CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

In foreign policy analysis, political interaction transcends the territoriality imposed by state boundaries, creating an interdependence between domestic and regional/international environments. Thus, whereas foreign policy outputs are designed to effect patterns of interstate action; (1) the nature of these outputs is conditioned, inter alia, by the domestic environment, (2) with the result that foreign policy action is generated and constrained, simultaneously, by internal capabilities and external opportunities.

Shrinking the foreign policy arena to that of regional subsystems facilitates an examination both of domestic and external environments, since a parameter with limited boundaries allows for more limited focus and more comprehensive analysis of relevant variables.

Libya, geographically on the fringes of Maghrib and Mashriq, has found itself on the fringes of political development in the subsystems too, a position determined as much by historic legacy as by a (Western, cultural) inability to portray the Jamahiriya as nothing other than the experiment of a "maniac". In order to pose a more rational milieu and understanding, it has been suggested that Libyan actions be viewed within context of a three-tiered perspective of Islam: Islam as

(1) Plischke, loc cit.
(2) Shembesh, op cit, p. 4 and O'Leary, loc cit.
doctrine, the interpretation of that doctrine, and the implementation of that interpretation. (3)

When combined with the multiple historic legacies - religiosity locking to leadership in charismatic incarnation; parochialist provincial nationalism traditionally directed by and centered around either a patriarchal or charismatic leader; a sharp divide between the "haves" and "have-nots" which had crystallised into acute animosity between the rural hinterland (which refused to participate in the new society unless on its own archaic terms) and the urbanised moneyed classes; and the discernable influence of Nasserism - Libyan regional and foreign policy, within this context of the domestic environment, presents a complex prototype of the radical rich Arab state:

"Of course, it is impossible even to describe anything as complex as another nation's foreign policy - even by portraiture - without forming an overall opinion about it ... In my view Qaddafi's vision and actions are neither crazy nor haphazard. Indeed, what gives his goals as wide an impact and audience as they have had is precisely their representative nature. They are widely shared in the Middle East and Third World, even if some of the governments there would shrink from the extreme form or unscrupulous implementation Qaddafi has given them." (4)

(3) Haley, op cit; p. 13.
(4) Ibid; p. 10.
Libyan foreign policy, given its regional emphasis, has been ideologically defined by subsystemic determinants. The Revolution's dualist policy of militant Arab nationalism and commitment to Islamism was forged largely in response to two environmental factors: the country's historic lack of a distinctive Libyan nationalism, and its peripheral role in Arab affairs.

"Libya has historically been a land of discontinuities, of barriers to integration, of paradoxes, and, therefore, of powerlessness. Regionally, it is situated between the Arab East and the Maghrib, but it has rarely served to connect them, nor did it properly belong to either part of the Arab world. Libya was rather dwarfed by these politically and culturally powerful blocs, particularly by its neighbors, Egypt and Tunisia, which exerted their influence respectively over Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, and before Ottoman times Tripoli sometimes came under the direct control of Maghrabi dynasties. . . . In summary, a glance at Libya over a millennium shows a recurrence of three patterns: foreign incursions on its coast, an inability to form a fixed political system, and cultural contrasts between a visible urban entity in Tripoli flanked by hinterland tribal and rural populations espousing different values. " (5)

Geopolitically, the country's islandisation between Maghrib and Mashriq has meant that the three areas comprising modern Libya - Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan - developed each its own distinctive character. The creation by the United Nations of an artificial federal state and the imposition of a tribal monarchy compounded national divisions and contributed to the creation of a polarised state, doomed to the periphery of both Arab regions.

The last in the North African region to be colonised, suffering a particularly short but especially harsh colonial period, Libya was also the first to be decolonised. Arab nationalism at the time was strongest and most prevalent in Tripolitania, thus generating the call for a unitary state from an area closely affiliated with Egypt. The creation of a unitary system, an illusion supported by the Arab League, would have brought Libya into the Arab fold as a core member of the Mashriq. (6)

As it was, the nationalists' compromise - largely induced by the fear of antagonising Idris and his British backers, who had the power to force Libya back into Italian hands - resulted in the creation of a monarchical federation in which conservative patriarchal leadership not only quashed the nationalist ideal, but effectively alienated the country from the Arab League, which refused to recognise Idris's regime. (7)

Independent Libya then, was forced out of the Mashriq because of the manner of its attainment of independence, and because of its method of

(6) Abun-Nasr, op cit; p. 391.
government. Idris, however, given his Cyrenaican roots - with the
nominal influence exerted by the Maghrib in that area - was content to
affirm his solidarity with the Maghrib, leading the country into nearly
two decades of passive membership of the "Greater Maghrib"; making no positive contribution to Arab affairs, this despite Libya's
apparent consanguinity with the Mashriq - the ethnicity which makes
Libya the second most "Arab" country, the linguistic, cultural and
historic ties with the Middle East, coupled with the population's
empathy with the Nasserist creed.

The 1969 Revolution has attempted, through often drastic measures, to
redress this perceived imbalance. The focus on the external environment
has been one of radicalism, an extreme Nasserist-Islamism more suited
to the Mashriq, but inappropriate in terms of Libya's geographic
separation from that area; in the Maghrib, conflict-generating in terms
of Maghribi conservatism and largely resulting in a power struggle
with subsystem-dominant Algeria, the only other radical state in the
region. Paradoxically, Al-Qathafi's inability to find regional
acceptability for his ideology, has provided him with mobility in both
subsystems, thus for the first time, enabling Libya - albeit as a
maverick - to bridge Maghrib and Mashriq.

The Jamahiriya, the direct consequence of Al-Qathafi's Revolution,
has gained acceptance and a measure of respectability as another phase
in a series of historical transformations arising from Libyan

(B) Vide pp. 26 f., above.
charismatic movements. Chronologically, these have been the Qaramanli dynasty, the Sanusi cult, and finally, Al-Qathafi and his Revolution.

In an analysis of the Libyan quest for national character, Roumani has found that indigenous political communities, spearheaded by charismatic personalities, would develop in Libya to meet crisis demands, but that they would compound rather than heal the national divisions. (9)

The Qaramanli dynasty, founded by Ahmed Qaramanli in the early eighteenth century, dominated the Tripolitanian region for a century and a half and transformed it from an outlying Ottoman taxpost, poorly administered, into an autonomous regency, politically stable and economically prosperous enough to sustain entry into the Mediterranean trade circle, its influence penetrating as far afield as Cyrenaica.

The Sanusi cult, rising to ascendancy after the collapse of the Qaramanli dynasty in the mid-nineteenth century, was founded in response not to administrative crisis, but religious relapse. Its founder, Muhammad Ibn Ali al-Sanusi, wished to rescue Islam from its ejection in order to stem the tide of European encroachment on Muslim territory. Through the establishment of the zawiya lodges, he united Cyrenaica into a closely knit egalitarian community in which tribal divisions were eroded by the territorial and corporate identity, founded on a spiritual revival which removed the legalistic traditions of the religious establishment.

(9) Roumani, op cit; pp. 154 - 155.
The similarities between the Qaramanlis and the Sanusis could thus be defined as community building in response to crises in the provinces, the newfounded communities generated and sustained by charismatic leadership. The differences lie in their perpetuation - or failure thereof - of the newly established communities. The Qaramani charisma rested on military and political power, which combined to create an affluent society. British and French interference in Tripolitania at a time of internecine strife in the dynasty guaranteed the erosion of that charisma, which waned as the Qaramani hold on power declined.

The Sanusis, however, established and maintained their charismatic power through skillful combination of religious inspiration and effective administration: creating a society running on a daily basis in accordance with sacrosanct precepts. With the Sanusi hierarchy deliberately isolating Cyrenaica and preventing Ottoman-inspired urbanisation, this rural, patriarchal tribal community endured intact until the Italian invasion of 1911. (10)

The Italian occupation of Libya marked not only the first recognition of a whole statal entity rather than three distinct regions, but also the birthing of nationalism. Tripolitania, because of its close links with Egypt, harboured a republican nationalism, evolving with its adherents in exile, into an Arab nationalism. Idris, with his personal ambition for an Arrange, perpetuated the intrinsic provincial divide. With the issue resolved, upon independence, into a stalemate, Libya

(10) Ibid; pp. 155 - 156.
entered into a phase in which political direction of the nascent nationalist movement was suppressed by the federal government, yet fuelled by the success of the Egyptian nationalists.

"For many Libyans, the regime of King Idris had failed to make sufficient progress toward true national unity and was unable to manage social change. By the time of the September 1969 coup, Libyan society was adrift... disconnected from its past and prepared for no other future than Western-style consumerism. The prospect for genuine political community appeared less promising than even at the time of independence, despite cabinet reshuffles and administrative measures designed to reconcile traditional elites, the new oil-made merchants and contractors, and the masses who remained at the periphery of it all." (11)

Guided by Al-Qathafi's charismatic leadership, the 1969 Revolution aimed not only to impose a corporate unity on the state - through the utilisation of administrative measures designed to eliminate tribalism and provincialism, and with the formulation of an official dogma which decrees that all men are equal, which has then been implemented to enforce that equality, at the least economically - but simultaneously to lead Libya into the Arab fold.

(11) Ibid; p. 164.
Al-Qathafi's perception of political community building has been delimited within the parameters of his near-obsession with the ideal of a unified Greater Arabia. On the one hand, his efforts to crystallise the concept of the nation, in the Green Book, are indicative of the extent to which nationhood can be simplified in a state which possesses wealth enough to dwarf stratification in a population conveniently that small. On the other hand, the sophistication of the Third Universal Theory's stages of development of the nation, enabled Al-Qathafi to "universalise" the Libyan community by replacing its national identity with the transnational identity of the Arab race.

The resurgence of a hinterland culture in Libyan national life, (12) drawing on the hitherto untapped resources of the still traditionalist communities, effected by means of popular participation in the administration of government and the anti-Westernisation programmes, was as much part of a purposely transitional nationalism as the regime's manipulation of Islamism. In a country with no stronger allegiance to that of the predominant religiosity, coupled with an almost xenophobic mistrust of non-Arabs, Al-Qathafi's utilisation of Islam and Arabism as interdependent means to achieve the goal of community (umma), has gone unchallenged.

Although "umma" is a phrase reserved for definition of the religious community, (13) Al-Qathafi, in the use of the concept umma 'arabiya,

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(12) Ibid.
(13) Ahmad, Muhammad Aziz. The Nature of Islamic Political Theory, Karachi, Pakistan, Ma'aref Limited, 1975, p. 84.
has politically reduced the essentially spiritual to the level of Arab nationalism. His conviction is that once Arab nationalism has been achieved, Islamic unity will be attained: thus, without Arabs, Islam has no meaning, (14) a view held commonly enough in the Maghrib with its ethno-religious homogeneity, but not in the Middle East. Therefore, for Al-Qathafi,

"... Islam is not a particular society which blends natural societies together. The umma is necessarily and primarily 'arabiya'." (15)

Moreover, the deliberate emphasis on the Jamahiriya's Arabism - Libya's common geographic, cultural, linguistic and religious heritage with the Middle East - when combined with the Revolution's desire for merger with other Arab states, has resulted in a negation of the nascent Libyan character and stimulated the evolution of a "transnational nationalism", the commitment to the ideal of a Greater Arabia emanating from Libya - a state of mind inculcated in the populace from school-going age. (16)

"Islam and Arabism have become inseparable in Libyan ideology and have superceded the development of a national identity. Under the revolution, Libyan identity has become a function of Libya's role in expanding

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(15) Ibid; p. 154.
(16) Vida pp. 131-133 above.
both the realm of Islam and the power of Arab unity. This explains (i) Qadhafi's vigorous pursuit of Islamic alliances throughout Muslim Africa and the Third World as far as the Philippines; and (ii) his obsessive persistence in seeking Arab unity, far beyond the efforts exerted by Nasser, the hero of pan-Arabism. " (17)

In the enforcement of this new doctrinaire 'nationalism' in Libya, Hajjar discerns a series of developments in Al-Qathafi's philosophy, to his mind in conformity with certain precepts espoused by Jean Jacques Rousseau. In terms of distinct phases of political development in Libya, Hajjar identifies the first traces of Rousseau's influence on Al-Qathafi, as the programmes of 'Libyanisation' in the early years of the RCC, with the development of the ASU to be seen as the real start of a trend towards transfer of power to the people; the second phase, of "readying" them for this trust, is recognisable as the years following the Zouara Declaration and the emergence of people's committees. Finally, the existence of the Jamahiriya was proclaimed, for Al-Qathafi had "withdrawn" from active politics and written his Green Book, since

" A form of direct democracy had emerged, and the next logical step was for the leader to provide his people with a succinct theoretical justification for the experiment. " (18)

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(17) Roumani, op cit; p. 167.
(18) Hajjar (Qadhafi and Rousseau, in JMAS, June 1980), op cit; p. 185.
Hajjar justifies his favourable comparison of Al-Qathafi with Rousseau with the fact that he finds considerable convergence between the basic premises of the Green Book and the Social Contract; such as in the definition of the political condition, the statement of the nature of the problem, and the presentation of a solution.

The condition of man, according to both Rousseau and Al-Qathafi, is determined by political environment. Rousseau, on the one hand, in averring the innate freedom of man, believes that political organisation (government) restricts and denies man his freedom. On the other hand, Al-Qathafi declares the equality of man, which empowers him to govern himself - a right and freedom that has been denied man by the "instruments of governing".

Rousseau believes that man once existed in a state of nature: a condition of total freedom and independence. His existence threatened, however, man founded an association with others through which to protect and defend himself; thus producing the political society, and depriving himself of both freedom and independence. The state of nature could be restored only with men entering into a social contract which would perpetuate the protective and defensive functions of society, but which would be generated and sustained by mass sovereignty as expressed in the general will. (19)

Al-Qathafi arrives at much the same conclusion, i.e. the desirability of mass (popular) sovereignty, but by different means. He does not examine the historic evolution of political society, merely presents its failure - the "totalitarianism" of contemporary instruments of governing - which could be overcome by popular revolution from which will ensue "genuine" democracy. Thus, "... the similarities between them are more subtle than apparent. For both writers, there is an urgent necessity to restore (for Rousseau) and to correct (for Muammar Kadhafi) the human condition. Men must then act, either to form a social contract, or to wage a popular revolution in order to avert the threat to themselves. In other words, history must be controlled by the action of men ... It can then be stated that while Rousseau and Muammar Kadhafi differ on the particulars, the thrust of their arguments as to the nature of the problem, how, and why it should be solved, are fundamentally identical." (20)

The problem is identified, by both writers, as the impracticability of a system of government in which each citizen is, effectively, a ruler. Rousseau's solution is that the social contract be entered into only in a small state with a correspondingly small - and homogeneous - citizenry; the general will is to be interpreted only by a "legislator"; and a civil religion should be created to distract the citizenry from

the administration of government and policy.

Al-Qathafi, drawing not exclusively on Rousseau, but also on the Islamic debate surrounding the social contract, arranges his state differently. Primarily, he introduces the theory of mass participation, implements an organisational procedure designed to incorporate pluralistic interest groups (something Rousseau is suspicious of), and utilises the societal moral code of custom and religion to avoid the creation of a "civil religion".

Hajjar, his analysis based mainly on theory, concludes that Al-Qathafi has managed not only to avoid Rousseau's "paradoxes", but that the Libyan has successfully absorbed Rousseau's theory into his own - creating an eclectic dogma which has effectively overcome the procedural problems presented by Rousseau's theory of the social contract. It appears that Hajjar concedes this "eclecticism" purely because Al-Qathafi has, as the "thinker" also usurped the position of "legislator"; which Rousseau introduces, but which Al-Qathafi's entire doctrine negates; (21) when in fact, the subtle similarities between the two writers are outweighed by fundamental differences.

Primarily, Al-Qathafi has created a society replete with contradictions. There is not a hint of voluntary association - popular participation is compulsory; the general will is expressed by the "new elite in the revolutionary committees; the moral code is an adaptation of Islam, the

religion interpreted solely by Al-Qathafi— who may have advocated the desirability of mass sovereignty, but who has also ensured that his position as "thinker-leader" of the Revolution would not abrogate his power to legislate. Thus, he might have theorised about a genuine democracy, but he had also warned that society will continue to be ruled by the strong—in this case, himself.

The concept of a population governing itself, within the parameters laid down by a supreme legislator, is not foreign to Islamic political theory. The doctrine of the Islamic social contract, which is not bound by territoriality, but rather by the acquiescence of the individual to the contract, (22) might very well have been the source of Al-Qathafi's doctrinaire nationalism which recognises only the Arab nation in toto and not the territorial nationalism of Arabs identifying foremost with their parochial character.

Furthermore, he has aligned himself with revivalist political theory. Traditionally, Islamic political theory has rested on the concept of the divine nomocracy: the laws decreed by God, implemented by a community of believers undeterred by territorial limitations, and overseen by an elected leader. At no point is sovereignty ever suggested to be either man's right or freedom. (23)

Revivalists present a notable departure from Islamic theory. Islamists

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(22) Khadduri (War and Peace in the Law of Islam), op cit; pp. 45 - 46.
(23) Ahmad, M.A. op cit; p. 78; and Gaber, op cit; p. 52.
retain the notion of a god-given law, but imbue the Prophet Muhammad and by extension, Islamist leaders, with the quality of "inspiration". Thus, Rousseau's legislator is transformed into a charismatic leader, above and outside the law, who promulgates and enacts the laws which the masses, left to their own devices, would not have been able to formulate. (24) Ultimately, this combination of Islamic fundamentals and Rousseau's doctrine, if translated into practice, would approximate the purportedly Islamic system which has been created in Libya, where

"... [the population] would be usually guided by the 'Law' of the legislator, but if they had to fill in the details of their public life, the 'Ijma of the ummat' would count, that is, the consent of the community would decide. " (25)

Translated from doctrine into policy, Al-Qathafi's Third Universal Theory has not only resulted in the transformation of the domestic environment, but has had a far-reaching impact on regional and international interaction. From being a virtual vassal to the West, dependent on American and British aid to the extent that the Libyan Kingdom had no voice of its own, regionally or internationally; the Jamahiriya has gained, with its independence from foreign powers and its "Declaration" of national wealth, a self-confidence in external affairs which has manifested itself in undisguised aggression: foreign affairs becoming an externalised expression of the contemporary

(25) Ibid; p. 166.
historic phase (as defined by Rowmani). Within this context, Al-Qathafi visualises himself, and Libya, as entrusted with a prophetic and revolutionary role in international affairs. To this effect, he uses the Jamahiriya's considerable oil wealth to proselytize on behalf of Islam, while supporting several revolutionary movements (Islamism not being a requirement to qualify for Libyan aid) for the purpose of hitting back at the capitalist "imperialist" system. (26)

Al-Qathafi derives this sense of messianism from his deep-rooted commitment to Nasserism: the glorification of Arab history and culture and the anachronistic belief in the existence of an Arab nation, temporarily divided by colonial borders. Libya being the country most absorbed with the goal of Arab reunification, the Jamahiriya is, therefore, portrayed as the vanguard of the Arab nation and the custodian of Arab nationalism. Hence the desire to be truly the bridge between Maghrib and Mashriq, (27) an ideal which expressed itself after the 1969 Revolution in the pursuit for merger.

With the Jamahiriya presenting 1969, in the chronology of Libyan history, as the true date of attainment of national independence, the quest for unification, as the mainstay of Libyan foreign policy, presents a contradictory deviation from the norm, for governments of newly independent states tend to seek, as first priority, to reinforce

(26) Haley, loc cit.
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their territorial integrity - not to negate their borders and their nation-state identity. (28)

However, given Al-Qathafi's Nasserist pan-Arabism, his anathema for the nation-state is explicable when taken into consideration that he firmly believed that the Arab defeats in the wars against Israel, in particular in 1967, were the manifestations of Arab discord, caused by parochialism. Thus is follows that when domestic affairs are given any priority, the cause of Arab union is proportionally retarded. In formulating a foreign policy responsive to these perceived ideological lapses in the Arab world, Al-Qathafi chose to adopt an aggressive stance which would not allow for a middle ground: anything contributing to the cause of Arab unity - and by extension the elimination of Israel - would be just and right. Conversely, anything obstructing or delaying unification would have to be circumvented and eliminated. (29)

Stimulated, during the first years of his regime, by subsystemic disruption, Al-Qathafi delineated three distinct spheres of interest for Libyan foreign policy. The close sequence of progressive coups in both Maghrib and Mashriq (Libya, Sudan, Syria), served as confirmation that his primary goal should remain unification first of the Mashriq, then under the leadership of Nasser, and then of the Maghrib. Secondly, perceiving the Maghrib as a springboard into Sahelian Africa, where the lowest common denominator with Libya would be Islam.
not Arabism, Al-Qathafi wished not only to incorporate the region as an adjunct to a Greater Arabia, but to isolate Israel, which at the time had extensive interests in that area. Thirdly, Libya would be actively involved in the greater Islamic community, i.e. the non-Arab Muslim countries.

During the period leading up to the death of Nasser, and to a lesser degree until the outbreak of the 1973 Middle East war, spearheaded by Sadat, Al-Qathafi's preoccupation was with a merger with Egypt. His initial offer of 1969, that Nasser incorporate Libya into Egypt, rejected, he pursued tripartite federations involving prerequisitely Libya and Egypt, and variously the Sudan and Syria.

These early federations failed to get beyond the paperwork stages, not only because Nasser's death precipitated a policy redirection in Egypt, but because the ultimate objectives for each party were so completely devoid of convergence. Nasser, and subsequently Sadat, viewed any merger purely as an expedient: a demonstration that Egypt, despite the loss of face of 1967, was still the vanguard of "progressive" Arab forces; that it could yet attract, unsought, ideological, military and economic support, thus preserving its claim to leadership of the Arab world. The Sudan and Syria, unquestionably, were attracted more to the prestige associated with such close intimacy with respectively Nasser and Sadat (with a view to consolidate their leadership legitimacy at home), than to the idea of initiating the reunification of the Arab race. (30)

(30) Bechtold, op cit; p. 153.
Al-Qathafi, undeniably, was the only partner to be motivated purely by ideological considerations. Any merger, but in particular a merger involving Egypt, would signal a positive first step in the reestablishment of the Greater Arabia, which would lead, in his view inevitably, to the ultimate defeat of Israel and the restoration of Arab sublimity as the chosen Muslim community. (31)

It is not certain that Al-Qathafi, at the inception of the first merger, was unaware of the disparities on which it was founded; or if he knew, that he had hoped that by continued association he would be able to realign the other federation partners' motivations more to his own.

It is clear, however, from subsequent actions, that he recognised the need to establish a broader spectrum of domestic complementarity in order for unification to succeed. Since he was, in all instances, the initiator, the responsibility for effecting such congruence would be his. Hence, the creation of the ASU: modelled directly on the Egyptian ASU, its purpose, domestically, might have been to draw the population into participation in government; but in reality its raison d'être was to facilitate a merger with Egypt by duplicating its system of government and administration.

After the death of Nasser, however, the amicable Libyan-Egyptian relationship was steadily eroded on the one hand by Sadat's increasingly

(31) Knapp, loc cit.
closer alignment with Syria to the exclusion of Libya, and on the
other by his suspicion of - and eventually, attempts to isolate -
Al-Qathafi's particular brand of Arabism. (32)

Al-Qathafi, by 1973, had already set in motion the course of events
defined by Hajjar as being in the tradition of Rousseau, with the call
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but that he played "revolutionary movements, (33)
signified a veiled call only to the states to his west, but
particularly to Egypt, given his ambition to take over the mantle of
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in the Maghrib, partly in the destabilisation of neighbouring states
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(32) Vatikiotis, op cit; p. 91.
(33) Vide pp. 150, 152 above.
(34) Shembesh, op cit; pp. 212 - 213.
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(32) Vatikiotis, op cit; p. 91.
(33) Vide pp. 150, 152 above.
(34) Shembesh, op cit; pp. 212 - 213.
greater foreign policy shift towards the Arab west.

Rebuffed in its attempts to find partners for unification in the Maghrib, Libya turned to the Sahel with its predominantly Muslim population; at the same juncture entering a new internal revolutionary phase, with the publication and imminent implementation of the Third Universal Theory.

The implementation of a new, purportedly "genuine democratic" procedural system of government in Libya, with its concomitant social and economic upheaval as established traditional and normative structures were uprooted, to make way for a new society in which equality before the law would be dictated, in the first instance, by economic precepts; did not unduly perturb any of Libya's neighbours - especially when the text of the Third Universal Theory confined itself to pronouncements on exclusively domestic matters, not giving any indication that its "universalism" could be translated in practice from an essentially socialist-humanist (rather idealistic) exposition of government and administration, into a virulently expansionist foreign policy.

The first indications that Al-Qathafi would use the Islamic derivatives in the Green Book - notably in the areas of landownership, the role of the family and extended family (clan, tribe), the very traditionalist perception of the role of women in society, and the universalism of religion - to establish a common basis for association with the rather conservative Muslim Sahel; were in the greater emphasis of Islamism
in foreign policy, coinciding with a series of expansionist, opportunistic activities in that region.

Al-Qathafi's involvement in Chad and Niger, first on a subversive basis, then by annexation of parts of those countries and finally, by direct military occupation, was seen as a crystallization of the desire to establish a Pan-Islamic African federation, (35) justified partly by the Third Universal Theory's exposition of the global nation, partly by Al-Qathafi's conviction that all Muslims are spiritually united, but physically separated by artificial colonial borders. The pursuit of such a "Muslim empire" was based on a dualist approach. On the one hand, there was threat, and actual use, of force. The threat, contained in the creation of an Islamic Legion, a military force comprising some Libyans, but mainly North African Muslims: acting in concert with the Bureau for the Export of Revolution, the Legion was used to intervene in the domestic affairs of Sahelian countries. The actual use of purely Libyan forces was exemplified in the military intervention and occupation of Chad and Niger, resulting in the annexation of large portions of those states.

On a more subtle and less aggressive level, Libyan Islamist proselytizing in Africa took the shape of financial incentive: Islamic centres consisting of schools, mosques and clinics would be built, linked directly to foreign aid and technical assistance for the recipient countries' governments.

The Western Sahara dispute, in which Libya supported POLISARIO, exacerbated Al-Qathafi's already strained relationships with neighbouring states. Using Tunisia's support for the partitioning of the SADR as pretext, coups were directed against Tunisia and the Sudan; the latter having moved away from its initial socialist orientation, depriving Al-Qathafi of a grassroots socialist receptacle. The coups having failed, Libya expelled all Sudanese and Tunisian migrant labourers: not only succeeding in denying the parent countries a sizeable income, but also in alienating Numeiry and Bourguiba and, most importantly, losing the conduit by which Al-Qathafi had hoped to export the Green Book into the Maghrib. (36)

In 1977, the Jamahiriya was officially proclaimed in Libya, which had by then effectively alienated itself in the Maghrib and Sahel. The Camp David Accords, however, seemed finally to vindicate Al-Qathafi's anti-Sadat campaigns. Creating and maintaining the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front (SCF), Al-Qathafi was finally able to contribute, in a somewhat positive manner, to the coordination of the "progressive" Mashriq. Libya, to some extent, achieved a leadership role in Arab affairs during this period, involving not only the radical states, but the Arab League on wholesale level.

Success, however, was achieved at a cost: Al-Qathafi had to seek reconciliation with those states he had affronted in the past, but more significantly, had to make a considerable ideological adjustment to

(36) Sarhane, op cit; p. 38.
his foreign policy. The Libyan policy of "rejectionism" had to be modified, since the Arab League, having no objections to a settled peace with Israel, would not have itself guided in the matter of the Camp David Accords by a rejectionist. Al-Qathafi was forced into adoption of the moderate stance: that Sadat's "treason" was not the settlement with Israel in itself, but rather, that it was a unilateral act denying the Palestinian people their "inalienable" right to establish an independent sovereign state. (37)

The apparent moderation of Libya's Middle Eastern policies was inverted in the Maghrib. With the implementation of the Green Book in Libya, Al-Qathafi would forcefully translate the Theory into the design of "Greater Libya": the federation of all North African states (Maghrabi and Sahelian), with some vestige of a Muslim population, however small a minority.

In keeping with patterns established earlier, Libya's immediate neighbours - including Algeria - were invited to participate in unification. Only after their rejection of his offers, would Al-Qathafi activate the use of force, in this instance, by invading and occupying Chad for several years, ostensibly a peacekeeping exercise at the behest of FROLINAT.

The Jamahiriya's military involvement in the subsystem was not confined to Chad. With Egypt effectively neutralised and Morocco occupied with

(37) Deeb and Deeb, op cit; p. 137.
the SADR dispute, Al-Qathafi set about to destabilise Algeria—his most powerful rival for subsystem dominance and the only real threat to the "Greater Libya" scheme. Initially the Jamahiriya's financial aid to POLISARIO and its defense of Algeria against Moroccan claims that POLISARIO was allowed to use Algerian territory as bases for incursions into Morocco, appeared to be directed against Hassan's conservativism.

However, Al-Qathafi's patronage of POLISARIO was of such substance that Algeria was forced to increase its expenditure on the SADR, vying for control of the movement. Algerian concern was not with losing prestige, but with having a mobile army resident on its territory, under Al-Qathafi's tutelage; when Libya had already been using Chad as an entry point for its armed forces into Algeria by the end of 1980. Furthermore, Al-Qathafi had established excellent relations with Islamic fundamentalists in Algeria, having found a most receptive audience for his Third Universal Theory.

Relief for the predicaments, in particular of Algeria and Chad, and in general of the Maghribi-Saharan regions, was a two year respite, when Al-Qathafi realised that his Chairmanship of the OAU in 1982 was being jeopardised by his continued military involvement in the subsystem. He withdrew from all overt operations, but indications are that he maintained a covert, subversive presence in all countries concerned.

In the event, Al-Qathafi's Chairmanship of the OAU Summit was a
failure because of his inability to share African priorities. He thus failed to understand the need for compromise on sensitive issues such as the admission of the SADR and Chadian delegations, at a juncture when the OAU members, for the first time, recognised the urgency of pressing economic needs above the need to score points in maintaining the traditional radical-moderate balance in the Organisation. (38)

The collapse of the OAU Summit (convened twice without the necessary quorum), saw the Jamahiriya's return to Chad - but not for Chad to become its exclusive regional focus. In yet another eastward shift, Al-Qathafi became extensively involved in the Horn of Africa. Because the 1980 merger with Syria was never consummated due to Assad's refusal to implement the Green Book, theory and structure, in Syria, (39) Libya supported Ethiopia against the Syrian-backed Eritreans. Not only would this irk Assad, to a large extent reliant on Libyan aid; but it preferred the opportunity to enter into a security pact, the Red Sea Alliance, with Ethiopia and the PDRY, ostensibly to counter USA influence in the area, perhaps more so to explore the potential destabilisation of traditional enemies such as Egypt, the Sudan and Saudi Arabia.

At the same time, Al-Qathafi entered into a new phase in his quest for expansion. Abandoning the prerequisite that potential members of a larger or federation with Libya should implement the Third Universal

(38) Cervenka and Legum, op cit; p. A44.
Theory, he instead opted for a system whereby union would be achieved in stages. By initially emphasising the coordination of internal and foreign policies, he engineered joint sittings of the cabinets and Parliaments of the Jamhiriya, with, respectively, Algeria and Syria; South Yemen and Tunisia. Despite this breakthrough, Al-Qathafi was the only participant to regard unification as a possibility. (40)

The greatest diplomatic coup in the Maghrib, was the Oudja Treaty of Union of States between the Jamahiriya and Morocco in 1984. Rather than a true political union, the Treaty envisaged a loose association, or formal diplomatic alliance; stipulating that each state would retain its own administrative structures, but providing for consultation and cooperation and for a mutual defense clause, in which aggression against one would be considered aggression against the other. (41)

The Treaty, however, represented a compromise on Libya's side and a victory for Hassan, who suggested it. Libya had little to gain: one month prior to the conclusion of the Treaty, Morocco condemned sixteen Islamists to death (for treason), a clear signal to Al-Qathafi to back off with his Third Universal Theory. Other than the possibility of using Morocco as a springboard into Algeria - which had, earlier, entered into the Treaty of Maghrib Unity with Tunisia and Mauritania - Al-Qathafi earned some prestige, but no advance. Morocco, on the other hand, gained possible Libyan protection against POLISARIO, a respite

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(41) Morrison, op cit; p. 15.
from Islamist subversion, substantial economic benefits, and a definite respite for the OAU with Al-Qathafi's pledge that the SADR problem be solved "within the Arab context". (42)

Efforts to export the Third Universal Theory, despite renewed good relations with the Sudan, were dealt a further blow by the Libyan expansion, in 1985, of the entire Tunisian, Egyptian, Malian and Niger labour forces. Justified in terms of Egypt's refusal to renounce the Camp David Accords in exchange for which Libya would replace in full American aid to Egypt, and in terms of Tunisia's closer links with Algeria (which had just occupied gas-rich Libyan land on its border); Al-Qathafi claimed that as long as migrants took money home, they would sustain pro-American and therefore pro-Camp David regimes. The expulsions, thus, were portrayed as essentially anti-American, not anti-Arab. (43)

It would appear, however, that there was an ulterior motive behind the economic punishment inflicted on these neighbouring states: Al-Qathafi's longstanding demand that migrant labourers adopt Libyan citizenship, had consistently been rejected. He had hoped to create, overnight, a scenario in which thousands of "Libyans" (i.e. migrants with dual citizenship) sometimes resided in neighbouring countries, granting him the right to intervene, on their behalf, in the domestic affairs of their "host" states - a unique opportunity to impose his philosophy on the subsystem. The loss of these migrants, however, could be turned

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(42) Ibid.
(43) Sbai, loc cit.
into an advantage. Given the Jamahiriya's newfound good relations with the Sudan and its "federal" partner, Morocco, the substitution of the labour force with Sudanese and Moroccans might well have the desired effect in terms of exportation of the Green Book, particularly in view of the fact that Morocco had agreed to the establishment of a joint legislature with Libya.

With the Maghreb situation, in 1986, of Libyan isolation and contact only with one "progressive" and one "reactionary" state, Al-Qathafi reached an identical stalemate in the Mashriq: close relations with only one "progressive", Syria, and one "reactionary" state, Saudi Arabia. The latter, seeking rapprochement with Libya in order to avert a possible escalation of the Gulf War, was motivated by the desire for Al-Qathafi to mediate with Iran, which had been using the war as a smokescreen while actively destabilising Saudi Arabia.

The Jamahiriya's commitment to a "Third Universal Theory" found expression not only in its Islamist domestic structures, seeking to impose political community on the state, but in the international arena too. An extension of the Libyan Republic's initial policy of international neutralism, it remains characterised by the typical Third World distortion of the concept of non-alignment: a deepseated resentment of the ex-colonial Western powers, a particular aversion for the USA, perceived as the leading power in the West; and a willingness to collaborate with the USSR, within parameters defined so as not to cause absorption into the Soviet satellite system.
As a result, Libya's relations with the superpowers, in particular with the Soviet Union, have been characterised by a dichotomy. (44) On the one hand, there has been the condemnation and rejection of the superpowers' ideologies; on the other hand, there exists a tactical expediency which allows Libya to purchase from the Soviets the arms it needs for its expansionist policies, and from the Western powers the technology required to maintain the state's infrastructure.

During the early years of the RCC regime, the USA acted as a benign benefactor. Aware of Al-Qathafi's virulent anti-communism, the American administration twice prevented coups in Libya, seeking to consolidate Al-Qathafi's leadership position in order to contain Soviet expansionism. (45) Al-Qathafi's commitment, however, to violence in the quest for Arab leadership, soon caused the relationship to deteriorate into mutual enmity.

Libyan relations with the Soviet Union, although of a more enduring nature, have similarly exhibited Al-Qathafi's ability to exploit the superpower conflict to his advantage. Whilst benefitting from extensive Soviet nuclear technology and expertise, (46) and military cooperation enough for Libya to threaten to join the Warsaw Pact, (47) the Soviet Union has not been allowed to gain a military foothold in Libya, not even access to warmwater ports. In real terms, the Soviet Union's only gain has been Libya's destabilisation of areas...

(44) St. John (Soviet Penetration of Libya, In: The World Today, Volume 38, Number 4, April 1982), loc cit.
(47) Ibid.
within the Western sphere of interest (e.g. Chad, Egypt) and the
debilitation of Western influence in both subsystems. President
Reagan's concern with Libya has been dictated by the perception that
Al-Qathafi must be "taught a lesson", precisely because he is, ultimately,
not a Soviet puppet - at most, a "nuisance". (48) Not even the
spectre of a nuclear threat emanates from Libya, for the USA is well
aware of the fact that unlike French, American or Canadian nuclear
technology and uranium supply agreements, no Soviet contract has ever
led to proliferation or diversion to weapons manufacture. Thus, the
Soviet involvement in the Libyan nuclear industry is the most reliable
guarantee of Libya's non-attainment of aggressive nuclear power. (49)

It has been noted that, despite its maverick appearance, the most
pronounced facet of Libyan regional and foreign policy has been its
consistency. The Revolution's creed of "Freedom, Socialism and Unity",
as pronounced during the early years, has merely been refined and
redefined as an expansionist Nasserist-Islamism. Al-Qathafi's
commitment to violence could, therefore, be viewed not as a
discernable policy, but rather as a tactic, supposed to induce the
"radical change" he seeks.

Hence, the Jamahiriya's isolation: from the adoption of an
anachronistic perception, Al-Qathafi has created a stagnation. Libyan
regional policies may have exhibited action, but there has been no

(48) Haley, op cit; p. 268.
(49) Wright, op cit; p. 41.
fundamental growth; leaving Al-Qathafi in a stasis - an indication
of his lack of comprehension of the realities confronting and giving
substance to the Arab world. (50)

Domestically, the pattern has been reproduced. Attempting to quell
discontent in the face of economic hardship following the decline of
oil revenues, Al-Qathafi sought, not to modify the policies giving rise
to the most discontent, but to enshroud them, and his political
reputation, in rhetoric: enforcing the fundamental tenets of the Third
Universal Theory amongst the younger generations, particularly amongst
the schoolgoing children of the disadvantaged; politicising the young
and underprivileged; eroding the power of the religious establishment;
and ensuring the survival of his new society by destroying and
fragmenting independent economic and social structures which could lend
a supportive base to political organisation. Moreover, Al-Qathafi's
central position in the structure of the Jamahiriya has been so
entrenched - American actions actually reinforcing his charisma - that
no other person could sustain the system without having to annihilate
the very fabric of the society, so painstakingly rebuilt over the past
two decades. (51)

In the final analysis, the Third Universal Theory, conditioned as it is
by eclectic Nasserism and Islamism, enveloped in an aggressive ethos

(50) St. John (Terrorism and Libyan Foreign Policy, In: The World
(51) Anderson Lisa "Qadhdhafi and His Opposition", In: The Middle
East Volume 40, Number 2, Spring 1986; pp. 223-234.
which does not shrink from the use of subversion to achieve its goals, has been constrained not merely by its inherent nature, but by the geopolitical fluidity of the subsystems it wishes to penetrate: uncomprehending of the geographic and historical synchronisation sustaining and driving Arab East and Arab West, it has caused its own stasis.

Mindful of further economic complexities in the Arab sphere, one must conclude that on the positive side, Libya, with one of the highest per capita incomes in the world, has enabled its people's committees and congresses to translate their decisions into actions. Hence, the massive developmental programmes of the past decade. However, the crux of the concept Jamahiriya being its universalism, the doctrine generates its own demand for exportation - into two subsystems where poverty and ethnic heterogeneity are the norm and where, consequently, participatory democracy could be nothing other than an exercise in frustration. Jamahiriya is a luxury very few - if any - can afford. (52)

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