Pring is consequently critical of those educational theories which stress initiation into forms of knowledge, such as offered by Hirst and Peters. He outlines the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing something, as follows, where 'p' stands for any proposition:

I know that p = i) I believe that p
    ii) p is true
    iii) There are good grounds for believing p to be true.9)

Briefly, the first condition presupposes an understanding of the concepts involved; the second relates to a general view of truth, independent of the subject's whims and the third condition refers to further criteria involving the subject's ability to justify the claim on appropriate grounds.10)

This means that in transmitting 'knowledge', it is not sufficient for education to demand a submission to standards. It also requires the ability to provide reasons for beliefs and judgements. Hence, a manifestation of education is its openness to criticism in constantly searching for truth. 'Knowledge' can never be equated with certainty or education with a closed mind, no matter how learned, well-read or clever.
a person may be. Allied to an open mind and the need for criticism is the idea that 'knowledge' is essentially a social venture which demands co-operation and collaboration, rather than competition. (This is not to say, however, that there are no independent and logical standards by which knowledge may be evaluated). On this view, then, the mark of an educated person lies not in the volume of 'knowledge' attained, but in a sense of humility before the unexplored 'knowledge' and the need for constant re-assessment and criticism of what is presumed known.

In the same way that authority is a pre-condition for liberty and autonomy, so these concepts are linked with education and this relationship is typified in a tradition known as 'liberal theory of education'. Although this approach is not unproblematic or without criticism,(11) some of its aspects highlight the way in which the concept 'authority' might inform a notion of education. A central feature is its emphasis on freedom and autonomy so that an educated person would be one who is able to make an informed choice from among various alternatives by giving good reasons, who holds beliefs open to revision and who acts with moral responsibility.

As such, education through its appeal to rational processes of reasoning, criticism and assessment has
been associated with a democratic society. Fundamental to a belief in democracy is the assumption that all political decisions, even those that involve specialist information, are ultimately moral decisions and these, according to the conception of human behaviour implied in a concept of authority, are within the scope of any rational person; they are not the prerogative of a privileged élite. Since participation in democratic procedures requires that individuals make informed decisions, evaluate courses of action and exercise judgement, education which is directed by 'authority' and fosters autonomy, has a role to play in equipping individuals with the tools for existence in a democratic society. This would not be true for an authoritarian society, however, where educated people might threaten its existence.

From this, it may be construed that one of the aims of education, or indeed its overarching aim, is nationalism or patriotism. The connection between education and democracy, however, does not imply this since it presupposes notions of freedom and autonomy which require a certain amount of neutrality and non-interference in specifying the goals of education. But, there is a strong case for declaring that education is politically charged and therefore, can never be neutral. Indeed, neutrality is perceived by some critics (12) as
an unattainable myth that functions to disguise the real intentions of particular power groups to perpetuate the status quo.

P.J. Crittenden (13) concedes that while this situation may well obtain, liberation from oppression does not imply the total political alignment of education as this would ultimately lead to the forfeit of autonomy, in contradiction to the ideal of liberty, through compulsory commitment to a specifically defined changed order. In other words, neutrality is seen as a necessary condition for autonomy, which is crucial if educational institutions are to function as arenas of critical inquiry in search of truth through open discussion and criticism. To define educational aims in terms of a particular social/political order is to narrow its application to a means/ends dichotomy and to shut down the opportunities for criticism, progress and change, thereby denying its close connection with the notions of autonomy, agency and responsibility and putting at risk the whole nature of the enterprise that distinguishes it as education rather than any other activity. Thus, there is a central place for neutrality to occupy in education, but this does not necessarily mean that individuals in their teaching attempt to be neutral - indeed whether this is possible or even desirable is debatable. Linked to this view is the
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idea, already mentioned in Barrow's account of education in the previous section and in the notion of knowledge as justified true belief, that 'knowledge' should be generously conceived of so that education is broadly based and does not merely depend on the acquisition of 'facts'.

Having outlined some of the implications that the concepts of power and authority might have for schooling and education respectively, I shall point to how these separate processes are related. It must be apparent that schooling can never substitute for education, but that education may occur within the context of schooling. It is not, however, a necessary relationship, for one may attend school for twelve years without being educated. Neither is education, like schooling, a finite process. Similarly, although learning is an aspect of education and one may learn at school, it does not follow that the acquisition of knowledge constitutes education - it may merely represent training. Thus while education may, under certain conditions, be related to schooling, it is logically incompatible with indoctrination and training which may also occur within the context of schooling.
Whatever else happens in schools, some 'knowledge' (14) should be transmitted but it is only in terms of an educational ideal which appeals to the necessary structure of knowledge illustrated by Pring in defence of 'an authority' in Part II as well as to other criteria of meaning and validity, that the continued practice of schooling is vouchsafed. To obscure the distinction between schooling and education is to shut down the opportunities for conceptualizing alternative institutional arrangements and ultimately, to limit the choice for purposeful change.

Summary: Part III

Before proceeding to the next section, I want to reiterate some of the features which seem to me to be central to a concept of education as opposed to schooling, and which, I hope to show, are inadequately treated in the accounts of education given by C.N.E. and Pedagogics.

To the extent that 'authority' and education involve the sharing of conceptual schemes, they are social phenomena which defy any explanation in terms of natural processes, such as contained in a causal account of power relations or schooling. Participation in an
authority relation requires the acceptance of rules relating to established ways of proceeding, while being educated is concerned with the acquisition of knowledge; but neither of these alone is sufficient. Both demand a broader understanding based on rational principles in terms of which reasons can be given for beliefs and behaviour. As such, explanations for action are logically connected with reasons i.e. they derive their sense from internal relationships or from what is seen as intrinsically valuable. Behaviour cannot be explained through deductions which are made on the basis of what is externally observable in the way in which it would be accounted for by a concept of power or schooling.

Closely connected with both authority and education is autonomy, which presupposes liberty and a degree of neutrality, according to which an individual may exercise freedom and offer good reasons for behaviour. From this it follows that an educated person would act with moral responsibility, whereas one who was indoctrinated would be subject to the dictates of beliefs held irrationally and therefore incapable of acting autonomously. Such a person would be a servant of a particular form of control, unable to entertain alternatives or envisage purposeful change.
Underpinning the discussion of C.N.E. and Pedagogics in the following two sections, is the account of education, as distinct from schooling and indoctrination, outlined above. It will provide the position from which these two doctrines are to be evaluated.
PART IV: THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT

In this section I want to show what implications the concepts of power and authority, with their expressions in the different processes of schooling and education, have for practices in the context of South Africa. With this in mind, I shall be specifically referring to two influential doctrines, namely Christian National Education in Section i and Pedagogics in Section ii.

What I hope to demonstrate is that neither is able to distinguish between power and authority, and ultimately, therefore, between schooling and education. My criticism of Christian National Education and Pedagogics is implied in the account of education as distinct from schooling outlined in Part III, so that much of what I have to say here is grounded on what has gone before. Finally, arising from these critiques, I intend to show in Section iii how Christian National Education and Pedagogics are related, and to consider the significance of their relationship within a South African setting.
Section 1) Christian National Education

The Policy of Christian National Education (C.N.E.) was originally designed for a specific group of people, i.e. those who shared a Dutch Reformed life- and world-view, but it was subsequently to have far wider application. As its history and influence have been documented elsewhere, they will be omitted here. My concern lies with the extent to which C.N.E. is able to distinguish between schooling and education on the basis of the way in which it perceives the concepts of power and authority.

By referring to its position as formulated in a document published by the Instituut vir Christelik Nasionale Onderwys (ICNO) in 1948, namely, the 'Beleid' or Policy Statement, I shall attempt to show that the conception of authority in C.N.E. has been conflated with power. This, I suggest, severely proscribes the possibility of C.N.E. providing conditions for education, and more particularly that account of it which I have outlined in the previous section, consequently aligning itself closely with the practices of schooling and indoctrination. It is from this point of view that I shall examine the two broad principles, i.e. the Christian and the National, on which C.N.E. rests, with their implications for education. Throughout the discussion the need
to distinguish between power and authority, as illustrated in Part II, and the account of education this spawns, outlined in Part III, are constantly presupposed in the criticisms of C.N.E.

Article 1 describes C.N.E. as a philosophy based on two fundamental tenets: a universal Christian principle to which a National principle is subordinate. The former is specifically Calvinist, being "grounded on the Holy Scriptures and expressed in the Creeds of our three Afrikaans Churches" while the latter, i.e. the National, "must be under the guidance of the Christian principle" and "must grow from the Christian root". Together "these two principles shall be the hallmark of the entire school with regard to its spirit, aim, syllabus, method, discipline, personal organisation and all its activities". (2) What is entailed in each of these principles will be examined in more detail with reference to the other articles.

Concerning the Christian principle, Rose and Tunmer describe C.N.E. as representing "a mid-century re-statement of the essential logic of Calvinism". (3) If this is so, then it would suggest that C.N.E., like Calvinism, as illustrated in the earlier discussion of Calvin, (in Part I, Section ii a) is unable to distinguish between the concepts of power and authority.
Consequently, it would be relevant to explore the way in which Calvinism is expressed through C.N.E. and some of the implications of this link for education.

With this in mind, I shall briefly consider the following aspects of C.N.E.: the notions of authority and knowledge, the role of the church in education, the conceptions of the child and teacher, teacher-training as well as Coloured and Black education. Each of these facets of C.N.E. comes under the influence of the Christian principle and throws light on the way in which Calvinism precludes an understanding of human behaviour implied in the concept of authority, in favour of one based on power.

One of the basic doctrines of Calvinism is the absolute sovereignty of God, as stated in the Holy Scriptures. Translated into the context of education in Article 7, this means that "all authority in school is authority borrowed from God" and, as such, it represents values that are absolute and external, i.e. arising outside human negotiation. In a document published by the College for Further Training, it is stated that:

For the Christian, norms cannot originate in a single person or in Society. True authority comes from God, and the norms for that form of authority are based upon the Holy Scripture as a revelation of the will of God.(4)
For Calvin, submission to secular authorities is part of a greater obligation to God. This extends to obeying all in authority, including princes, Magistrates and parents who delegate their authority to teachers. Coetzee explains this sequence as follows:

a) God is the absolute authority to whom man owes total obedience;
b) God has delegated his authority to man;
c) Children must obey their teachers, their parents and all others with authority over them, but only 'in the Lord'.

This conception of authority as external, morally binding and compelling leaves no space for the operation of liberty and autonomy. The individual is free only in so far that s/he may choose to accept or reject the Word of God. The former, i.e. acceptance, necessarily implies an uncritical obedience to a prescribed set of values which govern behaviour in terms of power. Operating from within these parameters, C.N.E is clearly limited in its capacity to perceive the individual according to the concept of authority, as I have outlined it.
Article 2 stresses the role of Christianity, (or more specifically, the Calvinist interpretation thereof) in education:

We believe that religious instruction according to the Bible and our Creeds should be the key subject in school ... and that all instruction that is given at school shall be founded on the Christian basis of life and world view of our nation.

This accords with the Calvinist aim of education which is to provide religious and moral training that will reveal insight into God through an understanding of the Bible, leading to the acceptance of a Christian way of life so that "the younger generation should inherit what is good and beautiful and noble in the cultural possession of the nation ... according to the life- and world-view of the nation."(6) The aim of education is consequently fulfilled in the realization of a particular kind of individual as opposed to another i.e. its ends are predetermined, as for example, illustrated in Article 6: "...if rightly taught they cultivate a Christian and National view of life", where 'rightly' is obviously and uncontroversially defined as that which is Christian and National. In this process, where education is aligned with the achievement of specific Christian and National ideals, there can be little space for the operation of neutrality and autonomy, essential to the pursuit of truth through critical inquiry.
Further infringements of neutrality are evident in the involvement of the church in education in C.N.E. in Article 8:

...the church must keep watch over the spirit and direction of education ... must exercise the necessary vigilance and discipline over the life and doctrine of the teachers as members of the church.

Of central importance in achieving the goal of education is a thorough knowledge of the Scriptures, for which purpose Calvin did much to establish schools in Geneva. Although he wanted to distinguish between church and state, in reality the influence of the Church permeated every aspect of civil life, including as illustrated in C.N.E above, the school. One of the main functions of the school was to teach the Word of God, which offered the most authoritative and reliable access to knowledge. C.N.E. identifies with this position, for example, Article 6 states:

...every subject must be taught in the light of the Word of God, in fact on the basis of the relevant scriptural principles - and ... in no subject may an anti-Christian or un-Christian or anti-National or un-National propaganda be made.
On this view, knowledge which is portrayed as fixed and static is equated with the Scriptures and whatever falls outside these parameters may be classified as propaganda. Moreover, the acquisition of knowledge does not depend on reason and intellect, but is governed by faith and intuition. This defies the possibility of evaluating knowledge in terms of objective criteria (such as mentioned by Pring earlier) and consequently, relegates much of what is learned to the realms of ideology and belief, which must run counter to any notion of education.

The Calvinist view of the child is marked in C.N.E. As a result of the Fall, children are born with the 'seed of sin' and because of this, they must (of necessity) be educated to realize their potential as beings in the image of God, i.e. "...through the Fall, sin has penetrated by means of heredity to later generations" and the child is therefore "a sinful and not a sinless being."(8)

Although humans are subject to the same physical laws as animals and nature, they differ in that they did not evolve; they are not able to be understood except through their identity with God; i.e. Article 4d states:
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