SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNTS OF REALISM IN APPLICATION TO FILM

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SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNTS OF REALISM IN APPLICATION TO FILM

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This dissertation attempts to provide an account of realism which may then be applied to film, both as an elucidation and as a test of the account.

The dissertation draws its account of realism from a variety of perspectives. The account is derived from the contribution of the philosophy of art, developed in terms of the analysis of the process of image making and reading and then applied to film through medium based and linguistic approaches.

The outcome is an account of realism posited on the dual notions of familiarity and discovery in terms of the realist work of art, its creation and perception. It is an account of realism as an effect and as such dismisses any contents-based approach to realism.

The successful application of this account to the case of film denies the essentialist notion of film which argues for a special tie between film and reality. The realism of the effects operating in film are shown to relate directly to the notions of familiarity and discovery as the account of realism derived in relation to the other arts argues.
DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Master of Arts in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.

[Signature]

Peter Charles de Greeff

31st day of July, 1986.
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There is a tendency in the post-modern age to be dismissive of the problem of realism as if it is no longer important that an adequate account be given. In part this may account for the reluctance with which film was admitted to the pantheon of the arts and the lack of interest evinced by philosophers of art.

But film, in bringing representation to a previously unparalleled acme of realism, has taken art to the very brink of the real. Any account of realism would have to accommodate film as the outermost limit of its applicability.

This dissertation is an attempt to derive an account of realism that may be successfully applied to film.

In this task I have profited enormously from the guidance of my supervisors Penny Levitt and Susan van Zyl of the departments of Philosophy and Communication Studies respectively, at the University of the Witwatersrand.

Channelling my enthusiasm for film into the strict discipline of a dissertation has not been an easy task. But it will have been worthwhile if it can provide the reader with a handhold on the elusive concept of realism not least as it is applied to film.
"Of all the changes of language a traveller in distant lands must face, none equals that which awaits him in the city of Hypatia, because the change regards not words, but things. I entered Hypatia one morning, a magnolia garden was reflected in blue lagoons, I walked among the hedges, sure I would discover young and beautiful ladies bathing, but at the bottom of the water, crabs were biting the eyes of the suicides, stones tied round their necks, their hair green with seaweed.

I felt cheated and I decided to demand justice of the sultan. I climbed the porphyry steps of the palace with the highest domes, I crossed six tiled courtyards with fountains. The central hall was barred by iron gratings: convicts with black chains on their feet were hauling up basalt blocks from a quarry that opened underground.

I could only question the philosophers. I entered the great library, I became lost among shelves collapsing under the vellum bindings, I followed the alphabetical order of last alphabets, up and down halls, stairs, bridges. In the most remote papyrus cabinet, in a cloud of smoke, the dazed eyes of an adolescent appeared to me, as he lay on a mat, his lips glued to an opium pipe.

'Where is the sage?'

The smoker pointed out of the window. It was a garden with children's games: ninepins, a swing, a top. The philosopher was seated on the lawn. He said: 'Signs form a language, but not the one you think you know'.

I had realized I had to free myself from the images which in the past had announced to me the things I sought: only then would I succeed in understanding the languages of Hypatia.

Now I have only to hear the neighing of horses and the cracking of
whips and I am seized with amorous trepidation: in Hypatia you have to go to the stables and riding rings to see the beautiful women who mount the saddle, thighs naked, greaves on their claves, and as soon as a young foreigner approaches, they fling him on the piles of hay or sawdust and press their firm nipples against him.

And when my spirit wants no stimulus or nourishment save music, I know it is to be sought in the cemeteries; the musicians hide in the tombs; from grave to grave flute trills, harp chords answer one another.

True, also in Hypatia the day will come when my only desire will be to leave. I know I must not go down to the harbour then, but climb to the citadel's highest pinnacle and wait for a ship to go by up there. But will it ever go by? There is no language without deceit.

Italo Calvino  Invisible Cities
London: Picador 1979
"The ancients built Valdrada on the shores of a lake, with houses all verandas one above the other, and high streets whose railed parapets look out over the water. Thus the traveller, arriving, sees two cities: one erect above the lake, and the other reflected, upside-down. Nothing exists or happens in the one Valdrada that the other Valdrada does not repeat, because the city was so constructed that its every point would be reflected in its mirror, and the Valdrada down in the water contains not only all the flutings and juttings of the facades that rise above the lake, but also the rooms, interiors with ceilings and floors, the perspective of the halls, the mirrors of the wardrobes.

Valdrada's inhabitants know that each of their actions is, at once, that action and its mirror image, which possesses the special dignity of images, and this awareness prevents them from forgetfulness. Even when lovers twist their naked bodies, skin against skin, seeking the position that will give one the most pleasure in the other, even when the murderers plunge the knife into the black veins of the neck and more clotted blood pours out the more they press the blade that slips between the tendons, it is not so much their copulating or murdering that matters as the copulating or murdering of the images, limpid and cold in the mirror.

At times the mirror increases a thing's value, at times denies it. Not everything that seems valuable above the mirror maintains its force when mirrored. The twin cities are not equal: nothing that exists or happens in Valdrada is symmetrical: every face and gesture is answered, from the mirror, by a face and gesture inverted, point by point. The two Valdradas live for each other, their eyes interlocked; but there is no love between them."

Italo Calvino Invisible Cities
London: Picador 1979
1. INTRODUCTION

This dissertation sets out to provide an account of realism in terms of the philosophy and history of art. The application of this account in film will provide an elucidation of the account of realism through analysis of the attainment of the realistic effect in this particular art form while simultaneously acting as a test case for the account.

Defining the provision of an account of realism as the analysis of the attainment of an effect demarcates a specific body of work as having a purchase on the problem of realism. This body of work is limited to theorists who work from the premise that realism is an effect generated by the relation between artist, artwork and viewer (which term includes reader and listener). Limiting the relevant work in this way does not imply that the contributing theorists have all adopted the same approach to the problem of realism. In fact the theorists from which this dissertation draws its account of realism represent a variety of perspectives from which to approach the same problem. A preliminary account of realism is derived from (1) the contribution of the philosophy of art, (2) developed in terms of the analysis of the process of making and reading from an art historical perspective, and then applied specifically to film through (3) medium based and (4) linguistic approaches.

Film is of particular interest as an application of an account of realism because of the standard explanation of film's realism on both essentialist and content grounds. Cinema's so-called "special relationship to reality and the status accorded the documentary are the products of these approaches to film. Deriving the account outside of a particular art form before application to film indicates that essentialist accounts of realism are specifically refuted in this dissertation. Similarly content-based accounts of realism by theorists who suggest that realism is somehow related to the film
of commoners as opposed to kings, the everyday as opposed to the exceptional, the unwashed, the diseased, the unsightly as opposed to the ideal do not contribute to the account of realism as will become apparent.

1. Realism - A Preliminary Account

The preliminary account of realism is derived from the work of Nelson Goodman. His arguments will be the basis of the account formulated in the first chapter of this dissertation. This account sets out realism as a differential term, describes the relationship that exists between art and world and clarifies what claims realistic art makes about the world it represents.

a) Realism as a differential term.

To provide an account of realism that will be in any way illuminating when applied to film, or indeed any art form, the term must be able to meaningfully differentiate between realistic and non-realistic art. This is certainly the most basic prerequisite of a functional account of realism as it must be possible to separate out those works to which the term applies before anything further may be concluded about the nature of realism.

Goodman argues for familiarity as the basis on which differentiation of realistic works of art takes place, while dismissing the claims of resemblance, copy, illusion and information to hold the key to representational realism. Implicit in this notion of familiarity is the root of the account of realism towards which the entire dissertation will work: namely that realism is an effect, a mode of representation that has become familiar and that it has no unique purchase on reality independent of that mode of representation.

b) Realism as a description of a particular relationship with
If realism is an effect, a familiar mode of representation, there is the possibility of the discovery of new effects that may result in a new degree of realism. Goodman’s relativist position aligns him with this possibility as relativism does not allow for a privileged description of what is seen, merely different versions. A notion of realism that allows for the discovery of a new degree of realism suggests that the relationship that exists between realistic art and world can be characterized as: realistic art reveals to us new versions of world.

The account of realism in this dissertation is grounded on this tension between familiarity and discovery that Goodman suggests is the basis of our usage of the term, and not any question of truth.

c) Realism as a claim about the world represented.

If realism could be said to make any claim about the truth of representations there would be the possibility that realism is a claim about the world represented. But as long as realism can be applied to works of fiction, as Goodman demonstrates, there can be no question as to the literal truth of realism and realism can not be said to make any claims as to, for example, the ontological status of that which it denotes.

4. Realism And The Role Of Artist And Viewer

Defining realism as an effect necessarily involves discussion of how this effect is achieved and this achievement can only be understood in terms of the part played by the viewer and the artist. The process of image making and image reading is the province of Ernst Gombrich’s Art and Illusion which will be the central text for extraction of the account of realism derived from Goodman in the second chapter. Gombrich’s account works from the perspective of the history of art.
Gombrich's explanation of the realistic effect is that the viewer of a realistic work finds in the familiarity of the mode of representation a fulfillment of his expectations such that s/he projects into the work the illusion of reality. If this is true then the part played by the viewer has a direct bearing on the artist's attempt to achieve a realistic effect. Those effects which encourage the viewer's 'projection' will create the illusion of reality. The artist arrives at these effects by a process of what Gombrich calls 'schema and correction', a process of making which then comes to catch something in 'the real world'. At the root of the creation of the realistic effect is the familiarity of the so-called schemata, corrected by the artist's discoveries of what fosters the viewer's projection. To ignore the role of the artist and the viewer is to fail to understand the importance of the notion of familiarity for realism insofar as that familiarity is created or discovered by the artist specifically to foster the effect of realism for the spectator.

Where Gombrich offers an understanding of the role of viewer and artist in the achievement of the realistic effect as delineated in chapter two, the actual achievement of the effect, most specifically in film, will be investigated in chapter five through semiological analysis.

3. The Realistic And The Cinematic

The application of this account of realism to film is introduced through the work of the leading realist film theorist André Bazin.

Film, with its mechanical recording of images and its unique ability to reproduce movement achieves the realist effect with an ease unparalleled in the other arts. Film, as a result, is perceived as enjoying a special tie to reality - a perception that has been raised to the status of theory. That film does not need to be treated as a special case will be a persuasive test of the account of realism derived in the preceding chapters of this
dissertation.

The work of Bazin is the outgrowth of his realist aesthetic and the examination of his work in terms of the amount of realism derived through Goodman and Gombrich will serve to clarify the contribution of realist film theory and introduce realism to film. The more detailed analysis of film in terms of the account of realism will be undertaken in chapter five.

Bazin's explanation of filmic realism is a psychological one based on the viewer's conviction about the truthful nature of the mechanical reproduction of reality in film. Film's so-called unique tie to reality, Bazin identifies as the viewer's convictions about the objectivity of the photographic process because of the mechanical nature of photography. Bazin then attempts to argue beyond this a realism deriving from the sheer re-presentation of spatial reality by film's mechanical mode of reproduction of images. Bazin fails thereby to grasp the very basis of realism - that it is an effect, that it is not a question of what is reproduced but of how it is created and how it is perceived.

4. Realism And Semiology

Semiology offers the opportunity to analyse the creation and perception of the realist film that the chapter on Bazin could not offer.

By utilizing the work of Christian Metz to apply the method and findings of structural linguistics to the study of film the mechanisms behind the achievement of realism, as opposed to non-realism, as an effect in film will be revealed. The mechanisms for generating realism are set out as a set of choices confronting the filmmaker, choices which will either enhance or detract from the realism of the film.

Semiology will investigate realism in terms of tripartite nature of
the filmic sign as suggested by Charles Peirce: its iconicity is a guarantee of the familiarity unique to the photographic process of recording; its indexicality which results from the mechanical mode of reproduction of the camera and suggests a unique claim to realistic representation; its symbolicity provides the associative habit that is at the root of the generation of the realistic effect.

Through Metz the notion of coding will be investigated to find how realism is determined by the selection and combination of codes. Utilizing the specific example of the films of Stanley Kubrick it will be pointed out how one or other selection or combination of codes affects the realism of the film. While specific rules cannot be drawn from these examples it can be noted what considerations are taken into account and the general principles that govern selection and combination to achieve the realistic effect.

Deriving an account of realism and applying it to film through the different perspectives offered by Goodman, Gombrich, Bazin and Metz is an attempt to provide an explanation for realism in film and to suggest an approach to the understanding of the generation of this effect through an understanding of the roles of filmmaker, viewer and the film itself.
2. REALISM - A PRELIMINARY ACCOUNT
NELSON GOODMAN

The preliminary account of realism set out in this chapter revolves around the basic usage of the term realism outlined by Goodman.

A. The first and most fundamental use of realism set out by Goodman is its work as a differential term separating out 'realistic' from 'non-realistic' works of art. That this differentiation should take place on the basis of the familiarity of 'a standard mode of representation from which information issues with ease', as argued by Goodman against the rival claims of 1) 'resemblance', 2) 'closest copy', 3) 'illusion' and 4) 'information' to hold the key to representational realism.

1) The overwhelming tendency is to think of resemblance as the key to realism. Goodman's, by now, familiar dismissal of resemblance from the theory of representation at the very outset of Languages of Art (1981) states that resemblance is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for representation. It is not sufficient as resemblance, unlike representation, is reflexive and symmetric (Goodman 1981 p4). Resemblance is reflexive because an object resembles itself. The same can not be said of representation - an object does not usually represent itself. Resemblance is symmetric because A resembles B as much as B resembles A but while a painting may represent an object that object can not be said to represent the painting (Goodman uses the word object for anything a picture represents).

For Goodman:
"The plain fact is that a picture, to represent an object, must be a symbol for it, stand for it, refer to it. A picture that represents - like a passage that describes - an
object refers to and more particularly denotes it. Denotation is the core of representation and is independent of resemblance" (Goodman 1981 p5).

Goodman posits the notion of representation as a symbolic relationship in the hopes of disengaging it from the notion of resemblance, but it must be pointed out that although a symbol is related to its object simply by a habit of association, Goodman's use of the term is more correctly understood as coextensive with what semiology labels a sign - a unit of signification. The habit of association is only one dimension of a sign: the sign also has a real connection to its object and, more pertinent, here a relation by virtue of its similarity to its object. This latter dimension of the sign is its iconicity. Goodman's subsumption of representation under the notion of denotation intentionally blurs the distinction between pictorial representation and verbal description so as to separate the former from the notion of resemblance but the iconic nature of representation cannot be dismissed by this ploy. Pictorial representations are different from verbal descriptions precisely because of the iconic dimension of the pictorial sign. The root of this difference is the distinction between the naturally generated understanding of pictures as opposed to learned linguistic understanding.

The evidence of the psychology of pictorial perception contradicts the belief that recognition of pictures requires instruction in a convention of representation.

Hochberg and Brooks (1962) experimented with a child, almost never exposed to pictures, books or even labels and never trained to label pictures. In other words he was never exposed to the so-called conventions of representation: no association, no picture explanations, no illustrated story-telling. At the age of almost two the child was shown outline drawings, complex detail drawings and black and white photographs - he succeeded in labeling almost all of them correctly. Successful picture
perception does not depend on age or schooling or even IQ as O’Connor and Hermelin (1961) showed by getting subjects with an IQ in the bottom one percent of the population (under 50) to match a selection of spoken words with outline pictures.

Choosing the relevant aspects of optic information to act on is a skill that develops without schooling or marked intelligence. But it is a developing skill - whether it requires tutoring or not - the skill required to extract three dimensional information from a two dimensional depiction of the reality and yet clearly retain the distinction between the two.

Infants were trained by Bower (1964) to respond to a real cube and although this response transferred to other cubes of different sizes and at different distances, the infants did not respond to colour slides of the cube. The conclusion reached was that the information for flatness is relevant to the infant and thus pictorial information is irrelevant, as infants are controlled by binocular information such as that supplied by the real cube. Bower’s contention from further studies in this field (1966) is that:

"The infant’s performance appeared to depend not on static retinal cues but rather on the information contained in variables, such as motion parallax, that are available to a mobile organism viewing a three-dimensional array" (Bower 1966 p90)

- hence the importance of binocular information and lack of responses to pictorial information. As confirmation, Bower (1971) presented infants with pictures in pairs so as to simulate binocular information and found the infants would reach for the pictured objects. No effort was made by the infants to reach out to single pictures of the object.

In the case of older subjects Yonas and Hagen (1971) presented children (3-4 and 7-8) and adults (college students) with objects seen without the possibility of head-motion or binocular
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information and then with these factors available. The subjects judged the distance to the objects perfectly in the second instance but the three year olds all judged according to visual angle in the first instance. When the objects were replaced with slides the adults were unaffected even in the second instance which made it obvious that it was a flat surface now presented to them. But the 7 year olds did not wish to respond to depth cues once it was apparent that it was a flat surface. Here then is the development of the skill of perception with regard to pictures: from infants dominated by binocular information to children affected by substituted two-dimensional information to adults who are able to handle and ignore the differences between the two kinds of information. The same trend is apparent with regard to kinetic information so crucial to the infant but less and less important to the growing child.

Adults have the necessary skills to choose what is relevant when presented with a picture. Elkind (1970) showed his subjects pictures where many objects formed another object when considered as parts of a larger configuration. The youngest subjects tend to see one or the other, slightly older children see both but not simultaneously, and adults immediately see both and the relation between them. Where Bower revealed the perceivers problem in coping with contradictions inherent in a two-dimensional portrayal of three-dimensional reality, Elkind reveals the conflict between the overall picture and its many parts. A third perceptual skill concerns the ability to cope with missing elements of a picture. Gollin (1960, 1961) erased elements of outline drawings until they barely hinted at the original picture and found that the amount of outline required for recognition decreased gradually from young child to adult. It is not that the children fail to see anything, merely that their identifications are less accurate. What is lacking is consistent accuracy, not imaginative variety.

Kennedy in A Psychology of Picture Perception (1974) concludes
that Studies of children's picture perception revealed the following:

"First, training is not necessary for depiction to be meaningful, even with such abstract pictures as line drawings, though for the sake of consistency the pictures should be highly faithful to their objects. Hochberg's drawings were reasonably faithful to their objects - complete outlines were always given and some internal detail, too. Second, there is a skill in picture perception that involves separating the relevant from the irrelevant and, ultimately, making use of the total set of elements on the picture surface and their configuration. Training may assist the development of pictorial skills, but it is not necessary to train children or even provide much experience with pictures in order for pictorial skills to emerge" (Kennedy 1974 p63).

Cross-cultural research into picture perception is the second important area of research that has bearing on the convention debate. Observers like Kidd (1904), Bieleke (1914) and even Segall, Campbell and Herskovits as late as 1966 interpret the 'puzzlement' on the faces of non-Western cultures when shown a photograph as indicating the conventional nature of the photograph. Kennedy is quick to point out that such an inference is largely governed by the observers' preconceptions. A much more simple explanation is that the subjects are seeing, for the first time, a curious alien artifact: the look is not one of incomprehension but curiosity to discover how the 'trick' is achieved. Indeed, a square piece of paper with shapes on it is hardly likely to elicit any response at all from the viewer. It is much more likely that the subject can see what is pictured in the photograph and is puzzled by that very fact. Hardly conclusive evidence for the need to learn the convention in order to see the picture. More careful cross-cultural studies bear this out.

Nadel (1937) found that his Nigerian subjects, despite a history
of 'imageless' art, could cope with photographs of men, animals, even bushfires. He and Hudson (1967) conclude that there is no problem with recognition only with background to the picture or ambiguous elements, such as that presented by frozen figures. In this latter respect the problem is not one of identification but association which will depend on cultural differences.

Morogwski (1968a) found that Zambian subjects (especially children) had no trouble matching photographs of toy animals with the actual toys even in the case of unfamiliar animals. Even the evidence for line-drawings which might be considered a more overtly conventional representation suggests that no subjects even in the most remote geographical locations fail to identify line-drawings of animals and humans fairly consistently (Hudson 1960, Mundy-Castle 1966). Kennedy's observation is that many of the studies which seem to offer a degree of conflicting results can be dismissed as using ambiguous pictures in the first place or approaching subjects in circumstances unlikely to encourage willing co-operation (for example Black labourers in South Africa).

Kennedy sums up cross-cultural research by offering the following observations:

"Anyone who hears that Hochberg's two-year-old child named drawn and photographed objects, without trouble or training, must be suspicious of claims that 'primitives' see pictures as meaningless daubs. The fact is that in all studies most subjects identified most of the depicted objects. What the depicted animals and men seem to be doing is another story: when subjects have to say where the objects are in relation to one another, and what the objects are doing to one another, cultural differences boil up. Wild stories and rationalizations are spun when subjects are asked to do more than identify the objects in pictures. The common core to picture perception - across poor Americans, nomadic Bedouins, South African labourers and well-schooled children - seems to
be recognition of objects. Pec seem to recognize objects in coloured or black and white photographs and in line drawings without trouble" (Kennedy 1974 pp78-9).

In other words, what the evidence suggests is that the ability to interpret pictures, to recognize what is depicted is applicable to new, previously unseen pictures without the need for prior instruction. That pictorial understanding is naturally generated has led Flint Schler to call this property of iconic modes of representation 'natural generativity' (Schler 1986 p43). "Natural generativity" makes a symbol iconic. A lack of "natural generativity means that a natural language is not iconic. Pictorial understanding is naturally generated, linguistic understanding is not. "Natural generativity" indicates that a picture resembles its depictum in that there is "an overlap between the recognitional abilities triggered [by picture and depictum]" (Schler 1986 p187). It is "natural generativity that specifies the similarities between picture and depictum and the requisite amount of similarities for resemblance to obtain.

"It is not required that a picture should look like its subject in any introspectably noticeable way. Moreover, what it is like to see S [picture] need not be phenomenologically similar to what it is like to see U [depictum]" (Schler 1986 p188).

Thus specifying exactly what similarities are required for resemblance to obtain is unnecessary as the picture need not even look like the depictum; and establishing the requisite number of these similarities is unnecessary because the picture is sufficiently similar to the depictum if same can "naturally generate" an interpretation of the picture as being of the depictum.

Natural generativity indicates that resemblance does have a vital role to play in pictorial representation and Goodman can not employ the notion of representation as a symbolic
relationship to ignore the role of resemblance or even, as he would have it, to act as a corrective to the prevailing confusion of representation with resemblance. Nevertheless his basic thesis that resemblance is neither sufficient nor necessary for representation still holds and resemblance, by the same token, can not be the key to representational realism. We must look elsewhere for this key.

If one does not confine realism of representation with 'looking like reality' in any introspectably noticeable way - then what is to be the criterion by which we compare the realism of any two pictures? Goodman considers and dismisses a variety of other possibilities.

3) Goodman considers the injunction that

"to make a faithful picture come as close as possible to copying the object just as it is" (Goodman 1981 p8).

Realism considered as 'the closest possible copy of an object' is significantly different to the confusion of realism with resemblance. However the injunction set out by Goodman brings into focus the problem of what an object 'just as it is' could be and the problem of access to anything 'as it is'.

Goodman's 'radical relativism' asserts that there are many versions of world - descriptions of world given by the various sciences and depictions of world in the work of the artists - which can be right at the same time even when irreconcilable (Goodman 1964 p109). There is, according to Goodman, no one way a thing is:

"the object before me is a man, a swarm of atoms, a complex of cells, a fiddler, a friend, a fool" (Goodman 1981 p8).

One could not copy all of the ways at once in the hopes of achieving a realistic picture. But by the same token there is no world separate and distinct from any description or depiction of it. We cannot compare these descriptions if we have no access to 'the world'. We are left only with versions. What is
3) Goodman is as dismissive of the argument that a realistic picture is one that is a successful illusion, a picture that seems to be or have the characteristics of what it represents. This possibility displaces the key to realism from the object to the reactions of the perceiver. This is the notion of realism entertained in an anecdote like Pliny's which credits Parrhosios with going one better than Zeuxis in producing a picture so realistic the viewer is deceived into thinking he is looking at the actual object and not a representation thereof. Although Zeuxis painted grapes so realistically that birds pecked at them, Zeuxis himself was taken in by Parrhosios' painting for when he attempted to lift the curtain that covered the work he found that it was painted.

Because it is the viewer's responses and expectations that count this theory does not run foul of the problems that beset the copy theory. But that the measure of realism comes down to the probability of confusion on the part of the viewer between
representation and representamen is not obvious or indeed suitable according to Goodman. The possibility of confusion varies from object to object, person to person; the probability of confusion is rarely more than nil even for trompe-l’oeil painting unless carefully staged in which case even unrealistic pictures can be made to deceive. Goodman is clearly not impressed by literal confusion between the representation and that which it represents but would rather have it that the images are signs which work instantly and unambiguously to represent the objects but without any element of confusion between the sign and that which it stands for.

The confusion between representation and representamen that it seems to Goodman is at the heart of the illusion theory of realism is however not the only interpretation of this much maligned theory. The confusion, such as it is, is of a different order in the work of Gombrich for example. His account is not that the realism of a picture of an object is the result of an illusion generated by the viewer being deceived into thinking that the picture of a man is in fact the man.

This is the explanation of trompe l’oeil and does not encompass the full set of works considered as realistic. Rather Gombrich’s notion of the illusion that attends the realistic picture is that the viewer, confronted by a two dimensional marked surface has the ‘illusion’ of the real in the picture. The viewer sees a man in the picture, it is not that he sees a man and does not realise it is a picture. The ‘confusion’ is not a deception as the viewer, confronted by a canvas covered in brushstrokes, lends his active participation to see what is depicted on the canvas. The realism of the picture is that it gives the illusion that it is a real object in the picture. This is how the notion of illusion will be incorporated into the account of realism in the next chapter. It has no connection with the illusion-as-deception theory dismissed by Goodman and would perhaps be better served by a label other than ‘illusion’.
4) Goodman's third rejection of a possible account of realism as a differential term is the argument that the more realistic a picture, the greater the amount of relevant information it supplies. Goodman insists that there is no difference in information yield between a realistic and an unrealistic picture. A picture in standard perspective and one in reverse perspective yield the same information when appropriately interpreted. More recently Goodman has pointed out that a picture which employs standard perspective but contains a number of errors is more realistic than one using reverse perspective with no errors, which pays a lot about greater informativeness. Indeed, Picasso's 'Young Girl with Blue Hat' probably supplies more information that Rembrandt's 'Portrait of Hendrickje Stoffles' does.

5) It is this latter consideration that leads Goodman to a vital distinction between realism and fidelity. The two pictures may be equally correct, provide the same information but they are not equally realistic. Fidelity is not a sufficient condition for realism, and here is a key to an answer. The difference between the two pictures is rather that while the Rembrandt is real according to a key to its symbols, so habitual, so practiced that we are unaware of the process of reading, choosing, interpreting, the Picasso forces one to find out how to read it, what interpretation to apply to it. Goodman's conclusion is that realism is a question of 'how easily information issues' (Goodman 1981 p38) and this in turn depends upon familiarity, upon how standard the mode of representation itself has become. This is not to say that at some point in time our exposure to abstract impressionism will make this mode of representation so familiar we would not want to call it realistic. The literal or realistic or naturalistic system of representation is traditionally taken as standard and thus whether systems of representation will be accorded the status of 'realistic' depends on how standard those systems are. An abstract impressionist painting, no matter how familiar it may
become, will never accord with the current standard mode of representation. The explanation of realism as a 'matter of habit' further suggests why most of us labour under the misapprehension that resemblance is basic to realism. It is the mode of representation that generates resemblance - a picture strikes one as resembling something because it is usually painted that way. In other words resemblance is a product of representational practices.

Goodman's argument for familiarity as the attribute which sets the realistic work apart must be assessed in the light of his arguments against resemblance, copy, information and illusion-as-deception. His argument is not that looking at a realistic work of art is like looking at the thing itself while non-realistic works look like artworks. That is why Goodman is so concerned to get aside the argument that a realistic picture is one that is a successful illusion. He can not accept an argument that suggests a confusion between representation and representation because he has dismissed both the necessity and the sufficiency of resemblance for realism. As will be seen, the notion of illusion which Coebrick attaches to realism is not tainted by the concept of deception but is rather a contrivance on the part of the artist and a conscious projection on the part of the viewer. So too for Goodman realism, the case with which information issues, is that in terms of which the effect may be achieved.

The notion that realism is an effect - a mode of representation that has become familiar and hence standard - is the outcome of Goodman's relativism which holds that there are many versions of world which can be right at the same time. That resemblance is not basic to realism but that familiarity is must be accounted for in terms of the vast variety of versions of the world but if realism is to function as a 'differential term it is not possible to concede Goodman's radical relativism which debar us from access to 'the world'. The inability to compare any disparities
between the 'many equally valid descriptions' of world which is
etailed by a radical relativism mitigates against a realistic -
non-realistic dichotomy. Without "the world" to help us pick
out the one right version, we can only compare one description
of world with another description. We only have descriptions of
world - these versions are our worlds. This does not deny the
possibility of one particular version, one particular
description, one particular mode of representation assuming a
familiarity such that one would regard it as the standard mode
of representation and refer to it as realistic. The notion of
truth does not enter into the equation of one mode of
representation with realism - merely familiarity. Realism is
not an absolute in terms of this analysis because as long as
there is no absolute relationship between picture and object the
mode of representation which is most realistic, the effect which
allows information to issue most easily to the viewer, is
established by convention. Once a particular convention is
entrenched, the mode of representation is so habitual as to be
regarded by the viewer as not 'merely' a convention established
by familiarity, not just an effect that has come to resemble
what it stands for because the mode of representation is so
established, but as realistic.

Once this account of realism is applied specifically to film
Goodman's case for realism as a differential term without
employing the notions of resemblance or copy (in particular) is
crucial. It negates any claims that could be made on the
grounds of mechanical reproduction giving film a realism
unattainable by a different means of reproduction. The iconic
nature of the filmic sign can not be posited as grounds for the
realism of the film medium if resemblance is neither a necessary
nor sufficient condition for representation. Realism as a
question of familiarity rather than an absolute relationship
between picture and object serves to negate any arguments for
the objectivity of film's mechanical reproduction. Indeed,
Goodman's position on a standard mode of representation is the
very antithesis of claims for the realism of mechanical reproduction. Goodman claims that the familiarity of the standard mode of representation is an effect attained by the artist rather than the result of a supposed lack of artifice involved in mechanical reproduction via the camera.

B. The relationship between art and world is the second use of realism outlined by Goodman: realism as discovery and revelation. This reflects the factor of initiative in the notion of realism as opposed to the inertia associated with familiarity.

"'A difference as to the facts', 'a discovery', 'a revelation', these phrases cover many things. Discoveries have been made not only by Christopher Columbus and Pasteur, but also by Tolstoy and Dostoevsky and Freud. Things are revealed to us not only by the scientists with microscopes, but also by the poets, the prophets, and the painters" (Wisdom 1957 p154).

Quite evidently Goodman is concerned with revelation and discovery in terms of art not science, but he chooses as his comparative example the Copernican revolution. The discovery of a heliocentric solar system by Copernicus revealed a new version of world.

Goodman recalls the discovery of standard Western perspective during the Renaissance and the rediscovery of the Oriental mode by the late Nineteenth Century French painters and characterizes the result of these changes to the standard mode of representation of these particular cultures as:

"Practice palls; and a new mode of representation may be so fresh and forceful as to achieve what amounts to a revelation" (Goodman 1984 p127).

Goodman is certainly not subscribing to any theory of evolutionism. His argument is that realism is relative to a particular culture and the system of representation standard to our own time - "the traditional European style" (Goodman 1981 p37) - has no special claim to the title 'realism'. Although we cannot talk of realism evolving towards an absolute realism, the particular system of
representation we call realism is in a constant state of flux. Familiar tools are employed in new ways, in new combinations and so the standard system of representation changes as these departures from the standard picture result in 'a new degree of realism'. It is a new degree of realism in the sense that it is only a new mode of representation to a degree. It is not an absolutely new mode or there would be no means of comparison.

The new mode of realistic representation is a discovery in that the artist discovers new effects which alters the standard mode of representation. The new mode of representation is a revelation in that it reveals to us a new version of world by depicting world in a different way. The discovery of deep focus, primarily by Orson Welles in Citizen Kane (1940) allowed for the maintenance of the spatial unity of scenes, representing an episode in its physical entirety. The discovery of this effect replaced the standard mode of soft focus and the characteristic 'shot-reverse-shot' (alternating between characters with each speech). This departure from the standard practice was so successful it occasioned what Goodman would call 'a new degree of realism'. Bazin wrote of depth of focus that it:

"brings the spectator into a relation with the image closer to that which he enjoys with reality. Therefore it is correct to say that, independently of the contents of the image, its structure is more realistic [than montage]" (Bazin 1967 p35).

Bazin's enthusiasm for the realism of depth of focus is indicative of the success of the move away from the standard mode of representation - it revealed a different world-version which was taken to represent reality. That we cannot join Bazin in labelling depth of focus as a step forward in the evolution of film language according to his realist aesthetic is the result of Goodman's relativist position which argues that there is no privileged description of what is seen and hence no absolutely valid correspondence with the facts that could pick out the single right version.
The use of realism as discovery and revelation to describe the relationship between realistic art and world, necessarily is preceded by realism's use as a differential term. The notions of discovery and revelation have no logical connection to realism. That is why Goodman is at such pains to establish familiarity as that which sets realist works of art apart, as opposed to the notion of resemblance, copy, information or illusion. Discovery is strictly in terms of the familiar, as it is only in terms of the familiar that we comprehend the new effect. The new version that is revealed to us is only realistic because it is comparable to the version given by the prior standard mode of representation. This ensures the acceptance of the new version such that familiarity with it leads us to call it 'reality'.

That revelation could concern anything more than 'a new version' is denied by the radical relativism of Goodman's stance despite talk of true and false versions. Goodman wrote:

"we make versions, and true versions make worlds" (Goodman 1984 p34).

so the notion of 'truth' here is intrinsically bound up with his relativist notion of 'worldmaking'. The world versions Goodman has posited in the place of the World are made by us according to versions. Although Goodman himself equivocates on the notion of making, he insists that we can only make what is already there. A constellation is created by a version, it is chosen from among other configurations according to a particular principle. The constellation was not 'always there' because to say that all configurations of stars are constellations whether picked out or not is to say that no configurations of stars are constellations. But at least the stars were there before any version (before any person who could make a version)? No, Goodman counters, stars are made by drawing certain boundaries and this making is done by a version that 'puts the stars earlier than itself in its own space time' (Goodman 1984 p36). The sense of making Goodman is employing here is as Aldrich points out "to make something of something" (Aldrich 1982).
"...all the terms of our language are interpretation laden, such
that reference even to what seems to be simply before the
perceiver makes something of it, a construction of the
interpretation the referring terms are laden with" (Aldrich 1982
p304).

Goodman is talking about making in this interpretative sense rather
than meaning that we make with our hands when he talks of making
versions. But Goodman also states that only true versions make
worlds. The obvious question about true versions is how can a
version be wrong about a world it makes? Wrong versions can be as
coherent as right ones, nor can there be any appeal to anything
outside of the version - some 'absolute'. Goodman points to
validity in the case of induction: validity of inductive inference
does not require truth of either premises or conclusion, only a
certain formal relationship between them and categorization that
has become extended. Goodman does not only use inductive validity
as an example of rightness but points out that inductive validity
is a criteria applied in the search for truth as that which is
inductively valid is more accepted than that which is not. Being
accepted is not truth but ultimate acceptance is a sufficient
condition for truth.

"And since acceptance involves inductive validity, which
involves right categorization, which involves entrenched
habit must be renamed as an integral ingredient of truth ... For
if we make worlds, the meaning of truth lies not in these
worlds but in ourselves - or better, in our versions and what we
do with them" (Goodman 1984 p38).

Goodman's statements in this regard loosely appropriate the
position of the pragmatists. The position of Charles Sanders
Peirce (who will receive further attention in the chapter on
semiology) is that propositions have meaning because they produce
an interpretant (an effect on some interpreter). Such an
interpretant is, according to Peirce, a habit - a disposition to
act or react in a certain manner under certain conditions, thus to
develop the meaning of a proposition it is only necessary to
determine "what habit it produces" (Peirce 1936 5.420) or to put it another way, the beliefs it occasions - "the essence of belief is the establishment of a habit" (Peirce 1936 5.398). The notion of belief which does not carry with it any notion of truth apart from the 'ultimately acceptable' is the basis for the explanation of realism in terms of the role of the viewer. Goodman's point about truth is an epistemic one and is not legitimately extended into the realm of the psychological foundations of habit. However, as the notion of belief has been drawn into the discussion of habit by reference to pragmatism it is appropriate to translate the pragmatist position into Goodman's terminology. For Goodman belief must be the correlative of an accepted version and not of some absolute notion of truth. In this sense 'habit is an integral ingredient of truth' because that which is in the standard mode of representation allows for an habitual reading by the spectator, the ease of which persuades the spectator that it is a 'true' representation of 'world'. This belief on the part of the viewer that he is looking at a true version is what is important to the notion of realism and not any question of absolute truth.

Beyond the viewer's belief, the question of truth does not enter into the notion of realism in the sense of revelation that led to this discussion. The departure from the standard mode of representation that results in a new degree of realism is related to beliefs of the viewer that the new practice renders the 'reality' more successfully and not the discovery of that which is 'right' to replace a previous 'wrong'. Truth or falsity in this sense could not possibly be entertained by a relativist like Goodman. For Goodman a nonverbal aesthetic object can be neither true nor false as no object in itself makes any statements which could be either true or false. A picture does not make any assertions such as 'This is the object' to which one might reply 'True, this is the object' or 'False, this is not the object'. Rather a painting shows an object - it represents it as having certain characteristics. But it does not make a claim to truth - it is just offering the object. Comparison to 'the reality' may
lead the spectator to make a statement as to its correspondence to the 'reality'. Such a statement about the painting may be true or false but not the painting itself.

In this sense Goodman derives the notion of realism as revelation independently of the notion of truth - it is a sense of realism that is concerned with the telling rather than the told. Truth in the telling is a matter of familiarity of symbols used and the truth of the told is of no concern in deriving this notion of realism unless it is to describe the belief of the viewer which provides a psychological underpinning for realism.

This is the limit of the notion of revelation derived by Goodman: not a step on the road to the ultimately truthful representation of reality but rather the making of a true version which gives us a new frame of reference through its particular description of the phenomenal (its particular mode of representation) and thus occasions in the viewer a new apprehension of what is represented. In this way the revelation associated with the realistic work of art goes through from the work to 'reality' itself and becomes definitive of the relationship of art and world.

The concept of realism as revelation is one that will recur in the chapters on Bazin and semiology. In both of those accounts it will be closely related to Goodman's third thesis on realism in relation to the 'told' rather than the 'telling'. The reason for this is that if, as is so often claimed, film does indeed have a claim to a special tie to reality it must lie in the fact that the object or event filmed did at one time stand/play out in front of the camera.

C. The question of truth is much more a concern of Goodman's third usage of realism which picks up on the distinction between the 'telling' and the 'told' and suggests a sense in which a realistic representation is realistic by virtue of its subject matter. This is a use vital to an art like film - a recording art - which will argue for a special tie to reality because film records 'actual' as
In short, a Dürer drawing of a dragon uses a standard mode of representation but is unrealistic in its subject matter. This is a use of realism that depends upon the 'told' being actual rather than the 'telling' being standard. It would appear to raise questions about the ontological status of the representa men and thus about the relationship of realism to truth of representation. Unlike the previous account of realism as revelation where revelation was related to the mode of representation irrespective of the truth of that representation, this account of realism would appear to be raising questions about whether the 'told' is actual and therefore if it is a truthful representation.

The first gloss of this account is deceptive. The Rembrandt 'Portrait of Hendrickje Stoffels' is realistic; the Dürer drawing of a dragon is unrealistic. The reason, or so it would seem, is that there is a difference in ontological status between Hendrickje Stoffels and a dragon that is responsible for the fact that the Rembrandt is realistic and the Dürer is not, namely that Hendrickje Stoffels was an actual young woman but the dragon was/is non-existent. Truman Capote's *In Cold Blood* (1955) is realistic as it is either "taken from official records or is the result of interviews with persons directly concerned" (Capote 1965) while J.R.R. Tolkien's *The Hobbit* (1937) is not realistic as it is about hobbits and dragons neither of which exist. In literature in particular this is often the most important sort of realism—it may, indeed, be the only way in which certain stories are more realistic than fairy tales.

However this first gloss is misleading because Goodman's account is not so straightforward: works that are unrealistic on this account are not to be identified with works representing what is non-existent.

"Strictly speaking, Bosch's painting [Garden of Delight] does not depict monsters, or the tapestries in the Cloisters depict a
unicorn; for there are no such monsters and there is no unicorn

(Goodman 1964 p128).

Similarly Dürer’s drawing does not depict a dragon as there is no
dragon. Tolkien’s story does not describe a hobbit as there is no
hobbit. In fact they are works of art that do not denote anything.
But Goodman argues that works that do not denote anything are not
necessarily unrealistic. Although it is true to say that none of
these works denote anything, it is not true to say that they are
all the same kinds of pictures. Goodman’s argument is that some
kinds of non-denoting pictures are realistic while others are
unrealistic. The distinction between the two can not be drawn in
terms of what they denote — as neither denote anything at all. We
may be misled by the phrases ‘pictures of’ or ‘represents’. These
appear to be two place predicates but when used with Pickwick or
dragon they are better considered as one place predicates.
Afterall, the former leads us to suppose that because Dürer’s
drawing is of or represents a dragon, there is a dragon that the
drawing is a picture of or represents. In short, it suggests
denotation when in fact it only indicates what kind of picture it is.
This is why Goodman speaks of a ‘Pickwick-picture’ or a
‘dragon-picture’. Thus any sorting we do is on the basis of kinds
of pictures without their actually representing anything to which
we could refer.

If the distinction between realistic and unrealistic pictures is
not to be drawn in terms of what these pictures denote then it must
be decided in terms of what denotes the pictures — what kind of
pictures are realistic or unrealistic? Goodman furnishes as an
example the difference between Rabbit Run (Updike 1960) which he
regards as realistic and Alice in Wonderland (Carroll 1872) which
is not, despite the fact that the chief protagonists are equally
‘fictive’. The example is revealing because it is not so if the
former tells about an actual ‘Pickwick’ while the latter is merely
a ‘Pickwick-story’. Goodman would be doing little more than
distinguishing history from fiction whereas in fact Goodman is
distinguishing the two in terms of what denotes them rather than
what the works denote:

"Just as pictures denoting nothing sort readily into
contour-pictures and uniform-pictures and monster-pictures and
Northwest Passage maps, so they sort into more comprehensive
groups such as mythical-object-pictures, imaginary-landscape-
pictures, etc., and into such still larger groups as
real-object-pictures and fictive-object-pictures" (Goodman 1984
p129).

In this way Goodman's argument avoids having to make any
ontological claims for a category of non-existent beings, like
Harry Angstrom in *Rabbit Run*, of the sort Meinong introduced to
argue for truth of statements about fictional entities. Realism in
the sense Goodman is striving for here is related to whether a work
is an actual-object-work. Actual-object-pictures or actual-object-
descriptions may be fictive (as in the case of Harry Angstrom) and
so denote nothing just as fictive-object-pictures and
fictive-object-descriptions may denote some actual person or actual
object (as in the case of a picture of Napoleon as a dragon). But
an actual-object-work is realistic whether it denotes an actual
object or not. *Rabbit Run* is realistic on this account although
Harry Angstrom is not a real person and it denotes nothing while
*The Hobbit* is unrealistic not because Bilbo Baggins is a fictive
creature and does not denote anything. What decides whether they
are realistic or unrealistic is the categories that denote them:
actual-person-work and fictive-creature-work. *Rabbit Run* and *The
Hobbit* are works of fiction and as such denote nothing. This is
not to say they are about something nonactual because there is
nothing nonactual (no unicorns, dragons, monsters), it is just
literally false.

Here then is the connection between realism and truth: as long as
realism can be applied to a work of fiction which denotes nothing
there can be no question as to the literal truth of realism. If
realism made some claim as to the ontological status of that which
it denotes the question of truth would arise...
questions us to whether realistic works show or tell the truth about 'the world'. An earlier account of realism as designative of revelation as characteristic of the relation between 'art' and 'world' made no claim as to the truth of representation of the realistic work of art but only referred to the making of worlds where the meaning of truth lies in our versions. Here, equally, realism is unrelated to whether the work of art shows or tells the truth about 'the world'. Truth or falsehood only applies metaphorically and of course metaphorical truth is equally compatible with literal truth or falsity. 'The joint is jumping' is evidently a literal falsity even if metaphorically true, although if 'the joint is jumping' is literally true then 'the joint is jumping' is metaphorically true. (Metaphorical falsity can be seen to be the literal falsity of 'the joint is jumping'). When applying these notions of truth to fiction one finds that fiction is literal, literary falsehood but that it can be metaphorically true. The fact that fiction is literally false does not mean it is not about what is actual. But 'actual' does not entail any notion of truth as it does not mean the 'actual world' because there is not the world, it simply distinguishes it from being about what is nonactual.

This is how Goodman can talk about a realism that is dependant on the told and not the telling even if the work denoted nothing literally — that is it is fiction.

* * *

Goodman's account of realism is anchored between the poles of familiarity and discovery. Although it is the familiarity of a standard mode of representation that differentiates the realistic work it is only the familiarity of one particular version of world subject to the Kuhnian process of replacement once it no longer 'works' for us, no matter how reluctant we may be to shake the habit. This element of change is occasioned by the discovery of new effects that reveal to us a new version and thus discovery is the necessary
counterpart to a relativist notion of realism such as that argued by Gooden's notion of familiarity. The third use of realism Gooden has drawn attention to has nothing to do with the familiarity of the effect or the discovery of a new effect but concerns the subject matter. His point here is that even fiction may be realistic for although nothing is denoted by fiction it may be separated into, for example, real-person-stories and fictive-person-stories.

Each of these uses of realism will be further extrapolated in the forthcoming chapters. First Gorbrich will make explicit the roles of artist and viewer in the generation and perception of the realistic effect. The role of habit and discovery will be closely examined through Gorbrich's psychological art historical study. Specific application to film will be initiated by Bazin's arguments for film's revelatory function and Meta's exploration of the attainment of the realistic effect in film in the chapter on semiology.
3. REALISM – THE ROLE OF ARTIST AND VIEWER

ERNST GOMBRICH

An account of realism such as that derived from Goodman's analysis of the basic usage of the term, which has at its centre the notion of familiarity, must be explicable in terms of the act of artistic creation that generates this effect coupled with the act of viewer participation that is the target of this creation. The roles of artist and viewer in the account of realism are the province of Ernst Gombrich's study of pictorial representation – *Art and Illusion* (1980).

Gombrich's point of departure accords with Goodman's stance on familiarity and discovery as the keys to realism and that is that realism is not an absolute relationship between art and world but merely one of revelation, associated with the discovery of new degrees of realism. As Gombrich has noted: "Different ages and different nations have represented the visible world in such different ways" (Gombrich 1980 p3).

He points to the difference between Canaletto's and Guardi's representations of the Campo San Zanipolo in Venice, a mere forty years separating the two (Gombrich 1980 pp166-7), as well as the difference between Chiang Yee's representation of Derwentwater and that of an anonymous 1828 lithograph (Gombrich 1980 p74), a vast five thousand miles separating the two culturally. Realism, in the face of such differences in representation is to be accounted for in terms of the question of style – techniques discovered by the artist to produce the effect of realism and the role of the viewer, or more precisely, the role of expectation and participation which from one perspective are the constraints which the successful realist artist must obey but from another perspective are the tools at his disposal in the creation of a successful realist work of art.
It is only an understanding of the expectations of the society regarding realistic art and the realisation of this by the artist that can make familiarity a functional distinction between realistic and non-realistic art. That realisation of representation is at least in part a question of the perceptions and expectations of the viewer and the artist is evident to Gombrich because:

"That we know what we see is no truer than that we see what we know" (Goodman 1963 p142).

Perception is not the 'innocent' mechanism that common lore suggests - 'seeing is believing'! First on the part of the artist, can he reproduce what is in front of his eyes? The answer is simply no according to Gombrich, not unless he is willing to sacrifice the aspect of light. This is something that can only be suggested. The artist's tool here is the notion of relationships. The artist uses a technique of suggestion through conventional notations to convey light and depth. He has to transpose not copy. Second, on the part of the viewer, the representational accuracy of the picture depends on having learnt the artist's notation for light and depth.

Gombrich is supported in his claims by the evidence of psychologists of picture perception. Kennedy's *A Psychology of Picture Perception* (1974) offers two pertinent experiments. Gibson (1960) experimented with the truth of claims about trompe l'œil. Two peepholes were arranged, one in front of a real corridor, one in front of a photograph of the corridor. From the monocular evidence subjects had to determine which was the real corridor: both subtended the same angle to the eye, the edges of the photograph were not visible, the optic array from the photograph replicated that from the corridor. The result: one third adjudged the photograph to be the real corridor - successful trompe l'œil even given comparison with the actual object, and the fact that the photograph was in black and white. Perhaps a technically more accurate photograph could have made the difference undetectable and resulted in a greater degree of deception but what is important in this experiment is how many viewers failed to make use of the differences that did exist to effect a correct choice. What must be concluded is that different subjects chose different
details to view as being relevant. Kennedy answers that this is not
the same kind of choice as the choice between objects that might be
represented - the choice claimed by convention theorists.

Where Gibson made a picture seem like reality, Hochberg (1962) set out
to find that real differences were not detected. A relief model of a
house, 2.5cm in depth, one colour material, sprayed from an angle to
achieve the effect of illumination different to that of the room
housing the model and set in a frame with a black border and covered
with a transparent cellophane cover was constructed. When displayed
next to a flat picture of the model subjects failed to distinguish
between the two, taking both to be two dimensional representations.
The relief depth was large enough to be detected and yet as in
Gibson's inverse version of the experiment the subjects did not choose
that detail as relevant - largely one must surmise because of the
context of display. Kennedy concludes

"Both studies show how close an optic array from a picture can be to
an optic array from the world in affecting perception. And both
studies suggest that observers have to consider what is relevant in
an optic array as well as what to do with the relevant components of
an optic array" (Kennedy 1974 p51).

In the light of Kennedy's conclusion it can be argued on Gombrich's
behalf that realism on the part of the viewer results from what
convention leads him/her to consider as relevant; in an optic array as
well as what to do with those relevant components. This is not
dissimilar to Goodman's standpoint: that there is no single reality
which we can perceive and which the artist attempts to copy. Rather
there is a way we react to 'reality'. The truly accurate picture is
then, as Goodman pointed out in the previous chapter, not the most
perfect copy of 'reality' but the most perfectly realised translation
of 'reality' into that which will elicit the same reactions on the
part of the viewer. Realism is more the understanding of our
reactions to the world than of the nature of 'reality' and that is
precisely why an explanation of realism in terms of the artist's and
viewer's expectations is central to a successful account of realism.
The key to such an account of realism is the subtle interplay between what Gombrich calls the viewer's 'mental set' and the 'schema and correction' process of artistic creation.

The concept of 'mental set' is explicable as the viewer's expectations of a work of art which determines what is seen. Because "our reactions and our taste must of necessity differ from that of past generations" (Gombrich 1980 p51) this mental set is not constant across time. As the viewer's mental set changes so the conventional notation of the artist changes in order to retain communication. In this way art of past generations may lose its realism as the artist's style no longer coincides with the audiences expectations, with what the viewers regard as realistic. Once an adjustment of mental set is required to decipher the works they no longer fall into the category defined as realistic by virtue of their lack of familiarity. For example Egyptian art made use of stereotypical images, modified only where the artist wished to convey clear distinctions such as that between men and women, achieved by the use of different colours, or between commoners and royalty, achieved by a profile alteration. These distinctions are no longer familiar to the present day viewer whose mental set is more closely aligned to the Greek rejection of the purely conceptual function of art. In other words, when the modern viewer with a realistic mental set looks at an Egyptian work of art he wants to know things about the objects represented which were not regarded as functions of the image by the Egyptians. The modern viewer wants to know if Egyptian men and women were different colours, if commoners and royalty had different profiles, but this is no more valid than wanting to know if the pawns on a chessboard are all bald. The requirements for a pawn to function as a piece on a chessboard, the requirements for an image to function as a representation of a male or a king in an Egyptian work of art do not coincide with the expectations of a modern day realistic mental set. The lack of familiarity that is coincident with this incompatibility of mental sets is at the root of the non-realism of art of a past age, like the Egyptians, for the modern viewer.
The changing mental set of the viewer is paralleled by an evolving creative process on the part of the artist who is involved in the discovery of new effects to generate realism according to the viewer's shifting expectations. The artist is like the viewer of course, in that he too is born into a particular time and culture which gives him a particular mental set. Like the viewer, he equates familiarity with realism, and that which is familiar is that which he can draw already.

Gombrich refers to these familiar 'sources' as schema:

"the first approximate, loose category which is gradually tightened to fit the form it is to reproduce" (Gombrich 1980 p64).

These are forever changing as familiarity with our world expands and the legacy of existing representations increases. Nevertheless, there is at any one moment an existing set of schemata which determines the artist's output. Schemata have their influence on the organization of perceptions: the mind assimilates experiences in terms of what is familiar. What is portrayed may look very different starting with a different set of schemata. Schemata may indeed present an obstacle to more effective portrayal. But the artist can not want to paint outside of the limitations of a particular system as he does not know it is possible. The realism of the artist's output is relative to this particular set of schemata and relative to the mental set (of artist and viewer) contingent on this set of schemata. From the schemata through a process of correction the artist can discover effects which will fulfill the expectations of the viewer of a realist work within the limits of the particular set of schemata available to viewer and artist.

"The discovery of appearances was due not so much to a careful observation of nature as to the invention of pictorial effects" (Gombrich 1980 p279).

The ideal for perception on the part of the realist artist can not be the passivity usually equated with objectivity. Experimentation, trial and subsequent simplification are the cornerstones of progress - progress towards equivalences which enable us to see reality in terms of an image and vice versa. They are equivalences of response to relationships irrespective of likeness; it is a question on an overall effect rather than any particular feature. This is why some
photographs of a person seem to 'work' and others not.

Acknowledging the existence of a particular set of expectations in the viewing public and the artist's need to fulfill those expectations in order to generate realistic art does not set up the possibility for realism in terms of psychology. This is to be understood in terms of what Gombrich labels 'making and matching'. Contra the Platonic notion of a pre-existent idea which is replicated by the artist, Gombrich formulates the artistic process as one of making first and then matching. The maker of a snowman, for instance, makes something out of snow until a man can be seen. It is not as if there was a pre-existent snowman. Gombrich here is employing the Popperian notion of the undifferentiated mass which man learns to articulate for himself rather than a theory of generalization from what is contained in reality to form an abstract idea. The point of the explanation of the artist's procedure is what it explains about the role of psychology in the achievement of realism in terms of both the artist and the viewer. Central to the understanding of this explanation is the notion of 'projection': the projection of a familiar form into other vaguely similar shapes. Numerous projections may be tried but once one seems to fit it becomes stuck, or at any rate rather difficult to dislodge. It has passed the test for consistency and those readings that make the most sense have been chosen. Projection is not usually a process of which the viewer or artist is aware as it is performed so frequently it becomes automatic. What this amounts to, Gombrich contends, is that culture teaches the viewer to seek for an intention behind the presentation in order to find the appropriate response. Basically this amounts to an alignment between the artist and the viewer. Projection is a phase in the process of interaction between making and matching.

On the one hand the artist in the process of making projects an image into the initial form with the possibility of further revision to allow for more comprehensive projection. The artist's experience is paralleled by that of the viewer who is involved in the same process of making and matching. The viewer adopts the artist's creations as
schema for his own images. The artist's 'suggestions' are matched by the viewer's projection. The viewer too becomes the maker, searching his/her mind for and projecting memories into the work.

Artist and viewer alike are involved in the process of making, employing the available schemata, correcting them until they can project an image into the schema and the more successfully this matches their expectations, the more realistic the work will be deemed.

The consequence of such a psychological theory of realism is to undermine the notion of a so-called 'innocent eye' as a prerequisite for realistic representation. The artist's perception is essentially active: s/he looks for things, conditioned by her/his expectations. If the artist did not actively look for something s/he would not notice it. The artist has the task of making, matching and remaking until her/his portrayal is not the victim of a passive acceptance. The viewer and the artist are involved in inventing comparisons which work according to their expectations - the very opposite of an innocent approach, consciously forgetful of what is already known. For example, apparently we are all inclined to underestimate the foreshortening of a disc when viewed from an angle. We have learnt to recognize and classify the object from its front view. We in fact have such strong expectations in our search for knowledge that we experience prior to the actual stimulation. We anticipate the roundness of a disc. As for the size of the object remaining constant, that is our habit of picturing an object in a standard setting. If it is a small object perhaps that would be how big it looks in my hand even though it would quite obviously look much smaller lying on the floor across the room. Our imagined standard distances are what govern our set of depiction.

There is a sense in which the artist tries to remove his knowledge of things - and this is to replace the familiar meaning with a new one so as to better be able to assess an object's appearance and attempt to find a match in his medium. But no amount of suppression of meaning
frees either the viewer or the artist from the effects of 'optical illusions'. These 'illusions' demand the very opposite of an 'innocent eye' - they demand a knowledge of how the juxtaposition of shapes and colours affect each other. These relationships must be kept in mind in order to find the equivalent of the original. Copying appearances is not possible unless first given something to be made to something else - make and then match. The task of matching could not be achieved without the knowledge of relationships and thus the task of achieving an 'innocent eye' is invalidated. Rather the artist is engaged in affirmative interpretation - he is a man aware of ambiguities.

"Only in making things and trying to make them like something else that man can extract his awareness of the visible world" (Gombrich 1980 p264).

For the beholder, memory and experience must be mobilized to read this image. And interestingly enough this memory is a memory of pictures already seen: hence the stability of an art which demands a picture already seen to account for a subsequent one. This is as true for the painter engaged in making and matching as it is for the beholder who seeks to be reminded of the paintings he loves. This is Wölflin's (1952) notion that all paintings owe more to other paintings than to observation. Thus it is only experimentation that can release the artist from the confines of style, to make, match and then remake in the search for greater realism. But that experimentation falls within certain limits or else it will be unintelligible - the realistic image is a very specific configuration of relationships.

"Language grows by introducing new words, but a language consisting only of new words and a new syntax would be indistinguishable from gibberish" (Gombrich 1980 p274).

Realism is not about the 'innocent eye' but about using art to probe reality and make a real visual discovery which seems to generate the idea that it is nature that imitates art.

The account of realism which confers on both artist and viewer the role of maker and matcher, provides a clarification of what may appear to be a contradiction of Goodman's position in Gombrich's equation of
realism with illusion. The fact is that Gombrich's notion of illusion has nothing to do with Goodman's understanding of the term which led to Goodman's outright rejection of it from his account of realism.

Gombrich's notion of illusion is based on the interplay of artist's creation and viewer's expectations, namely the artist sets up the conditions of illusion by generating an expectation to guide the viewers projective illusory representation which vary in extent, dependent on this 'guide of action'. Given a certain 'function' (something familiar) and on the screen and to project, illusion is possible: 'perspective starting ache from reality'. Gombrich illustrates how the illusion may be achieved through a number of examples which will be a key aspect of the application of the account of realism to form. One example he offers is the limitations of two-dimensionality and their representation. The former was dealt with by means of overlap and incomplete images. The latter the impressionists have overcome with an ambiguity of forms which the viewer supplements from his experience. A painting which records the infinite, implies the third dimension and sparkles with movement is the creation of an artist who knows how to generate the effects which promote an illusion. In an illusion reliant on our assumption that when we see a couple of numbers of a series we see them all, on our knowledge of what usually goes on behind..., on our experience of that moves at in everyday life. Thus it is very often the case that the more actual information there is on the canvas the more it hides illusion. It is the principle of minimising information (infurne) that maximises our tendency to project and for the illusion to be complete with no possible contradictory information. A further example he draws from the 'trick' of perspective. It is his thesis that perspective is not just a Fifteenth Century scientific convention but actually valid even though the perspectival image requires the beholders collaboration. The fact is that just looking does not show what is there: our expectations will merely condition a guess as to what we see - that is the most familiar interpretation. In fact "a correct rendering of perspective may stand for an infinity of shapes in space" (Gombrich 1980 p112). This does not detract from the
validity of perspective, which is a valid method of representing an image given that we cannot see around canvas. A perspectival picture cannot exist in its own right: perspective merely claims that one can read the picture in the same way as one reads 'reality'. It is a question of the one looking like the other and not an explanation of how we see things (in this light the curvilinear argument is ridiculous: if all straight lines look curved, then the painter who paints curves will create the appearance of even greater curves).

Perspective is a compelling illusion where it draws upon the expectations and assumptions of the beholder. Perspective works on those who know the conventions. The development of shading further reduces the ambiguity of an image, and through the consistent interaction of clues the illusion is complete. By viewing an image in context consistency is enhanced and ambiguity is unlikely - this is due to our assumed constancy in our changeable world. We have certain experiences which to modify our guesses. Once more a process of schema and correction. Artists have gradually learnt to simulate this consistency of clues upon which we make our guesses - hence the trompe l'oeil paintings of past generations. The trompe l'oeil is interpreted as the 'real' world with no contradictions to prevent the illusion - paradoxically it achieves a new height of visual ambiguity.

It is of course very rare to see such a picture in the perfect conditions for the illusion - just to move is to spoil the illusion.

What the trompe l'oeil ignores is the part if the beholder in using his imagination, in transforming. This pleasure is eliminated if the illusion is too complete. For the artist the perfection of illusion generates increased ambiguity and a consequent loss of control over his elements.

The final revolt against this ambiguity is the rise of Cubism which forces one reading of the picture: as a coloured, man-made canvas. This is achieved by reversing the tricks of the illusionists: generating an inconsistency of clues, an incoherency of image. Due to an inability to transform it the viewer is unable to attach any one
interpretation no matter how hard s/he tries. Even coherent forms are lost in ambiguities which can not be sorted out. The viewer is eventually forced to accept the flat pattern. The artist actively prevents the interpretation of his marks as representation — there are no familiar objects or patterns even if

"few of (the artists) realise that they can drive into the desired identification, only those who know how to apply the viewer's traditional consistency tests and thereby discover the absence of any meaning except the highly ambiguous meaning of traces" (Gombrich 1990 p234).

It will be apparent from the foregoing that the notion of illusion as an explanation for realism as offered by Gombrich has nothing to do with confusion or deception as Goodman would define the term. In fact it provides an explanation in terms of the artist and viewer of the familiarity and discovery Goodman argued was the key to representational realism. Referring to trompe l'oeil painting, Gombrich states that the increased ambiguity generated results in the artist losing control of his elements. Realism has rather to do with a lack of confusion — the familiar in short. His carefully proffered version of illusion is the 'illusion' of the real in the picture: an illusion created in part by the artist who guides (often more through what he does not say than what he does say) and in part by the perceiver who projects (imagination, experience, expectation). This is an illusion that depends on a knowledge of conventions, not a confusion as to what one is looking at. It is not for the realist artist to confuse or deceive but to create a work according to the most standard conventions of his society that corresponds with the experiences, fulfills the expectations and encourages the imagination of the viewer because it is so readily 'readable'. It is readable because the mode of representation is standard and the information therefore issues from it with a certain ease, to use Goodman's terminology. The viewer who sees a painting as realistic is not the victim of a confusion, he is not under the illusion he is seeing reality. As I have already pointed out there is no question that having the illusion has to be visually indistinguishable from the
experience of really seeing. He is rather a participant in creating the illusion of the real in the picture. If the viewer is deceived it is because the painting is realistic; but it is not because the viewer is deceived that it is realistic. It is realistic because the viewer and the artist know the familiar conventions involved and because talk about realism is talk about conventions. Gombrich, like Goodman, is not offering an absolutist notion of realism. The roles of artist and viewer vindicate Goodman's position on discovery as central to the notion of realism.

The importance of Gombrich is that he provides an underpinning for the account of realism set out by Goodman. By defining a role for the viewer as having particular expectations and for the artist as governed by the need to adhere to familiar schemata to fulfill those expectations, but also giving to the viewer the role of participant in the creation of the realistic work of art and to the artist the role of discoverer of the effects that can illicit this projection from the viewer, Gombrich maintains the tension between familiarity and discovery that is at the root of Goodman's distinction of realistic from non-realistic art and its relation to 'world'. The importance of the claims realistic art makes about the world it represents is only really to be understood in terms of the roles of viewer and artist.

Armed with an account of realism in art, it is now possible to shift the focus specifically to film and in so doing account for the basic realism of the film medium and analyse the attainment of the realistic effect in that art form.
4. THE REALISTIC AND THE CINEMATIC
ANDRE BAZIN

For the first time in this dissertation the discussion moves explicitly to the application of the concept of realism to film. Deriving this concept of realism in relation to the arts in general and then applying it to film suggests that film does not require a notion of realism as distinct from the broader spectrum of arts.

However the nature of film gives it a special place in the debate on realism for a number of reasons. The first reason would be one of technical procedure - the mechanical recording of images - which gives film its so-called 'unique' tie to reality. That this in part is shared with photography is not of any particular theoretical importance, in fact in the period of film's history when theorists were concerned with demarcating cinema's place in culture there was an impetus towards separating cinema from photography or any notion of mere copy theory. In other words film's nature as a mechanical recording of images was seen to be inimical to its status as an art. The mechanical nature of film does however have a certain relevance to the question of realism because of the role of the spectator in the generation of the realistic effect as suggested by Goebbels. The special tie between film and reality that it is argued is unique to film is based on what could be loosely labelled a psychology of realism, the spectator's tendency to regard the sequences of images films offer them as 'realistic', based on the spectator's preconceptions about the accuracy of mechanical reproduction.

Another reason that film occupies a special place in the debate on realism is that unlike many other arts the realistic effect is achieved with consummate ease while the reverse is true of attempts to undermine realism. It was only in the later stages of the Renaissance that realism was conceptualised as an aim of the visual arts and both
painting/sculpture and literature have fostered anti-realist schools, like the modernists and Epic Theatre has distanced drama from realism. (It is not certain how music or architecture could strive towards the realist effect). But the cinema with its mechanical recording of images and its unique ability to reproduce movement has since its earliest days elicited squeals from an audience threatened by an approaching train and it is only on the fringes of the industry that there is an anti-realist tendency. This may well be, in part, a result of the mode of production — it is as I say an industry — but it also reflects the ease with which realism is achieved by film and how the reverse is true of anti-realism. The achievement of the effect of realism (and indeed of non-realism) will be the focus of the chapter on a semiological approach to film. The application of the linguistic model to film will indicate how film’s ready attainment of the realist effect vindicates the concept of realism derived in the first chapters of the dissertation.

The notions that film has a natural affinity with ‘the real’ and that it has a unique tie with reality were adopted by the filmmakers of the realist tradition as an imperative to bring the spectator to see ‘the world as it really is’. This notion of the social function of film art is what underlies Grierson’s beliefs concerning the aims of his British documentary film movement:

“We believe that the cinema’s capacity for getting around, for observing and collecting from life itself, can be exploited in a new and vital art form ... We believe that the original (or native) actor, and the original (or native) scene, are better guides to screen interpretation of the modern world ... We believe that the materials and the stories thus taken from the raw can be finer (more real in the philosophic sense) than the acted article”. John Grierson, founder of the British documentary film movement (Hardy 1982).

Similarly Dziga Vertov proclaims the virtues of his Kino-Eye on the basis of the alternative they offer to the opiate of entertainment films – a cinema with a conscience true to our everyday world and our
social situation:

1. The film-drama is the opium of the people.
2. Down with the immortal kings and queens of the screen! Long live ordinary, mortal people, captured in the midst of life going about their daily tasks.
3. Down with bourgeois fairy-tale or stories! Long live life as it is ...". The "Basic Watchwords" for the absolute realism advocated by Dziga Vertov for his Kino-Eye Groups (Vertov 1964.)

The notion of film as an artform with the responsibility of bringing society to see the world as it truly is lies also at the root of the Neo-Realist movement in a later part of the 20th century. As explained by one of its seminal directors Roberto Rossellini:

"[Neo-Realism] involves a greater interest in the human and man as a being. Modern man feels the need to tell of things as they are, and take account of reality in an uncompromisingly concrete way, which goes with today's interest in statistics and scientific results. Neo-Realism is also a response to the genuine need to see men for what they are, with humanity and without recourse to fabricating the exceptional; it means an awareness that the exceptional is arrived at through the investigation of reality. Lastly, it's an urge not to ignore reality whatever it may be ... To me realism is simply the artistic form of truth" (Verlaine 1962).

These statements are no more than the retrospective vindications offered by filmmakers of what they perceive to be the realism of their work.

Siegfried Kracauer

For a fully elaborated theory of realist film one must turn to a work like Siegfried Kracauer's Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality (1960). It is Kracauer's belief that film is unique among the arts as it does not create an abstract world but presents the material world as it is. An Andy Warhol painting of Marilyn Monroe is not interesting because it is Marilyn Monroe but because we now see
her as the subject of an art work. However in a film featuring Marilyn Monroe our interest is in Marilyn Monroe herself; it is Monroe we want to see. It is the function of the filmmaker to choose the most suitable techniques to explore most clearly a particular reality. If this involves a degree of transformation, this is discounted by Kracauer: photography is almost a given part of nature and so one doesn't have to concern oneself with questions of difference between visible reality and filmed reality.

Reality surrenders naturally to the filmmaker who should never try to make us aware of the form at the expense of the content. For Kracauer the essence of film is to be found in its content. This is not really an argument so much as a prescription which amounts to: — photography can record reality, therefore it must. And as film is the heir to photography, it must also. In addition Kracauer found himself unable to say very much about "reality" as he perceived that 20th Century man no longer knows what it is. All he could do was point to the affinity nature has for film and the 'tendency' in man to attend to nature rather than his own imagination — this he called the 'cinematic approach'. In fact, Kracauer argued, the cinematic approach could accommodate formalism — as long as it saved "The medium's substantive concern with our visible world" (Kracauer 1960 p38).

Anything more would be to lose the unique character of film as an art. It is a question of 'balance' (Kracauer 1960 p39) between documentary, which Kracauer saw as falling short of the cinematic ideal, and art. The fulfillment of this ideal was accomplished by a genre he labelled "the found story".

"When you have watched for long enough the surface of a river or a lake, you will detect certain patterns in the water which may have been produced by a breeze or some eddy. Found stories are in the nature of such patterns. Being discovered rather than contrived, they are inseparable from films animated by documentary intentions. Accordingly they come closest to satisfying that demand for the story which reemerges within the womb of the non-story film." (Kracauer 1960 pp265-6).
The films of Robert Flaherty (Wanook of the North(1922), Man of Aran(1934), Louisiana Story(1948)) and the Italian Neo-Realists like De Staas (The Children are Watching Us(1942), Bicycle Thieves(1948), Umberto D(1952)) and Rossellini (Rome Open City(1945), Paisà(1947), Germania, anno zero(1947)) are classic examples of this genre. These are films where the plot is drawn from actual events even if the individuals portrayed in the film never existed. The characters are essential as they provide a human dimension which will ensure the realism of the filmed event by involving the spectator in the situation emotionally.

These remarks are not the point of Kracauer's position merely the consequence of that thesis. As such they reveal the arbitrariness of a thesis which suggests that Italian Neo-Realist films are more cinematic than German Expressionist films, or that Robert Flaherty is more cinematic than Kenneth Anger.

J Dudley Andrew characterizes Kracauer's thesis as a three point argument:

"(1) That cinema is more a product of photography than of editing or other formative processes; (2) That photography is first and foremost a process tied to the objects it registers rather than a process transforming those objects; and (3) That cinema must therefore serve the objects and events which its equipment allows it to capture, that is, that it should be formally /realistic because it is imagistically realistic" (Andrew 1978 p129).

The first two Andrew dismisses as premises, unprovable and as easily replaced with formalistic ones. The third is a conclusion drawn from the first two and this is where the real problem lies. Even theorists who accept Kracauer's initial 'assertions' must be critical of the strange conclusion he draws from them. Kracauer may have shown how the medium of film can be used realistically, he may even have shown how important this is. Yet in no way does it follow that all films must be realistic to be cinematic. It is furthermore a shortcoming of Kracauer's thesis that it does not provide the subscriber with the means of differentiating a realistic from a non-realistic film.
Legend has it that Kracauer locked himself in a library to work out his thesis alone. This would at least account for a curious omission in the work of Kracauer — the theories of André Bazin.

André Bazin

Bazin, like Kracauer, is a film theorist, not merely a filmmaker offering proclamations about the realism of his work. His theories were devised a full decade before Kracauer’s effort. Bazin and his followers had already asked many of the questions Kracauer posed, accepted the realism of the film image without any corresponding constraints on the cinematic form of that image and dismissed the notion of a realistic cinema as equivalent to “highly visual” cinema.

Bazin’s is not a prescriptive aesthetic. Bazin’s personal preferences coupled with his conviction that the realistic nature of film material influences the film maker in a very real sense should not be mistaken for an absolute insistence on how cinema is to be used. “Film is the visible existence of the invisible” (Bazin 1967 p71) and the theorist’s role is to describe and explain what has already been done. At any rate my approach to Bazin’s work is not to seek support for realism but to try and extract the essence of his ‘definition’ of realism and to see by what means he arrives at these conclusions about realism (once I have managed to distill and present this element of Bazin’s writings I can begin to relate it to theories of realism in philosophical aesthetics and semiotics).

The ‘essence’ of Bazin’s definition of realism has been clearly delineated by French film theorist and director Eric Rohmer:

“Each essay and indeed the whole work itself fits perfectly into the pattern of a mathematical demonstration. Without any doubt, the whole body of Bazin’s work is based on one central idea, an affirmation of the objectivity of the cinema in the same way as all geometry is centred on the properties of the straight line” (Rohmer 1959 p37)

How did Bazin establish this axiom, what are its limitations, what is
cinema's special tie to reality, how is it any less conventional than any other art?

This axiom grew directly out of his experience of the film medium, or more specifically a particular era of filmmaking. Not that Bazin's theories should be seen as locked into that era and not applicable outside of a specific genre. Bazin is concerned with film in general, not with particular films. Bazin was writing at a particular stage in film's history and his work is a response to the specific input of that era. But that response is not outside of the broader context of film history. Bazin himself in "In Defence of Mixed Cinema" identified three eras of film scenario.

(i) The first, from Méliès to the First World War, is one of diverse scenarios, each producer using cinema for something different (peep shows, music hall, theater, serials, magic ...).

(ii) The second era starts with Griffith - a period of a formalised system of conventions: everything from subject to length to narrative structure came under a rigid system. A standard style had been adopted to reach vast audiences who 'went to the movies' (good, bad or indifferent) probably more often than going to church (the modern equivalent would probably be watching television - sheer ritual). The audience in fact demanded this single language, which as time went by became virtually the only language. The outcome in terms of subject matter was to denature everything from Shakespeare to Dickens - all reduced to Hollywood formula. But of course there were those who refused the formula, saw a different relation of language to material - filmmakers like Flaherty and Stroheim who investigated their material. Their language did not have its roots in an a priori formula but derived from the particular film being made. Here are Bazin's champions of realism.

(iii) The third era is the vindication of these men. Renoir's The Rules of the Game (1939) and Welles' Citizen Kane (1940) opened the way for multiple styles expressing the multiple aspects of reality. Material dictates style (or at least attitude to material) - thus no more cinema, just films. In the case of novels it was no longer a case of restructuring to smoothly fit the Hollywood machine but rather
a unique adaptation for experiencing a cultural object through cinema not as cinema. Bazin talks of Robert Bresson's adaptation of Bernanos's *Diary of a Country Priest* (1951) as achieving "a dialectic between literature and cinema ... giving us the novel, so to speak, multiplied by the cinema" (Bazin 1971: 143). He insistes "it is not a question of being faithful to the original because to begin with, it is the novel" (Bazin 1971: 143) presented in a different way. Writing today Bazin may have offered Coppolla's adaptation of Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* (1902) as *Apocalypse Now* (1979) - a 1970's Kurtz reads from T.S. Eliot's *The Hollow Men* (1925), a poem Eliot subtitled "Mista Kurtz be dead!".

While it is correct to say that to explore the essays of Bazin is to concentrate on Renoir, Flaherty, the Neo-Realism genre of the post war era (De Sica, Rossellini) and the depth of focus technique pioneered by Welles and Renoir, it must not be assumed that these are his specific concern. Rather they are the illustrations of what Rohmer calls Bazin's central axiom. Thus despite new genres and new techniques Bazin's principles can still be applied. What I have said deserves at least one qualification pointed out by Bazin's biographer Dudley Andrew:

"Film is not mathematics. One does not begin theorizing about it in the abstract" (Andrew 1978: 105)

In other words the initial impetus for Bazin's theory was derived from these films specifically (De Sica's *Bicycle Thieves* (1945), Welles's *Citizen Kane* (1940)...) even if it was then found to apply beyond the specific genres and techniques employed by these film-makers. This consideration apart, Bazin's specific choice of examples would not appear to have much bearing on our discussion.

In order to evaluate Bazin's axiom it is necessary to identify the philosophical schools out of which his convictions grew. Two philosophical schools underlie Bazin's writings.

The first school influenced Bazin's views on cinematic realism. This is the secondary influence determining his theories about the
experience of cinema and why it seems realistic. The first school will account for Bazin’s theory as a psychology of realism and the ontology of the photographic image. The theoretical elucidation will be accomplished through reference to the Neo-Realist film-maker Roberto Rossellini and Orson Welles’ Citizen Kane.

The second school influenced Bazin’s views on reality. This is the primary influence as it necessarily determines his convictions about the role of cinema which he regarded as the “art of the real” (Bazin 1956 p. 22). Krasauer’s aesthetic was one of realistic content and technique, Bazin’s was one of the “realism of space: without which moving pictures do not constitute cinema” (Bazin 1967 p112). Cinema is the art of the real for Bazin because it registers the spaciality of objects as well as the space objects occupy. In other words perceptual reality is spatial reality. The realistic film style preserves the autonomy of objects within space (and hence his preference for depth of focus and antagonism toward montage as will become apparent). The theory that derives from this aesthetic will be elaborated through its practical realization in the work of Renoir,_family_r and the Neo-Realists.

A. A Theory Of Psychological Realism And The Ontology Of The Photographic Image

Perhaps the most crucial text in Bazin’s formative years was Sartre’s The Psychology of the Imagination, linking, as it does, art to ontology. Bazin, like Sartre, would come to see art as the fulfillment of man’s psychological impulse to ‘remake the world’ ‘and his situation in it’. Sartre compares art to daydreaming, emotional release and acts of the imagination like love-making, political activism and suicide. Sartre’s existentialism posits that the physical world man lives in is not his own and will crush him, and his desires in death. Thus it is that man tries to shape, in the emptiness of his consciousness, the fullness of a world he can call his own. These modes of consciousness help man to overcome the determinateness and solidity of an alien world —
because in the imaginary he can exercise freedom and spontaneity. Through art man can create human objects in a world of alien objects. Artworks may be 'out there' in space and time but our experience of them is in a space and time subject to the freedom of consciousness not the laws of nature. The importance of an art object is not related to its place in the (alien) world but to its ability to transport us to another reality in our experience of it as a 'de-realised' object. Sartre tries to account for the transitional aspect of experience between art and world - an experience well known to the movie-goer who leaves the 'place' of dreams with an intense sadness (no less so than the reader who departs from Middle Earth in J.R.R. Tolkien's The Lord Of The Rings(1955) or the listener who is 'reawakened' by the monotonous scratch of the needle against the record label). Man uses the physical aspects of a medium in art as an analogue which delivers up the 'sens' (the living meaning, the aura) of an absent object or feeling. The artwork is a mixture of this presence and absence. A picture gives us physical cues which transmit feelings to us which we turn into the 'sens' and rebuild that feeling into a presence in our imagination. Great art makes present to our experience something wonderfully human existing in the object previously unknown to us: it does not present something we have seen but something we have felt.

The major bridge between Sartre and Bazin is to be found in Malraux's Voices of Silence(1953). Working from Sartre's premise of the imaginary, this work seeks to categorise it in a way that corresponds to the essential motivations behind the impulse to paint: sacred, divine, profane, decadent. Bazin was to adopt these categories in his seminal essays "The Ontology of the Photographic Image" and "The Myth of Total Cinema". For Malraux art was:

"the eternal part of man, which emerges as the power which both enables and impels man to transcend his human condition, to break through the world of time and appearances to a truth whose discovery affords him a glimpse of eternity" (Horvath 1969 p20). His book traced the cycle of this impulse through the Egyptians
whose art denied the world of time and exists in a sacred place, an art of the Gods created anonymously; the era of classic Greek art deriving from a psychology of perpetuation and transmutation of earthly life, by artists who:

"conceived the notion of an immortality allotted to great human creations by reason of their participation in the divine they body forth" (Malraux 1960 p.86);

and Hellenistic art which neither negates appearances (sacred art) nor uses appearances for immortality (divine art) but values it for itself (profane art). This is the first time art accepted the order of appearance and the order of the scheme of things - as "the rea." (Malraux 1960 p.108) (The Romans would go beyond illusion to the "asorning" of reality).

Barzin's "The Ontology of the Photographic Image" clearly reiterates this movement of art from sacred to divine to profane - the impulse toward realism. He describes the change from Giotto to Leonardo as one from where "the symbol transcended its model" to one based on misniss, "namely the duplication of the world outside" (Barzin 1967 p.11). Barzin attributes to perspective the role of making painting conscious of the world of appearance. The divine purpose was lost to art - the flesh in its time-bound form becomes desirable instead. Note Malraux's view that "The emphasis on time (as opposed to eternity) in the Renaissance world view was now depicted in painting" (Hovath 1969 p.70). Thus for both of them the Renaissance sees the separation of symbol from appearance giving art two functions: either to embody eternity or to "embalm time".

The Baroque age in seeking to embody motion felt most strongly the tension between these functions. Here Barzin finds the "myth of total cinema" originates in the desire to re-create reality with complete fidelity. Painting was "redeemed" from this false ideal by photography (1828) and the cinematograph (1895). Photography could now pursue illusionary realism, and painting visual abstraction of the eternal in man.

Barzin writes:
"If the hist— the plastic arts is less a matter of their aerth psychology then it will be seen to be essential of resemblance, or, if you will, of realism" (Bazin).

He claims:

"Photography is clearly the most important event in the history of the plastic arts... Paintings being confronted in the mechanically produced image with a competitor able to reach out beyond Baroque resemblance to the very identity of the model, was competed into the category of object. Henceforth Pascal's condemnation of painting is itself rendered vain since the photograph allows us on the one hand to admire in reproduction something that our eyes alone could not have taught us to love, and on the other to admire painting as a thing in itself whose relation to something in nature has ceased to be the justification for its existence" (Bazin 1967 p1).

For Bazin the solution to the problem of psychology in arts comes not as a result of increased realism but from a new way of achieving realism:

"Photography and the cinema... are discoveries that satisfy once and for all in its very essence, our obsession with realism... [but] the essential factor in the transition from the Baroque to photography is not the perfecting of a physical process (photography will long remain inferior to painting in the reproduction of colour); rather does it lie in a psychological fact, to wit, in completely satisfying our appetite for illusion by a mechanical reproduction in the making of which man plays no part. The solution is not to be found in the result achieved but in the way of achieving it" (Bazin 1967 p12).

Bazin's point is that psychologically speaking, realism is not a question of accuracy in reproduction but one of how the work was produced. A painting is a product of an artist: his skill, his perception... A photograph is purely a physical object like that which it reproduces. It is a question of ontological status:
The objective nature of photography confers on it a quality of credibility absent from all other picture making... We are forced to accept as real the existence of the object reproduced, accurately re-presented, set before us, that is to say, in time and space. Photography enjoys a certain advantage in virtue of this transference of reality from the thing to its reproduction (Bazin 1967 ppl3-14).

This conclusion about realism as a question of ontological status which forces the viewer to accept as real the existence of the object reproduced stems directly from Bazin's reading of Sartre's theory of the role of the image in art. Sartre's theory was that all image-making must be an intentional act of consciousness. This obviously presents a problem for 'photographic art' - Malraux felt that copying automatically was a mechanical process which could not invest the referent with an aesthetic presence, for a photograph to generate a 'sens' it would have to be intentionally composed; a film would have to be highly edited to put it in the realm of derealised time and space. Anything less would be ' uninspired' and 'poor' providing only a referent without drawing our feelings into that world. Useful but without an aesthetic dimension. A photograph may signify a woman, the Mona Lisa has the 'sens' of the whole Renaissance. It was at this point that Bazin would have to abandon these thinkers who tended to use painting as a model for film aesthetics. For Sartre film had to transcend its mechanics and become invested with the creative intentions of the consciousness structuring it. For Malraux the physicality of film image had, by means of montage - the realm of the structured and intended, to become a more spiritual process. Both seek to deny the medium that which is absolutely fundamental to it so as to conform to the aesthetics of painting which inform us that nothing is worse than a mechanical reproduction. For Bazin, it was the technological breakthrough in mechanical reproduction that gave to film its true nature as the medium of the real - it had not to adapt for it had no precedent.
"Can the photographic image, especially the cinematographic image, be likened to other images and in common with them be regarded as having an existence distinct from the object? Presence, naturally is defined in terms of time and space. 'To be in the presence of someone' is to recognize him as existing contemporaneously with us and to note that he comes within actual range of our sense ... Before the arrival of ... cinema ... the plastic arts (especially portraiture) were the only intermediaries between actual physical presence and absence. Their justification was their resemblance which stirs the imagination and helps the memory. But photography is something else again. In no sense is it the image of an object or person, more correctly it is its tracing. Its automatic genesis distinguishes it radically from the other techniques of reproduction. The photograph proceeds by means of the lens to the taking of a veritable luminous impression in light - to a mold. As such it carries with it more than mere resemblance, namely a kind of identity... It makes a molding if the object as it exists in space and, furthermore, makes an imprint of the duration of the object" (Bazin 1967 pp93-7).

Bazin is seeking for the photograph a psychological power deriving from the fact that its referent at one time stood in exactly that position while the camera made its "deathmask". Cinema "replays the presence of the person reflected in it - but it is a mirror with a delayed reflection, the tin foil of which retains the image" (Bazin 1967 p97).

Where Sartre and Malraux see only duplication of accidental appearances, Bazin detects unique virtue: "All the arts are based on the presence of men, only photography derives an advantage from his absence. Photography affects us like a phenomenon in nature, like a flower or a snow flake whose vegetable or earthly origins are an inseparable part of their beauty" (Bazin 1967 p13).

The effect of realism for Bazin is at least in part the psychological power the cinema enjoys because of its existential
connection with the reality it represents or what semiology will call the indexical dimension of the image. That the cinema does enjoy such a psychological power is undeniable but the legitimacy of the claims that underly the spectator's convictions do not withstand closer scrutiny and so can not be elevated to the status of a unique tie cinema enjoys with reality. Bazin's statement that photography derives its advantage from the absence of man - which he suggests is some guarantee of its realism - is indicative of his faith in the objectivity of the photographic process (he is not so naive as to believe it is the same as objective reality). But as the semiological investigation of film will show, each and every shot is selected by the filmmaker from all other possible coherent shots and combined by the filmmaker with other shots in any one of numerous possible sequences. In other words the artist is not absent from the photographic process and whether the outcome is realistic is not guaranteed by some blind faith on the part of the viewer in the camera's objectivity but is rather a careful contrivance on the part of the artist. As argued by Gombrich his selections and combinations must evoke the correct response in the viewer to enjoy the psychological power of 'cinematic realism'.

Talk of realism is talk about an effect as detailed at length in the chapter on Gombrich and not talk about film's unique claims to being the medium of the real. None of this is a denial of cinema's psychological power, indeed the effect of realism is dependent on the viewer's convictions concerning 'cinematic reality' and, what Gombrich labelled, his/her consequent projection.

Bazin's 'sun' is so fail to distinguish between a viewer's beliefs concerning 'truth' and the question of rightness. Bazin can not be satisfied with the unique psychological power of realism enjoyed by cinema such that

"A very faithful drawing may actually tell us more about the model but... it will never have the irrational power of the photograph to bear sway our faith" Bazin 1967 p14).

His theory of realism serves the ultimate goal of discovery of the
truths of nature'. It is a theory that goes beyond the vanities of art - to seek man's history, man's destiny by encountering appearances on their own terms. In part, Basin derived these notions of cinema from Pierre Teilhard de Chardin who 'read in the face of the earth' man's evolutionary destiny. Teilhard saw the earth as striving towards consciousness and hence to a new evolutionary step. In Teilhard's theories, Basin could find the justification to use film to look at nature, to decipher its message, to discover the meaning that would otherwise pass us by.

This leads Basin to argue the ontological status of the photographic image such that:

"The photographic image is the object itself, the object freed from the conditions of time and space that govern it. No matter how fuzzy... it shares, by virtue of the very process of its becoming, the being of the model of which it is the reproduction; it is the model. Hence the charm of family albums. Those gray or sepia shadows, phantom-like and almost indecipherable, are no longer the traditional family portrait, but rather the disturbing presence of lives halted at a moment in their 'duration', freed from their destiny; not, however, by the prestige of art but by the power of an impasive mechanical process: for photography does not create eternity, as art does, it combines time, rescuing it simply from its proper corruption' (Basin 1957 p14).

Man through his imagination can bring to life the images of a photograph - paying homage to his world, his past. The development of cinema is the realization of a "myth of total cinema", a myth of total representation. He is making it possible to duplicate the earth in space and time.

Because Basin's theory is not simply an explanatory one but rather a vindication of the realist filmmaker on the grounds of an ethical programme, he becomes involved in notions of ontology, truth and meaning that his analyses simply cannot support. This becomes more evident as we move beyond questions of psychology to the realm of cinema to reality. Once more by enumerating the roots of
theories it will become apparent how his arguments work towards the fulfillment of his philosophical bias rather than a philosophical justification of the realist aesthetic.

5 Cinema as 'The Art of the Real'

One obvious influence on Bazin's views on cinematic realism is the culturally orientated magazine *Esprit* - a prime locus for Bergsonian criticism. In effect Bazin was a child of Bergsonian and not positivist education. Bergson held that perception, rationality and intuition were the three modes of apprehending the world. Perception is the most basic: our body encountering other objects in a field perpetually in flux. Reason organises these perceptions into comprehensible patterns while intuition, transcending both, reunifies experience that has been fragmented by intelligence. The latter is a return to the flux through supranational reflection, capturing the meaning and direction of the flux. 'Grasping' a melody is this intuitional grasping of meaning in flux as a global experience closed to analysis. Bazin's Bergsonian roots are explicit: 'Un film bergsonien: Le Mystère Picasso' (Bazin 1959) is an essay on cinema's relation to the flow of time, while 'Charlie Chaplin' (Bazin 1967) illustrates Bergson's thesis that comedy results from a breakdown of our 'automatic' response to the world producing an intuition previously blocked by reason (Bergson 1911). Bazin, taking this further, saw photography as fulfilling Bergson's injunction to strip from the world 'that spiritual dust and grime with which my eyes have covered it' (Bazin 1967 p18).

It was the Bergsonian notion of the integral unity of a universe in flux, that enabled Bazin to dispense with the notion of the shot - the analytical notion that helps us see the world as cut up into fragments - with which he associated montage. For 'great cinema' Bazin proclaimed:

"there remains henceforth only the question of framing the fleeting crystallization of a reality of whose environing
presence one is ceaselessly aware" (Bazin 1967 p91)
- not montage but the "global" attitude of grasping reality intuitively.

Even more specifically in the realm of film criticism it was Esprit that had the greatest formative influence on Bazin’s thought.

Roger Leenhardt’s realistly oriented writings on cinema, especially “The Little Handbook of the Spectator” (1936). Leenhardt advocated the transcription of reality as the purpose of photography and not Lumière’s ‘rhetorics’. For Leenhardt cinema attains its primary value not in becoming art, but in adapting itself to things as they are, not through ‘signifying’ (that is rhetoric, conventional speech, conventional art and not for cinema) but ‘rendering’. Unlike classical film aesthetics he says cinema is not a symbol system with a new set of signs – it is a partial view of something significant trying to appear through it.

Even more important was the influence of the founder/editor of Esprit and spokesman for the personalist movement, Emmanuel Mounier. He did not see personalism as a system but as a perspective, a method, an attitude situating man between systematization and solir. Personalism claims more freedom for man than Hegel, Marx or St. Thomas could offer. Not that Mounier uses arguments to oppose metaphysics – he opposes abstract systematic thinking. Metaphysics, he states, destroys the mystery in nature and replaces man’s freedom with a defined role. But opposition to systems is not the existentialist rejection of passivism or solipsism. Mounier felt this response to the world was equally presumptuous. Personalism does not lead to a conclusion about the final nature of things, striving rather to remain true to the ambiguities and confusing hopes of the.

Personalism is an:

“ethical programme by means of which beings can fully realize their humanity in the context of an undefined and confusion world. Action is necessary because man owes it to himself and...
his world to build with such materials as he finds around him and to peer outward with such light as he can gather and direct" (Andrewes 1978 p33).

Bazin adopted this response to the universe for his theory of the cinema. It is up to the filmmaker to use the camera to 'peer outward' and seek the 'light' of values. The true filmmaker attains power through 'style': an inner orientation facilitating this outward search. Finding one's own orientation is arriving at one's own style which will give a stability to one's work. Thus style is not a given, it is an achieved self-awareness. This is the parallel to the calmness of the personal self achieved by retreating from the world. However in retreat the self/style can not develop and clarify 'for itself' - it finds its existence only through immersion in activity. Style is a mysterious power capable of revealing and transforming the substance of the world for Bazin and for Mounier.

"Man presses down on nature to overcome nature, as the airplane presses on air in order to ascend" (Mounier 1970 p73).

Consider the 'reality axiom' in relation to the personalist 'mysterious otherness of external reality'. Mounier considered this otherness knowable to a person who has retreated into his inner distance, to return to focus on the physical world disposed to receive whatever truths should be made known to him. The mysteriousness is not that of a naive realism which regards the world as awaiting clarification through the investigations of science as though it were a self-sufficient sphere we try in various ways to penetrate and use. Rather, Bazin is a pupil of the school of thought that regards mystery as a quality of the world itself, not something that can be overcome. For Mounier, like Sartre, Marcel and Merleau-Ponty, reality is not a situation available to experience, it exists only in experience - an emerging something in which the mind participates. Thus mystery is not the result of human limitations - it is an attribute of the real, a value attained when consciousness encounters the otherness we call the world. Filmmakers can tend to one of the ends of the spectrum:
aiding our encounters with the universe or an expressive device 'speaking back' to the universe. Bazin’s derision for the latter filmmakers derived from the fact that they ‘discovered’ nothing, offering only subjective opinions, arranging the world to fit their views. German Expressionists, for example, were not being honest in their use of nature as given - the film image. Cinema is obviously not the same as objective reality but Bazin felt it was more than a mere opinion of reality: lying somewhere between perspective and objectivity. In Bazin’s geometrical vocabulary, cinema is a ‘asymptote’ of reality - forever approaching but never becoming reality. For a filmmaker to deny the unique relation cinema has to reality is to turn his back on the possibility of discovery for the sake of his own views.

If this explains why Bazin didn’t like certain films, it also explains why he did like the Neo-Realists, Flaherty and Renoir. His philosophical bias draws him towards the ‘creative documentary’ genre because these films are built on the central paradox: the filmmaker must make reality look real (to this extent at least Bazin subscribes to the rejection of realism as the outcome of mechanical reproduction accepting that it is an effect that must be consciously attained by the filmmaker) but he must also draw out the significance which is undiscovered in experience.

“There is no point in rendering something realistically unless it is to make it more meaningful in an abstract sense. In this paradox lies the progress of the movies. In this paradox lies the genius of Renoir, without doubt the greatest of all French directors’ (Bazin 1971 p85).

Flaherty’s documentary work consists in, paradoxically, transforming appearance in order to retain the significance of man’s life in his environment. The fact is that the truth of life goes beyond appearance, hence the need for fabrication without a corresponding loss of honesty. Flaherty, for instance, may very well alter events but he never ‘creates’ a reaction - just presents it in relation to the action and the background. Renoir’s
fictional work is comparable in that his subjects were chosen for what they could reveal of their own particularity, his locations were chosen to allow the actor to see himself as an actor in a fabricated locale but the rest was true reaction of the subject—a documentarian eliciting reactions from his actors. Both filmmakers do not sacrifice their style or vision. They do not direct the action but provide the audience with a considered perspective.

"His [Renoir's] style is part of an instinct that first chooses what to watch and then knows how to watch it—more precisely, how to coexist with it. Under the subtle pressure of this approach, relationships within reality become visible, bursting into the consciousness of the spectator as a revelation of a truth discovered" (Andrew 1978 p109).

Although Bazin does not have so narrow a view of realism that he can not allow fiction into the realm of realistic cinema, he only accepts the need for artifice for the revelatory role it can play because as he states 'the truth of life goes beyond appearance'. Bazin, unlike Goodman, cannot divorce the notion of revelation from that of truth. He cannot see the point of realism if it is not "to make it more meaningful" (Bazin 1971 p88) by which one must understand the revelation of "pre-existing relations" (Bazin 1967 p27). That, in this sense, there are 'truths' to be discovered through realism is an unnecessary but predictable claim that does not hold up well in the light of Goodman's rigorous denial that truth has any role to play in realism outside of the psychology of realism. Bazin however worked from Tielhard de Chardin's standpoint that by looking at nature we could read its message, contemplate its truths. The meaning is not in ourselves as Goodman would argue but to be found in an outward search. This is where the shortcomings of Bazin's thesis become apparent: his is not a position arrived at through analysis but rather through adoption of the ethical programme of Personalism. When Bazin argued for the psychological power underpinning realism in film as a result of its origins he was working from the understanding that the object reproduced is real, that the viewer is convinced because it is the
truth. This criticism should not detract from the vital contribution Bazin has made in indicating the nature of the psychology of realism in film. His belief, however philosophically indefensible, nevertheless endows the psychological conviction of the film spectator that cinema, unlike the other arts, is more than imitation - it is connected to what it represents. For Bazin the origin of an image has a direct relation to/efect on the image's visual reality. All this is not to say that Bazin could find nothing good to say about conventions. Indeed they are for him the guiding around the pure vision of reality - unfortunately a guiding that dates in a way the vision never does. The symbol may provide a moment of revelation, may act as a key to the universe. Thus Bazin can praise films that use conventions to generate revelations of an unconventional nature. (His interest stretches beyond realistic cinema to reality itself).

To Bazin, Renoir and Fleischer were the pioneers of a cinematography that upheld this aesthetic of participation in a subject so that the meaning may reveal itself. To Bazin, the Italian Neo-Realists fulfilled the promises of such a method. Rohmer was obviously wrong to call Bazin’s choice of film arbitrary (although one may yet take note of the point he wished to make) – indeed, what other choice could he have made if his background has been sketched correctly. Neo-Realism was the perfect strain to feed Bazin’s theories. In the films of the Neo-Realists what the audience sees is a view of life sparked by the tension between reality and the image as they brought cinematic experience closer to lived experience. In fact, they are so close to our everyday perception that the experience talks for itself without the interposition of the filmmaker. The Neo-Realists, to this extent, appear to conform with Goodman’s explanation that realism depends upon familiarity but equally Neo-Realism was the discovery of a new system of representation which clearly points to the fact that the realism of the Neo-Realists is based on a convention and not the achievement of an ultimate resemblance. The Neo-Realists, according to Bazin, choose one aspect of reality out of the vast flux of life which we
can engage in all its mystery. As his biographer Andrew tells us:

"Bazin loved Neo-Realist films not because of what they told him of cinema, but because of what they told him of reality" (Andrew 1978 p16).

Bazin sought images of reality, not abstractions, in the cinema. Neo-Realism was entirely devoted to this cause. It goes beyond everyday perception not through any technical tricks but by concentration which allows details to stand out. (Bazin calls the Neo-Realist cameraman a 'filter'). The arrangement of the facts (dramaturgy) is natural and they are presented independently. What this means is that the filmmaker has selected certain facts and arranged them — herein lies the art of the film: an inner disposition within the disposition of the facts of reality — but because the facts are independent they could as easily be incorporated in a different arrangement. Two directors with the same facts would probably come up with different arrangements. Bazin suggests the relativist conclusion that there are many equally valid descriptions of the phenomenal.

This is quite unlike the 'facts' of fictional films. Fabricated in the first place, they are 'fashioned' carefully to lock into the film with no independent standing. Bazin's analogy is that of the rock as opposed to the brick:

"I will say this of the classical forms of art and of traditional realism, that they are built as houses are built, with bricks or cut stones. It is not a matter of calling into question either the utility of these houses or the beauty they may or may not have, or the perfect suitability of bricks to the building of houses. The reality of the brick lies less in its composition than it does in its form and strength. It would never enter your head to define it as a piece of clay; its peculiar mineral composition matters little. What does count is that it have the right dimensions. A brick is the basic unit of a house. That this is so is proclaimed by its appearance. One can apply the same argument to the stones of which a bridge is constructed."
They fit together perfectly to form an arch. But the big rocks that lie scattered in a ford are now and ever will be no more than mere rocks. Their reality as rocks is not affected when, leaping from one to another, I use them to cross the river. If the service which they have rendered is the same as that of the bridge, it is because I have brought my share of ingenuity to bear on their chance arrangement; I have added the notion which, though it alters neither their nature nor appearance, gives them a provisional meaning and utility. In the same way, the Neo-Realist film has a meaning, but it is a posteriori, to the extent that it permits our awareness to move from one fact to another, from one fragment of reality to the next, whereas in the classical artistic composition the meaning is established a priori: the house is already there in the brick” (Bazin 1971 p99).

Thus for Bazin Neo-Realism and not "traditional Realism" more closely approximates everyday reality which does not consist of crossing readymade bridges but picking our way across stones to ford a river. Bazin's advocacy of Neo-Realism as opposed to Realism appears to be the film theoretical embodiment of Goodman's position that although it is familiarity that sets the realistic work apart, achievement of an even greater realism is attended by the notion of revelation. Quite apart from Bazin's belief in the unique tie cinema in general enjoys with reality Bazin argued that the move from the standard (Hollywood) mode of representation to a new (Neo-Realist) mode resulted in a new degree of realism. But is this the tension between familiarity and discovery as definitive of realism that is at the root of the term developed through the work of Goodman? A more detailed examination of Bazin's position would seem to indicate otherwise.

Bazin insists that it is to film's advantage that it approximates our everyday experience because it thereby shares in our appreciation of the beautiful forms of nature. This appreciation is built on a knowledge of the genesis of that form, the very
Bazin's theory humbles the artist before the film he 'helped bring about', but it also singles out certain directors as great 'explorers' in 'bringing them about'. They are the directors whose films make available the greatest disclosures. For Bazin reality is the result of an encounter between an active apprehension and the field of phenomena within which it operates and these films are the instruments of reality. He talks of Citizen Kane (Welles 1940) and Paisà (Rossellini 1947) as recording Merleau-Ponty's 'ambiguities of experience', as participating in a reality in which cinema was directly involved:

"although they use independent techniques, without the least possibility of a direct influence one on the other, and possessed of temperaments that could hardly be less compatible, Rossellini and Welles have, to all intents and purposes, the same aesthetic objective, the same aesthetic concept of realism" (Bazin 1971, p39).

Rossellini's situation perhaps best illustrates Bazin's point about the convergence of life, art, politics. Out of the ashes of the Second World War Rossellini, in exploring the crisis of his country, created a film style which became a part of the culture it wished to document. It was not a film style born of mogul, studios and stars.

Bazin felt he was championing the cinematic equivalent of Esprit's phenomenological stance: a wholeness of approach which does not make a logical analysis of the situation. A cinema of description alone, personal perhaps but not an imaginative reshaping of the world. Rossellini:

"I try to interfere the minimum amount possible with the image, my interference is only to find the point of view and to say what is essential, no more. That is why I insist really very strongly that I am not an artist ... You can suggest and tell people what you have had the possibility to collect, observe,
and to see. You can give, but very smoothly, your point of view which is there as soon as you have made your choice. The choice comes from your personality, one thing attracts you more than another... My purpose is never to convey a message, never to persuade but to offer everyone an observation, even my observation. Why not?" (Schultz 1971 p15-16).

Bazin's work, no matter how fully one may sketch in its philosophical background, is chiefly a description of the realistic nature of the cinema. At worst it is a statement of axiomatic belief at the root of which lies a conviction about the signifying power of nature. The filmmaker is not some one who 'adds to' or 'deforms' reality, but he:

"forces it to reveal its structural depth, to bring out the pre-existing relations which become constitutive of drama" (Bazin 1967 p27).

It should be observed that Bazin's belief that there are pre-existing relations awaiting revelation provides a built-in justification for the conclusion he will arrive at that a film's realism is at least in part a revelation of 'meaning' through sheer re-presentation of spatial reality.

For Bazin the world is a world of possibilities - man can actuate them:

"The representation of space... opens to a world of analogies, of metaphors or, to use Baudelaire's words in another no less poetic sense, of correspondences" (Bazin 1971 p90).

As we have see, film alone is the art form ontogenetically bound to the universe. "It is capable of re-presenting the spatial order as completed in its own blocks of time". So film can isolate aspects of spatial reality in a frame, mark off events into blocks of time for rearrangement as man encounters the universe, to aid his perception and understanding of what is limitless. It was his belief that these aids did not make nature submit to human consciousness but only gave us a chance to look at the 'correspondences' in the universe "as long-lasting and as close-up
as you like" (Bazin 1967 p27). It is the great filmmaker who, by applying his gaze with sufficient intensity, reveals a 'flood of correspondences' in the universe. Thus Rossellini is praised by Bazin:

"There is nothing in his films that belongs to literature or to poetry, not even a trace of 'the beautiful' in the merely pleasing sense of the word. Rossellini directs facts ... The world of Rossellini is a world of pure acts, unimportant in themselves but preparing the way (as if unbeknownst to God himself) for the sudden dazzling revelation of their meaning" (Bazin 1971 p100).

Similarly the films of Renoir and Welles, although dramatic fictional situations on an artificial stage, carefully maintain the field of interdependent elements resulting in realism. Meaning arises as relationships disclose themselves in this field. The director's job is to originate and then observe the development of these relationships. He doesn't create meaning, his job is "framing the floating crystallization of a reality of whose environting presence one is ceaselessly aware" (Bazin 1957 p91).

It is Citizen Kane (Welles 1940) above all others that Bazin felt forced him to locate a metaphysics within a style of photography and narrative. This conviction came from the overt correspondence between film style and larger concerns when Bazin viewed the film. It had been rejected by the film world in Paris which followed Sartre's line that it was 'pretentious' and 'fatalistic'. Analyzing the film's tenses, Sartre 'found' that the narrative technique of Citizen Kane was appropriate to literature alone. Sartre saw the role of cinema as an art of the present tense appropriate to a revolutionary consciousness and not a fatalistic gaze into the past. Against the ensuing flood of condemnations, Bazin defended a story and pictorial representation which he found corresponded so closely to his own way of imagining reality.

Bazin believed that the intense experience of Citizen Kane is a
result of the identity of plot structure and "the structure of the image". It is a tale told in a spatial atmosphere that envelopes the viewer.

"Citizen Kane" is unthinkable shot in any other way but in depth. The uncertainty in which we find ourselves as to the spiritual key or the interpretation we should put on the film is built into the very design of the image" (Bazin 1950 p36).

Bazin's best example is the attempted suicide of Susan Alexander. Another director would have built up drama by showing separate images of Kane outside the door, Susan, the pistol, Kane breaking the door down... Wells in one deep-focus shot shows Susan, the pistol and the door in the background with the sound of knocking. Here is a 'global rendering' not an 'analytical construction according to convention'. Conventional editing seems realistic because we have

"...the illusion of being at real events unravelling before us in an everyday reality. But this illusion conceals an essential bit of deceit because reality exists in continuous space and the screen presents us in fact with a succession of fragments called 'shots', the choice, order and duration of which constitutes exactly what we call the 'decoupage' of the film. If we try by an effort of attention, to perceive the breaks imposed by the camera on the continuous development of the represented event, and try to understand why we are naturally insensible (to those breaks) we understand that we tolerate them because they give us the impression all the sense of a continuous homogeneous reality.

The insertion of a doorbell in closeup is accepted by the mind as if this were nothing other than a concentration of our vision and interest on the doorbell, as if the camera merely anticipated the movement of our eyes (Bazin 1950 p51).

A system of conventions, called invisible montage, leads us to accept a certain order of things according to Bazin. It is invisible as it corresponds to the natural movement of our minds - the editor is creating what is psychologically real by matching the flow of our perceptions. Valen's realism is of a deeper sort for

"under the cover of the congenital realism of the screen a
complete system of abstraction (had) been fraudulently introduced... subordinating the wholeness of reality to the sense of the action” (Bazin 1950 p57).

Welles gives us a world which is infinitely more interesting than the drama itself by making “the action unroll continuously in its own block of time” (Andrew 1978 p127).

“In reality when I am involved in an action, my attention, directed by my plan, proceeds likewise to a kind of virtual shot breakdown in which the object effectively loses for me some of its aspects, to become instead a sign or a tool; but the action remains always in the act of becoming and the object is constantly free to recall for me its objectiveness and consequently to modify my planned action. For my part, I am at every moment free to no longer will this action and to be awakened by reality which appears to me as just a box of tools” (Bazin 1950 p58).

Thus reality is, at least in part, a free interplay between man and the objects he perceives. Conventional editing imitates our habit of organizing these perceptions by making them conform to a ‘plot’. For Bazin this destroys our freedom to organise our field of perception and destroys the autonomy of the objects (and thus the possibility of other ‘plots’).

“Classical editing totally suppresses this kind of reciprocal freedom between us and the object. It substitutes for a free organization a forced shot breakdown where the logic of each shot is controlled by the reporting of the action. This utterly anaesthetizes our freedom” (Bazin 1950 p58).

Welles gave us more than a new style, he changed our conception of the filmed event and the spectator of that filmed event. The key word was ‘participation’. The results extend beyond cinema. Citizen Kane is a new conception of the universe and man’s place in it: Traditional editing:

“...tends to exclude in particular the ambiguity imminent in reality. It ‘subjectivises’ the event in the extreme, since each
moment or particle then becomes the forgone conclusion of the director. This does not only imply a dramatic choice, emotional or moral, but again and more profoundly, a taking of a position on reality insofar as it is such" (Bazin 1947 pp943-9).

Welles does not allow the audience the comfort of 'focused' conceptions of life, drama, metaphysics. "Depth of field ... forces the spectator to make use of the freedom of his attention and demands, at the same time, that he feels the ambivalence of reality" (Bazin 1950 p58-9).

Citizen Kane then is a natural support for Bazin's philosophy - the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, Marcel, Sartre and Esprit. Welles said:

"A poet must seek out and cultivate his contradictions... I demand that men should have the right to keep and to encourage his contradictions" (Clay 1973 p66).

Not for Bazin the role of cinema as simplifier of the world; rather Welles' 'personalist' task of wrenching meaning and identity from the ambiguity of experience. The structures of Welles' films are forever questioned by the uncertainty of the universe beyond.

I asked the question 'is this the tension between familiarity and discovery that is at the root of realism according to Goodman's definition of that term?'. To which the answer 'no' must now be given. The understanding of the notion of familiarity that Bazin talks of as basic to Neo-Realist filmmaking is not the familiarity of a standard mode of representation that Goodman felt differentiated the realist work of art. It is rather the familiarity of 'conventionless rendering': 'images of reality', 'the facts of reality' 'brought about' by the filmmaker who offers a 'long-lasting close-up' of 'pure acts'. This is not the familiarity of an established system of conventions such as Goodman argues allows information to issue with ease. This is what Bazin would understand as 'traditional Realism'; he would read Goodman's claims as conventionalist. On this understanding he would reject
Goodman because the familiarity of conventional editing is not what Bazin wants from a realist work. Invisible montage is a deception which may be psychologically satisfying but is not revelatory of ‘reality’. In short, Bazin is arguing against realism as an effect - he would argue that the familiarity suggested by Goodman belongs to the realm of the conventional whereas his notion of familiarity is somehow connected to a realism of a deeper sort.

But as much as Bazin may want to go beyond a psychology conducive to realism in film to establish a special tie between cinema and reality on the basis of the meaning it can reveal through sheer re-presentation of spatial reality, the facts argue against his correlation of realism with revelation divorced from a standard mode of representation that is as conventional as any other mode of representation. Realism has to be created as an effect by the filmmaker working within the confines of the standard mode of representation. In attempting to generate the realistic effect the filmmaker is confronted by a number of choices which will either enhance or detract from the realism of the film. Bazin’s attempt to go beyond a ‘psychology of realism in film’ to a realism deriving from a sheer representation of spatial reality ignores both the filmmaker and the viewer in assuming the mechanical nature of photography results in an inevitable, innocent reflection of reality. There is nothing inevitable or innocent about a filmmaker’s choices in creating a realistic effect as those choices depend on the viewer’s experience of the world which is neither innocent nor objective. Rather our experience of the world is encoded (as the chapter on semiology will detail): we modify and reconstruct the world in order that we may experience it. So too the realist filmmaker must encode reality: his films can not simply reflect reality, they must appeal to the viewer by reminding him/her of the codes. As Roland Barthes (1974) argued for literature, film is a ‘structure’ deriving from an interplay of codes. The realist filmmaker has a story to tell - a hermeneutic code - and a set of actions to convey - a prosodic code - which he relates to our experience of the world outside by means of
reference to accepted knowledge - the cultural code - and "flickers of meaning" - the code of sense. This is how the realist filmmaker generates the realistic effect - by encoding reality in a particular form and relationship to align the film with the viewer's experience of reality. The product of an encoding which because of its form and the relationship between the codes corresponds to the viewer's experience of reality is a familiarity such that the viewer does not even notice his reading, choosing and interpreting of the images. Thus contra Bazin it is familiarity that differentiates the realistic work and so invisible montage may well be the choice of the filmmaker striving for realism. That Bazin's notion of realism can not encompass the familiar in this sense and the discovery that attends the departure from the standard code of representation is the shortcoming of a theorist who refuses to acknowledge that realism is an effect reliant on the artist's appreciation of the appropriate choice between familiarity and discovery. There are no truths to be discovered, no pre-existing relations awaiting revelation, only the viewer's beliefs concerning 'truth' and so Bazin's definition of realism in terms of his understanding of the Neo-Realist task can not escape the limits of what is psychologically realistic for the viewer. In the end that is all that is important and not some claim to a realism that goes beyond film and forces the viewer into a personalist enquiry.

But if Bazin is wrong about realism not involving convention, he is right about the ease with which the realistic effect is achieved in film even if this can not be said to constitute a unique tie to reality. The following chapter on semiology will explain, the filmmaker must set up the conditions of the 'illusion' of realism but equally it will show how film fosters that illusion and has great difficulty in reproducing something in a form different to experienced reality and thus in a form conducive to thought. These are two sides of the same coin and will be the subject of chapter five.
The previous chapter approached film with a specific aesthetic - Bazin's realist aesthetic - based on particular beliefs about the ontology of the photographic image and influenced by particular philosophical standpoints concerning the ambiguous realities of nature. If 'realism' as set out by Bazin is not a prescriptive aesthetic, as a theory of film it is both normative and evaluative. This chapter will attempt to approach film with a specific set of tools which will reveal the mechanisms behind the achievement of contrastive realism, as opposed to non-realism, as an effect without attaching any specific values to these mechanisms. This will be achieved by looking at how cinema communicates through studying its minimal units of signification - signs - and the application of a linguistic model. Christian Metz's *Film Language* (1974a) and *Language and Cinema* (1974b) rank among the more important attempts at setting out a semiology of the cinema.

In effect, to deal with the question of realism it will be necessary to incorporate both of Gilbert Cohen-Satat's possibilities for the semiotic study of film (Metz 1974a p90):
- the cinematic: the presentation of codes, signification in film, films in effect cut off from their genesis or results/effects and
- the filmic: the relationship of film to the world outside of film, what the signifying codes embody psychologically, sociologically, culturally and esthetically.

Metz himself has very little to say explicitly about 'realism' apart from the first chapter of *Film Language* entitled "On the Impression of Reality in the Cinema" but even this forms part of a section devoted to "Phenomenological Approaches to Film". But implicitly film semiotics must confront realism not least because realistic cinema
remains the norm. It is true however that as long as there was only one 'realistic' film we could ask how it achieved that affect. If modernism, which advocated the sovereignty of artistic construction and experimentation in processes of signification, were the norm in cinematic art semiotics could demonstrate the illusory nature of realism, dealing with it as just one more, unprivileged mode of signification, focussing on the codes of art rather than its effects. But in realism, which does not expose the gap between artifice and reality, that is the norm in cinematic art and so film semiotics must confront the mechanisms of the realistic effect.

This is not to say that the filmmaker is unable to embark on a modernist exposition of the artifice of his creation. But the Fellinis and filmmaking are far fewer on the ground than the Rossellinis - and with good reason. There is nothing easier for a filmmaker than to create the illusion of reality - this is a function of the metonymic character of the film medium. As David Lodge (1977) explains:

"We move through time and space linearly and our sensory experience is a succession of contingencies. The basic units of the film, the shot and the scene, are composed along the bare line of contingency and combination, and the devices by which the one-shot after-another of experience is rendered more dramatic and meaningful are characteristically metonymic devices that operate along the same axis: the photographic close-up that represents the whole by the part, the slow motion sequence that retards without rupturing the natural tempo of successiveness, the high or low angle shot that 'defamiliarizes', without departing from, the action it is focused on. Consciousness is not, of course, bound to the line of spatio-temporal contiguity, in the way that sensory experience is, but then film does not deal very much or very effectively with consciousness except insofar as it is manifested in behaviour and speech, or can be reflected in landscape through the particular fallacy, or suggested by music on the soundtrack" (Lodge 1977 p84).

The outcome of this metonymic character of film is that once the
so-called language of film has been acquired by the viewer; the version of reality offered by the cinema in turn acquires a 'naturalness' for the viewer. The viewer is induced to accept the truth, the objectivity and obviousness of what is shown while the processes of production of this meaning are not apparent. Thus film semiotics, in its confrontation of the mechanisms of the realistic effect confronts ideologically loaded images that would have the viewer believe that they are images of 'the way things are' and indeed that 'this is how things ought to be'.

Now then is a semiological study embarked upon, that the processes of the production of realism may be revealed?

Semiology may be described as that approach which applies the method and findings of structural linguistics to the study of non-linguistic sign systems. This approach is based on the work of Ferdinand de Saussure:

"A science that studies the life of signs within society is conceivable; it would be part of a social psychology and consequently of general psychology; I shall call it semiology (from the Greek "semeion", 'sign'). Semiology would show what constitutes signs, what laws govern them. Since the science does not yet exist, no one can say what it would be; but it has a right to existence, a place staked out in advance. Linguistics is only a part of the general science of semiology: the laws discovered by semiology will be applicable to linguistics, and the latter will circumscribe a well-defined area within the mass of anthropological facts" (Saussure 1959 p15).

and Charles Sanders Peirce:

"Logic, in its general sense, is as I have shown, only another name for semiotic, the quasi-necessary or formal doctrine of signs. By describing the doctrine as 'quasi-necessary', or formal, I mean that we observe the characters of such signs as we know, and from such an observation, by a process which I will not object to naming Abstraction, we are led to statements, eminently fallible, and therefore in one sense by no means necessary, as to what must be
the characters of all signs used by a 'scientific' intelligence, that is to say by an intelligence capable of learning by experience" (Peirce 1936 227).

Approaching non-linguistic sign systems as languages by employing a linguistic model works to the advantage of any investigation as it ensures the treatment of what may otherwise appear to be 'natural signs', having intrinsic meaning and therefore not requiring explanation, as signs whose meanings are the product of culture and convention (in short like the apparently arbitrary linguistic signs).

The better understanding of film as a sign system that semiology offers is achieved only through a formal study of signs and a precise application of the linguistic model. While the latter task will be undertaken through the work of Christian Metz, the account of signs that is of immediate concern here requires an investigation of the sophisticated classification proposed by Peirce in his "Speculative Grammar, or the general theory of the nature and meaning of signs" (Peirce 1936 1.191).

Charles Saunders Peirce

In turning to Peirce, the aspect of his account that is of some import for the concerns of this dissertation is his distinction between three different kinds of signs.

"There may be a mere relation of reason between the sign and the thing signified; in that case the sign is an icon. Or there may be a direct physical connection; in that case the sign is an index. Or there may be a relation which consists in the fact that the mind associates the sign with its object; in that case the sign is a name [or symbol]" (Peirce 1936 1.372).

An icon is something that is related to its object by similarity whether or not the object exists.

"An icon is a representamen of what it represents and for the mind that interprets it as such, by virtue of its being an immediate image, that is to say by virtue of characters which belong to it in
itself as a sensible object, and which it would possess just the
same were there no object in nature that it resembled, and though
it were never interpreted as a sign" (Peirce 1936 4.447).

Peirce's definition is of an iconic potential sign:
"An icon is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely
by virtue of characters of its own, and which it possesses, just
the same, whether any such Object exists or not. It is true that
unless there is any such Object, the icon does not act as a sign;
but this has nothing to do with its character as a sign. Anything
whatever, be it a quality, existent individual, or law, is an
icon of anything, insofar as it in like that thing and used as a
sign of it" (Peirce 1936 2.247).

If we consider what we call icons it is apparent that there are no
pure icons. For example, a diagram or portrait may very well be a good
example of an icon but it has no value apart from conventions and
symbols. Something has to indicate the respects in which the diagram
is representative. And of a portrait Peirce would argue that it is an
icon in so far as the viewer forms an idea of the person it
represents.

"But, in fact, it is not a pure icon, because I am greatly informed
by knowing that it is an effect, through the artist, caused by the
original appearance and is thus in a genuine obvius relation to
that original" (Peirce 1936 2.99).

In fact the closest analogue of an icon is an idea. An icon
"is of the nature of an appearance, and as such, strictly speaking,
exists only in consciousness, although for convenience in ordinary
parlance and when extreme precision is not called for, we extend
the term icon to the outward objects which excite in consciousness
the image itself" (Peirce 1936 4.447).

Nevertheless a sign is called an icon irrespective of its mode of
existence as long as it functions by means of similarity.

An index is something related to its object because of a real
action between it and the object.

"An index is a representation which fulfills the function of a
representamen by virtue of a character which it could not have if its object did not exist, but which it will continue to have just the same whether it be interpreted as a representamen or not (Peirce 1935 5.73).

As with icons, the sign vehicle and its relation to its object exist independently of its ever being actually used as a sign.

Peirce describes the function of indexical meaning as something which "forces the attention to the particular object intended without describing it" (Peirce 1936 1.359).

The pointing finger is an index: it has a spatial relation to its object and directs attention. As to the purity of indices, consider cause-effect relationships.

"Insofar as the Index is affected by the Object, it necessarily has some Quality in common with the Object, and it is in respect of these that it refers to the Object. It does, therefore, involve a sort of Icon, although an Icon of a peculiar kind; and it is not a mere resemblance of its Object, even in these respects which make it a sign, but it is the actual modification of it by the Object" (Peirce 1936 2.246).

If we turn to language, we are concerned with degenerate indices — not real connections which assure us of the reality of the object as in the case of genuine indices discussed above.

"Every subject partakes of the nature of an index, in that its function is the characteristic function of an index, that of forcing the attention upon its object. Yet the subject of a symbolic proposition cannot strictly be an index" (Peirce 1936 2.357).

It is the manner in which a grammatical subject functions, or for that matter pronouns or proper names that allows Peirce to call them indices. That is, not in the strict sense but simply because of their denotative function. A word can not be an index but it can "call upon the hearer to use his powers of observation, and so establish a real connection between his mind and the object" (Peirce 1936 2.287).
In a similar vein, quantifiers, in so far as they give directions for selecting the subject of the proposition, are indexical as are directions which bring the interpreter into connection with the intended object.

"A symbol is a law, or regularity of the indefinite future" (Peirce 1936 2.293).

The symbol is related to its object by virtue of a habit of association...

"... the [symbol] is the general name or description which signifies its object by means of an association of ideas or habitual connection between the name and the character signified" (Peirce 1936 1.369).

For this reason there can be no actual - potential distinction for symbols: the sign vehicle is related to the object by a mind. This is why Peirce calls symbols genuine signs - the foundation for the sign relationship comes from the fact that the relation is triadic.

Note that the symbol is not the same as the token. One may erase a word [token] from a page but that does not erase the symbol [type]. The function of the symbol is to bring generality to the sign's process:

"Such signs are always abstract and general, because habits are general rules to which the organism has become subjected" (Peirce 1936 3.360).

The manner in which the symbol carries this out is to influence the images, concepts, and actions of the interpreter.

"The being of a symbol consists in the real fact that something surely will be experienced if certain conditions be satisfied. Namely, it will influence the thought and conduct of its interpreter" (Peirce 1896 4.447).

The interpreter sees a token of the symbol and associates a mental icon with the objects denoted by the symbol in that context. This associative habit is the symbol.

"Any ordinary word as 'give', 'bird', 'marriage' is an example of a symbol. It is applicable to whatever may be found to realize the
idea connected with the word: it does not, in itself, identify those things. It does not show us a bird, not exact before our eyes a giving in marriage, but supposes that we are able to imagine those things, and have associated the word with them" (Peirce 2:208).

For the symbol the qualitative possibility is the icon and the existent is the token. The symbol consists in the fact that the quality will be associated with the existent. It is this habit of association and not the icon or token which embodies generality.

Fitzgerald explains Peirce's division of signs as follows:

"If we are able to reason about the objects in the world, we must be able to recognize similarities between one object and another. Such a process requires the use of icons. But an icon, which of itself is a potential sign, requires that there be an interpreter, who is able to take note of the features of similarity. It is only by reason of this latter process that generality enters the sign process. But when generality enters, we have thirdness of law, so we are concerned with symbols. However, the icon and the symbols of themselves are not sufficient, since neither of them indicates the subject of discourse. Indices are needed to bring our attention to the objects to which the symbol and its accompanying icon apply" (Fitzgerald 1966 p66).

Simply to extract the distinction between icon, index and symbol from the broader concerns of Peirce's theory of the nature and meaning of signs is to simplify his work to the point of misrepresentation. However as Peirce himself did not evince any particular concern with aesthetics it has proved necessary for commentators to isolate that area of his philosophy which is appropriate to their concerns. It is particularly the upshot of Peirce's distinction between the three kinds of signs which has been seen to be important in the field of aesthetics, and specifically film.

Peter Wollen has been a central figure in exploiting Peirce's triadic
distinction for the analysis of film. Wollen arrived at his conviction about the importance of Peirce's distinction, as opposed to the more generally adopted Saussurian account of signs for semiological film analysis, via the work of Roman Jakobson who:

"pointed out that whereas Saussure held that signs that are wholly arbitrary realise better than the others the ideal of the semiological process, Peirce believed that in the most perfect of signs the iconic, the indexical and the symbolic would be amalgamated as nearly as possible in equal proportions" (Wollen 1982 p142).

Wollen in Signs and Meaning in the Cinema (1982) (one of the major English language texts on semiology and film) suggests that the cinematographic image is such an amalgam with few rivals in the world of communication. In a film one is confronted with all three modes of signifying alternately. Consider the remarkable ant-covered hand from Dali and Bunuel's Un Chien Andalou (1928).

"Iconic, indexical and symbolic values are all present: the image is striking for its own sake; it is a measure of the infestation of the soul of the owner of the hand; it is certainly symbolic of a more general malaise; as well. It is etymology, because the ants are an 'associated detail'; it is also synecdoche, because the hand is a part that stands for the whole. Finally, the source of the image seems to be a trope: a verbal pun on the French idiom 'avoir des fourmis dans les mains', 'to have ants in the hand', an expression equivalent to the English 'my hand is asleep'. By illustrating the turn of phrase literally, Dali and Bunuel extended the trope so that a common experience is turned into a striking sign of decay" (Monaco 1981 p141).

Wollen's argument is that

"In fact the aesthetic richness of the cinema springs from the fact that it comprises all three dimensions of the sign: indexical, iconic and symbolic. The great weakness of almost all those who have written about the cinema is that they have taken one of these dimensions, made it the ground of their aesthetic, the 'essential'
dimension of the cinematic sign, and discarded the rest. This is
to impoverish the cinema. Moreover, none of these dimensions can
be discounted: they are co-present. The great merit of Peirce's
analysis of signs is that he did not see the different aspects as
mutually exclusive. Unlike Saussure he did not show any particular
prejudice in favour of one or the other. Indeed, he wanted a logic
and a rhetoric which would be based on all three aspects. It is
only by considering the interaction of the three different
dimensions of the cinema that one can understand its aesthetic
effect" (Wollen 1982 p141).

There can be no precise distinction between signs in a film, merely a
discussion of the prevalence of one mode of signification at the level
of units, signs, sequences or the whole work. Along these lines Lee
Russell (19 ) posits the predominance of one dimension over the
others throughout film history. Thus the films of Von Sternberg,
Ophuls, Resnais, Antonioni, Rosi and Petri belong to the iconic
dimension along with various 'underground' works by Markopoulos,
Warhol, Patella, Schifano and Mesboch. The films that belong to the
indexical dimension would be those of Flaherty, Murnau, Von Stroheim,
Renoir, Welles, Wylor, Rossellini and the Italian Neo-Realists. The
symbolic dimension is most obvious in the films of Eisenstein,
Resnais, Pasolini and some Godard.

The exact categorization of films on this basis is not of any direct
concern here, however it will be of interest to take one or more
films) from each of Russell's groupings and attempt to understand the
perceived realism of the work(s) in terms of the predominant
dimension.

Joseph Von Sternberg belongs to the iconic dimension. At the same
time his films stand in opposition to Realist cinema. Everything may
be taken from socio-geographic reality - a real boat is filmed on a
real beach, and real walls under a real sky in The Salvation
Hunters(1925) - but it is all material for the elaboration of a purely
filmic milieu. Von Sternberg sets out to destroy the existential bond
between the natural world and the filmic image. He stressed the pictorial character of the cinema - he saw himself as the author of a film equivalent to the author of a poem despite the mechanical nature of his medium. Thus he was at pains to set up a filmic discourse at a distance from the world -

"a world governed by laws other than those of imitation and representation, and certainly other than those of everyday causality" (Claude Ollier in Roud 1980, p950).

As Wollen puts it:

"It was the iconic aspect of the sign which Von Sternberg stressed, detached from the indexical in order to conjure up a world, comprehensible by virtue of resemblances to the natural world, yet other than it, a kind of dream world, a heterocosm" (Wollen 1982, p137).

What Von Sternberg exhibits is that a screening of the iconic aspect of the sign is compatible with anti-Realist filmmaking. In the very first chapter, Goodman began his account of realism with the statement that resemblance is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for representation and therefore resemblance can not be basic to realism. Rather Goodman pointed out it is the mode of representation that generates resemblance. In the case of the cinematic image the mechanical nature of the recording camera invades the iconic dimension of the sign. However, and here is a vindication of Goodman's position on resemblance, if the indexical aspect is suppressed no amount of stress laid on the iconic aspect will generate realism. The films of Von Sternberg are the fulfillment of his anti-Realist aesthetic: his sets may resemble the natural world with meticulous attention paid to every detail but they are not realistic in effect. They are strictly stereotyped worlds - as close as possible to the commonly admitted givens, corresponding exactly to what is expected. But by virtue of the mise en scène, the lighting, the delivery of lines, character relations to objects and gestures, the result is a wholly artificial space organized by the director. The director of films like Morocco (1930) and The Devil is a Woman (1935) is actually subverting the stereotypes by framing, elongation, distortion - undermining the
In fact Von Sternberg provides further vindication of Goodman’s dismissal of accounts of realism which implicitly argue from the ‘iconicity premise’. The very nature of the cinematic image as the product of a mechanical recording device suggests it is a claimant of the title ‘closest possible copy of an object’ but a film like The Saga of Anatahan (Von Sternberg 1953) indicates that this is no guarantee of realism. Further, film as the ‘closest possible copy of an object’ offers perhaps the highest probability of confusion between representation and representamen and yet a Von Sternberg film like The Blue Angel (1930) shows that deception has no direct link to realism.

The salient insight to be gained from the films of directors like Von Sternberg working in the iconic dimension is that despite the familiarity of what is presented because of the use of a standard mode of representation the resemblance that is generated thereby is no guarantee of realism. The cinematic sign is an amalgamation of the iconic, the indexical and the symbolic. The detachment of the iconic aspect from the indexical generates a work of art that offers only a surface resemblance to ‘the natural world’ but not thereby a familiarity that allows ‘information to issue with ease’ to the spectator.

Familiarity of the sort important to realism is far more the preserve of the filmmakers who belong to the indexical dimension. A glance through the list reveals that these are the filmmakers around whom Bazin developed his Realist aesthetics. It will be recalled that this was an aesthetic which shunned ‘mere resemblance’ in favour of an existential bond between fact and image, between world and film. Of the mechanical reproduction of reality he wrote:

“The photograph proceeds by means of the lens to the taking of a veritable luminous impression of light - to a mold. As such it caries with it more than mere resemblance, namely a kind of identity ...” (Bazin 1967 p98)
"The photographic image is the object itself, the object freed from the conditions of time and space, by virtue of the very process of its becoming, the being of the model of which it is the reproduction; it is the model" (Bazin 1967 p16).

More specifically it was the filmmakers of the Realist tradition who used deep focus to maintain the spatial unity of scenes and thus presenting the event in its physical entirety and it was the Neo-Realists who made films from 'the fragments of raw reality'—shooting on location, without a script, using amateur actors—allowing the world to reveal itself rather than imposing an interpretation on it.

None of this serves to argue that a director in the Realist tradition has to be a documentarist. When has steals a bicycle in Bicycle Thieves (De Sica 1948) it is a scene 'set up' for the camera, not some unwitting thief trapped by a hidden camera, yet this is a Neo-Realist work. But does this mean we have to argue that the actual existence of subject of a film, having been found rather than made, is an explanation for a film's realism: Antonio exists, so does the bicycle and the scene unfolded in exactly the way reproduced by the camera Bazin argues. He suggests that it is our awareness of this, the psychological power which this attaches to the cinematic image, is the root of the film's realistic. But equally trees and sets in The Saga of Anatahan exist—no amount of painting with aluminium paint could alter that fact. The viewer's awareness of the aluminium painted trees' ontological status does not make the film realistic for the viewer. Sorting into realistic and unrealistic does not proceed on the basis of ontological categorization. It was Goodman's argument that any sorting we do is on the basis of kinds of works without reference to the ontological status of that which they denote. The kind of work that is realistic is a real-object-work. Bicycle Thieves is realistic not because Antonio is a real person but because it is a real-person-work and The Saga of Anatahan is unrealistic not because silver trees are unreal entities but because it is an unreal-object-work.
The existential bond between the cinematic image and the object is guaranteed by the mechanics of the filmmaking process (except in extreme cases such as McLaren's experiments with direct marking of the celluloid) irrespective of the filmmaker's realist or anti-realist intentions. The indexicality of the cinematic image may force the viewer to accept as real the existence of the object reproduced as Bazin claims but as has already been argued the question of the object's ontology has no direct bearing on the realism of the image.

Indexicality is a powerful aspect of almost every cinematic image hence the ready psychological power for the maker of realistic cinema. Not being a guarantee of realism it is merely at the disposal of the filmmaker who wishes the viewer to believe what he sees. By producing a real-object-work the filmmaker creates a 'true version'—something that the psychological power that attends the indexicality of the cinematic image makes us believe is a 'true' representation of 'world'. For Goodman it was the making of a 'true version', a new means of realistic rendering, that occasioned a 'revelation'. It is specifically the filmmakers of the indexical dimension who have occasioned such successful departures from standard practice as to 'discover' a 'new degree of realism'. Welles and later Wyler who pioneered the use of deep focus and the Neo-Realists, like Rossellini who dispensed with sets, scripts and studio actors, were departing from standard practice and so achieving a revelation as the viewer 'sees anew'. The new degree of realism is directly related to the active role of the viewer who believes that the new practice renders the 'reality' more successfully. But the sign acts as an icon and index at one and the same time—the cinematicographic image unites these two nodes since the perceptuer's discoveries are directed by an impulse at least partly structured around resemblance. As Bazin would have it 'the closeness of realist films to our everyday perception allows us to discover in them the 'equivalences' in the universe. No amount of viewer awareness of a film's indexicality will allow a film detached from the iconic dimension of the sign to result in a new degree of realism.
If the iconic and especially the indexical aspects of the cinematic sign seem to have the capacity for an explanation of the realism of the image, that is because they are the most powerful aspects of the cinematic sign. The third aspect – the symbolic – is secondary and limited. Despite myriad theories of film which seek to explain the cinema by analogy with an actual language as opposed to utilizing a linguistic model, apart from the verbal sounds of speech and the graphic form of credits, the cinema is primarily indexical and iconic. In the visual image, the musical soundtrack and the sound effects the symbolic dimension is submerged.

The iconic dimension of the cinematic image is in part separable from the symbolic dimension. It has been argued in this paper that resemblance is a product of representational practices and that the mode of representation which is most realistic is established by convention. In other words it is the habit of association (the symbolic) that is the underpinning for the iconic dimension of realist cinema. The symbolic dimension in this way serves to underpin the indexical dimension also, for the iconic dimension itself underpins the viewer's awareness of indexicality that results in the revelations of a new degree of realism. The model of reality is the filmmaker's construction. Its iconicity an explicit creation of the director, the cinematographer, the production designer. . . . The perceived indexicality which engenders the psychology of realism in the viewer springs in part from the iconicity of the representation which is itself a conventionally established associative habit of the spectator used by the filmmaker to generate realism and at the same time making that reality meaningful in an abstract sense. The symbolic dimension of the signs of the cinema and their ordering open up a whole domain of meaning within the model of reality created by the filmmaker. This in itself is not a guarantee of a film's realism as is evidenced by the fact that the films which explore this symbolic dimension most explicitly number among the least realistic creations of the cinema, L'Année Dernière à Marienbad (Resnais 1961) being an obvious example. But the symbolic can and does work towards the revelation that is part
of realism: it gives the viewer a new frame of reference through its particular description of the phenomenal, a revelation that goes through to reality itself. This is the realism of which Bazin wrote when he argued the case for Citizen Kane (Kesey 1940) which did not merely give

"the illusion of being at real events unravelling before us in an everyday reality" (Bazin 1960 p51)

but rather

"forces the spectator to make use of the freedom of his attention and demands, at the same time, that he feels the ambivalence of reality" (Bazin 1960 p58-9).

But the symbolic dimension remains equally the preserve of Antonioni and his grey-painted fruit on a street barrow, red cabin on the waterfront and bedroom suffused with pink in Red Desert (1964), Resnais and his geometrical gardens and endless corridors in L'Année Dernière a Mariqued (1961) and Rossellini and his children and babies (born and unborn) in Rome Open City (1945), each one of these a director whose work reflects a predominance of a different mode of signification.

Thus armed with a Peircean account of signs and its extrapolation into the realm of film, one must turn to de Saussure to provide a linguistic model to apply to sign systems and more specifically to Christian Metz for an understanding of film as a sign system. By approaching film in this way the mechanisms behind the achievement of realism as an effect will be revealed.

Having suggested how Lee Russell's theory (1974) that one dimension of the sign may predominate over the others in different filmmaker's works may be related to the perceived realism of those works it remains to be said that such an exercise is based on the assumption that we can isolate signs in the cinema as one can in a language. But, as will become apparent from the investigation of Metz's semiology of film, film cannot be equated with natural language. Signs approximate words but the cinema has no words, only sentences. The shot in a film, as will be pointed out by Metz, is not the
equivalent of the word but rather of the sentence. Cinema, in short, is all syntax and syntax can not be iconic or indexical. It is therefore unclear what it could mean to relate realism to the predominance of a dimension of the sign in a film.

What can be argued is that the Peircean analysis of the sign is meant to apply 'metaphorically' to the cinema. It is a classification picked up by commentators to suggest that items other than signs may produce the effect of iconicity, indexicality or symbolicity and that these effects may relate to the realism of the work. This is to argue that while syntax can not be iconic or indexical or symbolic it can produce these as effects and so film can accrue the realism that it is argued is related to the predominance of one or other of these dimensions in the work. This in part accounts for the ease with which film can attain the realist effect but it would be going too far to posit a unique tie between film and reality.

Christian Metz

It is to Metz we must now turn for a specific application of the linguistic model to film to reveal the mechanisms behind the achievement of realism as an effect.

Metz embarks on his semiological journey by drawing the distinction that needs to be made for an application of the linguistic model to film: that film is a language and not a language system. The distinction is derived from de Saussure's *A Course in General Linguistics* (1959):

- **language** (in general) or **langue** is the universal capacity for utterance or discourse;
- a **language system** or **langue** is a particular, organised, articulated system of communication and 
  - **speech** or **parole** is an individual realisation of the potential inherent in a language system - a particular act or instance of that system.

Thus film for Metz is not a language system (langue), like English, it is a language (langage) which includes various language systems. Metz
given three main reasons why film is not a language system:

(1) The main reason it is not a language system is that it lacks double articulation: there are no phonemes combining into morphemes/moremes, minimal units of sound becoming minimal units of meaning, (second articulation to first articulation). This ability of language to function at the two levels of sound and meaning (its power of double articulation) is denied to cinema where cinematic signifiers are more closely tied to their signifieds. Cinema simply presents us with images which are realistic representations and sounds that are accurate reproductions. The signifiers can not be broken up without breaking up the signifieds also. In other words there is no way of breaking up the image of a man talking so that it can function with other images to produce different senses as the word 'talk' can be changed to 'talking', 'talked' or 'talkative'.

(2) The image can not be construed as the cinematic equivalent of the word (as held by Kuleshov and Pudovkin). A shot in a film gives more information than a word, more than a minimal unit of meaning. Metz's famous dictum is that a shot of a tiger says: "Here is a tiger", not just "Tiger". No dictionary of the cinema is possible.

(3) The relation between image and meaning derived is motivated. de Saussure asserts that the relation between the linguistic signifier (the acoustic image) and the signified (the 'meaning' of that image) is unmotivated or arbitrary. The connection between the two is conventionally established and the resultant sign is part of the language system. By contrast the visual image such as the one presented to us in film actually resembles the referent. There is a motivated relationship between signifier and signified:

"the signifier is coextensive with the whole of the significate [signified], the spectacle its own signification"[Metz 1974a p43].

For Metz cinema is thus a language:

(1) It is not a language system comprised of signs for
intercommunication, it is one way communication. No response to
the signs presented on the screen has any impact on the objective,
formal configuration of the image. As we cannot 'converse' with
images the film's system of communication is always used
poetically. What this means is that cinema, unlike verbal
language, lacks a 'basic' or non-poetic usage - a long-standing
system which is adopted and then perhaps 'deformed' by poetic and
artistic sensibilities so that the discourse can 'speak a new
meaning'.

(2) It does not even have a grammar as far as Metz is concerned. What
would an ungrammatical film construction be? We may not like or
find a particular choice of image or a particular combination of
images familiar but does that mean it is ungrammatical and
nonsensical? The film has a natural expressivity - the filmmaker
'directs' these expressions to signify his own meaning not
according to fixed rules.

(3) It does not have the double articulation which constitutes the
arbitrary signs of a language system:

"the image is first and always an image. In its perceptual
literality it reproduces the signified spectacle whose
signifier it is; and thus it becomes what it shows"(Metz 1974a
p75).

and

"from the very first an image is not the indication of something
other than itself but the pseudopresence of the thing it
contains"(Metz 1974a p76).

Metz here aligns himself explicitly with Bazin by asserting that
the photograph is the only kind of image

"that can give us the absolute certainty that graphic outlines
are faithfully respected (because their representation is
obtained by a process of mechanical duplication) and where, in
some way, the actual object has come to print itself on the
virgin film" (Metz 1974a p14).

It was Bazin's theory that it is this that "forces" the viewer
"to accept the existence of the object reproduced, actually
represented, set before us, that is to say, in time and space"
The notion of language only really comes into its own when dealing with filmed narratives according to Metz:

"cinematographic language" is first of all the literalness of a plot" (Metz 1974b p16).

The reality conveyed to us through images is the reality of a work of art presenting us with a narrative which external reality does not give us. Thus cinema is a language

"to the extent that it orders signifying elements within ordered arrangements different from those of spoken idioms - and to the extent that these elements are not traced on the perceptual configurations of reality itself (which does not tell stories).

Filmic manipulation transforms what might have been a mere visual transfer of reality into discourse" (Metz 1974b p10).

Discourse is the filmmaker's use of the combinative aspect of speech so that the code of language can be made to express his personal thought. Metz explains that this discourse depends on five cinematic codes

"the visual image, the musical sound, the verbal sounds of speech, sound effects, and the graphic form of credits" (Metz 1974b p16).

Metz confronts the codes of the filmic system in his semiotics by dealing with 'signification' by a 'code' in a 'text'. Signification exists in the sign values, the messages, we perceive. It is in fact the process of asserting such messages by means of a system of signs. These messages are coded in 'texts'.

Stanley Kubrick

The 'texts' that will be confronted by Metz's semiotics in this dissertation will be the films of Stanley Kubrick. This choice stems from the fact that Kubrick's 'filmed narratives' fall roughly into the category of 'commercial cinema' and so evince the 'realistic' cinema norm. They therefore provide ample scope for the investigation of the achievement of the realistic effect by the director, a task which is
made simpler by the fact that Kubrick is one of cinema's most exacting 'technical artists' drawing on a vast array of cinematic devices to generate the required effect. Although this effect may not always be one of realism, it will nevertheless become apparent from the body of his work with what consummate ease cinema is capable of producing realism and how the same can not be said for non-realism. Kubrick's range of subject matter emphasizes this point, ranging as it does from the science fiction of 2001 A Space Odyssey (1968) and A Clockwork Orange (1971) to the costume drama of Barry Lyndon (1975) the supernatural/horror in The Shining (1980) and the Vietnam war in Full Metal Jacket (1987). Reference will also be made to the nuclear apocalypse black comedy Dr Strangelove (1964) and his earlier works Lolita (1962), Paths of Glory (1957), The Killing (1956), Killer's Kiss (1955), Fear and Desire (1953) and the disowned Spartacus (1960).

The discussion of realism in terms of Kubrick's body of work dismisses any preconceptions about realism's dependence on subject matter. A voyage to Jupiter and a haunted hotel, Thackeray and Burgess, nuclear apocalypse and the Vietnam war are all grist for the Kubrick mill and yet each film remains wedded to realism often in spite of rather than because of its subject matter.

The choice of Kubrick's films to conduct the analysis of realism immediately establishes the parameters of the investigation because if Kubrick can make a space opera or a film about the supernatural which is realistic than the maintenance of the unity of experience is less crucial than the maintenance of the unity of space and time for the generation of the realistic effect. Whereas extra-terrestrials or psychic experiences may be accommodated within a realistic work, violations of spatial or temporal unity put realism in check. The viewer is already conditioned to accept violations of the unity of experience by the codes of editing which have aquired a familiarity such that they are no longer unrealistic in effect. As these codes of representation have come to affect the forms of our experiences realism is no longer relative only to the forms of experiences but also to prior representations. This is true because part of our
experience includes the experience of other works of art/other films.

It is then in terms of Kubrick's films that Mets will confront the codes of the filmic system in this dissertation.

The notion of a code, which is so important to the semiotician, is simply the logical relationship between the elements of a sign system which allows a message to be understood. The filmmaker makes use of codes to 'put his message across', even if that is only to convey to the viewer a sense of 'the way things are is the way they ought to be'. The semiotician makes use of the messages in a film to construct the codes, the laws governing those messages which enable them to speak to us. This is not to say that a filmmaker consciously follows certain pre-existing codes - codes are constructed after the fact of a film by semioticians.

The characteristics of cinematic codes are:

(a) Degrees of specificity: Coding proceeds both inside and outside film. Mets defines which codes are 'specific' to film. Mets cites the example of "accelerated montage" (image A and B alternate in progressively shorter and quicker fragments - message of convergence: specially or dramatically) as a cinema-specific code. Cinema-specific codes are by their very nature not realistic through any process of transference from everyday life/perception. However, they may be 'naturalised' over a period of time for the viewer by their repeated use in films. In other words the viewer of films, through repeated encounters with the medium, develops an internal cinema-specific frame of reference that persuades him or her of the 'realism' of what he or she is viewing. In so far as a cinema-specific code is standard to the medium it may be accorded the status of realistic which is Goodman's point that realism is a question of 'how standard the code of representation has become' because we are unaware of the process of reading, choosing and interpreting.
One such cinema specific code utilised by Kubrick would be disruption of symmetry by violence expressed through a change from a smooth, symmetrical, composed shot to disruptive hand-held camera work: in 2001 A Space Odyssey the symmetrical geometry of HAL's memory bank disrupted by the free flowing Dave Bowman as he sets about 'unplugging' the computer; in A Clockwork Orange the symmetrical elegance of HOME disrupted by the rape of Mrs Alexander; in Barry Lyndon the order and symmetry of military life disrupted by hand to hand combat; in The Shining the symmetry of the Hotel Overlook disrupted by the emergence of insanity and violence; and in Full Metal Jacket the symmetry of the platoon disrupted by the sniper's bullets. The hand held camera work subjectivizes the disruptions for the viewer. It is a realistic cinema specific code known as the viewer expects to be included in the action on screen. The viewer of a film like Earthquake (1975) does not expect static camera work but rather an unsteady frame that is the natural point of view of the spectator of such a natural disaster. But it is also a realistic code through reference to the specific body of work generated by Kubrick. The viewer, through reference to Kubrick's world, or what Goodman calls a 'version', may accord the status of 'realistic' to the work.

Realism in the case of less 'film-specific' codes, such as those defined by Metz which are transferred from life into our perception of the film, depends upon a choice of appropriate cultural codes that will be interpreted as natural in the circumstances by the viewer. As these are cultural codes, in Barthes' sense, not specific to film, the filmmaker has to choose according to an already established awareness of codes in everyday life if he wishes to garner a particular response from his viewers. The choice of a Rolls-Royce carries with it connotations of wealth and social status, different to the sort of wealth and social status that would be associated with a Lamborghini; the choice of caviar at Max's would indicate a different level of social status to the choice of 'burgers at MacDonald's.
Barthes explains in *S/Z* (1974) the realistic effect of the cultural code as being an appeal to established and authoritative cultural forms. By making a 'knowing' reference to the code, the code is held up as accepted wisdom or knowledge which it can be accepted 'everyone knows'. The fact that such knowledge can be shown to be based on a conventionally established signifier-sign connection does not negate or deny the realistic effect.

Kubrick utilizes the cultural code of 'costume' to multiply the roles of Peter Sellers (Group-Captain Lionel Mandrake/President Mersey/Dr Strangelove/end originally Major T.J. 'King' Kong) in *Dr Strangelove* and to chronicle the journey from innocence to experience of Ryan O'Neal in *Barry Lyndon*. He also gives us an interpretation of a character's honour, through dueling: he employs the 'code of honour' implicit in dueling to reveal Alex's opportunism in *A Clockwork Orange* where Alex lashes out in a surprise attack on his three 'droogs' Dr, Pete and Georgie in a slow motion parody of a duel and to indicate the positive qualities of Redmond Barry in *Barry Lyndon*, his courage (in the duel with Captain Quin) and his sense of humour and compassion (in the duel with Lord Bullingdon). The verbal duel between Joker and Animal Mother in *Full Metal Jacket* undermines the attainment of honour for the duellist in the contemporary context and removes from the characters any control over their destinies. Another device utilized by Kubrick to give an interpretation of a character's impotence is the wheelchair: the ex-Nazi advisor Dr Strangelove; Mr Alexander in *A Clockwork Orange* reduced to the role of voyeur as his wife is raped; the cuckolded husband of Lady Lyndon.

Ironically it may be inaccurate stereotyping that is most successful in conveying realism unless the viewer happens to have made a close study e.g., for example, period costumes. Director Bruce Beresford ill advisedly attempted to follow the exact words of the Bible in his film of *King David* (1985):
So David went and brought up the ark of God from the house of Obededom into the city of David with gladness . . . And David danced before the Lord with all his might; and David was girded with a linen ephod" (II Samuel 7:12-14 Authorized Version).

The undignifying sight of Richard Gere, clad only in a nappy, reeling in the streets of New York is patently unacceptable to an audience whose concept of authenticity is derived from the House of God, irrespective of its antiquity. Realism would be expected to mean: a man in flowing robes, with measured speech and gait. As Houbrich points out, communication is based on the principle of interplay between what is seen and what is expected by the part of the viewer. And, apart from 'life' itself, our expectations are most often derived from previous experiences with film. In that sense the realism is evident only in terms of an internal cinematic reference.

And finally there are codes neither entirely non-specific nor specific only to film but rather specific to one or other of the arts in conjunction with film. These are the codes film shares with the other arts: painting shares chiaroscuro lighting with German expressionist films.

In Kubrick's work theatre is a principal reference sharing for example the code of the mask whether it be the carnival masks of Alex and his droogs in A Clockwork Orange to represent a rejection of civilization and reversion to animal pleasures; the nightmare stylized make-up of Barry Lyndon, which is employed, as it was in the Eighteenth Century society, to powder over the repressed libido; or indeed the caricature mask of facial expression which is more an inner mask that Kubrick coaxes to the surface to rearrange the facial features of his characters (the mask of lunacy on Jack Torrance (Jack Nicholson) in The Shining, the mask of death on Joker (Matthew Modine) in Full Metal Jacket).

Reference can also be made to:
(i) the code of dance - the carefully choreographed violence of A
Clockwork Orange,

"Alex's erotic ballets with Mrs Alexander and the Cat Lady are also dances of death" (Ciment 1983 p67);

(iii) the codes of painting - in John Alcott's lighting photography in for example Barry Lyndon, reminiscent of a Gainsborough landscape; and

(iii) the codes of music - the forties World War II ballad "We'll meet again, don't know where, don't know when ..." is the ironic soundtrack for the destruction of the world in World War III during the closing shot of Dr Strangelove, while "Try a Little Tenderness", accompanies footage of bombers in flight and "When Johnny Comes Marching Home" compliments the image of pilots on a suicide mission. "The Blue Danube" is used to accompany the orbiting Space Station 5 evoking the music of the spheres and the joy of a ride on the Big Wheel in Vienna's Prater.

If these codes work to realistic effect is not necessarily a question of whether they work in a realistic way in the other arts but rather a question of how naturally they work with the filmed action. Masks, for example, are not themselves realistic representations but the dehumanizing, chilling effect they have on the wearer is realistic enough to evoke fear in the audience confronted by a threatening mask-wearer. Or again, it is hard to imagine what a realistic piece of music would be but very often the employment of soundtrack music can be realistic if an explanation can be offered for its presence (a car radio, a street organ). Often it is not essential for the music to be explained in this way for it to be accepted unquestioningly by the viewer; while the obviously satirical comment of "We'll meet again" drawn attention to itself and so can hardly be regarded as a realistic accompaniment for an image of mass destruction, the Blue Danube evokes only the feelings in the viewer that would accompany a ride on a ferris wheel without consciously referring the viewer to that subconscious feeling of spinning weightlessness that would realistically accompany first impressions of an orbiting space station of this design. The music draws the viewer into the
experience more realistically than the strict realism of dead silence would.

(b) Levels of commonality: Codes can be distinguished by the commonality of their appearance in films. The panarama shot is a general code according to Metz as it could be in any film — it follows that it can have various significations. It can work as a descriptive shot or a movement shot. Slow motion is also a general code as familiar to TV sports viewers as 'action film' lovers. (Slow motion is usually employed to lyricalize the violent death of one of the chief protagonists.) So familiar that Kubrick can employ it as a satirizing device by inverting the code. The orgy in A Clockwork Orange is filmed in skip-frame high-speed motion:

"It seemed to me a good way to satirize what had become the fairly common use of slow motion to solemnize this sort of thing, and turn it into 'art'." (Kubrick interview in Cinent 1983 p152)

It is the level of generality of a code which can determine its realistic effect. This would be true in the case of cinema specific codes, as has already been pointed out, because it is only the frequency with which a code of this nature is used that can invest the code with an aura of familiarity.

Alex's dream sequences in A Clockwork Orange are easily identified as belonging to the 'historical epic' genre because they emulate the particular codes of directors like Cecil B. De Mille (and indeed Kubrick's own Spartacus) that is, innovative visual and technical effects, impressive formal compositions, rhythmic editing and pseudo-historical ambience. Kubrick also utilizes the codes of the film noir period by reducing indirect lighting so as to create contrasts, shadows, hard textures and using unusual camera angles, authentic darkness, depth of focus and narrow lenses. This is more true of his earlier films like Paths of Glory, Killer's Kiss and The Killing but extends its influence
into Dr Stangelove and A Clockwork Orange.

As far as codes particular to a director go Kubrick's favourite stylistic device is the reverse track usually in a narrow corridor described by Ciment as:

"mastering the space and conveying a sense of confinement within it" (Ciment 1983 P114).

Kubrick is certainly not the only director to use this device, but its overt presence in almost every film he has made ensures the easy identification of the director's work: from the corridors of Discovery in 2001: A Space Odyssey to the prison corridors of A Clockwork Orange, from Alex's stroll through the Drugstore in A Clockwork Orange, to Bullingdon's entry into the club in Barry Lyndon (these latter two are almost interchangeable they are so similar in appearance) from the inspection of the kitchen in The Shining to the inspection of the barracks in Full Metal Jacket.

Whether Kubrick is reminding the viewer of De Mille's extravagances, or the film noir of the forties, at least a part of the effect obtained is increased realism. Kubrick appeals to what we consider 'to be the case' due to our previous encounters with film. In the same way that the viewer identifies black and white, grainy, unprofessional films as having a documentary nature due to exposure to numerous news reels, an exposure to numerous biblical epics or film noir detective features leads the viewer to identify aspects of Kubrick's work as authentic in that they resemble what has come to be accepted by the viewer as 'being the case'. On the other hand codes more particular to a director will not carry with them a pre-established realism and in fact will just as easily have the opposite effect. The director's favourite stylistic device is what may be called his/her signature. To say of a sequence or shot that it has 'Kubrick written all over it' is an indication of the audience's response which is not appropriate for the generation of the realistic effect.

It will be noticed by the reader that the admonition to the
realist filmmaker that appears almost as a refrain after each act of choices is: realism depends on the choice of that option which least obviously draws attention to itself. Familiarity is the most likely guard against being noticed. Goodman's position was that it is the standard mode of representation that generates the familiarity that is at the root of realism. But Goodman also encompasses within his uses of the term the revelation that attends the discovery of a new degree of realism. For the post-war Italian filmmakers to have conformed to standard production norms would have resulted in a familiarity not necessarily conducive to their aims as Neo-Realists. Indeed the freshness of their rough and ready techniques and the immediacy of their films revealed to the viewer a new degree of realism unattainable within the confines of the standard Hollywood mode of representation. Thus although the principle remains pertinent — realism and the foregrounding of form are antithetical — the actual choice which produces a realistic effect can not be prescribed as long as realism is not a fixed mode of representation.

(c) Reducability to subcodes: The semiotician deals with the possibilities of codes which extend beyond their use in a film, breaking the code down into single uses of that code. For example, the code of acting will have different characteristics in an Expressionist as opposed to a Neo-Realist film. In short, stylistic history is a study of selected codes and their subcodes.

The semiotician is studying the use of different subcodes in different coding situations. Of course codes are not experienced in isolation — they are joined to others in a text. Thus a text is the place where messages come together, it is a "delimitation" of coded material (Andrew 1984 p227). A single film is a "privileged text" in terms of creator, public, distributor but the semiotician can broaden or restrict the delimitation of his text, dealing with whole genres or mere sequences. Thus a text is nothing more or less than that group of codes we feel must be read as a whole.
A text as context for codes adds to the individual messages - a total signification. In fact the text organizes the codes in a logical system that confers value on the messages. The patterning takes place along two axes. The syntagmatic axis is the horizontal flow of successive messages linked in the text. Narrative is syntagmatic signification within the codes. The paradigmatic axis is the vertical dimension of selectivity. A film draws on or creates paradigms giving us meanings through association. This is a dimension not dependent on narrative but rather on a selection of details in no particular order.

The full meaning of a text is the interweaving of the axes of selection and combination.

The axes of selection and combination provide a useful method for approaching the realistic film text:
- the paradigmatic axis where the realism arises out of the selection of codes and
- the syntagmatic axis where the realism arises out of the combination of codes.

This process of selection and combination by which the total signification of the text is generated, is communicated to the viewer in two ways - denotatively and connotatively. According to Kierkegaard, the viewer first reads an image for its denotative content: the material on the screen is the signifier of denotation, the scene represented is the signified (its meaning). The film image has denotative meaning simply by being what it is: a cinematic record communicating an accurate description of the same thing (beyond that which spoken language - capable of). The viewer then considers what the image connotes: the product of the relationship between signifier and signified is a sign which is the signifier of a connotative relationship, 'an impression of ...' (its signified). A film has a connotative ability not least because of its ability to record other arts.

The connotative aspect of spoken language (which is at the core of its expressive ability) is available to film through its soundtrack, as indeed are the connotative aspects of painting, music, drama, dance.
architecture ... This stems from films status as a recording art whereby replication of the older arts is central to the art of film. This mimetic aspect goes beyond the use of a film's denotation (what Metz calls the digesta); drawing on our cultural awareness and awareness of the choices confronting the filmmaker, and thereby reinforces the realism the film image communicates denotatively.

(a) Culturally determined connotations draw on our cultural awareness. For instance in A Clockwork Orange 'The Korova Milk Bar', "We're..." and 'the Cat Lady's' all carry strong cultural associations. Ideology marshals these connotations to insist on their natural priority which accounts for "a 'natural' tendency to 'believe' in the reality witnessing. As Barthes reveals in Mythologies (1983) manipulation of codes takes place to generate and reinforce a world view in which bourgeois values are inevitable and 'right'. This deception can be uncovered by analysis - the mechanisms of realistic filmmaking exposed in relation to the filmmaker's reliance on culturally determined connotations.

"The classical symmetry of the Korova, for instance, not only stands as High Camp mockery but expresses a conditioned society's transference of sexual fantasy and function to the solidarity and harmony of machines disguised as art objects. White female statues perform machine functions (as cables and dispensers of milk plus) and assume postures in sadomasochistic Grand Guignol. They either can be contemplated from afar, as Kubrick's camera invites us to do at the end of the opening shot, in its backward movement, or 'used' as machines: in one scene, Ola raches between the legs of one figure ('Pardon me, Luna') to pull the phallic lever that dispenses milk plus through the nipple of a jutting breast, while the arms in chains, extend backwards in a gesture of arctic submission. In the first HOME scene, Kubrick creates a domestic version of the same world: Mr. Alexander (Patrick Magee), in a red and white robe, is first seen as a figure behind a prominent and red IBM Selectric, while the camera records a conjugal distance when it tracks right to
pick up his wife, in a red pyjama suit, engulfed by a white modernistic chair shaped like a lopsided egg and upholstered in the assertive hues of Korova purple. As before, decor — the arrangement of shapes and colours within a confined space — absorbs people as well as things into the configurations of a clockwork aesthetic. In the hallway, as Alex and his masked droogs invade this museum advertised on an illuminated sign as the archetypal HOME, mirrors on each side of a chessboard floor create a triptych that recalls the static duplications first seen in the Korova Milkbar. ... Alex not only disrupts HOME's Korova-like aesthete, but forces Alexander to watch as his wife is twisted into an animated version of a Korova sex-machine ... in the context of the Korova's sexual postures and its unnatural colours (bright oranges and purples) in the midst of a predominantly black and white world, as well as HOME's heterosexual sterility (the Alexanders spawn objects instead of children), Alex's rape of the wife/mother has the virtue of being a 'normal' (even if Oedipal) expression of an unrepressed libido. Alex's killing of the Cat Lady extends this sexual allegory even further. When first introduced, the Cat Lady is an upside-down figure in a landscape of erotic paintings showing women in various states of sexual excitement, either masturbatory or lesbian. Overall, she assumes a character and definition several steps higher on the aesthetic ladder than Alex's own Mum, making her the decadent rather than pathetic mother-figure: En (Sheila Raynor), for instance, decorates her home in a ghastly combination of colours (electric blue and pink in the living room; yellow, silver and orange reflective checkers in the kitchen) and with discount store paintings of darkly erotic women who all look alike, and she wears brightly coloured onion wigs (like the statues in the Korova) and vinyl miniskirts to disguise both her age and maternal status. ... But the Cat Lady totally denies her potential for procreation (one which En ... symbolically denies). She lives amidst lesbian self-portraits ... colors herself like an art object ... and twists her body into mechanical contortions that resemble a
piece of abstract sculpture or her own 'health farm' exercise equipment. This psychosexual landscape, like the Korova, suggests not only that sexual function has been replaced by sexual extensiveness, but that human beings, machinelike, imitate the objects of their own creation. As a female masturbatory nightmare, the Cat Lady's room both opposes the masculine fantasies of the Korova and symbolically castrates them (Nelson 1982 pp. 146-149).

The Korova's concretization of masculine fantasies, Homie's heterosexual sterility and the Cat Lady's denial of procreative potential are all determined by the viewers cultural awareness - the connotations of these acts are reliant on an awareness of bourgeois sexual mores. Thus the realism of Kubrick's creation is to a degree reliant on the viewers perception of the 'naturalness', 'rightness' of the narrative, in terms of this culturally determined 'psychosexual landscape'.

(b) Film-specific connotations arise from an awareness of the filmmaker's choices.

(i) Paradigmatic Choices: A specific shot (angle, movement, lighting, colour, framing, content, focus, duration ...) must be selected from all other possible coherent shots by the filmmaker. The viewers sense of connotation stems from a comparison, consciously or unconsciously, with unrealized variations of what is shown. The realistic shot is the one that ideology suggests is the most natural given all the possible variations in the given circumstances. The shot of Malcolm McDowell in the Cat Lady's house threatening the Cat Lady/camera with a phallic 'art object' reveals a multitude of directorial choices all carrying specific connotations through comparison (unconsciously or consciously) with other possible shots that could have been composed; the angle of the shot carries connotations of threat as opposed to the shot showing Kubrick achieving this effect.
which depersonalizes the menace.

- the framing and depth of focus which contextualize the action in terms of the lesbian and masturbatory artworks as opposed to a shot which through different framing and focus would decontextualize Alex's stance relinquishing connotations of "sexual function" displacing "sexual extensions" (Melson 1982 p.149).

- the contents of the shot - phallic object, codpiece, rubber nose carefully composed and directed at the camera - carry connotations of male dominant phallic sexuality over female denial of procreative potentiality.

- and so on.

To change an aspect of the manner of filming is to change the signification. The way of presenting an image, while it remains denotationally identical, changes its connotation with resultant shifts in the meaning we attach to it. The filmmaker's paradigmatic choices involve a perceived similarity between the shots that form the set of possible candidates that could be substituted for each other in the given circumstances. In this way metaphor is generated: if the filmmaker, wishing to communicate a particular message to his audience, substitutes one shot for another without suppressing the difference between the two he may achieve this communication through the device of metaphor. Alex's masturbation moves to orgasmic climax as successive zooms move closer to Beethoven's face until his eyes stare directly into the camera, then to a painting of a nude woman with a smiling look of sexual invitation and then down to Alex's snake seemingly about to enter her vaginal opening and within the same shot, four Christ figures joined in a passion of celebration and repeated close-ups of Alex as Dracula, hanging figures, avalanches and explosions - all of which are substituted for the mor dirct portrayal common to pornographic cinema. In a basically realistic medium, metaphor represents a pull in the opposite direction away from
the illusion of recording reality. As has been suggested the
film medium rather has a metonymic character in general.

(ii) Syntagmatic Choices: A shot does not stand in isolation in a
film but rather as part of a sequence of shots, so it is not
surprising that connotation should also arise from the
juxtaposition of a particular shot with the shots preceding
and following it. Here the viewer’s sense of connotation does
not arise from comparison with potential shots but with the
actual shots the filmmaker has combined in bracketing a
particular shot. The realistic sequence is the one that
ideology suggests is the most natural in the given context.
The greatest degree of naturalism would be achieved by a
sequence that did not draw attention to the movement from one
shot to the next: not the ‘life giving energy’ of
Eisenstein’s shot collisions – the juxtaposition of images
like the face of a man and the picture of a fox or a shot of a
crowd and one of a bull being slaughtered ([Strike (1925)]) –
but rather the flow of shots in Hitchcock’s shower sequence in
Psycho (1960) – the seventy separate shots in less than sixty
seconds are experienced as continuous as they are
psychologically fused into the single connotation of horror
for the viewer. It is not coincidental that the same director
is responsible for the film Rope (1948) which attempts to
eliminate syntagmatic choices by filming the action in one
continuous shot, not of course that a greater degree of
naturalism is synonymous with a decrease in number of shots.
No such simple equation could be applied in every situation
and indeed the very reverse may be true if the sustained shot
has the effect of drawing attention to itself. In Barry
Lyndon the shot of Barry (Ryan O’Neal) kneeling next to Lady
Lyndon’s (Marissa Berenson’s) bath and holding her hand, is
followed by the shot of his kissing her in the bath. This
gives the kneeling shot a connotation of genuine affection
in contrast to the rest of the film. It is preceded by Lady
Lyndon’s companion reading a French poem to her:
"Les coeurs l'un par l'autre attirés
Se communiquent leur substance
Tels deux miroirs ardents
Concentrent le lumière
et se la réfléchissent
Les rayons tour à tour
requellis
... divisés
En se multipliant
S'adriossont, s'embellissent
Et d'autant plus actifs
Qu'ils se sont plus croisés
Au même point se réunissent

(Two hearts by each other
attracted
Communicate
their substance
Like two burning mirrors
Concentrating light
and reflecting it back
The beams collected
each in turn
... divided
By multiplying
Grow larger and more beautiful
And becoming the more active
The more they intersect
Are at one and the same point
reunited.")

(transl. Clément 1983 p10)

This gives the kneeling scene the connotation of reason and passion reunited in the persona of the opportunistic Barry and his loving wife.

This combinatory axis involves the concept of metonomy. Metonomy is the use of associated details to convey an idea or object, a figure of speech allied to synecdoche which involves a part being used to stand for the whole or vice-versa.

Bowman's journey in 2001 A Space Odyssey through the 'Star-Odys' presented as an 'orgy of colour, shape, images, light, explosions and movement is a metonymic device intended to connote a journey into infinity, indeed 'beyond the infinite', to the 'other side' of reality, time and space. (Simply a more complex version of the cinematic cliché of newspaper headlines whirling past to designate the passage of time). The fetus (or 'Star-Child') which appears at the closing sequence of 2001 A Space Odyssey is a synecdochic device which connotes rebirth, a new dawn or even more
precisely, if coupled with the accompanying Strauss soundtrack—Thus Spoke Zarathustra—'eternal recurrence'.

It might appear that metonomy involves much the same process of substitution as that involved in metaphor but just as Sausure posited the binary opposition between paradigm and syntagm, so Jacobson has argued the opposition of metaphor and metonomy as belonging to the different axes of selection and combination. David Lodge has therefore suggested that metonomy involves a process of deletion as opposed to substitution. Unlike metaphor, metonomy is produced by ‘deleting one or more items from a natural combination, but not the terms it would be most natural to omit’ (Lodge 1977 p75).

Interestingly, Lodge suggests that a film’s verisimilitude is a function of the metonymic character of the film medium. To return to a passage which appeared in page 75 at the beginning of this chapter:

"The basic units of the film, the shot and the scene, are composed along the same line of contiguity and combination [as our sensory experience] and the devices by which the one-then-thing-after-another of experience is rendered more dramatic and meaningful are characteristically metonymic devices that operate along the same axis: the synecdochic that represents the whole by the part, the slow motion sequence that retard without rupturing the natural tempo of succession, the high or low shot that defamiliarizes, without departing from, the action that it is focussed on" (Lodge 1977 p84).

The connection between the axes of selection and organisation is what Monaco (1981 p140), borrowing from literary theory, calls a ‘trope’—a turn of phrase. The denotation is connected to the connotation by a trope which turns the strict denotation into a new meaning. Film presents the viewer with a static denotative meaning— but the image is open to dynamic
expansion through tropes of comparison: paradigmatically, syntagmatically or metaphorically.

The priority of denotation is not an indisputable necessity - this is particularly evident in the cinema. The process that leads from sensation through perception to signification in cinema demands the activity and time of interpretation. Metz recognizes that the split between denotation and connotation in most cinematic codes aligns it with literature rather than music or architecture (the purely connotative). In cinema we appear to recognize a signified (the denotative base) before we attend to the significations it evokes through its manner of presentation. What this means is that there are separate codes for denotation and for connotation: Metz held that the former enable recognition of the object/action and the latter proceed from these objects to more abstract significations. If this sounds suspiciously like connotation is the decoration added to denotation, Metz insisted that connotation was the form of denotation. Talk about the contents of the image is talk at the level of connotation. Denotation and connotation pertain to the analysing of the sign rather than its functioning. All levels are present simultaneously and it is up to the analyst as to how far he wishes to pursue his analysis. Roland Barthes, originally a subscriber to Hjelmslev's classic formulation maintaining the dependence of connotation on denotation (Mythologies(1955)), argued in Système de la mode(1957) that denotation exists only as the final sum of connotation. Denotation for Barthes is not the origin of all other meanings but the settling down to proper performing of meaning in such and such a situated.

The communication of the signification of a text to the viewer explained in terms of connotation and denotation, it is necessary to return to the actual generation of the signification through the axes
of selection and organization. What this will entail in terms of the discussion of realism, will be an examination of what may be termed the syntax of film. The spatial and temporal composition of film will be investigated to determine the selection and organization of codes that generate the realistic effect in film.

First, the paradigmatic axis will bring into focus the director's various processes of selection or what is termed the film's mise en scène.

1. Paradigmatic Axis: Mise en scène

The director must decide what to shoot and how; his decisions are made with regard to the codes operating within the frame image (static shot) and the diachronic shot (dynamic shot).

(a) Static

(i) Frame size (or aspect ratio): The choice that confronts the director is between the 'classic' Academy aperture which focuses attention, resulting in a more intimate effect, or the widescreen ratio (Cineascope, Panavision) which emphasize spatial relationships, more conducive to action and landscape filming. The most obvious emphasis of frame size in recent years was Sword of Damocles (Trumbull 1968) which switched between standard 35mm and 70mm to involve the audience more directly in mind-controlled experiences. Ideally one's proximity to the screen should be such that the switch to 70mm results in an extension of the image beyond the periphery of one's vision and in such a way overlapping the conventional boundaries that separate viewer and image.

(ii) Shape: The filmmaker must decide whether he wants a self-sufficient image or an awareness that extends beyond the frame. This corresponds to the choice of a painter who, in the attempt to create the conditions of illusion, can try to
overcome the limitations of static representation by means of incomplete images (as described on page 39). But the filmmaker is not limited by static representation and has access to the cinematic code of relationship between construction within the frame and movement of the camera. His choice is thus also between following the movements of the subject closely or allowing the subject to move into and out of the frame.

The closed form is apparent in a scene such as Alex's interrogation in *A Clockwork Orange*. The frame constrains the action just as the interrogators hem Alex into a corner. On the other hand the slow right to left track revealing Joker, Enforcer, Cowboy, Animal Mother ... (in *Full Metal Jacket*) crouching for protection behind sandbags does not specifically frame each character but rather alludes to the extension of the line beyond the frame to both left and right. The open frame is the cinematic equivalent of painting's incomplete image extending what is directly presented on screen to an illusory reality off screen. It is the very opposite of the post-modernist impulse towards the revelation of the artifice of the realist artwork.

(iii) Discussion: Choices concern the plane of the frame, the plane of space in the frame and the depth plane. The filmmaker focuses our attention on these planes: as the codes of the three planes interact according to his composition. For example, overlapping takes place on the first plane, while convergence and relative size take place on the second. By shooting Shelley Winters and James Mason in bed in *Lolita*, Winters with her back to the camera, Mason staring at the photograph between the bed and the camera that the viewer knows to be of Lolita, Kubrick evinces a co-ordination of the plane of space and plane of depth: our perception of depth depends upon factors in the plane of space, chiefly relative size in this instance. The
significance of these codes can be demonstrated in a shot like the one described here: a family relationship overshadowed by the image of Lolita - represented by the photograph in the foreground. The proximity of the photograph to the camera and its proportion in relation to the other elements designates its importance. The majority of compositional elements take place on the dominant frame plane and a large number of these depend for their effect on factors of which we are largely unaware.

The effect of having Poole falling into the void in 2001 A Space Odyssey is achieved by having Poole on the right and the pursuing craft on the left. Because we habitually read from left to right, we see the image from left to right and Poole is moving away from the craft and into the void. Filmed the opposite way around the reverse would appear to be: Poole moving towards the craft and safety. It is the filmmaker who understands how to appeal to the viewer's subconscious reading of planes who will be able to present the action in a way the viewer will consider realistic.

(iv) Form, Line, Colour: Just as a frame is invested with meaning even before the filmmaker begins to fill it, so the meaning carries inherent values which the filmmaker can exploit. The Shining is a good example of how colour is employed to chart the progression towards madness - psychologically, and a masculine ethos - symbolically.

The former is achieved through the obvious choice of the colour red as it carries with it psychological implications of violence, anger, blood, murder: so Jack's clothing moves from browns and greens towards red (the maroon coloured jacket he dons in the latter part of the film), the conversation with Grady (one of Jack's two shinnings) takes place in a red bathroom and Danny's shinnings all involve red - the butchered Grady children, the blood elevator, REDRUM.
As the colour red has a psychologically documented and culturally entrenched value it can be exploited by Kubrick to evoke aesthetic reactions in his viewers thereby enhancing the realistic effect of horror.

The progression, symbolically, towards a masculine ethos is achieved by use of the colour yellow. The colour yellow picks up from the Navajo motif; the Overlook Hotel is built on a Navajo burial ground, it is decorated in an indigenous Navajo style and the Colorado Lounge (scene of Jack's labours/isolation/deterioration) is dominated by a Navajo sand painting of four males. Yellow is the male colour according to Navajo symbolism and as Jack and the Overlook's past begin to assert themselves, it is a masculine assertiveness directed against the rest of the family and yellow becomes the dominant colour. The Grady murder corridor has yellow wallpaper, Jack works on yellow paper, his face and eyes at the bar (his other shining with Lloyd the bartender) have a yellow hue repeated as he stands outside the bathroom with an axe (Wendy covering inside is in blue, the Navajo female colour), the walls are made yellow by the interior lighting as Jack stalks the corridors while the Gold Room and corridor are almost nauseatingly yellow/gold. It is a yellow tennis ball that Jack throws against the sand painting and that intrudes on Danny's game to lure him into Room 237 and it is even a yellow liquor - Advocaat - that Grady spills on Jack's red jacket. An understanding of the masculine ethos of yellow may not be understood outside of the Navajo community but it is Kubrick's evocation of this symbolism in the filmed narrative that subconsciously engenders an 'understanding' of the 'meaning of yellow' in the viewer. No knowledge of Navajo culture is required for Kubrick's use of colour to provide a psychological underpinning for the consciously perceived plot. The use of colour in this way serves the interests of realism. Kubrick achieves the effect of
'horror' through an understanding of the inherent values of form, colour and line and so employing them to generate an effect so realistic it is 'horrifying'.

[v] Lighting: The choice of lighting can alter the significance of almost every other choice considered above. Lighting codes operating in film are well known to the photographer:
+ Lighting from below creates a sinister effect. Jack Nicholson's malevolent in _The Shining_ is enhanced by the underlighting at the bar in the Gold Room as the Overlook's past resurrects itself.
+ Lighting from the side creates contrast and ambiguity. The dual nature of Malcolm McDowell as 'our friend and narrator' and as perpetrator of 'ultra-violence', as aggressor and as victim, is mirrored by the side-lighting of his features in the opening shot of _A Clockwork Orange_.
+ Lighting from above has a spiritual effect. Marissa Berenson is a creature of pure and innocent love - almost angelic when she accepts Barry's apology for a love scorned in _Barry Lyndon_.
+ Lighting from behind creates a silhouette effect. The silhouette can range from romantic to frightening depending on the context. The effect of Jack's silhouette in _The Shining_ or indeed that of Alex and his droogs in _A Clockwork Orange_ is to come between the viewer and the light source (with all the connotations of light versus dark) and so present a threatening presence on the screen. It is interesting to note that Kubrick is strictly authentic in his choice of lighting sources. In other words, although his effects are carefully conceived, there is always an explanation available to the viewer for the lighting effect:
the illuminated bar in the Gold Room accounts for the yellow hue of Jack Torrance's face in _The Shining_; the footlights of the Overlook's hedge maze account for the sinister mask on Jack's face as he lopes after Danny.
By providing an obvious explanation for the convenience of lighting such that it reflects a character's malvolence, ambiguity or purity, Kubrick does not upset the realism of the scene while exploiting the readily understood lighting codes of film.

(b) Dynamic:

(i) Distance: This is a choice on the spectrum from extreme long shot and long shot, through full, three quarter and medium shots to close-ups. Once more the realistic effect is the result of the most appropriate choice given the action being filmed. The longer shots serve to contextualise the action and are used to emphasise the drama as opposed to the personalities involved in the drama.

Captain Quin (Leonard Rossiter) in long shot is simply one of the trials Barry must face, in close-up he is a pathetic, frightened coward in Barry Lyndon. The close shot disorientates the viewer by depriving him of context and the sheer proximity creates a feeling of claustrophobia. Jack horns in both Wendy and the viewer in the bathroom of the Torrances living quarters at the Overlook in The Shining.

(ii) Focus: Two sets of choices confront the filmmaker - he must choose from the range 'shallow - deep' focus and from the range 'soft - sharp' focus. Shallow focus allows the filmmaker to guide the viewers perceptions quite precisely, specifying exactly what the viewer must look at and understand. Basin, the champion of depth of focus is keen to point out, that sharp deep focus is less likely to draw attention to itself and the perception we bring to bear on the screen is probably closer to that of everyday life.

This is not a blanket rule as the consequent loss of focussed attention may have the very opposite outcome of the pursuit of realism.
In *The Shining* our attention focuses exclusively on Jack as he pursues the retreating Wendy/camera across the Colorado Lounge and up the stairs - there is no escape either for Wendy or our eyes which remain tightly focused on the pursuer. On the other hand in *Barry Lyndon* we have to scan the entire frame to locate Barry among the troops led by Hardy Kruger - emphasizing his entrapment in the violence and death of the Seven Years War. Kubrick is a master of depth of focus which allows him to fill the scene with details which may register consciously only after numerous viewings (in the pencil holder on Ullman's desk as he narrates the story of the Grady murder to Jack Torrance in *The Shining*, is a miniature axe; in the 'Underground' record section of the Record Bar Alex in *A Clockwork Orange* views a copy of the *2001: A Space Odyssey* soundtrack...).

Soft focus creates a smooth, distant, romantic effect. As Ryan O'Neal (Redmond Barry) attends to Gay Hamilton (his cousin Nora) so the soft focus creates a suitably romantic feeling in *Barry Lyndon*, whereas the sharp focus aboard the space ships of *2001: A Space Odyssey* conveys an impression of authenticity. In terms of the dynamic shot, it is focus changes within a shot that bear consideration. Here the filmmaker is concerned with diverting the viewer's attention by some device such as the 'rack focus' which moves our attention from one object to the next or the 'follow focus' which concentrates our attention on one subject despite its movements. If the required effect of focussing attention is achieved in such a way as to draw attention to itself, the realistic effect is automatically diminished.

(iii) Angle: The filmmaker must choose from the three sets of axes that determine the shot -

- The pan axis (vertical) or angle of approach. This is either the square approach which emphasizes the aspect of design or an oblique approach which gives more of an effect...
of space (and appeals to the inherent quality of diagonals as more active in our reading of the frame). Kubrick uses the square shot repeatedly to emphasize the order and symmetry of his compositions (a recurrent theme), for example in the scenes of an English regiment on parade in Barry Lyndon but switches to the oblique shot to convey more of a sense of depth and drama once the order moves towards disruption as the regiment marches into battle during the Seven Years War.

The tilt axis (horizontal) or angle of elevation or obviously the high-angle shot diminishes the subject while the low-angle shot emphasizes the subject, one overpowers while the other is overpowered. In the scene inside the Cat Lady's house Kubrick films the Cat Lady from above, Alex from below. So Alex symbolically overpowers the impotent and mechanical through his phallic, life-giving sexuality.

The roll (movement around the horizontal parallel to the axle of the lens). This is a fairly rare camera movement, unless to simulate a ship's movements, as it disorients the viewer. Kubrick employed the roll to great effect in 2001 using a device where the camera is attached to a revolving set to convey a sense of zero-gravity, disorientational space. This device enables, for example, a flat attendant to walk full circle, supposedly using velcro shoes.

None of the choices of angle confronting the filmmaker are inherently more realistic than any other choice - the given action must be considered. The realistic effect of a roll or tilt can often be measured by the audience reaction: shrinking back in the seat as a result of the angle of elevation or lolling of heads in response to a roll. A filmmaker will have to make the whole set of choices to arrive at a non-realistic effect - although the possibilities are more limited for a non-realistic artist.
working in a basically realistic medium.

(iv) Camera movement: Not only is the camera revolving in the ways described above but it is also moving around - though tracking or crane shots. The tracking shot enhances our sense of depth perception and offers the possibility of emphasizing the central subject by closely following it or focusing attention on the camera as it changes from one subject to another. It is a technique useful for point of view shots, creating a sense of movement, generating suspense, affecting surprise . . . . For example, Gianetti suggests that the reverse track (so favoured by Kubrick) is a device to emphasize psychological and physical information.

"...[A Clockwork Orange] opens with a close-up of the protagonist (McDowell) staring brazenly at the camera. On the soundtrack we hear his confidential commentary which establishes an intimate if uneasy rapport between him and us: we become his confidants. Once this intimacy is established, Kubrick pulls back and offers us a wider and longer view of the protagonist's physical environment - a weird 'milk bar' [the Korova] where he and his 'droogs' sit in a drug-induced stupor" (Gianetti 1982 p167).

There is also the zoom which would seem to be similar to the tracking shot in effect but is deceptive in that it does not actually move into the scene. The result is a somewhat foreign effect as we do not experience this in everyday life. According to Clement the reverse zoom allows Kubrick to appropriate filmic space without the sense of confinement associated with the reverse track while retaining a powerful scrutiny of the subject and setting (Clement 1983 p14) - a device most commonly observed in Barry Lyndon. Once again, should the camera movement, or even lack of movement, draw attention to itself the realistic effect is lost.

(v) Point of view: This is a rather more abstract notion than
the choice of 'perspective/angles'. The choice is basically subjective or objective, first person narration or omniscient narration. This is a straightforward enough choice confronting the author of a novel. If someone in the story - whether a minor or major character - narrates the events it is first person narration and if someone outside the story - whether a separate character or entirely devoid of character (although this narrator of course reflects the author's personality) - narrates the events it is an omniscient narrator. But the filmmaker is not confronted by such a clearly differentiated choice. Most films are told from an omniscient point of view - for a very good reason. First person narration fails to achieve what it professes to be: although we may hear the narrator, we also see the film and so obtain an 'objective' insight into what is meant to be a subjective account. For this reason Harper Lee's *To Kill A Mockingbird* (1960) which chronicles the violence, eccentricities and prejudices of the Southern United States through the unique first person narration of a child makes an unexceptional screen adaptation which can only present the plot, cast the children as its heroes and provide a narrator to try and repeat some of the children's insights. The point of view of the film is not that of the recollecting narrator but of the filmmaker who can not provide his audience with the visual experiences of a child.

In terms of realism this general fact about a film's point of view is a two edged sword: on the one hand the 'objectivity' of the camera argues in favour of Realist ontological realism but the 'subjectivity' of our everyday perception argues for more expressionistic filmmaking - perhaps *Mary Poppins* (Disney 1964) is a more realistic expression of what a child sees than *To Kill A Mockingbird* (Mulligan 1962).

Alex may well be 'our friend and narrator' in *A Clockwork Orange* but he is also the object of our viewing. For
example, although Alex tells us that the first Ludovico film he is forced to watch is "a very good, professional piece of shiny, like it was done in Hollywood", we can compare it to Kubrick's cinematography and draw the opposite conclusion. Alex comments on the blood of the man beaten in the film that "the colour of the real world only seems really real when you viddy them on the screen" but we can see it is blatantly artificial unlike Alex's own blood shown on 'our' screen during the interrogation room sequence.

The second axis is the syntagmatic axis which will reveal the directors various processes of organization or what may be termed montage.

2. Syntagmatic Axis: Montage

The filmmaker must decide how to present the shot. Another word for this process is 'cutting' or 'editing'. Unlike mise en scene only one choice confronts the filmmaker as a physical level: whether to overlap the film pieces or join them end to end [images and sound]. But montage is also used to describe two other processes:

(a) the creation of a new meaning from the juxtaposition of two shots with their own meanings. The classic Eisensteinian 'collision of shots' was identified by Bazin as a singularly unrealistic effect, however a more sophisticated version of the same process can be seen at work in the films of Kubrick. By juxtaposing images that have a well defined origin in the film Kubrick can achieve a similar effect without drawing the viewer outside of the film for the purposes of comparison. For example the final two shots of The Shining are:

1. Jack Torrance's grisly death in the hedge maze, which has a logical explanation in terms of the narrative, followed by
2. 'Jack Torrance' in a 1921 photograph of a July 4th Ball at the Overlook hanging on the wall of the Gold Corridor, which has already been passed over by the camera several times during the action except that here it is singled out for particular attention.

The juxtaposition of the two shots does not undermine the realism of the film but rather provides the viewer with a proposed resolution by suggesting a possible meaning previously overlooked in the course of the film just as the content of the photograph previously passed unnoticed. What do the individual shots mean? The first means that Jack has found his way to the centre of the labyrinth - and the nothingness that awaits. In his search for immortality he has denied his humanity (fallibility, uncertainty, hope) and has lost his soul in the timeless sea of the Overlook. The second reveals Jack surrounded by revellers of a 1921 ball amid 21 other pictures in the hotel's reception area - its meaning is recurrence "a Jack re-encountered" (Kubrick interviewed in Cinent 1983). Taken together the 1921 photograph gives an image of normality while the present time image of Jack's frozen face in the image of madness. This 'collective' meaning acts as an inversion of the earlier evolution which doubled the normality - the present Jack as father, writer and teacher with a hideous past, not yet forgotten. The multiplication of meaning that arises from the juxtaposition of two shots with their own meanings approximates the multiplicity of meanings that confronts the perceiver of 'everyday reality'.

(b) The communication of a large body of information in a short time by the weaving together of a series of short shots. Consider Nelson's explanation of the last three minutes of Barry Lyndon - the vast amount of information and meaning conveyed by a series of short shots.

"The final two episodes of Barry Lyndon unite Barry's tragic fate and Lady Lyndon's private sorrow, while they express,
more succinctly than any film before or since, both Kubrick's artistic intelligence and his personal vision. He completes Barry Lyndon's story with the only freeze frame in the film, returning for the first time since the woeing of Lady Lyndon in Part I, and with the narrator's last words ('He never saw Lady Lyndon again'). The camera reveals Barry from behind (probably a one legged double for Ryan O'Neal) as he enters a carriage, artlessly suspended in midair without either the support of good fortune or good form. This series of frames, repeating and freezing the same image, visualises Barry's personal decline within the informality of contingent space, just as the last scene of the film shows Lady Lyndon's sorrow within the static enclosures of formal space.  

(1) Cut from interior shot, a large room at Castle Mackton ... (2) Cut to close-up view ... of Lady Lyndon slowly and methodically signing bank drafts ... (3) Cut to slow zoom shot of a bank draft being made out ... (4) Cut to close-up of Lady Lyndon's distracted and sorrowful face ... (5) Cut back to long shot, static composition as before, as the last piano note strikes (6) Screen cuts to black as Handel's 'Sarabande' plays during the film's end-titles ... this remarkable three minutes of film ... reaffirms an eighteenth-century society's entanglement within its own forms and rituals, its own folly and moral irrelevance ... Kubrick's Barry Lyndon leaves its audience with ... the haunting memory of those last frozen images of Barry and Lady Lyndon, he with his back to the camera and falling into space, the last forever in a distant mise-en-scène, and both implying us to gape with feeling and understanding at two film portraits that refuse to eviscerate humanity in the formal pursuit of art" (Nelson 1982 pp.194-196).

Hollywood style cutting was a body of rules developed over the years to achieve the most unobtrusive montage without consequent loss of realism so as to concentrate on the action. For example
a fairly unimportant action taking place in real time is likely to be boring and undercut the tempo of the action so the 'dead time' can be pared away. The Hollywood grammar maintains that this can only be accomplished 'invisibly' by inserting a shot of something else to account for the missing time or changing the camera angle noticeably for the viewer. Should the montage become visible, according to this theory, the focus of the viewer shifts from the mechanics of the plot to the mechanics of montage and the illusion of reality is destroyed. Contemporary styling is far less rigid and can accommodate directors like Jan-Luc Godard who jump-cuts mid-scene in a film like Breathless (1960) to generate a nervous, reckless, brash rhythm by ignoring the Hollywood rules. The realist filmmaker is not forced to operate within the confines of the Hollywood grammar any more than the nature of realism I am discussing in this paper is constrained by the Nineteenth Century literary understanding of the term.

A second choice that confronts the filmmaker is the length of individual shots within themselves and in relation to the adjoining shots. Hollywood montage demands a cut just after the climax while contemporary directors often maintain a shot long after the climax.

Alain Tanner talking about his film In the White City (1983):

"Since I often do lengthy shots, which are sometimes a whole sequence, I can't, as they say, correct it in the editing. But of course the editing is important: I think that the longer a shot is the more vital it is to find the exact frame to cut it. If you make a film with a thousand shots in the classical way, you can give it to a good professional editor and he will be able to put it together for you. But with my film, he wouldn't know what to do about it. To give you an example: there's a shot of a curtain being ruffled by the wind — no camera movement, nobody in shot, just the open window and the curtain. The shot lasts eighty seconds — very long. But
what's time in the cinema? This eighty seconds probably represents a whole afternoon. If I gave that shot to a traditional editor, he might take three seconds and say that's quite enough. But with my editor (Laurent Uhler) it took us a long time to decide: was ten seconds too long, or was a minute too short?" (Pullaine 1983/d)

The Hollywood grammar can not be regarded as an absolute for delimiting the length of shots required for a realistic effect. This is far too rigid a notion of what constitutes realism.

Montage is also used to abandon strict chronology.

(a) Parallel montage alternates between two separate stories by cutting from one to the other repeatedly. It is this device that allows Kubrick to delay showing us what happened to Danny in Room 237 until Jack goes to investigate his story about a woman who attacked him in the Room. Then the two 'Shinings' become confused (it is also not evident which parts are Halloran's shining in his hotel room in Miami), Danny's experience of an old decomposing hag rising from the bath water and Jack's erotic encounter with a young nude woman who becomes the hideous hag once he embraces and kisses her.

(b) Flashback and flash-forward: which allows the director to communicate related, tangential material or preview the action. The Shining overflows with flashbacks/forwards as the Overlood's past resurrects itself. Danny's 'shinings' include the 'blood elevator' which is a flash forward to a stage in the film where the past has resurrected itself and confronts Wendy, the Grady daughters which is a flashback into the hotel's past and a flash forward to the impending fate of the family and REDRUM which is flash forward to the transformation of Jack when he tries to reenact the past as detailed in the flashbacks. Jack's shinings include a conversation with the barman, lloyd which is a flashback to
1921 and a flashback to the final image of the film and a conversation with Delbert Grady in the bathroom which is a flashback to his previous incarnation as car thief and a flashback previewing the course he must embark upon.

(c) Involved montage allows chronology to be disregarded through repetition or lack of order. One of Kubrick’s earliest directorial efforts (his third chronologically) The Killing (1956) is a masterful exposition of involved montage. The narrative concerns a robbing of a racetrack as the seventh race begins. Instead of arranging all the sequences leading up to the robbing chronologically to give the film continuity, Kubrick tells the story from several points of view. Every time the seventh race is about to start and the robbery take its course, the film stops and moves back in time to approach the start of the race/robery from a new perspective. The repetition of the same race track footage each time and the disregard for strict chronology builds tension while revealing the intricacies of the plot and building the puzzle piece by piece.

Although abandonment of strict chronology would seem an unlikely choice for the filmmaker striving after realistic effect – there is nothing in our everyday experience that parallels such a device as we experience everything in real time – as long as the device makes sense in terms of the unfolding plot its effect can be realistic. In fact abandonment of chronology can be essential to the realism of the film by maintaining suspense (what Barthes termed the hermeneutic code by which the artist generate enigmas). However if the chronology is abandoned merely to frustrate the resolution of the plot or undermine the clues to its resolution provided by the narrative, the result is not realism. In such circumstances the physical impossibility of bilocationality implicit in parallel montage, the realm of science fiction time travel suggested by flashbacks and
forwards and the self-conscious contrivance of involuted montage will become apparent to the detriment of the realistic effect.

The match cut deserves special mention as the most common device for linking two very different scenes. This is achieved by repetition of action, form or mise en scène. James Monaco claims

"Stanley Kubrick's match cut in *2001 A Space Odyssey*, between a pre-historic bone whirling in the air and a twenty-first-century space station revolving in space, is possibly the most ambitious match cut in history, since it attempts to unite prehistory with the future anthropologically at the same time as it creates a special meaning within the cut itself by emphasizing the functions of both bone and space station as tools, extensions of human capabilities" (Monaco 1981 p185)

By achieving a smooth transition between two very different scenes the match cut enhances the realistic illusion that might otherwise suffer from the abrupt transition required of the viewer.

Thus the codes of montage are a great deal more complex than would at first appear to be the case. Metz tried to formulate a Grande Syntagmatique and so synthesize the theories of montage. What he wants is to define the nature of narrative units in a film. So the Grande Syntagmatique is the attempt to provide for the description of narrative discourse in terms of cinematic language. Narrative is seen to be the product of a code of interrelationships between shots. Metz holds that there are eight syntagms in the major paradigm of elements which permit the structuring of denotation. It is a linguistic model of the process of a director's decision on how to put all the shots and sequences together, his use of a particular cinematic discourse. Just as the speaker draws his utterances from
the potential utterances and constructions available to him, so the director draws from Metz's eight categories for each sequence of his film.

1. The first is the autonomous segment: that is one shot. This can be either a long take or short inserts. If an insert it may be:
   a) Nondiegetic: shows something external to the action.
   b) Subjective: an image related to a character.
   c) Displaced diegetic: an image related to the main action but not dominant.
   d) Explanatory: a different (closeup/angled) shot to give detail.

2. The second type is parallel montage: "montage brings together and interweaves two or more alternating 'motifs', but no precise relationship (whether temporal or spatial) is assigned to them - at least on the level of denotation" (Metz 1974a p.25).

3. The third type is bracket syntagm: "a series of very brief scenes representing occurrences that the film gives as typical samples of a same order of reality, without in any way chronologically locating them in relation to each other" (Metz 1974a p.25). Where 2 and 3 are nonchronological, the rest are all chronological on a denotative level.

4. The fourth type is the descriptive syntagm: the chronology is simultaneous - the various shots coexist at the same moment.

5. The fifth type is the narrative syntagm: this is consecutive, the actual passage of time. The alternative narrative syntagm is the switching from A to B to A to B and so on - time is consecutive but A and B occur simultaneously.

6. The sixth type is the scene: the continuous flow of time which is consecutive.
7. The seventh type is the episodic sequence. "strings together a number of very brief scenes which are usually separated from each other by optical devices (dissolves, etc) and which succeed each other in chronological order" (Metz 1974a p140).

8. The eighth type is the ordinary sequence: a single action with spatial and temporal breaks. "... the sequence is based on the unity of a more complex action ... that 'skips' those portions of itself that it intends to leave out and that is therefore apt to unfold in several different locations (unlike the scene)" (Metz 1974a p182).

Reproducing Metz's synthesis of the theories of montage without an attendant elucidation may not serve as a useful guide to the structuring of denotation but it does represent, in one sense, the apogee of semiological cinematic code analysis. As such it irrevocably disconnects realism from any account other than an effect oriented account. The semiotic task of untangling the codes that constitute the filmic system has revealed the mechanisms of the realistic film - in this sense destroying the illusion of reality reproduced. The signs of the film medium reproduce at best one aspect of the reality as we conceive it. It is a partial duplication of something we already know which partially coincides with the everyday reality. What we see is what language has named for us and what we see in film is meaningful to the extent that it supports our semantic universe.

* * *

The vindication of the account of realism comes with the delineation of the attainment of realism as an effect in film and the perception that the familiarity of the mechanisms whereby this effect is attained is the key to realism. That these mechanisms are subject to change with the discovery of newer ones is basic to the account of realism.
and is nowhere contradicted by the analysis of those mechanisms in this chapter. The final vindication of an effect-based account of realism comes with the perception that a film about Vietnam can be talked about in the same breath as one about a haunted hotel in demonstrating the use of a particular mechanism of realist filmmaking.

Nowhere was the content of the film an issue in the analysis of realism in film. The interplay between the role of the artist in generating the effect and the responses of the viewer was the real issue with regard to what was to be labelled realistic or non-realistic.

That semiological analysis has located film among the other arts through successful application of an account of realism developed in relation to the other arts finally shuts the door on claims about film's unique tie to reality because of its mechanical reproduction of reality. Metz's Grund Syntagmatique alone should serve to dispel the myth of sheer re-presentation of spatial reality. Even the appeal to Peirce's tripartite division of the sign and the suggested fact that the cinematic image is a perfect assemblage of icon, index and symbol does little more than suggest why realism is so easily attainable by film. This can not be elevated to the status of a prescriptive aesthetic.
6. CONCLUSION

This dissertation set out to provide an account of realism in art and apply this account to the case of film.

In order to fulfill this aim it approached the problem of realism from four different perspectives, utilizing the seminal theorist's contribution in each case as representative of the particular approach.

Approaching the question of realism from the point of view of the philosophy of art, Nelson Goodman offered three basic usages of the term that would serve as the foundation of the account. First, Goodman used the term to differentiate between realist and non-realist works of art by arguing that familiarity is the deciding criterion. The essential point to be gleaned from this usage of the term was that realism is the effect of familiarity. That the effect of familiarity is not a static notion was allowed for by Goodman's argument that the discovery of new effects allows for a greater degree of realism, for the revelation of a new world version. Goodman's second usage of realism thus set up a tension between familiarity as differentiating the realistic work and discovery as characterizing its relationship with world. In a third use of the term realism Goodman drew attention to the fact that even fiction may be realistic for although nothing is denoted by fiction it may be separated into, for example, real-person-stories and fictive-person-stories.

Gombrich's art historical account of realism operates in the area demarcated by Goodman's first two usages of the term. A similar familiarity — discovery dichotomy operates in Gombrich's Art and Illusion. Gombrich made the invaluable contribution of moving the emphasis from the issue of 'image — reality' to 'image — viewer/artist'. Goodman's position on realism as an effect rather
than a question of content was reflected in Gombrich's 'psychological study' of the role of artist and viewer in achieving the realistic effect. In terms of familiarity Gombrich identified the expectations of the viewer, governed largely by previous encounters with realistic works, and the adherence of the artist to familiar schemata to fulfill those expectations. In terms of discovery Gombrich identified the viewer as participant in the creation of the realist work of art and the role of the artist as discoverer of the effects which could generate viewer 'projection'.

The outcome of chapters two and three was an account of realism that dismissed a contents based solution to the problem of realism and argued for familiarity and discovery as the keys to representational realism in terms of the creation of the work by the artist and its perception by the viewer.

The application of this account to film offered the opportunity to elucidate the concepts set out in the first part of the dissertation while providing a test of its efficacy in dealing with a realism of representation unparalleled in the arts. In terms of film itself the success of this application would bring film into alignment with the other arts, refuting the essentialist position of many commentators.

André Bazin's realist aesthetic worked from an essentialist position, arguing that film enjoys unique tie with reality because of its ability to mechanically reproduce what is in front of the lens. An account of realism that could not choose between the multiple versions of reality offered by realistic art would not sustain Bazin's position. By seeking to relate film to an antecedent reality, Bazin retained a relationship of dependence between film and reality that is not appropriate for an fully fledged artform. It implies that film, unlike the older arts, is not free to criticize or oppose reality, as it is not complete in itself. The 'unique nature of film' is a handicap Bazin would never have wished on the cinema. Bazin was left with nothing more than a psychology conducive to realism in film based on the viewer's misplaced trust in the objectivity of the lens.
Bazin's aesthetic was further undermined by the notion that the familiarity and discovery that attends realism is more than the employment of a standard mode of representation and the discovery of a new effect in the case of film. Bazin wished to tie these notions to a reality of pre-existing relations and not just the attainment of a particular effect.

Netz's semiotic approach by contrast offered the possibility of revealing the mechanisms by which filmmaker's attain the realist effect. It could relate that effect to the role familiarity or discovery played in the codes operating in any one film or part of a film. It could relate that familiarity and discovery to the role of the filmmaker in using cinematic discourse and the role of the viewer in labelling particular effects as realistic and others as non-realistic. Nowhere was the content of the film an Issue in the analysis of realism.

Chapters four and five feed directly back into the first half of the dissertation by vindicating the account of realism derived in chapters two and three. Further, the success of this application dispelled any notion of an essentialist account of film's realism. The fact of the filmic images perfect blend of iconic, indexical and symbolic aspects merely suggests why realism is so easily attainable by film but can not be argued as a unique tie to reality.

Nowhere have I suggested that this is a complete account of realism but I believe it at least looks in the right direction for its answer. The understanding of filmic realism (and indeed realism in all art) on the part of the viewer remains akin to Bazin's notion of realism. But the insight that realism is an effect, that this effect can be characterized in terms of familiarity and discovery and its utilization by the filmmaker revealed in minute detail, moves the focus away from the relation of image and reality to that of image and viewer/artist. If this dissertation has at least managed to communicate this much, the reader will longer be looking at a mirror held up to nature and his or her experience of the cinema will be the...
richer for that understanding.
APPENDIX

Michel Ciment's brief outlines of the plots of the four major films of Stanley Kubrick utilized in this dissertation (Ciment 1983 pp280-291):

2001: A Space Odyssey
1. The Dawn of Man.
A group of vegetarian apes, threatened by a neighbouring group of carnivores and basking for possession of a waterhole, one morning discover a mysterious black monolith. One of them then learns to use a bone as a weapon and kills to obtain meat.

2. Four million years later, in 2001, an American scientist, Dr. Heywood Floyd, goes to the moon to investigate the presence of a black monolith emitting signals towards Jupiter.

3. Mission Jupiter. Eighteen months later. A spacecraft, the Discovery, is heading for Jupiter on a nine month journey. On board are David Bowman and Frank Poole, three other astronauts in hibernation and the computer HAL 9000 which controls the vessel. HAL announces that an external antenna is out of order. When Poole leaves to repair it, he discovers the information is false; but HAL cuts off his link with the spacecraft, maroons him in space and causes the three hibernating astronauts to die. After endeavouring to save his friend, Bowman returns to the discovery to lobotomise HAL.

4. Jupiter and Beyond Infinity.
Bowman continues his flight and encounters the monolith in Jupiter's orbit. Entering a new spatio-temporal dimension, he passes through a succession of landscapes and colours. He arrives in an eighteenth century room, sees himself progressively grow older, is once more confronted with the black monolith and is reborn as an astral football floating above the earth.
A Clockwork Orange

England in the near future. Alex Delarge and his three droogs, Dim, Pete and Georgie, succeed in attack a tramp, a rival gang led by Billyboy and the isolated house of a writer and politician, Mr. Alexander, whose wife they rape. The following day, while his parents are at work, Alex receives a visit from the social worker Delilah, then meets two girls in a record store and enjoys a quick orgy with them. After he has reasserted his leadership of the gang, they break into the house of the Cat Lady who manages to alert the police seconds before Alex kills her. He is arrested and receives a fourteen year sentence; two years later, however, he agrees to undergo shock treatment initiated by the government in their war against crime.

After agreeing to be brainwashed, he is released and can no longer countenance any form of violence. He discovers that a lodger has appropriated the room which he occupied in his parents’ house, is set upon by tramps and beaten up by his former droogs who have since become policemen. He seeks refuge with Mr. Alexander who, combining personal revenge with a desire to discredit the government, drives Alex to attempt suicide. Alex escapes and recovers in hospital. There the minister offers him a lucrative job which will allow him once more to indulge his violent instincts.

Barry Lyndon

Ireland in the eighteenth century. After the death of his father in a duel, Redmond Barry is raised by his mother. He falls in love with his cousin Nora Brady; challenging her suitor, the English officer Col. Quin, to a duel and convinced that he has killed him, he flees. He is robbed by highwaymen and forced to enlist in the army. While taking part in the Seven Years’ War, he learns from a former friend, Captain Grogan, that Quin is not dead but married to Nora. Barry deserts, but meets a Prussian ally, Captain Potsdorff, who sees through his disguise and forces him to enlist in the Prussian army. Ordered to spy on the Chevalier de Balibari, an Irishman like himself, he confesses his mission to him and becomes his protégé. At a gaming
table, he meets the rich countess, Lady Lyndon, who marries him after her husband's death and gives him her name. He is unfaithful to her, incurs the enmity of his stepson, Lord Bullington, and, following a public brawl between the two, loses all hope of being raised to the peerage. After the death of his own son Bryan, he becomes estranged from his wife who attempts to commit suicide. Bullington challenges him to a duel in which he is seriously wounded. Barry is obliged to leave England.

**The Shining**

Hoping to write a novel there, a former teacher, Jack Torrance, accepts the post of janitor for the winter at the Overlook Hotel, which is close to the season and totally isolated from the outside world. The manager, Ulman, warns him that in 1970 a janitor named Grady killed his wife and two daughters before committing suicide. Jack Torrance settles in with his wife Wendy and son Danny, who possesses both extrasensory powers and a 'double', Tony, who speaks to him. Before leaving the hotel, Halloran, the head cook, 'communicates' with Danny and warns him that for those like them who possess 'the shining', certain events leave traces which can be dangerous. He particularly warns him not to enter Room 237.

 Becoming increasingly nervous and irritable, Torrance cuts himself off on work. He begins to frequent the hotel's guided lounge where he has conversations with a barman, Lloyd. His son's visions become more and more frequent, and he receives a strange wound on the neck: then Torrance in his turn encounters a woman in Room 237. In the hotel's toilets, during an evening which is really taking place in the twenties, an attendant named Grady advises him to be stricter with his wife and son. Torrance becomes more and more brutal in his relations with his family and Danny enters into conflict with Halloran who is vacationing in Florida. Halloran rushes back to save them but is killed on his arrival by Torrance, who proceeds to chase his son through the snow-covered labyrinth in the ground of the hotel. He dies of cold, however, before he can kill him.


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