authentic way of studying education. The pedagogician takes the phenomenon education in the everyday life world as the point of departure and, assuming a critical stance, follows the stages of the phenomenological method so that its essence may be revealed and described from a pedagogic perspective. Following this procedure, Pedagogics focuses on the education situation, the education relation and various categories which characterize the pedagogic phenomenon. For convenience, I shall use the same headings in structuring my discussion of Pedagogics. Of special interest for my purposes, is the way in which Pedagogics interprets the concepts of power and authority through the formulation of the teacher-pupil relationship in each of the above-mentioned areas.

a) The education situation
Humans can never be 'unsituated'. According to Griessel, "From the moment of his birth man finds himself in a situation and will continue this human situatedness until the day of his death."(26) Before looking specifically at what distinguishes an education situation from other situations, it is worth noting that for Pedagogics, being situated does not imply an 'inevitable circumstantial totality',(27) according to which man's behaviour is determined; it is a position
from which an individual is free to act and transform his/her reality. As such, it promises scope for understanding behaviour in terms of the concept of authority, rather than power.

The education situation itself is composed of three elements; namely, the educand, the educator and the educational goal; each of which will be considered for the possibilities it opens up of conceptualizing human behaviour in terms of authority in the sphere of education.

The educand is one 'who lends himself to education'(2) and the child, who is depicted as being utterly helpless and dependent at birth, naturally fills this role. Notwithstanding this vulnerability, Pedagogics stresses that the child is a full human being, although not-yet adult and that it would be wrong to perceive the child as 'an incomplete adult or small grown-up', in terms of criteria that s/he lacks by comparison with adults. Consequently, the child should be viewed as a 'developing adult' whose human dignity is inviolable, but who needs assistance in becoming what s/he would like to be. And the realization of this is only possible through the educative situation. Being human, the child is fallible and exposed to risk. The underlying implications of this suggest that the child
faces open possibilities and is susceptible to both negative and positive influences so that one of the tasks of education is to enable the educand to choose and act with responsibility, which is associated with maturity and adulthood.

In its conception of the child as weak, insecure and dependent, Pedagogics creates problems for understanding the child's behaviour in terms of authority. In order to enter into a relationship of authority, there must be a shared conceptual scheme between participants. If children are not born with conceptual schemes but must acquire them, then it is difficult to see how they may enter into a relation of authority. Indeed, adult/child situations invariably offer poor examples of authority relations, since the involvement of their participants is disproportionately weighted, as illustrated by Du Plooy and Kilian in the following quote:

...two unique persons - an adult and adult-in-the-making - associate and meet each other in their unequalness or lack of equality.(29)

The same doubts about understanding the educator's behaviour in the light of authority must apply, especially in the primary education situation i.e. the home, where parents are ascribed stereo-typed and sexist roles, (eg the mother's 'abiding' and the father's
'conquering' way of life). In meeting their obligation as educators, they are required to have a knowledge of the child, in general and particular, respect for the child "because of the authority of the values to which both he and the child are subject and by which he is appealed to" (30) as well as a relationship of trust. Of relevance here is to know which values make up the authority to which the educator and, ultimately, the educand are subject. If they are values that reflect the norms and traditions of a particular group, rather than intersubjective agreement necessary for conceptual understanding, then it would be uncertain whether the participants were involved in the practice of education in accordance with the concept 'authority' or not.

Instead of continuing the discussion of the education situation here, I shall consider its last component i.e. the educational goal, later. I want to turn to the education relation now because it is a more detailed elaboration of the relationship mentioned above between the educand and the educator.
b) The education relation

Education is a social phenomenon which takes place through relationships, in particular that between the educand and the educator. Although there is a 'gradual inequality between adults and adults-in-the-making' (31) and this puts added responsibility on the educator, it is a relationship of mutuality in which man encounters and is encountered by others and the world. In the same way that people are unique, every education relation is unique, but there are, nevertheless, certain fundamental features that it embodies; for example, it is a binding relationship characterized by love, support and dialogue. In particular, it involves three pedagogic relation structures; namely the relationship of knowing or understanding, of trust and of authority. These three aspects are closely interwoven, but it is the relationship of authority on which I shall focus.

Introducing this relationship, Viljoen and Pienaar claim that education is inconceivable without it and equate authority with being told what to do; for example:

When a person accepts or rejects the authority of another person, he allows himself to be told what to do, or refuses to be told. (32)
The same position is echoed by Landman et al. when they explain "the exercise of authority is to be told". This does not look particularly promising in the light of my understanding of authority; it seems more like an instance of power, demanding conformity through force. Griessel, nevertheless, insists that authority must not be equated with force, punishment and suppression. He associates it with notions of 'guidance', 'inculcation' and 'protection'; for example, "The chief component of the authority relation can be defined as assistance in proper progression to adulthood". While this interpretation carries with it patronizing overtones inherent in a relationship of inequality, it wants to distinguish between power and authority; whereas the others seem to confuse authority with some sort of force, namely that implied in a command.

According to Pedagogics, three constituents are discernible in a relationship of authority; namely appeal, obedience and tension. Arising out of the helplessness of the child, cast adrift in the world, the educand addresses an appeal for support to the adult. In return, the adult, who is subject to the authority of the values s/he holds, is aroused by the child's need and obliged to offer sympathetic guidance. The encounter in which the 'authority-demanding child acknowledges the authority of the authority-bearing
teacher' (35) lays the foundation for the purposeful engagement in the education occurrence.

Besides the difficulties of understanding the participants' behaviour in terms of authority, caused by the obvious inequity in the education relation, another problem arises when authority is seen to be located in an individual. This is clearly illustrated in the description by Landman et al of the teacher as the 'bearer of authority' and later in their discussion of the teacher and exertion of authority. Stress is laid on the outward appearance of the teacher as a means towards exercising control; for example:

His appearance, his clothes, his actions are interpreted by pupils as revelations of the quality of person he is. (36)

In the same way that Peters was unable to distinguish between being 'in authority' and power, Pedagogics because it tends to attribute authority to personal characteristics, cannot make this distinction either. As Winch showed, 'authority' derives its meaning from concepts about which there is mutual agreement.

With regard to education, this means that there are certain intersubjective criteria which are not dependent for their authority on individuals. By contrast, education for Pedagogics tends to be exposed to the influence
of individuals. For example, the initial encounter between educand and educator relies on the fairly hap­ hazard selection of an educator who, by virtue of the child's weakness and insecurity, has access to power. Although there is the suggestion that the educator is restrained in terms of the norms to which s/he is subject, it seems that these norms are acquired in the process of gaining adulthood and directly related to a particular world view, 'emanating from his philosophy of life'. Furthermore, the educator's allegiance to these norms demands that s/he win the educand's submission to them, i.e.

His [the educator's] intervention is actual­ ized in accordance with a philosophy, the authority of which he acknowledges and which he is compelled to perpetuate.(37)

There seems to be some inconsistency in the application of these norms. At one moment, they are seen as restraining the teacher from exercising uncontrolled authority and at another, they represent a motivating force with moral overtones, demanding their propagation.
They represent impersonal and external standards while at the same time, they are unique to an individual's philosophy of life. Under these conditions, their vacillating role makes an uncertain contribution to the occurrence of education.

The second facet of a relationship of authority in education is obedience. This, according to Griessel, "is an essential and fundamental structure of education, and one whose elimination is inconceivable in any response to the child's need for support". (38) He is critical of the opinion that obedience is merely a subtle form of repression and wants to distinguish between 'pseudo' and 'true' obedience. The former implies a "slavish obedience" that "delivers the child to the vagaries of an adult with a lust for power and results in cringing hypocrisy which lacks all moral value". Conversely, the latter involves 'listening, choosing and acting together in accordance with what is valuable in life' in order to achieve moral responsibility which ultimately demands "unconditional obedience to the authority of norms". (39)

There are two problems associated with this account; the first is related to the distinction between 'true' and 'pseudo' obedience. Observed in isolation, obedience is obedience i.e. the same behaviour may be
elicited for different reasons. Viljoen and Pienaar claim that obedience "indicates a willingness to submit to authority"(40) but it may also indicate a state of subjection to power. Consequently, any meaning that attaches itself to the notion of obedience must be made with reference to factors outside its existence. In this context, the distinction between 'true' and 'pseudo' obedience rests on a perception of the activity in which one is involved. If it is considered to be 'what is valuable in life', then 'true' obedience obtains and the reverse holds for 'pseudo' obedience. The difficulty arises, however, in defining what is valuable in life: what guarantee can Pedagogics, in insisting upon obedience as an essential structure of education, offer that it is not involved in securing the conditions prevalent under pseudo-obedience?

The second problem in Griessel's account of obedience concerns a contradiction in, on the one hand, achieving moral responsibility and self-determination that implies, on the other, 'unconditional obedience to the authority of norms'. In an earlier discussion of Hobbes and Rousseau, it was shown that these two notions are mutually exclusive. It would be impossible to act in a morally responsible and accountable way if one were to give unconditional consent to an 'absolute moral authority', such as in unqualified obedience to the
authority of norms. In any case, the exact status of these norms in education has already been called into question, since it is not clear whether they represent external standards imposed from without or a personal life-philosophy.

Furthermore, in the discussion on authority in Part II, the connection between autonomy and liberty was emphasized. There can be no autonomy without freedom of choice, but this does not mean that autonomous behaviour is synonymous with subjectivist anarchy and 'unrestrained liberalism' as many Pedagogicians seem to think; this is demonstrated by Morrow (41) in a paper addressed to Pienaar and also apparent in Landman et al. (42). Instead, it implies a moral action involving a rational decision based on the assessment of various alternatives. However, because Pedagogy sees selfish indulgence, unrestrained freedom, permissiveness and chaos as the logical outcome of autonomous behaviour, it denies a space for the operation of autonomy and consequently, the concept of authority, in asserting obedience and submission to norms.

In the same way that the child's obedience to the teacher is perceived as a criterion for the presence of authority relations, the teacher must submit to the norms of society so that the ultimate success of
education is measured in terms of the child's ability to transfer obedience from the teacher to the values which the teacher represents. In this 'event' there is little room for critical questioning and rational acceptance of ideas demanded of an autonomous person. Indeed, a blind obedience and unthinking acquiescence to a particular set of beliefs and values, more appropriate in a description of indoctrination than education, is fostered.

The final aspect of the authority relationship is tension, which is the motivating force that brings about development from childhood dependence to responsible adulthood. It manifests itself in the interplay between "obedient coexistence and rebelliousness as self-willed existence".(44) As an ontic fact of human life, tension cannot be denied; indeed, it makes education and the fulfilment of the goal of education possible. It demands the intervention of the educator, who is compelled as a representative of a set of norms, to confront the not-yet adult with the requirements of adulthood. The educand is subject to evaluation and correction to the extent that the intervention generates a fruitful tension which will eventually result in the realization of adulthood. The presence of tension in the authority relationship invites the educator to play the part of someone who is 'in authority' and who,
consequently, (as illustrated in Part II) in the sphere of social control, has recourse to power. As such, the view of authority presented undermines its potential as a set of rules about which there is conceptual agreement, in favour of its portrayal as an instrument of coercion and control, akin to power. This conception of authority is also emphasized by Viljoen and Pienaar: "Because man is free, authority always implies tension", (44) where authority is represented as a restraint or means of control, rather than a way by which human beings regulate their behaviour according to rules.

c) The category of authority

Following the phenomenological method, the pedagogician seeks to explain the nature of the phenomenon i.e. education, by discovering and describing its categories, of which one, the category of authority, is of interest here. A study of this category serves to reinforce what the foregoing discussion of education situation and relation have revealed i.e. an inability to distinguish between power and authority.
This confusion is clearly evident in the following statement by Viljoen and Pienaar; namely

Initially authority denoted a pronouncement, i.e. power was exercised by means of authoritative pronouncements. The man who speaks is heard and obeyed, possesses power or might. (45)

In this example, there is obviously no attempt to distinguish between power and authority. They are synonymous and the way in which they regulate behaviour is explained in terms of personal magnetism and force. This results in the conception of the individual as an organism responding to the imposition of external factors in a causal fashion. No reference is made to the rules embedded in authority by which individuals interpret their world according to shared concepts and direct their behaviour in a rational manner. Failure to distinguish between power and authority is logically incompatible with this last conception of human behaviour.

Further instances of the blurring of the two concepts in the category of authority become apparent when it is stated that the child must "if necessary be compelled to change his present course" and that "compulsion is therefore pedagogically justified". (46) This hardly sounds like a relationship in which the concept of authority, based on the sharing of conceptual schemes,
may gain a purchase. Instead, Pedagogics confuses authority with power, aiming to elicit what it considers to be appropriate behaviour (defined in terms of adulthood) through threats.

In *Interest and Discipline in Education*, referred to in Part III, P.S. Wilson argues that compulsion arises out of the intrinsic worth or 'interest' that a child recognises in the activity in which s/he is engaged, i.e. it has the force of a moral or logical imperative and nothing to do with physical or psychological coercion. Consequently, he distinguishes between discipline and control: the former refers to the order necessarily contained in following rules and striving to meet standards in the pursuit of valued activities, while the latter involves securing order for reasons extrinsic to the activity at hand. This way of perceiving compulsion runs parallel to that implied in the distinction between power and authority. The failure of Pedagogics to appreciate this leads to its misconception of authority as compulsion in physical and psychological terms through the imposition of external restraints. Although Pedagogics claims this type of compulsion is 'pedagogically justified', the reasons given for this are inadequately formulated, in terms of the conception of the child as dependent and deficient.
And when, "In the case of obstinacy the authority of the educator becomes compulsion", it makes little sense to talk of the child being "by nature opposed to authority".(47) It would be more appropriate to explain the opposition in terms of resistance to power. Actually the rejection of authority must needs be an unintelligible notion in view of its earlier description in Part II as fundamental to the continued existence of human society as we know it, through the operation of rule-governed activities. Furthermore, it is a serious misunderstanding of the concept of authority to suggest that it may become compulsion. 'Power' and 'authority' do not lie along the same continuum where authority merges into power; each occupies a separate conceptual space, representing entirely different ways of articulating human behaviour.

The description of the educator as "the person who bears and exercises authority in the pedagogic situation" (48) offers yet another insight into the way in which Pedagogics misconceives authority. As illustrated by Winch in his criticism of Peters, authority cannot be located in an individual and expressed in terms of personal characteristics. It is embedded in the context of rules about which there is intersubjective agreement. It would seem more likely that what the educator is 'bearing' and 'exercising' is not authority, but power.