience only because we have already decided upon our moral premises" (p. 170). Thus although Erikson's theory is useful in helping to explain the development of negative identities in Blacks, he is working from a premise in which an ideal environment will create only positive identities.

3.2. Erikson's ego stages and cognitive-development theory

Although the concept "ego-identity" has been operationalized into "self-concept" or "self-worth," Erikson's theory remains an ideal ex-
planation of the development of ego-identity, and one that is difficult to examine empirically. Kohlberg (1973) characterizes Erikson's functional approach as a focus on the changing self of the growing child in a constant socio-moral world. On the other hand, the structural approaches of Piaget and Kohlberg "represent a series of increasingly adequate cognitions of a relatively constant physical and social world" (Kohlberg; 1973, p. 51). Kohlberg (1973) views moral development as a contributory factor to ego development and thus seeks to link the cognitive-developmental approach with Erikson's ego-oriented theory:

"While Erikson's stages cannot be defined, measured, or logically handled in the same sense as cognitive-developmental stages, suggestive empirical relations between ego-identity terms and moral stages are found" (Kohlberg; 1971, p. 1077).

The important point to note here is that cognitive-developmental theories lend themselves to empirical investigation; the theories as such are themselves modifiable in terms of experimental results. Given a theoretical link between Erikson and the cognitive-developmentalists, studies which find a relationship between highly principled subjects and "identity achievement" (Kohlberg and Gilligan; 1971, p. 1077) are proffering support for Erikson's theory of identity. In addition such studies relate Kohlberg's moral stages to an ego-developmental approach, an integration Kohlberg (1973) examined. He tabulated a "loose fit" (Kohlberg; 1973, p. 47) between ego stages and moral stages:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'Ego stages'</th>
<th>Moral stages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ascribed identities accepted</td>
<td>Conventional morality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity crisis or moratorium</td>
<td>Traditional or 'retrogressed' relativism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity achievement</td>
<td>Principled morality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is a further implication in the relationship of the two theories. Kohlberg (1967) sees moral development "as a progressive movement toward basing moral judgement on concepts of justice" (Kohlberg; 1967, p. 173) just as Piaget (1932) views heteronomous, as opposed to autonomous, societies as those which attempt to impose a supposed truth on individuals.
A study of the development of race attitudes is strengthened if the development of moral judgement in terms of the concept of justice, is examined. Studies of race attitudes have almost invariably been forced to examine the growth of identity in the child as an integral part of his race attitudes. Thus although Erikson himself has explained the formation of negative identity in individuals, it is through the application of a cognitive developmental approach to moral development that the maintenance of prejudiced racial attitudes in terms of identity development can be examined. At the same time theories of moral development account for an individual's acceptance of authoritarian systems and provide a framework in which to examine how race attitudes develop.

3.2.1. Piaget

According to Piaget (1932), a child at the heteronomous stage of moral development is egocentric, that is, he views the world as fused with his own perception of reality. He is also characterized by realism, subjective and objective phenomena are confused. In terms of moral realism, such a child regards rules as unchangeable and absolute and judges these rules according to the physical consequences of an act rather than its intentions. These three dimensions have been found to exist in American and French-speaking cultures, as have the heteronomous dimensions of definition of wrong by punishment, expiative as opposed to restitutive justice, and immanent justice. All these dimensions demand a cognitive set in which the child is unable to separate physical and biological laws from adult-made laws. Laws exist independently of the child and independently of circumstance or intention - thus judgements concerning punishment are fairly simple. It is only through cooperative activity that the child comes to understand the purpose of rules which are not independent of himself. Yet this stage in Piaget's theory
lacks empirical support: reciprocity and peer orientation "do not appear to be 'genuine' developmental dimensions" (Kohlberg; 1963, p. 319). As these two dimensions are essential for the development of an autonomous individual it appears that Piaget fails to provide evidence of the cognitive development essential for the autonomous stage. He views this development in terms of the falling away of egocentrism and the ability to view reality from the perspective of other individuals. Kohlberg (1963) found that such mutual cooperation does not lead to reciprocity. Reciprocity, according to Kohlberg (1963) is "associated with lack of respect for adult authority, but not with peer-group participation" (p. 320).

Although Kohlberg has questioned the crux of Piaget's theory, namely that a sense of justice develops from a solidarity among children themselves, Piaget (1932) also maintains that a complex society will foster the development of such solidarity. Kohlberg (1963) validly criticizes Piaget's assumption that a sense of justice is a product of a certain stage, yet Piaget did qualify his stages by the assertion that conformist societies will tend to be heteronomous and will encourage the development of dimensions such as constraint or expiative justice. Thus an authoritarian society will be less likely to produce autonomous individuals than a democratic society as in the former, mutual cooperation is discouraged. Piaget's theory does have the validity of placing the emergence of an autonomous stage in a larger social context, and perhaps this explains why, in fact, research has failed to find "a positive relationship between peer-group participation and an orientation to reciprocity" (Kohlberg; 1963, p. 320). A truly democratic society would produce more evidence of such a relationship, while negative and authoritarian societies would foster an objective, or non-cooperative sense of responsibility.
3.2.2. Kohlberg

Kohlberg (1973) maintains that aspects of moral development are a reaction to the whole social world and not merely a product of a certain stage. He sees each stage as representing a more adequate conception of the social system and the developing ability to think more abstractly. At the same time he examines the relationship of ego-development to moral development. Just as the cognitive-learning of sex-role concepts is related to value judgements consistent with self-conceptual identity, so too can the cognitive-learning of concepts such as race be related to the development of morality and identity. Kohlberg (1966) states that "the curvilinear age development of moralist sex-role stereotypes is probably quite similar to the more thoroughly studied development of moralist racial stereotypes" (p. 123). Thus if a tendency exists to equate the self with the good, then the racial group to which one belongs is also perceived of as good. The fact that at the ages of three or four the child is already able to value his own gender-identity positively in terms of sex-role stereotypes, lends weight to the finding that children of four years old already begin to express race attitudes (Goodman, 1964). An explanation in terms of cognitive balance explains the tendency to judge what is equated as part of the self as good - thus children will value positively people of the same racial group as themselves, as being an extension of their selves. A negative identity develops when the child values the self as good, but society negates that belief and portrays aspects of the child's self (such as skin colour) negatively.

Competence motivation (White, 1959), a concept Kohlberg (1966) used to help explain the adoption of sex-role stereotypes, is also an explanation for the acceptance of racial stereotypes. Since in a white-dominated society, white is conceived of as good, children, both
white and black, will be motivated to identify with what is good. This conformity will in turn be conceived of as moral, as being part of the socio-moral order of society. Conformity leads to the conventional level of Kohlberg's stages, to an acceptance of the rules of authority, but it is Kohlberg's (1966, 1973) intention to account for the development of post-conventional morality in adults, as this is where he found Piaget's theory to be at fault.

Smith (1969) and Haan, Smith and Block (1968) found that the majority of students involved in sit-ins at the University of California, Berkeley, were at the post-conventional level of morality while only twelve percent of non-protesters had reached that level. Kohlberg (in Keniston, 1970) found that a high level of moral development does not lead naturally to participation in public protests and sought to explain adult moral development in terms of Erikson's theory of ego-identity:

"Our reasoning is that the movement from conventional to principled morality was one which must be considered as a matter of personal choice and as a choice of a self in a sense which was not true of earlier moral stages. Accordingly, it might be hypothesized that an Eriksonian 'identity crisis' and its resolution might be a necessary part of this movement" (Kohlberg; 1973, p. 47).

Kohlberg (1973) found that in fact people who remain at the conventional level of moral development, and who have never experienced an "identity crisis" lack both ego and moral progression. In a study conducted by Podd (Kohlberg and Gilligan, 1971) two-thirds of the principled subjects had an "identity achievement status". Kohlberg and Gilligan (1971) conclude from this that "to have questioned conventional morality you must have questioned your identity as well, though you may continue to hold a conventional moral position after having done so". (Kohlberg and Gilligan; 1971, p. 1078). Thus the emergence of the post-conventional level correlates with the individual achieving ego-identity, in other words, perceiving himself in relation to, and independent of, a
given socio-moral order. Kohlberg (1973) prefers the notion of choice in Erikson's stages (that is, the movement of the self is dependent on the self's choices) to Piaget's more static notion of stages of perception of the world. By basing his theory on the former, while still maintaining the cognitive approach of the latter, Kohlberg has attempted to synthesize the affective and cognitive aspects of moral development.

It can be concluded then, that the adolescent choice, in Eriksonian terms identity versus role-confusion, is a moral one. Kohlberg (1971, 1973) perceives of moral development as the widening of role-taking opportunities. While at stage three of the conventional level, the child begins to orientate himself towards the mutuality of interpersonal relations. Should he, however, be presented with differing groups and conflicting expectations, the individual can yield "to an identifying with one system which is seen as overarching and adequate" (Duska and Whelan; 1977, p. 64). This is the "law and order" orientation of stage four, a stage when the individual has his identity in society confirmed by conforming to the moral order of society. It is this stage that allows for the perpetuation of authoritarian systems. Kohlberg (1973) states that cognitive maturity is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition, for moral judgement maturity. Only when the individual undergoes an "identity crisis", in other words, when his perception of himself conflicts with society's conception of his role, can he progress morally towards the post-conventional level of moral judgement - an ability to see what "ought" to be, and not acceptance of what "is".

Kohlberg's theory of moral development provides the basis for the development of race attitudes in young children, conformity to racial stereotypes, and in older children, the inability to identify the self in terms of higher levels of moral judgement. Kohlberg (1971) found only ten percent of American urban middle-class males aged twenty-four
to have reached the personal principles stage. Because individuals fail
to separate themselves from the socio-moral order, a system can be per­
petuated for generations. It is an atmosphere of acceptance of the
socio-moral order that characterizes middle-class Americans, a fac­
which can perhaps explain the racial prejudice still rampant in such a
society.
CHAPTER 4

Empirical Findings

The theoretical issues discussed in the previous chapters elucidate the developmental stages of the child which could account for the development of race attitudes and race consciousness in children. Although Kohlberg (1971) has investigated the relationship of moral stages to ideology, race attitudes research has not relied on theoretical postulates to confirm empirical findings. Thus, for example, Goodman (1964) found that at the age of two, children are conscious of their own and others' racial characteristics. Stevenson and Stewart (1958) confirm this finding and maintain that by the age of four to six, children are already aware of the stereotyped roles assigned to Negroes. The discussion of Kohlberg's theory of moral development has already pointed to the early development of stereotype awareness in children. Erikson's ego-identity theory can be applied similarly to Clark's (1955) finding that for Negro children, most often the recipients of racial prejudice, self-identification in terms of skin colour is entrenched at ages five to eight. The following review of empirical research will attempt to establish where possible the relationship between experimental findings and theoretical issues. While the cognitive and affective growth of the child in terms of ego-identity and moral development has been discussed, empirical research focuses on those societal influences responsible for aiding such growth.

4.1. Determinants of racial attitudes

There is no single determining factor responsible for the development of racial attitudes in children. There is no conclusive evidence
45.

to prove that parents are responsible for transmitting attitudes to their children: while Freud (1973) believes in early childhood introjections of parental authority figures (the formation of the superego), Erikson (1965, 1968) and Kohlberg (1973) see a wider configuration of societal influences as being responsible for attitude formation. These environmental influences will be reviewed below.

4 1.1. Parental Influence

There has been some evidence to show that a more rigid and authoritarian upbringing will produce a more prejudiced child (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1947, 1948; Adorno et al., 1950). Frenkel-Brunswik (1947–1948) found that prejudiced children manifest similar personality traits to their parents, but in a less rigid form. She found that racial attitudes were strongly developed in children of eleven years of age when children should have developed the sense of cooperation that Piaget (1932) sees as essential for the development of autonomous moral judgement. But children such as those in the Frenkel-Brunswik studies (1947–1948) had not attained such autonomy. Frenkel-Brunswik (1950) stipulates the kind of environment likely to produce a prejudiced child: parents of such children create an environment of submission in which the child is brought up in a highly conventional manner. Concepts of "good" and "bad" are interpreted in terms of social conformity and the child is unable to develop an ego-identity independent of his parents wishes:

"The lack of an internalized and individualized approach to the child, on the part of the parents, as well as a tendency to transmit mainly a set of conventional rules and customs, may be considered as interfering with the development of a clear-cut personal identity in the growing child" (Frenkel-Brunswik; 1950, p. 385).

In terms of Erikson's theory, if the child must accept the roles outlined for him by his parents and thus by society, his own ego-identity development suffers. His moral judgement, according to Piaget (1932)
and Kohlberg (1971, 1973), would retain a conventional respect for, and obedience to, authority figures. Frenkel-Brunswik (1950) found that parents with less desire to conform to societal norms produced more tolerant children with a richer emotional life and a greater independence from their parents. Such children would hence become more autonomous in their moral judgements, and would be more questioning of their own role in society. Frenkel-Brunswik (1950) found prejudiced individuals to be lacking in personal insight, a finding which supports Kohlberg's assumption that an "identity-crisis" is necessary for principled moral reasoning.

Clark (1955) found that Negro children often develop racial attitudes quite disparate to those of their parents. Clark and Clark (1939) found that children in a mixed nursery-school develop a consciousness of self in terms of racial identification at much later stage than do children in segregated nursery-schools. These findings stress that it is not necessarily parental attitudes that are responsible for racial attitudes towards the self and towards others. Clark and Clark (1939) point out that

"...the physical characteristics of individuals making up the environment for the developing child seems at present sufficient to change markedly the orientation of the dynamics of self-awareness and racial identification as found in a study of segregated Negro children" (Clark and Clark, 1939, p. 163).

Thus regardless of his parent's racial attitudes, the Negro child will develop attitudes that reflect society's attitudes towards him: "...the fact that young Negro children would prefer to be white reflects their knowledge that society prefers white people" (Clark; 1955, p. 24). This statement parallels Erikson's (1965) postulate that in order to confirm his ego-identity a child will develop a negative identity that allows for continuity between his own self-conception and society's conception of his identity.
In an influential and important longitudinal study, Trager and Yarrow (1952) tried to assess the extent to which parents influence their children's racial attitudes. They interviewed one hundred and one families to see whether parents could accept the racial attitudes inherent in their children's experience. They found that most parents, both Negro and White, firstly did not have an adequate understanding of cultural differences and could not impart such knowledge to their children, and secondly were themselves emotionally confused in areas concerning race and religion and were thus unable to develop positive social and emotional coping mechanisms for race problems in their children. Trager and Yarrow (1952) as opposed to the Frenkel-Brunswik (1950) finding, found that in fact many children expressed greater hostility towards another group than did their parents. They concluded that no parent-child cause-effect relationship could be postulated but that a marked similarity did exist between the racial attitudes of parents and their children. They found that parents had little or no understanding of the dynamics of prejudice and suggest a programme of parent education to help parents understand their own racial attitudes.

Black parents are able to foresee the problems which their children will have to face and often postpone mentioning racial problems to their children (Clark, 1955). Clark (1955) suggests that when the social forces responsible for racial stereotypes are broken, the cycle which gives rise to conflict and anxiety in the parent and child alike, will disintegrate. The black child has a problem of self-identification and group belongingness in a multi-racial society in which he is unable to participate fully.

A general pattern of racial response is common to white children: children reject blacks in terms of racial stereotypes regardless of
the amount of contact they actually have with black children; there is a slow increase in prejudice with age, however, prejudiced attitudes become more firmly established, they do not change qualitatively: black children show a less rapid increase in racial attitudes towards white children; there are no sex differences in racial responses and often group identification is part of the development of ego-identity (Trager and Yarrow, 1952). This pattern develops in the child as other social attitudes are formed - conformity is rewarded and the child is supported by his group (be it peers or parents): "these acquired patterns of social and racial ideas are interrelated both in development and in function" (Clark; 1955, p. 23). In studies of the development of a national attitude, children based their preference on "liking" - yet liking associated with one's own national group. For white children their social reality seems to reinforce their own group while for black children the same social reality results in a negative portrayal of his race. Trager and Yarrow's (1952) findings support Erikson's theory of ego-identity.

4.1.2. Social influences

Racial symbols in the environment are directly responsible for the growth of racial attitudes. Pettigrew (1958) found that authoritarianism was not specifically related to prejudiced beliefs which were a product of environmental pressures towards conformity. Thus in South Africa, apartheid is an institutionalized form of racism which legally enforces the segregation of black and white children. There is very little contact between the two groups on a mutual basis. Unlike in America and Britain where the media has often been responsible for fostering racial stereotypes (Hartmann and Husband, 1974; Milner, 1975), in South Africa the child's reality is one of prejudiced racial attitudes. Such a "pseudo-species" (Erikson, 1968) results in the forma-
tion of a number of ego-identity possibilities: white children can conform to the general values of the dominant group to which they belong and remain at a conventional stage of morality. Alternatively white adolescents can choose to question the established system and risk ostracism from the social order. An "identity-crisis" (Erikson, 1968) ensues which can result in a high level of post-conventional morality and a belief in the concept of justice, or in acceptance of the roles prescribed to him by his society. The black child too has a choice. He can either develop a negative identity by accepting society's definition of his minority status in terms of skin colour, or he can reject such a definition and develop a positive ego-identity in terms of a strong group consciousness. Hraba and Grant (1970) found that a multi-racial environment resulted in a strong positive self-consciousness among black children which included an acceptance of white children. As Clark (1955) states: "The measure of a social injustice is its consequence in the lives of human beings" (Clark; 1955, p. 37), and this consequence is seen especially in South Africa where the policy of educational segregation resulted in one of the major social conflicts in South African history, and one centred on the education of black children (Soweto, June, 1976).

Group membership, an important factor in the development of racial attitudes, is directly related to the weight given to a certain group by society:

"The role of group membership in the concept of self varies with the psychological position of each group in society. This position may be such as to increase or to decrease the importance of the specific group membership for the individual" (Trager and Yarrow; 1952, p. 117).

In studies involving the Clark Doll test, there is a greater tendency for black children to identify with the most socially prestigious group (Clark and Clark, 1947; Radke and Trager, 1950; Goodman, 1952;
Coopersmith (1975) found that when in the company of mainly black children, Blacks regarded themselves more favourably than did black children in a predominantly white environment. However when white children are in the minority they still consistently favour white children and hold prejudiced attitudes against blacks (Rosner, 1954). Horowitz (1935-1936) found that white children who could not have participated in racial discrimination "displayed prejudice in imagined activities in which they were too young to participate in reality" (Horowitz; 1935-1936, p. 31).

4.1.3. Cultural influences

Embedded in the artifacts of a majority culture, is evidence of racial prejudice. In literature the connotations of the words "black" and "white" have evolved into social stereotypes. The "Black is beautiful" movement is surely a linguistic as well as a social revolution. The French structuralist movement (Roland Barthes, 1977; Christian Metz, 1976) has investigated the extent to which a code dominates a person's thought structures. Constant exposure to denotative assumptions such as white symbolizing purity, imprint upon a person an order of thought which he in turn reproduces. Aspects of the media such as film or television which have only shown blacks in menial, subservient roles, or children's books which completely exclude pictures of black children, have all helped to create a code whereby the mere word black has several negative connotations.

This is borne out by a technique called the Semantic Differential, developed by Osgood (1952). Williams, Norland and Underwood (1970) using the Semantic Differential, investigated the values attached to certain colours and found that "white" was consistently associated with "good" while "black" connotated "bad". They also found that the evaluative
technique used by white subjects to arrive at the black-bad association was similar to the way in which they evaluated black people. Renniger and Williams (1966) found that children of five years of age showed a high knowledge of the negative connotations of the word black. Renniger and Williams (1966) warn against the danger such connotations can hold for a young child who can develop a simplified framework from which to pass racial judgements.

Milner (1975) has investigated the influence of cultural factors such as comics on the development of racial attitudes. He found comics to abound in stereotyped jargon. Different cultural groups are referred to by derogatory terminology. Many comics centre around "us" and "them" themes which help in fostering an in-group mentality. He concludes that comics

"encourage outdated and dangerously hostile views of foreign nations; and non-white peoples are largely omitted from comics, and derogated in their few appearances. ... Their present treatment of black people can only foster ignorance and divisiveness in a multi-racial society" (Milner; 1975, p. 73).

The important point to note, however, is that the media is a product of a certain society and it is society that fosters the code ascribed to by cultural artifacts.

It is also the dominant culture that usually imposes its will on a minority culture. In South Africa, where the majority is actually ascribed the status of a minority group, Soweto schoolchildren in June, 1976, rejected the imposition of an educational system (Bantu education) especially created for them by the dominant white group. They demanded the right to the same educational system as white children. Black writers such as James Baldwin have dismissed the role cast upon them by the dominant culture: speaking to Margaret Mead, Baldwin (1971) said

"... you are identified with the angels, and I'm identified with the devil" (p. 228). ... It's difficult to be born... and difficult to live
for everybody, everywhere, forever. But no one has a right to put on top of that another burden, another burden which nobody can pay, and a burden which really nobody can bear" (Baldwin; 1970, p. 256).

Similarly, Soweto school-children in South Africa tried to reject such a burden.

4.2. Self-concept research

Self-concept research is hampered by serious methodological problems centering around large variations in firstly, definitions of self-concept, secondly instruments used to measure self-concept, and thirdly faults in research designs (Zirkel, 1971). About fifteen different definitions of self-concept exist, all of which relate to a number of different theories. Thus Erikson's theory of ego-identity might yield many operational definitions such as self-esteem, self-worth or self-image. Often, self-concept instruments lack standardization, validity and reliability. Research designs make it difficult to compare differences in self-concepts between black and white children. For example the impact of being white in a white society does not have the same effect on self-concept as being black in a white society might have. In fact, studies have found that self-concept is a much more important aspect of personality development in black children than it is in white children (Shannon, 1973).

Another problem in self-concept research arises when attempting to compare recent studies of self-concept with studies conducted in the 1940 to 1960 period. Given the importance of environmental factors such as the socio-political order for identity development, a comparative exposition of self-concept research must take into account changing social systems. Thus while Clark and Clark (1939, 1947) found, using the Clark Doll Test, that black as well as white children rejected black dolls in favour of white dolls, the same experiment conducted in 1966 and 1970
(Gregor and McPherson, 1966; Hraba and Grant, 1970) found that black and white children preferred the dolls of their own racial group. This is an indication of the changing self-concept of black children in response to changes in the status of Blacks in American society. Lessing (in Reece, 1974) suggests that the black power movement has been partially responsible for a more positive self-image among black children. Powell (in Reece, 1974) studying the self-concept of Northern and Southern American students, concluded that a united black community providing strong black adult models could help in the development of high positive self-concepts, a finding confirmed by Beglis and Sheikh (1974). It is logical to assume that an oppressive society will have an effect on the self-concept of black children if they are members of the oppressed group. This is suggested by Erikson's theory of ego-identity. Shannon (1973) states that to "negate the degree to which racism affects the atmosphere in which Blacks develop...is ludicrous" (Shannon; 1973, p. 519). Current research indicates that an atmosphere of black assertiveness is conducive to the development of a positive self-concept in black children.

A further difficulty in comparing the self-concepts of black and white children lies in the lack of stabilizing differences in socio-economic status. In addition many studies fail to take such differences into account. Differences between self-concepts in black and white children in Long and Henderson's (1968) study might be accounted for in terms of the socio-economic difference in the subjects' backgrounds. Similarly the race of the experimenter might have an effect on self-concept results. This is Cotnam's (1969) finding, but is refuted by Raymer's (1969) study on experimental effects on Negro and white subjects.

Kvaraceus (1965) has suggested that the self-concept per se can be used for the "reeducation of Negro youth" (p. 1). Perhaps more important is the effect of bicultural education on the self-concepts of both black
and white children; the latter are often more secure and more unquestioning of their ego-identity. Kohlberg (1973) has criticized such security as hampering moral development. A discussion of the importance of educational institutions in changing the racial attitudes and ego-identity of black and white children will form part of the following chapter.
CHAPTER 5

Race attitudes and education

Repeatedly, studies of racial attitudes and ego-identity focus on the school as the agent to change, for example, prejudiced attitudes or negative self-concepts. Yet just as psychology has been responsible for the scientific sanction of misguided race relations research, so has education in the fullest sense of the word, been used to perpetuate myths concerning the educability of many black and white poor children. It is these myths that will be examined below.

5.1. The cult of the disadvantaged child

The general premise underlying research into disadvantaged children could be summed up by Deutsch's (1963) statement that "generally the combination of circumstances in middle-class life is considerably more likely to furnish opportunities for normal growth of the child" (Deutsch; 1963, p. 164). What does Deutsch mean by the "normal growth of the child"? Does he mean the cognitive development of the child in terms of the progressive development of cognitive structures enabling him to cope with his environment, or does he mean the recognized skills that the middle-class school demands from the child? Deutsch (1963) in fact adopts the social pathology model of behaviour and intelligence. The environment of the Negro or the lower-class child is considered lacking in those facets that enable the child to develop proper cognitive skills. The facets put forward as potentially retarding forces are, a mother who is unable to provide her child with the necessary language ability required for success in school, and an impoverished environment, or one that "deviates from the normative system defined by the white middle-class" (Baratz and Baratz; 1970, p. 32).
The social pathology model derives from a misconception of the meaning of poverty. In his book *Culture and Poverty* Valentine (1968) defines poverty as comparative and relative. Above all though, he points out that as "a quality... the condition of being poor does have a central significance: the essence of poverty is inequality" (Valentine, 1968, p. 13). He views the poor as disadvantaged in respect to "occupations, education, and political power" (p. 14) and points out the contradiction of American society which has equality as the basis of its ideological value system. Yet it is just such a contradiction that leads to the social pathology model which, paradoxically, denies cultural differences by attempting to raise the lower-class child to a middle-class standard. Baratz and Baratz (1970) mention that proponents of the social pathology model are careful not to postulate the existence of cultural differences for fear of being branded supporters of the genetic model which postulates inherent racial differences. Instead, followers of the social pathology model adopt what Valentine (1968) calls "an intellectual fad of attributing a 'culture' or 'sub-culture' to almost any social category" (p. 15). It is under such a fad that the lower-class child is labelled "disadvantaged" or "deprived", which he might be economically, but which he is not, necessarily, in terms of his cognitive functioning. The use of words such as "deprived" have lost their original, economic meaning:

"... the 'culture of poverty' may distract attention from crucial structural characteristics of the stratified social system as a whole and focus it instead on alleged motivational peculiarities of the poor that are of doubtful validity or relevance" (Valentine; 1968, pp. 16-17).

Valentine (1968) validly states that the "culture of poverty" concept will only "perpetuate the disadvantages associated with the poor" (p. 17). The school is one of the institutions responsible for the perpetuation of those facets which lead to the label of the lower-class...
child as "disadvantaged".

The first assumption of the social pathology model is that "one's linguistic competence is a measure of one's intellectual capacity" (Baratz and Baratz; 1970, p. 33). While the theoretical implication of this statement is an argument in itself (the language-thought controversy), what is assumed by researchers (Bernstein, 1961; Deutsch, 1963; Bereiter and Englemann, 1966; Hunt, 1968) is that Negro parents provide poor linguistic models for their children. Consequently, these children do not develop the necessary communication skills for social interaction. Baratz and Baratz (1970) point out that the basis of such a view is that standard English is necessarily correct, and that non-standard English is less complex, deficient and inferior. Alternative findings produce contradictory results. Labov et al. (1968) examined Negro language as an independent system. They found that "while the lower-class Negro child has a somewhat distinctive form of speech, it is not impoverished, illogical, syntactically primitive or semantically empty" (Ginsburg; 1972, p.90). An example of a cultural linguistic difference open to misunderstanding in the school situation is the Spanish phrase "the bus missed me" as opposed to the English "I missed the bus" (Slaughter, 1969). Without the knowledge of the Spanish implication, teachers could cause untold difficulties by demanding punctuality from a Spanish child.

Related to findings of the inadequate language skills of the lower-class child is the assumption that the child lives in a disorganized environment which fails to provide him with a sense of time and continuity. Continuity with the environment is regarded as essential for the development of ego-identity (Erikson, 1965), but the disorganization of the environment can hardly be said to result in distortions of time, conceptualizations of time being, like language, a cultural phenomenon.
The lower-class mother is accused of not providing a stimulating environment for the child, thereby retarding his cognitive growth. Yet as Feuerstein (1972) states, "the term 'cultural deprivation' may occur... in the uppermost socio-economic echelon of the ascendant society" (p. 3). Cognitive dysfunction can occur in a middle-class environment just as it is found among some lower-class children. It results in an impairment of some area of learning, and was thought to be a result of perceptual problems (Bruner, 1966). Cognitive dysfunction in learning disabled children often results in difficulties in concept formation, although Meltzer (1976) found that on Piagetian measures of conservation, there was no difference in the performances of normal and learning disabled children. Thus the area of cognitive dysfunction forms a separate and complex problem of its own and one that is not specifically related to the environmental conditions surrounding the child. Lower-class children develop language, and hence communicative, skills and maternal teaching takes place albeit not as it does in a middle-class environment.

Baratz and Baratz (1970) state that "what makes [a lower-class child] appear 'uneducable' is his failure in an educational system that is insensitive to the culturally different linguistic and cognitive styles that he brings to the classroom setting. The school, therefore, fails to use the child's distinct cultural patterns as the vehicle for teaching new skills and additional cultural styles" (Baratz and Baratz; 1970, p. 39).

5.2. The failure of early intervention programmes

Many early intervention programmes operate on the social pathology model discussed above. They attempt to provide impoverished environments with those assets considered necessary for "normal growth". The failure of many such programmes resulted from assessment with tools designed for use with middle-class children, (the problem of assessing the "disadvantaged child" is discussed by Feuerstein, 1972) and intervention in terms of middle-class norms. The cause of pathology is
attributed to the black American, and not to American society as a whole. This is akin to "blaming poverty on the poor" (Valentine; 1968, p. 15). The initial three month intervention of the Head Start programme was ineffective, and thus the programme was extended to a pre-school year. The logical conclusion was to continually increase intervention in order to offset the effects of the deprived environment, until such programmes started to interfere with the actual family unit of the lower-class child. The basic premise was to change existing modes of life in the lower-class environment, instead of concentrating on the social system that created such an environment. Ironically the logical extension of the widening of the scope of intervention programmes was the dismissal of such programmes altogether, and the postulation instead, of a genetic model of individual differences.

Such a model accounts for the failure of early intervention programmes as follows:

"...genetic aberration, clearly identifiable under the microscope... has quite specific consequences on cognitive processes. Such specific intellectual deficiencies are thus entirely possible without there being any specific environmental deprivations needed to account for them" (Jensen; 1969, p. 32)

and "intelligence variation has a large genetic component..." (Jensen; 1969, p. 82). In spite of its condemnation of environmental influences, the genetic model employs the same postulate as the social pathology model, namely that the lower-class child lacks certain cognitive skills. The work of Jensen (1969) in this regard relies heavily on the intelligence quotient as a measure of assessing the child's capabilities. He places much faith in the value of intelligence testing as a means of evaluating the child's intelligence, and explains differences in I.Q. scores in terms of "heritability". In other words, genetic differences are thought to be instrumental in producing I.Q. differences. Jensen (1969) extends this thesis to an explanation of differences in I.Q.
scores between Negro and white children in terms of genetic variations. The "Jensen controversy", as it became known, has been logically and experimentally refuted. Logical inconsistencies in Jensen's argument stem from his trust in the I.Q. phenomenon. Traditional I.Q. tools are biased towards the middle-class child, and the test situation, experimenter-bias and so on are all known to have a significant effect on the outcome of I.Q. test results. Empirically, strong environmental influences have been found to affect I.Q. scores (Kagan, 1969; Deutsch, 1969; Ginsburg, 1972; Watson, 1973), as opposed to merely genetic influences.

Jensen's theory has thus been firmly discredited, however its implications have been damaging and far-reaching. A letter to the Harvard Educational Review in which Jensen's article was first published, condemns Jensen's theory for its "white intellectual superiority" approach. Brazziel (1969) states: "It will help not one bit for Jensen or the HER editorial board to protest that they did not intend for Jensen's article to be used in this way" (Brazziel; 1969, p. 349). The fact is that Jensen gives scientific support to all those prejudiced people who believe in the inherent inferiority of the Blacks. Brazziel (1969) suggests that Jensen should perhaps examine the role of racism on differences between Blacks and Whites. Jensen (1969) has merely institutionalized a social scientific form of racism. Deutsch (1969) rejects Jensen's "racist hypothesis" (p. 525) and points out that his article is an "invitation to misunderstanding" (Deutsch; 1969, p. 526). This misunderstanding extends to the school situation.

5.3. Schools and poor children

A poor child's I.Q. score is used as a stigma throughout his school life. The general pattern of intelligence test scores for a Harlem
scores between Negro and white children in terms of genetic variations.

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5.3. Schools and poor children

A poor child's I.Q. score is used as a stigma throughout his school life. The general pattern of intelligence test scores for a Harlem
school child is one of progressive deterioration which parallels a decrease in levels of academic performance (Clark, 1965). Clark (1965) compared these findings with the performance of New York City pupils who show an increase in I.Q. scores through school. He concludes that "these findings strongly suggest that for Harlem pupils I.Q. tests reflect the quality of teaching and the resulting educational achievement more than intellectual potential" (Clark, 1965, p. 121). Ginsburg (1972) has also postulated that "schools for poor children are not functioning properly" (p. 1) and regards the failure among poor children at school as due to an educational system geared towards a white middle-class child. Koch (1970), rather than viewing the school as a medium for change, sees it as one element in the constant denial of opportunities to black children. He rejects the use of the word disadvantaged as a term used to detract from the actual agents of a "disadvantaged" or poor environment:

"The words deprived and disadvantaged may be thought to apply to poor children's imagination and their power to create things, and they do not. The tragedy - and for a teacher, the hope and opportunity - is not that children lack imagination, but that it has been repressed and depressed, among other places at schools..." (Koch, in Ginsburg; 1972, preface).

The misinterpretation of the causal factors for black children's failure in school led to a crisis in American education in the late 1960's when black leaders protested about inadequate educational opportunities for black children.

Teacher attitudes and school policy can deny poor children non-discriminatory education. Milner (1975) points out that teachers often view black children as what now appears to be a caricature of the "typical lower-class child", a child inferior in most respects to a white middle-class child and one of whom little is expected by a way of educational achievement. This "self-fulfilling prophecy"
(Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968), when children start to behave as expected of them by the teacher, has been shown to depress the actual performance of lower-class children. By discriminating against him the teacher can reinforce the minority child's status in the classroom and lower his potential for achievement in an academic environment. The tendency to stream pupils according to their performance often results in the segregation of middle-class and lower-class children into different classrooms thus effectively preventing a poor child from rising in the educational hierarchy.

An important factor then in promoting multi-cultural education is to introduce a teacher education programme whereby teachers are made to confront the stereotypes they hold of minority group children. Black children are aware of the social implications of their group membership and their self-image can be reinforced by the teacher's low level of expectation from their group. In a programme designed to change children's attitudes, Trager and Radke-Yarrow (1952) investigated the effect of teachers' values on children as they viewed "the teachers' dissatisfaction with the status quo and her willingness to change" (p. 355) as essential to curriculum improvement and attitude change in white and black children.

The use of discriminatory teaching material is basic to discrimination in education. Few teaching aids reflect the multi-cultural society in which they are used. In South Africa, a history text, The British Commonwealth and Empire by M. Masefield states that "...in South Africa, where the white man's safety and welfare must be safeguarded, it is not easy to give Africans equal rights and responsibility" (Masefield, in Kuya; 1974, p.210). Children's literature in which black people are portrayed reflects a preoccupation with colonial-type stereotypes. The black child is presented with a derogatory picture of his
group, if, in fact, black people are included in the literature at all. Books such as *Little Black Sambo* are still included in the British school's reading programmes, often in order to expose children to the portrayal of black figures (Milner, 1975). The *Doctor Dolittle* books use insulting racial terminology and are widely read by most white children. Many school-readers (such as the *Ladybird* series) of children situations of unreality by propagating an ordered middle-class world of happiness. Milner (1975) states that "this semi-detached and sports-jacket world is irrelevant to working class children, let alone black children" (Milner, 1975, p. 227). That such literature is offensive and discriminatory should serve as encouragement for the production of multi-racial books for use in a multi-racial society. Litcher and Johnson (1969) presented a group of white children with "multi-ethnic" readers. They found that there was a significant decrease in prejudicial attitudes towards Negroes after a four month exposure to such books. Similarly a group of Harlem adolescents who were given extra-curriculum lessons in black history, demonstrated a more positive self-image after the four month course (Johnson, 1966).

5.4. Moral education and educational change

Kohlberg (1972) has applied his theory of moral development to moral education. The basic question concerning moral education is whether there exists a universal value-system that all children should develop. Given the existence of culturally universal stages of moral development, Kohlberg (1972) believes that it is possible to present a philosophical and psychological theory of moral education. The possibility of moral education revolves around the fact that moral development can be stimulated by modes of thinking and problem-solving. Just as stages of moral development are conceived of as being culturally universal, so moral education involves "a set of rational principles of
judgement and decision valid for every culture, the principles of human welfare and justice" (Kohlberg; 1972, p. 14). Kohlberg (1972) thus places justice at the centre of the school's role in moral education. He suggests that schools plan moral education discussions which generate cognitive conflict. It is the teacher's duty to help the child resolve such conflicts. Yet as Kohlberg (1972) states: "at present, the schools themselves are not especially moral institutions. Institutional relationships tend to be based more on authority than on ideas of justice" (Kohlberg; 1972, p. 16). Similarly, schools are not models of institutions freed of racial prejudice. If "the teaching of justice requires just schools" (Kohlberg; 1970, p. 38), then it follows that just schools can help in the development of just children. Radke, Trager and Davis (1949) found that multi-racial contact per se did not reduce prejudice between black and white children and concluded that contact is not the only means of eradicating prejudice. Changes in educational policy and school curricula are potential agents of change of race attitudes in children. If a normative theory of racial prejudice is adopted then it is the norms of society that are largely responsible for the development of race attitudes and to change these, normative institutions must be scrutinized. Milner (1975) suggests bi-cultural education for "tolerance". Baratz and Baratz (1970) also suggest that the aims of educational change "should be to produce a bicultural child who is capable of functioning both in his subculture and in the mainstream" (Baratz and Baratz; 1970, p. 73). The final, and most important word comes from Milner (1975) who cautions that "what is quite wrong is to see education as a panacea; to see it as a substitute for action against discrimination and institutional racism in the wider society" (Milner; 1975, p. 212). Nothing must detract from the realization that racism is a phenomenon which must be attacked at its roots, however ingrained these are in societal networks.
CHAPTER 6

Race attitudes in the South African context

The one special feature distinguishing race attitudes research in South Africa from similar research in countries such as America or Britain, is that multi-racial South Africa is a separate society in which apartheid is legally sanctioned. While, as Mann (1971) points out, South Africa is a "perfect laboratory" (p. 51) for studies of race attitudes, such studies must take cognizance of the historical and social forces that are operant in the formation of racial attitudes in South Africa. Mann (1971) draws attention to the fact that race attitudes are part of the social fabric of the South African way of life. They are responsible for the perpetuation and continuation of the policy of apartheid and any attempt to change such attitudes necessitates an examination of the forces that created them. MacCrone (1937) found the historical beginning of racial prejudice in South Africa in the laager-like frontier society of the eighteenth century. Just how ingrained these attitudes have become is shown in a study on racial attitudes by Pettigrew (1965). He found that in South Africa, as in the Southern parts of the United States, prejudice against Blacks does not correlate with authoritarian personality traits. Pettigrew (1965) concludes that "conformity to South African... mores is associated with racial intolerance, while deviance from these mores is associated with racial tolerance" (Pettigrew; 1965, p. 40). Thus racial prejudice is a norm in South Africa, and in terms of Kohlberg's theory of moral development, the majority of the dominant group will conform to the authority embodying the norm.
6.1. Education in South Africa

On June 16th, 1976, school children in Soweto, a Black township outside Johannesburg, protested against the use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in Black schools. Since that date seventy-one percent of Soweto school teachers have resigned and there has been a fifty percent decrease in school attendance (Rand Daily Mail, 1979). In comparison, school children in white schools have had an uninterrupted period of education. The Soweto riots, while being a product of apartheid policies, also highlight the problems of a segregated educational system in which the minority white group enjoys compulsory education, as opposed to the then non-compulsory "Bantu Education" for Black children.

Malherbe (1977) states that this isolationist policy of segregated education began in 1936 with the growth of Afrikanerdom and in the "course of time served to generate stereotype attitudes not only in regard to English-Afrikaans relationships but also on ideological issues involving Black-White relationships..." (Malherbe; 1977, p. 48). Malherbe (1970) examined the attitudes of white children to other language groups and found that those attending multilingual schools were far less hostile to other language groups than those children attending unilingual schools. A similar result could be expected for children attending racially segregated schools. Schlemmer (1974) found that Afrikaaners under the age of 25 had no sense of urgency in coming to terms with South Africa's racial problems. Malherbe (1977) maintains that deliberate educational segregation will only make children "less adaptable in meeting new challenges due to changing circumstances" (p.48).

The premises of Bantu Education were laid out in the Eiselin Commission report of 1951. Despite the report's acknowledgement of the "extreme aversion" Blacks had to "any education specially adapted for the Bantu" (Horrel; 1968, p. 5), the Commission recommended a separate Bantu
education system to train the child in "Bantu culture". The rationale behind the system was to dampen any aspirations Blacks might have had towards the opportunities provided by education. The introduction of "Bantu Education" led to a boycott of black schools on the Witwatersrand and the Eastern Cape in 1955.

The differences between black and white educational facilities are pinpointed by a few facts. Government expenditure on black pupils was R42-00 in 1975-1976, as compared to R644-00 spent on each white pupil. Teacher shortage in black high schools in 1975 was one hundred and forty-three percent with black teachers earning forty-six percent of the salaries that white teachers in similar posts earn (Kane-Berman; 1978, p. 197). It was such an educational climate that led to the Soweto riots of 1976 which were sparked off directly by the enforced teaching of at least two subjects in Afrikaans. The riots were also an expression of a "Psychological liberation... enabling Blacks to purge themselves of negative conceptions of themselves... and replace them with positive self-awareness" (Kane-Berman; 1978, p. 103). A detailed sociological, as opposed to psychological, background to the Soweto riots can be found in Kane-Berman's (1978) book Soweto, Black revolt: White reaction.

6.2. Race attitude research in South Africa.

It is this socio-political climate that makes the study of race attitudes and identity so important in South Africa today. Virtually no mutual contact exists between young black and white school children, and as these children grow older their roles become those of dominant white and oppressed black. The objectivity of race relations research in South Africa diminishes if one views a part of that research as being action-oriented, or designed to change existing attitudes. In South Africa, studies of race attitudes in children have revealed an early racial preference for Whites on the part of black and white children (Gregor and
McPherson, 1966; Meij, 1966; Melamed, 1967). The preference is reinforced by a segregated educational system which perpetuates racial stereotypes. Lever (1972) measured changes in the racial attitudes of students after a four-year period. He managed to reduce the social distance between Whites and Blacks. Malherbe (1946) also reports a change in the attitudes of army servicemen after a series of lectures and discussions. Mann (1971) criticizes the non-representative samples of many race attitude studies in South Africa, for example Pettigrew (1958), McCrone (1947) and Lever (1972) used mainly university students as their subjects. McCrone (1947) does suggest that further research should examine "what role is played by this ready-made real-life bogey [Blacks] in the psychology of the young [white] child..." (McCrone; 1947, p. 86). The present study attempts to examine this role, while also attempting to assess whether a new self-consciousness has emerged amongst black children, in spite of the continuing oppression of the existing apartheid system.
CHAPTER 7

Experimental method

The effects of a multi-racial media programme on black and white children were measured in terms of racial attitudes and ego-identity. This chapter will involve a discussion of the experimental design pertinent to a pre-posttest study, as well as a description of the sample and the tests used to assess racial attitudes and ego-identity. Scoring and testing procedures will also be outlined.

7.1. Design

The study was based on a four group before-after design called Solomon's design after its innovator R. Solomon (1949). A simple two group before-after design does not enable the experimenter to assess firstly, the effects of pretesting on posttest results, and secondly, the effects of contemporaneous factors which could occur between the pre- and posttesting. Since this study actually attempted to assess the effects of an intervention programme on children's attitudes, it was necessary to determine that other factors were not in fact responsible for posttest results. Solomon's design has the following advantages: it enables the experimenter to "assess the interaction of the experimental testing with the experimental treatment" (Solomon and Lessac; 1968, p. 146); it is the minimum design necessary for a developmental study involving an intervention procedure in that pretesting a control group "enhances the developmental influences of its normal environment" (Solomon and Lessac; 1968, p. 147); Solomon's design also enables experimental results to be interpreted in terms of absolute observations as well as relative ones while a traditional two group design is only capable of producing relative statements.
The four group design operates in the following manner: both experimental and control groups are divided randomly in half: one half of each group is pretested, while all the subjects of the four groups are posttested. In this study half of the experimental groups (one black group and one white group) were pretested, as were their corresponding control groups. All subjects were posttested. This is shown in Table I.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE I</th>
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<tr>
<td>The Four Group Design for an Intervention Programme with Two Experimental Groups and Two Control Groups</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>E.grp. I</th>
<th>C.grp. I</th>
<th>E.grp. II</th>
<th>C.grp. II</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Groups</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pretested</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Intervention</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Posttested</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table I demonstrates that in this study the four group design is duplicated, as two experimental and two control groups exist. Thus not only does each experimental group have a corresponding control group, but control is also built into the specific design from which statistical inferences are made. One can, for example, compare the effects of the intervention programme on the experimental group that was not contaminated by pretesting, with the group that did receive pretesting. On another level, by comparing control and experimental posttest results, the effect of the intervention programme, as opposed to natural developmental phenomena, can be assessed. At the same time this study sought to examine the differences in racial attitudes and ego-identity between black and white children. The design enables the experimenter to compare pretest and posttest results for both experimental groups and both control groups. Solomon's design yields numerous experimental, as well as statistical,
possibilities: for example, it is possible for the control groups to improve, while the experimental groups deteriorate after the intervention programme. Alternatively control group scores could remain static, and experimental scores deteriorate; or both experimental and control groups could improve. Campbell (1957) has stated that Solomon's design presents a new ideal for social scientists. Randomization leads to statistical equivalence of groups, and history and maturation are controlled for.

The major problem with this design is how to determine one's overall statistical tactic, as for each step in the design a different statistical technique could be used. Solomon (1949) recommends a 2 x 2 factorial analysis of variance; however, this study involves two experimental groups, and a multiple analysis of variance technique was used.

7.2. Subjects

One of the aims of this investigation was to examine the racial attitudes of young South Africans, and to see whether it was possible, in a prejudiced climate to change the negative racial attitudes of children. Thus eighty, seven to eight year old black and white children were selected for this study. At this period in their development children should be passing from the Eriksonian stage of initiative versus guilt to that of industry versus inferiority. In the former stage children base their identifications on ideal adults (such as teachers), while in the latter stage, the environment of the child can threaten his sense of identity - thus the child becomes conscious of the colour of his skin, or of his background (Erikson; 1965, p. 252). The child of this age group (seven to eight years old) is generally characterized by Piaget's heteronomy and moral realism - the child will usually submit to the rules of outside authority. After eight years of age children start to develop
moral autonomy. In terms of Kohlberg's stages, the child is centred around stage one of moral reasoning - children will judge as good that which is similar to themselves. Age thus formed the basis of the selection of subjects.

Two experimental and two control groups (that is, one black experimental and control group, and one white experimental and control group) were used. As it was impossible to control for the socio-economic background of subjects (see Table 2), children were selected only if their scores on the Coloured Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1956) fell within the average range for "observation and clear thinking" (Raven; 1965, p. 1). All eighty children obtained between 50 and 90 percentile points on the Coloured Progressive Matrices, this representing the average to above average range. The backgrounds, home languages and religions of the children differed widely; and although both white and black children attended private schools, the black children were selected from a parochial urban school, while the white children came from a private school in a middle-class environment. Table 2 represents a breakdown of the socio-economic differences of the subjects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2</th>
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<tr>
<td>Socio-economic backgrounds of Forty White and Forty Black Children</td>
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<tr>
<th>SE category</th>
<th>Professional</th>
<th>Managerial</th>
<th>Skilled</th>
<th>Unskilled</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

Of the eighty children, 34 were males, 46 females, this representing a fairly even distribution between sexes. The South African group classification system makes it necessary to explain what, in this study, is meant by a "black" child. The South African legal system classifies
people as White, Coloured, Asian or African. Although the subjects in the study would, under such a system consist of forty Whites and forty Africans, the contemporary word, the generic "black" is a more universal and acceptable term stemming from the ideology of black consciousness.

In sum, the sample consisted of forty white children and forty black children with a mean age of 7 years 7 months. The latter were mainly from a lower socio-economic background; the former came from middle to upper-middle class environments. Religions backgrounds were varied, black children being predominantly Catholic, white children coming from several different religious denominations. White children had English as their home language, black children spoke either Zulu (27 Ss) or Sotho (13 Ss). All subjects scored between 50 and 90 percentile points on the Coloured Progressive Matrices, and this served as a form of matching within- and between-groups.

7.3. Description of tests and scoring procedures

The following tests were used to measure racial attitudes in children: the Clark Doll Test (Clark and Clark, 1940); the "Show me" test (Horowitz and Horowitz, 1938) and the Categories Test (Horowitz and Horowitz, 1938). Ego-identity was measured by the Colouring-in Test (Clark and Clark, 1940), the Clark Doll Test (Self-Identification) (Clark and Clark, 1940) and the "Where are you Game" (Engel and Raine, 1963).

The Coloured Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1956) served as a test of observation and clear thinking. It was especially designed for use with young children and is easily applied to people who have little or no command of the English language. For this reason it was particularly suited to this study as not all subjects were fluent in English. As its name implies, the Coloured Progressive Matrices enables the child to develop a pattern of thought as he progresses from relatively easy items to more difficult ones. It is thus not a test of general intelligence, but rather one of logical thought processes.
7.3.1. Clark Doll Test

This test forms the basis of most race attitude studies with children. Its usefulness lies in the simple nature of the task which the child must perform: he must merely indicate his preference, in answer to a number of questions, for one of the differently coloured dolls in front of him. Yet this apparently straightforward test has been subject to some criticism (for example, Katz and Zalk, 1974): first of all, no reliability or validity data exists for the test. Different experimenters use different dolls and often obtain different results. A forced-choice technique which forces a child to choose one particular doll, can result in different answers to those obtained using another method such as an open-ended interview. Lerner and Buehrig (1975) found less prejudice using this latter technique.

A second criticism listed by Katz and Zalk (1974) is that the Clark Doll Test confounds skin colour with other cues. Yet as the test is designed to elicit responses in terms of skin colour, a child choosing a doll on any other basis might reveal less prejudice by his very choice. This is the aim of the Clark Doll Test. If a child is provided with consistent cues among the dolls, his preferences should reveal what he is in fact responding to. The actual test situation can have a strong influence on children's answers; for example, a child might choose dolls that correspond to his own and his examiner's race, should they be of the same race. Katz and Zalk (1974) found that children actually said little about colour when asked to explain their choices. This might also have been in response to the examiner's race, or to the implications, for the child, of the total test situation. Thus the test must be seen as part of a situation in which many factors operate to influence the child's response.

In this study children were presented with four six-inch, unclothed, female dolls - two black dolls and two white dolls. All dolls had short hair.
and fairly similar features. Subjects were required to answer the following questions: show me the doll that (1) you would like to play with; (2) you like best; (3) is a nice doll; (4) has a nice colour; (5) looks naughty.

The range of possible scores, in terms of a score of favourableness towards Blacks/Whites, was 0.5. Thus for each other-race preference, subjects obtained a score of one.

This test was also used as a measure of self-identification. Children were asked to identify the doll that looked like a white child, a black child and like themselves. The latter question presented an interesting possibility as all the dolls used resembled females. Males thus had to make a clearly defined racial choice while females could respond more easily to the features of each doll. Nevertheless the purpose of the test was to determine whether each child was firstly able to distinguish black from white, and secondly, whether or not he identified himself in racial terms. The range of possible scores was 0-3.

7.3.2. "Show me" Test

Horowitz and Horowitz (1938) revised the original "Show me" test constructed by Horowitz (1936) in order to enable children to make unfavourable as well as favourable selections from sixteen photographic portraits. In its revised form, the "Show me" test also enabled the experimenter to compare race attitudes with sex attitudes using one instrument. Horowitz and Horowitz (1938) used the test to provide supportive evidence from findings derived from the use of the Categories Test and a forced-choice interview, and found the "Show me" test to be a more "refined" (p. 312) instrument for the study of sex and race attitudes. Although the same criticism of lack of reliability and validity can be applied to this test, it has a very important advantage over many rigourously standardized psychometric tests: while the structure of the test remains constant, content can be changed to provide contemporary and
country-specific portrait pictures. Thus the test need not become out-
dated and visually meaningless. Horowitz and Horowitz (1938) state that
differences in objective research findings on racial attitudes in children
are due, not to the lack of test validity, but to geographical
differences between samples.

In the investigation the E used twelve pictures of
black and white children, as well as three pictures of non-South Africans
and one picture of a cat. The inclusion of the three non-South Africans
served to assess children's reactions to unfamiliar faces (pictures were
of one Japanese girl and two Mexican boys), while the inclusion of the
cat enabled children to vent whatever unfavourable feelings they might
have on an innocuous and neutral creature. In terms of Erikson's theory
of ego-identity, the "Show me" test could predict that children would
respond positively to familiar faces of the same race. Sixteen black
and white photographs, approximately all 10 x 10 cm., were mounted on a
large piece of white cardboard measuring 62 x 62 cm. Portraits consisted
of eight boys and seven girls (see Appendix 1). Subjects were asked the
following questions: Show me who (1) you would like to sit next to at
school; (2) you would like to play with; (3) comes from a poor home;
(4) you do not want in your school; (5) you would like to have as your
cousin; (6) looks stupid; (7) you do not like.

Subjects received one point for other-race responses to questions 1,
2 and 5 and one point for same-race responses to questions 3, 4, 6 and
7. The latter four questions are designed to tap negative racial
attitudes. All portraits showed only children's faces yet prior know-
ledge could affect subject's responses. For example, within the South
African context black children generally do come from poorer homes than
do white children, and question 3 must be examined in conjunction with
the child's other responses - that is, if the child shows favourable
other-race attitudes and scores question 3 as other-race, this might be an accurate appraisal of the social system in which the child lives. The range of possible scores was 0-7.

7.3.3. Categories Test

This test was designed by Horowitz and Horowitz (1938) to determine the relative strength of socio-economic, race, sex and age categories for children. It was based on a subtest used in standard verbal intelligence batteries, in which the child is required to select the item that "does not belong" from five words. The nature of this task was transferred to the Categories Test in a pictorial form: children are required to reject a picture that does not belong in a series of five pictures. The selection of items in the Categories Test is such that the child's structuring of the social world can be examined. Thus, for example, one task might consist of four females and one male; but only three of the females plus the male will be black, while the remaining female will be white. The child can either make a choice in terms of race (choosing the white female) or sex (choosing the male). The child's own perception of the underlying pattern in each task is assessed. Horowitz and Horowitz (1938) found that children rarely made a response in terms of some other variable such as the position or quality of the picture. A reverse form of the Categories Test has been designed by Landreth and Johnson (1953). Their Picture and Inset Test demands that children select a black, brown or white person to complete a picture containing another black, brown or white person. This test also makes it possible to compare children's race, age or sex responses.

In this study, only age versus race and sex versus race were examined. For each category children were given two practice tasks in which the race variable was excluded. Subjects were thus mentally prepared for non-racial choices in the actual test. Each category
measured contained four tasks. Thus the age versus race category consisted of four 50 x 13 cm strips of cardboard with five portraits mounted on each, as did the sex versus race category (see Appendix 1). Photographic portraits of black and white South Africans were selected from newspapers and magazines.

Scoring consisted of giving one point to each response made in terms of age or sex. This indicated that the child made a non-racial judgement in terms of the pictures that "did not belong". The range of possible scores was 0-8.

A total race attitudes score, in terms of other-race favourableness was obtained by summing the final scores of the Clark Doll Test, the "Show-me" test and the Categories Test. The range for the total score was thus 0-20.

7.3.4. Colouring-in Test

The aim of this test is to measure firstly children's colour concepts, and secondly their ego-identity in terms of how they identify themselves racially and how they would like to be identified. Erikson (1965) states that ego-identity cannot be attained until the individual perceives an inner consistency between his identity and society's perception of his identity. If, at the ages of seven and eight, the child desires to be another skin colour, he has already reached a "crisis" in terms of who he is, who he would like to be, and his perception of society's reaction to either his actual, or his real, self. Such a crisis, Erikson (1968) states, can be resolved by the formation of a negative self-identity. This deceptively simple Colouring-in task designed by Clark and Clark (1940) can thus be used to examine the early formation of ego-identity in children.

Each child was given a sheet consisting of five line drawings of a leaf, an apple, a pig and two clothed children corresponding to the
subject's race and sex (see Appendix 1). Children were required to colour-in the three objects the colour they are in nature. In this way the subject's ability to relate a colour to a particular object was assessed. Children were then asked to colour-in the first child the colour of themselves and the second child any colour they would like to be. Subjects were given a box of sixty-four wax crayons in order to present them with as wide a range of colour choices as possible.

Colouring-in was examined in terms of: (1) correct colour-object match; (2) correct racial self-identification; (3) the second child coloured the same colour as the first child; (4) a clear light-dark/dark-light dichotomy between the first and second child; (5) imaginative choice of colour for second child. Subjects received a point for 1, 2, 3 and 5 above, the range thus being 0-4.

7.3.5. "Where are you game"

The problems of operationalizing a concept such as ego-identity have been discussed in Chapter 4. The Colouring-in test described above probably lends itself more readily to an Eriksonian interpretation than do many self-concept tests. Nevertheless the latter, used in conjunction with the former, can help to measure the self-concept of the child with which certain identifications are made. Engel and Raine's (1963) "Where are you game" is a self-concept test designed to be as enjoyable and unthreatening to the ego-integration of the child as possible. The test consists of seven five-point vertical ladders, each ladder representing seven bi-polar, positive-negative dimensions construed as important in the child's self-concept. The following seven dimensions were used (Engel and Raine, 1963): (1) intellectually gifted-lacking these capacities; (2) happy-unhappy; (3) popular-unpopular; (4) brave-frightened; (5) attractive-unattractive; (6) strong-weak; (7) obedient-disobedient. For each dimension the E drew a stick figure to represent,
for example, a "happy" child and an "unhappy" child, and then explained what the middle three lines represented. The subject then had to decide on which step of the ladder he would place himself (see Appendix 1).

Each child could score a maximum of 35 points, in other words 5 points per dimension, 5 representing the top rung of the ladder and 1 the bottom rung. The range of possible scores was 7-35.

A total ego-identity score was obtained by summing final scores on the Clark Doll Test (self-identification), the Colouring-in test, and the "Where are you game", the range becoming 7-42.

7.4. Multi-racial media programme material

The selection of material for the multi-racial media intervention programme was based on Milner's (1975) statement that material must portray Blacks and Whites as "individuals doing ordinary, unremarkable things, displaying the normal range of human characteristics" (Milner; 1975, p. 218). Selection was also based on the findings of two previous studies: Litcher and Johnson (1969) used multi-ethnic readers over a four month period in an attempt to change the racial attitudes of second-grade white American schoolchildren. Their material was designed to "portray Negroes in a positive way, contradicting prevailing prejudices and stereotypes" (Litcher and Johnson; 1969, p.148). Controversial material is subject to "selective perception and recall" Levine and Murphy; 1943, p. 515), in other words a person will generally remember material which supports his social attitudes rather than conflicts with these attitudes. Alternatively such material is ignored. Litcher and Johnson (1969) found a dramatic increase in favourable attitudes towards Negroes after using multi-ethnic readers and in a further four week investigation with another group of children, attempted to ascertain what it was in the pictures of the multi-ethnic readers that created a positive change in attitudes. Litcher, Johnson and Ryan (1973) presented two experimental groups with
pictures of multi-racial contact - the first group received pictures of children in middle-class settings, while the second group used material of children in lower-class settings. Control group children used the normal school curriculum. Litcher, Johnson and Ryan (1973) found no improvement in children's racial attitudes. This was either due to the short time period of the study, or to the ineffectiveness of exposure to multi-ethnic pictures. The experimenters warn that where multi-racial, mutual contact is minimal, multi-ethnic pictures might be inadequate for the complex task of changing racial attitudes.

In this study the intervention programme took place over a two-month period. Twelve multi-racial books were used (see Appendix 2). These were translated from English to Sotho for use with the black experimental group. The books were incorporated into the personal reading programme of both experimental groups, while control group children continued to use normal school readers in which no multi-racial contact occurred. Books were suited to a range of seven to eight year old reading skills and showed children in various multi-racial situations. Multi-racial material was not limited to books. Experimental group children were asked to participate in a project called "People of the world" in which they were presented with numerous magazine pictures of black and white people from many different countries. They were requested to stick pictures of those people they liked on three 62 x 62 cm pieces of white cardboard. This exercise was designed to actively involve children in a multi-racial project. Subjects were shown a film about the American children's television series "Sesame Street" which included multi-racial contact amongst children. Subjects also listened to a Sesame Street record.

While the experimental group received visual and auditory stimuli requiring their active participation, control group subject were exposed
to their regular school curricula. The intervention programme was thus designed to change the racial attitudes and ego-identity of black and white school-children. Multi-racial contact showed children of different races in mutual cooperation with one another. No derogatory or stereotyped material was included in the programme.

7.5. Testing procedure

To begin with, biographical information was obtained about the background of Ss in terms of father's occupation, religion, age and sex. Ss were then individually tested on the Coloured Progressive Matrices and remained in the study if their scores fell between 50 and 90 percentile points.

Ss were divided randomly into groups to be either pre- and post-tested or only post-tested and were then individually tested on the measures of racial attitudes and ego-identity described above. White children were tested by the author while black children were tested by a black E. After spending a few minutes establishing rapport with Ss, the E explained to them that they would be asked a few questions to which there were no right or wrong answers, only Ss thoughts about themselves and other people. The test material was sufficiently interesting to motivate subjects to participate in the study.

Testing took place in one session with a ten minute interval between tests of race attitudes and tests of ego-identity. During this break Ss were encouraged to talk about the pictures in the "Show me" test. Ss comments were recorded by the E. Ss were tested with the "Show me" test, Clark Doll Test and Categories Test in that order. Testing took place at a small table in an empty school room. The "Show me" test was placed against the back of a chair and Ss were encouraged to examine the pictures for as long as they liked before answering questions. The black and white dolls were placed on the table in front of Ss as was the Categories Test.
Ss were first required to do practice tasks for the Categories Test and then one by one, were shown the sex versus race, and the age versus race, tasks. The E noted Ss responses on a race attitude answer sheet (see Appendix 3).

After the ten minute break, subject and moved to another table for the ego-identity tests. Ss answered the self-concept test first, followed by the Clark Doll Test (self-identification) and the Colouring-in test. The Colouring-in test was given last in order to enable Ss to spend as much time as they desired in choosing colours from a box of sixty-four crayons. The order of test presentation was consistent for pre- and post-test groups.

The multi-racial intervention programme was implemented so as not to interfere with the normal functioning of classes. A week after the pretesting, multi-racial books were given to teachers to introduce into the personal reading programme of experimental groups. Ss were required to look at a minimum of one book a week. In fact 90% of Ss read all twelve books at least once. The "People of the World" project was explained to Ss by their teachers. About 70% of Ss participated in this project in their spare time. All Ss viewed the "Sesame Street" film shown to them by the E and heard the "Sesame Street" record. A week elapsed after the end of the programme and the start of posttesting.

Testing sessions varied in length as Ss were free to spend as much time as they required on each test. The average length of testing sessions was about thirty minutes. All tests were scored by the author and an independent rater. Inter-rater reliability was determined by means of the Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient. Table 3 indicates that inter-rater reliability was significant at the .01 and .001 levels. Agreement between raters is sufficiently high to allow for an interpretation of results based on the above scoring procedures.
### TABLE 3

**Inter-Rater Reliability Coefficients for Tests of Racial Attitudes and Ego-Identity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test</th>
<th>$r$</th>
<th>Signif. Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clark Doll Test</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark Doll Test (Self-Ident.)</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Show me&quot; Test</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Categories Test</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colouring-In Test</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Where are you Game&quot;</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 8

Results

8.1. Statistical analysis

Multivariate and univariate analyses of variance were used to test the hypotheses that (1) a multi-racial media programme would change the racial attitudes of black and white children; (2) white children would have more positive self-concepts than black children before the programme and (3) there would be change in the self-concepts of black children after the programme. In addition the effect of pretesting on posttest results was examined. The Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient was used to examine the relationship between racial attitudes and ego-identity.

As a first step the descriptive statistics means, standard deviations and ranges were calculated for all groups for ego-identity and race attitude scores. These are presented in Table 1 and Table 2 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1</th>
<th>Means, Standard Deviations and Ranges for Race Attitude Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-posttest M</td>
<td>11.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>(3.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>(6-17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posttest M</td>
<td>10.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>(3.85)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 shows that the highest pretest race attitude mean was obtained by the black control group, in other words this group initially obtained the highest score for other-race favourableness. This was probably due to the selection of a sample of relatively unprejudiced children. Ranges indicate higher race attitude scores than for all other groups. When posttested this group retained its high mean score. This finding does not hold for the group that did not receive pretesting. The white treatment group obtained a higher score after the intervention programme than the white control group but this improvement in scores does not hold for that half of the white treatment group that did not receive pretesting (the postest group). Black and white treatment and control groups all show a decrease in mean scores from the pretest condition to the only posttest condition. Black treatment and white control group means decreased from the pretest to the (pre) posttest condition. For all these groups there was a decline in other-race favourableness over a period of three months.

Table 2 shows the close similarity of ego-identity means for all groups. The black treatment group obtained the highest pretest mean.
while the black control group obtained the lowest pretest mean. This, again, could be due to sample selection. The black control group was the only one to increase its ego-identity scores from the pretest, to the posttest and the only-posttest conditions, while all other groups showed a slight decrease in mean scores in posttest conditions. Ego-identity scores for the only-posttest groups were slightly higher than pre-posttest means.

<p>| TABLE 3 |
| Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient for Race Attitude and Ego-Identity Scores |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>df</th>
<th>r²</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>Significant Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient was calculated for all race attitude and ego-identity scores. Table 3 shows a significant negative correlation between racial attitudes and ego-identity. This indicates that higher race attitude scores (other-race favourableness) are related to lower ego-identity scores. In other words there is no one to one correspondence between high race attitude scores and high ego-identity scores. The 2 shows that the pretest black control group obtained the lowest ego-identity score, while also obtaining the highest race attitude score (Table 1). Table 3 does indicate that only 11% (r² = 0.11) of the variability in ego-identity scores is attributable to the race attitude scores. Thus although a significant relationship was found between race attitude scores and ego-identity scores, 89% of the variation in ego-identity scores were due to factors other than racial attitudes.

The effects of race, multi-racial media programme (treatment) and pre-testing on race attitude and ego-identity scores were analyzed by a 2x2x2
multivariate analysis of variance. 2x2x2 univariate analyses of variance were used to analyze race attitude and ego-identity scores for pre-posttest groups, and pre-posttest and posttest groups.

A multivariate analysis of variance for race attitude and ego-identity scores (for the pre-posttest group) yielded no significant race effect, \( F(1,72) = 1.75, p < .05 \), and no significant pretest effect, \( F(1,72) = 2.56, p < .05 \). There was a significant main effect for treatment, \( F(1,72) = 5.74, p < .05 \), based on Roy's Maximum root criterion (see Table 4).

Univariate analyses support the following conclusions:

a. Race has no significant effect on race attitude and ego-identity scores (RA, \( F = 1.63, df = 1, p < .05 \); \( E_1, F = .16, df = 1, p < .05 \)); in other words, on all measures no significant difference was found between black and white subjects. This is borne out by the close similarity of means in Tables 1 and 2.

b. Treatment has a significant effect on race attitude scores but not on ego-identity scores (RA, \( F = 3.62, df = 1, p < .10 \); \( E_1, F = 1.88, df = 1, p < .05 \)); this suggests that the multi-racial media programme had an effect on race attitudes scores.

c. Pretesting has no significant effect on posttest race attitude and ego-identity scores (RA, \( F = 1.37, df = 1, p < .05 \); \( E_1, F = 1.08, df = 1, p < .05 \)); in terms of Solomon's design the significant treatment effect (see b above) for race attitude scores was not due to contamination by pretesting.

As the only significant relationship was found on race attitude scores for the pre-posttest group, these results will be analyzed in detail. Table 4 presents the results of a 2x2x2 analysis of variance of equal numbers of the effects of race, treatment and pretesting upon race attitude scores.
A significant difference was found between the scores of treatment and control groups (p < .10). There was a second-order interaction effect of race, treatment and pretesting (p < .05) as well as a first order race and intervention effect. These two interaction effects are best explained graphically by Figures 1 and 2.

Figure 1 shows that the difference between treatment and control groups is explained mainly by the difference between the black posttest treatment and control means. The black control group shows the most favourable race attitudes in both pretest and posttest conditions, while the white treatment group shows an increase in race attitude scores from the pretest to the posttest condition. Both the black treatment group and the white control group show a decrease in race attitude scores. The white control group has a larger pretest mean than the white treatment group and the latter increased after the intervention programme while the former decreased. This suggests that the programme was effective in changing the race attitude scores of the white pre-posttest group. However, given
the fact that (a) a treatment-control effect was found only with the pre-posttest groups and not with the pretest and only-posttest groups; (b) an increase in scores after the intervention programme was found only with the white treatment group and (c) a second-order interaction effect does not preclude the possibility of pretesting affecting posttest scores, differences between treatment and control groups can be the result of developmental differences in children, and not the result of the intervention programme.
Figure 2 shows the difference between treatment and control means for black and white groups. The figure confirms that the greatest difference between means is found between the black treatment and control groups. A greater difference exists between black and white control groups than exists between black and white treatment groups. Figure 1 shows that the former difference is especially large for posttest scores.

8.2. Chi Square Test

In order to assess the significance of answers to questions of the "Show me" test, Categories Test and Clark Doll Test, two-tailed chi square
tests for nominal data were conducted for black and white subjects.

8.2.1. "Show me" Test

a. Who would you like to sit next to at school?

\[ \chi^2 = 19.53 \quad df = 3 \]

This is significant at the .001 level. A significant difference thus exists between the choices of black and white subjects. Black subjects chose to sit next to a black child significantly more often than did white subjects who chose the cat more frequently than did black children.

b. Who would you like to play with?

\[ \chi^2 = 13.50 \quad df = 3 \]

This is significant at the .01 level. While black and white subjects both expressed a desire to play with white children, black subjects chose to play with black children significantly more often than white subjects.

c. Who comes from a poor home?

\[ \chi^2 = 1.09 \quad df = 2 \]

No significant difference was found in the responses of black and white children to who comes from a poor home. Both groups of children chose black and Japanese/Mexican children as coming from poor homes.

d. Who do you want in your school?

\[ \chi^2 = 18.66 \quad df = 2 \]

This is significant at the .001 level. While black subjects chose mainly black and Japanese/Mexican children for this question, white subjects chose white, and then black children.

e. Who would you like to have as your cousin?

\[ \chi^2 = 18.305 \quad df = 2 \]

This is significant at the .001 level. Black subjects chose black children significantly more often than white subjects while the latter chose Japanese/Mexican children significantly more often than did black subjects.
f. Who looks stupid?

\[ \chi^2 = 1.00 \text{ df} = 2 \]

No significant difference was found in the responses of black and white children as to who looks stupid. Both groups of children chose fairly evenly white, black and Japanese/Mexican children.

g. Whom do you not like?

\[ \chi^2 = 2.97 \text{ df} = 2 \]

No significant difference was found in the responses of black and white subjects as to whom they did not like. Both groups of children chose evenly amongst the pictures with white subjects choosing more white pictures and black subjects choosing more black pictures.

8.2.2. Categories Test
a. Race versus Sex

\[ \chi^2 = 10.93 \text{ df} = 2 \]

This is significant at the .01 level. White subjects tended to make significantly more non-racial judgements than did black subjects although both groups made more non-racial than racial choices.

b. Race versus Age

\[ \chi^2 = 15.19 \text{ df} = 2 \]

This is significant at the .01 level. Again, white subjects made significantly more non-racial judgements than black subjects although both groups made more non-racial than racial choices.

8.2.3. Clark Doll Test
a. Which doll would you like to play with?

\[ \chi^2 = 2.70 \text{ df} = 1 \]

This is significant at the .10 level. No significant difference in doll choice can be assumed. There was a fairly equal distribution in choice of black and white dolls by black and white subjects.
b. Which doll do you like best?

\[ \chi^2 = 1.21 \text{ df} = 1 \]

No significant difference was found in the doll choices of black and white subjects. Black subjects tended to prefer the white to the black doll.

c. Which is a nice doll?

\[ \chi^2 = 16.34 \text{ df} = 1 \]

This is significant at the .001 level. Black subjects chose the white doll significantly more than did white subjects, the latter having a fairly even distribution between black and white dolls.

d. Which doll has a nice colour?

\[ \chi^2 = 0.54 \text{ df} = 1 \]

No significant difference exists in the doll choices of black and white subjects. Both black and white subjects tended to prefer the white doll to the black doll.

e. Which doll looks naughty?

\[ \chi^2 = 17.73 \text{ df} = 1 \]

This is significant at the .001 level. Black subjects chose the black doll significantly more often than white subjects who showed a fairly even distribution between black and white dolls.

No significant difference was found between males and females in their choices of black and white dolls (\( \chi^2 = 2.17, \text{ df} = 1 \), significant only at .20 level of significance). There was a fairly even preference for black and white dolls between males and females. There was no significant difference in the choice of dolls between black and white females (\( \chi^2 = .86, \text{ df} = 1 \)). Both black and white females tended to choose the white doll more often than the black doll. There was no significant difference in the choice of dolls between black and white males (\( \chi^2 = 3.62, \text{ df} = 1 \), significant only at .10 level of signifi-
 cancelled). White males chose the black doll more often than the white doll while black males chose the white doll over and above the black doll. The difference in choice was not, however, significant.

8.3. Conclusion

Hypothesis 1, that the multi-racial media programme would change the race attitudes of black and white children, was rejected. Although results showed a significant difference between treatment and control groups, there was no significant difference between pretest and only-post-test, or pretest and posttest groups. The black control group and the white treatment group were largely responsible for this difference between treatment and control groups which was thus not attributable to the multi-racial media programme but to sample selection.

Hypothesis 2, that white children would have more positive self-concepts than black children before the programme, was rejected. In fact the black pretest treatment group had the highest ego-identity mean, this being a result of sample selection but the overall difference between black and white ego-identity scores was not significant.

Hypothesis 3, that there would be a change in the self-concept of black children after the programme, was not significant. No significant change in ego-identity was found, and only the black control group, which did not receive the programme, showed an increase in an already high ego-identity score. In addition the effect of pretesting on posttest results was not significant.

A significant negative correlation was found between racial attitudes and ego-identity. Thus an increase in race attitude scores was significantly related to a decrease in ego-identity scores. The black control group is an example of such a relationship which could also be due to sample selection.

Significant results were obtained in an analysis of questions of the
"Show me" test, Categories Test and Clark Doll Test. Black children chose to sit next to, play with, and to have as their cousin, black children, but did not want some black, and Japanese/Mexican children in their school. White children chose to sit next to and to play with, white children, to have as their cousin, Japanese/Mexican children, and did not want white and then black children in their school.

In the Categories Test, white subjects made significantly more non-racial judgements than did black subjects. In the Clark Doll Test black children chose the white doll as the "nice" doll and the black doll as being "naughty". Where no significance was found this was due to the choice of the white doll as preferable by both black and white children.

Chapter 9 will present a discussion of the above results.
CHAPTER 9

Discussion

It was the aim of the present study to investigate the effects of a multi-racial media programme on the racial attitudes and ego-identity of black and white children. Such a programme was found to be ineffective in changing the existing racial attitudes of both groups of children. Both black and white subjects showed initially positive ego-identity scores and these did not change after the intervention programme: in other words, contrary to expectations, black children did not have lower self-concepts than white children, nor did these change after the programme. All three hypotheses were thus rejected. The failure of the intervention programme will be discussed first, and then findings will be discussed as they relate to the theoretical and social issues of this study.

9.1. General discussion of findings

The premises underlying the intervention programme were that (1) both black and white children would hold some form of racial attitudes; (2) that these were due, in part, to the social sanction of such attitudes as well as being a result of lack of equality between races and (3) a programme designed to show such equality would change negative racial attitudes. A possible relationship between ego-identity and racial attitudes was investigated as empirical studies (Horwitz, 1939; Clark and Clark, 1939, 1940; Milner, 1975) have alluded to the bearing the latter has on the former. In addition, a theorist such as Kohlberg (1966, 1971) based his investigations of morality on the work of ego psychologists (Erikson) and cognitive developmentalists (Piaget), and suggests a link between the formation of ego-identity and the development of morality. Erikson (1978) himself postulates that the development of a positive ego-identity is rooted in the social order which
gives meaning to the individual's attempts at resolving stage crises. Equilibrium between the individual and the social order occurs when a positive ego-identity unfolds. While Piaget (1932) sees the development of a principled morality as possible only under a society of cooperation and not constraint, Erikson (1966) created the idea of a pseudo-species as being responsible for the formation of negative identities. The latter develop when individuals are forced to conform to the role stipulated for them by the pseudo-species. Erikson (1966) maintains that out of a collective negative identity, there can emerge a collective positive identity which the pseudo-species must recognize. The resultant cooperation could result in that "wider identity of mankind" (Erikson: 1968, p. 265) which is, in a way, a collection of positive identities. Piaget (1932), on the other hand, believes that this "morality" of justice could occur only in a system of cooperation, a state children could maintain were it not for adult rules and sanctions. Kohlberg (1973) believes that it is necessary for an individual to reach an "identity crisis" in the fullest sense of the word (that is, a conscious awareness of the choice he must make, in Eriksonian terms role confusion versus identity) before he can reach the personal principles stage of morality.

Thus the theoretical background to this study suggested a link between racial attitudes and ego-identity whereby the latter would necessarily influence the development of the former, both being rooted in a greater socially sanctioned morality. Findings indicate that there is a negative relationship between racial attitudes and ego-identity, both before and after the intervention programme.

The failure of the intervention programme can be explained by several factors: firstly, the programme was implemented for only two months. Litcher, Johnson and Ryan (1973) found no improvement in children's racial attitudes after a short four week period while a three month
programme resulted in an increase in favourable attitudes towards Negroes after the use of only multi-racial readers (Litcher and Johnson, 1969). Secondly the content of the programme might have been ineffective. Children could have responded differently to the controversial material by either ignoring it or recognizing it as supporting existing attitudes (Levine and Murphy, 1943). Books were not specific to the South African social context and showed a world where equal multi-racial contact actually does not occur. Litcher, Johnson and Ryan (1973) warn that where multi-racial contact is minimal, the mere pictorial presentation of such contact might be inadequate in changing racial attitudes. In the "Show me" test children responded predominantly in terms of past experience: the high number of favourable choices for the Japanese girl by white subjects was in fact due to the presence of a Japanese girl in the school. Milner (1975) urges that programmes designed to change attitudes should parallel an active attempt to change the conditions that produced an unjust situation, just as Piaget (1932) postulates that one cannot expect the development of a just morality in a society of constraint.

The lack of a positive relationship between ego-identity and racial attitudes, on an experimental level, could be due to the inadequacy of the major determinant of the ego-identity score, the "Where are you game". From a range of 7-42 possible ego-identity scores, all groups scored between 31.80 and 35.20. Yet an analysis of individual questions of the race attitude test, the Clark Doll Test, gives a more detailed account of subjects responses. In spite of the high ego-identity score of black and white subjects, racial responses to the Clark Doll Test indicate that black subjects showed a preference for the white doll significantly more, in some cases than white subjects (this finding supports those of Clark and Clark; 1939, 1947). While the "Where are you game" taps
subjects' self-concept, the Clark Doll Test is perhaps an example of a measure of both racial attitudes and ego-identity: subjects responded either in terms of their awareness of the racial class strata, or in terms of their own racial self-consciousness. On the other hand, from a range of 0–20 possible race attitude scores, all groups (pre- and posttest) scored between 10.30 and 15.50 mean points, the latter score actually indicates a positive other-race favourableness mean. In other words scores on both race attitude and ego-identity tests could have been specific to the sample studied and not representative of a population of eight year old children. A biased sample selection, that is, children already segregated, could have resulted in a random variation of scores. Thus the failure of the multi-racial media programme also testifies to the effect of a social system such as apartheid on young children of both races, for given an average, and not definitely negative group of scores, existing attitudes did not change — a result more likely to be found with strongly prejudiced adults. While the effectiveness of the programme is called into question, one might speculate on the effect of such a programme on children with extreme racial prejudice.

The findings of the study suggest support for Thomas and Sillen (1972) who view expressions of racial prejudice as consequences and not causes of racism. To this end racial prejudice cannot be changed merely by an intervention programme, but by the eradication of racism. Findings also question the assumption that a positive ego-identity is necessarily related to the development of a just morality. Kohlberg's (1971, 1973) studies of such a relationship were conducted with adults; the present investigation took place with children, who are likely to conform to the stereotypes presented to them as good. Within a developmental framework children cognitively construct their reality (Piaget)
while developing a psycho-social identity (Kohlberg, 1971). This development is dependent on the social reality with which children interact and it is this reality that shapes their subsequent moral development. Given this fact the results of the study become more explicit: white children show a positive ego-identity and express racial attitudes that are in accord with their reality; black children show a positive ego-identity and express racial attitudes that have resulted, not from the reality defined for them by the dominant group, but from their identification with the positive elements emerging in their reality. These results will be discussed (1) in terms of Erikson's theory of ego-identity with especial reference to his conceptualization of the formation of negative identities in oppressed peoples; and (2) in terms of the theoretical relationship between ego-identity, racial attitudes and moral development.

9.2. Theoretical Criticisms

According to Erikson (1968), a positive ego-identity is an expression of equilibrium between the individual and the social order. Society reinforces "the values by which the ego exists" (Erikson; 1965, p. 269) and thus the high ego-identity scores of black and white subjects suggest a unity between children and their society. In terms of Erikson's theory of ego-identity, that such a society can produce positive ego-identities, is verification for the continuation of the status quo. But the question to be asked, with regard to the usefulness of Erikson's ego-identity theory for the study of racial attitudes, is what in fact the social order has produced in children: do positive ego-identities in young children justify the status quo in South African society? Such a society has failed to produce unambivalent children without confusion as to racial norms and individual conscience: subjects in this study were perhaps too conscious of the need to make non-racial judgements. This can be seen from the generally unprejudiced responses to
the "Show me" test, Categories Test and Clark Doll Test. Subjects thus showed a definite awareness of the nature of the study. In addition, if a pseudo-species such as South African society produces positive ego-identities in white subjects, it should, in terms of Erikson (1968) produce negative identities in black subjects. This study contradicted such an assumption. Disequilibrium between the ego-identity of black subjects and the majority social order results in the formation of positive identities which are in fact a challenge to the social order. The fact that the positive ego-identity of white subjects does not go hand in hand with high other-race favourableness is evidence of an early morality in terms of majority stereotypes. In other words, a pseudo-species or society of constraint creates a morality in children which conforms to the social norm of such a society. Race attitude scores show that white subjects are adapting cognitively to their situation. As a functional necessity for cognitive growth they are meeting society's demands. Their high ego-identity scores result from the confirmation society gives to their adoption of that society's values. Were black subjects exposed to, and then to accept those same values, they would in fact develop negative identities by developing an identity defined by the dominant group.

Yet black subjects in this study showed positive ego-identities. On an empirical level, it has been found that the development of black consciousness has resulted in positive self-images in black children (Iraba and Grant, 1970; Reece, 1974). The fact that the adolescent crisis of role confusion often occurs earlier in black children is evidence of an early racial self-consciousness and the necessity to examine in South Africa future roles in a society dominated by whites. Erikson (1968) has spoken of a "collective recovery" (p. 25) among black Americans - this is the ability to turn a negative identity into a
collective positive identity which Erikson sees as forming the psychological core of the liberation of oppressed people.

Erikson relates identity to ideology and writes of the solidarity created by linking common identities (Erikson; 1967, p. 37). The results of this study show no difference between the ego-identities of black and white children, and in Eriksonian terms, this confirms the ideological basis of identity. Kane-Berman (1978) demonstrates that the 1976 Soweto riots led to a positive self-awareness amongst black children. This fact necessarily does polarize the ego-identity of white and black children - while the former confirms Erikson's theory (namely choices in accord with societal values), the latter calls for a revision of Erikson's ideal society. The society responsible for positive ego-identities in white children, when challenged, results in positive ego-identities amongst black children. Roazen (1976) criticizes Erikson's acceptance of the social order; this study questions the necessity for equilibrium between child and society in the formation of ego-identity. The possibility of challenging the societal order and still developing a positive ego-identity can perhaps best be thought of in terms of Erikson's conception of a "crisis". There exists a "crisis stage" between ego and society in which the individual has a choice - either to accept societal "rules" and deny the ego its true identity; or to challenge those rules, risk rejection by society, yet confirm a true ego-identity. To conceive of children having to make such a choice demonstrates the extensive effect of an unjust societal system.

At the same time such a moral choice does not necessarily equal subsequent moral judgement. Kohlberg (1973) found that individuals who recognized the moral choice open to them could still adopt the conventional stage of morality by recognizing normative rules as authoritative. Kohlberg (1973) conceives of moral development as a reaction to the whole social world and not just a product of a certain stage of cognitive
development. It is this fact that links moral development to ego-identity; both are shaped by interaction with society, and moral development begins in the early stages of identity-development. As the child decents from Self, he begins to recognize the role others play in his environment; this leads to the development of ego-strength as well as to the formation of morality. Erikson sees in the development of ego-strength the growth of a "sense of humanity" (Erikson; 1968, p.402). Roazen (1976) criticizes such a conception as an ideal form of development and not an actuality. The results of the study suggest the idealistic nature of Erikson's link between ego-identity and morality. While positive ego-identities did not result in other-race favourableness, young children have not yet reached the stage of awareness of the Self's choices and thus are not able to judge the moral consequences of their racial attitudes. Erikson (1968) conceives of the child as incorporating moral rules in the third stage of development (initiative versus guilt) and his conscience at this stage is "the ontogenetic cornerstone of morality" (Erikson; 1968, p. 119). The results of the study suggest that perhaps conscience is predominantly an adolescent attribute, for both Kohlberg (1966) and Piaget (1932) have stated that young children generally adopt rules without question. It is possibly not human infancy that is "the bedrock of ethics" (Roazen; 1976, p. 155) but societal institutions. Only when the child can separate his ego from the influence of others can he develop an autonomous personality, which, for Piaget (1932), is the core of a sense of justice. This confirms the suggestion that disequilibrium between the individual and the social order can result in a positive ego-identity. While a sense of autonomy in Piagetian terms implies a sense of justice, ego-strength does not necessarily imply the same. Erikson (1965) conceives of autonomy as being rooted in "law and order" (p. 246); this idea was not confirmed by the present investigation.
The classic Piagetian peer group cooperation is evident in the development of the positive identities of black children. Theoretically, a logical extension of peer group cooperation is the development of a sense of justice. Yet the other-race favourableness of black children was not significantly different to that of white children. On an empirical level it is possible that both groups of children are inextricably enmeshed in the social values of their society, with white children reinforcing the attitudes of the dominant group, and black children merely responding to the physical reality of their position as the oppressed majority. Both groups of children for example, chose as a poor child (economically poor) a black child - and this is not indicative of a racial attitude but rather of a social reality.

Where children were able to separate racial from personal choices was to a certain extent in the Clark Doll Test: white males tended to prefer the black doll over and above the white doll, while black males chose the white doll. Although this difference was not significant, it does indicate the somewhat arbitrary nature of doll choices made by males when forced to identify with a female doll. Black and white females both tended to choose the white doll - this indicates a racial choice on the part of both groups, white females preferred their own-race doll while black females preferred the other-race doll. The fact that black children responded to the white doll as having a nice colour shows the extent to which racial stereotypes are perpetuated; at a young age black children judge the white doll as "nice" and the black doll as "naughty". White children chose fairly evenly between black and white dolls. This indicates either a non-racial choice in preference for one particular doll, or an attempt to choose fairly between both races. Many of the white children came from professional backgrounds and could have been more exposed to liberal ideology than
the average South African child. The fact that one group, the black control group, scored an initial high other-race favourableness score of 13.40, which, after a two month time-span increased to 15.20, points to a possible development of justice from peer group cooperation. This group actually obtained the lowest ego-identity mean and confirms the significant negative correlation found between racial attitudes and ego-identity. Certainly at the age of eight, a secure ego-identity does not go hand in hand with other-race favourableness.

The stress Kohlberg and Gillian (1971) place on the effect of social forces on stages of moral thought is the direction in which the results of this study can be interpreted. The study confirms the fact that an historical approach is embedded in much child psychology for an examination of social forces can elucidate the development of any particular cognitive and affective stage. Erikson's theory of negative identities arose in fact from his study of the historical emergence of the psycho-social identity of American Negroes, and Erikson could have foreseen the impact of black consciousness on ego-identity development when he postulated the growth of positive identities out of a collective negative identity. Just as children incorporate past identifications in their future ego-identity, so too do historical identities converge in the formation of a new self-consciousness. Milner (1975) sees feelings of inferiority as basic to the personality of the black American; it is possible that historical circumstances have already changed such a conception. Jahoda (1961) found inferiority to be intrinsic to Ghanaians identification of themselves before independence - a post-independence study might produce contrasting results. It can be seen that a multi-racial media programme alone would not be sufficient to change attitudes and identities which have an historical root.
The results of this study confirm the need for a theoretical background to empirical race attitudes research: Erikson's theory of ego-identity, and its relation to Piaget and Kohlberg's theories of moral development provide a developmental basis for the study of racial attitudes in children. An empirical correlation between racial attitudes and ego-identity was significant, but in terms of an inverse relationship to that suggested by theoretical studies. This study suggested a theoretical concordance between race attitudes, ego-identity and moral development, and the findings support such a conclusion, taking other-race favourableness as an indication of moral judgement. The findings do suggest that race attitude research must take into account the historical and social background of the social system in which such research takes place; for example the South African context comprises an inverted situation where the majority has minority status and will obviously hold negative attitudes towards the dominant minority. Given the historical basis of child development, Erikson's theory of ego-identity offers a theoretical link between changing social orders and the developing child - this is a link Erikson (1965, 1968) himself proffers. It is also suggested by theorists of moral development (Piaget, Kohlberg) who cannot ignore the moral social order in which the child develops.

9.3. Methodological Criticisms

The chief methodological criticism centres around the tenuous relationship between the measurement of self-concept and Erikson's ego-identity theory. In this study ego-identity was operationalized into self-concept due to the paucity of tools to measure what Erikson defined as ego-identity. Ego-identity is a developmental stage concept that should be operationalized in terms of Erikson's eight stages of man, and the resolution of the crises of each stage. The self-concept test in this study was the "Where are you Game" (Engel and Raine, 1963)
and this concentrates on the child's feelings of worth. The fact that a child feels "happy" does not necessarily mean that the child has resolved a certain stage, although feelings of inferiority were tapped by the self-concept test.

In terms of self-identity, the Clark Doll Test, which was used in this study as a test of racial attitudes, is perhaps a more stable measure of Erikson's theoretical construct. The Colouring-In test (Clark and Clark, 1940) which produced individually interesting results did not yield sufficient information to affect the ego-identity score; this was possibly due to the E's own classification of pictures in terms of only five categories. Subjective evaluations of colouring-in revealed many internal dynamics suggested by Erikson's theory of ego-identity: for example one white child who was obviously aware of the implications of the study coloured in the second girl (any colour could be chosen), brown, and said "I want to be untidy". She was possibly able to perceive the plight of being black in South Africa and wanted to express some form of identification with black children without wanting to be black. Several black children chose the white crayon and coloured in the second child white, expressing a desire to identify with white children. On the other hand many black children seemed to be overwhelmed by the range of colour choice and appeared to use a wider range of colours than white subjects.

The Colouring-In test also involved the correct identification of three objects - one of which was a pig. White children responded in terms of the cultural stereotype of a pig as pink, while black children responded in terms of their reality. Many had never seen a pig and coloured the picture any colour they happened to like. The final ego-identity score did not tap the very complex reactions children actually gave to the Colouring-In test and the Clark Doll Test. These reactions
increase the likelihood of a relationship between ego-identity and racial attitudes even though overall statistical results indicate a negative correlation. More complex measurement tools might produce more complex results in terms of Erikson's theory of ego-identity.

Although tests in this study have been used extensively all over the world, no validity or reliability data exists, probably because of the flexibility of the content of tests. It is possible that the Clark Doll Test should allow children an open-ended choice such as suggested by Lerner and Buehrig (1975). At the same time the repetitive nature of the battery of tests could result in progressively consistent responses of subjects in terms of boredom with the experiment. Recordings of children's verbal expressions during testing suggest that an open-ended interview on racial situations might elicit more about the children’s racial attitudes than a series of tests. Children were encouraged to talk about their choices which often indicated complex racial attitudes not revealed in their actual choice. It seems likely that one might ask, together with Katz and Zalk (1974) whether doll preferences are in fact an index of racial attitudes. Open ended interviews based on pictorial or real-life situations would possibly serve as a better measure of racial attitudes.

Another methodological weakness is the high possibility of experimenter effect. Both races were tested by same-race experimenters in order to eliminate a confounding racial factor. Nevertheless, subjects were curious as to the nature of the study, and attempted to elicit "correct responses" from both experimenters. This suggests an awareness on the part of subjects as to the possibility of giving an "incorrect" response in terms of the experimenters' own racial attitudes.

An important methodological downfall lies in the great socio-economic differences in subject's backgrounds. From the outset, their intervention
programme had to contend with the fact that however much multi-racial contact such a programme portrays, children go home from school to their segregated and very different home environments. For white children education is a foregone conclusion, for black children it is only a possibility. Thus in the South African context sample selection in a multi-racial study is automatically biased. In this study white subjects came from mainly professional and managerial backgrounds while black subjects were children of unskilled or skilled workers. The study should have attempted to arrange contact between black and white children as a preliminary or prelude to the intervention programme. Milner (1972) conducted an action research project on five to nine year old children and examined the effect of black teachers as well as multi-racial curricula on the racial attitudes of black and white children. The premise of the year long programme was to create in white children the formation of a close relationship with a black person whose position of respect and affection will affect the formation of their attitudes towards black people in general, and the black teachers will help to foster a secure sense of identity in their black children" (Milner; 1975, p. 249).

This is the ideal of multi-racial education in its entirety. Milner (1975) found early changes in children's attitudes of children after prolonged intervention programmes.

9.4. Design

The results of the study suggest that the design used in this investigation, Solomon's design, might be particularly necessary for a short pre-posttest time-span. The intention of the design is to elucidate whether any significant posttest results are due to pretesting and not the intervention programme. No pretest effect was found, but given only a short two month intervention between pre- and posttesting, it is possible for pretest results to have a significant influence on posttest
results (Solomon, 1949). The inclusion of a control group increases the possibility of distinguishing between a treatment effect and a pre-test effect. In this particular study, Solomon's design necessitated the use of a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) as the design created three independent variables. Multivariate analyses of variance are becoming increasingly popular in the social sciences, particularly with respect to pre- and posttest designs (Olson, 1976; Hummel and Sligo, 1971; Forman, 1978) and Solomon's design, particularly where two experimental groups exist, lends itself to such an analysis.

9.5. Suggestions for further research

The present study should be viewed as an impetus for future research: a two-month multi-racial media programme was found to be ineffective in changing children's racial attitudes, but extensive research possibilities are suggested by the theoretical and empirical issues discussed in the study.

There is a need for a thorough investigation into the tests used to measure racial attitudes especially in South Africa, and for the construction of an operational Eriksonian ego-identity measure. The construction of such a tool will enable experimenters to investigate the second important theoretical factor suggested by this study, namely the relationship between racial attitudes, ego-identity and moral development. Kohlberg (1972) has constructed several reliable moral development tests which he has used extensively to examine the development of moral judgement. If in fact ego-identity per se could be measured, the theoretical link between Erikson's ego psychology and the cognitive-based theories of Kohlberg and Piaget could be investigated. This could lead to an enrichment in race attitude research by providing a theoretical explanation for the moral and social basis of the development of ego-identity and racial attitudes.
This study lacked an investigation into moral development which could have provided the key to Erikson's belief in the moral basis of identity development, and hence of racial attitudes. Kohlberg's theory suggests that children will probably express attitudes that accord with sanctioned racial stereotypes, thus research on racial attitudes and moral development should perhaps concentrate on the adolescent who is at the Eriksonian stage of role confusion versus identity. Such a study could investigate the hypothesis that racial attitudes are a function of identity development. If the adolescent in a prejudiced society rejects the social order, is this a function of his ego-strength? Similarly, in South Africa today, what are the psychological consequences for an adolescent who makes such a choice yet is rejected by his society? Does the black adolescent who rejects the social order have more support for this identity crisis than the white adolescent?

The present investigation was concerned with younger children, and the potential for action research lies with just such a group. While a two-month intervention period was inadequate, most year-long intervention programmes have changed young children's attitudes (Milner, 1977). Many of these studies have taken place in societies which permit equality between races and this might have accounted for their effectiveness. In South Africa, future research must concentrate on alternatives to the present education system and the possible effects of changes on young children given existing racial attitudes. A recent report published by the Education Commission of the South African Institute of Race Relations (Education for a new era) suggests that in education "there should be as little separation of ethnic and language groups as possible" (Education Commission; 1979, p. 4) and by concentrating on means of achieving multi-cultural education, the research will be aiding attempts to change the society that has produced racial atti-
tudes. To this end, the racial attitudes of parents and children should be studied together, for Trager and Yarrow (1952) found that children did not always express similar attitudes to their parents. In addition, investigations of group-belongingness could help elucidate the extent of resistance to educational programmes designed to create multi-racial contact.

The present study confirmed theoretically and empirically the need for an investigation of the social forces responsible for the development of the child's ego-identity, racial attitudes and moral judgement. The dynamics of the child's interaction with his environment can be assessed in terms of the child's personal social and emotional coping mechanisms, and the social and normative pressures to which he is subjected. To this end further research should include an historical investigation of those forces responsible for the environment with which the child interacts in the present.

This study also confirmed the importance of psychology's role in race relations research. By utilizing social, educational and child development theories, the research psychologist is able to employ a broad and comprehensive perspective in the investigation of what is itself a multi-dimensional concept, racial prejudice. In South Africa such prejudice might be related to the social system to a much greater extent than in countries where racial equality exists. For example an authoritarian upbringing might not be a causal factor of racial prejudice in South Africa (Pettigrew, 1956) while it might play an important part in explaining the prejudice of individuals in other environments. Such differences highlight the need for an underlying historical perspective in all race attitudes research. The psychologist is able to play his part in change by analyzing and constructing material for use in multi-racial programmes, and by evaluating the efficacy of such
material. At the same time by encouraging multi-racial contact amongst children the psychologist can attempt to envisage some of the immediate problems caused by educational desegregation.

This investigation was limited to black Zulu and Sotho-speaking, and to white English-speaking, children. It is essential that all sectors of the population be studied at an early stage to effectively assess the effect of apartheid on urban and rural Blacks as well as English and Afrikaans-speaking children. Such research will help alleviate the many generalizations made possible by research on a limited number of subjects. Should race attitude research multiply, there might indeed be sufficient interrelated studies to support calls for educational reform as one of the means of alleviating racial inequality in South Africa.

9.6. Conclusion

The overall aim of this study was to examine the racial attitudes and ego-identity of black and white children and to see whether a multi-racial media programme could change such attitudes. The study also attempted to provide a theoretical framework for the study of racial attitudes by examining Erikson's theory of ego-identity. This theory provided the stimulus for investigating ego-identity in conjunction with racial attitudes; similarly the moral basis of Erikson's conception of ego-identity prompted a discussion of Piaget and Kohlberg's cognitive based theories of moral development. The study took cognizance of the segregated structure of South African society in which there is no racial equality. In view of the failure of the intervention programme to change racial attitudes, and the fact that no difference was found between the ego-identity of black and white children, the following tentative conclusions can be drawn:-

1. Racial attitudes do exist in children of seven and a half years of
age. A two month intervention programme is too short to register a change in such attitudes; however a longer, more concentrated programme which includes multi-racial contact between black and white children might be more effective.

2. The relationship between racial attitudes and ego-identity was found to be significant; such a link was investigated in order to provide a developmental basis for race attitude research. The difference between the self-concept measure used in this study and Erikson's ego-identity construct could account for the significant negative correlation between the two variables.

3. It is suggested that Erikson's theory of ego-identity retains its importance for race attitude research. The theory accounts for the emergence of positive identities out of the collective negative identity of an oppressed group such as South African Blacks. The theory is criticized for its justification of the status quo as essential for the development of a positive ego-identity.

4. Kohlberg and Piaget identify the developmental stages of morality which could account for children's racial attitudes. Children respond to racial stereotypes which are sanctioned by the significant others in their environment. In addition, peer group cooperation cannot lead to a sense of justice in a society of constraint.

5. While pretesting did not have a significant effect on posttest racial attitude and ego-identity scores, it can be concluded that Solomon's design would be especially valuable where a long term intervention programme is used. This design enables the experimenter to assess the effect on children of developmental maturation and contemporaneous effects during the time-span of the programme.

It is suggested that future research concentrate on investigating the theoretical basis of race attitude development by focusing on
the theories of Erikson, Piaget and Kohlberg, within an historical-social perspective. Studies of the relationship between ego-identity and morality in the adolescent could help to further understanding of the development of racial attitudes. This study investigated a very small sample of the South African population and it is suggested that future studies select a wider cross-section of urban and rural, English and Afrikaans speaking children. The most important task of future psychological research is the creation and assessment of material to be used in multi-racial education. In this way the researcher can predict the possible problems created by a desegregated educational system in South Africa.
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"Show me" Test
APPENDIX 1c

Colouring-in Test
APPENDIX 1d

Engel and Raine's Self-concept test.

1. (intellectually gifted)

2. (happy)

(lacking this)

(unhappy)
5. (attractive) 

6. (strong) 

(attractive) 

(weak) 

(unattractive) 

(strong)
7. (obedient) 

(disobedient)
## APPENDIX 2

Books used in multi-racial media programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHOR</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>PUBLISHER</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gilroy, B.</td>
<td>Bubu's street</td>
<td>Macmillan Educ.</td>
<td>1975</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kyter, E.</td>
<td>Who are we?</td>
<td>Burke Books</td>
<td>1977</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mackay, D. et al.</td>
<td>Dressing up</td>
<td>Longman</td>
<td>1970</td>
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<tr>
<td>Keats, E.J.</td>
<td>Pet show</td>
<td>Puffin Books</td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonsal, C.</td>
<td>The case of the Hungry Stranger</td>
<td>World's work</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crompton, M.</td>
<td>The house where Jack lives</td>
<td>Bodley Head</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolcutt, P.</td>
<td>Super Sam and the Salad Garden</td>
<td>Addison-'esley</td>
<td>1976</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vaughan, J. (ed.)</td>
<td>Having a party</td>
<td>Macdonald &amp; Co.</td>
<td>1973</td>
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<tr>
<td>Usborne, P.</td>
<td>In the park</td>
<td>Macdonald &amp; Co.</td>
<td>1972</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beim, L. &amp; J.</td>
<td>Two is a team</td>
<td>Harcourt Brace</td>
<td>1973</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weil, L.</td>
<td>Fat Ernest</td>
<td>Jovanovich</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Alchea</td>
<td>David and his sister Carol</td>
<td>Dinosaur pub.</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources of multi-racial material and information concerning education in South Africa.

South African Institute of Race Relations Library.
Auden House, 68, De Korte Street, Braamfontein, Johannesburg.

U.S. Information Service (Library and Film Centre)
Shakespeare House, Commissioner Street, Johannesburg.

Gubbins Library, University of the Witwatersrand.
1 Jan Smuts Avenue, Braamfontein, Johannesburg.
Human Awareness Programme
R&C House, De Beer Street, Braamfontein, Johannesburg.

Institute of Social Economic Research
Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa.

African Studies Institute
University of the Witwatersrand, 1 Jan Smuts Avenue, Braamfontein, Johannesburg.

Ravan Press
105, Corlett Place, Braamfontein, Johannesburg.
APPENDIX 3

Race Attitudes Scoring Sheet

Name: ___________________________ School: ___________________________

1. "Show me" test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total:_____

2. "Categories" test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race v. Sex</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Race v. Age</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total:_____

Overal:_____

3. Clark Doll Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total:_____

Comments:

Total Race Attitudes Score:
Author  De Saxe M
Name of thesis Changes in racial attitudes and ego-identity after a multi-racial media programm  1979

PUBLISHER:
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg
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