DISTORTIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF DISCIPLINE IN EDUCATION

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ABSTRACT

This Research Project looks at the way in which discipline is applied in educational institutions, most especially schools. As a consequence of the application of this notion of discipline, unequal relationships are structured between those who instruct and those who receive instruction. Furthermore, the entire educational system is structured upon the formal disciplines, those branches of knowledge that have as their ultimate aim the quest for the truth. As a result of this over-emphasis placed upon the formal disciplines, an important dimension in the educational process is neglected; and it is those activities that do not fall into the category of the formal disciplines. There is a need to include these activities in the educational curriculum as they have the following advantageous functions for their recipients. They allow the development of personal discipline devoid of controlling authority figures; they allow participation through rule-guidance as opposed to rule-following, and they have greater scope for innovation than the formal disciplines. Such activities are practices.
DECLARATION

I declare that this Research Project is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Master of Education at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.

[Signature]

4th day of July, 1986.
To Claudia, my wife, who supported me all the way, and to Dale and Layla, who patiently accepted my continued absence from home.
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SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION

Following are the dictionary definitions of the word 'discipline':

discipline n. i. Branch of instruction or learning; mental and moral training, adversity as effecting this; system of rules for conduct; behaviour according to established rules. ii. Order maintained among schoolchildren, soldiers, prisoners, etc., control exercised over members of church or other organisation. iii. Chastisement; (Eccl.) mortification by penance.

discipline v.t. Bring under control; train to obedience and order, drill, punish, chastise.

My essay is concerned with both meanings of the word as it is understood and applied in education. The two meanings reflected in the definitions are: a 'discipline' such as mathematics, which is defined as a 'branch of instruction or learning', which has a formal internal structure, and 'discipline' as a form of control, defined as 'to bring under control; train to obedience and order, drill, punish, chastise'.

Discipline is considered, by people involved in activities of a serious nature, to be inextricably interwoven with successful achievement, irrespective of the field of endeavour. It is accepted that in order for a person to achieve success in an
activity, a vital ingredient is discipline. That it is an
indispensable ingredient for successful achievement is not denied,
but this is not the most common use of the notion.

As a concept, its most frequent use is that of the imposition of
discipline by an external agency, usually a person regarded as a
superior, upon the agent or actor. A number of issues arise from
this position. Firstly, it is assumed that the agent is incapable
of attaining discipline independently. Secondly, it is that such a
relationship contains elements of coercion. It is accepted that
the actor is reluctant and does not voluntarily acquiesce to being
disciplined, hence the need for coercion on the part of the outside
agency. Thirdly, the question of morality arises. It is whether
it is morally acceptable for one person to impose upon another an
activity that he believes will be beneficial to the other.

Granted, there are activities the imposition of which is morally
acceptable, as they are seen to be in the interest of the
individual. An example of such an activity is learning to write
correctly. By this I mean that the child should learn, even if by
being compelled to do so, the correct formation of letters so that
his writing is legible, as legible writing is an important
communication medium, one that it is in the interest of the
individual to have. But I cannot see the point in getting a child
to spend tedious hours, under threat, at perfecting his legible
writing so that it attains standards of excellence expected in
caligraphy.
Other questions that spring to mind regarding the morality of the situation described above are about the criteria used in ascertaining 'superiority' and 'inferiority', and whether the criteria are acceptable justification for the unequal and unfair relationships that exist in situations where 'discipline' is being imposed.

Relationships of 'superiority' and 'inferiority' are usually based on age-difference, where the senior person automatically assumes the dominant role. In education they are based on the hierarchic structure within the institution or, alternatively, on the assumption that because a person is more experienced or better qualified, therefore that person knows more than those less experienced and less qualified. Such a description is assumed to be appropriate to the relationship that exists between those who do the teaching and those who are taught.

To illustrate what I mean I will cite examples. A child may compile a geography notebook with the utmost care. He draws borders around his notes and colours in his illustrations, paying meticulous attention to detail. He has a beautifully printed introductory page followed by an equally impressive Table of Contents. One teacher may consider this to have been the disciplined performance of an activity, but another may dismiss it as time-consuming window-dressing. Or, similarly, a teacher may regard an obedient child who sits quite passively in the corner of the class from day to day, only allowing the occasional smile to
crease his face, as a disciplined child, but another may consider the child to be abnormal and in need of specialised assistance.

While the above examples have highlighted the difficulty related to the establishment of objective criteria in describing and ascertaining discipline, what they have also highlighted is the fact that an external assessor is unchallenged in determining whether discipline prevails or not.

Another dimension of the commonly-held notion of the concept of discipline is that it is misconstrued as other concepts whose gratification is external to the agent. The agent has to conduct himself in a certain manner; he has to attain certain standards of behaviour; he has to subject himself to certain sets of ostensibly objective criteria before he may be adjudged to have performed or behaved in a disciplined way. He, the agent, is never fully in control of the situation because he is not the adjudicator or evaluator of his actions. He may have subjected his behaviour to personal perusal, to scrutiny and evaluation, but this is insufficient.

The commonly-held notion of the concept of discipline has external agencies for gratification. External agencies will determine whether the procedures have been complied with and they will decide whether the standards have been attained.

Discipline, while it may contain some of the following in its
commonly-held notion, is not synonymous with any single concept from the ensuing list, and it is my claim that discipline is misconstrued to mean some of the following in education: organisation, punctuality, meticulousness, working mechanically, conformity, working systematically, self-deprivation, order, sternness, pride, accuracy, restraint, self-control, responsibility, restriction, prudence, obedience, co-operation, subordination, self-denial, constraint, prohibition, obligation, coercion.

The observer, who has misconstrued discipline to mean one of the above-named concepts is usually a 'superior' of some sort, and the decision about whether the agent's performance of an activity is to be regarded as disciplined or not, is left entirely in the hands of the observer. He may slavishly apply the commonly-held notion of discipline, and in the application of this concept he runs the risk of disregarding, completely, the agent's understanding and interpretation of his action.

I am at pains to make this point forcefully and no reiteration of the position may count as overemphasis. The person who ultimately decides whether an activity was performed in a disciplined manner or not is an outside agency, an external assessor, an observer, who is inevitably accepted to be a 'superior' of some sort.

What then are the possible consequences of this situation? Throughout his educative experience the individual has interacted
with his so-called superiors from a position of subservience. He has been part of an unequal relationship where he has been dominated and has had decisions made about his life regarding the activities he should and should not practice. Assessment of his performance of these activities was the responsibility of an observer who ostensibly was qualified to pass judgment on the nature of the performance. Thus his behaviour was directed at the authority of particular others. Because he found himself in a particular situation, where he was expected to display certain behavioural responses, he reproduced what was expected of him, in a mechanical fashion because his behaviour was oriented to an evaluator. In order to elicit the desired response from the evaluator, he performed in the prescribed manner.

But this is an unhealthy state of affairs. It is undesirable that an individual should orient his actions to the approval of others simply because they hold the balance of power. In actuality what has occurred is that the individual has been deprived of his individuality. He cannot make decisions on his own about how he intends to behave because a consideration will always be the question of how he will be assessed and if he has been subdued to the point where he is desirous of positive reinforcement from his assessor, then he will respond in a manner that will elicit the desired reinforcement.

This smacks of conditioning, and it is immoral that a human being should be denigrated and forced to the level where he is expected
to respond as an animal would. Such a person has been robbed of his autonomy. He is incapable of responding to human relationships in an autonomous way. But it may be asked why autonomy is a desirable character trait to have. I will return to this question immediately after I have briefly sketched what autonomy is, and hopefully the adumbration of this character trait will vindicate the claim for its incorporation in the individual's personality.

According to John White, 'autonomy seems to make the individual the final arbiter of his own good, not a blind follower of the authority of others, whether God or men. It underpins an education which avoids the imposition of value-judgments on the pupil: he is not to be indoctrinated into other's pictures of the good, but freely chooses his own.'

And according to R.F. Dearden, the autonomous person is one who displays the following features in his person:

(i) wondering and asking, with a sense of the right to ask, what the justification is for various things which it would be quite natural to take for granted;
(ii) refusing agreement or compliance with what others put to him when this seems critically unacceptable;
(iii) defining what he really wants, or what is really in his interests, as distinct from what may be conventionally so regarded;
(iv) conceiving of goals, policies and plans of his own, and forming purposes and intentions of his own
independently of any pressure to do so from others; (v) choosing amongst alternatives in ways which could exhibit that choice is the deliberate outcome of his own ideas or purposes; (vi) forming his own opinion on a variety of topics that interest him; (vii) governing his actions and attitudes in the light of the previous sorts of activity. In short, the autonomous man has a mind of his own and acts according to it. And this 'mind of his own' will typically be no natural product, but the outcome of one sort of education.4

In response to the question posed earlier, which asks why autonomy is a desirable character trait to have, my answer would then be that autonomy is desirable because it makes us, as individuals, the determiners of our own fortunes or misfortunes. I, alone, should be credited with the success I achieve as a result of an autonomous decision. I, alone, am culpable for failure for an act gone wrong as a result of an autonomous decision. I am taking the position in this essay that the good society is one which enables its members to be determiners of their own fortunes or misfortunes.

In schools children are faced with two forms of the concept of discipline. The first is the discipline that is imposed upon them by outside agencies, in this instance the teacher, or other adult members on the school's staff. This discipline is of the regimental type which facilitates control of children and forces
conformity and uniformity upon them. It is an unequal relationship that exists between child and adult. It is, however, the type of interpersonal relationship which is immoral, given the notion of the good society which underpins my argument.

The second is the discipline that is structured, conceived of and implemented in the form of subjects that are studied at schools. An example of such a discipline is mathematics, which differs from ordinary activities because of its formal internal structure. In order for the child to succeed in the practise of such disciplines, the child is compelled to follow the rules applicable to the specific discipline. If he does not follow the rules of the discipline, he is assured of being unsuccessful. A simple illustration of the point being made is that in the division of common fractions if the child does not invert the second figure after he has changed the division sign to a multiplication sign, he will get his sum wrong. He will therefore be seen to have been unsuccessful in the performance of an activity in the discipline of mathematics. This is a relationship that exists between child and 'object'. It is a relationship between a living child and an inanimate discipline that comes alive as a result of the intervention of the child. This type of discipline facilitates 'control' as well in that it demands conformity and uniformity from the child, as failure to comply with the rules will result in personal failure, although I do appreciate that there are immense benefits to be derived from being exposed to formal disciplines in schools.
The child is subjected to discipline at schools at the hands of teachers, and he is subjected to the rules of the disciplines, e.g. mathematics, because of their formal internal structures. In the first instance, the child is subject to the control of an adult; in the second instance, the child is subject to the rules of a discipline. Throughout its school life, the child operates from a position of subjection and subordination.

I will argue, in the course of my paper, that a disciplined performance need not necessarily be conceptualised in terms of control or one of its allied concepts, nor is it feasible that a person can only perform in a disciplined way within a formal discipline, e.g. mathematics. I argue that a disciplined performance of an activity is possible where a person is guided by the rules, as opposed to following the rules as in a formal discipline.

In being guided by the rules space is created for individuality, ingenuity, inventiveness and creativity, and the agent is no longer subject but is at least elevated to the status of 'equal' with the activity.

In this section of my essay I have briefly outlined the concept of discipline as it is applied in schools. The remainder of my essay will develop as follows. In order to demarcate more specifically my area of concern, I will differentiate between a discipline, e.g. mathematics, and I will expand on its formal, internal structure;
its internal organisation and logic, to separate it and its ilk from 'non-discipline' activities, such as music or art for example.

Characteristic of an academic discipline is that it is concerned with the search for truth. This is not the case with music or art. This will be discussed in Section 2. In Section 3 I will locate the debate within present views about the concept of discipline by giving an exposition of the views, related to discipline, of P.S. Wilson and Michel Foucault, and I will explore the contributions of another writer who appears to be pertinent to this field of enquiry, Alisdair MacIntyre.

In Section 4 I will make observations regarding the accepted or commonly-held notion of discipline; I will look at the implications that emanate from this view and its consequences, and I will compare and contrast my view with the commonly-held notion.

Finally, in Section 5 I will press claims for the inclusion of 'non-discipline' activities in school syllabi. Activities that are rule-guided should be granted equal status with activities that are rule-following.
SECTION 2 - DISCIPLINES

In this section of my essay I will explore the notion of 'a discipline', e.g. mathematics, and I will expand on its formal, internal structure, its internal organisation and logic and 'non-discipline' activities such as music and art, for example. In order to distinguish more accurately my area of concern, and to facilitate clarity at specific points in my discussion, I will use the word 'discipline', the noun, when I am exploring that which is defined as a 'branch of instruction or learning', and I will use the word 'practice' when I am discussing those activities regarded as 'non-discipline' activities. My choice of the word 'practice' stems from the way in which Alisdair MacIntyre uses it in *After Virtue*. MacIntyre informs the reader that a practice is not a technical skill only, but for its production it requires the use of a technical skill.5

What I have in mind appears to correspond with what MacIntyre conceptualises a practice to be, because the activities that I will later discuss each have a history; they each have a tradition, and they each involve standards of excellence, all requirements of MacIntyre's conceptualisation of the concept of a practice.

At points in my discussion where my use of the word practice may be at variance with MacIntyre's view, my usage will be dictated by the need to maintain consistency in terminology, and it should be accepted and viewed with this need in mind, as opposed to being
seen as a misrepresentation of the said writer's views.

A Discipline

Characteristic of a discipline is its quest for truth. A discipline has a terminal point, and this terminal point is arrived at when the truth is established. The truth is established on condition that certain prescribed procedures are adhered to. The procedures mentioned have rules which govern their application. The relationship that exists between a discipline, the truth and rules, is that in order to establish the truth within a discipline one has to follow the rules.

A child is given a mathematical problem to solve. He is therefore intent on establishing a truth within a discipline. The phrase 'terminal point' is synonymous with truth which, in turn, is synonymous with 'the correct answer'. But in order for the child to arrive at 'the correct answer', she will have to apply certain procedures which are governed by rules; she will have to follow the mathematical rules that are applicable in specific instances.

Failure to follow the rules will lead to the failure to establish the truth. Failure to establish the truth within a discipline in this way is interpreted as personal failure, so in reality the child has to slavishly follow rules to avoid personal failure. She is dictated to by rules. Rules govern her actions.
I will illustrate the above contention about rule-following by demonstrating it with an example. In this way I hope to show that observation (i.e. following) of the rules leads to the realisation of the truth, and deviation from the rules leads to the failure of establishing the truth.

Let us assume that the following problem in matrix algebra is given:

**GIVEN:**

\[
[A] = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & -1 & 2 \\ 3 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad \text{and} \quad [B] = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 & 1 \\ 1 & 2 & -1 \end{bmatrix}
\]

**ASSIGNMENT:**

Obtain \([A] \times [B]\) or \([AB]\)

**METHOD:**

Write the two matrices partly alongside and partly above one another as shown below, and number the rows of \([A]\) and the columns of \([B]\) as indicated.
i) To find the value of element 11 (read one-one) in [AB] (designated by *) multiply the first element in row one of [A] by the first element in column 1 of [B], the second by the second and the third by the third (follow the arrows). The sum of these products is the value of element 11 in [AB], i.e. 

\[(1 \times 1) + (-1 \times 0) + (2 \times 1) = 3.\]

ii) The value of element 12 (read one-two) in [AB] (designated by □) is found in the same way. In this case row 1 of [A] is multiplied by column 2 of [B]. The sum of the different products is \((1 \times 2) + (-1 \times -1) + (2 \times 2) = 7.\)

iii) The value of element 21 (read two-one) in [AB] (designated by △) is found by multiplying row 2 of [A] by column 1 of [B]. The sum of the different products is \((3 \times 1) + (0 \times 0) + (1 \times 1) = 4.\)

iv) The value of each of the other elements in [AB] is obtained in exactly the same way. Note that if the two original matrices are written as illustrated, it is always the row (of A) and
the column (of $B$) in which the specific element occurs which are multiplied. The completed product matrix $AB$ is as follows:

$$AB = \begin{bmatrix} 3 & 7 & -3 \\ 4 & 8 & -1 \end{bmatrix}$$

From this rather lengthy example, it will be observed that one is dictated to by rules. One has to follow the rules in order to arrive at the truth. This is acceptable because it is an accepted fact that a discipline seeks to establish the truth.

A cursory perusal of the mathematical problem will reveal that there are at least ten rules that must be followed. Closer analysis will reveal that there are many more. One obvious rule is that governing the arrangement of rows and columns. This is a basic rule that has to be followed if the correct solution, which appears at the end of the example, is to be arrived at. Deviation from the rule will lead to the presentation of an incorrect solution, which is not the truth. Such a deviation could be the assumption that multiplier and multiplicand are interchangeable as in ordinary arithmetic, e.g. $4 \times 3 = 12$ and $3 \times 4 = 12$; such is not the case with multiplication in matrix algebra.
A Practice

Alisdair MacIntyre claims that:

A practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to rules as well as the achievement of goods. To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those standards and the inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them. It is to subject my own attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the standards which currently and partially define the practice. Practices of course, as I have just noted, have a history: games, sciences and arts all have histories. Thus the standards are not themselves immune from criticism, but nonetheless we cannot be initiated into a practice without accepting the authority of the best standards realised so far.7

(own emphasis)

My concept, or should I say 'use', of the word 'practice' should not misrepresent MacIntyre's definition. However, there is a point at which we differ, and it is that he refers to being 'obedient to rules'. I will talk in terms of rule-guidance as opposed to rule-obedience. The difference of views referred to above will be discussed in Section 3.

A practice, MacIntyre tells us, is not only a technical skill, but
it requires a technical skill for its performance. The practices that I will discuss fall under this description. A practice as I will discuss it differs from a discipline in that it is not concerned with establishing the truth; it does not have a terminal point as a discipline has. In fact it would be quite absurd to talk about a practice as having a terminal point, as a practice is anything but static.

In my discussion of practices I will refer to games and then art forms, in turn.

The high jump is an athletic activity that falls into the category of games. There are rules governing the actual technical performance of the activity, the most important of which is that the participant may not take off from the ground with both feet simultaneously so that the bar is crossed head first. This rule was introduced presumably to prevent people from diving over the high jump bar as opposed to jumping over it. The safety of the competitors may also have been a consideration when this law was introduced.

Basically, what the high jump is about is that the participant has to get over the bar in any legal way possible. The legality of his style has been discussed, but other contraventions of the rules may be that he should not use a pole to assist him, as is done in the pole vault, or that he cannot be shot from a cannon or some other such apparatus.
The participant's activity within the practice is circumscribed by rules related to the specific activity, in this case the rules related to high jump. But the most important rule is that related to the cross-bar; that horizontal obstacle suspended between two upright poles. If the participant knocks the bar down in attempting to jump over it, he has broken the most important rule, because he has not taken the practice to its conclusion in an acceptable way. He has contravened the rule related to the bar not being knocked down. If the participant succeeds in getting over the bar, i.e. he does not dislodge it, then he has taken the practice to its conclusion in an acceptable way, because he has satisfied the most important rule of the practice, and it is that the jumper should not dislodge the bar in crossing it.

To deviate slightly for a while, I would like to discuss the historical development of styles or techniques used in the high jump and then I will link this to what has been said above. It is not my intention to present a technical exposition of the various styles. All that I will do is mention them in the sequence, more or less chronologically, in which they appeared. The first was the 'scissors', still seen at schools today, which is the least successful style of all, then we have the 'western roll', the 'eastern cut-off' and the very popular latter-day 'straddle', which were all successors of the 'scissors'. Then, in 1972, at the Olympic Games in Munich, Dick Fosbury introduced a new style to the world which was soon referred to as the 'Fosbury Flop'.
In my historical survey of high jump styles I mentioned five. They are the 'scissors', 'western roll', 'eastern cut-off', 'straddle' and 'Fosbury Flop'. Each of these styles is distinctive. There are certain specialised techniques peculiar to each of these styles. What they do have in common is that they are styles used and accepted legally in the practice of high jump, and they successfully or unsuccessfully allow the competitor to participate in the practice of high jump within the rules of the activity.

So at a particular athletic meeting it is not inconceivable that in the high jump there will be participants who will use the five different styles described. They will be seen to be participating in the practice in different ways, but all within the rules of the practice. None is culpable of having contravened the rules in being individual and possibly non-conformist.

This, then, is clearly an example of rule-guidance. The participants are guided by the rules. They do not follow the rules, and they are not dictated to by them, but one can claim correctly that the participants were disciplined in the performance of the practice, which is considered to be a 'non-discipline'. It would be correct to say then that it is not only within the disciplines that a disciplined performance is possible. One can be seen to have performed in a disciplined way in a practice as well.

Wittgenstein makes the following observation regarding the acquisition of language and its relationship to rules, but I
consider his views to be pertinent in this context as well.

Characteristically he does so, as it were, on its own home grounds: by exploring the way rules actually work even in games and mathematical series, by showing that even here rules cannot account for what needs to be explained. Thus he shows that while some games have formal, explicit rules, there are also informal children's games of which this is not true at all, and games in which one makes up the rules as one goes along. Moreover, while learning a game may entail explicitly learning its rules, it need not; one might learn it simply by observation and practice. And even a game governed by definite rules is not 'everywhere circumscribed by rules'; there are no 'rules for how high one throws the tennis ball in tennis, or how hard; yet tennis is a game for all that and has rules too.' And above all, even the strictest rule or system of rules ultimately requires application.8

Wittgenstein's view is useful for my purposes because he makes the observation that there are a number of ways in which rules operate. He observes that there are formal, explicit rules, and in certain instances this is not true at all in some children's games. There are also instances where rules are made up as things develop. Another important observation that is made in this extract is that
it is possible to engage in an activity in the proper way without knowing the rules. Wittgenstein states that 'one might learn it simply by observation and practice'. But I think that what is most important for me is the observation that 'even the strictest rule or system of rules ultimately requires application'. It is acknowledgment of the importance and significance of the role of the agent that for me is crucial. This observation will be dealt with in greater detail in the following section, but in order to ensure that the impact of this crucial point is not lost, I must point out that Wittgenstein's observation emphasises the role of the agent in the activity. Rules, and activities as such, are empty if they are not applied and given life by people. People bring activities alive by participating in them.

A feature of a practice is that, unlike a discipline, it is not terminal. This can be illustrated by reference to the way in which styles have evolved over the years and also the way in which records have improved over the years.

Another quick example of a game to support the points I made earlier about rule-guidance, is that in soccer it is the objective of one team to score more goals than its opposition. On condition that the ball is not handled all other body contact with the ball is legal. And if Team A should score all its goals in the following sequence, head, chest and heel, and Team B should score its solitary goal in the more conventional manner of it having been struck powerfully with the foot, Team A nevertheless is seen to
have achieved the prime objective of the game, and it is that it has scored more goals than Team B.

While it is accepted that playing the ball with the foot is a feature of soccer, the players are not dictated to about which section of the foot has to be used in playing the ball, so in modern-day soccer players are able to use six foot 'surfaces' skillfully. They are the inside, outside, toe, instep, heel and sole. Once more this is clearly an example of a practice that is rule-guided.

I will now move to art forms in an attempt to fortify my argument.

A piece of music is composed in a certain key at a specific timing. The key relates to the musical scale in which the music score is written and the timing indicates the rhythm at which it is to be played. The composition in question is for a male tenor.

Let us, for argument's sake, say that the music score is written in B♭ (B flat) and its timing is 2/4, to be sung by a male tenor. Does this state that this is the only way in which this piece of music can be performed? It certainly does not. While it may be the 'best' way, it certainly is not the only way. The music can be transposed into a variety of keys, higher or lower; its timing can be changed so that it is quicker or slower, and it can be sung by different voices or it can even be played on any number of musical instruments.
Art takes a variety of forms, but I will talk about it in its conventional form, that of putting brush to canvas, though this appears not to take cognisance of the variety that does exist within art. But my approach is suitable for my purposes, so I will continue with it. My understanding of art at my very simple level is that there are a number of 'components' and 'possibilities' that are related to art. By 'components,' I mean the artist's choice of colour, material, tone, atmosphere, interpretation. By 'possibilities' I mean the way in which art can be used as culturally enriching, e.g. appreciation at a very simple level as an object of aesthetic value, appreciation related to technicalities, comparative art as between different cultures or between different periods.

Literature can be talked about in the same way as I have discussed art. One cannot formulate general laws in literature as attempts to find general laws have inevitably failed. Wellk and Warren make the point that 'while physics may see its highest triumphs in some general theory reducing to a formula electricity and heat gravitation and light, no general law can be assumed to achieve the purpose of literary study: the more general, the more abstract and hence empty it will seem; the more the concrete object of the work of art will elude our grasp'.

What is also characteristic of practices, besides not being concerned with establishing the truth and not being terminal, is their capacity to allow innovation. This can be seen from what has
occurred in sport, the new art forms, that have emerged, and changes of form and style in music. Practices are more dynamic and less elitist than disciplines, and within them we are more aware as practitioners of 'standards of excellence',¹⁰ and we are able to notice 'the inadequacy' of our 'own performance' as judged by those standards of excellence. We are also more acutely aware of the history of practices because practices facilitate reflection and comparison.

In this section I have attempted to illustrate the difference between a discipline, e.g. mathematics, and 'non-discipline' activities such as music and art. The purpose of this exercise was to demonstrate that it is possible to attain a disciplined performance in a 'non-discipline' activity which I called a practice. This view is contrary to that which believes that a disciplined performance is only possible within a formal discipline, e.g. mathematics.

In having argued that one can attain a disciplined performance in a practice, I have demonstrated that one is capable of a disciplined performance within an activity that is rule-guided. Implied in my argument is the claim that there is no such thing as a high-status subject or a low-status subject as is the popular belief held in educational institutions. Subjects or practices are of equal status if they allow the practitioner the possibility of a disciplined performance. As this is so, it is my belief that greater emphasis should be placed on practices than is now the
case, but this should not be done at the expense of the disciplines. Each, i.e. disciplines as well as practices, should be allocated equal status and they should be given equal emphasis in schools, as both are potentially beneficial to the child.

It is not my claim that my explication of practices makes them more appropriate to education than the formal disciplines are. My argument is against the exclusion of practices from schools, and when they are included in the school curriculum they are dealt with in a very low-key fashion.
SECTION 3 - THREE POSITIONS RELATED TO DISCIPLINE

In the previous section I discussed 'a discipline', the noun, i.e. that which is defined as 'a branch of instruction or learning', and I then discussed 'non-discipline' activities, which I referred to as 'practices'. I argued that it is possible to attain a disciplined performance in 'non-discipline' activities, which I called 'practices'.

In this section I will locate my views about 'discipline' within present debates surrounding the concept by giving an exposition of the views of Michel Foucault and P.S. Wilson, and I will explore the contribution of Alisdair MacIntyre in this field.

At the outset, a point of clarification that has to be established is that it is somewhat inaccurate to talk about Michel Foucault's concept of discipline, because in Discipline and Punish, he does not present a definition of the concept as such. He looks at the mechanisms that are utilised in the implementation of discipline, but inherent in his analysis and description of this concept he implicitly subscribes to the view that discipline is a form of control; it is the way in which the body is manipulated by external forces. As Foucault's analysis of the concept of discipline is applicable to schools, I will undertake an exposition and explication of his views first.

What should be noted at the outset is that for Foucault the effects
of and the mechanisms used in the application of discipline assume
primacy of position in his analysis, but it should nevertheless be
observed that the moral dimension of discipline is not neglected,
though it is not overtly stated.

Foucault makes the observation that 'the classical age discovered
the body as object and target of power'. As a result of this
discovery it was possible to manipulate the body and thereby create
docility. A docile body is one that can be subjected, used,
transformed and improved.

'The body was in the grip of very strict powers, which imposed on
it constraints, prohibitions or obligations.' But the body
was not subject to control en masse; control was exerted upon the
body by breaking down composite bodily gestures into their
components. Holds or controls were exercised upon rapidity,
attitudes, gestures and movements, and activity was partitioned as
closely as possible in terms of time, space and movement.

These methods, which made possible the meticulous
control of the operations of the body, which assured
the constant subjection of its forces and imposed
upon them a relation of docility-unity, might be
called 'disciplines'.

What the disciplines achieved initially was the growth of bodily
skills; but of greater importance was the achievement of greater
obedience with concomitant greater usefulness. The forces of the body increased in economic terms, but decreased in power in political terms. 'If economic exploitation separates the force and the product of labour, let us say that disciplinary coercion establishes in the body the constricting link between an increased aptitude and an increased domination.'

Foucault then proceeds to discuss what he calls the art of distributions as a mechanism that imposes discipline. Discipline occurs in this instance when individuals are distributed in space. Each individual has his own place and each place has its individual.

Groups must be broken up to avoid the creation of collective dispositions. Individuation allowed those in control to establish the whereabouts of those under control. 'Its aim was to establish presences and absences, to know where and how to locate individuals, to set up useful communications, to interrupt others, to be able at each moment to supervise the conduct of each individual, to assess it, to judge it, to calculate its qualities or merits. It was a procedure, therefore, aimed at knowing, mastering and using. Discipline organises an analytical space.'

After individuals have been distributed in space their activity is then controlled. The three methods of the control of activity are the establishing of rhythms, the imposition of particular
occupations and the regulation of the cycles of repetition, which were closely related to the manner in which the act was temporally elaborated. Foucault calls this the way in which 'a sort of anotomo-chronological scheme of behaviour is defined'.

The temporal elaboration of the act necessitated exhaustive use of the time available. It was as if greater fragmentation of time would facilitate greater intensification of the use of even the slightest moment. To ensure the exhaustive use of time, a system of injunctions had to be formulated, characteristic of which was brevity and clarity. Response to injunctions prompted reactions by way of a prearranged agreement regarding signals.

In the section entitled 'The Means of Correct Training', Foucault discusses in turn Hierarchical Observation, Normalizing Judgement, and the Examination. This section is of particular importance in describing, among other things, the imposition of discipline in schools, and because of its pertinence in this context, I will discuss each section in greater detail.

Foucault observes that 'The exercise of discipline presupposes a mechanism that coerces by means of observation; an apparatus in which the techniques that make it possible to see induced effects of power, and in which, conversely, the means of coercion make those on whom they are applied clearly visible'.

One can see, immediately, how this is applicable to schools.
There is a hierarchic chain that is linked in descending order from the head of the school down to the pupils. Schools are constructed in such a manner that they allow those undertaking surveillance to do so undetected, and it is the knowledge that surveillance is occurring, without being able to detect the agents of its implementation, that enforces discipline upon individuals.

Similarly, the classroom is arranged in rows and columns, and this facilitates observation of the pupils. To allow effective observation to be maintained in schools, an architecture was fashioned, cognisant of this need. Foucault comments that 'Stones can make people docile and knowable'.

The hierarchic chain that reaches down to pupils insidiously invades their group as well. This is done by the utilization of prefects, class captains and monitors as an extension of the adult surveillance machinery.

Other ways in which observation manifests itself in schools are the recording of absenteeism, the recording of late-comers, the recording of homework defaulters, and official notes sent to parents whose children fail to be properly attired.

With reference to schools, Foucault makes the following observation.

A relation of surveillance, defined and regulated, is inscribed at the heart of the practice of teaching,
not as an additional or adjacent part, but as a mechanism that is inherent to it and which increases its efficiency.\textsuperscript{19}

In schools discipline is pyramidal in its organisation, it is a mechanism that operates in an upward direction, but equally important is its lateral movement, and this is what allows it to be undetected, yet present, but discreet.

Normalizing judgment refers to the way in which systems of penalties were imposed upon those who departed from the norms of proper conduct as defined within specific institutions.

It is a mechanism whose sole function is the imposition of conformity. Those who strayed from the path of acceptable conduct were disciplined by being punished, which took the form of physical punishment, deprivations or humiliation.

At a school a child may depart from the norm by failing to do her work. Such an instance may be punishable by one of the methods mentioned above, which is supposed to be corrective in nature. Foucault quotes Jean-Baptiste de La Salle, who says,

Of all penances, impositions are the most honest for a teacher, the most advantageous for the parents; they make it possible to derive, from the very offence of the children, means of advancing their progress by correcting their defects;\textsuperscript{20}
But in discipline punishment does not function in isolation. It is part of a dual system, punishment-reward. So, for example, a child may negate a possible punishment as a result of having accumulated reward, and in this way too, power is wielded over the pupil and he is disciplined. Rank also functions on the model described previously. It both punishes and rewards. Discipline rewards by a promotion in rank, and it punishes by the reverse process of demotion. This is achieved by the presentation of colours, or the use of distinctive badges, or even academic grading.

Foucault notes that,

This hierarchizing penalty had, therefore, a double effect: it distributed pupils according to their aptitudes and their conduct, that is, according to the use that could be made of them when they left the school; it exercised over them a constant pressure to conform to the same model, so that they might all be subjected to 'subordination, docility, attention in studies and exercises, and to the correct practice of duties and all the parts of discipline'. So that they might all be like one another.21

Foucault makes a number of observations and presents criticisms regarding discipline as a form of control. They are:

1) That discipline is different from judicial penalty. Judicial penalty is based on a set of laws that must be remembered, but
discipline is based on observable phenomena. Judicial penalty is a consequence of the contravention of a statute, whereas discipline is a response to whether internally agreed upon rules are being contravened. The contravention is observable because discipline is based on the control of the operations of the body. The body has established for it rhythms, particular occupations, and regulation of cycles of repetition, and all the time it is under observation and surveillance.

2) Judicial penalty specifies acts according to a number of categories. Discipline operates by differentiating among individuals.

3) Judicial penalty operates by bringing into play the opposition of permitted and forbidden.

4) Judicial penalty condemns law breakers; discipline seeks to homogenize.

In the examination, the techniques of hierarchical observation and normalizing judgment are fused. As a result of the examination, children are classified, categorised and punished. Children are differentiated and judgment is cast upon them.

The examination is a form of power that keeps objectified subjects under scrutiny, and it has internal to it a norm towards which the subjects strive. The knowledge that is extracted from the child
during an examination is knowledge that has its origin within the teacher, and it is now transmitted by the child back to its source.

Related to the examination are a number of documentary techniques which transform the child into a case. The child is thus constituted as a branch of knowledge and an object of power simultaneously. He becomes an object of power because the examination slots him into his specific place of individuality. 'The examination is at the centre of the procedures that constitute the individual as effect and object of power, as effect and object of knowledge.' Within this process, the concept of individualization underwent a theoretical transmogrification, from one who possessed power and privilege, to one who was the object of power and denied privilege.

P.S. Wilson deals with the concept of discipline in ways that are different from those of Foucault. For Wilson, discipline is a moral issue, and, whereas Foucault undertakes an analysis of discipline as a method of control and a mechanism of power, Wilson presents a definition of the concept by discussing its implementation.

For Wilson, discipline and interest are inextricably interwoven. If a child has a particular interest, the child will participate in the interest in a way that justifies his participation in that interest, and his discipline derives from the moral compulsion
implicit in the interest, without consideration of how the interest may prove to be of instrumental value.

There is a logical link between an interest and discipline as an interest has an order to which the agent has to 'submit' if he is to participate in it in a disciplined way, for to do so would mean that the agent will be engaging in the interest in a manner that justifies his participation in that interest.

The most important question that P.S. Wilson poses is: why should children have to go to school? Only if there were something intrinsically valued in school, and only if we sent children there because of it could it be morally as well as educationally justifiable to say that they should go.

Interests are central. We can justify compelling children to go to school if they are able to pursue activities relevant to their interests. This means that they must see the point of participating in their interests in a way that is appropriate to the interest, and this could mean submitting to the rules of an interest in order to participate in it for its intrinsic value. Wilson argues in this way to establish that there is a logical link between education and discipline.

His view of discipline is somewhat less conventional than Foucault's. Its implication for education is that a wide variety of activities warrants inclusion in the educational curriculum, if
it enables an individual to pursue activities appropriate to her interests.

Discipline is viewed by Wilson as a form of order. He says that the way in which he is using the term discipline 'is that the orderliness characteristic of it is "internal" to the activity or relationship in question'. He then adds that discipline, then, is educative order. The word 'discipline' refers always to the kind of order involved in trying to reach appropriate standards or follow appropriate rules for engaging in a valued activity.

What is established very painstakingly, but with admirable cogency, is the view that discipline and control are not the same thing, though he does concede that they are both forms of order.

But the forms of order of each are of a logically different kind. Discipline is attained within an activity for reasons intrinsic to the activity. Control is achieved for reasons external to the activity. Control is exercised when it is considered necessary to get things done; discipline implies the learning of a logical and evaluative order which must be learnt if the actor understands 'what is involved in doing something'. Both discipline and control are forms of compulsion, but the latter lacks the moral dimension that is a feature of discipline. For its implementation control is dependent on force, which is either physical or
psychological.

Where instructions are used to achieve discipline they are of a didactic nature, but when instruction is used for the purpose of the attainment of control, it assumes the form of an order, which is devoid of the didactic element.

It would appear that order is compatible with discipline. When children see the point of the establishment of order as a prerequisite for classroom activity, then they are responding in a disciplined manner. 'To order', in the sense of the issuing of commands, is compatible with control and this occurs when children fail to see the point of the need for order. The children respond obediently; the teacher gains control, but the class has not responded in a disciplined way.

Unlike control, discipline is not evaluated against a pre-existing order. It lacks the regulative function that control has, and disciplined activity is not directed at the appeasement of particular others.

It is Wilson's view that 'The only kind of compulsion appropriate to education, then, as opposed to schooling, is not that of control and command, but that of discipline and instruction'.

I now move to a third writer, Alisdair MacIntyre, who I believe has a contribution to make regarding the concept of discipline.
MacIntyre does not make direct mention of the concept in *After Virtue*, but there appears to be a notion of the said concept implied in his conceptualization of a practice.

He says that

'A practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to rules as well as the achievement of goods. To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those standards and the inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them. It is to subject my own attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the standards which currently and partially define the practice. Practices of course, as I have just noticed, have a history: games, sciences and arts all have histories. Thus the standards are not themselves immune from criticism, but nonetheless we cannot be initiated into a practice without accepting the authority of the best standards realised so far.27

I noted earlier that MacIntyre does not make direct reference to the concept of discipline, but the use of phrases such as 'obedience to rules', 'authority of those standards', and 'the inadequacy of my own performance', suggests that he would subscribe to a view of discipline that is one of control and subservience.

I make this claim because obedience suggests passive unquestioning
acceptance of the dictates of rules, and if the standards of practices have to be accepted as authoritative, then the implication is that the practitioner is subservient to the practice concerned. Finally, inadequacy of performance is judged by existing standards, and while this is true, it is rather distressing to be continually reminded about personal failure to approximate to established standards within given activities, and the danger lies in the possibility of a sense of futility of activity creeping in, because, with the exception of a few, large numbers of practitioners are considered to be failures.

It must be observed that MacIntyre does not argue himself into a position that would support the above claims, but what I have done is make inferences from the position that he adopts regarding practices, which may not be verifiable beyond doubt, but they are nevertheless possible.

To briefly sum up the views of the writers discussed, I will present the crux of each of the writer's contributions. For Foucault, discipline is a form of control. Wilson describes discipline as a form of moral compulsion. Implied in MacIntyre's conceptualization of a practice is obedience to rules to attain discipline.

Michel Foucault, in his analysis of discipline as a form of control, describes accurately what goes on in schools. Discipline
is a form of control where authority figures are responsible for the implementation of the mechanism upon subservient subjects.

P.S. Wilson's view is one which has central to its position the child's interest. Children should be compelled to go to school if there they can engage in their interests. It is morally and educationally justifiable to compel them to go if the above conditions are met, and in this way, though put briefly, Wilson establishes the link between education and discipline.

The two writers present quite different views of discipline. While Foucault presents a picture of what happens in some schools, P.S. Wilson paints a picture of the, for me, unattainable educational utopia. Foucault's 'position' is far too extreme and of necessity should be eradicated from any institution that is concerned with education, while Wilson's position is suggestive of unconstrained freedom, which could prove counter-productive.

However, while I do make the above-mentioned observations, I believe that the writers do not give an adequate account of the concept of discipline. They leave out a vital dimension, which I will now describe.

Discipline is a form of control; it is submission to rules, and it does encompass being obedient to rules as well. But it is not only these things. It is something else as well, which I will proceed to describe. Discipline confers rights, circumscribed by
rules, upon people who in turn are guided by the rules of the practice. The rights are circumscribed by rules and practitioners are guided by them. Therefore, in order for a person to attain a disciplined performance in a practice, the person has to be guided by the rules that confer rights upon him, that allow him to make choices, that give him the right to make choices, from a number of possibilities within the rules.

The rules do not give the individual the right to make the choice; they circumscribe the limits from which choice may be made. But the right to exercise choice is related to our positions as autonomous moral beings located in the good society of which it is a prerequisite that autonomous choice is respected. As this is so, it is accepted that an individual has the right to make the choice when the occasion arises.

It will immediately be noticed that my conceptualization of discipline is different from that of Foucault, who analyses it as a form of control; it is different from Wilson's, who defines it as an act of compulsion related to the submission of the individual to rules, and it is different from what MacIntyre's possible idea about obedience to rules in order to attain discipline is. My view is one that claims that a practitioner is guided by the rules, and in being guided by the rules he has the right to choose from the alternatives available within the rules.

What does it mean to be guided by the rules? What does it mean to
have a right to choose from alternatives within the rules? I will answer both questions after I have clarified the use of the words 'rules' and 'rights'.

The sense in which I am using the word 'rules' is the sense in which G.J. Warnock uses it when he discusses 'constitutive' rules. He differentiates 'constitutive' rules from 'regulative' rules by virtue of the difference of their application. 'Constitutive' rules create possibilities from which choice can be exercised for doing something, whereas 'regulative' rules regulate a person's activity; they prescribe how things should be done, and they demand compliance.29

When I talk about rights, I am not talking about a right to be unhindered from doing something; it is not a right to a thing, and it is not a legal right. My use of the word 'right' refers to a right to do something, and in this instance doing something means having the right to choose from a number of alternatives.

On the preceding page I posed two questions which I will now answer. The first question is what is it to be guided by the rules? To be guided by rules means that one is not compelled by them. Rule-guidance does not demand compliance as rule-following does, and the individual is not dictated to by the rules.

To illustrate what I mean I will present an example. The example that I will use is sculpture. Sculpture is presumably
circumscribed by rules. The rules that I am thinking about are rules related to what is acceptable as sculpture; rules about what passes as sculpture. Obviously the cutting of wood into blocks or rectangles is not sculpture, but representation of objects by chiselling stone, carving wood, modelling clay or casting metal is.

It is clear then that while not just anything passes as sculpture, there is a large variety regarding what is accepted. So in being guided by the rules related to what is passable as sculpture, the sculptor has the right to choose the material that he will use, and he has the right to decide which implements are to be used in certain circumstances, though there are certain tools that are more suitably used under certain conditions than others. In addition to this, the decision about interpretation and expression is left entirely to the sculptor.

In the activity described above the person has been guided by the rules and within the rules he has the right to do something. He has the right to make choices, yet it is possible to perform in a disciplined way in such an activity. This is the additional dimension of discipline to which I earlier referred and which appears to be totally neglected in schools.

In schools questions that are asked are 'does the child have this right, or should he have this right?' And if it is argued that the child should have this right, then it may be asked why he should
have it.

My response is that the debate centres upon whether it is better for others to choose for us or whether it is better for us to choose for ourselves. Also, another question that is asked in the school situation is 'when is a schoolchild old enough to make choices?' As a response to this I argue that what must be borne in mind is that the child is not expected to make choices from an infinite variety of alternatives. His choices are limited to a specific number of alternatives, which in the first instance are circumscribed by rules. Examples of such activities which spring to mind are painting, sculpture, games, dancing (classical or other), and designing, (e.g. clothing). There are definitely similar other such activities.

In the types of activities mentioned there is room for error as well and this makes them different from the formal disciplines. In the formal disciplines there is the clear distinction between right and wrong. In the activities I mentioned above it is possible to incorporate error in the activity and it becomes part of the practice. An example of this is where an error in the sculpture is incorporated in the finished product.

P.S. Wilson's account of the logical link between discipline and education is an interesting one, but he fails by not demarcating limits in terms of what is educational and what is not. Further, there is the need to see the point of participating in the activity
in a way that is appropriate to the activity and the implication, for me, is that the agent is relegated to a position beneath that of the activity.

Such an account fails to take cognisance of the role of the agent. A person may in one instance perform a given activity in a disciplined way, but in another instance his performance of the same activity may be absent of discipline.

An activity has a structure peculiar to it, call it its internal organisation that makes it what it is. When a person performs that activity in a manner that is suited to the internal structure of the activity, he is seen to have performed it in a disciplined way.

This is not to say that the person's performance is dictated by the internal structure of the activity. Rather, there is a coalescence of the inert and the animate in a mutually disciplined union.

In this section I have looked at the views of Michel Foucault, P.S. Wilson and Alisdair MacIntyre regarding the concept of discipline. I observed that they operate with completely different notions of the concept and I added that their notions did not give a full account of the concept. I then argued that a more adequate account of the concept becomes available when my notion is granted recognition. The notion of discipline becomes more rounded and complete.
In Section 4 I will undertake a critique of the commonly-held notion of discipline.
SECTION 4 - A CRITIQUE OF THE COMMONLY-HELD NOTION OF DISCIPLINE

Before I launch into my critique of the commonly-held notion of discipline, I consider it appropriate at this stage to signpost for the reader the stages through which my argument has proceeded.

In the first section I differentiated between a discipline, e.g. mathematics, and 'non-discipline' activities. In the second section I pointed out that academic disciplines are concerned with the search for the truth, whereas this is not the case with 'non-discipline' activities. In the third section I located the debate within present views about the concept of discipline, by giving an exposition of the views of Michel Foucault, P.S. Wilson and Alasdair MacIntyre.

In this section I will develop a critique of the commonly-held notion of discipline by making some observations regarding the commonly-held notion of discipline, i.e. that it is a form of control only; I will look at the implications that emanate from this view and its consequences and I will compare and contrast my view with the accepted view.

As a reminder I must point out that I am opposed to the view that claims that discipline is a form of control only. Such a view subscribes to discipline as a form of control that compels rule following. I do not deny that discipline does operate in this way, and I am not dismissing it from education as superfluous. It does
have a role to play if applied with certain reservations. What I am arguing is that to conceptualise discipline in the way described above as the only way in which the concept operates, is to give an inadequate account of the concept. Discipline is not only control through compulsion by rule-obedience; it is also practice through rule-guidance. This distinction was discussed quite exhaustively in Section 3.

Before proceeding with my argument, I must establish use of terminology that will facilitate clearer argument.

I will use the phrase 'commonly-held notion of discipline' when I refer to the view that supports the idea that it, i.e. discipline, is a form of control only; and I will use the phrase 'my view' when I refer to the idea that rule-guidance is being talked about as opposed to rule-following, because the commonly-held notion of discipline subscribes to a notion of discipline as rule-following, which appears to be opposed to my view of rule-guidance.

A Critique of Discipline as Control

Conceptually the English language can cater for one who participates in an activity, one who is involved in a practice, one who produces a work, in a disciplined way. However, the word is very frequently misused and this confuses our understanding of these issues.
Confusion, I believe, stems from the following. Firstly, it is an outside observer, normally some type of senior or authority, who casts judgment upon the subject's performance, and secondly, for me, the subject becomes subjected to the activity that he performs. Let us take each observation in turn. In education if a person is engaging in an educational task his evaluator is usually in some position of 'superiority'. It is that person who may decide whether the task has been engaged in in a disciplined way or not. The subject's viewpoint is totally ignored, if it is sought at all.

Now, in making his evaluation, the evaluator may confuse a mechanical performance with a disciplined performance, and so his evaluation will be wrong.

The point that I am trying to establish is that if individuals slavishly follow rules in all the activities that they participate in, they then become slaves to rules; they become rule-following animals who perform activities in a mechanical way rather than in a disciplined way.

I have been using the terms 'mechanical' and 'disciplined', without saying what they are. I will do so now. For me a mechanical performance of an activity is when the agent follows the rules of the activity slavishly, without seeing the point of participating in the activity, with the activity seen as being of instrumental value. In this case participation in the activity in an instrumental way means that his actions are directed at the approval of external others, possibly an evaluator of some sort.
Disciplined performance, for me, means seeing the point of participating in the activity; participating in the activity for its intrinsic value; performing the activity in a way appropriate to it, for its own sake. In this case the agent would need to locate Herbst's opus in the activity which he is performing, and I make no distinction here between rule-following activities and rule-guided activities, though I am inclined to issue the warning that the confusion discussed earlier is more likely to arise where rule-following activities are concerned, because it is in these instances that it is easier to tell when a rule is not being followed, and this is where the evaluator comes in.

This brings me to the next point that I would like to discuss. Related to the concept of discipline in its commonly-held notion is the idea of a disciplinarian. If applied in the educational situation, an anomaly then stems from the fact that we have a 'disciplinarian', one supposedly responsible for the imposition of discipline, i.e. one responsible for the control imposed, but we do not have a 'disciplined'.

We do have one who is disciplined by a disciplinarian, e.g. when unequal power relations exist between the one who wields the power and one who is the target of that power, and we do have a person who is disciplined in the performance of an activity. But there is an iniquitous implication that arises from the positions described above that supports what I said in my argument, and it is that it is an invidious arrangement to have, in the educational situation,
power relations that are unequal.

From the remarks made in the preceding paragraph it is possible to make certain inferences. They are that people being educated can only achieve their objective if exposed to the type of discipline described above. People can only be educated under conditions of control and supervision. Alternatively, if they are not being controlled or supervised, i.e. disciplined directly, the discipline assumes a less explicit manifestation. Its form is that of 'judgment', where the person in charge will decide whether a disciplined performance of an activity has taken place or not.

This appears to be very much like the sort of preparation one would undergo if one were being trained as an unthinking, docile automaton being prepared to slot into part of the social production machinery without concern for the person involved. But this is not so; what is being discussed and described is what goes on in schools and other similar educational institutions which are supposed to be in the interest of the individual.

What also goes on in these institutions is that communication is from the top down. Children are talked at, rather than talked to. In classrooms children must guess what the teacher wants them to say; they must respond in a way that the teacher has predetermined; they must say that something is true, because someone else has said that it is true. If not, they are not disciplined.
My description of what goes on in schools should be cause for alarm. Are schools working in collusion with the ownership class, or are their interests primarily those of the children? If the second part of the above question is answered in the affirmative, then schools are certainly setting about their task in a most peculiar manner.

A Critique of the Disciplines

My approach, though based on an attack on what goes on in schools, will take a different thrust now. It is different because I now talk about 'disciplines', those fields of study that have logical internal structures, and which are concerned with a quest for the truth; which are different from discipline, the form of control.

My approach will be to challenge two established positions, one unmentioned, and one dealt with in a previous section of my essay. The two positions that I refer to are those adopted by Paul Hirst and P.S. Wilson. But before I challenge the positions of the said writers, I believe that it is necessary to reiterate my stance so that it will be possible to observe our points of variance.

I do believe that there is room for the commonly-held notion of discipline in schools, with certain reservations of course. I do believe that there is a need to be exposed to the disciplines, e.g. mathematics, in the educational process, but in each instance, as I observed earlier, the agent is the subordinate. In the first
instance this is so because the authority figure responsible for the implementation of discipline is in a position of control over the subject. In the second instance the agent is dictated to by the rules of the discipline; he is compelled by the rules and must follow them slavishly if he is to be seen to have performed the discipline in a disciplined way.

My view is that it is necessary for the subject to at least be elevated in status to that of equal, if not superior, to the activity, and this can be done if the individual participates in activities that create scope for choice. Such activities would have internal to their structure rules that serve the function of guidance. The individual is then guided by the rules and he is allowed to make choices within the rules concerning how he will participate in the activity. I chose to call such activities practices, it will be remembered, and as examples of such practices I suggested games, art and music.

The difference between discipline as control and disciplines as school subjects, on the one hand, and my conception of practices on the other, becomes apparent. My view creates scope for choice. The agent is not prescribed to; he is not under control, and he is not a rule-following animal. He is allowed to exercise choice within given parameters, but choice nevertheless it is.

In his article 'Liberal education and the nature of knowledge', Paul Hirst first sets out what he considers liberal education to
be. He says that 'a liberal education is, then, one that, determined in scope and content by knowledge itself, is thereby concerned with the development of mind'. It is different from an exclusively scientific education, it is not vocational education, and it is not a specialist education of any sort.

Liberal education commits itself to exposure to what Hirst calls the forms of knowledge. They are mathematics, physical sciences, human sciences, history, religion, literature and the fine arts, philosophy and morals. And Hirst states that Acquiring knowledge of any form is therefore to a greater or lesser extent something that cannot be done simply by solitary study of the symbolic expressions of knowledge, it must be learnt from a master on the job. No doubt it is because the forms require particular training of this kind in distinct worlds of discourse, because they necessitate the development of high critical standards according to complex criteria, because they involve our coming to look at experience in particular ways, that we refer to them as disciplines. They are indeed disciplines that form the mind.

What is at stake here is the question of whether it is possible to only achieve a disciplined performance in what Paul Hirst terms 'forms of knowledge'. Hirst appears to imply this in his article, which appears to be in support of R.S. Peter's view about
worthwhile activities. I am in disagreement with this view. In schools children are exposed to a selection from among the disciplines. The disciplines that are used in schools are those that allow measurement or evaluation in terms of performance. Children are evaluated by their performance within the prescribed disciplines. Very often it is mistakenly assumed that those children who perform well within a discipline have performed in a disciplined way. If a child excels in an examination within one of the subjects, i.e. disciplines, it is accepted that that performance is indicative of a disciplined performance. This is not necessarily so. The child may have reproduced what was required of him in a manner that was devoid of discipline. His response may have been completely mechanical. I therefore argue that measurable proficiency does not necessarily indicate a disciplined performance.

Rules do not give a complete description of an activity. A disciplined performance escapes specification by the rules. One cannot differentiate between a disciplined player and an ill-disciplined one in terms of the rules of an activity. And it is therefore my view that it is possible to perform in a disciplined way in an activity that is not categorised as one of the disciplines. Examples of such activities are ballet or soccer or sculpture.

While Hirst demarcates activities that are apparently acceptable as "forms of knowledge", P.S. Wilson strays by not demarcating limits.
I will challenge him on this issue, and then I will respond to his claim that discipline is a kind of compulsion to which it is right that one should have to submit.

I observed that Wilson does not demarcate limits in terms of activities that are educational, and the implication of this extremely generous attitude is that if the activity is an interest of the individual it is worthy of inclusion in the educational programme. Wilson does acknowledge that 'the interests of children are often childish and absurd', but one wonders how he reconciles this admission with his view that a child should go to school if it is a place where he can pursue his interests. The problem with P.S. Wilson is that one is unsure of what he wants included in the school curriculum. He is not clear on this matter.

What Wilson fails to recognise, I believe, is that activities have social traditions. They have emerged in a social context and are interpersonal. Therefore, it is unacceptable that just anything, because it happens to be the interest of the individual, should be considered to be educational. What happens if the individual is interested in tiddly-winks or pea-shooting? I do realise that my examples are absurd, but it is not inconceivable that there are some people who do have such interests. What then? Do we include such activities in our educational programme because they are the interests of certain individuals? My response is a categorical no! Not just anything goes, and I believe that the criteria should be that the activities should have traditions and they should have
histories of standards of excellence.

Wilson's next argument that I intend to deal with is his claim that discipline is a kind of compulsion to which it is right to submit. I do agree that discipline is a form of compulsion, but it is not only an act of compulsion, it is something else as well.

Wilson does not claim that discipline is only an act of compulsion. However, this is the way in which he deals with the concept in Interest and Discipline in Education, and as he does not take into account other dimensions that may be descriptive of this concept, I am inclined to read him in this way.

I will spell out what this something else is regarding discipline after I have undertaken a brief analysis of the relationship of discipline to rules, and it is likely that my position will attain greater clarity.

For its implementation discipline ultimately depends on rules. A person is seen to have performed an activity in a disciplined way if he follows the rules. If he does not follow the rules, i.e. if he breaks the rules, then he is seen to have performed the activity in an ill-disciplined manner.

When students in schools, or elsewhere, are disciplined by authority figures, the authority figures resort to rules for the justification of the imposition of discipline. So what is
happening here is that those under control are indirectly compelled by rules. They are compelled by the rules of certain activities in which they participate, and they are compelled by rules when they are being disciplined by authority figures. Here discipline is certainly an act of compulsion, but as I remarked earlier, it is not only this; it is something else as well. What this something else is will be discussed in the ensuing paragraph.

My claim earlier was that for its implementation discipline ultimately depends on rules. What if the rules in this case differ from those described above? Rules that guide differ from rules that dictate, and my present concern is with rules that guide.

What is the relationship between an activity circumscribed by rules that guide, and an individual who participates in such an activity? The first response is that the agent is guided by the rules internal to the activity. If this is so, that he is being guided, then what is implied is that in being guided he is allowed to make choices within the rules of the activity. If choice is present, and if it is possible to exercise choice and still perform an activity in a disciplined way then, for me, it is an obvious dismissal of compulsion as a necessary component of discipline. In fact, in the above context choice and compulsion are quite incompatible; in fact they are actually diametrically opposed.

Finally, as part of my observations, I would like to note that the phenomenon of innovation shows that it is insufficient to give an
account of discipline only in terms of something internal to the activity; you need something about the agent (subject) as well. In the commonly-held notion of discipline we noticed that the agent was relegated in status because he was a subject of control, acting out of a need to appease particular others. My notion of discipline elevates the agent in status to equal or superior to the activity. The rules, applicable to most activities, are in most instances static. That they do not undergo dramatic change over time is attributable to the fact that these activities have identities, and if they change in their rules, they lose their identities. But activities are not static in terms of what happens within them, within the confines of the rules, and this is where the phenomenon of innovation appears. But innovation is nothing without the innovator, and this is why, in my conceptualisation of discipline, the agent is given primacy of place because he is allowed to exercise choice from among the rules, with the likelihood of improvising. I believe that my view of discipline says more about the agent than does the commonly-held notion, and, if only for this, I feel that we cannot neglect to give it the recognition that it deserves by creating space for its inclusion in any programme that is considered educational.

Consequences of the Application of the Commonly-held Notion of Discipline

From having made observations I now move on to implications of strict adherence and total commitment to the commonly-held notion
of discipline. After I have done this I will question the validity of the implied belief that it is only possible to attain a disciplined performance within a formal discipline, i.e. a form of knowledge.

The commonly-held notion of discipline accepts that discipline is a form of control. In education it is then accepted that the educand is controlled by an outside controlling force; a 'superior' of some sort who has been placed in authority. Whether the person is 'an authority' is an altogether different matter which we will not digress to discuss here. The educand, or subject, is involved in an unequal relationship, and particular situations will dictate how the subject responds in view of the presence of the authority figure. Put differently, it means that the subject's behaviour will be directed at the approval of particular others. In such instances the individual will be displaying behaviour that is heterocentric.

R.W. Wilson makes the following distinction.

For behaviour in terms of learned standards the term autocentricism is suggested and for behaviour in terms of situational demands the term heterocentricism is suggested. Autocentricism is defined as a condition where particular others are not cited as the authority for behaviour, where there is an orientation to rules or principles; heterocentricism is defined as a condition where particular others are
cited as the authority for behaviour, where there is
an orientation to others.\textsuperscript{34}

A question which needs to be asked at this stage is: 'What are the possible consequences of prolonged heterocentricism, as it is true that subjects will be exposed to the commonly-held notion of discipline throughout their educational careers if cognisance is not taken of my view and attempts are not made to implement it.

One possible answer to the question posed above is that it is likely that prolonged heterocentricism could lead to permanent heterocentricism. The person will always cite others as the authority for his behaviour. Permanent heterocentricism, for me, is tantamount to Pavlovian conditioning of human beings. But if it is education that we are talking about, then it is reprehensible that the likelihood of such a situation could arise, but it can, and it does, and we have got to guard against it.

Another way of looking at the above situation is to acknowledge that the hypothetical subject under discussion may never operate as an autonomous human being. The reader need only turn back to Section 1 to read the views of John White and R.F. Dearden on human autonomy, and then she will recognise the invidiousness of the position of the heteronomous subject.

The second implication that I indicated that I would deal with,
that is associated with the commonly-held notion of discipline, is the implied belief that it is only possible to attain a disciplined performance within a formal discipline, i.e. a form of knowledge, e.g. mathematics. I think that this is not so.

A discipline is such because of its formal internal arrangement, so that proficiency in the performance of a discipline is measurable. However, excellent measurable proficiency does not necessarily indicate a disciplined performance of the activity. It may be a mechanical performance, and here again I must reiterate the point made earlier, that it is insufficient to give an account of discipline only in terms of something internal to the activity; you need something about the subject as well.

A person may in one instance perform an activity in a disciplined way, but in another instance his performance of the same activity may be absent of discipline. An activity has a structure peculiar to it, call it its internal organisation, that makes it systematic. When a person performs that activity in a manner that is suited to the internal structure of the activity, he is seen to have performed it in a disciplined way. This is not to say that the person's performance is dictated by the internal structure of the activity; rather there is a coalescence of the inert and the animate in a mutually disciplined union. The role of the agent is of vital importance.

From having looked at the implications of strict adherence to the
commonly-held notion of discipline and the possible consequences thereof, I now want to finally challenge the views of Michel Foucault and P.S. Wilson regarding the concept, in the hope that it will ultimately be acknowledged that there is another conceptualization worthy of consideration.

Foucault's analysis of the disciplinary process concluded in the acceptance that it is a power relation; a form of control, exerted upon people. Such a view would be supportive of the claim that discipline is a form of control circumscribed by rules of compulsion.

As was observed in Section 3 of this essay, P.S. Wilson develops an intricate argument through which he finally links education and discipline. For the sake of brevity I will sketch his main ideas only.

He initially asks why a child should go to school and the answer is that he should go; he is compelled to go, only if the school is a place where he is allowed to pursue his interests. The element of compulsion appears when the child is compelled to go to school because it is a place at which he may pursue his interests. His interests are those activities in which he has seen the point of participation in an appropriate way. Discipline is a kind of compulsion to which it is right that one should have to submit.

My inclination is to say that if P.S. Wilson formulates the concept
of discipline in this way, then it would not be a form of misrepresentation to claim that he, too, would see the role of rules as compelling and dictatorial.

I have developed a view of discipline that is different from that described above. It is not radical, but it is different. Discipline confers rights, circumscribed by rules, upon people who in turn are guided by the rules.

People who participate in what I earlier called practices, have rights, as individuals, to choose the way in which they will perform within the rules of a specific practice. That practices are circumscribed by rules serves to emphasise their histories and traditions, and the rules peculiar to specific practices make them what they are; they retain their identities in this way. But in being circumscribed by rules, it must be painstakingly noted that the rules of practices serve as a form of guidance only. They do not compel. This is the difference.
SECTION 5 - CONCLUSION

To summarise, then, my argument as it has proceeded, so that the salient points may be placed in relief, I will briefly present the contents of each section.

In Section 1, my argument proceeded as follows. I first presented a definition of the two meanings of the word 'discipline'. They are a form of control, and a branch of instruction or learning. My concern is with both, as both concepts of the word discipline have application in education.

Discipline, as a form of control, is implemented by an external agency, and this creates unequal power relationships in the educational situation and it has not been established whether there are moral grounds for the criteria used in the imposition of discipline. All the time, within the process, the subject directs his behaviour at external agencies, and it is conceivable that discipline is confused with associated or similar concepts.

As a result of having continuously directed his behaviour at particular others, the agent has had his individuality eroded. He has been conditioned to respond in a manner that will elicit reinforcement from his evaluator, and this is an immoral situation, where a human being has been denigrated to the level of a conditioned animal. Such a person has been robbed of his autonomy, but I argued that it is desirable to be autonomous.
My next move was to discuss 'the disciplines', i.e. branches of knowledge, as they are applied in schools. Here a relationship exists between a child and an 'object', a school subject, a discipline. This, too, is a relationship of 'control', because it demands conformity from the child because he has to comply with the rules of the discipline, as failure to do so will lead to personal failure.

In Section 2 I differentiated between a discipline, i.e. mathematics, and I explicated its formal, internal structure and its internal organisation and logic. Then I discussed 'non-discipline' activities such as music and art. My terminology for the respective areas of concern were 'discipline' and 'practice' respectively.

Characteristic of a discipline is that it is concerned with establishing the truth. In order to establish the truth within a discipline, one has to follow the rules. A practice, as I conceptualise it, is not concerned with establishing the truth. It is concerned with disciplined performance, but in order to perform in a disciplined way in a practice one is guided by the rules.

I demonstrated that it is possible to attain a disciplined performance in 'non-discipline' activities which I called practices, and I argued for their inclusion in the school curriculum on equal status with the disciplines, because they do have a dimension that is unavailable in disciplines, and it is the
potential for innovation.

Section 3 was utilised to locate my views about 'discipline' within the present debate about the concept. I did this by giving an exposition of the views of Michel Foucault and P.S. Wilson, and I drew Alisdair MacIntyre into the discussion as a result of his conceptualization of a practice. According to Foucault's analysis, discipline is a form of power which facilitates control. For Wilson, discipline and interest are inextricably interwoven. If a child has a particular interest, the child will participate in the interest in a way that justifies his participation in that interest, and his discipline derives from the moral compulsion implicit in the interest, without consideration of how the interest may prove to be of instrumental value.

I observed that Alisdair MacIntyre does not make direct reference to rules, but in his discussion of a practice he uses certain phrases that suggest, I remarked, that he would subscribe to discipline as a form of control and subservience.

I then presented my conceptualization of discipline against the above-mentioned background. Discipline confers rights, circumscribed by rules, upon people who in turn are guided by the rules of the practice. The rights are circumscribed by rules and practitioners are guided by them. Therefore, in order for a person to attain a disciplined performance in a practice, the person has to be guided by the rules that confer rights upon him, that allow
him to make choices, that give him the right to make choices from a
number of possibilities within the rules.

The most important difference between my conceptualization of
discipline and the commonly-held notion, is that my view
encapsulates rule-guidance as opposed to rule-following, and I
argued that it is possible to attain a disciplined performance in
activities that are rule-guided.

Observations were made by me regarding the commonly-held notion of
discipline, implications related to this view were considered and
its consequences were assessed in Section 4. I then compared and
contrasted my view with the commonly-held notion of discipline. I
continued this section by arguing that if individuals slavishly
follow rules in all the activities in which they participate, they
then become slaves to rules; they become rule-following animals
who perform activities in a mechanical way rather than in a
disciplined way.

Disciplined performance, for me, means seeing the point of
participating in the activity; participating in the activity for
its intrinsic value; performing the activity in a way appropriate
to it, for its own sake.

I then discussed the deleterious effects of having a disciplined
performance controlled by a disciplinarian, where, in places such
as schools, children labour under unequal power relations. There
they are relegated to a position of inferiority to the formal discipline. I claimed that my conceptualization of discipline related to rule-guidance elevated the subject to equal or superior to the activity, a position much more desirable than the former.

Finally, I staked a claim for the inclusion of rule-guided subjects in the educational curriculum, as it is my belief that if we are to counter the effects of the school production line by producing critical, free-thinking, unfettered minds, the educational process will have to be planned to this end.

It is my view that it is an illusion to believe that a method of axiomatic instruction will eventually lead to creative and evaluative thinking. The mind becomes manacled by the method of axiomatic instruction, and is incapable of escaping from the fetters of its effect when it is expected to do so. In order for a person to develop creative, critical and free thinking, the individual should be allowed and encouraged to do so within the structure of her educational programme.

The manner in which education is presently structured, with its obsession with the commonly-held notion of discipline and its emphasis of the disciplines in curriculum design, destroys any possibility of producing, as an end product of the process, an individual who is capable of creative, critical and free thinking.

I would like to quote, at length, from Neil Postman and Charles
Weingartner, on what learning takes place in schools, and what messages are transmitted:

Passive acceptance is a more desirable response to ideas than active criticism. Discovering knowledge is beyond the power of students and is, in any case, none of their business. Recall is the highest form of intellectual achievement, and the collection of unrelated 'facts' is the goal of education. The voice of authority is to be trusted and valued more than independent judgement. One's own ideas and those of one's classmates are inconsequential. Feelings are irrelevant in education. There is always a single, unambiguous Right Answer to a question. English is not History and History is not Science and Science is not Art and Art is not Music, and Art and Music are minor subjects and English, History and Science are major subjects, and a subject is something you 'take' and, when you have 'taken' it, you have 'had' it, and if you have 'had' it, you are immune and need not take it again. (The Vaccination Theory of Education?) 

In view of what has been said above, one is then to ask whose
interests are being promoted in schools and other educational institutions? Certainly, with things as they are, it cannot be the interests of the recipients of what is called 'education'. If it is education that is under discussion, then something has gone amiss with its process and objectives, and I think that it should more suitably be called instruction, or something else of a similar nature.

People being schooled are passive recipients of knowledge instead of active producers of knowledge. Learning is being told what happened instead of being a happening in itself. As this is the case, how then is education to create people who can think for themselves, by themselves, about issues that affect them individually and as part of the human collectivity?

Our training in educational institutions equips us with a smug acceptance of our inability to think. We transport this debilitating condition into other realms of our lives, where authority is unquestioningly accepted; where we are afraid to express personal preferences, opinions or views, where others, ostensibly better qualified, make choices for us. It has become so bad that we even allow 'others' to make decisions for us. This is especially to be observed in the political sphere where people regard the casting of a vote as synonymous with the exercising of a political right.

This has got to stop, and the places that are ideal for introducing
change are educational institutions, which have the advantage of a large captive audience over an extended period of time.

At these places people should be encouraged to think. Space must be created within the educational curriculum to facilitate personal choice and decision-making and hopefully, as a result of having been allowed or rather encouraged to exercise these faculties, they will rightfully become part of our natures.

An unthinking being accepts his lot in life. He is incapable of indulging in leaps of the mind that will allow him to question the status quo, by comparing what is with what should be, and what could be. He docilely vegetates in his condition of hibernation, unconcerned about how his life has been mapped for him, and is equally unconcerned about his contribution as a human being to his immediate community or society at large.

Schools, within the educational structure, are particularly culpable of some of the more serious charges of stifling individualism and stifling the mind.

There are alternative possibilities available to schools. They have available, for choice, open or closed systems in education. A closed system of education accepts that there is only one correct answer; an open system accepts that there are various possibilities as answers. As consequences of these systems, we either have open- or closed-system thinkers. Sadly, because of the
way schools are structured, the emphasis is on closed-system education, and the consequence is a plethora of closed-system thinkers.

In the classroom the teacher is both judge and arbiter. How is it possible under such conditions to encourage free speech, which I believe is considered by the good society that underpins my argument to be the inalienable right of every human being, as long as it is not used in a manner that is slanderous or hurtful to the next person? Because free speech is not encouraged in schools, Postman and Weingartner observe that 'children become ventriloquisers, speaking with the voice of the authorities'. The whole performance then becomes a sham. The dominant mode of action in schools is pretence. Teachers pretend that what they are doing is education, and children pretend that what they are receiving is education. Pretence leads to alienation from the true task at hand, and it ultimately becomes unattainable.

My reformulation of the concept of discipline is an open challenge to the way discipline is conceived of and applied in schools. Schools apply an accurate though limited notion of the concept. My earnest request is that they extend the notion of discipline to incorporate my view, and, if this is done, we will need a reformulation of the educational process as a whole. What are some of the changes envisaged? The most important change that I anticipate is the introduction of rule-guided activities on a par with rule-following activities. Instructors, be they teachers or
professors, should see education as a part of a process in which they are engaging, rather than as a finished product which they are dispensing. Communication should not be from the top down, it should be on a horizontal plane, with each communicant participating in the dialogue, on an equal footing. Learning must become a happening, it must be a right to do. We must become active producers of knowledge. The recipients of education must be given the right to voice their opinions, express their views, air their preferences, approve or disapprove, make choices, make decisions, follow their inclinations that stem from desires, express themselves freely on matters that they choose to discuss, question the pronouncements of authority figures, especially when such persons are in authority, but they are not necessarily 'authorities', with a view to seeking clarification on matters.

My list is certainly not exhaustive, but it covers sufficient ground and lays bare the limitations and restrictive role that education plays, especially in view of the fact that it is closely linked to the commonly-held notion of discipline. The commonly-held notion of discipline is the cornerstone of virtually all education planning and implementation. Education, as it is conceived today, is built upon such foundations. It is time that we rock the edifice, then, hopefully, we will be undertaking the true task of education and it is to educate.
NOTES:


2) Ibid.


5) Refer to Alisdair MacIntyre's use of the word 'practice' in After Virtue, pp.177-178.


9) In the chapter 'Literature and Literary Study', in Theory of Literature, the writers make the following point: 'While physics may see its highest triumphs in some general theory
reducing to a formula electricity and heat, gravitation and light, no general law can assume to achieve the purpose of literary study: the more general, the more abstract and hence empty it will seem; the more the concrete objects of the work of art will elude our grasp'. (p.18.)

10) Alisdair MacIntyre makes this point in his discussion on practices in After Virtue.


13) Ibid, p.137.


20) Ibid, p.179.


24) Ibid, p.79.


27) MacIntyre, A., op. cit.


29) For further discussion see C.J. Warnock on Rules, Chapter 4, in *The Object of Morality*. London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1971.

30) In his paper 'Work, Labour and University Education', in *The Philosophy of Education*, Oxford: OUP, 1980, R.S. Peters (ed.), P. Herbst makes the following distinctions between work and
education is work rather than labour, and that to educate well is to work, as well as to teach people to work.'

'... work is conceived to be a species of unalienated action, labour is activity tending to alienation.

'The product of work is works. I am sorry that the only available English word is so weak and colourless. I shall use the Latin word 'opus' instead. The opus, as I conceive it, is the point of the workman's work; if the opus is well done, he has not worked in vain. I shall argue that in order to work well, a workman needs to love or value that at which he works and if so, he aims at good workmanship. The excellence of an opus will be sharply distinguished from its instrumental goodness, and in particular, from its propensity to procure satisfaction for consumers. At the same time it is not denied that in objects which belong to a telic species, what counts as their excellence may depend on their telos.

'Work need not similarly cause, or give us pleasures; congenial work on the contrary is a pleasure. The pleasure consists in doing the work, not in some consequence, or state of mind, produced by the work. The pleasure of labour on the other hand (if any) is always extrinsic to it.

'Activities conceived as pleasure-producers are labour. Activities conceived as happiness-constituents are work.'

'Work is non-contingently related to its product.'... 'Labour is contingently-related to its product.'

32) Ibid.

33) Ibid.

34) R.W. Wilson makes the discussed distinctions in his article 'Some comments on stage theories of moral development' in *Journal of Moral Education*, Vol. 3.

35) This extract is taken from *Teaching as a Subversive Activity* by Neil Postman and Charles Weingartner. In part of my conclusion, i.e. Section 5, I am greatly indebted to the writers for the views I express there.

36) My essay is not concerned with the distinction drawn between education and schooling and to have focussed upon it in the text would have resulted in side-tracking of the main issue, i.e. that the concept of discipline is distorted in education. My argument that discipline is distorted in education is not dependent upon establishing a clear and presumably crucial distinction between education and schooling, as the distinction is anything but clear or universally agreed upon. My claim is that there are institutions that claim to impart education, whatever their conceptualization of education may be, and in imparting what they consider education to be, they distort the
concept of discipline in their methods and approach. However, there is extensive literature that concentrates on the distinctions between education and schooling. The articles that I have read for this essay, which deal with the difference between education and schooling, are listed below. What they have in common is the claim that education and schooling are of a logically different nature. Education is a concept, whereas schooling is a process of a certain sort. Also, the writers listed below accept that schools do not educate:

The articles are:


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