So far, I have tried to show how Pedagogics misconstrues authority by conflating it with power and this leads to parallel difficulties in distinguishing between schooling and education. That this is the case, I shall attempt to illustrate with reference to the last component of the education situation; namely the educational goal.

d) The goal of education
The educational goal for Pedagogics is adulthood. This should not be confused with the process of natural or physical 'maturation' nor should it be viewed as arriving at an end state. It involves the realization of various criteria such as: when man gives meaning and purpose to existence; is capable of self-judgement and understanding; respects all human dignity; makes deliberate choices and acts with moral responsibility; consciously identifies with values of propriety and finally, upholds those norms consistent with a commitment to a philosophy of life.

It is the last two criteria that need more careful examination. The others, in the way that they assert a space for purposeful action, freedom of choice, autonomy, accountability, etc, are obviously related to the concept of authority. Whether, however, given the
inclination of Pedagogics to confuse power and authority, they are really able to sustain any credibility in this connection is doubtful.

According to Pedagogics, one is not born with a set of values or a life philosophy, but these are acquired through the purposeful endeavour of education. Instrumental in this occurrence are educators, who as adults have themselves accomplished the goal of education and formed their own life philosophies in accordance with which they direct their activities, including education, (and who, as was demonstrated in the previous section, have disproportionate access to 'authority' i.e. power to impress their values on the educand). The ultimate success of education is achieved through the educator's redundancy when the educand's obedience to the educator is transferred to the values and norms which the educator represents. Griessel explains the difference between obedience to 'enforced human authority' and 'compliance with norm identification' as follows:

Where a not-yet-adult will obey because he fears punishment, the responsible adult obeys his conscience which has been formed by the demands of propriety. (49)
The attainment of adulthood is confirmed by the incorporation of the demands of propriety into a philosophy of life which calls for consistent commitment to its values and ideals. There is therefore a close relation between the goal of education i.e. adulthood and a philosophy of life - and it is this relationship which creates difficulties for understanding Pedagogics as education. As Viljoen rightly acknowledges:

The moment values are mentioned one finds oneself in the realm of opinions on the meaning and purpose of life, a realm in which there can be no question of rational and scientific choice. The choice of a final goal depends ultimately on faith ... The choice of an aim is related to one's view of adulthood ... one's philosophy of life ... it is (therefore) not the business of pedagogics to prescribe any particular choice. The nearest approach ... to the formulation of an aim is to describe the goal as adulthood, on the understanding that this concept may be variously interpreted in accordance with differing views on life.(50)

In keeping with these sentiments Pedagogics, as an autonomous science, claims not to prescribe values but to offer a framework within which people holding different philosophies of life might establish their particular education systems in accordance with their definition of adulthood.
Any evaluation of this claim must take into account the way in which Pedagogics perceives the relationship between science and values, with particular reference to the distinctions it makes between science and non-science, which is characterized by the pre- and post-scientific modes of reflection. Despite attempts at strict compartmentalization, the unifying link between these scientific stages is to be found in a philosophy of life that is also closely connected with the goal of education. The way in which this philosophy of life intertwines the moments of scientific activity is illustrated below:

The values and principles ... are a matter of belief and therefore fall totally in the pre-scientific field of life. These values and principles cannot be scientifically proved, verified or justified. They can, however, be rationally arranged in a certain order, which is then called a philosophy of life ... which is essentially a post-scientific implementation of scientific knowledge in the arranging of what is unconditionally believed and lived by a particular person or group of persons. (50)

What Viljoen and Pienaar seem to be saying is that a philosophy of life is essentially a post-scientific implementation of scientific knowledge, i.e. science ranks values of the pre-scientific world. Thus, not only is science involved in description, but it also takes on the task of prescription. In order to rank values, Pedagogics must rank values on the basis of some
values itself and these, we assume, because they cannot meet the criteria for scientific practice on its own definition, must be pertinent to a particular life view.

A circular process in which the scientific stage becomes redundant is therefore postulated. The pedagogician interprets the 'new' knowledge gained at the scientific level according to a life philosophy so that this may be 'implanted' back into the community during the post-scientific phase. Margetson notes a contradiction inherent in this process through the words, 'new' and 'implant' showing that:

"The claim to implant new knowledge 'back' into this world ... is incoherent, for if the knowledge is new, then in what sense it could be implanted 'back' into this world; or conversely if it is being implanted back into this world, then in what sense could the knowledge be 'new'?"(52)

This brings us back to where we started, consequently raising doubts about how the knowledge gained in the scientific stage might be relevant and/or useful, and posing problems for the radical distinction which Pedagogics is seeking to make between science and values.
Its failure in this respect illustrates a further contradiction, i.e. that while it professes to entertain a diversity of opinion surrounding the notion of adulthood, Pedagogics defines it in a specific way according to specific values. For example:

Education is a particular occurrence in accordance with accepted values and norms of the educator and eventually also of the group to which he belongs. He is engaged in accompanying the child on the way to self-realization, but this realization must be in accordance with the demands of the community and in compliance with the philosophy of life of the group to which he belongs. In this way the South African child has to be educated according to Christian National principles.(53)

and

Such a view, that the relations of understanding, trust, and authority, in concrete education situations must evince a Christian character, is of course a Christian view. The authors think that the Christian philosophy of life is indeed the correct philosophy of life according to which the child should be educated.(54)

Although Pedagogicians would claim that these views are acceptable in the post-scientific stage, their inability to distinguish between the three scientific modes of reflection must raise doubts about the status of these views. Since a distinction has been shown to be untenable, these views would suggest that Pedagogics, despite its claims to the contrary, has definite ideas on what constitutes adulthood in its identification with a
Christian philosophy of life. It would, consequently, be involved in producing one particular kind of person as opposed to another and, as such, its opportunities for educating would be proscribed.

The predicament is compounded when Viljoen and Pienaar assert that "pedagogics is not intended to be without a view of life (a viewless view), but rather to be a grounding of views of life."(55) There is ambiguity and confusion in Pedagogics which wants simultaneously to incorporate the neutral stance of a descriptive science and to provide a grounding of particular views which are prescriptive. These represent mutually exclusive ideals, as illustrated below:

It [Pedagogics] endeavours to be valid for all people and for all ages. It strives towards universality and validity, transcending time and space. In this way Pedagogics lays the foundation of various systems of teaching and education endorsing different views of life.(56)

Surely, however, in 'endorsing different view of life' Pedagogics is at the same time denying for itself the possibility of being 'valid for all people and for all ages'? In the light of its failure to distinguish between science and non-science, the indications are that it is predisposed towards the former i.e. 'endorsing different views of life'. From here it is an easy step to assert "that educators from different
cultural groups should differ in respect of practical education". (57) In other words, because differences are seen to exist, it is further presumed that they 'ought' to exist. And it is not difficult to find an ideology within the context of South Africa to which this conceptual confusion may lend support, as illustrated, for example, in the fallacy of 'separate but equal'.

The discussion of the educational goal which is associated with adulthood has shown that, for Pedagogics, this is defined in terms of a philosophy of life and more particularly, a Christian philosophy of life. This further coincides with the perception of the individual in causal terms, as a result of the failure to distinguish between power and authority so that, education for Pedagogics is realized in the shaping of a particular kind of individual. Notwithstanding, however, the creditable successes which this process might effect, it can never be identified with the account of education which I have given in Part III because its ends are so narrowly prescribed that they limit opportunities for autonomy, purposeful change and unanticipated consequences. As such, Pedagogics might be more aptly described in terms of schooling and/or indoctrination.
Section iii) The Relationship between C.N.E. and Pedagogics

There are two dimensions to the problem of power and authority in C.N.E. and Pedagogics. The first one is connected with their mutual failure to distinguish between power and authority, and ultimately, schooling and education, as demonstrated in the previous sections (i.e. Part IV, Sections i and ii). The second dimension is related to the way in which each attempts to authorize a position from which to wield power. It is the latter aspect that affords insight into understanding their relationship which is the focus of my attention in this section.

Superficially, C.N.E. seems far removed from Pedagogics, but I intend to show that they are linked ideologically in their search for legitimation. As such, they illustrate the tension, noted in Part I where it was suggested that power and authority, originally located in the Church, were transferred to the domain of science. The same conflict between science and religion for ultimate 'authority' (power?) is apparent both within C.N.E. and Pedagogics respectively, as well as in the pattern of the declining influence of C.N.E. in contrast to the growing importance of Pedagogics.
Their ostensible point of departure lies in their appeal to different authorities i.e. C.N.E. bases its ultimate justification on religion, in particular the Calvinist interpretation of Christianity, while Pedagogics rests its sanction on a claim to being an autonomous science. I shall attempt to show that neither is, however, able to sustain its credibility on these grounds. This will involve some investigation of the grounds on which each is based; more specifically, a) the contradiction between the religious and national principles in C.N.E. will be examined and b) the claims of Pedagogics to be an autonomous science will be exposed.

From this it will be argued that the differences between C.N.E. and Pedagogics are more apparent than real and that their inability to sustain credibility on these grounds is as much indicative of the grounds themselves, as it is of their misrepresentation of authority as a surrogate for power. A consideration of this claim (i.e. the misconception of power and authority) will show c) how they are ideologically linked and the way in which their relationship reflects a subtle shift in rhetoric. In no way does it indicate a move towards dismantling earlier educational policies, but rather reveals a new level of sophistication in perpetuating the status quo.
The structure of my argument in this section will follow the pattern of the questions posed below:

a) Can C.N.E. sustain its credibility by appealing to religion as its authority?

b) Can Pedagogics sustain its credibility by appealing to science as its authority?

c) What is subsequently revealed of the relationship that exists between C.N.E. and Pedagogics?

Christianity, for example, is not contained within geographical boundaries; it rises above and beyond physical constraints, extending into the Kingdom of God. It is, therefore, supra-national and not national. Setting aside its specifically Christian beliefs in God, Jesus, resurrection etc., Christianity represents a
moral code based on love for others, tolerance, humility, justice, truth and mercy. It preaches the brotherhood of man and is consequently involved in reconciling differences and emphasizing a commonality among people, their languages and cultures.

In contrast, nationalism demands an awareness of separateness in terms of area, identity, language, history, loyalty and ethnicity. The commitment it expects may sometimes override broader moral obligations, such as when a patriotic appeal to defend one's country results in the violation of a non-member's rights or even death. The glorification of one's own may encourage attitudes of arrogance, conceit and complacency, contrary to Christian virtues, leaving little space for the recognition of the achievements of others.

From these brief descriptions it must be apparent that there is some tension between the two principles. Where Christianity advocates universal love, nationalism would rather pursue a separatist and isolationist policy, leading to divisions rather than unity. Although it is relegated to a subordinate role in C.N.E., whether nationalism can be rooted in Christianity is question-
able. And it is this very contradiction which threatens to undermine the appeal that C.N.E. makes to religion as its ultimate authority.

Closer historical examination of the relationship between the Christian and National principles in C.N.E. does indeed reveal the changing emphases of each. Before 1948 the religious component of C.N.E. was given priority and despite the reiteration of its importance in Article 1, Hofmeyr shows that the "1948 resolution merged Christian National principles with an increasing secular nationalism in which the basic principles of C.N.E. were sacrificed to the higher goal of a united 'volk'."(58)

Their competition is, for example, illustrated in the rift between the 'confessionalists' and 'permeationists' prior to the reformulation of C.N.E. in the Beleid of 1948. The former put the Christian principle first, wanting to guarantee the parents' right in determining the spiritual direction of the school, while at the same time securing state aid in financing and administering the school. The fact that the latter approach endorsed by the 'permeationists' who represented a more liberal and diluted Christianity, which they argued could be adequately propagated through state schools, was successful, indicates that the National principle was
beginning to assert itself over the Christian. There was a greater concern for the survival of Afrikanerdom than doctrinal purity.

In the sphere of black-white relations, the growing importance of Afrikaner nationalism was to have a different application of C.N.E. Instead of recognising parallel aspirations for the emergence of a Black nation, it was intent upon relegating the black people to an indigenous culture and identity within a Christian framework for which the whites, and especially the Afrikaners, accepted self-appointed responsibility and guardianship. C.N.E. policy for Black education was expressed through the following: segregation, mother-tongue instruction, ethnic identity and the need for conversion to Christianity. Some reference to the influence of nationalism on Black education in general as well as on the language policies, content and control of White education has already been made in Part IV, Section i.

The uneasy relationship between the Christian and National principles, as a result of their conflicting demands, the historically documented evidence of the way in which their roles have been inverted (59) and the impact of nationalism on black and white education respectively, all point to the dominant role of the
National principle in C.N.E. so that the lip-service paid to the Christian principle may be exposed for what it is: justification of the unjustifiable. In relying on the uncritical acceptance of the absolute authority of God and the Scriptures fostered by the fundamentalist approach of Calvinism, divine sanction has been won for the implementation of a policy of apartheid, ironically described by some as a heresy. As such, C.N.E. has been a powerful instrument in extending Afrikaner hegemony. Consequently, any appeals C.N.E. may make to religion as its ultimate authority when it gives precedence to the National principle, must be exposed as thinly disguised ideology and seriously impair its credibility.

b) Can Pedagogics sustain its credibility by appealing to science as its authority?

Pedagogics lays claim to be the only authentic way of studying education. It bases this claim on its existence as an autonomous science through the adoption of the phenomenological method. Although criticisms (which have significant implications for the credibility of Pedagogics) have been levelled against its application of phenomenology, I shall not be concerned with investigating these here. Instead, I shall limit myself to a consideration of the account of science given by Viljoen and Pienaar, in assessing whether
Pedagogics is able to sustain its credibility on these grounds.

Viljoen and Pienaar acknowledge that 'science' is a most controversial term, often not clearly defined, and they therefore regard it as "compulsory to begin this discussion by reflecting very carefully on the exact meaning of this concept". (62) Its existence is taken for granted and may not be denied because according to their strange reasoning, "Every library in the world gives proof of the actuality of science". (63) Their approval of science is registered in "it is employed to improve living conditions, to bring about progress etc", (64) revealing a simple equation of science with technology and ignoring its 'double-edged' potential to be a mixed blessing.

In the light of the discussion of positivism (Part I, Section iii), these attitudes might justifiably invite reservations as it was shown there that the mystical respect accorded to science may function ideologically in winning support for particular policies. The instrumentalist approach put forward here resembles that of policy science, which operates as a conservative force biased towards perpetuating the features of industrial society, through the reduction of controversial issues to a means-ends dichotomy.
From these introductory remarks, Viljoen and Pienaar proceed to a definition:

Science can be defined as a systematic totality of knowledge or a structure of knowledge. (65)

Thus, science represents knowledge in the form of a 'systematic totality' or 'a structure'. How these two definitions are related to each other is not clear. A structure of knowledge need not be systematic or total and while science may use a systematic analysis, this does not necessarily of itself constitute a science. These definitions share a vagueness which allows almost anything to count as science. They continue, quoting Stoker's definition of science, as:

Knowledge, systematized and verified technically and methodically, for the sake of knowledge itself. (66)

The same problems arise in attempting to relate this definition to the previous two, except that the additional notion of verification arouses suspicions of positivism which Viljoen and Pienaar strongly reject in