PONDOLAND: HER CAPE AND NATAL

NEIGHBOURS. 1878 - 1894.

Thesis submitted for the Degree of Master of Arts in the Department of History, in the University of the Witwatersrand - June 1935,

by

Agnes M. Hutton.
I, Agnes Malcolm Sutton, declare this thesis: "Pondoland, Her Cape and Natal Neighbours 1878-1894," to be my own work; and to have been submitted as a dissertation for a Master's degree to the University.

29th May 1935
ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<tr>
<td>B.R.</td>
<td>British Resident.</td>
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<tr>
<td>C.M.</td>
<td>Chief Magistrate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>C.O.</td>
<td>Colonial Office.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Col. Sec.</td>
<td>Colonial Secretary.</td>
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<td>Confid.</td>
<td>Confidential.</td>
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<td>D.P.</td>
<td>Document Presented.</td>
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<td>enclos.</td>
<td>enclosure.</td>
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<tr>
<td>G.H.</td>
<td>Government House.</td>
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<td>Govr.</td>
<td>Governor.</td>
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<td>Govt.</td>
<td>Government.</td>
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<td>H.C.</td>
<td>High Commissioner.</td>
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<td>Ibid</td>
<td>the same.</td>
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<tr>
<td>J.P.</td>
<td>Jenkins' Private Papers.</td>
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<td>J.N.</td>
<td>Letter Book.</td>
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<td>N.A.D.</td>
<td>Native Affairs Department.</td>
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<td>Nats.</td>
<td>Natives.</td>
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<td>P.P.</td>
<td>Parliamentary Papers.</td>
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<td>page.</td>
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<td>P.L.A.</td>
<td>Prime Minister's Archives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>R.K.</td>
<td>Resident Magistrate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S.N.A.</td>
<td>Secretary for Native Affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sec. of State</td>
<td>Secretary of State.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S.P.</td>
<td>Shepstone's Private Papers.</td>
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<td>U.S.N.A.</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Native Affairs.</td>
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See bibliography:

- de Kiewiet
- Egerton
- Macmillan
- Theal
- Uys
- van der Poel
- Walker - "History"
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          landing goods at Pt. Grosvener - des- 
          pite Cape remonstrances;
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   c. 2 Germans arrive at Great Place.
   d. Wildest stories circulated.
   e. Hinwul formerly in Zululand, chief mover —
      1. urging cession of land.
      2. promising assistance.
   f. Pondo express road being made by Cape.
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   h. Death of Umquikela (October).
      1. More Germans arrive representing the
         "Berlin Bonds Society".
      2. Sigauu pressed to accept a transfer
         of German cession to them.
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   1. Renew plea for annexation
      a. border constantly violated.
      b. expense of extra police.
      c. Governor becomes aware of secret
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      a. Cape Ministers refuse.
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      return Natal will amend customs.

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5. Feel certain Cape forced to call on their help in end.
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Bibliography 1
Most problems are two-sided but Pondoland in the latter half of last century might be said to have been triangular, if not quadrangular, having a Cape side, a Natal side and an Imperial side, not to speak of a Pondo side. Though it played an interesting and sometimes controversial role in South African history, Pondoland seldom, if ever, reached the centre of the stage and that for a very obvious reason. The Ponds never actually took up arms against the British Authorities. They remained peaceable and quiet throughout all the troublesome times of Native Wars and rebellions. Thus, they, like the well-behaved child received less attention than the bully, but to them in the end was meted out the same punishment. They too, were hard pressed and deprived of their much-needed land, in the same way that the Natives on the Eastern Border and Basutoland suffered.

Frequently Pondoland came within the orbit of the diverging policies of Downing Street, the Cape and Natal, more especially in the late 'seventies and 'eighties and early 'nineties, when commercial and political rivalry had developed to make relations between the two British Colonies in South Africa strained and bitter to an acute degree.

Pondoland as defined in the 'forties and 'fifties lay on the East beyond the bounds of the Cape. Its

*C. Brownlee "Reminiscences of Kaffir Life and History", p.104.

+de Kiewiet, pp.11 and 234; Macmillan "Bantu, Boer and Briton", pp.33, 62-64, 229, 237, 251.

+van der Poel, pp.17-18.
Southern boundary was the Umtata, its Western the Drakensberg; while to the North-East its border marched with that of Natal along the Umzimkulu River. To the East and South-East rolled the Indian Ocean along an uncharted coastline, the vulnerable spot against which a foreign or unfriendly power might strike. In one or two inlets only, however, could small ships enter—the most important of which being Port St. John's.

Like all the tribes in South-Eastern Africa, the Pondos suffered from the Zulu invasions and attacks. By 1832 they were in a deplorable condition, starving, without sustenance or organisation, plundering and preying upon each other. They had been driven from their own country across the Umtata River. After the collapse of the Zulu power, they gradually began to straggle back to reoccupy their own country under their Chief Faku. Meanwhile the Boers were establishing themselves in Natal. On finding in their expeditions against the Bacs under Nocayi, early in 1841, a large unoccupied tract of country between the Umzimkulu and Umzimvubu Rivers they contrived to possess themselves of it. Nocayi was a rival of the Pondo Faku and he lived on the southern border of Natal where Boer farmers complained of cattle stealing. They traced the spoor to his kraal and carried off 3,000 head of cattle and 17 "apprentices". This action caused the anger and indignation of the Wesleyan Missionaries who were already established among the Pondos and affiliated clans to the South of the Umzimvubu. Letters appeared in the Press.

4 Theal, p. 173.

5 C. 2676, No. 23. Frere to Secr. of State 22.6.80, forwarding copy of memo. by Hon. C. Brownlee on "Xesibe-Pondo Question", cf. Historical Atlas (Walker).


7 J.P. W. Shaw in Grahamstown Journal 5.8.41.
British force was sent up to the Umzimvubu "for the protection of the Native tribes from attacks of a similar character". At that time the question of annexation of Natal was being mooted in British circles. Thus the military force sent to Pondoland played a double part in its tendency to the "security of our immediate (Cape) border by its influence on the Kaffirs, and it has already favourably influenced public sentiment amongst the Emigrant Farmers in Natal; it placed the shield of British protection over a large and powerful tribe (Faku's) who are the allies of the Colony, and secondly it was perhaps intended as a necessary step towards the accomplishment of an event greatly to be desired .... the peaceful establishment of British Rule in Port Natal".

Thus early was Pondoland the base of operations of the Cape versus Natal. Though the conduct of the Boers towards the Natives around Natal was "infamous and would sooner or later bring upon them the just indignation of the British Government", it was not by dint of much persuasion and pressure on the part of the Colonial Governor and negrophilist agitators, such as Dr. John Philip, the L.M.S.'s staunch upholder of Native rights, and the Rev. William Shaw, the Wesleyan Superintendent at Grahamstown, that the Imperial Government agreed to the annexation of Port Natal. It was probably rather, Dr. Uys suggests, through the fear of foreign interference and the rumours of coal deposits in Natal that the Imperial Government decided to undertake the rule of Natal.

In furtherance of the policy advocated so strongly by

8 Ibid.
9 J. F. W. Shaw - Jenkins 12.10.41.
10 Uys, pp. 8-21.
Dr. Philip and carried out to a certain degree with Native Chiefs, Mosheesh in Basutoland, Waterboer in Griqualand and others, the Imperial Government made a similar treaty with Faku in 1844. Sir Peregrine Maitland represented Faku as a powerful Chief and hereditary paramount Chief of all the Kaffir tribes between Natal and the Cape Colony border.* Whether this was indeed the truth is doubtful in that time of flux, but Faku was doubtless intelligent and endowed with more than average native cunning, and he like Mosheesh, the Basuto had collected round him tribes and remnants of tribes seeking protection from the Zulus. Thus was Faku considered a worthy subject for alliance with the British Government, who, by supporting him in his possessions and aiding him in his rights, sought thereby not only to retain the friendship of a neighbour of the young Colony of Natal and keep open uninterrupted communication by land with Natal, but also to weaken Cape frontier tribes by having an ally in their rear.+

There was, too, the attempt to control and curb Boer aspirations inexpensively and to prevent their exterminating and dislocating native tribes on the borders of the Cape. With these objects Sir P. Maitland entered into a treaty of amity with Faku which recognised the latter as "Paramount Chief of the Amapondo nation .... and of the whole territory lying between the Umtata River and the Umzimkulu River." Those committing, or suspected of having committed crime were to be apprehended. Disputes incapable of peaceful settlement were to be submitted to Colonial Government mediation. Faku further promised to assist with Captains and Warriors in defence of the Colony when called upon. The British Government on their part undertook to protect the

* C.2584, No.56. enclos. 3. p.122. Memo. by Bulwer Sept. 1880.
+ C.2584, Memo. op. cit.
Chief "against all claims and pretensions on the part of British subjects" ..... and agreed to pay him an annual subsidy to the amount of £75.\(^{13}\)

It is significant that of all the treaties made with Native Chiefs during the early 'forties this one with Faku endured the longest. Indeed it was still claimed to be unannulled in 1885. \(^{14}\) This fact might reasonably be accounted for by the great influence exercised in Pondoland by the Wesleyan Missionary Society. The Rev. William Shaw and the Rev. W.B. Boyce had visited Faku in the early days when he was still living West of the Umzimvubu River near the Umzazi and they had promised to send him Missionaries. \(^{15}\) In 1838 Thomas Jenkins became missionary to Faku at Buntingville and for close on thirty years, contrary to Wesleyan Missionary organisation, until his death he continued as the Chief's Missionary, moving later to Palmerston and finally to Emundesweni, following the Chief as he changed his residence to reoccupy his old land. It was to Thomas Jenkins the Pondos owed their later prosperity, their enduring friendship with Cape and British Authorities at a time when Colonists looked on their land with covetous eyes. Faku appreciated the debt he owed his Missionary for he insisted on his moving with him as he described himself and Jenkins as the only two men in Pondoland.

Missionaries were often accused by Colonists and officials of partisanship with the Tribes with whom they resided. \(^{16}\) It was, however, scarcely surprising that the tribes


\(^{14}\) P.M.A. No. 39, 19.3.85.

\(^{15}\) Rev. S. Clark "Missionary Memories", p.47.

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14 P.M.A. No. 39, 19.3.85.
15 Rev. S. Clark "Missionary Memories", p.47.
should look to their missionaries for advice and guidance in the complicated and often incomprehensible relationships they were expected to assume with the white man whose ideas of every phase of life were so entirely different from their own. They were called upon to throw off, suddenly, the covering of barbarism and don the cloak of civilisation. The wildest Chiefs realised the advantage of having someone who could interpret to them the behests and doings of the white men in and outside their country. Many Chiefs applied for a Missionary with no intention of adopting Christianity, but wholly with the view of gaining for themselves assistance.

The centralised system of the Wesleyan Society made interference and assumption of a prominent part in tribal life almost inevitable. The Superintendent at Grahamstown received reports from all the Stations in Kaffirland. He was probably the best informed person on the Eastern border of the Cape. Therefore it is quite intelligible that Government officials and even the Governor himself should discuss Native affairs with him and ask for advice, using his Missionaries as a source of communication with far distant tribes with whom there was no Government representative. It was by means of the Mission Stations in and on the borders of Pondoland that communications between Cape and Natal were conducted. During times of war with Border tribes it was possible to hold open communications with and through friendly Pondoland.

What Dr. Philip was in the 'twenties and 'thirties at the Cape, William Shaw, Superintendent of the Wesleyan Missionary Society at Grahamstown became to a lesser degree in the 'forties and 'fifties. He was the channel through

17 J.P. W. Shaw - T. Jenkins, 3.9.45 and 23.4.50.
which complaints and grievances often reached the Governor. His Missionaries sent regular reports and with Rev. Thomas Jenkins, at any rate, these were not merely confined to mission affairs but referred to the tribe generally. Information was encouraged and though at times the Rev. Shaw might caution him to take care that he did not advise the Chief one way or another in some decision, and though Jenkins himself might carefully refuse to take part in any scheme engineered by land-grabbers of Natal or the Cape; and though he vehemently disclaims the accusation levelled at him of being a political agent, yet he nearly always contrived to advise or indicate to the Chief the path he should take and where he could not prevent Faku's taking a foolish course it very often failed in its consummation through his efforts - and Mr. Shaw's. Theophilus Shepstone thought Mr. Jenkins and his wife "had such peculiar ideas of the rights of the Pondo". So it would seem to those who sought to aggrandize themselves at Pondo expense.

Government Agents were appointed for a time. On more than one occasion Mr. Jenkins found it necessary to interfere to protect his protégé against their schemes. In 1848 H.F. Fynn was appointed British Agent to Faku. During his term of office Jenkins had much ado to preserve


20 J.P. Shaw - Jenkins 16.8.49 and 20.11.50.

21 S.P. Shepstone - G. Cato 28.7.54.

22 C.O. 1454, H.G. Smith to Secretary of State 20.4.48.
the integrity of Faku’s country. At that period Sir Harry Smith was busily extending British sovereignty over territory as far North as the Vaal and East to the Drakensberg. The friendly Chief Faku was not to be arbitrarily dispossessed of his country but Mr. Fynn was instructed by Sir H. Smith to "use his influence with Faku for him to make a voluntary offer of all his country to the British Government". This was probably to advance the "immigration scheme of the Earl of Arundel and other noblemen who were desirous of promoting immigration of these parts", and for which purpose Fynn was asked to furnish a report giving detailed information as to the quantity of unoccupied land, the character of bays, roadsteads, inlets of the sea, rivers, navigation, roads and the probable expense, whether cotton could be grown or cattle and sheep reared. The Report made by Fynn was very favourable — so much so that Jenkins, to whom it was sent for criticism, "felt he could not allow it to pass" as its name might be cited to give it added force. With all Fynn’s conclusions he disagreed. He agreed that Faku and the clans considered themselves under the protection of the Government but the four tribes mentioned for at least fourteen years past had considered Faku as their superior head and had referred their disputes to him as paramount Chief. The Rev. W. Shaw cautioned Jenkins to refrain from advising Faku.

23 C.J. Uys, pp.27,28.
24 J.P. Jenkins — W. Shaw, 15.5.49 "He presses on the necessity of its being a spontaneous act of the Chief".
25 J.P. Ibi. of Diary 15.5.49.
26 J.P. Jenkins to H.F. Fynn 7.5.49. cf. Copy Replies to Questions transmitted for Report, undated, in Jenkins’ writing.
27 J.P. Shaw — Jenkins 25.5.49 "They will take it but don’t let it be said you assisted them to it".
So convincing, however, did Fynn declare Jenkins' arguments to be that he altered his report, and reported also on the country from the Zimvubu to the Umtata and recommended it to the attention of the Government as a field for emigration. It is possible that the reverend gentlemen's agitation about the proposed Emigration Scheme was not unmixed with personal feelings as the Earl of Arundel was a zealous Roman Catholic. Mr. Shaw feared the end in view was mainly the establishing of a "mass of Irish Roman Catholics, not excluding felons and convicts."+

Natal, already seeking to extend her territory, looked on Faku's country lying adjacent to her border as a desirable direction in which to try her practice hand. A number of Bushmen living in close proximity to her annoyed farmers on the border with constant depredations. The Basas under Cita and Ncapsiyi's widow and a headman, Hans Lochenberg, were accused by Fynn of being associated with the Bushmen in their nefarious actions. He called Faku with his army to fall upon them and punish them, while he himself took Cita prisoner. Faku obeyed Fynn, perhaps not unwillingly, as the Basas were not on the friendliest terms with the Pondo's, though they were obliged to acknowledge the latter's paramounty.+

The Honourable Walter Harding, Member of the Legislative Council of Natal, then paid a visit to Pondoland.²

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*J.P.  Jenkins - Shaw - Copy, undated.
+J.P.  Shaw to Jenkins, 30.6.49.
&J.P.  Diary 1.5.49, "What will an enlightened world say to this conduct of Her Majesty's Agent?"
&J.P.  Diary, 7.5.49, 8.5.49.
I.J.P.  Diary, 1.4.50.
He came with the proposal to extend the "Natal boundary into Faku's territory". His argument was subtle. Thousands of head of cattle, and hundreds of horses had been stolen from Natal and "traced into Faku's country"; and by treaty Faku was bound to restore these cattle and horses or make compensation. But, inasmuch "as the Government knew neither Faku nor his people were implicated in these thefts, and out of friendliness they had never imposed this burden upon him. But now he (Mr. Harding) had been sent to propose a new line of boundary in order to relieve Faku of this burden". Faku, on Jenkins' advice, discussed the matter with his chief men, who were almost unanimously averse to any cession; but the Chief, on hearing that in the future "he must hold himself responsible for all the cattle so taken from Natal if he would not consent", at last agreed as far as the Umtemvuba River, despite Jenkins' warning that the responsibility still rested with him as the treaty was not altered. A hundred head of cattle was the purchase price.

This did not end the affair, for great agitation was caused shortly after by a demand for a thousand head of cattle by Fynn without explanation other than the threat of war if not complied with. Mr. Fynn was supposed to have enclosed from Faku a letter to the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal offering his country, or a large part of it, to Natal. Faku absolutely denied ever having signed any such document giving any part of his country to the Government and insisted on

* J.F. Diary, 11.4.50.
*+ J.P. Diary, 20.9.50; 2.11.50.
* J.P. Copy Jenkins to Lt.-Govr. Pine, 11.7.50.
* J.P. Diary, 28.10.50.
Jenkins' writing for him to the Lieutenant-Governor. Through the combined efforts of Jenkins and Shaw, the Governor, Sir H. Smith, was informed of the matter. He dismissed the whole affair and wrote to the Lieutenant-Governor ordering him to restore the cattle. A commission, sent to enquire into the merits of the case, left the country in Faku's possession as heretofore, and decided he was to be "considered responsible for all the territory as settled by the new boundary from the Umtamvuna upwards to the Ingeli and thence to the Kathlambo Mountains" (Drakensberg).

During the Kafir war of 1850-1851, there was little fear that the Pondo's would join with the Kafirs, although Faku had been irritated by the Government. To arouse dormant loyalty, Sir H. Smith himself wrote a stirring letter to Faku, calling upon him to collect his armies and fall upon Kleri; the promise of "thousands of cattle" was the spur used to awaken flagging energy. The war was ended without aid from the Pondo's, though they expressed their willingness to fight.

+ J.F. W. Shaw - T. Jenkins 6.12.50, and M.B. Shaw - Jenkins 18.12.50. "Sir H. Smith is heartily mortified at the whole affair ... every newspaper ... denounced the robbery in no measured terms. Mr. Pine will, I fancy, reflect before he again lends himself to such dishonourable transactions."

J.P. Diary, 6.1.51.
J.P. Diary, 13.1.51.
J.F. Sir H. Smith to Faku 27.11.51.
J.P. M.B. Shaw to Jenkins 23.12.51 and 24.12.51.
J.P. Diary, 6.12.51.
The trouble with Natal lost H.P. Fynn Government favour; besides Faku refused to deal through him after the alleged "bona fide transactions" with the Chief and the Lieutenant-Governor. Therefore his office was abolished from 1st March, 1852.

He was superceded by Mr. M.B. Shaw, a son of the Rev. William Shaw, who was appointed "British Resident with all the tribes lying between the Kei and the District of Natal." He lasted little longer than Fynn and left his residence in Pondoland in an even greater state of opprobrium. He was deeply disliked and distrusted by the Missionaries and on the borders of Pondoland. He incurred great odium by the manner in which he acted in what was known as the "Umdumbi Affair" when he himself led out an army to attack the Pondos under Damas, Faku's eldest son and Chief in West Pondoland. The Pondos were returning from a raid on the Pondomise when Shaw's men fell upon them, the Resident himself opening fire and killing two or three men.

Jenkins' honesty is patent in the part he played, writing to the Rev. Shaw and telling him of the excitement and indignation caused by his son's misdeeds and warning him that as Faku would probably present the affair to the Government he

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44 C.O.1349, No.1, Newcastle to Govr. of Cape 4.1.53.

45 J.P. M.B. Shaw—Jenkins 16.2.52 and Diary 21.4.52.

46 J.P. Rev. J.S. Thomas to Jenkins 2.8.55.

47 J.P. C. White to Jenkins 5.7.55.
(Jenkins) would have to write for him.*

As a result of Mr. Jenkins' writing for Faku to Colonel Maclean, Chief Commissioner,† Major Thomas Addison was appointed by the Governor to carry out an enquiry,‡ with the result that M.B. Shaw was removed.

Natal's attempts to wedge herself into Pondoland were made at intervals. The Honourable Walter Harding had come in 1850 and succeeded in obtaining from the Chief a grant of land between the Umzimkulu and Umtamvuna.

In 1854 there was made a more unobtrusive though none the less insidious effort, by the then rising Native Administrator, Theophilus Shepstone, who had a very clear idea as to what exactly the Maitland Treaty implied. The acknowledgement of paramount authority had not conveyed the right of proprietorship to the soil within the boundaries mentioned. Under the Treaty the right to the land had been secured to those in whom it had previously existed and in Faku was vested no power to cede or alienate any portion of the lesser tribes' and clans' territory.‡ He did not, therefore, concentrate on Faku but canvassed for a cession from the other Chiefs.† He rather pompously states that

*J.P. Jenkins - Rev. W. Shaw, 18.7.55 "Faku is resolved to have no more communication with M.B. as Government Agent".
†J.P. Jenkins - Col. Maclean, 8.8.55.
‡J.P. Maj. T. Addison - T. Jenkins, 3.11.55.
§J.P. Memo. draft in Shepstone's writing Emfundisweni, 25.3.72.
†J.P. T. Shepstone - G. Cato, 21.5.54 "If I do not succeed with Faku as long as I do with the other Chiefs ...."
as he had pledged himself "before the Government and before the world" to carry out his scheme, he is determined to succeed "or prove it is not to be done". That he considered he had succeeded is evident in his enthusiastic letter to his friend, G.C. Cato, after his return. "I have succeeded beyond my expectations, I can do pretty well what I like with the whole country. The Mouth of St. John's to the influence of the tide is placed under my control".

He was not, however, satisfied with Mr. Jenkins though he had secured his meeting with Faku. "He is not straightforward enough and he, as well as his wife, have such peculiar notions about the Pondos' and Faku's rights, that it is difficult to do anything with them in the face of their prejudices".

Events proved that though Shepstone had recognised the opposition of Jenkins and his fellow Missionaries, he had underrated its significance. Rumours of Shepstone's visit to Faku and the object thereof had reached William Shaw. He requested Jenkins to help his son "M.B." with some useful information as the Governor had directed him to report on the actual state of the case as the Government "knew nothing about the affair" and, as the "Government is very sensitive on any matter that disturbs the Native mind", he did not think "they will approve of the Native Government's doing

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53 Ibid.

54 S.P. Shepstone – G.C. Cato 28.7.54.

55 Ibid.
anything beyond the border of that Colony". 56

Jenkins' account of the affair certainly does not agree with Shepstone's, nor does it give grounds for the latter's exuberance. He had been unwilling to participate at all in the negotiations and had only agreed at the pressing request of the Chief who would not have consented to see Mr. Shepstone without his Missionary. After Faku had refused altogether to give or cede any territory, Jenkins, knowing that "there was one small part undefined in the boundary ceded to Mr. Harding", suggested to Faku the propriety on his part of giving Shepstone "a kloof or two" for the sake of having a distinct line. He saw it and consented; "but not being definite enough in his language Mr. Shepstone was of the opinion he meant all the kloofs". In the document it is stated he ceded all the waters running into the Umzimvuma. "This", explains Jenkins, "would take a narrow strip of Faku's country instead of a kloof or two". As to the Umzimvubu, Mr. Shepstone kept to what Faku said, except "a mile on each side of the river as far as the tide went". 57 Faku taking advantage of the Cape Governor's interest and anxious to stand well with that Government now denied having ceded any country, though he expressed himself quite satisfied with what he had ceded previously to Harding. 58 This later concession of which Shepstone felt so confident and

56 J.P. W. Shaw - Jenkins 28.7.54, and W. Shaw to his son 29.7.54.

57 J.P. Jenkins to W. Shaw 21.8.54.

58 Ibid.
on which he rather prematurely set his hopes was never confirmed by the High Commissioner, on whose ratification its validity depended.*

From the time of the departure of M.B. Shaw as Resident in 1855 until his death in 1866 Jenkins was virtually British Agent - the "eyes and ears", sometimes the "mouth" also, of the Government.† After 1854, the time of the Conventions, the British Government definitely repudiated interference beyond the strict borders. There was enough to do to control unruly tribes already under their rule without troubling about a friendly tribe such as the Pendas had ever proved themselves. But by 1860 the Boer States were becoming a menace to British prestige, because of their gradual absorption of Griqualand and their final ultimatum to Adam Kok to fight or trek.‡ The High Commissioner, Sir George Grey, advised a general trek to Namaqualand§ and he negotiated with Faku for a cession of land.¶ Faku granted land at the foot of the Drakensberg. Despite dissension on the part of the Griques, Sir George Grey insisted that they should only trek into their new

*G.H. Nats. 1876-77, Memo. by Shepstone, 4.9.76.
†J.P. Col. Maclean to Jenkins, 10.7.56, 22.12.56.
‡Dower "Early Annals of Kokstad", p.11.
§Part of country ceded to Harding between Umsimkulu and Ustanyana, not unoccupied but no authority. C2584, No. 56, Memo. by Bulwer, p.120.
¶Walker, p.312; Dower, p.12; J.P. Geo. Brownlow, Sec. to Lt.-Gov. to Jenkins 21.11.60, enclosing conditions on which His Excellency, the H.C. thinks it expedient that the Griques under Captain Adam Kok should occupy a certain tract of country lying between British Kaffraria and Natal.
country as British subjects. Natal considered herself very hardly treated, her interests and prior claims to the territory passed over and ignored. 

In 1861 the first mention of establishing a Customs House at the Umzimvubu was made. . . The British Authorities at the Cape and in the Colonial Office were becoming alarmed at the report of Marthinus Pretorius, President of the Transvaal, on making himself President of the Orange Free State having said: "I have one grand object in view which I cannot at present disclose." This, commercial Cape Town feared was the intention of the Republics to gain an outlet to the sea by way of Port St. John's.

The matter became more pressing in 1865, however, when hostilities broke out between the Orange Free State and the Basutos once more and Wepener annexed all the lands between the Orange and the Caledon Rivers, thereby threatening to open a corridor between the Colony and the remains of Basutoland by which the Republic could reach the sea via Pondoland at Port St. John's. Therefore Wodehouse instructed both Jenkins and Mr. A.S. White, a trader, to negotiate for the cession of Port St. John's, and as a

64 Dower, p.12.
65 Chap.II.
66 J.P. Col. Maclean to Jenkins 1.3.61. Private: "Will you be so kind as to acquaint me if Paku would agree to the Government's establishing a Custom House at the Umzimvubu?"
67 Uys, pp.39-40 and de Kiewiet, p.139.
68 Walker, p.326.
69 J.P. Wodehouse - Jenkins 4.5.65; 16.9.65; 29.1.66; 28.4.66 - 20.9.66; Wodehouse to A.S. White 18.4.66; 12.10.66.
fillip Faku's allowance was increased from £75 to £100 per annum, and Damas, Faku's eldest son, was given one of £50. "The matter of St. John's River is of much importance, that is, as to its not falling into other hands", and Jenkins was entrusted to choose the time and mode of bringing about an arrangement. Much satisfaction was expressed by Faku at his increase and the decision to give a house to Damas. Jenkins had hopes of success with regard to St. John's, though he felt it wise to wait for a favourable opportunity. The time eventually chosen to ask Faku proved inopportune, as the Natal Government had recently with great gusto and public display proclaimed Alfred County British territory, and annexed it to Natal. Pondo clans owing allegiance to Faku had been filtering over the boundary and taking up gardens. At this public demonstration Faku was startled and annoyed and not disposed to discuss any new cession, he and his people fearing "lest the territory and the subjection be the object". Jenkins did not, however, fail to mention "other parties who were wishful to get possession of the port". Mr. A.S. White, confidentially commissioned by Sir F. Wodehouse to negotiate for the cession of "as much of the territory belonging to the Pondo Chief, Faku, as

70 J.P. Wodehouse - Jenkins, 4.5.65.
71 Ibid.
73 Uys, p.45; J.P. Shepstone to Jenkins 27.12.65 and 7.1.66.
75 Ibid.
would ensure the command of the navigation and trade of the Umzimvubu River and having authority to spend £500 used the same tactics. He pointed out to them the complications which might arise in the disputes between Basutos and Boers and reminded them of the want of respect for native rights shown by the Boers when, still in occupation of Natal, they had invaded their country, and how at that time, the British had sent a force to protect them. This could not be done again, therefore it would be infinitely to the advantage of the Pondo to have "a friend like the British Government near them at the Mouth of the St. John's". Further it was explained that it was well-known how anxious the Boers were to secure a port somewhere on the coast and that immediately the present war ended steps would be taken to secure one, but if Faku had already ceded it to the British Government he would be troubled no further. Though, a few months later, Faku appeared willing to cede a smaller extent of country than originally proposed, and though the High Commissioner appeared disposed to accept the territory, negotiations lapsed. It has been suggested the annexation of Basutoland was determined by Wodehouse to prevent President Brand obtaining a path to the sea, for he, like Pretorius, was anxious for a port.

* J.P. Wodehouse - A.S. White, 18.4.66. Cf. J. Cameron to Jenkins, 6.12.65 "I am sorry either Wodehouse or the Boers should have set their minds on having the Port of the Umzimvubu".

† J.P. A.S. White to Sir P. Wodehouse, 4.7.66.

‡ J.F. Wodehouse - A.S. White, 12.10.66.

Shortly afterwards, Faku died - on 29th October, 1867, and Umquikela succeeded him.  

As Faku had taken his Great wife late in life, Umquikela, the heir, was quite a young man at the time of his father’s death and many years junior to Damas, whom Faku had made chief in Western Pondoland and as a favourite son had allowed a great degree of independence. Umquikela appeared friendly and anxious to remain on good terms with the British Government as well as maintain peaceful relations with the tribes around him.  

Perhaps Umquikela was a little wild and reckless and, maybe, had already acquired that fatal taste for strong liquor which proved his, as well as many another Pondo Chief’s, undoing.  

It required wisdom and strength to withstand the wily flatterers and evil counsellors, Native and European, who surrounded the “court”. Umquikela was young and inexperienced, easily persuaded and certainly weak.  

It was extremely unfortunate that the old and trusted friend of the tribe, the Rev. Thomas Jenkins, should survive Faku only a few months. Though his widow, Mrs. Jenkins, remained and undertook to some degree her husband’s role of adviser to the Chief and his tribe and though she has been called the “Queen of Pondoland”, she could never exert so great an influence.  

She lived for another twelve years but she must have been ageing. She and her husband had adopted and brought up two boys, Josiah, and Umhlangaza,


*J.P. Jenkins to Wodehouse, 9.12.67.  


‡J. Whiteside - "History of the Wesleyan Methodist Church of South Africa", p.253.
sons of a brother of Faku, Sitata. These two were destined to play no very laudable part in the later history of Pondoland. Umhlangaza, the elder, was sent to Lovedale, he was married by Christian rites to a Christian woman, Victoria, in whom Charles Brownlee took an interest,* and for a time held services in his house.+

Before the subject of Port St. John's was reopened, another event had occurred to annoy the Pondos. In 1872 a Commission, consisting of the Honourable William Ayliff, Captain Griffiths and Captain Grant, had been appointed to define the boundaries between Griqualand East, Natal and Pondoland and enquire into grievances of various smaller tribes who had applied to be taken under the Government. The Commission decided to take over the Pondomise, a tribe constantly at feud with the Pondos under Dumas, but agreed that the Xhobes and Amabaos were to remain within the bounds of Pondoland and acknowledge Umqikela, Paramount Chief. Nehemiah and Pingoes were already located in Nomansland. The Pondos repeatedly protested against the loss of land but with no avail.

The matter of obtaining Port St. John's and the establishment of a Customs house was reopened by the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal who complained of goods, especially spirits and guns, entering the river and avoiding Custom

* J.P. Brownlee - Mrs. Jenkins, 1874.

+ Notes by S. Clarke in manuscript "Stories of Hargreaves," Wesleyan Methodist Archives, Cape Town.

+Walker, p.357.

duties. This entailed a serious loss of revenue both to
the Cape and Natal, as the goods, though paying no
duty, were often consumed in one colony or the other.
Both the Governor of the Cape, Sir Henry Barkly, and his
advisers were disposed "to co-operate so far with the Natal
Government". To Theophilus Shepstone was assigned the
task of negotiating with Umquikela for the cession;* but
as he shortly after left for England the matter was in abey-
ance until Sir H. Barkly himself should attempt a settlement
with the Pondo Chief on his tour of Kaffraria and Natal.†
He, however, was met with a firm though courteous refusal,
though he wrote to Umquikela explaining his wishes.‡ In
1876 Mrs. Jenkins was sounded on the subject. In spite of
the Government's being disposed to act liberally in the way
of an annual consideration for the cession, Mrs. Jenkins
returned the discouraging opinion that the "time was most
insuspicious ..., because of the excitement existing on the
boundary question."II Barkly subsequently came to the

*G.H. 31/12, p.246. Barkly to Kimberley, 24.12.73, and
G.H. 9/1, Memo. by C. Brownlee, 26.11.73, and Brownlee to
Barkly (Private), 13.5.74.
+G.H. 31/13, p.250-253. Barkly to Carnarvon, 5.7.76, and
G.H. 9/1, Brownlee - Barkly, 13.5.74 note by Barkly.
‡G.H. 9/1, Brownlee - Barkly private 3.8.
¶G.H. 31/13, pp.250-253, Barkly to Carnarvon, 5.7.76.
I J.F. Irrobert to Mrs. Jenkins, 10.1.76.
II J.F. Draft in Mrs. Jenkins' hand, undated.
conclusion after inquiries as to the actual extent of trade and the facilities for introducing goods that it had been overrated and as the commercial capabilities were "not inspiring his impression was that it was not worth while risking a quarrel with a tribe which was not one of the most warlike, especially as the course of events in the Transkei was such as to induce the Government to remain on as friendly terms as possible with the Pondo Chief". Besides he entertained the optimistic view that the Pondos would of their own accord come under British rule in a few years without pursuing an aggressive policy. Lord Carnarvon and Shepstone, in London at the time, were in entire agreement.

In the thirty years which had passed since the Maitland Treaty, the Pondo Chief had suffered much curtailment of land and restriction of his paramountcy. There too had the policy of "squeeze", so characteristic of the colonial policy, generally been practised. Probably the Pondos had multiplied to a greater degree than any other Native tribe as they alone had remained at peace apart from minor inter-tribal disturbances. Of course their numbers were periodically diminished by the constant "smellings out" which were rife in all branches of the tribe.

Natal had encroached on the Northern Border, pushing the Pondo boundary to the Umzimvuna. Adam Kok had been established on the West along the foot of the Drakensberg. Pandomise and Basas had been taken over in 1873 and 1876 respectively. Repeated efforts had been made to obtain

a G.H. 31/12, p.250-253. Barkly to Carnarvon, 5.7.76.

b G.H. Nata, '76-'77, Carnarvon - Sir H. Bulwer, 20.3.76, and Memo. by Shepstone, 4.9.76.

possession of the Mouth of the St. John's.

The Cape, after receiving Responsible Government with the doubtful addition of Basutoland, was cautious of incurring new responsibilities and received Orpen's earnest pleas for annexation of all the territories between the Cape and Natal with indifference. At the same time there were signs that the Cape realised her increasing need to undertake these responsibilities, for Magistrates had been sent to districts in Griqualand East and in various districts of Tembuland.*

Pondoland, with the exception of Emigrant Tembuland and Bomvana-Galekaland, was the only Native territory in which there resided no official British Agent. It was inconceivable that her independence should long remain unrestricted.

*Walker, p.373.
In 1878 there was a decided change in the relationships between Pondos and British Authorities at the Cape. Until 1877 communications had been carried on in an amiable tone of mutual friendship and trust, the treaty of 1844 remaining as the basis of intercourse. Then former courtesy and consideration gave place to brusqueness and contumely, threats and accusations. The Cape had found it necessary to extend her frontiers and increase her responsibilities during the 'seventies.' What Anthony Trollope wrote of Krelli's country was equally applicable to Pondoland. "Can it be well," he asks, "that a corner should be kept for independent kaffirs; that a single tribe may entertain dreams of independence and hostility? Of what real service can it be to leave to the

"Walker, p.373."
unopened dominion of kaffir inhabits a tract of 16,000 square miles when we have absorbed from the Natives a territory larger than all British India?" Though the Pondos were a very much less aggressive people than the Coalekas they were the most numerous of all the Transkeian Tribes and remained the one independent tribe between Cape and Natal. Thus it almost appears in 1876, it was really immaterial how far Pondoland might deserve the appellation of a danger zone was where disloyalty, treachery and rebellion brewed. With the arrival of Sir Bartle Frere as High Commissioner the Pondos' fate was sealed. His was the reversal policy employed with regard to Pondoland.

He came from India with definite ideas of discipline and administration, as the chosen instrument of Lord Carnarvon to bring into being the latter's cherished scheme of a confederation of South African Colonies and States; for only by such means could Britain unburden herself of oppressive responsibility. It has been said of Frere that he was one of the very few who realised to the full British responsibility, "true Imperialism - a British South Africa for the British nation as opposed to mere Colonial expansion on narrow and sordid lines".

*Trollope, p.296. Cf. J.P. Wm. Ayliff to Mrs. Jenkins, 10.6.78 "manifest Government must assume control over this as well as other parts of Kaffraria".

+Trollope, p.308 "Table of Estimated Population of Transkeian Territory":
  Pondos 200,000,
  Pondoiss 12,000,
  Bovanas (Mohl) 15,000,
  Gakekas (Kolli) 55,000,
  Griqua E. (A. Kok & Bacas) 40,000.

#Hofmeyr, p.146.

#Cf. de Kiewiet, p.296.

Scarcely had he taken up the reins than a great conflagration overtook the Government and the country. It seemed, therefore, desirable that he should with as much expedition as possible give effect to what he believed was the intentions of Her Majesty's Government, that "there should be but one native policy in South Africa, and that should be the policy under which Her Majesty's native subjects everywhere can live in most safety and enjoy to the utmost the benefits of a strong, benevolent and just rule".

He was in agreement with those who contended that it would be necessary sooner or later to extend the British dominions and Protection, in some form or other over all the tribes between the Orange River and Lake Ngami and between the sea and the present Transvaal border.

The Boer Republics had to be placated and enticed to ally themselves with the Cape and Natal. The Transvaal's opposition Sir. Theophilus Shepstone was attempting to overcome and it was hoped the Orange Free State would fall into line more quietly. It was not, however, only necessary to break down barriers within South Africa but an impenetrable wall must fence in the newly amalgamated states against the dangers of foreign infiltration or annexation. Insecurity lay in the long, unproclaimed coasts of South West and South East Africa, where the Pondo coastline and the seaward territory from Natal to Delagoa

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*1, C.2220, No.88. Memo by Frere 18.9.78. 2. Cf. Walker, p.360 "Confederation was to be approached primarily along the line of seeking a native policy on a South African scale".

Bay offered themselves invitingly to would-be adventurers. "You must be master, as representing the sole sovereign power, up to the Portuguese frontier on both East and West Coasts", Frere wrote to Imperial Authorities. What was "essential was that no European or American power should establish itself between us and them" (Portuguese). Had Frere been able to follow his bent there would have been no German annexation of Angra Pequena. As it was after Walfisch Bay was proclaimed British territory negotiations were broken off.*

The opposition of the Boer Republics was not the only obstacle raised by the white communities to federation in South Africa. The Cape Colony, in its still newly acquired status of a Responsible Government Colony, was extremely self-conscious and jealous of any infringement of her rights. Thus any move or policy advocated by the Imperial Government was immediately looked on with suspicion and disapproval.† Her sister colony of Natal was despised and looked upon with contempt, not unmixed with jealousy. This attitude was heartily reciprocated by Natal, who fearing inferiority took every opportunity to assert herself. Commercial rivalry was commencing to embitter relations between the Colonies still further.‡ Natal, on more points than one differed almost proudly from the Cape. Sir Henry Bulwer did not share Frere's views as to the inevitability of the clash between the British and the Zulus whose attitude Frere, from the first, considered menacing and threatening to the peace of Natal and to the newly-annexed Transvaal.¶ This state he,

*Worsfold - "Frere", p.65.
‡van der Poel, p.7.
¶Walker, p.377.
unconsciously, did a great deal to foster and thus precipitated events. Nor did Natal Officials and Bulwer agree as to the hostile and surly bearing of the Pondos and their Chief Umquikela.+

Frere himself was quite convinced that the Kaffir war into which he was thrust was but a branch of a general Native rising of which Cetywayo was the instigator. Though there is no actual proof that this was the case, there certainly were some who saw in the communications between Native Chiefs indications of a general Black alliance against their white neighbours and rulers. Charles Brownlee gave credence to this view. In 1877 he reported that Cetywayo had sent a deputation with "a view of establishing friendly relations with the Pondos", which caused rumours among the Gaikas and Goalakas that Pondos and Zulus would assist them in a war against the British and which induced them to resort to war in 1877.1

Certainly the general hostility which followed gave support to this view. Close on the heels of the Goalaka war and the Gaika rebellion followed a rebellion in Griqualand East which the Pondos were said to have aided and abetted. The Basutos were seething, prepared once more to plunge into warfare. The Zulus assumed an

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2. S.P.P. Bulwer to Shepstone 21.11.77 and 10.5.78.
7. U. Brownlee "Reminiscences", p.118.
overbearing and warlike demeanour. There was trouble in the Transvaal with Seccosani who was not yet subdued. It only required the Pondos to assume a hostile and unfriendly attitude; which apparently they did. Whether or not their actions had any connection with the general disturbances, the rumours which passed for facts appeared incriminating enough. In March 1877 ten men committed for murder in East Griqualand fled to Pondoland. Their surrender, according to the Agreement of 1844, was demanded by Captain Blyth, Chief Magistrate, in East Griqualand, but Umquikela disregarded the request.*

During the Ccaleka war Kreli and some others were said to have fled across the Umtata and taken refuge in Umquikela's country. The Resident Magistrate of Alfred Country quite discredited the report. "The condition of Pondoland this side of the St. John's is one of absolute tranquility; there is no excitement regarding wars or rumours of wars elsewhere. Their disposition to England remains as always one of friendly feeling, not forgetful of aid received when Chaka swept the country."+ Still more culpable to all appearances was the part played by the Pondos in the Griqua rebellion. Captain Blyth in a letter to Mrs. Jenkins quoted a communication, written by Adam Muis, one of the ringleaders, who had escaped from Prison in Kokstad. This letter of Adam Muis, written from Mhlangaza's kraal, had been intercepted.


It breathed out threats and imprecations and
Slyth wished Umquikela to know that Adam Muis was still in
his country hatching schemes though he had promised to ex-
pel him.* Umquikela was induced to write to Captain Blyth
saying he was sending Adam Muis back.† But the party of
armed Pondos who conveyed Adam Muis to Griqualand East were
joined, either by accident or design, by a band of rebel
Griquas under Smith Pommer. Not having anyone in authority,
one Pondo returned to ask Mrs. Jenkins' advice as to how to
proceed. As it was too far to go to Umquikela, she sent
Josiah Jenkins to take charge of the party and wait until
Captain Blyth should come and arrest Adam Muis. The Mag-
istrate, however, sent a verbal message that unless the
rebel Adam Muis were brought to Kokstad and handed over
Umquikela would have the blame.‡ The Pondos were afraid to go on
prisoner with their. Thus when the rebels were attacked under Smith
Pommer, a body of armed Pondos came out of their Camp.‡
But Mrs. Jenkins "positively denied" that the Chief and
Tribe had anything to do with the rebellion, but she wished
to know if the Government were going to declare war against
the Pondos. I

Apropos of a somewhat similar situation later at
St. John's River Mouth, the Griqua affair had a rather

*J.P. Capt. Blyth - Mrs. Jenkins, 31.3.78.
†J.P. M. Blyth - Mrs. Jenkins, 12.4.78.
‡J.P. Drafts of letters in Mrs. Jenkins' writing to
Ayliff(?) Brownlee(?) undated.
‡J.P. M. Blyth - Mrs. Jenkins, 18.4.78.
I J.P. Draft in Mrs. Jenkins' writing undated.
interesting outcome. Two hundred Griqua prisoners were sent to Cape Town. Their trial caused great embarrassment for inevitably the question arose, "Were they after all British subjects?" If they were Rebels let them be brought to trial. What court had jurisdiction? Were these people to be confined for ever or were they to wait till an Annexation Bill could be passed through the approaching Session of Parliament. The whole problem bristled with unanswerable questions. The result was that the court declared the Government had no legal right to detain these men a single day. British dealings with these people were a series of slanders showing weakness and vacillation. When a new location on British Territory had been found for them the condition of their removal was to be that they consented to become British subjects under a British Magistrate, but none appeared and they had had to rule themselves — until the death of Adam Kok in 1876, when Captain Blyth was appointed as Magistrate to the Griquas, and British Agent to the Pondos. His position from the beginning was difficult, as the Griquas accepted him only on sufferance.+

The court finding raised another point. If the Griquas were not British subjects then the Cape Authorities had no case against Umquikela for omitting to give up the Griqua murderers who had taken refuge in his country, as the clause in his treaty referred only to British subjects. Neither could they be accused of harbouring the rebel Adam Muis, nor later of helping the rebels, for automatically these people ceased to be rebels.


* N.A. 30. No. 78. Blyth to S.N.A., 2.7.78.

These charges against the Pondos had been serious enough and they had failed to clear themselves to the entire satisfaction of the Cape officials and the High Commissioner. In addition to these accusations it was said Umquikela had been entertaining Zulu emissaries for some time without having communicated the fact to the Government. Umquikela's explanation that the object of their visit was merely to encourage a friendly interest between the Pondos and the Zulu people and to beg for cattle, catskins and English dogs was scarcely calculated to pacify an irate Magistrate or Secretary for Native Affairs, who were already prejudiced and angered by Umquikela's refusal to give up the murderers, because justice had not been done to one, Bell, a British subject who had murdered a Pondo and had been handed over to justice.

In an impassioned, almost prophetic letter, Mrs. Jenkins wrote to Umquikela pleading with him in the name of his father, Faku, and his missionary, Marwawya (Mrs. Jenkins' native name), to give up the men, and warning him what it would mean to break friendship with the Government, the destruction of his tribe, the taking of his land and the recognition of every chief such as "Jojo, and the Imizizi Siroya ... who wished to be independent of the Pondos".

Perhaps with proper management Umquikela would have given up the fugitives in the first instance. Such

*S.F.P. Letter Book, Shapstone - Frere, 8.10.77, and
J. Brownlee "Reminiscences", p.149, to Umquikela, 25.10.77.
†J.F. Umquikela to Elyth, 15.11.77.
‡J.F. Brownlee to Mrs. Jenkins, 25.10.77.
§J.F. Mrs. Jenkins to Umquikela, 30.10.77.

at any rate was the opinion of Natal officials, supported by Mrs. Jenkins. Captain Blyth was censured by Lord Carnarvon because his letter was not "as forbearing and considerate in its tone and language as it should have been, having regard to the relations which have subsisted and which it is desirable to maintain with the Amapondo". * Blyth defended himself after the above censure had appeared in the Natal press on the grounds that he had acted on instructions from Secretary for Native Affairs. + But the fact remains he had made himself very unpopular both with the Chief and the people, partly because of his brusque and tactless way of making his demands and also because of his having at a meeting insulted Umqukelwa before his indunas. † Captain Blyth may have been a splendid soldier but therein lay the fault. He attacked matters in too military a spirit - he was a bad diplomat and a poor tactician. ‡ Because of the latter's unpopularity, Major Elliot, Chief Magistrate of Tembuland, was appointed to assist Blyth and take his place as intermediary between the Pondo Chief and the Government. 1

Whatever the issue Frere had determined to enfeeble Pondo land. Probably he intended annexation for he confidentially asked the advice of Sir Henry Bulwer,

‡G.H. 2220, No.70. Blyth's defence.
‡Dower "Early Annals of Kokstad, p.90.
‡G.H. 32/2 p.112-115. Frere to Sec. of State Confid. 22.5.78.
Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, as to the best time and mode for calling Umquikela to account for his omissions and for any information with regard to St. John's and the possibility of landing troops there. He anticipated little trouble as the "Pondos had never ranked high as warriors"; in addition to which he had heard several minor chiefs were not likely to resist force. His hands, however, were tied by Garnarvon's instructions absolutely forbidding any extension of power or jurisdiction of the Cape Colony over Pondoland. Therefore he contented himself with subjecting Pondoland and bringing it into "subordinate co-operation with the British Government as a protected state" - merely in fact reiterating the 1844 Treaty. He was specially anxious to weaken the Pondos, convinced as he was of the coming conflict with the Zulus. He felt with their evacuation the rear would be secured.7

Frere's object was, as Dr. Leyds describes the later British settlement of Zululand, to "set one tribe against the other - and by division rule without the appearance of responsibility for consequences"." Thus the Paramount Chief Umquikela was lowered in the eyes of his people, deprived of any real power in his own country, the heritage of his fathers. He was deposed from the Paramountcy; his subsidy was discontinued; minor chiefs were declared by the High Commissioner to

7G.H. Nats. 1876-77 Confidential Frere - Bulwer 18.11.77.
8G.H. 1/26 No.4. Carnarvon- Frere 3.1.78.
9C.2220 No.59 Freze to Hicks Beach 3.9.79. "I trust the measures will lead to the solution of the long pending Pondo difficulty and in any complication arising with the Zulus on the Eastern frontier of Natal that there won't be a power of dissatisfaction among the Pondos to seriously embarrass Her Majesty's forces in Natal by any offensive operations in the rear".

#Leyds "The Transvaal Surrounded" p.21.
be released from their allegiance to Umquikela and were encouraged to enter into direct relationship with the British Authorities.* Not only were they encouraged but they were actually invited and Blyth went so far as to ask the Resident Magistrate of Alfred to help in detaching chiefs from Umquikela.†

All the country lying to the South of the St. John's River was taken away from the authority of Umquikela and Nqwiliso (nephew of Umquikela and son of Damas), Chief of that part - Western Pondoland, was recognised as independent as was too, Jojo, Chief of the Amaresibe, a tribe numbering about 700 fighting men and living on the Pondo-Griqua border on land extending from the Rode to the Umtemvuna River.‡ The Jojo Chief, and his people were taken over and placed under the Griqualand East Magistracy. The Hlubi Chief, William Nato, ruling over a tribe of 5000 in the Rode was also received as a British subject. A British Resident was appointed in Eastern Pondoland, one John Oxley Oxland, a former missionary of the L.M.S. and Major Elliot was placed as Resident in Western Pondoland.§

Frere accomplished, somewhat arbitrarily, what had been mooted at intervals without result for more than 20 years - the acquisition of St. John's River Mouth. He sent an ultimatum on the 30th May, 1878: "In consideration for the breach

*C.2584 No.56. ancol.3 pp.122-132 Bulwer Memo. on Pondo disturbances.
†G.H. Nats. 1878 Confidential R.M. Alfred - Col. Sec. 5.7.78.
‡N.A.38. No.98. Blyth - J.N.A. 22.7.78.
§C.2586. No.2 ancol.2. pp.2-11 Memo on Pondo Affairs by H.E.R. Bright, W.S.N.A. 15.4.8C.
of the Treaty he (Umquikela) must agree to accede to the British Government all right to levy customs and control in any way the navigation of St. John's River ... and all sovereign rights whatever to the waters of the Umzimvubu and give to the British Government all land which may be required for the purpose of trade or land which may be paid for at a fair valuation." He was further required to give a right of way and a wagon road from both sides of the river to the main road from the Cape Colony to Natal. A British Resident was to be informed of all envoys and messengers sent from other chiefs, people or nations outside Pondoland. Because Umquikela had not answered by 6th July, 1878, by order of the Government he was no longer acknowledged Paramount (16th July). Sir Evelyn Wood with a column was on his way to Natal via Umtata. The Government declined to use force on Pondoland but Umquikela, fearing invasion, offered 1,000 head of cattle in lieu of the surrender of the Umzimvubu Port, (5th August) which was, of course, rejected.*

In a proclamation issued on 11th September, 1878, announcing the annexation of the St. John’s River Mouth, "British sovereignty over the port and tidal estuary of the St. John's River" was formally declared to be vested solely henceforth in Her Majesty's Government by Colonel Theiger (later Lord Chelmsford) who took formal possession.†

Previous to this, in July, arrangements had been made with Ngwiliso who had agreed to sell land at St. John's

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* C.2586 Memo. by Bright op.cit.
† C.2252 No.6. Frere to Hicks Beach 26.12.78 enclosing proclamation.
River Mouth where a Magistrate's office and Customs House could be erected. Land to the amount of 3,500 acres, carefully selected and marked out was purchased for £1,000 and paid for by the Secretary for Native Affairs. In such manner was the subjection of Pondoland effected. As Frere had sown the dragon's teeth so was later the Cape to reap the harvest of giants. By weakening the Paramount Chief he increased the difficulties and impotence of Umquikela. The growth of anarchy was stimulated. He repudiated the only authority in Pondoland, frail though it might be, but gave no other more stable.

By his autocratic actions he had thrown down the gauntlet which Natal was not slow in picking up. Throughout the year whilst Pondo affairs were being weighed, he had studiously ignored Natal's advice. In answer to Frere's inquiries with regard to assistance in the event of hostilities with Umquikela, officials and Governor had agreed in the view that the "Amapondo had never yet shown themselves otherwise than friendly to the English .... and it was very much doubted if there would be any disposition on the part of the present Paramount Chief to act differently unless it should arise from fear of the country's being annexed or his independence being lost".

As was to be expected, Mrs. Jenkins vigorously defended her protégés and watched with dismayed alarm the

*C.2586 No.2. encl.2. Memo by Bright 15.4.80.

+Worsfold "Frere" p.103, quoting Beach to Frere 2.10.78 ... I wish it had been possible for you to have discussed it privately with Sir Henry Bulwer before taking action".

encroachments on their territory. She impressively indicts the Cape Government: "Ever since Natal became a Colony, over thirty years ago, the Pondos have been on the border and they have lived in peace; no police or soldiers were required to guard it. But no sooner does the Cape Government take over Griqualand and Captain Blyth is placed at the head of affairs than there is always something wrong that the Chief says or does." Because of her views and her defense of Josiah Jenkins and the Pondos generally in the Griqua rebellion, Frere accused her rather unjustly of supporting Umquikela in his non-compliance with Captain Blyth's demands. The support of Umquikela and belief in the harmlessness of his actions came to be known as the "Natal" view in contradistinction to the "Cape" or "official" view.

The establishment of a Customs House at St. John's River Mouth merely served to foster the already growing commercial rivalry between the two maritime colonies as evidenced in their separate efforts to extend their railways to reach the flourishing Diamond Fields. There was the added danger that Port St. John's might become a rival of Durban - it being the only port between East London and Durban. The increasing hinterland of British Kaffraria and Griqualand East held out tempting possibilities for would-be traders. Though opinions as to its utility and potentialities differed, yet time and

*J.P. Extract undated in Mrs. Jenkins' writing.

+G.H. H. Nats. 1876-77. Frere to Bulwer Confd. 16.11.77.

++C.2584 No.56. enclos. despatches by Frere 31.10.79 and Bulwer 24.1.80 pp.117, 120.

*van der Poel, p.7.
enroachments on their territory. She impressively indicts the Cape Government: "Ever since Natal became a Colony, over thirty years ago, the Ponds have been on the border and they have lived in peace; no police or soldiers were required to guard it. But no sooner does the Cape Government take over Griqualand and Captain Blyth is placed at the head of affairs than there is always something wrong that the Chief says or does." Because of her views and her defence of Josiah Jenkins and the Ponds generally in the Griqua rebellion, Frere accused her rather unjustly of supporting Umquikela in his non-compliance with Captain Blyth's demands. The support of Umquikela and belief in the harmlessness of his actions came to be known as the "Natal" view in contradistinction to the "Cape" or "official" view.

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+G.H. Nats. 1876-'77. Frere to Bulwer Confid. 18.11.77.

†S.C. 2584 No.56. enclos. despatches by Frere 31.10.79 and Bulwer 24.1.80 pp.117, 120.

‡van der Poel, p.7.
Perhaps expenditure would show. Now in 1878 the separation between the two colonies had advanced so far that there was no mention of combined action at St. John's River nor division of custom duties as in 1874. This was keenly felt by Natal whose traders had almost exclusive possession in Pondoland and had in fact commenced and developed the trade in that country.

Commercial rivalry was not the only point in Natal's armour pierced by the "unwarranted and unjustifiable" policy of the High Commissioner. For almost as long as her existence as a colony she had been trying, largely under the auspices of Shepstone, to obtain for herself a "safety valve" in the form of more land in which her colonists and teeming hordes of natives could expand. Thus Shepstone had expressed the object of his negotiations with Faku and the subordinate chiefs in 1854, as a method of affording "the large native population of Natal a means of peaceful removal from the Colony." He had arranged to settle 50,000 Natal Natives under his absolute authority. He was "desirous also of obtaining absolute control of the Port of St. John's and a right of way to it through the Pondo people." Though he had succeeded fully

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Ibid.
G.H. Nats. 1876 - '77 Confidential Mem. by Shepstone London 4.9.76, on Despatch from Bulwer 19.7.76 and Barkly 5.7.76 - "on acquisition of St. John's River."
S.P.P. Shepstone - Cato 9.5.54. "I have had lots of applications from the Chiefs about going but I find it necessary to be cautious in my answers because I am anxious to avoid a rush."
Ibid.
in these objects, Sir George Grey, the High Commissioner,

opposed the removal of Natal Natives in that direction,* and

"criticised the idea of allowing to be surrendered to one man

a territory of three and a half million acres to be governed

by him as an independent kingdom".† The opportunity of

acquiring Port St. John's willingly from the Pondos was lost.

In 1861, at the removal of the Griquas from Griqua-

land West to Namaqualand, comprising the country lying under

the Drakensberg between the headwaters of the Umzimkulu and

Umtata Rivers, negotiated for by the Government and ceded by

Faku,‡ Natal again tried to revive her claim to the grant

made by Faku in 1850. The Imperial Government had already

admitted the validity of Natal's claim and decreed that the

territory had to be apportioned with "due regard to the in-
terests of Natal".¶ The High Commissioner, Sir Philip

Wodehouse, however, decided against Natal.। Sir Walter

Currie had been sent up as Commissioner to the Cape to en-

davour to arrange the boundary between Natal and Adam Kok,‡

but had found it almost impossible to come to any amicable

arrangement with the Natal Commissioners who, of course,

insisted Natal had a right to almost the whole country given

to Kok. Therefore Sir Walter Currie, in agreement with the

‡Memo. op.cit.

¶Thesis. "Natal and Annexation of Basutoland 1865 - 1870"


।Basutoland Records ibid - "No alternative but make room for

Adam Kok at expense of Natal" because of the presence of

Nehemiah Moshash between the Umzimkulu and Umtamvuna Rivers -
since 1859.

।J.P. Currie to Jenkins, 25.1.62.
High Commissioner, opined the Government should "simply do what is right and ask no further questions," which was what Woodhouse did do and secured to Adam Kok two-thirds of Namaland comprising the "best pasturage and arable land in South Africa." Inspired by Shepstone, Lieutenant-Governor Scott protested vehemently and the Natal Legislative Council ... suggested annexing Adam Kok's territory and people to Natal.

But owing to an unexpected move on the part of Molapo, a son of Mosesh, whose land adjoined Natal, the latter became distinctly alarmed. The Basuto Chief made friendly overtures to the Free State and Natal realised, if he, unable to stand the strain of war, should surrender his territory to the Free State, then the Boers would be within easy distance of the maritime portion of Namaland which Natal had declined to accept", therefore she hastily decided to grasp at the crumb rather than lose all. Shepstone set out with a military escort and with much eclat and demonstrativeness proclaimed Alfred Country as annexed to Natal.

From 1866 Natal turned her eyes upon a more lucrative, larger and more ambitious sphere wherein she might achieve political prestige, pecuniary gain and land on which to settle White and Black. The already overcrowded condition of Basutoland was not considered. Achieving a complete political somersault she turned from agreement with the Free State in its troubles with the Basuto to entire sympathy with the latter in their hardships imposed by the former.

*J.P. Currie to Jenkins 1.4.62.

*Uys, p.44.

Weared of the so-called war with the Free State
Moshesh, his sons and Basuto Chieftains had made repeated
requests for annexation of their country by Britain. * Though
Wodehouse was anxious for its accomplishment, realising that,
in fact, it was essential for the establishment of tranquility,
the proposition was regarded with "extreme aversion" by the
Home Authorities. † Therefore Wodehouse could not afford to
encourage the Basuto Chiefs' pleadings. Whereupon, perceiv-
ing the apparent indifference of the High Commissioner, Moshesh
turned to Natal and addressed his later requests almost ex-
clusively to her, ‡ sending repeated messages and deputations
expressing the Basutos' willingness to surrender their inde-
pendence and to be governed as the Natal Natives. Shepstone
had no hesitation in recommending the incorporation of Basuto-
land on the "grounds that it was the centre of all native
political agitation ... and its control would place in the
hands of Natal the key of all South African politics, so far
as natives were concerned." † At the same time Natal was
unable to give any more definite answer than the High Commiss-
ioner and therefore maintained an apparently unsympathetic
silence, though public opinion was unanimous in desiring the
annexation. ‡

* Thesis "Natal and the Annexation of Basutoland 1865-1870"
p.38. J.P. Wodehouse to Jenkins 29.1.66.

29.12.65. G.H. 80/35.

‡ J.P. Wodehouse - Jenkins 28.4.66.

G.H. L.B. 63 p.244, Moshesh to S.N.A. 15.7.66.
de Kiewiet p.203.

† G. Lagden p.409 quoted Memo. by Shepstones 4.9.66.

‡ Thesis op.cit. p.48-49.
In January 1868 there came a surprise in the form of a despatch from the Secretary of State acknowledging the pertinent circumstances which pointed to the necessity for actual recognition of the Basutos as British subjects for which the most obvious arrangement would be to annex them to Natal.

Such would be in accordance with the requests of Moshesh. "Permission was accordingly granted Wodehouse ... to treat with Moshesh with a view to his recognition as a British subject and the incorporation of his country with the Colony of Natal."

On receipt of this news Shepstone wrote jubilantly to his son, Henrique, "You will see by the papers Basutoland is to be annexed to Natal. Sir P. Wodehouse goes there next month to arrange the incorporation and Mr. Keate and I go up to meet him and there receive our territory and our people". His joy was premature for whilst on his way to effect the transaction Wodehouse received letters, one from a Rev. Daniel, a Wesleyan Missionary in the Wittenbergen Reserve, and one purporting to be from Moshesh, both of which expressed disagreement with the idea of annexation to Natal and as "opposed to the wishes of every Mosuto" - besides being, geographically, politically and commercially undesirable. Moshesh prayed that his country should be placed under the High Commission rather than annexed to the Cape. This suggestion Wodehouse adopted recognising Basutoland as a Native Reserve, much to Keate's and Shepstone's chagrin on their arrival.


S.P.F. Shepstone - Henrique 8.2.68.


‡"When asked by Mr. Keate what and who had made him change his mind Moshesh simply denied having expressed such a wish" S.P.F. Shepstone's Basutoland Journal 22.4.68.
In spite of a reprimand by the Secretary of State to Wodehouse for his unauthorised action, the settlement was allowed to stand "until more fitted for union with one or other of the Colonies in South Africa".* A loophole was thus left and in 1870 fluttering hopes again rose in the breasts of Shepstone and Keate when the final settlement of Basutoland was still in the air, and the Chief Tsakelo and Daumas, the French Missionary, returned with the "wonderful news that there was to be no more High Commissioners and the whole territory between the Cape and Natal including Basutoland is to be annexed to Natal."+ Basutoland was, however, formally annexed to the Cape in 1871.\(^ \text{3} \)

Baulked to the South and West, Shepstone at last turned his eyes northward to Zululand to a disputed strip of country lying between the Zulus and the Transvaal and of which Cetywayo expressed himself anxious that the Natal Government should take possession, and that it should be a sort of reserved area for colonial Natives.\(^ \text{4} \) Shepstone, at the time of his installation of Cetywayo had every hope of acquiring this outlet for the Natal Native population to the North which, in a memorandum in 1876, he regretted he had not attempted earlier to obtain.\(^ \text{5} \) But annexation became more and more fraught with difficulty in that direction and with Shepstone's attention focused on the Transvaal nothing further was gained.

Independent Pondoland remained, a tempting prize to Natal still seeking a "safety valve", till Freze firmly closed egress thereto by his reversal policy.

* G. Laqden, p.441.
+ S.P.P. Shepstone to his son Henrique 16.8.70. C.O. 45/445
  Sir P. Wodehouse to Earl Granville 2.7.69 and Minute by Sir F. Rogers 8.9.69.
\(^ \text{3} \) Eybers p.61.
\(^ \text{4} \) Uys, p.80. quote Shepstone to his son 12.12.72.
\(^ \text{5} \) U.H. Natal, 1878 Memo. Shepstone 4.9.76.
CHAPTER III.

CONFUSION IN PONDOLAND, 1878 - 1885.

The difficulties, implications and omissions in Sir Bartle Frere's arbitrary treatment of the Pondos were clearly apparent in the years following 1878. Instead, as formerly, of being the most inoffensive, docile and least warlike tribe in contact with the Cape, they became dissatisfied, grumbling and at times openly defiant, aggressive and threatening. The reason for this attitude was not far to seek, for it lay largely at the door of the British rulers whose policy was unsettled and vacillating in the extreme.

Frere had, undoubtedly, proved to his own satisfaction and, apparently, to that of the Imperial Government, always so chary of any extension of territory, that none had been made and that what he had enacted in Pondoland was inevitable in
view of the generally disturbed state and suspicious actions of the Paramount Chief whom he represented as incapable of governing his tribe. The Secretary of State, Sir Michael Hicks Beach, on receipt of the Pondoland despatches, wrote approving of the measures taken and feeling satisfied that the Chief Umquikela had been afforded "every opportunity for making amends for the non-observation of the treaty of 1844" and that the state of Pondoland was such as to render the "interposition of the British Government absolutely necessary". He approved the immediate occupation of the Mouth of St. John's River and the arrangement with the Chief, Nqwiliso for the free navigation of the river.

The Cape established a Customs House at the St. John's River Mouth and appointed H.M. Edye to act as Resident Magistrate and sub-collector of Customs. But no immediate action was taken to define the position of the Fort or legalise its relationship. Here, as in Griqualand East, existed an anomalous situation. The Fort had been taken under British protection and yet the Cape had no legal sanction.

Similar uncertainty existed in Xesibeland. A Resident Magistrate had been appointed to Mt. Ayliff under the Chief Magistrate of Griqualand East. The Amaxesibe were recognised as British Subjects but so anxious were the Cape Ministers to avoid collisions with the Pondos that might lead to armed conflict that when raids and counter-raids between Xesibe and Pondos took place, as was inevitable they should, local Magistrates were at a loss to know how to act as they had strict instructions to avoid invading Pondo territory.

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*G.H. 1/28, No.30. Hicks Beach to Freer 7.10.78. enclos. copy from War Office 23.10.78 approving proceeding in occupation of the left bank of St. John's River.

+C.O. 3622. Govt. Notice No.843 of 1.10.78.

If the Pondos took advantage of such spineless "protection" of their enemies it was scarcely to be wondered at. Fresh complications arose every time a collision occurred, * though the Government maintained a much larger force in Mount Ayliff than in any other district between the Kei and Natal. † Instead of acting with decision and firmness in establishing the position they had determined on, whether rightly or wrongly, the Cape Government showed hesitation and inaction, leaving difficulties to magnify, or as they hoped, to diminish in the "natural efflux of time".

Sir Bartle Frere's contention that his action in Pondoland created no new policy might have satisfied the Secretary of State who was not over anxious to inquire into the merits of actions as they affected the Natives adversely or otherwise, being more concerned with the military expenditure incurred in subduing them. Lord Carnarvon's early injunction that "Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to approve any extension of power and jurisdiction of the Cape Colony over the Amapondo", ‡ he had tacitly ignored. He justified himself as merely having inflicted condition punishment for Umqikela's disloyalty and non-compliance with terms of the Treaty of 1844. As for St. John's River Mouth he had merely resumed the sovereignty which had been declared by Britain in 1844 Treaty. Thus, he averred, "not a foot of Umqikela's country or head

† Theal p.169-170.
‡ G.H. 1/26 No.4. Carnarvon to Frere 3.1.78.
of cattle had been taken.*

By 1880 confederation, at least from without, was dead. Any revival was to come from within South Africa itself. Therefore Lord Kimberley in 1880 was probably even more anxious to avoid further extensions and more frankly discouraging than his predecessors had been. The burden of having to annex the Transkeian Territories in fulfilment of engagements entered into by his fore-runners weighed heavily upon him. In anticipation of the probable recommendations of the Commission which was to be appointed to inquire into the state of affairs in Pondoland he felt bound to warn Frere that "Her Majesty's Government is not prepared to assume responsibility of bringing further territories in South Africa under direct British rule on the ground that it is the duty of the British Government to undertake the rule of Native tribes in order to correct the misdeeds of chiefs and to improve and elevate the population". However laudable these aims might be it was felt contrary to policy to "advance further" without some paramount necessity which the Secretary of State felt did not exist in Pondoland, "with whom the Cape generally maintained relations of friendship."†

Having determinedly repudiated any extension of territory or responsibility in Pondoland it was natural that the Secretary of State should refuse his sanction to Imperial Troops' being used to subdue the Pondos who constantly threatened and at times attacked Xeibe and Bacos, who had been taken under British protection, but whom the Pondos continued to regard as rebellious subjects.‡ Frere was obsessed with the idea that

*C. 2740 No. 59 p. 100 Frere - Col. Off. 18.11.80.
* C. 2584 No. 56 Wolseley to Beach enclos. Frere - Wolseley 31.10.79 p. 118.
† A. 41 of 80 Kimberley to Frere 18.5.80.
‡ C. 2482 No. 53 Frere - Hicks Beach 12.8.79 enclos. C.M. Kokstad - S.N.A. 30.7.79.
the Pondo raids and aggressions were part of the Zulu difficulty. He was supported in this idea by Charles Brownlee.

Sir Garnet Wolseley, in independent command of the Troops and High Commissioner in South Eastern Africa, on the other hand, upheld the "Natal point of view", stigmatised by Frere as the "non-official view", gathered from stray facts and residents in Pondoland who gave the Pondo view being themselves almost identified with the Natives. When Frere applied to Wolseley for military aid he met with a distinct rebuff from the latter who did not feel justified in employing Her Majesty's Troops without orders, which reply was clearly approved by Lord Kimberley to whose mind Frere took "too serious a view of the condition of affairs in Pondoland." As the disputes "between tribes in Pondoland appeared mainly cattle-stealing affairs" and therefore to be treated as police matters, there was no reason why they should not be dealt with by Colonial Magistrates. Every precaution was to be taken not to allow border disputes to lead to serious hostilities with the Native tribes and any expectation of Her Majesty's Troops being employed in suppressing such "local disorders was to be discouraged". Not only did the Imperial Government refuse military aid in settling tribal matters in Pondoland but they were anxious to relieve themselves of the support of a garrison at Fort Harrison at the Mouth of the St. John's River. As the interests involved subjects of the Cape... the Secretary of State thought "the selection of officers and receipts could best be dealt with by the Cape" and England was to be relieved


+C.2484 No.97 Sir G. Wolseley - Beech 11.9.79. C.2586 Kimberley - Frere No.8 p.16. 27.5.80.

*Ibid. C.2586.
as soon as possible of the responsibility. The Secretary for Native Affairs corresponded with Major-General Gordon on the reorganisation of the Colonial troops in Kaffaria and the replacing of Imperial with Colonial troops at St. John's.†

Trouble in Zululand and the Transvaal distracted attention from Pondoland and elsewhere. Imperial and Colonial troops were needed to quell the Zulus and scarcely had that danger passed than the seething discontent of the Boers in the Transvaal surged to the surface, finally resulting in the abandonment of the Transvaal by the British.‡

In spite of his convictions Frere was powerless to authorise any force or coercion because of the division of power and responsibility which he looked upon as bound to lead to evil results.¶ Wolseley neither thought the division of power and responsibility a disadvantage nor did he agree that the "Pondo difficulty was clearly and obviously a branch of the Zulu difficulty" - there being in his opinion no connection whatever,† and he was anxious to "keep Her Majesty's Troops aloof from small tribal disputes which were more properly functions of the Police Force".

Her Majesty's Government no doubt recognised in the interests of confederation Pondoland would have eventually to be annexed; but to which Colony was a problem. Sir Michael Hicks Beach felt, geographically at least, as far as the St.

*C.2564 No.12 Beach-Frere 29.1.60 and again in 1882 O.R. 1/36 No. 30 Kimberley to Robinson 26.4.82.
+C.3493 Nos.16-23. 24.6.82-4.7.82.
nychers p.455 3.8.81.
O C.2482 No.70 enclos. Frere to Wolseley 23.8.79.
Ic.2482 No.97 Wolseley to Beach 11.9.79.
John's River it seemed as if it ought ultimately to belong to Natal, though the recent arrangements seemed to pressage its annexation altogether to the Cape. He suggested the division of custom duties between Natal and the Cape and division of responsibility for Residents otherwise the Cape would be virtually ruling in places where it properly had nothing to do.*

During 1878 and 1879 Confederation was still in the realms of practical politics and because of this as well as for other reasons the Imperial Government was not in the mood to consider Pondoland and its ultimate disposal and therefore any precise definition of the extent of allegiance to the British Crown in that part of Kaffirland was deferred. The result was the Colonial officers on the borders and in Pondoland were placed in an anomalous situation.† The lack of powers of the Colonial officers so embarrassed their action that until hostilities actually commenced Border officials were disinclined to act with the decision necessary to prevent breaches of peace.‡

So were matters allowed to drift, no decisive action being taken one way or another in the constant raids and counter-raids between Pondos and Xesibe and Pondos and Basos.§

By 1883 so irksome had Pondo matters become that the Cape Ministers repudiated the action of Frere and "deeply regretted that any interference with the inter-tribal relations of Pondoland should have taken place". They recognised the action of 1878 undertaken at the instance of Her Majesty's

*Wernford "Frere" p.103, quoted Beach - Frere 2.10.78, and G.H. 1/26 No. Beach - Frere 23.10.78.
†UL. N.A.D.30. No.78, Blyth - S.N.A. 2.7.78.
‡C.2482 No.53 Frere to Beach 12.8.79.
representative in the Colony and honoured with the approval of Her Majesty's Government, as the cause of the disturbed feeling then existing. On 11th August, 1878, Sir Bartle Frere had "issued definite instructions on various matters which caused irritation in Pondoland". The Ministers vindicated themselves on the expression used in Frere's despatch to the Secretary of State when forwarding the proposals. The High Commissioner had had the "concurrence" of his Ministers which clearly showed that Frere had acted throughout the matter as representative of Her Majesty's Government in South Africa and not on the advice of his Ministers. It was even admitted that the Xesibes were probably not blameless and "there was no doubt in taking them under Colonial protection a grave error was committed involving an undoubted injustice to the Pondos".

Sir Hercules Robinson, the High Commissioner who took office after Sir Bartle Frere's recall, himself admitted the injustice of the action, but he, like his Ministers and superiors in the Colonial office, found it impossible to retreat from the policy entered into by his predecessors.

That the Pondos had grievances was realised by the Cape Ministers and the High Commissioner though very seldom admitted.

The deposition of Umquikela from the Paramountcy was an indignity felt by Chief and people alike. Faku may have given Damae, his favourite son, a great deal of liberty and

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9. 27.10.83. Minutes of Proceedings of Pondo Deputation 27.10.85.
Ngwiliiso, Faku's grandson, might have claimed independence of
Umquikela in all save superior rank * yet that was the crux of
the relationship - recognition of the paramountcy of the Great
House. As late as 1865, only two years before his death, Faku
said of Damas' branch, "The House is one and must remain so".†
Nor would Faku treat with Jenkins or White about thecession of
St. John's River unless Damas were also present.‡ This griev-
ance was aggravated by the Cape Government, who ignoring
Umquikela, treated with Ngwiliiso for thecession of his rights
to the navigation of the St. John's River and the purchase of
land on the West bank. Umquikela protested, "How can the Gov-
ernment-buy from a person not authorised to sell or who does
not own the land?"§

The taking over of the Xesibe who had been definitely
placed under Umquikela by the Commission of 1872, was a very
vexatious point. Though Umquikela and leading Pondos reiter-
ated the Pondos and Xesibe were one people in origin;† the loss
of a number of troublesome people would not have grieved them
much but the loss of their land was keenly felt. As in the
earlier years on the Cape Border the lack of land had caused
many disturbances and wars so now were the Pondos feeling the
pressure of increasing populations and decreasing areas of land.
It was said, with what evidence it is hard to tell, that the
population of Pondoland had, during the last twenty years, nearly

* Theal pp. 177-178.
† J.P. Jenkins - J.C. Warner 14.8.55.
‡ J.P. Jenkins - Wodehouse 9.12.65. - A.S. White - Wodehouse
29.9.65.
§ C.3432 No.53 endos. Report of Meeting 8.4.79. C.3853 No.7
Officer Admin. Govt. - Derby 15.11.81.
‡ A.105 of 1880 No.267 Report by Oxland 31.5.80 and Cf. G.H.9/1.
as occupying land belonging to Pondos - and the Commission
(1872) also came to the same conclusion. Therefore it is
necessary for us to move with the greatest circumspection."
doubled itself and should it continue at the same rate in a very few years the country, as defined by the 1872 Commission, would not be large enough for them. Already the cattle which had increased in proportion to the people were dying of sickness and poverty owing to want of sufficient ground to graze on."

The Rode, a fertile valley on the borders of Xesibeland and Griqualand East where William Nota, a Hlubi headman who ruled some Baas, and who had been accepted in 1878, was later restored to the Pondos with the promise that the Baas under Nota should be removed as they had been accepted as British subjects. Mr. Oxland doubted at the time the expediency of the move as he feared the place would become a harbour for thieves and bad characters. As a receptacle for stolen stock it would prove a veritable thorn in the side of Makaula's district and East Griqualand. He was certain it would soon become evident it was a political necessity for the Government to annexe the Rode, for William Nota's case having been given in their favour, the Pondos would clamour for the restoration of the country occupied by Jojo (Xesibeland), as they already spoke of Nota's and Jojo's cases as parallel. However, the Government made no attempt to remove the Rode people, though the promise was renewed in 1881, with the result that the Pondos made repeated attacks on them ending in actual warfare in February, 1883, when the Pondos were successful and threatened to drive the Baas out.

The constant alarms of Pondos preparing for war on
the Colony took no more menacing form than an occasional cattle raid or reprisal on the Xesibes whom the Pondos regarded as rebellious subjects, who, if they would not submit must then be exterminated and forced out so that the Pondos might reoccupy their own lands.

From 1879 for the next four years there were repeated reports of the Pondos' deliberately attacking and destroying Xesibe Kraals and carrying off cattle; of Pondos' "goading" Xesibes and Basos to retaliate; Charles Brownlee staunchly supported Jojo and strongly disagreed with Sir G. Wolseley and Sir H. Bulwer who considered all the fire and slaughter and wholesale capture of stock merely cattle raids and to be settled by the police. "Our own subjects", he contended, "without any offence have been slaughtered on our own land."

Against the accusations of aggressions, on the Pondo side might be cited Mrs. Jenkins' and Natal's testimony to the contrary. The former, more or less justly, placed all the blame for the confusion on the Government who, she averred, was responsible for the condition of Pondoland and the loss of life and the effects of war, instancing as showing the unwarlike tendency of the people, the order received by one firm from trading stations beyond the St. John's River, for 350 ploughs.  

Sir Henry

C.2676. No.28. Frere to Sec. of State 22.6.80. forw. memo. by Brownlee, pp.54-64. Cr.
C.2462 No.41 Frere to Brench 5.8.79.
" No.53 enclos.6. Crland to S.N.A. 24.7.79.
" " enclos.10. C.M. Kok - S.N.A. 26.7.79.
" " enclos.12. Cape Argus 7-8.78.
C.3717 No.43 Robinson - Kimberley 3.7.82.
" 53 Robinson - Kimberley 15.10.82.
" 72 Robinson - Derby 26.2.83.

*2482 No.53. enclos.14. Mrs. Jenkins to Sir S. Freres, 6.8.79.
Bulwer, the Governor of Natal, as firmly endorsed that view that the "recent difficulties ... are due to our own creation". He, too, entirely denied that the disturbances in Pondoland had any connection with the Zulus; nor if there had been, he tersely inquired, why did not the Pondos rise after Isandhlwana? Whether the Pondos or the xesibes were to blame it was difficult to say, but probably the Pondos were no more aggressive towards the Xesibes now than they had always been, only now every instance was noted as an attack on British subjects. Also, the Pondos probably felt encouraged by the insufficient protection afforded the Xesibes and by the embargo on the latter's retaliation. It was natural they should take advantage of their hereditary enemy's weakness and seek to avenge themselves for their deeply resented wrongs. Thus did the inaction of the Government Authorities tend to increase aggression and enmity. Moreover, British prestige was lowered and threats were treated with indifference. "Moral sanction alone", said Mr. Oxland, "is of no avail to natives unless there is force for the support of constitutional authority".

At last reprisals became so frequent and relations between Xesibes and Pondos and Pondos and Bacas so strained that after appeals from the Resident and Chief Magistrates on the Border, steps, it was decided, must be taken. Major-General Gordon was asked to include suggestions on the Pondo-Xesibe question in his report on the Transkeian Provinces.

\[\text{Note: The citations are not fully transcribed.} \]

\[\text{Note: The citations are not fully transcribed.} \]
As the Cape felt itself in honour bound to continue its protection of the Xesibes it had either to remove them and give back the land to the Pondo which would have satisfied the latter; or else define a boundary between the two quarrelsome tribes. The Xesibes, when sounded on the subject, refused to move to colonial territory. The Government did not press the matter as they would have found difficulty in locating them among tribes in the already closely packed Transkei. Major-General Gordon upheld non-withdrawal from Xesibeland and proposed the definition of a boundary line in which Umquikela was to be invited to assist by sending representatives. He advocated too the including of the Rode with Xesibeland within the Cape boundary and, as a suitable sum for the compensation of the Pondo for the loss of territory, he suggested £10,000 (£7,000 for Xesibeland and £3,000 for the Rode).

The Pondos were not at all desirous of receiving compensation. They wanted only land and refused to admit the right of the Cape to interfere, probably feeling, once they had accepted a sum of money the matter would be closed. As it was they still had hopes of appealing past the Cape Authorities. Accordingly, when in April 1883 a Commission consisting of Charles Brownlee, C.P. Watermeyer and Donald Strachan was appointed to define a boundary and Umquikela was invited to send representatives, he declined, refusing to recognise the Government's right to select a boundary in his own country, added to which the Pondos objected to all the members of the Boundary Commission, as they felt all were biased against them. Having thus protested the Pondos contented themselves with ignoring

[C.3493 No.23 Gordon to Colonial Sec. 4.7.82.]
the boundary. Having laid down the boundary the Cape Government made the praiseworthy resolution to enforce it.

Umquikela and his Pondo distrusted the Cape officials — not indeed, without reason. They could obtain no sympathetic hearing of their grievances. The Resident, Oxley Oxland, himself in no enviable position and labouring under difficulties, discouraged all mention of wrong; in fact, the Pondo complained "absolutely refused to listen." It was natural, therefore, that they should seek other means of redress. They were probably encouraged to hope for assistance by appeal to the Imperial Government. In his dual capacity as Governor of the Cape and representative of the Imperial Government in provinces and colonies beyond the Cape, the High Commissioner was the most obvious person to settle Pondo matters and arbitrate between them and the Cape Government. The Pondo realised that no favour could be hoped from Sir B. Fraser at any rate, particularly as it was his policy largely under which they were smarting. Sir Hercules Robinson pursued no strong policy but fell almost completely under the sway of the Cape politicians — or more especially one great politician, Cecil Rhodes, who was at that time entering upon his parliamentary career. Though Robinson might in private sympathise with their treatment and acknowledge their hardships, yet he had no notion of

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1. Trend p.169. 2. G.92 of 1883 No.88 Report of Commission appointed to define the boundary line between Xesibes and Pondo 30.4.83. 3. No.86. Pondo Com. to S.N.A. 15.5.83. 4. No.90. Pondo Com. to S.N.A. 26.5.83 "The Boundary will not disturb a single Pondo village, but a large number of Xesibe gardens and many old villages destroyed by the Pondo will be thrown into Pondo Land as well as the Tola Forest, between Emfumdelweni and Mt. Ayliff which was common to both parties and a fertile source of dispute. 5. C.3855 No.1. Off. Admin. Govt. — Derby 28.5.83.


*S.P.P. Memo. by T. Shepstone Dec. 1880 on message sent to Umquikela 25.11.80.

rescinding what his fore-runners and advisers had agreed to. It was always a difficult position, holding the balance between local interests as represented by the Cape Ministers and Imperial concerns beyond the frontiers of the Cape. Almost impossible did the carrying out of his duties become when questions arose where the Cape Government and Native interests were at variance. More and more did the Cape Parliamentarians grow impatient of control, making the position of High Commissioner increasingly onerous and impossible, especially for a man desiring any vestige of independent action. Thus the Pondos early became aware that the High Commissioner was almost entirely eclipsed by the Governor of the Cape who was ruled in his actions by his Ministers. Thus to the Secretary of State's suggestion that Sir Hercules Robinson should offer his mediation in restoring peace between Xesibes and Pondos* he replied, "It does not appear to me that I can at present attempt with advantage to mediate in the dispute".†

During 1880 and 1881 there was talk of the Pondos' sending a deputation to Cape Town to meet the new High Commissioner, who had recently arrived. That their intention was serious is evident by their appealing to Bishop Colenso to accompany their deputation to Cape Town; probably thinking in this upholder of Zulu rights they would find a staunch friend to present their wrongs. The Bishop, however, refused having spoken to Sir H. Robinson on the subject, and feeling assured that the Pondos would receive a sympathetic hearing, and feeling, moreover, that his presence might prejudice their cause by suggesting distrust of the Cape's intentions. Though he felt

*G.H. 1/38 No.42 Derby to H.C. 15.3.83.
†G.H. 31/18 pp. 259-262 Robinson – Derby 16.4.83.
the deep sense of wrongs they had suffered, he warned Umquikela against passing by the Governor and High Commissioner and going direct to England, as such a course would result in nothing but failure. The idea of sending a deputation to England had been canvassed and appeared to be maturing towards the end of 1881. The Cape Ministers had in no way opposed the sending of representatives to Cape Town. In fact, both William Ayliff when Secretary of Native Affairs in 1880 and later Mr. Sauer in 1883 gave every encouragement. Sir Hercules Robinson himself had expressed himself willing whenever it should suit Umquikela's convenience to meet his representatives. But the Chief was probably encouraged by his "Diplomatic Agent" and others to hope for more satisfactory treatment of his wrongs by direct appeal to the Queen or her representatives in England.

There appeared a number of what Mr. Oxland described as "choice white rascals of the Welborne type" round Umquikela, advising and influencing him. They drew a distinction between the Cape and the Imperial Governments and even attempted to imbue them with the idea of actual antagonism of interests between the two Governments.

*Colenso Papers, Colenso to Umquikela 13.8.81, and Cox - Life - p. 349.
*N.A.D. 92 Fort St. John's Report, 15.1.82 "The long-talked of Pondo deputation, under consideration since May 1880, was still preparing to start for England."
*N.A.D. 61 of 1880 Memoranda by Wm. Ayliff, Memo. on Report of Oxley Oxland of a Meeting with Umquikela 7.7.80 - and C.3855 No.5 Officer Admin. Govt. to Derby 2.7.83 enclos.
*G.H. 31/17 p.373 Robinson to Kimberley 8.3.81 and p.385 Robinson - Derby 25.3.81.
*A.105 of 1880, 367/80 Oxland's Report of Meeting 31.5.80.
*C.3855 No.2. Officer Admin. Govt. - Derby 11.6.83 enclos.
* Ibid and C.4590 No.9 Welborne to the Colonial Office 8.4.84, and N.A.D. 92 Fort St. John's 1882, Report by O. Oxland 15.1.82.
After the Xesibe-Pondo Boundary had been defined and Umquikela and his chief Councillors realised they could expect no countenance from Cape Town, apparently the idea of a deputation again received support but funds were low and cattle were not plentiful. Under the circumstances Umquikela was persuaded to apply to the Aborigines Protection Society, stating his case and asking for funds to "defray expenses of a deputation to England".† The Society apparently replied to the effect that the case should be left in their hands but if Umquikela changed his mind and sent a deputation to England, the Society would give it support. Meanwhile they addressed the Colonial Office on the subject, forwarding Umquikela's letters.† The Colonial Office, inundated with epistles of a similar nature from the indefatigable Mr. Harry Wellesley Welborne, by this time, discredited "Diplomatic Agent",‡ and felt little desire to undertake the onerous task of governing more Native territory, however laudable the reason, being at the time concerned once more with shouldering the responsibility of Basutoland,§ returned the answer both to the Aborigines Protection Society and to Umquikela's notification of his intention of sending a deputation to England¶ that such a deputation would not be received but that all communications with the Imperial Government must be made through the High Commissioner, Her Majesty's accredited

‡C.4590 No.4 A.F.S. to Col. Office 28.4.84.
¶N.A.D. 103 of 1883 - Report E. Pondoland 3.1.83.
§Zybers, p.67.
¶0.3855 No.32 Umquikela to Col. Off. 27.10.83.
The Chiefs were hardly dissuaded from their idea of sending a deputation to England but at last this gave way to the plea for a Royal Commission. Mr. Welborne had, in one of his communications to the Colonial Office, suggested the appointment of a Commission to inquire into matters in Pondoland. Umhlanga, the educated and ambitious cousin of the Chief, who was beginning to take a prominent part in affairs at the Great Place, made the request that a Royal Commission be authorised to make a new treaty between Fondo and Her Majesty's Government, the treaty of 1844 having virtually ceased to exist after Faku's death, as it had made no provision for his successor.

Pondoland was a fertile field in which the seeds of dissension and disloyalty would flourish and spread. Undoubtedly there was a great deal of truth in the opinions of the Cape Officials, repeatedly expressed with regard to the actions of unscrupulous Europeans. The Pondo grievances were real but their advertisement by persons of such low repute as those who frequented the Great Place rather tended to their disparagement than to their alleviation. Certain traders largely of Natal origin, who had held a monopoly of trade in Pondoland, naturally looked askance at the new order and the establishment of a Customs House at St. John's. They would in all likelihood uphold Umquikela

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in his resistance to Cape enactments and were in all probability
aided and abetted by a section of the Natal Press. *

For long Pondoland had probably been a smugglers' and gunrunners' paradise where, by reason of its favourable
position between the Cape and Natal, goods could very easily be
passed across the border of either Colony and so evade customs
duties. There is evidence of much gun-running after 1878 when
every advantage was taken to foster in the Native mind the aggressive
nature of the Cape proceedings and to inculcate the idea
that the Pondos must fight for their rights.† Perhaps Pondoland
was not quite the "Cave of Adullam" Merriman pictured it,‡ but
its fastnesses probably offered refuge to many a questionable
character. The Pondo Chief's European secretaries were clearly
not of the highest type of individual. The career of H.W. Wel-
borne is somewhat vague. Having assumed the style of "diplomatic
agent to the Pondo Chief" in 1881, he addressed himself repeatedly
to the High Commissioner on behalf of the Pondos. But apparently
falling foul of Umquikela he left Pondoland in somewhat peculiar
circumstances.‡ These circumstances did not silence him, on

* C.2682 No.53. encl. 2.4.28. encl.3. 2.8.79.
† 1.C.4990 No.10. Robinson - Derby 29.4.84 encl. 2. letter from B.R.
"The craving for the possession of arms and the desire shown of late by certain of the Pondos to assert their independence of
British Authorities in South Africa is found in the pernicious advice tendered to the Pondos by some Europeans .... whose chief
aim is to make a safe and sure asylum for every rascal."
and R.M. Alfred Country to S.N.A. 15.11.82.
‡ 1.C.4990 No.4. A.P.R. A. Col. Off. 26.4.84.
‡ N.A.D. 104 of 83 - Report on East Pondoland 3.1.83.
the contrary, he petitioned the Colonial Office when in England.*

Hamilton McNicholas, his successor, the Rev. Hargreaves described some years later as unscrupulous.† Neither he nor Welborne made any effort to reconcile Umquikela with the Cape Policy, indeed, their influence had ever the reverse tendency. From the time of Mr. McNicholas' assumption of office dated Umhlangaza's gradual ascendancy until he predominated the Councils of the Great Place.‡

The annoyance and defiance of Cape measures shown by certain traders in Pondoland had a very interesting sequel. Nothing more clearly shows the inadequacy of British policy. After having proclaimed British sovereignty over St. John's River Mouth and appointed a Resident Magistrate and a sub-collector of customs,§ nothing further was done, until enterprising traders "White and Wood" refused to pay duty on goods imported at St. John's River Mouth and made a forced landing. The matter was handed over to the Attorney General who found "St. John's River territory has never been lawfully annexed to the Colony and does not form part of it. Sir B. Frere's proclamation if valid at all could only have the effect of annexing the Port and tidal estuary of the river to the British dominions. The documents do not profess to annex any territory ..." Consequently on this finding, at the urgent request of the Cape, a commission

² C.5/17 No.64, H.W. Welborne - Col. Office 2.5.83.
³ G.4590 No.9, H.W. Welborne - Col. Office 8.4.84.

† Hargreaves Diary 11.5.86, 23.7.86.
‡ G.4590 No.1, Officer Admin. Govt. - Derby 5.2.84.
§ G.H. 1/29 No.47. Beach - Frere 13.2.79.

¹C.O. 3622 St. John's River - Refusal of White Ers. to pay Customs duties.
was drafted under Royal Sign Manual and Signet appointing the Governor of the Cape to be Governor of St. John's River territory and providing for the Government of that territory.

Natal—Cape rivalry during these years increased. Frere had diagnosed Natal's attitude as jealousy, objecting to the Cape having control over a district which was so much nearer to Natal who could manage it better than the Cape Colony. In most frontier states there was a Cape and Natal policy or "Government" and "opposition".

Though the Cape was in no immediate hurry to undertake responsibility she most bitterly resented Natal traders "poaching" on her preserves. Thus she sought to oust them. It is stated in a report on St. John's River territory in 1883 though trade has improved it is still monopolised by Natal. To combat this annoyance roads were the most pressing question. From Umkata to St. John's the road was near completion, which would, so the Resident Magistrate forecast, trouble trade. A road to Kokstad was also a vital matter because the whole trade of East Griqualand and Eastern Pondoland was in the hands of merchants whose base was in Natal. Further, the development of trade of St. John's River was not prejudicial to any of the other Cape ports, on the contrary it would divert £30,000 to £40,000 to the Cape Coffers which at that time were finding their way into those of Natal.

At the same time it was obvious Natal who had long enjoyed this monopoly would do all in her power to retain it.


+C.2740 No.59 Frere to Col. Off. 18.11.80 and No.1. Frere to Beef 3.3.80.

She had nothing to lose and perhaps much to gain by showing sympathy and encouragement to the Pondos. Wolseley and Bulwer would admit no wrong on the Pondo side, on the contrary, so Freere declared, wrote a spirited memorandum which was "virtually an indiciation of the Cape Policy for the last twenty years". Natal was also anxious to retain the friendship of the Pondos because of their proximity, being their nearest neighbours and "anything likely to disturb them would be of concern to this colony".

The Natives were not slow to discern a divergence in the viewpoints of Natal and the Cape and were not long in taking advantage of it. They like the Zulus were quite adept at "playing off the one colony against the other".

So in 1884 the retaliatory act of the Chief was motivated by this intention principally though not entirely. It was a gesture against their oppressors at the Cape, as it was a concession to their friends in Natal. Umquikela by proclamation levied toll on all Cape Wagons entering or leaving Pondoland to the extent of £50 and on pack horses, mules or oxen to the amount of £10 each. Whereas from Natal vehicles were taxed only to the extent of an amount varying from fifteen shillings to £2:10:0 and pack animals five shillings. Nor would he allow the

*C.2482 No.97 Wolseley to Beach 11.9.79 "From the Natal point of view ... I do not consider it necessary to take any action whatever in the matter".

+C.2740 No.59 Freere to Col. Office 18.11.80.

+C.2708 No.88 Freere to Beach 21.9.78, enclos. despatch from Bulwer 23.8.78.

Alys pp.61-67, 80.

*C.2717 No.83 Robinson to Derby 9.4.83, enclos. telegram from E.R. meeting "Umquikela - "Does the Cape Colony want the Pondos to go to Natal for redress? How would the Cape Government like the Pondos to give St. John's River to Natal?"

+C.4590 No.14, enclos. 9.8.84 Proclamation "Whereas Her Majesty's Government of the Cape are by force and contrary to our will collecting revenue at the mouth of the Umzimvubu which are ours of right as Paramount and Independent Chief of Pondoland ..."
passage of armed troops through any part of his territory—
that was along the great wagon road from Umtata to Natal which
passed mostly on the Griqualand East side of the boundary and
only crossed into Pondoland at two places— one in Nqwiliso's
country, the other in the Ndoe.* A month later and as a gesture
against the annexation of Port St. John's, another proclamation
was issued opening "for import and export of goods for and from
our country" the mouth of the River Umalambo Mkulu, about five
miles from Wreck of Grosvenor as a free port.†

This action was a decided challenge to the Cape because not
only was this free from Cape Custom duties and therefore, a loss
extended to the revenue of the Cape,‡ but the opening, an invitation to
foreign interference and maybe aggression. It gave added
privileges to Natal of which she was aware, and not prepared to
resist in view of the nearness of Port Grosvenor in relation to
her border and its freedom from Cape Custom duties.

* Theal, p. 187.
† G.N. Nats 1894–1896 Proclamation 4.10.84. "Whereas owing to the heavy duties which we have deemed it advisable to levy on
goods coming into our country from the mouth of the Umzimvubu
River on account of the unjust seizure and occupation of the
River by the Government of the Cape of Good Hope
said River Mouth by the said Government, it impracticable for traders and others residing in our country to get goods from the Umzimvubu River
Mouth."
CHAPTER IV.

GERMAN INTRIGUE NECESSITATES MORE DEFINED CAPE POLICY, 1885-1886.

The beginning of 1885 saw British Authorities suddenly awaken to sinister influences at work in South Africa which called for speedy and more definite action in Tondoland. The Cape had already experienced the unpleasantness and indignity resulting from vague and undefined measures in the case of their non-legal authority and claims at St. John's River Mouth in 1881. They had recently somewhat ignominiously had another lesson on the effects of procrastination, and thereby realised something of their unsuspected rivals' tactics.

The year 1884 is memorable in the history of Africa as witnessing the commencement of the scramble for African possessions, impetus being given by the appearance in the forefront of Germany as an active Colonising Power. At first England was not alive to her real intentions.* So subtle had been her

*E. Lewin "Germans in Africa" pp.87-88.
diplomatic moves in Damara-Namaqualand over which Frere had urged in vain for a protectorate. \(^2\) England had consistently refused, and it was not until Angwa Faguena had been placed under the protection of the German Empire that the Cape and Imperial Authorities suddenly realised the trend of events. The late 'seventies and early 'eighties were characterised by a strong reluctance on the part of Britain to increase her responsibilities. She felt the necessity of consolidating her already acquired territory, therefore it was stated that the Orange River was the North West boundary of the Cape Colony and no encouragement was to be given to establish British jurisdiction beyond nor to annex territory in other parts.\(^+\)

Only after a horse had been stolen did British Authorities rush to secure the stable door on what remained. Lord Derby telegraphed pointedly to Sir Hercules Robinson "Her Majesty's Government have determined they are not in a position to oppose the intentions of the German Ministry to extend protection to German subjects having acquired concessions or formed settlements where no British jurisdiction already existed. So much therefore, of the country in the neighbourhood of Angwa Faguena as may be after careful inquiry found to have been acquired in proper form by Läderitz, will be under the protection of the German Empire". But "Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to proclaim under British protection and authority any other places on the coast at which British subjects have claims .... Her Majesty's Government infer the Colonial Government will consider it desirable that the coast to the North of the Läderitz concession said to

\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^+\) Egerton, p.444.
extend to Latitude 26° should be placed under British protection. Thus in March 1885 a British Protectorate was proclaimed extending as far north as the 26° parallel of Latitude.¹

So much for the West Coast - but the same agents were at work on the East. There too Sir Bartle Frere had realised possible danger and had called attention to a significant article in a German periodical advocating the acquisition of Delagoa Bay and a steady flow of German immigrants into the Transvaal ... to pave the way for the foundation of a German African Empire of the future.² In 1884 at any rate there were undoubtedly intrigues between the Boers of the New Republic in Zululand and German subjects the object of which was the annexation of St. Lucia Bay.² There, however, Britain realised the implications of the apparently innocuous proceedings of Herr Idderitz and his confederates and betook herself of a disregarded and long neglected treaty with Parisa in 1843, and forthwith proclaimed the Bay British territory.¹

Not meeting with their expected success at St. Lucia Bay but nothing daunted, the indomitable German agents cast about for further fields to conquer and their gaze fell upon the apparently unwanted and contentious Pondoland.³

¹ C.4190 No.74 Derby - Robinson 14.7.84.
² E. gerton British Colonial Policy p.442.
³ E gerton, p.443.
¹ Walker, p.408. E. Lewin p.102, British took formal possession, 16.12.84.
⁵ E. Lewin, p.104. "It was often remarked in S.Africa and indeed, in England a short time ago that the German Government had in view the annexation of Pondoland, and when I was in Natal it was stated that representatives of Berlin influence, either official or unofficial, were seeking to bring about close relationships between Germany and the Pondo Chiefs. You can easily imagine what issues would be raised by the introduction of foreign authority in Pondoland separating as it would the Cape from Natal" - footnote - address by Sir Donald Currie before the Royal Colonial Institute 10.4.88.
Here was a long, comparatively undeveloped coast-line with unknown possibilities and advantages for unobtrusive infiltration and appropriation. Besides, there had at times been rumours current of mineral wealth. As early as 1854 Shepstone was anxiously inquiring about some alleged copper mine which he thought lay somewhere in the territory ceded to him by Faku and his Chiefs. * Later in 1873 Sir Henry Barkly forwarded to Lord Kimberley a letter from one, H.L. Rudlin advocating the immediate annexation of certain territory "lying between Natal and this Colony", for the ostensible object of opening up copper mines reputed to exist within the area. † Frere, too, heard tales of considerable mineral resources in parts of the territory. ‡

The country was unquestionably fertile and would probably respond to agricultural development.

Moreover, the internal confusion of Pondoland, the weakness of the tribal government, the jealousy and suspicion of one chief of another, the disintegration of the people and clans, not to mention their unredressed grievances and differences with the Cape Government, offered an irresistible invitation to foreign adventurers and would-be colonists, such as the German pioneer Empire builders were.

As in Angra Pequena and St. Lucia Bay there was no one commissioned by the German Government to effect a cession of country, merely one of the numerous agents, military officers and others whom the German Government had "employed of late in South Africa, in the British Colonies and in adjacent countries.

*S.P. T. Shepstone - G. Cato 21.5.54 and 28.7.54.
†G.H. 31/12, p.224. Barkly to Kimberley 14.11.73. and G.H. 9/1, Memo. by Brownlee 17.9.74.
‡C.2308 No.13. Frere to Barkly 20.2.79.
who have been exceedingly busy in obtaining information for their Government, and on the look-out for possible opportunities of German intervention and German aggrandisement - agents whose actions and whose proceedings the German Government are able afterwards to support or disavow just as suits their convenience"." Such an individual was Herr Emil Nagel in Pondoland as August Einwald had been in Zululand and Lüderitz in South-West Africa.

Captain Nagel had gone to Pondoland from Zululand, probably in reply to a notification issued by the Pondo Chief to the effect that he was prepared to enter into relations with other countries for certain purposes and renouncing British protection. There was the rumour, though probably nothing more, that the Paramount Chief thought of seeking the intervention and protection of Germany. Donald Strachan later traced on reliable information the origin of the German intrigue to Hamilton McNicholas, Umquikela's Secretary, who had begun a correspondence with the German Consul either at Durban or Cape Town. Nagel was sent by the Consul to meet Umhlangaza, the Pondo and McNicholas, to whom he was already known as they had served together in a volunteer corps during the Basuto War. The purpose of this visit was said to be the ascertaining of the "views and desires of the Pondo Chief". What actually took place could only be a matter of conjecture, though the British Resident at Port St. John's reported that negotiations respecting German intervention and future protection had taken place between Umquikela's Councillors and

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*Colenso Papers P.W. Chesson - Miss Colenso 20.11.84, 9.4.85, 11.12.84.

P.M.A. No.97, 7.7.85.

G.H. Nats. 1884-86 Pulwer - Stanley 10.11.85.

and the German representative. *

Sir Henry Bulwer took a keen interest in the proceedings of Herr Nagel and he reported that later in the year (August) he had been in Zululand inquiring into German Mission Stations there, which information Prince Bismarck had instructed Dr. Bieber the German Consul-General at Cape Town to obtain. There were undoubtedly German interests in Zululand because of the Hanoverian Missionaries who had been complaining of their treatment by the Boers. It was therefore quite feasible that the German Consul-General at Cape Town or the German Consul at Durban should appoint someone to report on the conditions, nor was it unusual that Captain Nagel should be sent. "But the fact of itself marked his (Nagel's) connection with the German Government" and if therefore he was found proceeding to Pondoland where he could have no personal interest and where no German interests were concerned, it was not unreasonable ... that he went there ... acting under instructions from the German Consulate."+

Bulwer, quite alive to the underlying intentions of the German Agents, warned the Imperial Authorities ... that he had heard that Nagel had secured a concession of land from the Pondo Chief and if this was a transaction which like that of Herr Lüderitz at Angra Pequena and of Herr Einwald in Zululand might be taken up or not by the German Government, just as it suited their purposes - "At any rate it must not be a matter of surprise should the German Government attempt to turn the results of Captain Nagel's proceedings in Pondoland to the same account."

A reply by Bismarck, intended to refute the allegations of Bulwer with regard to the doings of Herr Nagel, rather failed

*C. 4590 No. 23. Robinson to Lord Derby, 24.6.85.
+G. H. Nats 1884-'86, Bulwer to Stanley 10.11.85.
*Ibid.
in its object. In fact, read in connection with an application made to the Colonial Office by Captain Nagel himself, it gave confirmatory evidence in support of Bulwer's assertions rather than otherwise. The Berlin office repudiated the charges that Nagel had been commissioned 

... either by the Imperial Government or by the Imperial Consulate General at Cape Town or Durban, to report on the position of the German Mission Stations in Zululand, or to establish political relations with the ruler of Pondoland. On the contrary, he had undertaken his journey into Pondoland "far more as the representative of the Berlin firm of Angerhauhen and Lüdka and associated himself in that capacity at Durban with the local firm of Monhaupt, Lehmann and Co., and for this purpose obtained a grant of land from the Pondo Chief Umquikela". A petition from the latter firm, to place Pondoland under the protection of the German Empire, had been refused (August '85). "A request of a similar nature made by Nagel for the firm of Angerhauhen and Lüdka (6th August, 1885) met the same fate". Further the Foreign Office had been informed by Herr Nagel in a petition of 26th September, '85, of a treaty made by him with King Dinisulu of Zululand by direction of the German Land and Colonisation Company by which it appeared he had acquired considerable landed possessions in Zululand. A proposition for German protection which had accompanied it had been similarly refused by the German Government, *a somewhat lengthy vindication, illustrating laudable disinterestedness:

Nagel's own application to the Colonial Office in London on December 7th '85, † for the Colonial Government of Her Majesty,

*Foreign Office Berlin 8.1.86. G.H. Nats '84-'86.
Queen Victoria's recognition of the Grant of land and bestowal of title, and in which an enclosed copy of the treaty describes him as negotiating on "behalf of the German Land and Colonisation Company", makes no mention of Monhaupt and Lehmann. He suggests as the Pondo question is troublesome the sooner white settlers built on both sides of St. John's Mouth the better. But before he takes any steps he wishes the land to be recognised by a civil Government. He had already applied to secure German Protection but had been advised to apply to Her Majesty's Government as having the most right by reason of the protection pronounced by the High Commissioner in 1878 over the Pondo Coast.

This time, however, the British Authorities were prepared, warned by the results of their disregard and complacency on the West Coast and the movements already afoot at St. Lucia Bay. Lord Derby had wired to the High Commissioner that a British Protectorate over all Pondoland should be renewed in explicit terms and if Her Government (i.e. the Cape) were prepared to undertake control Her Majesty's Government would probably consent. To which the Cape Ministers made immediate reply that in their opinion "in view of events now occurring in South Africa not a moment should be lost" in removing any doubt which might exist regarding the assumption of British authority over Pondoland and the Xesibe country. They went further - "and in the event of Her Majesty's Imperial Government establishing immediately a British Protectorate as suggested by the Secretary of State for Colonies, Ministers on this point will be prepared to submit proposals to Parliament at its meeting for relieving Her Majesty's

*Sir B. Frere's proclamation September 1878.
+Governor's Minutes - January-April 1885. C.0.3908.
Imperial Government of control of the protectorate by annexation of the territory to the Cape Colony.

An "immediate" proclamation was issued in a Gazette Extraordinary containing the announcement of the hoisting of the flag at St. Lucia Bay, 18th December, 1884. Moreover, by the time the "treaty" was made England and Germany had come to an agreement by which the latter promised to make no further annexations in East Africa, South of Delagoa Bay. Thus the British sovereignty over Pondoland, which had existed since the treaty of 1844 made between Faku and Maitland, and which had been nominally renewed by Sir Bartle Frere's proclamation in September 1878, was further secured by Sir H. Robinson as a weapon against possible German penetration of Pondoland, where, as in Zululand, German agents had not the same freedom from interested observation as had existed in South West Africa, in the Cameroons and in Togoland.

The Nagel "Treaty" as it was called was entered into between "Emil Nagel on behalf of the German Land and Colonisation Company and Umquikela, Independent and Paramount Chief, his successors or assignatories of the Pondoland". Umquikela granted and made absolute a certain piece of land of an area not less than 160 English miles, situated on the East bank of the Umzimvubu River extending from the seashore of the Umzimvubu inland as far as the Walubini Drift and from the mouth of the St. John's River along the seashore to the mouth of the Ubazi River (West bank). The Eastern and Northern boundaries were parallel to the Western and Southern confines. Such land was the free and legal property of the Pondoland people.
with all territorial and sovereign rights within the said boundaries of the German Land and Colonisation Company, who in return recognised all import duties and taxes levied by the contracting chief, whose subjects might dwell on the land subject to their laws. Further they undertook the education of two Pondoland youths for seven years in Germany. It concludes with the challenge to British interests: "The German Land and Colonisation Company will submit the said tract of land to a German Protectorate and do their best to secure the same protectorate for the whole of Pondoland and that she and her subjects be recognised as free and independent within their own borders and at the same time the company will open negotiations on the Amaxesibe and St. John's questions."*

The recent retaliatory acts of the Pondo Chiefs, imposing an exorbitant tax on Cape merchandise and opening Port Grosvenor, thus encouraging smugglers and foreigners, were steps which tended to aggravate the commercial enmity between the two British Colonies which had been steadily increasing since 1882.† To counteract the undoubted advantage Natal had achieved by her lower custom rates, drawing trade from Port Elizabeth and East London through Durban, the Cape had instituted a rebate system "equal to the difference between Cape and Natal tariffs," and in this way seriously damaged Natal's growing trade with the republics and inland territories. By setting up a Customs House on the border of Griqualand West in 1883, the Cape effectively shut Natal out of this lucrative market.‡ Moreover, in 1885 the Cape had established a Customs House on the border of East Griqualand

*van der Pool, p. 15.
†van der Pool, p. 13 and foll.
‡van der Pool, p. 12.

Note:

and Natal, * a decidedly aggressive move—just as if, the Natalians said, a neighbour had built a partition wall in one's own house. For, Griqualand East, like Pondoland, Natal looked upon as a reserve for her own trade. In the light of this policy of erection of prohibitive tariff walls and throat-cutting, the position of Port Grosvenor was such as to give it undue significance, situated as it was near the borders of Natal who in "some danger of losing her trade with the Transvaal and the Free State on one side and East Griqualand on the other"† was not likely to disregard any means by which she could get the better of her rival by evading the Cape Customs. As the Customs House had been established on the borders of East Griqualand and attempts would no doubt be made to smuggle from Port Grosvenor into East Griqualand Natal did not see why she "should concern herself about that"—probably being the chief smuggler. Their neighbours at the Cape could be trusted to look after their own interests and take care that any such attempts be frustrated. Besides the Natal traders argued "nothing could be gained by Natal stopping exports to Port Grosvenor underhand as that would simply tend to throw the whole of the trade into the hands of the Cape Colony via St. John's and thus stop an outlet for our merchandise. A good deal of the trade done with Pondoland through St. John's is now being absorbed by Port Grosvenor and hence, no doubt, the desire of the Cape Government to stop imports to the latter port.

Traders at St. John's do not seem to object much to Port Grosvenor as they are enabled by getting their goods through this channel

*Gov.'s Minutes C.O.3903 May-Aug.'85. No.122 1.6.85.
to avoid heavy Cape duties on all goods supplied to their stations in Pondoland*. 

Thus Natal connived at the illegitimate trade progressing at Port Grosvenor. In fact, she encouraged it and to the repeated requests and demands from the Cape Government† to refuse clearance to ships from Durban bound for Port Grosvenor, she argued she was infringing no law as the "Colony" stipulated in the Maiitland Treaty as having sole right of granting licences might be taken to mean Natal as much as the Cape as the former was not, at the time, separate from the latter.‡

There came a sudden change in Natal's tone when she found the Port and its closeness to the border jeopardizing her own trade and customs,§ as it enabled goods to be landed within a short distance of the Natal border and offered facilities for illicit import into Natal. Though at that time the Natal Government could not prevent vessels clearing for Port Grosvenor, the Legislative Council proposed remedying it by an Act.\ The Cape Ministers trenchantly retorted that neither the Governor nor the Legislative Council appeared aware that the evils owed their existence to the Natal Government, for in the face of remonstrances from the Cape they had persisted in ignoring the treaty of 1844, and vessels with spirits were constantly clearing from Natal for the Pondo Coast.\*

It was becoming increasingly apparent to the Cape Government that some settlement, however temporary, must be

* Ibid. (CINatE1854-56 Series of Articles)
† P.M.A. Nos. 39 and 57, 19.3.85, 25.4.85.
§ C.5022 No.5, Robinson - Stanley equals, corresp. with Govr. of Natal, and No.8, Bulwer - Stanley 26.9.85.
\ Gov.'s Minutes C.0.3909 May-August 1885. No.62. 14.8.85.
\* C.5022 No.5, Robinson - Sec. of State 9.9.85.
attempted in Pondoland. The many complications, due partly to
their own vague and somewhat provocative policy, called for ad-
justment. The annexation of Pondoland was even then considered
and mooted by the Cape Ministers themselves, not with any pressing
desire to undertake the responsibility then but more to prepare
the way for the future. They had recently rid themselves of
troublesome Basutoland. The North was now the absorbing inter-
est.† To placate the chiefs and patch matters up once more, the
Government agreed to receive a deputation from Umquikela at Cape
Town. After all, they did merit a little consideration, being
the only independent tribe with whom the Government had never
fought; they had, too, resisted repeated inducements to aid others
in rebellion; they had on various occasions assisted the Cape.
Moreover, they had exercised great forbearance under the most
trying and irritating circumstances with the Government people on
their borders. In view of these considerations together with
their valid grievances against the Government, Donald Strachan
thought the Fonso deputation should be accorded a hearing.‡

In October, the deputation, including Umhlangaza,
McNicholas, Mr. Dietman, an attorney in Cape Town, and Donald
Strachan set out. In preparation for the pending interview the
Cape Ministers endeavoured to adjust their position with regard
to Pondoland and the Imperial Government. Though desirous of
securing the annexation of Pondoland to the Colony they did not
feel justified in taking so important a step without ascertaining

* Eybers, p.67.
‡ P.M.A. 117. 15.8.85.
§ C.5022, No.4. Robinson - Sec. of State 19.8.85. encl. o
 Donald Strachan to P.M. 3.7.85.
from Her Majesty's Imperial Government whether the Protectorate
would be transferable to the Colony in a peaceable condition,
at the same time repudiating any suggestion of initiating the
Protection over the coast of Pondoland in January 1885.† The
Imperial Government could be assured of their desire to use their
best efforts to carry into effect their undertakings.‡ Having
thus stated their disposition they proceeded to the meetings with
the Fondo deputation quite determined not to discuss any contro-
versial subject such as the retrocession of St. John's River Mouth
or Xesibeland. To the Fondo, however, these two matters were
of vital interest. They would listen to no proposals of compen-
sation for the loss to the Paramount Chief's income resulting
from the Cape's appropriation of Port St. John's where all ships
had formerly paid a tax to Umquikela, nor to the monetary substi-
tute offered for the Cape's retention of Xesibelaland and the former
income derived from it. From the first Natives and Government
were arguing at cross purposes. What the Cape wanted, the mak-
ing of roads and the opening of ports, were anathema to the raw
Fondos who, nevertheless, realised the more the white man was
given in trade and facilities for opening up the country the more
he would take. Thus Umhlangaza could see in the oft repeated
Protection but a step to final annexation.§ At such a termina-
tion to the long-talked of deputation, sent at great expense
and hardship to the tribe, the chiefs must have felt the utter
futility of such appeals. They had requested an independent

†P.M.A. No. 125, 31.8.85.
‡P.M.A. No. 125, 31.8.85.
§G.30 of '86. No. 1. Minutes of Proceedings of Fondo Deputation
27.10.85.
Ibid.
IHarpreaves Diary 29.7.85, 4.11.85.
commission from the Imperial Government; they had applied to go to England. In each case they had been referred to the High Commissioner as Her Majesty's Representative and the proper source to which to appeal.

Had the High Commissioner been a representative of the Crown only and entrusted with the representation of and the safeguarding of the interests of England, some impartial judgment might have been expected. But as in the present instance so was it always; the High Commissioner was dominated by his position as Governor of the Cape. He might admit the Pondos had been unfairly treated and Xesibeland taken without a shadow of pretext, yet he took his stand on what the Cape Government had already done in annexing Port St. John's and their purposing to do the same in Xesibeland. Therefore these questions would not be reopened. The dual position of the High Commissioner and Governor of the Cape was exciting much interest at that time.

Even among those at the Cape the ambiguity of the position was felt. But much more so was it realised by Natal. She had more than once felt the brunt of Cape intervention in her concerns. Her earliest plans and hopes of enlarging her bounds had been baulked by an unsympathetic High Commissioner (e.g. Nomansland and Basutoland).

As a concession, Mr. de Wet, Secretary for Native Affairs, promised to visit Pondoland and Umquikela within a few

‡van der Poel, p.13.
months on condition the latter had by that time consulted his
great men and agreed to treat on some basis other than their old
grievances.* But on Umquikela's failure to do so—such is the
natural procrastination of the native, developed to a high degree
in the Pondo Chief, weak and vacillating by temperament, and en-
feebled by illness and excessive drinking†—Mr. de Wet refused
to visit the Great Place but suggested that the Chief should
communicate with the Magistrate if he wished to come to terms.‡
Umquikela expressed his anxiety for a settlement,§ and W. Stan-
ford, Chief Magistrate of Griqualand East, was authorized to
proceed to Fondoland as he knew the policy of the Government,
the principal object of which was to secure control of all ports, the
right to roads from such points as might be opened. In addition,
the securing of the Rode valley was deemed most urgent to strengthen the position on the Baca-Xesibe border.¶ To secure these
terms Stanford was permitted to offer compensation to the extent
of £2,000 for former appropriation of ground (i.e. St. John's and
Xesibelands) and a further £3,000 for the possession of the Rode
Valley. Though £5,000 was mentioned he could increase the offer
to £7,000.¶ But negotiations fell through, the chiefs not being
willing to make concession.**

Then commenced a period of petty warfare between Bacos and
Pondos and Pondos and Xesibes; Umlangaza instructed by
Umquikela had made a cession of land vacated by William Nota,

*G.30 of 1886, p.20-21.
†Hargreaves’ Diary 2.1.85, 3.8.85.
‡G.30 of ’86, p.22. de Wet to Umquikela 11.12.85.
¶G.30 or ’86, pp.23, 24. S.N.A. — C.M. Kokstad 19.12.85 and
2.1.86.
**Ibid.
the Hlubi Chief living in the Rode, to Mrs. Adam Kok on the understanding the ground was to remain to Faku's successors. To effect such a vacation Josiah Jenkins had complained to the Chief Magistrate at Kokstad of thefts from the Pondos and had asked the Government either to remove the Bacas under William Nota or allow the Pondos to do so. Umhlangaza proceeded to attack the Bacas. Then the Xesibes attacked the Pondos, burning kraals and doing much damage, and Umhlangaza was only prevented, retaliating by the strenuous efforts of the Rev. Hargreaves who blamed the Government for allowing these border fights, and the Pondos accused the Government of supplying the Xesibes with arms and ammunition. The Government's policy being to stand on the defensive, they would not reinstate Nota as that would be tantamount to hostility against the Pondos.

Makaula, the Baca Chief, under British protection, took matters into his own hands, invaded the Rode, reinstated Nota and announced his intention of retaining possession of Josiah's former location.

Thus matters were in a bad state when the Government was neither forceful enough to prevent fights nor able to prevent their people violating Pondo territory. At the same time officials on the border were endeavouring to come to some arrangement. In Cape Town too, Ministers were urging the immediate, if long-delayed, annexation of Xesibeland. Meanwhile there

* G.30 of '86, p.34. Proc. at Gr. Place 28.11.85.
^* Hargreaves' Diary 11th, 12th and 13th Feb. 1886.
^ Hargreaves' Diary 21st-25th March '86.
^ Hargreaves' Diary 12.2.86.
^ Hargreaves' Diary 14.4.86, 24.4.86.

II G.10 cr '87, p.12.
III Hargreaves' Diary 14.4.86, 24.4.86.
had been a rift in the clouds in May when Umquikela and Umhlangaza agreed to open roads and promised to meet the Government, and on 6th May a notice was issued withdrawing the former proclamation imposing duty on wagons from the Cape Colony.

Rumours of attacks and aggressions were soon revived, and by October the Pondos and Xasibes were in open warfare, which party was the aggressor being a matter of controversy.

Negotiations and settlements were undoubtedly hampered and deferred by the action and sympathy given the Pondos by outside parties, who were largely of Natal in origin or inclination. There was, for instance, quite a prolonged correspondence between Umquikela through his secretary Hamilton McNicholas and the Honourable Harry Escombe, the former asking the latter's influence with the Governor of Natal in endeavouring to obtain the appointment of a Royal Commission or any other means deemed expedient with the object of placing the country on a satisfactory basis with the Cape and Natal Colonies as he was on the verge of war with the Cape Colony. Escombe gave every encouragement in his recommendation to the Pondos to link themselves with Natal in which case they would be assisted as far as possible. A month or two later he went even further on McNicholas' inquiring if it would not be practical for Pondoland to be taken under the protection of the Imperial Government as represented by Natal. Escombe

* Hargreaves' Diary 5.5.86.
+ 5.10 of '87, p.12.

Though Hargreaves refuted such suggestions for Umhlangaza had no intention of committing himself with the Pondos and the Government and "Chief Umquikela was opposed to aggressive operations", Diary 19.6.86.

* Hargreaves' Diary 11th-19th Oct.'86.

+ C.5022, No.46. Torrens to Granville 8.5.86 enclos.

+ C.5022 No.50 Torrens to Granville 12.5.86 enclos.
replied immediately he believed it was not only practical but natural to bring Pondoland under the Colony in terms acceptable to Natal. He anticipated no difficulty with the Secretary of State, who if he realised it was the desire of both countries would raise no objections.*

Sir Theophilus Shepstone, also, was appealed to for advice and help in Pondo Affairs.† But he returned a decided refusal knowing in what light such interference would be viewed by the Cape.‡

All these overtures Natal was desired to ignore and to pay no attention to attempts by the Pondos "to play off one Colony against the other".§ Increase in the Native population of Natal would involve additional responsibility to Her Majesty's Government, so said the self-supporting Cape.¶

Imperial protection was applied for by a sympathiser from Kingwilliamstown and an M.L.A. - J.J. Irvine. He corresponded with a Member of Parliament, L.L. Dillwyn, who was entrusted on more than one occasion with memoranda on Pondoland to lay before the Secretary of State.∫

The influence of commercial Natal² is very obviously the

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* C.5022 No.64. Havelock - Granville 10.8.86 encl.
† S.P. McNicholas to Shepstone 20.5.86 and 1.7.86.
‡ S.P. Article in "Natal Advertiser" 17.7.86.
§ C.5022 No.48 Torrens to Granville 8.5.86.
⁰ C.5022 No.63, Mem. given to Sec. of State by L.L. Dillwyn, M.P. 4.9.86. No.67 L.L. Dillwyn to Col. Off. 27.9.86. encl. copies of extracts from J.J. Irvine. No.69 L.L. Dillwyn to Col. Off. 14.10.86.
II C.5022 No.53. Torrens - Granville 26.5.86 ... because of the danger to trade of this Colony (Natal) with Pondoland should the demands of the Cape be complied with which will lead to the annexation of the country to Cape Colony I advised Umhlangaza against granting the road (through Pondoland from St. John's to border at Fort Donald) or treaty and if he is unable to prevent they should seek union with Natal with whom they have always been friends". encl. T. McCubbins - Havelock, 29.4.86.
force behind all the applications from Pondoland and Griqualand East for annexation to Natal. The establishment of a Customs House on the Natal-Griqualand East border whereby full duties of sea customs were imposed on all goods introduced, at a time when the extension of railways in Natal brought Durban closer, resulted in the growth of the Kokstad Political Association which set itself to detach Griqualand East from the Cape and bring it under the Natal Government. Their attitude was not surprising, considering many were supported in trade by Natal Houses and that they had had most connection with that Colony for years. An appeal was addressed to the Governor of Natal. Further a memorial was addressed to the Government of Natal and purporting to be signed by the majority of the inhabitants of Griqualand East, petitioned for annexation to that Colony. Bulwer refused to receive either the memorial or the deputation as Griqualand East had been annexed to the Cape in 1879. The leading members of the Kokstad Political Association had paid a visit to Pondoland, had a meeting at the Great Place, and attempted to persuade the Pondos to join them in petitioning the Queen.

Though the Governor might be conscientious and careful not to tread on his neighbour's political corns, the Legislative Council had no such scruples, especially in view of the repeated requests from Griqualand East and Pondoland. Therefore the

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* C.5022 No.48. Torrens to Granville 8.5.86. enclos. J.F.Rethman to Govr. of Natal asking for arbitration in settling matters between Pondoland and the Cape. No.53. Torrens to Granville 26.5.86 enclos. T. McCubbins (Durban) to Havelock 29.4.85.


III Cf. G.12 of '87, p.81. Report on Griqualand East ... "about 500 signatures were put to the petition and yet the population ... is estimated at 100,000 Natives and 5,000 Europeans".

II Mr. Peaves' Diary 16.8.86.

No.68 Dower to Sir John Bisset 27.9.86.
Governor of Natal was addressed with regard to a resolution to annex East Griqualand if the Cape would allow it and if it was the desire of the majority of the inhabitants,² to which the Cape administered a severe rebuff.⁴ Quite regardless, however, of their neighbour's disapproval the Legislative Council a week later passed a similar resolution urging the necessity of measures to bring about the union of Pondoland and Natal and protesting against any and all proposals for political separation of the two countries.⁷ The measure was introduced by the indomitable Harry Escombe. He indicted the High Commissioner of considering only the interests of one colony. Communications made by the Governor of Natal to the High Commissioner were replied to by the Cape Ministers, whose interests were diametrically opposed to those of Natal; therefore it was a case for the Secretary of State. The only reply accorded this outburst was a reminder from the High Commissioner once more stating the undesirability of third party interference.⁶

After another affray between Pondos and Xesibes⁴ as a result of the formal annexation of Xesibeland by the Cape,² a meeting between the Pondos and the Government was at last proposed, and arranged.¹¹ Thus at Ntola's kraal on the 9th December 1886 the Chief Magistrate of Griqualand East met Umhlangaza as representative of Umquikela. An agreement, which was ratified by Umquikela on the 10th February 1887 and confirmed by the High

²C.5022 No.76 Havelock to Stanhope 19.10.86.
¹F.M.A. 146, 4.11.86.
²C.5022 No.83 Havelock - Stanhope, 25.10.86. and enclos.
⁴C.5022 No.89 Torrens to Stanhope 17.11.86. Cf. Nos. 50 and 54.
¹Hargreaves' Diary 11.10.86, 20.10.86.
⁵Eybers, p.69.
¹¹Hargreaves' Diary 2.11.86. G.10 of '87, p.19.
Commissioner on the 12th March, was made. Besides an extradition clause and Umquikela's undertaking the control of the Border at Mt. Ayliff and Mt. Frere, the Chief conceded the right to enter, construct and maintain a road through Eastern Pondoland to the Mouth of St. John's with all outspans and grazing rights and freedom of tolls. Besides conceding the Rode for £600*, Umquikela renounced his claim to compensation for the territories of St. John's and Kesiib Country in consideration for £200 being an annual subsidy to him and his heirs and a lump sum of £1,000 for Kesiibeland.†

Having gained their ends by obtaining the cession of the Rode valley and the promise of freedom to make a road through the country to connect the port of St. John's with the interior of Pondoland and Griqualand East, and further having solved their consciences by giving the Pondos pecuniary compensation for Kesiibeland and St. John's, the Cape Government felt they had put a spoke in the wheel of their rival Natal and concerned themselves not at all about the clipping of the Natives' land.‡

* C. £3,000 offered the previous year. G.30 of 1886, p.24 S.N.A. - C.M. 2:1.86.
† G.10 of '87, pp.21-22.
‡ G.12 of '87, p.96. Report on Pt. St. John's 3.1.87. Population compared with the census of 1884 shows an increase in Natives.
CHAPTER V.

FLOTTINGS AND REVIVAL OF GERMAN INTEREST, 1887-1891.

Very soon was the amicable settlement disturbed by rumours and alarms once more. This disquietude was caused mainly by unquestionable German schemes, hatched probably by private individuals with the help and co-operation of Umhlangaza, who had for some time been administrative head of Pondoland and had been able to indulge his ambition to its full extent by reason of Um-quickela's growing feebleness, inability and drunkenness. It was very likely through his agency in the first instance that Herr Nagel had been given a concession. That the treaty was causing interest and possibly uneasiness in the minds of Cape Officials is evidenced by the fact that Donald Strachan in June 1887 was at the Great Place "settling outstanding cases about the treaty with Nagel".* Apparently the Pondos generally were not aware of

*Hargreaves' Diary, 8.6.87.
the treaty and some irritation was felt against Umhlangaza but he was able to overcome the feeling and convince the other chiefs that the Cape was jealous of the Germans through whom the Pondos would be able to obtain arms and ammunition that would enable them to "set the Cape Government at defiance and settle old scores".

Two months later (August) one of the boys, Umhlangaza's son, Oscar arrived in Durban from Germany from whence he had been sent suddenly on account of illness. Oscar died before he reached Pondoland. It was a great blow to Umhlangaza who had centred his hopes on this youth and his German education. "He had been sent from home against the will of his friends, it being a great political idea of his father." So deeply seated was the superstition of these people that death was believed to be caused solely by some malignant force from without, with the result that one or more persons suspected and named by the witch doctors were invariably "smelt out" whenever any important headman or chief died. In the present instance, whether Umhlangaza upheld the traditions of his tribe or not, he had ceased to profess Christianity; under his instructions a trader, Mr. Rook, was threatened, and his store looted by an armed band and £300 demanded as a fine. It was said he had detained the letter telling of Oscar's arrival.

Meanwhile there had arrived at the Great Place two men, representing themselves to be German officers, and they presented Umquikela and Umhlangaza with swords, medals, and flags.

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*: G.52 of 1888, p.6.
†Hargreaves' Diary, 13.8.87.
‡Hargreaves' Diary, 24.8.87.
§Hargreaves' Diary, 27.8.87.
I Ibid, 8.9.87.
II G.52 of '88, p.98.
III Hargreaves' Diary, 6.9.87.
They appeared to be very active for reports of the coming of the Germans were freely circulated and believed by the simple-minded people and it was feared by some they might be tempted to interfere with the property of English residents, for the Natives were all in favour of the Germans and "hard nuts on the English".

The wildest stories were believed, the tendency being to establish the superiority of the Germans over the English. "It is said the Germans have taken possession of Durban and German immigrants are expected to land at Port Grosvenor with rifles and ammunition."

The Pondos also expected a cannon and a Nordenfeld from the Germans who were to get back all the country claimed by the Pondos from the Government. One, "Dr." Einwald appeared as the induna or chief man and it was reported he proposed residing at the Great Place, whether as a private adviser to Umquikela or as a representative of the German Government was not ascertained."

The German immigrants were rumoured to be on the way and were to occupy the land ceded to Nagel. Einwald was urging the cession of ground from Umquikela, assuring him of German assistance and repeating his promise at a large meeting. The Pondo reliance upon his support probably induced and stiffened their resistance to the road which the Government was making through Pondoland. It was progressing favourably when Umquikela under German influence objected to the proposed deviation. "Dr. Einwald was said to have written to a confidential agent at the Great Place that he was good for five hundred men and while at Palmerton misled

*Hargreaves' Diary, 9.9.87 - 22.9.87.
+G.52 of '88, p.40.
/^G.52 of '88, p.39.
/²G.52 or '88, p.41, 30.9.87.
all with whom he came in contact saying there were five men-of-war off the coast from which snipers and ammunition and blankets would be sold cheaply, whereas the Government had been crushing them for years. Though many of the rumours were wild and exaggerated in the extreme, gaining volume with repetition and circulation among a primitive, credulous people, yet there was some ground for official alarm when it is remembered that this Herr Einwald was the same, who, a year or two previously, had caused such stir in Zululand and forced the British Government to annex St. Lucia Bay.

The German Land and Colonisation Company had applied to the Governor of the Cape requesting protection while they "took possession of and settled on certain property alleged to belong to the Company in Pondoland". The Ministers replied by stating facts by which the validity of the treaty was conclusively disproved. In the first place, without British consent it became null and void. Moreover the arrangement between the Cape and the Fontoc in December 1886 had nullified all prior agreements. At the same time it could not be doubted that Nagel acting on behalf of the German Land and Colonisation Company believed himself in possession of a valuable territory in Pondoland and might in all probability rely on the protection of the German Empire. That, however, had not been accorded and only after that had application been made to the British Government. But even on the most superficial analysis the Treaty in a strictly legal sense utterly broke down. Apparently it had been drawn

*Walker, p.408, and above also Evans Lewin "The Germans and Africa", p.101, 25th Nov. '84. Lüderitz wrote in glee "I have today received a telegram from Herr Aug. Einwald who on 22nd of May went to Zululand on my behalf to obtain if possible a large grant of land, which will thus "mission ended successfully"; quoted from Adolf Lüderitz der Wagner ... von Herbert Hanoch.

†P.M.A. No.146, 7.10.87.
up without knowledge of the Port St. John's Annexation Act* or the proclamation declaring British Protection over the whole coast of Pondoland.† Further it purported to have been drawn up and signed by Umquikela in the presence of witnesses at Durban, but the forgery was glaring by the fact that Umquikela had never left Pondoland. Nagel himself, probably prompted by Umhlangaza, abrogated three clauses and substituted a codicil instead to give two boys a German education. By the concession the chiefs Umquikela and Umhlangaza had hoped to obtain large supplies of arms and ammunition and substantial aid in fighting to recover Xesibeland and St. John's River. Their aggressive attitude of the previous year was thus accounted for.‡

In view of these happenings and their disquieting effect on the Native mind, Umquikela was reminded that Britain had established a protectorate over the coast, including the cession Umquikela was supposed to have granted to Nagel; also that the Maitland Treaty (1844) had stipulated that the Chief could not allow master mariners of any ships to land merchandise or traffic with the Ponds in any part of Pondoland without authority from the Colonial Government. Then too, the German Government by an arrangement in April 1885 with the British Government had agreed to refrain from making acquisitions of territory or establishing a Protectorate on any part of the African Coast South of Delagoa Bay.§

Despite the proved invalidity and the unauthorised

†Govt. Notice 5.1.85.
‡C.5440, No.2. encl. Ministers to Govr. 7.10.87.
Cr. Scott Keltie, p.192-198.
nature of Nagel's actions and the indifference to Pondoland evinced by the German Government, the Secretary for Native Affairs considered the matter of Einwald's machinations important enough to require repeated assurance of German disinterestedness. Therefore the Secretary for Native Affairs called upon the German Consul General in Cape Town, who repudiated all Einwald's acts "which were done without knowledge or consent". He stated he had no intimation of German immigrants, and Einwald, he denounced as an "illiterate adventurer", who had already caused mischief in Damaraland and Zululand. Einwald retaliated by accusing Herr Bieber, the Consul General, of personal jealousy as he had come to Pondoland, not to rob the natives of land but for scientific purposes to explore the country. He again showed letters at the Great Place purporting to be from Prince Bismarck, Mr. Chesson and Sir Henry Holland (who utterly denied any communication with Einwald since his assumption of office). Though he admitted the German Government had not sponsored the movements of Germans he denied any connection with Nagel.

Amid these plottings and perplexities, the death of Umquikela occurred to plunge the country into more anxiety and uneasiness. There was no heir, Umquikela having taken no Great Wife. Therefore one of his sons would have to be chosen by the chiefs and headmen. The growing disintegration and intertribal

Ibid., "When Nagel treaty brought to notice of German Authorities in June 1885 a distinct denial was given by the German Consul that the persons negotiating with Umquikela were representative of, or acted under authority from German Government".

G.52 of 88, p.40. U.S.N.A. - C.M. Kok. 29.9.87.
G.5410. No.4. Holland - Robinson 24.11.87.
G.52 of 88, p.41.

Memo. on probable Successor to Pondolo Chief on Umquikela's Death, 8.3.80. C. Brownlee.
jealousies would cause confusion untold, but that was not all:
Einwald still remained in Pondoland. Rumour and conjecture became
more rampant regarding him and his compatriots, more of whom short-
ly arrived. A party consisting of five men, Hertwig, the leader;
Bockmann, a doctor; Beirich, an engineer; Hauser, a Swedish photo-
grapher and one Sangmeister. They, in agreement with Einwald,
denied all connection with Nagel, saying they represented the
Berlin Pondo Society and were employed to explore that part and
arrange for the establishment of a colony. To give colour to the
assertion of disassociation, and unfriendliness between Einwald and
Nagel, the former at one time leading a company of Pondo proceeded
to an arranged meeting with Nagel on the borders of Alfred Country.
They had secret instructions to arrest Nagel and bring him to the
Great Place. He however failed to keep his appointment. Nagel
had completely lost favour with the Pondo Chiefs, which perhaps
explained Einwald's vehemently disclaiming connection with him.
Nagel was declared to have behaved fraudulently with money given
him for the purchase of arms and ammunition. Einwald professing
summons from a disinterested visit but really acting on a Hertwig, went to
assist him in procuring the assent of Sigoa, the probable Para-
mount Chief. The latter, apparently under the influence of Umhlangaza,
consented to the transfer of the Nagel concession to the Berlin
Pondo Society on the condition that the money, not accounted for
by Nagel, should be refunded to the Pondoos. There was no
public meeting of Pondo Chiefs, headmen or councillors to discuss
the plan, therefore it appeared that the affair was one for which
Umhlangaza was alone responsible and could have no weight or sanc-
tion with the tribe as a whole, even had it been permissible under
the existing British agreements and protectorate acknowledged by
the Pondoos. The Germans, however, were in earnest. Careful

*G. 52 of 88, p. 42, 15.3.88.
exploration of the country East of St. John's River was carried out and it was stated that five hundred families were in readiness to come as soon as the necessary arrangements were ready. It was understood by British residents that the aim was to found the colony in defiance of British influence, and probably land at Port Grosvenor or at a suitable spot away from St. John's and although the German Government might refuse official sanction, they would, when circumstances arose, afford them the required protection. The rumour of vessels bringing German immigrants did not materialise but there were two or three Germans at Port Grosvenor who were busily erecting houses and a store and leaving no stone unturned in their efforts to reopen Port Grosvenor.

Though the Ministers could not credit that any intervention on any part of Pondoland could have been intended by the German Government, as it would have been "so entirely contrary to international comity" yet they petitioned Her Majesty's Government to obtain from the German Emperor the assurance that could be published "that the persons now intriguing in Pondoland were doing so on individual responsibility alone and had no official sanction".

Faith in the Germans seemed to die suddenly. Umhlangaza received a letter from the Acting German Consul warning him against believing in a German Protectorate being established over any portion of Pondoland. It became evident they were not able to pay the money agreed on to Sigoa. Einwald attempted to arrange for alienation of a portion of the cession to a Mr. Peachy from Natal, by which means he would be enabled to raise money,

\*G.52 of '88, p.43.
\+G.52 of '88, p.37. Minute of Ministers to H.C. 19.5.88.
\/^G.52 of '88, p.30. C.M. - S.N.A. 17.5.88.
but Umhlangaza refused to recognise any disposition of land by Germans to others. Under the circumstances Sigoau might have cancelled the concession on the ground of failure of the Germans to fulfill the conditions. But apparently it was simply allowed to lapse. A few years later, in 1893, when trouble in Pondoland pointed to annexation by the Cape, the "Treaty" was once more revived for a brief space to pass finally into oblivion. The land acquired by the Berlin Pondo Company was offered to the Natal Government who with this valuable footing might gradually incorporate Pondoland with Natal, which at that time was exactly what that Colony was agitating to accomplish. The deeds on which the Pondoland Company based their title consisted of a concession of 375,000 English acres "made by the Independent Chief Umquikela on 20th and 25th June, 1885, and confirmed by Sigoau 10th March, 1886".

Meanwhile the new road in course of construction between Kokstad and St. John's became the vexed question between Government and Pondors. In 1887 Donald Strachan had been appointed to go into Pondoland and arrange the route, matters of compensation, and, with his suggestions, assist the Chief in carrying out his treaty obligations. No objections had been raised till, after inspecting the country between the Intafufu Drift and St. John's, Mr. Jarvis in charge of road construction, and Mr. Strachan found the only practicable line lay by "Camerondale". This proposal Umhlangaza and Umquikela, backed by some traders whose interests lay on the old route, definitely negatived. Probably the Chiefs

*Hargreaves' Diary, 23.5.88. G.52 or 88, p.30. 25.5.88.


^G.52 of '88, p.7. U.S.N.A. - C.M. Kok. 29.8.87.

^G.52 of '88, p.11. C.M. Kok. - S.N.A. 30.9.87.
were abated in their obstinate refusal to reconsider the matter by the Germans who, it was rumoured, intended to build a fort in Camerondale and talked of a town on the East bank of the St. John's River. On the death of Umquikela, in spite of his having acknowledged Brandy as the cause of his end and that none had bewitched him, the witch doctors, probably acting under instructions, declared that Donald Strachan was responsible for the death of the chief. Some associated his name with the death of Umhlangaza's son and they proceeded to "smell him out".

Eiswald was rumoured to have encouraged the superstition.

Matters continued in this unsatisfactory strain for months, Stanford, the Chief Magistrate of East Griqualand, making repeated and fruitless journeys to the Great Place to negotiate the deviation, until, in August, largely due to the Rev. Hargreaves' efforts, the Chiefs agreed to the deviation.

Sigoau had been unanimously chosen chief of Pondoland. He probably would not have been the choice of Umhlangaza who would have preferred a weak ruler that he might himself usurp the power. After the deviation matter had been settled amicably, matters seemed to improve to so great a degree that W.E. Stanford was able to report, "the present relations with the Pondo Chief and his people are on a better footing than has been the case for

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*G.52 of '88, p.25.
\[G.52 of '88, pp.17 and 18.
\(^H^\) Hargreaves' Diary, 3.6.88. "The Ponds are not without right on their side because the Treaty (9.12.86.) can be made to mean anything and uncivilised natives cannot understand it."
\(\) Hargreaves' Diary, 20.2.88.
I Manuscript in S. Clark's writing "Stories of Hargreaves".
many years past". At the same time Sigou refused to recognise the British Agent appointed in June 1888, and in March 1889 he was withdrawn. Nevertheless "official" satisfaction with Pondoland was short-lived. Umhlangaza appeared in the role of instigator and agitator, as Sigou seemed of a tougher fibre than the nerveless Umquikela. Thus early in 1889 Umhlangaza began stirring up strife on the border, first with a petty chief Umbali and with the Amansis and then by abetting the Griquas to whom Umquikela had granted land in the Rode. He became the bitter enemy of Missions, as his brother Josiah was already. He libelled Rev. Hargreaves repeatedly in malicious letters published in Kokstad and Umbata papers. In these attacks he was undoubtedly made the instrument of the white adventurers and concessionaires who buzzed round Sigou like bees round a honey-pot, and to whom the latter granted concessions, mining and railway rights promiscuously, much against the Rev. Hargreaves' advice and warnings. He repeatedly pointed out the dangers, forfeiture of lands and the depression of the people.

The Cape kept more or less aloof from Pondoland affairs for the time being, as Charles Brownlee had hinted, and as the Rev. Oxley Oxlund had prophesied there was internal trouble, inter-tribal unrest and warfare enough to occupy the time and resources of the Pondos. Therefore after the German balloon had collapsed


Hargreaves Diary, 23.6.88.

Ibid, 23.3.89.

G.30 of 1886, p.34. Proclamation Ct. House, Pondoland. 28.11.85. Hargreaves' Diary, 18.2.89 - 23.2.89 and 4.10.89 - 25.11.89.

Hargreaves' Diary, 11.2.90; 18.2.90; 22.2.90.

Hargreaves' Diary 17.9.88 "I urged him (Sigou) to be careful as to what papers he signed. 24.8.89 'Heard Sigou has ordered the wagons of gold prospectors out of the country ... 25.9.90 'Chief can neither read nor write and he is urged to sign important documents conveying to other persons certain rights' and 29.10.90.

N.A.52. Memo. on Probable successor to Pondo Chief ... 6.3.80.
and the road deviation had been granted, official interest stagnated. Their continued independence could not long be counte-
anced under the large extending and aquisitive policy now afoot 
in the Colony under the aegis of Rhodes, but given enough rope the 
Pondos could safely be left to tie their own noose which would be 
tightened at the Cape Government's convenience.

Natal did not desist in her endeavours to canvass the 
annexation of Pondoland. But from neither the Secretary of 
State nor from the Cape Ministers did she get much encouragement 
on which to base her hopes.\footnote{C.5410, No.7. Havelock - Sir H. Holland 17.12.37. Request by Legislative Council and Durban Chamber of Commerce.}

The Cape Ministers in a lengthy Minute, submitted to the 
Secretary of State through the High Commissioner, accused Natal of 
sympathising with the Pondos, not because they were in the right 
but because Natal considered she (Natal) had a better right to 
Griqualand East than the Cape Colony. With regard to matters 
in 1886 the bitter feeling in Pondoland was raised to the highest 
pitch by Fowle, Pasmore and Holyneux, delegates of the Kokstad 
Political Association, "composed principally of persons from Natal, 
and in close connection with that Colony". The Ministers further 
declared that messages were continually being forwarded to Pondo-
land from Natal offering moral support. "As all the expense and 
burthen of maintaining peace with Pondoland had fallen on the Cape 
... the Ministers thought the decision of Her Majesty's Government 
announced by the Secretary of State to the Governor of Natal 
justified."\footnote{C.5410, No.8. Holland - Havelock 31.1.38.} Further, the Cape stated "the interests of Natal in
Pondoland from a commercial point of view were more imaginary than real, consisting of a few Kaffir Trading Stations in the country supported by Natal Houses. Port St. John's was already a part of the Cape Colony which had recently at its own expense constructed roads from that port through Western Pondoland and through Eastern Pondoland to Kokstad. The Ministers concluded with a definite repudiation of the aspirations of Natal both as regards East Griqualand and Pondoland, as these districts were one physically and formed the natural head of the Transkeian Territory with the Colonial Seaport of St. John's; "the geographical position and existing political relations render it apparent that the annexation of Pondoland to Natal would inevitably lead to serious complications between the Government of Natal and the Cape". Thus the Cape Government had not the slightest intention of surrendering East Griqualand to Natal, "however much the people of that Colony may desire it — nor will they surrender Port St. John's".

Trade rivalry between the two colonies was becoming acute. Facilities previously accorded had been rescinded and Cape Merchants were given preference in East Griqualand and Pondoland. Since the discovery of gold in the Transvaal much of the former interest in the Kimberley Diamond Fields had been diverted there and "the maritime colonies began to scheme for the lion-share of the Transvaal trade and for the immediate extension of their railways towards the Rand". Natal had the advantage of the Cape in her "favourable geographical position" with regard to both the Free State and the Transvaal. By 1898 the Cape and

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† Van der Poel, p. 25.
‡ Ibid, p. 43.
the Free State made a convention by which the latter was at last to benefit from the custom duties. "Natal protested vainly against this arrangement which would cripple her own Free State trade with a protective duty deliberately imposed to defeat every competitive lowering of her own charges." The only concession she could gain was a promise from the Free State that no duty would be charged on goods passing through that country to the Transvaal, whose ever-growing markets were still open to whatever inducements the rival ports might offer. She now pushed on her railway with as much expedition as possible towards the Transvaal, aiming to become the "feeder of the Rand". For this reason, despite the loss of Free State markets, she preferred to remain "free of the trammels" of a customs agreement, that she might entice the Transvaal with a low tariff - having already the great advantage of a port 182 miles nearer the Rand than any Cape port. The Cape too was pushing ahead with her railway construction.

Meanwhile, with the commencement of hostilities between Sigoeu and his "wicked Uncle" Umhlangaza, Natal's border was violated time and again; refugees and cattle invaded Alfred County with the inevitable repercussions on Natal natives living in the vicinity. Natal for her own security was forced to send Police to the frontier, and, needless to say, her anxiety to incorporate Pondoland became more urgent than ever.

The Cape at last responded to the stimulus of having her own borders of Griqualand East threatened and populations disturbed by attacks and descents of refugees and cattle. Moreover she probably felt the time was in sight when definite action

\textsuperscript{8}Ibid, p.42.

\textsuperscript{9}van der Poel, pp.42-43.

\textsuperscript{\textdagger}Theal, p.218.
should be taken. Under these circumstances Colonel C.D. Griffiths was commissioned by the High Commissioner to report on the actual state of the country, and invited to make suggestions. Colonel Griffiths' conclusion was that, "whether the Pondo nation asked to be taken over or not as British subjects, it is quite clear something must be done before long. It appears inevitable that the country must be taken over and law and order maintained". That was obvious, but by whom? That question interested Natal, who in spite of receiving little sympathy in her ambitions, had but newly acquired Zululand and was consequently feeling more important. The Cape, as has been seen, had little doubt as to the ultimate destiny of Pondoland. The Pondo themselves were given little consideration. Colonel Griffiths had suggested in a meeting with Sigcau that unless matters improved the Pondo would ask to be taken over by the Imperial Government or the Cape would take them over by force. The former alternative was rather agreeable to the Pondo, who dreaded annexation to the Cape. The Rev. Hargreaves advocated Imperial rule as the "temporary salvation of the Pondo".+

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* A.2 of '91. Cf. Hargreaves' Diary, 20.2.91. "Done to move the English Government or to justify the intention of the (Cape) Government."

'Hargreaves' Diary, 24.2.91; 26.2.91.
CHAPTER VI.

ANNEXATION BY CAPE 1891-94.

The Imperial Government had no intention of taking the Fondonas under their authority and within a short time of Colonel Griffiths' report the Cape Ministers and the Secretary of State came to an understanding whereby it was definitely decided within a year or two the Cape should undertake the annexation of Pondoland. Tribal strife continued intermittently, and save for an occasional "remonstrance" or demand for settlement of stock thefts by the unrecognized British Resident, Mr. Scott, Cape Authorities took little heed. The High Commissioner himself had visited Pondoland in October 1891, and told Sigcau he must receive the Resident and find him a place; if the Chief failed to comply the Resident would select one for himself. But no steps were

*Hargreaves' Diary, 5.10.91.

+Col. Sec. Off. Tour of His Excellency the H.C. - Interviews with Sigcau at Palmerton 5.10.91 and 6.10.91. Hargreaves' Diary op. cit.
taken when Sigcau shortly after refused point blank to allow Scott to enter his country. It almost appeared from the consciousness of Cape officials of the coming anarchy and disintegration of the Pondo nation that the policy from 1878 had been framed with that end in view. It was obvious, of course, that a small island of backward people practising barbarous customs, offering an asylum to renegade natives from tribes beyond and criminal whites, surrounded as it was by Cape and Natal territory and the only independent native country, could not be allowed to remain uncontrolled. Pondoland was bound to come into line through Rhodes' all-embracing extension policy. Moreover it was coveted by Natal, which in itself was enough to induce the Cape to determine on annexation. But affairs pressing for settlement and consolidation were very much more urgent than in Pondoland where the warring chiefs could be left to quarrel among themselves. They were not disturbing or infringing Cape borders to any alarming extent as almost all the fighting which took place between Sigcau and Umhlangazza from the end of 1891 occurred on the Southern boundary of Natal, whose Border Magistrates were constantly badgered with refugees fleeing across the line, driving their cattle, and on their return to Pondoland lifting those Natives and Farmers of Natal. To Natal fell the expense of strengthening her police force on the border; to her too fell the anxiety of the constant conflict disturbing her own tribes. Not only was she left the

*Hargreaves' Diary, 18.5.92.
+Cf. N.A.D. No.52. Memo. on probable successor to Pondo Chief - C. Brownlee 6.3.80.
+Hargreaves' Diary 2.2.88; N.A.D. No.104. Report on East Pondoland 3.1.83. 6.32 of '68. Paragraph 119 re Umdumyelwa roasted over fire by brother.
#Vindex p.390. - On Annexation of Pondoland 20.5.94.
burden of defence but she was asked by the Cape for active cooperation in the efforts to trace cattle thieves and recover stock— to which Natal readily agreed, while asking for cooperation and help the Cape had no idea of dividing the Spoil with her sister colony for at that time negotiations were afoot between Downing Street and the Cape which resulted in the agreement that the latter should annex Pondoland. It was not so much at the instance of the Cape as at the suggestion of the Imperial Government. Foreseeing possible complications and anxious to avoid, at all costs, expensive military operations, the Secretary of State hastened to define responsibilities more clearly. Thus in a telegraphic reply to a despatch by Sir Henry Loch relating to Sigoau's attitude to the Resident, Mr. Scott, the Secretary of State urged the High Commissioner to be careful to carry his Ministers along with him in "all measures relating to Pondoland, so as to insure, if possible, their willingness to take upon themselves measures which the circumstances might necessitate, Her Majesty's Government being extremely anxious not to share in the ..." The High Commissioner gave definite assurance that he was acting in concert with his Cabinet Ministers who clearly understood that if active interference became necessary both military and financial responsibility would be on them, provided Pondoland would then be annexed to the Cape Colony. This assertion was later disclaimed by the Cape Ministers who denied expressing this desire, but declared it was the suggestion of the High Commissioner and Secretary of State. In his despatch

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%'Col. Sec. Office - Natives Pondoland H.C. to Sec. of State 31.12.91.
\ In red ink in margin on copy of date. H. Loch - Sec. of State 31.12.91.
following his telegram (31.12.91) Sir H. Loch made the suggestion, alarming to Imperial Authorities, anxious as they were to incur no responsibility - that "Her Majesty's Government will doubtless realize that Pondoland being under Imperial protection, they will in all probability be open to attack if the atrocities which are of frequent occurrence .... are allowed for any lengthened period to continue unheeded".* Lord Knutsford made haste to modify such directness and declared, "the words British Protection are in this relation more suitable than Imperial Protection - the Cape Government having always led the Imperial Government to understand that it is willing to assume the responsibility for the conduct of British relations with both sections of the Pond people, so that Her Majesty's Government have never sought to initiate or enforce any policy of their own in relation to Pondoland affairs. Had this not been the case Her Majesty's Government would have given a much more minute examination than in fact they have given to measures, such for example as that of forcing Sigcau to receive Mr. Scott and to permit him to build a permanent residence in Pondoland country. On the contrary Her Majesty's advisers had always avoided any interference in order that the wishes and interests of the Cape Colony in relation to Pondoland might be allowed the fullest scope, it being always understood that the responsibility involved in the direction of Pondoland affairs ... was the concern of the Cape Government alone".† The understanding between the Cape and Imperial Authorities was concluded by memoranda by the High Commissioner and the Ministers. The former expressed the desire on his own behalf and on that of the Cape Government that every peaceful endeavour and personal


† Col. Sec. Office Nats. Pond. Sec. of State - H.C. 4.2.92.
influence should be exerted to put an end to cattle stealing and
disturbances on the frontier ... and that these results should
be attained through the independent action of Sigcau and Eqwiliso.
But in the event of peaceful efforts failing to put a stop to
the state of anarchy and misrule which prevailed throughout Pondo-
land, the High Commissioner understood the Cape Colonial Govern-
ment recognised their obligation to accept all "military, finan-
cial and other responsibility in connection with the application
of coercive measures which may become necessary for the estab-
lishment of law and order and for the annexation of East and West
Pondoland to the Cape Colony".6 These intentions the Ministers
confirmed and that "when the Cape Government in consultation with
the High Commissioner shall have deemed the time to have arrived
for acting with a view to terminating the state of anarchy ...
they will be prepared to accept all ... responsibility".7

The High Commissioner had suggested once or twice co-
operation with Natal,8 but it seemed on his own responsibility
entirely and not with the advice or sanction of his Ministers,
for they deprecated any division of authority.9 The Secretary
of State, however, noted "with satisfaction" that his advisers
were hopeful that it might be possible to avoid any active inter-
terece and "I would observe their expressed desire for the co-
operation of the Natal Government affords an additional reason, if

7 Col. Sec. Office Minute Prime Minister's Office 23.2.92 - signed
C.J. Rhodes.
8 Memorandum op. cit. 1.2.92. "This understanding with Her Majesty's
Government is not intended to interfere with any agreement being
entered into between the Governments of the Cape Colony and Natal
by which joint military and financial co-operation could be ar-
ranged on the basis of a division of the Pondoland Territory
between the two Colonies" - also H.C. to Sec. of State 31.12.91
Confid. "Possibly agreement might be arrived at with Government
of Natal for sharing military territory".
9 In the margin, in red, opposite the suggestion that Natal should
co-operate, H.C. - Sec. of State 1.2.92 op. cit. - is written
"This desire was never expressed by Ministers. It was a sugges-
tion of the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State".
such were required, for proceeding with caution and forbearance. For it would be difficult to come to an understanding with Natal until that colony receives responsible Government and as there may be some delay in the settlement of this question it may be well to postpone for a time any decisive action with regard to Pondoland.

The High Commissioner and Ministers expressed their readiness to undertake the annexation of Pondoland when they should deem the time ripe for action; the Secretary of State leaving co-operation with Natal an open question. Meanwhile the Cape Premier had to consolidate his position in the North and the disintegration and division had progressed in Pondoland the easier would the ultimate appropriation of territory become.

Natal had been left in complete ignorance of the confidential communications between Cape and Imperial Authorities, and the final agreement. She, herself, was occupied with changing her constitution and her status. Towards the end of 1893, however, she had become a responsible Government Colony, equal in position if not in seniority and authority to the Cape, and a situation whereby she might assert her power proved ready to hand. There at her doors were troubled Pondoland where Sinai gave notice of again attacking the rebel Umhlangaza and applied for Natal’s help in closing the drifts against Umhlangaza and his

*Col. Sec. Office. Sec. of State - H.C. 6.1.92. and in red in margin opposite above passage “This desire was never expressed by the Ministers of the Cape Colony. It was a suggestion of the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State”.

+Col. Sec. Office. Sec. of State to H.U. 24.3.92.

Lyders, p.204.

Conlid. L.P. 6.7.91 - 23.1.93 Deevr. Natal - Sec. of State 21.12.93 “find that Ministers feel strongly that Pondoland ought to be annexed to Natal. They complain the Cape Government have not attempted to take effective steps to preserve order in Pondoland and Natal is put to serious inconvenience and expense in maintaining order on the border. They also consider the boundary of Griqualand East has been unfairly settled with regard to Natal”.
ally Patockele and retaining any refugees who should cross.*

In view of the possible augmentation of disturbances and because of the "present confusion" of the territory abutting on the Southern border of Natal "where the State was most detrimental to the interests of the Colony ... Natal being used as a base of operations for internecine strife and the Natives in Alfred Country being kept in a constant state of ferment and alarm", the Ministers desired to suggest to the Cape Government the sending of two commissioners to represent their joint interests and to visit Umlangana and Sigeanu. The obligation to watch the border, entailed by these disturbances, had already cost Natal not less than £25,000, "in addition to imposing great inconvenience on the Government by diverting Police forces from their proper duties". † To this end to the further suggestion that Colonel Bartness, Commandant of Natal Mounted Police, whom Sigeanu had asked to visit him, ‡ should be allowed to go - the High Commissioner returned the same answer, that in his opinion, any "meeting between any but the High Commissioner's accredited representative, whom Sigeanu repudiated," was undesirable and that though he was quite aware of the gravity of the matter not only for Natal but for the Cape Natives as well, it must await the Prime Minister's return from Mashonaland. §

But the Natal Ministers were not silenced by such opportunism. They repeatedly enumerated the sufferings of Natal

§ Natal Corresp. No.17. H.C. - Govr. 10.11.93; No.17. Govr. - P.M. 17.11.93; No.27. Govr. to Col. Sec. 27.11.93.
during the last three years. Umhlangaza, established on the
borders, used the colony as a base of operations and when pressed,
people and cattle were sent into Natal for refuge. Facilities
for crossing the frontier were so many that it was impossible for
a small body of European Police to guard the line. Though both
Sigoau and Umhlangaza had invoked the intervention of Natal,+ 
and though Natal had good reason to believe that she might have
interposed with good results, the High Commissioner had forbidden
it. At length, they inquired cautiously who was responsible
for the state of affairs in Pondoland seeing the only channel rec-
ognised by the High Commissioner and the Cape Government was Sigo-
au, who by the former's own admission, consistently repudiated
the High Commissioner's representative.# To this the High Com-
missioner replied indignantly he, as High Commissioner, was re-
ponsible and they were mistaken, 'to think that Sigoau was repud-
iating his authority."

The Governor of Natal, Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, then
became aware of some secret agreement between the Cape and the
Imperial Authorities - "I do not clearly understand the position
and extent of responsibility of the Cape Government in Pondoland.
I was under the impression that Pondoland was altogether under
the High Commissioner but I gather from a communication from Sir
Henry Bish that there exists some correspondence between the High
Commissioner and the Secretary of State with regard to Pondoland
defining the position and responsibilities of the Cape Government

* Ibid and No.43. H.K. Alfred to Col. Sec. 10.1.94 - No.63. Darte-
nell to Col. Sec. 17.1.94.
* Ministers to Govr. 20.12.93. op. cit.
in Pondoland which was never communicated to the Governor of Natal.** When permission was applied for to show the Governor of Natal the correspondence of 1891-92 between the Cape and the Secretary of State, Lord Ripon, tried to urge a conference between Cape and Natal Ministers to discuss, and perhaps come to some decision, with regard to the division of Pondoland.†

Lord Knutsford, the former Secretary of State had made the same suggestion, in recognising the Cape's claim to Pondoland. He had urged delaying pending Natal's change of Government.‡ The Cape Ministers had, however, definitely implied their aversion to such an idea.§ The Secretary of State refused to interfere, leaving it to the Cape to act as they thought best. He stood by his predecessor's decision and would not intervene between two responsible Government colonies even to the extent of enforcing a conference. Probably Imperial Secretaries had learnt by experience the after-attached to Imperial intervention in Colonial matters. Then, Lord Ripon averred, looking to the past action of Sir Robert's Government and to the responsibilities to which the Cape had committed itself ... it would be out of the question for him "to maintain any claim on the part of Natal to have the existing arrangement modified" ... although like his predecessor he would be glad if the Cape would offer concessions to Natal.¶ He had treated with pleasure the possibility of a conference between the two Governments which, however, Sir Walter

*Col. Sec. Office. Sec. of State to Govr. Natal 16.2.94.
**Col. Sec. Office. Sec. of State to Govr. Natal 16.2.94.
†Col. Sec. Office. Sec. of State to H.C. 6.1.92.
‡See above.
§See above.
¶Col. Sec. Office. Sec. of State to Govr. 16.2.94.
Hely-Hutchinson was at great pains to explain, was merely an invitation from the High Commissioner to himself for a personal meeting.

The Secretary of State supported Cape claims, probably feeling as the older and more experienced Colony, not only would she have the greater right but also she would have the better resources. In a reply to the claims of the Natal Ministers on the subject, he warned them against listening to the leading Pondos and their European advisers who showed the more undesirable side of their character to Natal... and whether, if annexed, they would prove a docile and valuable addition to its already overwhelming Native population. The trade advantages would be small. Moreover, the hardships of which the Government now complained through the refusal of its Mounted Police being locked up guarding the Pondos border, so far from being removed would be perpetuated. He entirely overlooked the fact that Natal would willingly have "looked" up twice as many police could she have gained her point, and been allowed to annex Pondoland for which she had been angling for forty years. Further as the Kundis and Pondos had been at enmity so long, it seemed very unlikely to the Secretary of State that extension of Natal rule over the independent Pondos would extinguish warlike feeling. "I should think it would be recognised as undesirable that a frontier between two European communities should be over a great extent identical with a line dividing hostile Native factions... each European community being liable to be drawn into opposing the side of its own Natives - which was quite an apt point in consideration of the partiality displayed by the Cape for Kundis and Natal for the Pondos. In conclusion Lord Ripon inquired whether Natal in seeking Eastern

* L.B. Govr. Natal to Sec. of State 18.1.94.

* Natal Correspondence No. 28. Ministers to Govr. 20.12.93.
Fondoland was not going out of her way to saddle herself with a costly responsibility which another colony was perfectly willing to undertake. Thus he suggested in the negotiations which the Cape desired to open with Natal, the latter Colony should seek satisfaction by some demands other and less extensive than a claim to govern Fondoland.

Far from the Cape Government's desiring to consult or discuss Fondoland with the Natal Government, the only mention of a meeting to discuss Pondoland matters was made by the High Commissioner to the Governor of Natal, "strictly confidentially" and inviting him to visit Cape Town. Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson was asked not to communicate the matter to his ministers, then the invitation was extended to the Prime Minister and to one other to accompany the Governor. Meanwhile the Governor became aware of the existence of confidential correspondence. To the further proposal by the High Commissioner, reported by his Minister, that the Governor and his Prime Minister and one other should visit Cape Town, Sir John Robinson, the Premier, indicated that he did not feel justified in leaving Natal and, though glad of a conference with the Cape, he did think Natal Ministers should be expected to wait on the Cape. Sir Walter had asked Sir Henry Loch for a formal invitation indicating the special points to be discussed and in a private note stated the advisability of any interview unless the wishes of the Natalians were to be met to some extent. The High Commissioner, however, returned to his former suggestion that the Governor should come alone and later decide about a conference. Upon receipt by the Governor of Natal of the Secretary of State's code telegram 16th January, the Prime Minister communicated officially to his Ministers the suggestion that one or two should visit Cape Town and discuss the Pondoland question, as His Lordship considered such a discussion in the best interests of

*Col. Sec, Office, Sec. of State to Govr. Natal. 19.1.94.*
Natal. The ministers agreed to accept the invitation from the Cape Government provided the date fixed allowed of the completion of "certain pending business of great importance." In compliance with this the Governor again addressed the High Commissioner asking him to formulate an invitation and informing him the pressing business was Railway negotiations. Meanwhile, the Governor had received a cypher telegram for his own "private and confidential" information from the High Commissioner telling him in March 1892 Her Majesty's Government had agreed to Pondoland's being annexed to the Cape Colony.

Alarmed and distressed were the relations between the two ministries. Sir John Robinson was so suspicious of Mr. Rhodes' machinations that he actually feared the latter wished to interpose difficulties in the way of the Charlestown extension settlement by pushing on a conference, believing him to be the unseen force both behind the High Commissioner and the Secretary of State. The latter, Sir John suspected of advocating a conference on the advice of the High Commissioner, was cast as a matter of political necessity not in the interests of the Cape rather than those of Natal, when the interests of two colonies were at variance. "This always has been his idea and I have tried in vain to disuade him of it", explained Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson.

The Charlestown extension negotiations proceeding with the South African Republic were the pegs on which Natal hung her hopes of future competition and perhaps commercial superiority over the Cape. Thus the ministers were willing not to say eager, to confer with the Cape as soon as negotiations were concluded.

* L.B. Govr. to Sec. of State 18.1.94.

+ L.B. Contin, of Secret desp. between dates 18.1.94 - 9.2.94.
With such an agreement to brandish before their rivals the Natal Government felt that if members of the two Governments could be brought together to discuss questions of common interest, some understanding respecting Railway rates and customs union might result and it was thought the Cape would be most anxious to meet as far as possible the wishes of Natal on the border question. The Governor himself proposed allowing Natal to take possession of the Eastern portion of East Pondoland occupied by the disaffected tribes, in which case the annexation would be effected without bloodshed for Sigoen, threatened from both sides, could not refuse terms. Natal could not well be expected to incur risk, expense and trouble unless it were to secure an extension of boundary thereby. Sir Walter tried to prepare Sir John Robinson for the inevitable disclosure by suggesting that the Cape might have claims which Natal would find difficulty in contesting, and if Natal wanted an extension of boundary on the South she must give quid pro quo in the shape of Customs union or railway rates. Sir John Robinson was quite favourable as soon as the Charlestown Railway negotiations were concluded. Meanwhile co-operation with Natal to effect the annexation of Pondoland without bloodshed appeared necessary to the Natal Governor and Ministers. The latter had offered their aid in return for a reversal of a portion of the country to Natal. Shortly after the news of the 1891-92 negotiations was confided to the Ministers who felt it keenly, and though still willing to discuss the matter with the Cape they would not have it mixed with anything else, having recently concluded the Charlestown extension arrangements with the Transvaal and feeling in a particularly strong position. Seeing Pondoland gradually slip from their grasp they reverted to their old plan for annexation of

I.B. Govr. to Sec. of State 9.2.94.

Ibid.
Griqualand East. In fact the Governor thought the Government of Natal would probably prefer it as Pondoland in its present state would be expensive and not altogether desirable. At the same time the Natal Ministers were not sure that the Cape wanted Pondoland, but true to their usual dog-in-the-manger attitude they would not allow Natal to stake a claim in their territory. They even suggested the Cape intended leaving Pondoland independent as "an open sore in the side of Natal" until Natal should be willing to concur with the Cape with regard to Customs and Railway rates.

It was the Ministers' pride and self-esteem which suffered most by the disclosure. The fear of their colonists and constituents, for they were now answerable to Parliament, gave some anxiety. They agreed readily with the view of the Secretary of State that Pondoland by itself was a dangerous hornet's nest, but they did not wish to lay themselves open to an accusation of having suddenly abandoned the position they originally assumed and they were very anxious to obtain a rectification of the boundary of Griqualand East.

Anxious to clear themselves of the charges of supineness and inaction which were being hurled at them by Parliament the Ministers wished to make public the secret agreement between the Cape and Imperial Governments. "We are being misjudged, mis-interpreted and aspered because of our silence", said Sir John Robinson, "The Cape Government is gaining 'Kudos' by its action, while we are being charged with apathy, indifference and absolute inactivity".+

Nevertheless the Natal Ministers took upon themselves the role of martyrs and decided to suffer in silence the double refusal of their help and their aggrandisement. They decided to

*L.B. Govr. to Sec. of State 1/2.94.
*L.B. Govr. Natal - Sec. of State 16/3.94.
accede to the High Commissioner's request to postpone the publication of correspondence. In doing so, they claimed credit for their self-denial, and pointed out that they had in effect been asked to co-operate in the matter of the settlement of Pondoland. When the papers, carefully selected with passages curtained, were published, Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson thought they would effectually "clear the Ministers from any valid accusations of supineness or indifference to claims and interests of Natal".* The Ministers proceeded to write a series of Minutes, with the view of publication in order to justify their apparent inaction.† With the publication of the Pondoland Bluebook (Pondoland Correspondence Sept. 1893 - April 1894) they appeared to have achieved their political object, that of creating the impression that they had done everything in their power to obtain a reversion of a portion of the country for Natal.‡

As ever, Traders in Pondoland were not silent. The Natal Government had been memorialised by Mr. Bethman, one of the chief if not the principal trader in Pondoland and a Member of the Natal Legislative Assembly, for permission to raise a private force to put down disturbance,§ which was of course vetoed by the High Commissioner.¶

The claim for some indemnity for expenses incurred with regard to maintaining additional Mounted Police on the border of Pondoland and compensation and return of all stock thefts occurring since 1890 were points in furtherance of Natal's "policy" of vindicating herself before her colonists.\n
* L.B. Govr. to Sec. of State 16.3.94.
† L.B. Govr. to Sec. of State 23.3.94 and 27.4.94.
‡ L.B. Govr. to Sec. of State 1.5.94.
¶ Ibid No.27. Govr. - Col. Sec. 27.11.93.
In spite of the Natal Government's self-assurance that sooner or later the Cape would be forced to call upon them for help when the former would dictate terms, and despite, too, the Secretary of State's anxiety for a conference between the two ministries to effect some arrangements, the Cape Prime Minister, Cecil Rhodes, drove through Pondoland with a small escort, and without bloodshed or serious resistance effected the submission of the Chiefs and the annexation of Pondoland. The time was then ripe to undertake the responsibility. The North was subdued and native policy had to be stabilised.

In view of the voluminous correspondence between Cape and Natal Governors with regard to Pondoland and the latter's desire to share in the expense and partition of Pondoland, Rhodes' statement in Parliament announcing the annexation of Pondoland falls rather flat. Natal had not been consulted he said, because there was no time to lose. Hostilities constantly occurring between the Chiefs necessitated prompt action. Moreover the position taken up by Natal was impossible. They had actually suggested that the Cape should hand over the territory of Griqualand East. The Natal Government was not seriously disturbed by the annexation for they felt themselves in possession of resources not yet guaged by the Cape. Thus Sir John Robinson looked forward to a conference with the Cape on matters "such as the Southern boundary of Natal, Railway matters and a custom union" - but the Ministers were of the opinion a little

* L.B. Gvr. to Sec. of State 30.3.94 ... "The Cape Government has undertaken an extremely arduous task ... which (so long as Griqualand East is in the hands of the Cape) Natal is well rid of but that the Cape will not be able to dispose of ... satisfactorily without the co-operation of Natal, which it will be obliged sooner or later to ask. In the meanwhile for political reasons, the ministry feels bound to adhere to the position they have adopted ..."

† L.B. Gvr. to Sec. of State, 23.3.94.


 Vindex, p.392.
delay was all to the interests of Natal as when the Cape felt railway competition, as would be inevitable, with the extension of the Charlestown line and when the harbour of Durban was improved the Cape would be willing to consent to terms more or less favourable to Natal.

Thus in the end did Pondoland, the last semi-independent Native State, become absorbed by the Cape. Although Sigoau and his people feared Colonial rule, circumstances too powerful for him to resist, forced acceptance of the terms, unfavourable and harsh though they might be. Unconditionally and at one stroke, the Chief renounced a yearly income of £2,200 received from concessionaires for the paltry substitute of £700, being the subsidy promised by the Cape. The Rev. Clark suggests, Rhodes, in his desire for land rather than people, was chagrined at the Chief's peaceful cession of his country as that spoilt his plans and a very provocative method of administration was the result.

2. L.B. Govr. to Sec. of State 23.3.94.

† Thomas Hargreaves' Diary 17.3.94.

Map compiled from Walker's Historical Atlas; map in O5622 P. 90 and sketch map by H. R. Fynn in Cape Archives.

--- Roads
--- Boundaries
--- Past Sir P. Wodehouse proposed Kox should give to Natal
--- Encloses area defined in "Natal Treaty"
--- Line first ceded to Natal

Note: Unable to locate Camerondale between Umzimkulu and Umsimvubu Rivers.
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1887 C 9488 High Commissionership of South Africa and separation from Governor of Cape.
C 5022 Affairs in Pondoland - Suggested German Protection.

1888 C 9410 Affairs in Pondoland - Claims of Herr Kinwald and Herr Hegel.

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Map of Bontoland (photograph) from Shapstone Collection.