MENTAL HEALTH AS A FUNCTION OF RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION.

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A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Arts University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Clinical Psychology.

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This dissertation studies the relationship between religious commitment and mental health. It is contended that the concept of religious orientation has not been utilized sufficiently in previous relevant research. This concept is thus used in an attempt to clarify the vague and confusing relationship that has thus far been shown to exist between religion and mental health. This dissertation proposes that it is not religious commitment as such, but rather religious orientation, that is important in determining the level of personal adjustment.

The Religious Orientation Scale and Personal Orientation Inventory were administered by various Church Ministers from different denominations to voluntary members of their congregations. Two hundred and thirty one unspoilt questionnaires were returned by post, and were analyzed in terms of breakdown across demographic variables as well as the relationship between religious orientation and self-actualization.

Using zero-order and partial correlation coefficients, it was determined that significant correlations in the predicted direction exist between religious orientation and the Time Competence and Outer Directed dimensions of self-actualization. On this basis it was concluded that intrinsic orientation is associated with a self-actualizing mode of being, while an extrinsic orientation is associated with a non self-actualizing mode of being.
DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Master of Arts in Clinical Psychology in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.

Timothy Peter Dix
10th day of July, 1986
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1. INTRODUCTION

"The real research question for the scientific investigation of religious behaviour is not whether a person is religious but rather how he or she is religious." (Burke, 1978)

The study of religion as a popular topic in academic psychology began in the middle 1890's, with the first empirical study of conversion published by J.H. Leuba in 1896, in the "American Journal of Psychology." Three years later the first book entitled 'The Psychology of Religion' (Starbuck, 1899) was published, while G.S. Hall encouraged further empirical studies conducted by Leuba and Starbuck. Thus Schaub (1924) wrote: "The dawn of the twentieth century witnessed the rise of a new approach to the study of religion psychological investigations along strictly empirical and scientific lines" (p. 111). Whereas questions of belief and religion had previously been dealt with exclusively by philosophy, psychology began to take up the task of objectively studying subjects that previously belonged to philosophy.

Various theories of religious behaviour have since been presented by certain prominent psychologists. Some theorists, such as Allport (1956), Frankl (1967), and Jung (1938), have suggested that religion may have a positive effect on psychological well-being by forming a basis of integration for the different facets of life, thereby providing meaning and initiating greater emotional stability. Other theorists, such as Freud (1928), Fromm (1963), and Ellis (1962) see religion and positive mental health as being antithetical to each other. Therefore, two basic hypotheses have been considered concerning the broad question of the relationship between religion and personal adjustment. The first presented by supporters and promoters of religion, proposes that religious faith contributes to individual wellbeing, happiness and peace. The second suggests that religion itself is an expression of psychopathology, that religiosity is a reflection of psychopathology, or at least that religion contributes to personal maladjustment.

The results of the research that has been stimulated by these theories have been inconclusive, with some studies
to support each of the above hypotheses, and some finding no relationship in either direction."

In an attempt to explain this dilemma Tyson (1979) suggests that many of these researchers have made the mistake of considering religion as a unitary concept. Some previous authors have, on the other hand, referred to two broad categories, such as "sick souled" versus "healthy minded" (James, 1902), "authoritarian" versus "humanistic" (Fromm, 1950), and "utilitarian" versus "deeper" (Adorno, Frenke-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford, 1950).

These authors all seem to be saying that the important psychological issue is not "...whether a person is religious, but rather how he or she is religious" (Burke, 1978). This differentiation was refined in Allport's conceptualization of intrinsically and extrinsically motivated religion (Allport and Ross, 1967). Extrinsicly motivated people view religion for their own ends, for example to provide security, sociability, status, and self-justification. Intrinsically motivated people, however, find their master motive in religion, with other needs regarded as ultimately less significant.

At this point a brief comment on why the relationship between religion and personal adjustment should be regarded as a legitimate topic for scientific research seems pertinent.

A recent survey reveals the extent and variety of religious beliefs, experiences, and practices characteristic of contemporary America. Sevenksy (1984) notes that 94% of adults in the USA claim to believe in God and 56% claim that their religious beliefs are "very important" to them. About 34% of Americans claim to have had a "born again" experience and 35% report having felt at least once that they were very close to a powerful spiritual force.

Although comparable figures are not available for RSA, the 1980 census (HSRC, 1981) revealed that 76.6% of South Africans are Church members. However, this does not necessarily imply that these people are active Church members; therefore one cannot infer anything about the extent of religious beliefs or practice. The American figures (Sevenksy, 1984) will therefore be referred to in the development of the present argument.

Note: An overview of these studies is provided in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
In contrast to these figures on the extent of beliefs in the general population, a 1976 sample of the American Psychological Association (cited in Bergin, 1980) revealed that only 50% of psychologists believe in God, a proportion significantly lower than that of the general population. These figures are of great significance to the mental health profession in that they highlight an area of potential conflict rooted in fundamentally different world views. Clearly, many people hold beliefs which most psychologists see as false; they claim as possible or actual experiences which most psychologists regard as impossible; they organize and make sense of their lives around meanings and goals which a majority of the scientific-medical establishment considers mistaken.

In view of these differences, it is my contention that psychologists should endeavour to achieve an objective understanding of the relationship between religious commitment and personal adjustment, so as to avoid the pitfalls of professional bias, misinterpretation or error in the psychodiagnostic and psychotherapeutic processes.

The aim of this study is to address this issue; that is, to attempt to clarify the relationship between religious commitment and personal adjustment. It is my contention that although the concept of religious commitment has been refined, as mentioned above, this refined concept of religious orientation has not been utilized sufficiently in the relevant research. This concept will thus be used in an attempt to clarify the vague and confusing relationship that has thus far been shown to exist between religion and mental health. This dissertation proposes that it is not religious faith as such, but rather religious orientation, that is important in determining the level of personal adjustment.

At this point a clarification of the term "personal adjustment" seems to be pertinent, as it is used interchangeably with the terms "mental health" and "self-actualization" in the text of this dissertation. "Personal adjustment" in the present study refers to the extent of psychological development. As such it is intended to emphasize a shift away from the psychiatric concept of mental illness, towards the more humanistic concept of the level of positive mental health. This conceptual shift seems to be best reflected by Maslow's (1970) notion of self-actualization, which will be discussed further in Chapter 4.3 of the present dissertation.
In an attempt to examine this specific issue, this dissertation will first offer a basic foundation of important theoretical contributions to the psychology of religion, including the work of James(1902), Freud(1928;1955), Jung(1938) and Boisen(1950). The concept of religious orientation will then be examined in some detail, with a consideration of personality characteristics that have been found to correlate with religious orientations. The specific relationship between religion and psychopathology, with reference to both theory and research, will then be considered. The method, results and discussion of the present study will then be offered.
2. THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

Certain prominent psychologists have made significant theoretical contributions to the psychology of religion. A degree of familiarity with these contributions will provide the reader with a broader and more meaningful understanding of the present study. An overview of the major theories on the psychology of religion follows.

2.1 William James

At the turn of the century William James, the leading academic psychologist in America at the time, was asked to give the Gifford Lectures in Edinburgh. What he said on that occasion, together with his epoch-making 'The Varieties of Religious Experience' (1902) is still regarded by many as the most important single psychological work on religion. (Pruyser, 1960)

His propositions were:

a. That religious phenomena are continuous with other psychic phenomena;
b. That in religion, as everywhere else, the sublime and the ridiculous are two poles of a continuum, with a lot of ordinary, drab, and hackneyed happenings in between;
c. That in religion, as in other human endeavours, feelings tend to be more important than thoughts;
d. That there is not one single psychic wellspring for religion in the form of a special instinct, sentiment or disposition;
e. That religion has a human and a divine side and that psychology can study only the former; and
f. That people do not simply have a God but that they use their God and that religion is known by its fruits in behaviour. (James, 1902).

Although James's work (1902) is still of considerable importance, it does not pass without criticism. Pruysers (1960) questioned whether James’s most lasting legacy was not essentially a political as well as a scientific contribution.

For James, the psychology of religion, if it is to be empirical, deals with subjective experiences called "religious". This emphasis on feelings and complete
subjectivity cuts down on the importance of cognitive states, decisions, and acts on the very things that systematic and moral theology is interested in. Hence the work of James and his followers was not taken too seriously by the theological disciplines, since it dealt only with the subjective, all-too-human side of religion. It dealt neither with God, with doctrine, nor with the nature of the redemptive community. It touched only so lightly and so humanly upon the nature of man that it necessitated no change in churchmen's thoughts about God and his relation to man.

It therefore seems as if James set up narrow boundaries to the psychology of religion, and that many of his successors held to those limits without giving the matter much thought, although they might have found this limitation tactfully useful.

2.2 Sigmund Freud

Psychoanalytic studies of religion started early in this century. Freud's major contributions were contained in the works 'The Future of an Illusion' (1928) and 'Totem and Taboo' (1913). Because of the general hostility to psychoanalysis in the early decades of this century, there was initially very little carry-over of psychoanalytic observations and theories into the main body of religious studies.

Psychoanalytic studies of religion have a special character, both conceptually and methodologically. They are basically studies of motivation for religion, whereby the person's set of beliefs and practices are approached from the point of view of wish fulfillment, drive control, primary and secondary thinking, object relations, the genesis of conscience and the ego ideal, and the economics or libidinal and aggressive drives. Because the word "symptom" in psychoanalysis covers such a wide range of possibilities, religion can be approached as a symptom. Psychoanalysis therefore said more forcefully what James (1902) had said earlier - that people use their God.

The psychic mechanisms, the defence processes of the ego, and the fundamental psychosocial constellations, such as the oedipal conflict, were all brought to bear upon religion within a genetic-dynamic formula. This formula added an entirely new dimension to the methodology of the psychology of religion in that it demanded longitudinal assessment of the individual in the network of object relationships. Therefore, the psychoanalysis of religion occurs within the process of psychotherapy, which enables an evaluation of the
significance of religion in relation to other pursuits, preoccupations, values, and needs of the individual.

Freud's term "illusion" (1928) denoting the formal psychological status of religious beliefs, has given rise to bitter opposition, particularly from those who have only read the title of the book. In the book itself, Freud (1928) clarifies the meaning of the term and suggests that religious beliefs are illusions in the sense that they are not pure products of experience or end results of thinking, but fulfils of the oldest, strongest, and most urgent wishes of mankind. An illusion is therefore not necessarily false, that is, incapable of realization or contradictory to reality.

An important contribution of psychoanalysis to the psychology of religion was its emphasis on the role of conflict in religion, and of religion in conflict, personal as well as social. Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi (1975) contend that religion can be a product of inner-conflict in two ways. First, guilt feelings can be aroused and relieved by Protestant doctrines and practices. As evidence for this theory, Sargent (1957) notes that the arousal of a sense of sin was a standard technique of nineteenth century revivalism; it has been found that adolescents converted at revivals have often experienced a period of guilt beforehand; that Protestant doctrine places considerable emphasis on sin and salvation; and that Protestant mental patients are more likely than others to be preoccupied with feelings of guilt and unworthiness (Argyle, 1958).

The second aspect mentioned by Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi (1975) about religious reaction to conflict is that some people, when faced with a conflict between the self and the demands of conscience, will project the latter so that moral demands are experienced as coming from an externalized deity. Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi (1975) suggest that this mechanism is more likely to occur among Catholics, who make more use of projection as a defence mechanism.

As early as 1907, Freud (1928) defined religion as "a universal obsessional neurosis" on the basis of the similarity between certain religious rituals and obsessive acts. The basic underlying principle is that the performance of a ritual is able to reduce anxiety. This implies that situations presenting as a source of stress and anxiety can be rendered harmless by the adoption of certain beliefs about them. For people who are worried about death, belief in an after-life is a highly satisfactory adjustment. Several lines of
evidence cited by Argyle (1958) suggest that this is an important basis of religious belief: as people get older, after thirty-five, more are religious and believe in the after-life; 100 per cent of subjects over the age of one hundred held this belief in one survey, and in another survey 75 per cent of soldiers who have been in action report that they were helped by prayer (cited in Argyle, 1958).

Although Freud later changed his theories and formulations concerning religion, he never abandoned the reductionistic explanation of religion in terms of some other function or source.

In "The Future of an Illusion" (1928) Freud suggested that God was invented by primitive man when he found himself overwhelmed by life's inevitable difficulties and frustrations. As a response to frustration, religion therefore offers gratification in fantasy to those who are deprived in reality. From this it would follow that working-class people, who are deprived both of worldly goods and social status, should be more religious. Supporting evidence is provided by Argyle (1958), who points out that if one examines one particular type of religious activity - the minor Protestant sects - they are found to be very largely among the underprivileged. Furthermore, the beliefs entertained by these bodies are of a wish-fulfilling character. To take this theory further, Freud (1928) claimed that in response to these difficulties many an individual regressed and wished that he were a child again and could appeal to and be helped by his all-powerful father; thus emerged the concept of an omnipotent God. However, a father is not only a source of help and support but also, as a result of the castration complex, a fear inspiring figure. Consequently, God is both loved and feared. Moreover, Freud (1928) clearly implies that this theory is not only intended to explain the religious behaviour of primitive man, but of all men. In support of this theory, a cross-cultural study of sixty-two primitive societies conducted by Lambert, Triandis and Wolf (1959) found that where child-rearing was nurturant, the gods were regarded as benevolent, but when child-rearing was punitive, the gods were seen as malevolent. With reference to Christianity, Adorno et al (1950) found that people with punitive parents tended to believe in a sterner, more punitive God.

Siegman (1961) distinguishes two aspects of Freud's theory of religious behaviour, namely, a philosophical and a psychological aspect. It is a philosophical theory in the sense that it purports to explain the
nature of God. It is also, however, a psychological
theory in the sense that it identifies psychological
variables which supposedly are causally related to
individual differences in religious behaviour. As a
philosophical theory it can be criticized primarily for
its reductionism. As it can be seen from the above,
Freud explains religion purely in terms of psychological
processes. However, Clock and Stark (1965) identify
religion as both a social phenomenon, involving
institutions exhibiting varying degrees of formal
organization and distinction, as well as an element of
individual behaviour. If one accepts this formulation,
then Freud's theory clearly falls short by neglecting
the social aspect of religion.

As a psychological theory, various criticisms are
pertinent. Sevensky (1984) points out Freud's use of
inaccurate or incomplete historical and anthropological
findings, as well as such errors in methodology as
assuming that similarity in appearance or structure
indicate similarity in meaning or function.

Critiques of Freud are not only formulated on a
theoretical level. Siegman (1961) has conducted an
empirical investigation into the validity of the
psychoanalytic theory of religious behaviour. This
study raises some pertinent questions regarding Freud's
theory, and will therefore be covered in some detail.

Siegman (1961) based his study on a number of testable
hypotheses generated by Freud's theory. These
hypotheses were as follows:

a. The more religious in belief and observance have a
greater tendency to project. Freud's theory on
religion was elaborated by his students and later
followers who placed more emphasis on internal
frustrations or intra-psychic conflicts, rather than
on environmental frustrations, as the source of
belief in God (Fenichel, 1945). According to
Flugel (1945), for example, religious prohibitions
and injunctions are a projection of the super-ego
onto God. This theory therefore generates the
testable hypothesis that religious people should
have a greater tendency to project. Siegman (1961) in
fact points out that most of the theories advanced
by psychoanalytically oriented writers about the
dynamics of religious behaviour centre around the
concept of projection.
b. There is a positive correlation between subjects' feelings and concepts concerning God and their feelings and concepts concerning their father. This hypothesis is derived from the father-projection theory (Freud, 1928), discussed earlier in this section.

c. Males have a greater tendency than females to perceive God as a punishing figure. This hypothesis is based on the theory that fear of God is a projection of castration fears. According to Freudian theory (1928), castration fears are most prevalent among men.

The hypothesis that the more religious in belief and observance have a greater tendency to project was tested in two different groups. One consisted of sixty female and twenty-five male undergraduate university students. All subjects in this group were of the Jewish faith. A second group consisted of fifty-seven male university students of the Protestant faith. The hypothesis that there is a positive correlation between subjects' feelings concerning God and feelings concerning their father was tested in the same Israeli group, and in a group of seventy-nine male university students (US group B). Subjects in this group were roughly equally divided between the Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish faiths. The third hypothesis was only tested in the Israeli group.

The degree of each subject's religious belief and observance in the Israeli group was determined respectively by Thurstone's Attitude Toward God Scale (Thurstone and Chave, 1929) and Foa's Sabbath Observance Scale (1948). In US group A, the former scale was used as an index of subject's religious belief, and Thurstone's Attitude Toward the Church and Sabbath Observance Scales as indices of subject's religious observance. Self-ratings on a ten-point religiosity scale were used in US group B as a general index of subject's religiosity. The subject's tendency to project was evaluated by means of the Paranoid and Schizophrenia scales of the MMPI (Dahlstrom and Welsh, 1960) and Walsh's R-scale (Welsh, 1956). Osgood's Semantic Differential (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum, 1957) was used to test the remaining two hypotheses.

The correlations between the indices of religious belief and observance, and the various indices of projection were all less than 0.10 and clearly not significant. This certainly raises some doubt about the validity of the projection hypothesis. Partial support was found for the hypothesis that there is a relationship between subjects' feelings concerning God and their feelings.
concerning their father, and Siegman (1961), explains this in terms of basic perception and learning principles. No support was found for the hypothesis that males have a greater tendency than females to perceive God as a punishing figure.

Although this study does facilitate a more objective evaluation of Freud's theory, further research is needed before any definite conclusions can be reached.

2.3 Carl G. Jung

Freud's interest led many Freudians and neo-Freudians to think and write of religion. One of the most influential of the latter was Jung. Although he was a more obscure writer than Freud, Jung was more positively and openly religious. In fact he declared that, among his patients over the age of 35, there were none whose problems did not have their roots in religion (Jung, 1938). Like Freud, Jung found the principal roots of religion in the unconscious, by which he explained the universal aspects of much religious symbolism.

The difficulty in Jung's works is that there are no systematic treatises on the psychology of religion. There is very little material on individual differences in religion. All these and many other topics are scattered throughout his works, sometimes in relation to religion, sometimes in connection with non-religious aspects of living. However, there is an abundance of searching propositions from which the psychology of religion could greatly benefit.

While several thinkers, for example James (1902) and Freud (1928), have stated that people use their Gods, nobody has come as close to Jung as saying that people also make their Gods. Lest one be repelled by the implications of this position, it should be noted that Jung is one contemporary psychologist who does not shrink away from the word "soul" which he at times even seems to prefer to the more neutral and technical term "psyche" (Hoffman, 1955). Added to this is his conception of human life as a process of individuation in which the self and its destiny are actively sought and nurtured. The journey of the self is described as a road toward salvation - indeed, the soul and the self have by postulate been given a sacramental and pseudo-divine status. Thus Jung is able, from this position, to study the psychological side of the whole process in which man lives with his God, in terms of the religio-psychological borderline concept of archetypes.
Within Jungian theory God is no longer an abstraction, but something to which people feel related "in tension" (Hoffman, 1955, p.52). In other words, psychology of religion can be a psychology of interaction and interpersonal relationships with supernatural beings in which not only man but also God and the dialogue between them become objects for analysis. For God is not the projection of a thought or idea onto another person, but he is projected as a person. Therefore he is within the reach of personality theory. In his "Answer to Job" (1954), Jung describes God as a changing, developing Being who learns to respond to one man's exemplary morality.

Undoubtedly there is reason to worry about the solidity of Jung's premises and conclusions, but nevertheless it remains true, to quote Hoffman (1955, p.53) that "his propositions will stand as a watershed between the traditional and the coming psychology of religion".

2.4 Anton Boisen

In his book "The Exploration of the Inner World" (1950), Boisen put a new stamp on psychopathology and religion by placing both in the framework of the life-crisis. Religious experience can best be understood if it is seen in the same order of intensity and depth that attaches to severe mental illness. Both are processes of disorganization and reorganization of personality, of transformation, dealing with Man's potentialities and ultimate loyalties. It seems as if this is a position which places religious experience functionally and experimentally most clearly at the nexus of holistic, integrating tendencies of the organism. In this theoretical framework religion is not an adjuvant to integration - it is integration. It is one way of solving problems, sometimes successfully. Religion and mental illness, and of course by implication also mental health, are to be approached as existential conditions. Specific categories of experience obtain the focus in mental illness and in religion: catastrophe, death and rebirth, the feeling of cosmic importance and of personal responsibility and mission.

Whatever one may think of Boisen's propositions in detail, they do stress a dimension that is much needed in the psychology of religion. The mental-hospital chaplain with special clinical-pastoral training as part of the psychiatric team is chiefly Boisen's creation. His is a unique function, as he represents religion in all its aspects on the psychiatric team and to the patients.
The chaplain comes into contact with persons who have met with utter failure in problem-solving, with or without religion or pseudo-religion, and at times with failure in earlier attempts at religious problem-solving, which has resulted in specific resistances to even the faintest religious allusions. If Boisen's thesis is correct, the chaplain is forced to seek religion in psychopathology; and he finds it sometimes in obvious manifestations of psychopathology of religion, sometimes in seemingly non-religious processes, and at other times nowhere. This has major consequences - while James (1902) and the traditional body of the psychology of religion focused on the more obvious and indisputably religious experience, the chaplain is broadening the range of religious data immensely by including all potentially religious phenomena. The old question was: which are the significant data of religious experience? The new question is: which data of experience are of religious experience?

Boisen's theory is susceptible to many criticisms. These are covered in the relevant section in Chapter 4 on "Religion and Psychopathology".

2.5 The Multidimensionality of Religion-An Integration

In this section an attempted integration of pertinent theories on the psychology of religion will be examined. Capps (1974) argued that origins and solitary experiences may have impressed Freud (1928) and James (1902) as especially vital forms of the religious, but the assumptions underlying their research methods suggest that religion or the religious is multidimensional, feeding into all aspects of human experience. Therefore, if we take seriously these underlying philosophical assumptions, the psychology of religion cannot limit its object of inquiry to origins and solitary experiences - events which have special psychological salience. Rather, its object of investigation is the very unidimensionality of religion which its research methods assume but which its traditional theoretical constructs undermine.

Geertz (1968) proposed that we think about and perceive religion as a system or structure of meaning which is based not on the dichotomization of religion and nonreligion but on the pattern which religion, in spite of its diffuseness, its multiplicity, presents to the observer as he begins to clear away the fog.

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Attempts of this sort have been made by sociologists, anthropologists, historians and psychologists of religion. Capps (1974) has proposed a six-dimensional schema which addresses virtually all of the current research concerns of both Freudian and Jamesian psychologists of religion. These dimensions are:

a. **The Mythological Dimension**
Including both the study of mythical consciousness and specific types of myths.

b. **The Ritual Dimension**
Including both the problems of the ritualization of everyday life and specific religious rituals.

c. **The Dispositional Dimension**
The formal systems of meaning which dispose men to cognize, perceive, and value their lives and the world in consistent ways.

d. **The Social Dimension**
Encompassing the larger social context of which religious organizations are part but whose religious aspect is not exhausted by such organizations.

e. **The Experiential Dimension**
Personal religion as exemplified by experiences, moods, emotions, and aspirations having religious salience.

f. **The Directional Dimension**
Foil to the dispositional dimension, with the latter capturing the element of arranging and structuring systems of meaning and the directional centering on the process of individual and group realization in terms of these systems.

Taken together, these issues reflect a concern for an appropriate balance between past and present contributions to the discipline, for contributions both generic and topical, and for attention to current forms of religion and the religious; thus counterbalancing the traditional tendency of the discipline toward the discovery of primitive forms of religion. The most profound implications of the multidimensional approach centre around the relation of tw or more dimensions to
each other. It is this systematic thrust which is most lacking in the Freudian and Jamesian traditions.

This chapter has attempted to provide the reader with an overview of some of the most important theoretical trends within the psychology of religion. An appreciation of these theories is deemed necessary in order to be able to view the present study within a general historical and theoretical context.
In order to understand the aim and tenets of the present study, it is important to be familiar with the concept of orientations to religion, as defined by Allport and Ross (1967).

Allport and Kramer (1946) discovered that students who claimed no religious affiliation were less likely to be anti-Negro than those who declared themselves to be Protestant or Catholic. Furthermore, students reporting a strong religious influence at home were higher in ethnic prejudice than students reporting only slight or no religious influence. This initiated a series of studies demonstrating that church-goers are more intolerant of ethnic minorities than nonattenders. For example, "The Authoritarian Personality" (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 212) stated that scores on ethnocentricism and authoritarianism are significantly higher among church-attenders than among non-attenders. Gough's (1951) findings were similar, and Kirkpatrick (1949) found religious people in general to be less humanitarian than non-religious people. For example, they had more punitive attitudes toward criminals, delinquents, prostitutes, homosexuals, and those in need of psychiatric treatment.

On the other hand, some researchers such as Schinert and Ford (1958), Rosenblum (1958), and Photiadis and Biggar (1962), have measured intensity of religious practice and frequency of church attendance and have found that frequent attenders stand with the unchurched in lower levels of prejudice, vis-a-vis the irregular attenders. Other researchers, such as Martin and Westie (1959) and Prothro and King (1952), have found no relationship between religiosity and prejudice.

Allport (1959) proposed a distinction between those who are truly devout and those who have not successfully internalized their faith, that is, those who have a more external-social relation to their faith. These two types of religious styles are termed respectively "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" (Allport, 1959). The briefest way to characterize these two poles is to say that the extrinsically motivated person uses his religion, whereas the intrinsically motivated person lives his religion. Allport (1959) points out that most religious people fall upon a continuum between these two poles. One seldom encounters a "pure" case, yet to clarify the dimension
it is helpful to characterize it in terms of the two ideal types.

3.1 Extrinsic Orientation

Persons with this orientation are disposed to use religion for their own ends. Borrowed from axiology, the term itself designates an interest that is held because it serves other, more ultimate interests. Extrinsic values are thus always instrumental and utilitarian. Persons with this orientation may find religion useful in a number of ways, for example to provide security and solace, sociability and distraction, status and self-justification. The embraced creed is lightly held or else selectively shaped to fit more primary needs.

3.2 Intrinsic Orientation

Persons with this orientation find their master motive in religion. Other needs, strong as they may be, are regarded as of less ultimate significance, and they are, so far as possible, brought into harmony with the religious beliefs and prescriptions. Having embraced a creed the individual endeavours to internalize it and follow it fully. It is in this sense that he lives his religion.

Pasquin (1964), in his study of prejudice and religious types in a group of Southern Baptists, reached four conclusions:

a. Contrary to expectation, extrinsic and intrinsic items did not fall on a unidimensional scale but represented two independent dimensions;
b. Only the extrinsic orientation was related to intolerance toward Negroes;
c. Orthodoxy as such was not related to the extrinsic or intrinsic orientation;
d. Greater orthodoxy did, however, relate positively to prejudice.

Thus the intrinsic-extrinsic concept went a long way toward clarifying and explaining the earlier contradictory studies which had attempted to relate prejudice to religion as a unitary concept. It can therefore be assumed that the inner experience of religion, or what it means to the individual, is an important causal factor in developing a tolerant or a prejudiced outlook on life.
The psychological tie between the intrinsic orientation and tolerance, and between the extrinsic orientation and prejudice, has been discussed by Allport (1966). Briefly the argument holds that a person with an extrinsic orientation is using his religious views to provide security, comfort, status, or social support for himself - religion is not a value in its own right, it serves other needs, and it is a purely utilitarian formulation. Prejudice is also a "useful" formulation - it too provides security, comfort, status, and social support. A life that is dependent on the supports of extrinsic religion is likely to be dependent on the supports of prejudice, hence the positive correlations between the extrinsic orientation and intolerance.

However, the intrinsic religious orientation is not instrumental. It is not a mere mode of conformity, nor a crutch, nor a tranquilizer, nor a bid for status. All needs are subordinated to an overarching religious commitment. In internalizing the total creed of his religion the individual internalizes it's values of humility, compassion, and love of one's neighbour. In such a life, there is no place for rejection, contempt, or condescension towards one's fellow man.

Allport and Ross (1967) went on to refine this formulation by introducing the category of indiscriminately proreligious to refer to those people who agree with all of the statements pertaining to religion in the Religious Orientation Inventory (Allport and Ross, 1967). In this study they found that churchgoers who are indiscriminately proreligious are more prejudiced than the consistently extrinsic, and very much more prejudiced than the consistently intrinsic types. This is explained in terms of a common cognitive style - undifferentiated thinking. Allport and Ross (1967) hypothesize that people with undifferentiated styles of thinking are insecure in a world that mostly demands fine and accurate distinctions. The resulting diffuse anxiety may well dispose them to latch onto religion and to distrust strange ethnic groups.

The above research implies that social scientists who employ the variable "religion" should keep in mind the crucial distinction between religious attitudes that are intrinsic, extrinsic, and indiscriminately proreligious. To know that a person is religious is not as important as to know what role religion plays in the economy of his life. This warning was recently restated by Sevensky (1984) who noted that since Allport and
Ross (1967), many researchers have continued to neglect this differentiation. The present study is based on the premise that this very differentiation will enhance a clearer understanding of the relationship between religious commitment and mental health.

3.3 Personality Correlates of Religious Orientations

Several researchers have investigated the personality variables associated with the four kinds of religious orientation. Hatemy (1973) in a study of 275 university students, found that the intrinsically religious tended to be persons who were trusting, positive in their concept of self and others and intelligent and insightful. They tended to assume responsibilities and to work hard at a task until it was completed. They tended to be concerned with interpersonal relationships, to conform to social custom, and to be willing to control their impulses out of regard for others. Generally, they tended to be the most mature among the orientations.

The indiscriminately proreligious tended to be persons who were trusting, conforming, cooperative and conscientious, but they seemed to be rule-bound, low in self-confidence, and not given to an abstract approach to experience. They seemed to have failed to mature beyond levels of dependency.

The extrinsically religious tended to be persons who were suspicious, evasive of responsibility, low in self-confidence, competitive, and assertive. They appeared to be self-aggrandizing persons who were likely to have difficulty in interpersonal relationships. There were hints that they might be less secure than those in the other orientations.

The nonreligious members of the student sample tended to be persons who were suspicious, autonomous, unconventional, aggressive, and competitive. They tended to act out their impulses and disregard rules. Interpersonal alienation was implied by their lack of regard for responsibilities to others and by their self-centeredness associated with some of their personal characteristics.

* The fourth category is "nonreligious".
These results were supported by those of Wiebe and Fleck (1980). In a study of 158 male and female Canadian university students between the age of 17 and 22 years, Wiebe and Fleck (1980) applied Allport and Ross's "Religiosity Scale" (Allport and Ross, 1967) and Cattell's "Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire" (Cattell, Eber and Tatsuoka, 1970) to examine the personality profiles of the different religious orientations. They found that intrinsically religious subjects tended to have a greater concern for moral standards, conscientiousness, discipline, responsibility, and consistency than those with other orientations. Intrinsically religious subjects also appeared to be more sensitive, dependent, empathetic, and open to their emotions. In addition, they tended to reflect more conservative and traditional attitudes. The authors note that although these characteristics have positive features, they can degenerate into pathological rigidity which might lead to a neurotic style of living, such as obsessive compulsivity.

Extrinsically religious and nonreligious subjects seemed to reflect greater self-indulgence, indolence, and undependability. They tended to be more sceptical, flexible, self-reliant, pragmatic, and less sentimental. They also seemed to be more innovative, analytical, and free-thinking. They tended to be less rigid, and the authors suggest that this tendency may decrease their propensity towards pathology. According to Wiebe and Fleck (1980), their flexibility may make them more adaptive to experiencing a conflict-free living environment and thereby reduce their susceptibility to neurotic patterns of thought and behaviour.

The findings of the above two studies were in conflict with those of Morgan (1977), who investigated the influence of religion on the coping methods of a group of five young adults. The specific purpose of the study was to examine the religious orientation of each subject, and to study its effect on his or her coping strategy. The results of this study failed to support the hypothesis that one who is oriented intrinsically to his faith will cope more effectively than one who is not. However, the validity of this study must be questioned in view of the fact that only five subjects were used. Further support for the importance of looking at orientations to religion rather than at religion as a unitary concept was provided by Baither and Saltzberg (1978). They examined the relationship between religious attitude and rational thinking, using scores on the Religious Orientation Scale (Faigin, 1964) and the Self-rating Scale for Rationality (Bard, 1973) from 144
college freshmen. The results showed that those oriented extrinsically to religion were less rational. According to Baither and Salzberg (1978, p.854) this implies that "religion itself is not necessarily irrational but is dependent on the individual's attitudes towards religion".

Allport (1966) states that in contrast to the extrinsic orientation which plays an instrumental role only, the intrinsic orientation "floods the whole life with motivation and meaning" (p.450). Bolt (1975) conducted a study to test the hypothesis that the intrinsic experiences a significantly higher sense of meaning than does the extrinsic. Fifty-two undergraduate psychology students served as subjects and were assessed on the Religious Orientation Scale (Allport and Ross, 1967) and the Purpose-in-Life Test (Crumbaugh and Maholick, 1969). The results indicate that intrinsics and extrinsics differ significantly in the extent to which they have found meaningful goals around which to organize their lives. A significantly higher sense of purpose or meaning is experienced by those individuals demonstrating an intrinsic orientation than by those with an extrinsic orientation. This study is therefore consistent with the majority of research (Hamby, 1973; Wiebe & Fleck, 1980; Baither & Salzberg, 1978) which indicates that people with an intrinsic orientation are psychologically healthier in the broad sense of the term.

Several researchers (e.g. Brown, 1964; Bolt, 1975) have suggested that the Intrinsic-Extrinsic distinction may refer not only to differences in religious behaviours or orientations but may reflect basic personality differences. Bolt's study (1975) suggests that the extrinsic whose religion plays an instrumental role does not find a compensating sense of purpose or meaning in the pursuit of secular goals or values. The Intrinsic-Extrinsic concept does seem to reflect basic differences in orientation to the ultimate meanings of life, with extrinsics more likely to experience what Frankl (1959) terms "existential frustration" than intrinsics. Frankl's thesis (1959) that man ultimately finds meaning through self-transcendence may explain why the extrinsic orientation, which according to Hunt and King (1971) is best operationalized as a selfish, instrumental approach to religion, is associated with a significantly lower sense of purpose or meaning in life.
In summary, this section has outlined the concept of religious orientation as proposed by Allport and Ross (1967). It has also been demonstrated that research conducted indicates a definite trend of negative personality characteristics being associated with extrinsic orientation, and positive personality characteristics associated with intrinsic orientation.
Thus far I have outlined general theories on the psychology of religion, the development of the concept of religious orientation, and research into the relationship between religious orientation and personality variables. In this section I will discuss both theory and research relating to the more specific relationship between religion and psychopathology. This will lead up to the specific issue which the present study examines.

Religion and psychopathology are not infrequently found together. Religious preoccupation in incipient psychosis is well known, and religious ideas may also be interwoven with neurosis. Walters (1964) cautions that this occasional mingling of religion and psychopathology makes it important for the psychologist or psychiatrist to be able to differentiate between the normal and the pathological in religious expression. Similarly, Sevansky (1984) states that one should not consider religion and religious concerns as, in and of themselves, evidence of psychopathology. Precisely such a tendency has been present in psychology, however, since it sought its disciplinary and methodological independence from religion.

James (1902) showed no interest in differentiating between normal and pathological in religious expression. In the process of breaking down religious experience to determine its essential components, he made no effort to screen out the atypical and bizarre to eliminate the influence of psychopathology upon the final result. Instead, he took as his major premise, "if there were such a thing as inspiration from a higher realm, it might well be that neurotic temperament would furnish the chief condition of the requisite receptivity" (p. 25). The essence of religious experience, he insists, is most prominent in those which are most one-sided, exaggerated and intense (p. 45).

This selective bias which granted a higher order of authenticity to the more extreme forms of religious expression sprinkled James's pages with psychopathology. James's logic was sound up to the point of selecting his data. Since religion reports what claim to be facts, it is only proper to examine the evidence. The objective truth of the experience will hinge upon the reliability
of the reports. At this point James begged the question of reliable reporting by enunciating the premise that psychopathology enhances capacity for religious insight and interpretative authority.

The indiscriminate mingling of reports of religious experience tainted by psychopathology with the experiences of normal persons has tended to stigmatize the whole as pathological. James himself foresaw the possible consequence when he recognized that in using extreme examples "we may thereby swamp the thing in the wholesale condemnation which we pass on its inferior congener" (p. 22).

The terms 'sick soul' and 'healthy-minded' coined by James (1902) at first appear to designate categories signifying the presence or absence of psychopathology in religious experience, and have come to be used extensively in this way. However, Walters (1964) suggests that those who use the terms to convey such meaning have stopped short of James's intention. As his thesis develops, James (1902) acknowledges at length that these categories are somewhat ideal abstractions that do not exist in fact. 'The concrete human beings whom we oftentimes meet,' he recognized, 'are intermediate varieties and mixtures' (p. 167).

Freud (1928; 1955) clearly was also largely responsible for the tendency to view religion in itself as evidence of psychopathology. His conclusions about religion, as discussed in chapter 2 of the present study, were based more upon speculation and theory than empirical observation. His first paper on religion (1913) drew an analogy between obsessional neurosis and religious practices. The description of obsessional neurosis is clearly based upon empirical observation, but the constricted concept of religion reflects Freud's unfamiliarity with its nature. According to Sevensky (1984), the result is a distorted analogy, only one side of which is grounded in acquaintance with the subject.

In 1907 Freud wrote, 'An insight into the origin of neurotic ceremonial may embolden us to draw by analogy inferences about the psychological processes of religious life' (p. 25 of 1924 edn.). At the end of the same paper, by an even bolder analogical speculation, he writes, '....one might venture to regard the obsessional neurosis as a pathological counterpart to the formation of a religion, to describe the neurosis as a private religious system, and religion as a universal obsessional neurosis' (p. 34). In 1923 Freud wrote, 'the true believer is in a high degree protected against the
danger of certain neurotic affiliations, by accepting the
universal neurosis he is spared the task of forming a
personal neurosis' (p. 19). The bold analogy of 1907
became an unqualified assertion in 1928 and by 1960 was
considered an established relationship, empirically
based: 'It was clinical experience that led Freud to see
the dynamic relation between neurotic and religious
phenomena' (Psychiatry and Religion, 1960, p. 358).

According to Walters (1964), many analysts have expressed
agreement with Freud's declaration that his philosophical
views on religion were not bound to the clinical data and
conclusions of psychoanalysis. Nevertheless,
Ginsberg (1953) commented that many psychiatrists and
psychoanalysts believe that religious acts express
neurotic helplessness and sick dependence, inevitably
resulting in warped attitudes and crippling experiences.
Zilboorg (1962) stated that most Freudian psychoanalysts
look upon atheism as an earmark of scientific
superiority, and upon religious worship as something left
over from primitive magic and animism. Sevensky (1984)
cautions that although psychoanalytic psychiatry is still
proposing to learn more about the psychology of religion
from its patients, clarification is needed as to what an
analyst with these presuppositions can bring from
pathological personalities to a normative psychology of
religion.

4.1 Religious concern in Schizophrenia

In discussing religion and psychopathology, it is
important not only to consider religious belief and
practice as a manifestation of psychopathology, but also
to consider religious symptoms in psychosis. Linn and
Schwartz (1958) have written that 'Resemblances between
the onset of acute schizophrenia and religious experience
are almost a byword' (pp. 206-7). In support of this
comment they refer to the writings of Boisen (1950) as
being 'of the first importance' (1958, p. 207).

Boisen (1936), who himself suffered from schizophrenia,
formulated the hypothesis that psychosis is a religious
process in which the disturbed person is trying to
assimilate some aspect of ultimate life philosophy. The
central theme running through all of Boisen's
writings (1950, 1954, 1960) is that psychosis is a
potentially constructive, essentially religious process.
However, Boisen's view of schizophrenia as a religious
process that may contribute towards an understanding of
the psychology of religion begs the question of whether
the religious experience of a psychotic is commensurable
with that of normal persons, and whether the individual
with abnormal perception and thought processes may give a reliable account of reality. Boisen's approach not only assumes that the psychotic shares a common ground of religious experience with normal people but also that schizophrenic reports of religious reality are trust-worthy, and that they may enlarge the religious understanding of normal persons. Since the reality testing of most schizophrenics is not reliable (American Psychiatric Association, 1980), there is no reason to consider their religious observations any more valid than their other reports of reality.

Initial research on this issue tended not to support Boisen's theoretical views. For example, Lowe (1953) studied a series of patients with religious delusions and concluded that religious preoccupation was an aftermath of severe personality disturbance, not its cause, and represented severe anxiety rather than truly religious mystical experience.

Bleuler (1950) further illuminated the issue when he found that schizophrenics with a previous religious inclination tended to have religious delusions, and doubted whether such delusions ever appear in those without previous religious interest. The idea that religious symptoms in schizophrenia are the consequence of premorbid religious concern is in fact supported by Boisen's own life history. In his autobiography (1960) he traces clearly the strong religious influence of his family and early environment.

4.2 Religion in a Context of Health

The psychology of religion has become preoccupied with psychopathology. Clinical pastoral training has been permeated extensively by psychoanalytic psychology and has been strongly influenced by the view of its founder (Boisen, 1950), that schizophrenia is a religious process. When James (1902) enlarged religious experience to include pathology, and Freud (1928; 1955) extended psychopathology to include religion, the boundaries between normal and pathological were subsumed in the process. Consequently, the psychology of religion has come to appear as a melange of health and disease without reliable criteria to tell which is which.

Various ideas have been expressed on this differentiation. According to Walters (1964), no such dilemma exists, as both psychoanalytic and operational criteria have been offered. Kubie (1954) holds the view that behavior is neurotic when the unconscious dominates and is normal when the conscious-preconscious alliance is dominant. Redlich (1952) states that the
extremely abnormal, both psychotic and severely neurotic, can usually be recognized by both lay and expert. He proposes the social agreement that leads to psychiatric treatment as an operational approach to the concept of normality, whether it comes through external pressure or voluntary private arrangement.

It is true that the normal is not likely to be seen in the consulting room. Psychoanalysis has always been vulnerable to the criticism that its observations and inferences are made upon 'sick' persons who are paying for treatment. The heuristic role of the analyst has always been limited by the psychopathology of the patient and the expectation of improvement implied by the treatment contract. Observations upon religion made in the one-to-one relationship are subject to distortion by the analyst himself, as well as by the psychopathology of the patient. The factors that make for health and stability in personality should be studied in the healthy and stable where they are operative, not in the sick where they are absent or inoperative. It is for this reason that the subjects in the present study have been drawn from a normal, and not a psychiatric population.

Unfortunately many psychiatrists who have submitted without protest to the mandatory act of faith in Freudian principles required for initiation into psychoanalysis, have rejected any religious affirmation of faith or refuse any formal affiliation with the church(Walters,1962). By this disaffection, psychiatrists who are frequently obliged to make authoritative discrimination between normal and pathological religious elements in personality are shut off from a comparable acquaintance with religion in its constructive and wholesome expression in normal persons.

4.3 Research

Having discussed some of the major theoretical arguments, I will in this section review research which has attempted to relate religiousness and various aspects of mental health.

Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi(1975), in a discussion of the relationship between religion and mental disorder, concluded that the empirical evidence available up to that point in time offered little support for the hypothesis that religion ever causes mental disorders or that religion prevents such disorders. This review(Argyle, & Beit-Hallahmi,1975) reported mixed results, with some studies finding a positive
relationship, some a negative relationship, and some none at all between religiousness and mental health.

For example Brown and Lowe (1951), Bender (1958), and Stanley (1964), produced results which suggest that religion is associated with greater personal stability and adjustment. On the other hand Cowen (1954), Roberts (1965) and Wilson and Miller (1968) found that religion is associated with lower self-esteem, greater anxiety, and higher neuroticism. Meanwhile Lantz (1949), Funk (1955) and Brown (1962) found no significant correlation in either direction.

In another review of empirical studies on religion, mental health, and personality, Sanua (1969) concluded that at that point in time all that could be said was that a substantial number of additional empirical findings would be necessary before any valid conclusions could be drawn as to the relationship between religiousness and mental health. Thus it can be seen that an entire decade of research had failed to illuminate any further the relationship in question.

It is my belief that these researchers have made the mistake of considering religion as a unitary concept. They have neglected the concept of religious orientations, as defined by Allport and Ross (1967) and have thereby confined their concerns to whether a person is religious rather than to how a person is religious. It is a central contention of the present study that this very differentiation is crucial if the relationship in question is to be at all further illuminated.

Although much research addressed to the relationship between religion and mental health has been generated within the decade-and-a-half since then, recent results as a whole are just as inconclusive. A more detailed review of these studies follows.

As in previous research, some studies indicated a largely positive relationship between religion and mental health. For example, Wilson (1977) conducted a longitudinal field study evaluating personality, value, attitude, and cognitive characteristics and change by teenage Christian converts against the background of two southern Christian populations and unbelieving youth. Developmentally, converts increased in self-sufficiency, introversion, future optimism and shrewd dogmatism. Conversion effected greater seriousness, and personality-attitude reorientation opposite to unbelievers - converts increased in mental health. Neither brainwashable predispositions nor brain-washing personality changes were found in converts. These
results therefore undermine the psychoanalytic-mental-illness theory of religious experience.

Similarly positive results of conversion have been found by Bragan(1977). In a phenomenological analysis of a therapy case presentation, Bragan(1977) investigated the psychological gains and losses of religious conversion. He found that the conversion experience of a 25 year old male student-minister resulted in a sense of identity and personal strength which could be used for considerable personal growth. The sense of being a Christian was an individualistic one and one that initially received sufficient social confirmation, although as time went by the absence of continuing confirmation proved critical. However, at the same time there were some negative results conversion resulted in the rejection and repression of libidinal needs and a firm control of anger. According to Bragan(1977), these considerable losses so affected personal relatedness as to eventually lead to breakdown of adjustment. Bragan(1977) suggests that religious conversion may need to be followed by a therapeutic experience if such rigidity and repressions are to be overcome. Bragan's findings might be accurate, but the generalizability of these findings must be questioned on the basis of the single case study design.

Mixed findings have also been produced by Stones(1980a & b). In a study of the Jesus People in South Africa, Stones(1980a) hypothesized that the conversion experience and subsequent integration into the movement would bring about a perceived decrease in self-actualization as a function of adherence to group norms. The twenty two subjects were Jesus People who had been living communally for at least three months, while the control group consisted of twenty two established denominational members who had not undergone a rapid and emotional conversion but were being exposed to institutional religious experiences as had members of the Jesus movement prior to their conversion. Subjects were matched for age, sex, home-language, and occupation of father.

In groups of not more than five each, subjects completed the Personal Orientation Inventory(Shostrom, 1960) to reflect (a) their present attitudes and (b) their previous attitudes if they felt they had changed at any time in the past five years. To counter effects of order, half completed the inventory in each of the two possible orders.
Methodologically, this design can be criticized for relying on subjects' subjective memories to determine the extent of change. However, Stones (1980a) justifies this design by claiming that it was not feasible to administer the inventory before and after conversion since it was difficult to predict who would undergo such an experience.

In the pre-conversion condition, the Jesus People's self-perceptions as measured by the support scale of the PCI, were significantly more self-actualizing than were those of the control group, while in the post-conversion condition there was no significant difference between groups. The perceived self-actualization of the Jesus People therefore decreased as a function of their religious experience. However, they perceived themselves as having become significantly more secure than they were prior to their conversion experience, while the members of the control group did not indicate such changes in their feelings of security. Stones (1980a) cautions that the reported changes may well be the effect of rising expectations.

In another study, Stones (1980b) examined the hypothesis that membership of small religious communities relieves the lack of meaning and personal identity characteristic of contemporary mass society. Four religious communities in Johannesburg - the Jesus People, the Hare Krishna devotees, the Maharaj Ji Premies and a Catholic Priest community - were given the Purpose-in-Life (PIL) Test (Crumbaugh & Maholick, 1969) together with its complementary scale Seeking-of-Noetic-Goals (SONG) Test - and Allport and Ross' (1967) Religious Orientation Scale (ROS) were administered. The PIL - test measures the degree of meaning in life which a subject has found while the SONG - test measures the strength of motivation to find meaning.

The tests were administered to subjects when they first joined the community and again after they had been members for a continuous period of four months. Any possible changes in meaning in life and religious orientation, due to maturation, life experiences and general social change were corrected for by the use of a non-equivalent control-group design.

Analysis of the data confirmed the hypothesis that as a function of integration into any one of these groups, individuals' lives take on greater meaning and purpose and that the motivation to seek meaning decreases.

... therefore clear from the results examined thus far that religious commitment as a unitary concept is
associated with both positive and negative psychological consequences. At this stage it is therefore not possible to make any clear statement regarding the nature of the relationship between religious commitment and mental health.

Some researchers have examined the psychological consequences of certain specific aspects of religion, rather than simply of religious commitment in itself. For example, Griffith and Mahy (1984) studied the West Indian Spiritual Baptist ceremony of mourning, which involves prayer, fasting, and the experiencing of dreams while in isolation. Mourners revealed six psychological benefits of the practice: relief of depressed mood; attainment of the ability to foresee and avoid danger; improvement of decision-making ability; heightened ability to communicate with God and to meditate; a clearer appreciation of their racial origins; identification with church hierarchy, and physical cures. Griffith and Mahy (1984) conclude that mourning appears to be a viable psychotherapeutic practice for these church members. This research therefore indicates positive psychological consequences of a specified aspect of religious involvement.

Another aspect of religious commitment that has been examined is that of religious counselling. Charpentier (1978) studied the personal growth and religious experience of participants in a church-related counselling centre. He found that a significant number of respondents indicated a potential for the churches to contribute to the personal growth of their constituents. He concludes that the churches should remain faithful to their spiritual heritage of proclaiming the "Good News", and states that "such activity has a profoundly therapeutic dimension" (p.1646). Thus, two aspects of religious activity - mourning (Griffiths & Mahy, 1984) and counselling (Charpentier, 1978) - have been found to have positive psychological consequences.

Similar results have been found in relation to religious activity in general. Ness and Wintrob (1980) assessed the relationship between religious activity within a Pentecostal congregation and the emotional status of the congregants. The Cornell Medical Index, which records the number and types of complaints related to physical and psychological functioning, was administered to all members of a Newfoundland Pentecostal church 13 months after observation of religious behaviour was initiated. The focus of this observation, which continued for one year, was the distinctive set of religious behaviours encouraged by the Pentecostal church: glossolalia, testimonials, seeking possession by the Holy Spirit,
requesting ritual healing, helping at the altar, and consistent attendance. The results indicated that the more frequently people engaged in these religious activities, the less likely they were to report symptoms of emotional distress.

Similarly positive results have been found with different denominational groups. In a study of twelve middle-class Catholic samples from cities in five different cultures, Smith, Weigert and Thomas (1979) found a definite tendency for religiously oriented adolescents, in the traditional mode, to have a positive sense of self-esteem. Similarly, in a psychological study of conversion and membership in the Unification Church,* Galanter, Rabkin, Rabkin and Deutsch (1979) found an improved emotional state on a 216-item structured questionnaire in 237 respondents following conversion.

However, not all of the research has yielded results which indicate such a positive relationship between religion and mental health. Indeed, some studies have reported results which seem to contradict those reviewed thus far.

Hjelle (1975) conducted a study which examined the specific hypothesis that self-actualization is negatively associated with reported frequency of active involvement in religious activities. A group of 63 male undergraduates enrolled in a Catholic coeducational institution indicated the extent of their involvement in religious activities and completed Shostrom's POI (Shostrom, 1974). Results indicated substantial support for the hypothesis. Nine of the 12 POI subscales were significantly correlated with the religious participation index in the predicted direction. Correlations significant at or beyond the .01 level of confidence were with Inner Directed (-.31), Feeling Reactivity (-.36), Self-Acceptance (-.31), and Capacity for Intimate Contact (-.46). Self-Actualizing Value (-.29), Existentiality (-.30), Spontaneity (-.29), Self-Regard (-.24), and Acceptance of Aggression (-.30) are significant at or beyond the .05 level. These findings yield compelling support for the hypothesis that self-actualization is inversely related to active involvement in religious activities.

Hjelle (1975) grounds these findings in a useful theoretical explanation. He argues that young people who are drawn towards and display an active involvement in religious activities are, in terms of emerging

* Popularly referred to as "The Mooneyes".
psychological traits, reinforced for manifesting such behaviours as compliance, subservience, and deference to authority - behavioural attributes that are clearly antithetical to Maslow's (1970) depiction of the self-actualizing individual. Conversely, young people who have disengaged themselves from active involvement in religious activities are autonomous and self-reliant, and are more prone to utilize their own internal norms as a basis for constructing a meaningful lifestyle.

This study can be criticized for the limited nature of its sample, which consisted exclusively of college-aged Catholic males. The effects of age, denomination and sex therefore remain unexamined.

In a similar study but with a slightly broader sample-consisting of Protestants of either sex and of any adult age, Hittle(1977) found that religious fundamentalism was negatively correlated with self-actualization. This suggests, therefore, that the limited nature of Hjelle's(1975) sample may not have had a significant effect on the final results of his study.

Some researchers have examined the relationship between religiosity and more specific aspects of mental health. For example, both Thyer, Kramer, Walker and Papsdorf(1981), as well as Baither and Saltzberg(1978) have examined the relationship between religiosity and rational thinking. According to Thyer et al(1981) previous research has shown that irrational thinking is associated with psychological dysfunction such as increased levels of state and trait anxiety, depression, hopelessness, and hostility. In a test of the hypothesis that religious values are related to the rationality of one's beliefs, Thyer et al(1981) administered a measure of religious orthodoxy in conjunction with the Rational Behaviour Inventory to 80 college students. The sample of 44 males and 36 females had a mean age of 23 years. The results of the study indicated that a high level of religious orthodoxy is associated with greater irrationality regarding personal and attributed feelings of guilt. Baither and Saltzberg(1978) provided a more refined analysis of this relationship and found that for 81 male and 63 female college students, extrinsically oriented subjects were less rational than intrinsically oriented ones. This may suggest that religion itself is not necessarily irrational but is dependent on the individuals' attitudes toward religion.
The relationship between religiosity and personality functioning has also been investigated. Simmonds (1977) conducted a study designed to provide descriptive personality data on a group of members of the Jesus Movement in the USA. A lengthy questionnaire and three personality tests, the Adjective Check List, the State-trait Anxiety Inventory, and the Crowne-Marlowe Scale of Social Desirability, were used to assess the demographic and personality characteristics of group members. The main focus of analysis of the personality data was on the comparison of personality results from this religious group with those of a normative sample.

It was found that in comparison to a normative sample converts to the Jesus Movement in America revealed personality profiles which could be generally described as "maladaptive". More specifically, 96 members of this religious group scored significantly higher on the variables of unfavourable adjectives checked, succorance, abasement, counselling-readiness, and trait anxiety. The religious sample's scores were significantly lower on the variables of defensiveness, favourable adjectives checked, self-confidence, self-control, personal adjustment, achievement, dominance, endurance, order, introspection, affiliation, hetero-sexuality, and change.

Simmonds (1977) claims that this maladaptive pattern is consistent with previous research which has shown dependency patterns among the religious. Bolstered by the fact that a large majority of these converts reported unhappiness, difficulties in life and heavy use of drugs prior to conversion, variables which were discovered to be nonexistent after conversion, the notion of a switching of dependencies from other sources of gratification to a rigid religious belief system is suggested. Thus far I have reviewed studies that have found either a positive or a negative relationship between religiosity and mental health. Some other studies have found no particular relationship in either direction.

Panella (1977) examined the relationship between self-actualization and the degree of religiousness in a person's life. He postulated that self-actualizing people could be found in a population who claim to be religious to about the same extent as that found in the population in general. The results of this study seemed to confirm this hypothesis - Panella (1977) found no meaningful correlation between self-actualization and a person's religiousness. Bradford (1978) attempted to determine whether or not there are differences in the degree and type of mental abnormality between different
religious orientations. The results indicated that the intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations were not significantly different on any of the MMPI scales. Hoover (1977) found no relationships between religious activity and marital adjustment, nor between self-actualization and religious activity. This supported the results produced by Panella (1977), above. A similar conclusion was reached by Larsen (1979) who found that high and low self-actualizers alike have religious experiences, and that such experiences cannot inherently be viewed as either symptoms of pathology or as evidence of positive mental health.

In summary, the research conducted thus far into the relationship between religion and mental health has yielded three broad groups of results: those that indicate a positive relationship, those that indicate a negative relationship, and those that indicate no relationship at all between religion and mental health.

One noticeable aspect of all of the studies on religion and mental health that have been reviewed, with the exception of Baither and Saltzberg (1978) and Bradford (1978), is that they have all treated religion as a unitary concept. Only the latter two studies have utilized the concept of religious orientation, as proposed by Allport and Ross (1967). It is my contention that this tendency to treat religion as a unitary concept has prevented previous researchers from achieving consistent results with respect to the relationship between religion and mental health. The aim of the present study is to determine whether religious orientation will significantly affect personal adjustment.

A central assumption of the aim is that for the purposes of research it is more fruitful to consider how a person is religious rather than simply whether he or she is religious. This differentiation is reflected in Allport’s conceptualization of intrinsic, extrinsic, and indiscriminately proreligious orientations (Allport & Ross, 1967); therefore these conceptual tools are utilized in the present study.

With respect to the concept of personal adjustment, as used in the formulation of the aim of this study, it was noted in Chapter 1 that “personal adjustment” refers to the humanistic concept of the extent of psychological development. The reason for taking this conceptual stance is that the present study is an attempt to examine the role of religious orientation in normal, healthy psychological development rather than in psychiatrically classifiable mental illness.
This notion of normal psychological development seems to be epitomised by Maslow's humanistic theory of self-actualization (1970). This theory historically represented a shift in focus away from the negative, pathological emphasis on human nature, as popularised by psychoanalysis, towards healthy human functioning (Wertheimer, 1979). The underlying assumption of this theoretical approach to human nature is that people are basically good and worthy of respect, and that they will move towards a realisation of their potentialities if environmental conditions are right. Within this framework then, self-actualization refers to a process of growth, or striving towards an ideal psychological state of mental health. Although this process obviously occurs along a developmental continuum (Maslow, 1970), the fully self-actualized person can be said to have attained such an ideal state of mental health. This can only be achieved after the person has satisfied the hierarchically arranged physiological needs, safety needs, belongingness and love needs, and self-esteem needs.

In view of this conceptual framework, the present study attempts to determine to what extent this developmental process is a function of religious orientation. In other words, how does a person's intrinsic or extrinsic religious orientation affect his level of self-actualization? The research studies on personality correlates of religious orientation, which were reviewed in Chapter 3.3, demonstrate a clear trend of negative personality characteristics being associated with extrinsic orientation, and positive personality characteristics associated with intrinsic orientation. In view of this trend, my hypothesis is that extrinsically oriented people will tend to be significantly less self-actualized than intrinsically oriented people, as reflected on the Personal Orientation Inventory (Shostrom, 1980). This inventory "...provides an objective delineation of the level of the client's mental health..." (Shostrom, 1980, p. 4), and thus seems to be well suited to answer the research question addressed by the present study.

In view of this approach, the terms "personal adjustment" "self-actualization", and "mental health" as utilized in the present study, should be regarded as synonyms for the same psychological process.
5. METHOD

5.1 Questionnaire

The questionnaire consists of three sections (See Appendix). The first section consists of questions relating to age, sex, marital status, educational level, religious denomination, and occupation. The second and third sections consist of Allport and Ross's (1967) Religious Orientation Scale (ROS) and Shostron's (1968) Personal Orientation Inventory (POI) respectively.

The Religious Orientation Scale was used as a measure of religious orientation. This scale was developed jointly by members of a seminar at Harvard, and has been reported separately by Paeglin (1964) and Allport and Ross (1967).

The 21 items are scored from 1 to 5, with 4 or 5 indicating an extrinsic orientation, 1 or 2 an intrinsic orientation, and 3 being assigned to omitted items. The total score is simply the sum of the 21 item scores. Although one can thus obtain a single total score, Paeglin (1964) and Allport and Ross (1967) recommended scoring the intrinsic and extrinsic subscales separately, because they found that for many respondents they appeared to be independent. Paeglin (1964) found that item-to-scale correlations ranged from .22 to .54 when the whole scale was given one score. The latter author noticed that some items were intercorrelating well while others were not, and so performed a factor analysis. Two orthogonal factors emerged, representing intrinsic (18% of variance) and extrinsic (11% of variance) dimensions.

When these were considered as subscales, item-to-subscale correlations ranging from .48 to .71 were obtained for the top six items on each factor. Allport & Ross (1967) found item-to-subscale correlations ranging from .18 to .58. They also found that some people, labelled indiscriminately pro-religious, tended to endorse both extrinsic and intrinsic items. These people are those who on the intrinsic subscale score at least 12 points less than on the extrinsic subscale.
Shostrom's POI (1968) was used as a measure of self-actualization. According to Robinson and Shaver (1973), this scale seems to have a place as the measure of self-actualization in the literature. The questionnaire consists of 150 items in which the subject is posed with two different statements about himself, and he is asked to choose the one which most accurately describes himself. These questions are then scored to provide a profile on 14 subscales.

The first four subscales - Time Competence/Incompetence and Inner/Outer Directed - can be combined to give two ratio scores. However, Shostrom (1980) recommends that for statistical analyses, scores from the separate scales be used in preference to the ratio scores. This study follows that recommendation.

A brief description of the subscales is shown in Figure 5.1 for reference purposes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subscale</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TIME INCOMPETENCE/COMPETENCE</td>
<td>Ti</td>
<td>Degree to which one is &quot;present&quot; oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUTER/INNER DIRECTED</td>
<td>OI</td>
<td>Whether reactivity orientation is basically towards others or self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELF-ACTUALIZING VALUE</td>
<td>SAV</td>
<td>Affirmation of primary values of self-actualizing persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXISTENTIALITY</td>
<td>Ex</td>
<td>Ability to situationally or existentially react without rigid adherence to principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEELING REACTIVITY</td>
<td>Fr</td>
<td>Sensitivity of response to one's own needs and feelings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPONTANEITY</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Freedom to react spontaneously or to be oneself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELF REGARD</td>
<td>Sr</td>
<td>Affirmation of self because of worth or strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELF ACCEPTANCE</td>
<td>Sa</td>
<td>Affirmation or acceptance of self in spite of weaknesses or deficiencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATURE OF MAN</td>
<td>Nc</td>
<td>Degree of constructive view of the nature of man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYNERGY</td>
<td>Sy</td>
<td>Ability to transcend dichotomies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCEPTANCE OF AGGRESSION</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Ability to accept one's own aggressiveness as opposed to defensiveness, denial and repression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPACITY FOR INTIMATE CONTACT</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Ability to develop contactful intimate relationships with other people, unencumbered by expectations and obligations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 5.1**: Subscale descriptions for the POI (Shostrom, 1980)
Numerous studies have demonstrated the Pol to have acceptable reliability and validity. Shostrom (1980) demonstrated that the POI significantly discriminates between clinically judged self-actualizing and non-self-actualizing groups. Another study in a clinical setting involving a criterion group was reported by F. Knapp and Michael (1968). The POI was administered to a group of 100 hospitalized psychiatric patients. All scales significantly differentiated the hospitalized sample from the nominated self-actualizing sample and from the normal adult sample. Both Robinson and Shaver (1973) and Shostrom (1980) report that studies completed subsequent to these initial, critical studies have supported the validity of the POI as a measure of self-actualization.

Shostrom (1980) reports that test-retest reliability coefficients have been obtained for POI scales based on a sample of 48 undergraduate students. The inventory was administered twice, a week apart, to the sample with the instruction that it was part of the experiment to take the inventory twice. Reliability coefficients for the major scales of Time Competence and Inner-Diretion are .71 and .77 respectively, while coefficients for the subscales range from .52 to .82. According to Shostrom (1980), these correlations are at a level commensurate with other personality inventories.

5.2 Procedure

Batches of the questionnaire together with a covering letter and a postage-paid return envelope were given out to Ministers or members of various churches in and around Johannesburg and Pretoria. They were in turn asked to distribute the questionnaires to interested members of their congregations.

A total of nine-hundred questionnaires were given out, while two hundred and forty-four were returned. This represents a return rate of 27.11%. However, of these thirteen were considered unsuitable for analysis because too many questions had been omitted. Therefore, two hundred and thirty-one subjects constitute the sample in consideration.
6. RESULTS

6.1 Description of the Population Sample

In order to provide a descriptive overview of the subjects, the composition of the sample in terms of scatter across the variables of age, sex, marital status, educational level, religious denomination and occupation follows. Chi-square tests were conducted to determine the significance of the differences in the observed frequencies across the variables.

6.1.1 Age

Subjects were classified into the following age-groups in order to facilitate a quick descriptive overview of the sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE GROUP</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Z</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&gt;60</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 - 60</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 50</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 - 40</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>23.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 30</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>24.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;21</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>17.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since $X^2 = 34.42$, which is significant at the 0.05 confidence level, it would seem that there are significant differences between the frequencies of respondents within the above age-group categories.

From Table 6.1.1 above it would seem that the majority of respondents fall within the age-range 21 to 40, or what one might describe as young to middle-aged adults. There is a drop-off in the number of respondents in the age groups on either side of this range.
6.1.2 Sex

**TABLE 6.1.2. BREAKDOWN BY SEX (N = 231)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEX</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>X²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MALE</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>41.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMALE</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>58.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since $X^2 = 6.58$, which is significant at the 0.05 level, it would seem that there were significantly more female than male respondents in the sample.

6.1.3 Marital Status

Subjects were classified into three groups: married, single and divorced or widowed.

**TABLE 6.1.3. BREAKDOWN BY MARITAL STATUS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MARITAL STATUS</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>X²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MARRIED</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>58.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SINGLE</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>27.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIVORCED OR WIDOWED</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since $X^2 = 89.33$, which is significant at the 0.05 level, it would seem that the frequencies of respondents in the above categories differ significantly. Although one would expect a relatively smaller amount of divorced or widowed respondents as a reflection of the general population, it does seem noteworthy that there were 19% more married than single respondents. However, if one considers that in terms of age distribution, only 17% of respondents were younger than 21, a higher percentage of married than single respondents can be expected.
6.1.4 Educational Level

Subjects were classified into four groups: graduate, denoting those subjects with degrees or diplomas; matric; secondary, denoting those with qualifications lower than matric; and others, denoting subjects with high school qualifications not based on the South African system. Since the latter group consists of only 2 subjects, it was not included in the chi-square analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EDUCATIONAL LEVEL</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GRADUATE</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATRIC</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>45.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECONDARY</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since $X^2 = 47.83$, which is significant at the 0.05 level, it would seem that the frequencies of respondents in the above categories differ significantly. There seems to be an equivalent proportion of graduate and matric respondents, but there is a smaller amount of respondents with secondary qualifications.
6.1.5 Religious Denomination

Subjects were classified into six groups: Anglican, Baptist, Methodist, NGK*, Roman Catholic, and others.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DENOMINATION</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>X</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptist</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>15.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGK</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>17.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>33.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since \( \chi^2 = 55.51 \), which is significant at the 0.05 level, it would seem that the frequencies of respondents from the various denominations above differ significantly.

One can see that by far the largest number of respondents were Roman Catholic - almost twice as many as the next largest group (NGK).

* Nederlandse Gereformeerde Kerk (Dutch Reformed Church)
6.1.6 Occupation

Subjects were classified according to the following ten occupational categories:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>X</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARTISAN</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLERICAL</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSEWIFE</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>16.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEACHER/LECTURER</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANAGEMENT</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>18.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDICAL/ PARA-MEDICAL</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALES</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECRETARIAL</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHOLAR/STUDENT</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>17.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

X² = 55.49, which is significant at the 0.05 level. It therefore seems as if the frequencies of respondents from the various occupational groups above differ significantly. It can be seen that the proportions of respondents in the groups 'housewife', 'management' and 'scholar/student' are the highest, and are roughly equivalent.

6.2 An Analysis of the Religious Orientation Scale (ROS)

The development of the ROS was discussed in chapter 5. Given the findings of Faegin (1964) and Allport and Ross (1967) that this scale should be considered as consisting of two separate subscales, it was considered prudent to begin with a bivariate plot analysis of the sample in the present study.
For the above bivariate plot there is a positive correlation between the Extrinsic subscale and the Intrinsic subscale \( r = 0.533; p = 0.000 \). The scores spread adequately around the scale centre point "36" for the variable Extrinsic subscale, but not so for the variable Intrinsic subscale, with scale centre point "29". All scores above the line \( X \) satisfy the equation

\[ \text{Extrinsic score} - \text{Intrinsic score} > 12. \]

It would seem that a comparison between indiscriminately proreligious persons (those above the line \( X \)) and the rest (those below the line) is called for. The scores below line \( X \) happen to belong to predominantly intrinsically oriented persons. Therefore the comparison would in effect be one of indiscriminately proreligious persons with intrinsically oriented persons. At this stage it would therefore seem worthwhile to preserve the Extrinsic and Intrinsic subscales as well as the total of the two scales as interval scales in the analysis.

At this stage the question can be asked whether these dimensions have any empirical justification. This issue is addressed below.

6.2.1 Reliability of the Extrinsic and Intrinsic Subscales

The Cronbach alpha coefficients were computed for the Extrinsic subscale, the Intrinsic subscale and the total scale. They were found to be 0.74, 0.76 and 0.83 respectively. These coefficients suggest a fair amount of internal consistency among items. Especially the 0.83 for the scale as a whole suggests that a single underlying dimension might be appropriate. Some doubts therefore arise as to whether the Extrinsic and Intrinsic subscales found by Faegni(1964) and Allport and Ross(1967) can be empirically justified to be two separate dimensions.

Factor analyses were subsequently performed on the ROS items to try to establish whether a two-dimensional factor structure exists.
6.2.2 Factor-Analysis Results for the ROS

A principal axis factor analysis was performed on the items of the ROS.

Two factors were extracted since Paeglin(1964) and Allport and Ross(1967) suggest a two-dimensional structure. An oblique rotation of the factor solution was performed since the bivariate plot above(Fig. 6.2) already suggests that the Extrinsic and Intrinsic subscales are correlated. The eigenvalues (Table 6.2.2) and the oblique rotated factor pattern (Table 6.2.3) are presented below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTOR</th>
<th>EIGEN VALUE</th>
<th>% OF VARIANCE</th>
<th>CUMULATIVE %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.226</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.066</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.510</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.137</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.009</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>56.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEM</td>
<td>FACTOR 1</td>
<td>FACTOR 2</td>
<td>COMMUNALITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.047</td>
<td>0.380</td>
<td>0.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.634*</td>
<td>0.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-0.077</td>
<td>0.348</td>
<td>0.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>0.654**</td>
<td>0.464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.648*</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>0.424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>-0.396</td>
<td>0.561*</td>
<td>0.402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.797*</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.438*</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>0.237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.490*</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>0.406*</td>
<td>0.251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>-0.181</td>
<td>0.538*</td>
<td>0.284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.482*</td>
<td>0.295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.363</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.389</td>
<td>0.450*</td>
<td>0.424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.685*</td>
<td>-0.171</td>
<td>0.452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>0.513*</td>
<td>0.338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.010*</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.805*</td>
<td>-0.332</td>
<td>0.651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.457*</td>
<td>0.243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.630*</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.449</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FACTOR STRUCTURE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTOR 1</th>
<th>FACTOR 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FACTOR 1</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FACTOR 2</td>
<td>0.199</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For the present study, a loading of 0.4 was chosen because it enables one to distinguish between items that predominantly constitute a factor, and items that are less significant. Thus, in Table 6.2.1, all factors loading above 0.4 have been marked with an asterisk to indicate which items load on which factors. It is immediately clear that the first twelve items which constitute the extrinsic dimension do not load on the same factor. Similarly, the last nine items, which constitute the intrinsic dimension do not load on the same factor.

An inspection of the eigenvalues in Table 6.2.2 would however suggest that some underlying factor structure might exist. The first two factors have substantial eigenvalues but from factor 3 onward there is a marked drop in the eigenvalues. The point is however that the two factors that do emerge are not those suggested by Faeglin(1964) and Allport and Ross(1967).

In the final analysis then, it can be concluded that the Extrinsic and Intrinsic dimensions reported by Faeglin(1964) and Allport and Ross(1967) were not found in this study. Moreover, since the construct "Indiscriminately Proreligious" depends on the existence of the Intrinsic and Extrinsic dimensions (as discussed in chapter 5), the construct "Indiscriminately Proreligious" also has a doubtful existence in the present study.

It was therefore decided to adhere to the original conception of the scale (Faeglin,1964) as a bi-polar dimension with extreme intrinsic orientation on the one pole and extreme extrinsic orientation on the other pole. For the purpose of further analysis, then, the total score on the Religious Orientation Scale will be used.

6.3 A Breakdown of the ROS and POI by Demographic Variables.

In this section the ROS and POI scores will be compared across the variables sex, marital status, education, denomination, occupation and age.
### Table 6.3.1: POI and ROS by Sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEX</th>
<th>POI</th>
<th>ROS</th>
<th>ROS SCALES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR POI & ROS BY SEX
From Table 6.3.1 above it can be seen that there are no significant differences between males and females with respect to either self-actualization or religious orientation at the .05 confidence level.
### Table 6.3.2: Means and Standard Deviations for POI and ROS by Marital Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>POI</th>
<th>ROS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The table contains numerical data for POI and ROS by marital status, but the specific values are not legible from the image provided.
From Table 6.3.2 above it can be seen that significant differences occur across marital status on the Time Incompetence (Ti), Spontaneity (S), Synergy (Sy) and Religious Orientation (ROS) scores at the .05 confidence level.

Scheffe tests were conducted to denote which pairs of groups are significantly different at the .05 confidence level. The following results were established: on the Time Incompetence scale, divorced and married subjects scored significantly different; on the Synergy scale, single and divorced subjects scored significantly different; and on the ROS scale, divorced and married subjects were significantly different. On the Spontaneity scale, no two groups scored significantly different at the .05 level. Since the Scheffe test is a conservative test, this analysis was extended to determine at what level significance would occur. It was thus determined that the single and married groups were significantly different at the 0.12 level.
Table 6.3.3: Means and Standard Deviations for POI and ROS by Educational Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Graduate</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undergraduate</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table includes means and standard deviations for POI and ROS by educational status. The educational statuses include: Graduate, Undergraduate, High School, and College.
From Table 6.3.3 above it can be seen that significant differences occur across educational status on the Time Competence (Tc), Inner Directed (I), Existentiality (Ex), Acceptance of Aggression (A), Capacity for Intimate Contact (C), and ROS scales.

Scheffe tests revealed significant differences between the following pairs at the .05 confidence level: on Time Competence, between the graduate and secondary and between the graduate and matric groups; on the Inner Directed and Existentiality scales, between the graduate and secondary groups; on the Acceptance of Aggression and Capacity for Intimate Contact scales between the matric and secondary and graduate and secondary groups; and on the ROS between the secondary and matric and secondary and graduate groups.
### 6.3.4 POI and ROS by Religious Denomination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denomination</th>
<th>POI</th>
<th>ROS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6.3.4**: Mean and Standard Deviations for POI and ROS by Religious Denomination.
From Table 6.3.4 above it can be seen that significant differences occur across denomination on the Time Incompetence (TI), Time Competence (Tc), Nature of Man (Nc) and ROS scales.

Scheffe tests revealed the following significant differences at the .05 level:
On the Time Incompetence scale, Catholics scored significantly higher than Methodists, Baptists and the NGK. Conversely, on the Time Competence scale Catholics scored significantly lower than the Methodists, Baptists and the NGK.
On the Nature of Man scale, Catholics scored significantly higher than the Baptists and Anglicans.
On the ROS, Catholics scored significantly higher, and thus more extrinsically, than Methodists, Baptists and Anglicans. The NGK group scored significantly higher than Methodists, Baptists, Anglicans and others.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>PO2 in mmHg</th>
<th>PO2 in kPa</th>
<th>SO2 in %</th>
<th>PO2 in mmHg</th>
<th>PO2 in kPa</th>
<th>SO2 in %</th>
<th>PO2 in mmHg</th>
<th>PO2 in kPa</th>
<th>SO2 in %</th>
<th>PO2 in mmHg</th>
<th>PO2 in kPa</th>
<th>SO2 in %</th>
<th>PO2 in mmHg</th>
<th>PO2 in kPa</th>
<th>SO2 in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HOS by Occupation</td>
<td>3045</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>3045</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>3045</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>3045</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>3045</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From Table 6.3.5 above it can be seen that there are no significant occupational differences on the POI and ROS scales.

6.3.6 POI and ROS by Age

**Table 6.3.6: Correlations of the POI and ROS with Age**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POI</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TC</td>
<td>0.0158</td>
<td>0.140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS</td>
<td>-0.0267</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>0.0763</td>
<td>0.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>-0.0570</td>
<td>0.222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAN</td>
<td>-0.0244</td>
<td>0.312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>-0.1339</td>
<td>0.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FC</td>
<td>-0.1386</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>-0.1676</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>-0.0290</td>
<td>0.240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>-0.0118</td>
<td>0.411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rg</td>
<td>0.0338</td>
<td>0.313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sy</td>
<td>-0.0434</td>
<td>0.271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>-0.1553</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>-0.1071</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROS</td>
<td>-0.0163</td>
<td>0.302</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Table 6.3.6 above it can be seen that significant negative correlations exist between age and the following scales of the POI at the .05 level: Time Competence, Feeling Reactivity, Spontaneity, and Acceptance of Aggression. This implies that for this sample, the above self-actualizing qualities tend to decrease as a function of age.

6.4 The Relationship Between Religious Orientation and Self Actualization

Since the POI and the ROS can be considered as being of interval measurement strength, a Pearson Product Moment correlation coefficient seemed to be an appropriate procedure for establishing whether a linear relationship exists between self-actualization, as measured by the POI, and religious orientation, as measured by the ROS.
The problem, however, is that such a correlation may be spurious. It was therefore decided to partial out the contributing effects of sex, marital status, education, denomination, occupation and age on self-actualization.

The zero-order correlations, followed by the correlations with religious denomination, marital status, educational level, sex and age controlled for are presented in Table 6.4.1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS</th>
<th>PARTIAL CORRELATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>z1</td>
<td>0.677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>z0</td>
<td>-0.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d</td>
<td>0.1795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>t</td>
<td>-0.0895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d0</td>
<td>0.0201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d1</td>
<td>-0.0425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d2</td>
<td>0.0495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d3</td>
<td>-0.0826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d4</td>
<td>0.0152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d5</td>
<td>-0.1112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d6</td>
<td>0.0398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d7</td>
<td>-0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d8</td>
<td>-0.0609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d9</td>
<td>-0.1451</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Table 6.4.1 above it can be seen that before the contributing effects of the demographic variables have been partialled out, significant correlations exist between religious orientation and Time Incompetence (Ti), Time Competence (Tc), Outer Directedness (O), Self-Acceptance (Sa), and Capacity for Intimacy (C).

However, once the contributing effects of the demographic variables have been partialled out, only Time Incompetence (Ti), Time Competence (Tc) and Outer Directedness (O) remain significantly correlated with religious orientation.
7. DISCUSSION

7.1 Description of the Population Sample

From the previous chapter it can be seen that the sample is not distributed evenly across any of the demographic variables. In this section, these distributions will be compared to those which have previously been reported in the literature. Furthermore, certain features of the sampling technique which could have contributed to the distributions found in the present study will be discussed.

7.1.1 Age

The results of the present study indicate that the majority of respondents fall within the age-range 21 to 40, with a steady decline in the number of respondents in either side of this range. Therefore, in terms of this sample it would be tempting to assume that religious activity tends to peak during middle-age. However, this contrasts with previous results reported by Spinks (1963) and Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi (1975), who reported that religious activity peaks during adolescence (12-18 years), declines between 18 and 30 years, and then increases steadily, especially after age 50.

This discrepancy could have been influenced by the sampling pattern in the present study, whereby it was left up to Church Ministers to distribute questionnaires to their congregations. It is possible that the Ministers were biased in their distribution of the questionnaires. For example, they might have felt the relatively sophisticated contents of the questionnaire would make it more suitable for the attention of young to middle-aged adults. Moreover, it could well be that this age-group is both more interested in, and aware of, the importance of research.

7.1.2 Sex

In the present study it was found that there were significantly more female than male respondents. This is consistent with results based on a number of studies reported by Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi (1975), wherein it was indicated that women are more religious than men. This tendency has been explained by the latter authors in terms of more guilt feelings for women, less aggressiveness and more fear than men, greater influenceability of women, and the argument that higher religiosity among women is a reaction to the greater
level of deprivation and frustration they face in society.

7.1.3 Educational Level

The results of the present study indicate an equivalent proportion of graduate and matric respondents, with a very much smaller proportion of respondents with secondary qualifications. Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi (1975) report that the relationship between education and rigidity is unclear, with no conclusive support for a relationship in any direction. The uneven distribution of educational status in the present sample could have been affected by the probability that people with qualifications lower than matric are less interested in or aware of the importance of research, and are therefore less likely to return questionnaires.

7.1.4 Religious Denomination

In the present sample there were almost twice as many Roman Catholic respondents as the next largest group (NGK), with the remaining respondents spread fairly evenly across the other denominations. If these results are compared to those obtained in an analysis of religious affiliations in South Africa by the 1980 population census (HSRC, 1985), it can be seen that the scatter of the present sample across religious denomination can hardly be considered as representative of general trends in South African society. For example, 17.15% of the present sample are affiliated to the NGK, whereas according to the 1980 population census, 37.4% of South African whites belong to the NGK. Other figures that can be compared are: Anglicans - 8.6% of the present sample, 10.1% in the 1980 census; Methodists - 15.02% of the present sample, 9.1% in the 1980 census; and Roman Catholics - 33.90% in the present sample but only 6.7% in the 1980 census.

However, the figures from the present study must be considered in the light of the sampling technique, whereby the amount of questionnaires distributed to the different denominations depended on the relevant Minister's subjective opinion of how many he could give out to his congregation. Therefore it was not the case that even amounts of questionnaires were distributed to the various denominations.
7.2 Comparison of the ROI and POI scores across Demographic variables

In this section the relationship between the Religious Orientation Inventory and Personal Orientation Inventory Scores and the various relevant demographic variables will be discussed.

7.2.1 Sex

From the previous chapter it can be seen that there are no significant differences between males and females with respect to either self-actualization or religious orientation at the .05 confidence level. This contrasts with research done by Shostron (1980), who found significant differences between males and females on the Time Competence, Self-Acceptance, Nature of Man, and Synergy subscales. In all of these instances the female sample mean was higher than the male sample. However, as Shostron (1980) points out, with the exception of the Time Competence scale all mean differences were less than one raw score point, and thus may be of little practical significance for individual interpretation. Furthermore, Fox (1965), in reporting on a sample of 50 male and 50 female adult hospitalized psychiatric patients, found no significant sex differences on POI scales.

7.2.2 Marital Status

The results of the present study indicate that divorced subjects scored significantly higher than married subjects on the Time Incompetence sub-scale. This implies that in relation to the married subjects, the divorcees tend to live primarily in the past with guilt, regrets, and resentments; and/or in the future with idealized goals, plans, expectations, predictions and fears. This seems to be consistent with what one would expect given that being divorced or widowed would mean experiencing these types of feelings about both the past and future. Divorced subjects also scored significantly lower than single subjects on Synergy, which suggests that the former group is less able to transcend dichotomies than the latter group. On the Religious Orientation Scale, divorced subjects were significantly more extrinsically oriented than married subjects, implying that divorced subjects are more prone to use religion for social and psychological gain.

It is interesting to note that in the above comparisons the divorced group consistently appeared as the least self-actualized in relation to the other groups. This
seems to be consistent with the rating of divorce as a severe psycho-social stressor according to DSM III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980).

7.2.3 Educational Level

On the POI, the group of subjects who hold either university or other post-matric qualifications scored significantly higher than the matric and/or the secondary education groups on Time Competence, Inner Directedness, Existentiality, Acceptance of Aggression, and Capacity for Intimate contact. On the ROS, the graduate group scored lower, and therefore more intrinsic, than the secondary education group. The matric group also scored lower than the secondary group.

For all of these comparisons there is thus once again a consistent trend - that the degree of self-actualization tends to increase with educational level, and that those subjects with the lowest level of education tend to be the most extrinsically oriented. There thus seems to exist a positive relationship between self-actualization and educational level, and religious orientation and educational level. This suggests that the more educated one is, the more self-actualized and intrinsically religious one is likely to be. However, the possibility that the more educated subjects are more aware of the norm that the qualities that contribute towards self-actualization are more socially desirable, and therefore that they responded in a favourable way, cannot be discounted.

7.2.4 Age

Significant negative correlations were shown to exist between age and Time Competence, Feeling Reactivity, Spontaneity and Acceptance of Aggression. This suggests that for this sample, the older subjects tended to be less able to live in the here and now, and were less in touch with and less able to express their true feelings. This appears to be consistent with what one might expect, given that people approaching old-age are probably more likely to dwell on the past. If one considers the remaining scales which are negatively correlated with age - Feeling Reactivity, Spontaneity, and Acceptance of Aggression - they all seem to reflect the area of feeling. It thus appears as if the older the subjects within the sample, the less sensitive they are to needs and feelings within themselves, and the less able they are to express feelings behaviourally.
7.2.5 Occupation

The results of the present study indicate that there are no significant differences between the various occupational groups with respect to either self-actualization or religious orientation.

7.2.6 Religious Denomination

Significant differences were found across various denominations on the Time Incompetence, Time Competence, and Nature of Man subscales of the POI, as well as on the Religious Orientation Scale.

On the Time Incompetence scale, Catholics scored significantly higher than Methodists, Baptists and the NGK. Conversely, on the Time Competence scale, Catholics scored significantly lower than the latter three denominations. This suggests that in relation to the other denominations, Catholics tend to live primarily in the past, with guilt, regrets and resentments, and/or in the future, with idealized goals, plans, expectations, predictions and fears. This could possibly be related to the Catholic ritual of confession, which could activate a sense of sin, and therefore guilt about the past. Moreover, the stringent Catholic doctrine with regards to issues such as pre-marital sex, contraception, and divorce is likely to reinforce a preoccupation with sin, and therefore guilt.

It could be argued that the Catholic confession acts as an outlet for the alleviation of guilt, but the point is that this is extremely short-lived in the sense that as soon as one leaves confession, one is bound to start sinning again. This makes confession an on-going, intermittent event which might temporarily alleviate guilt, but in between which guilt is bound to re-accumulate. In this sense, the devout Catholic develops a lifestyle whereby he lives from one confession to the next in order to have his guilt alleviated.

In contrast to this, the more progressive Baptist and Methodist churches tend to preach a "born-again" doctrine, whereby once the believer has accepted Christ into his life, he is given the message that Jesus loves him, no matter what his short-comings or faults may be. This type of doctrine is bound to lead to a once-off cathartic release of guilt about what one may have done in the past. This is despite the fact that early Protestant doctrine placed considerable emphasis on sin and salvation (Argyle, 1958) and that the arousal of a
sense of sin was a standard technique of nineteenth-century revivalism (Sargant, 1957). Modern conversion techniques might still utilize the arousal of a sense of sin, but once the person has accepted his sinfulness and has been "re-born" there is a belief that he has been cleansed of his sins and has therefore been "saved". Unlike the Catholic, then, the Methodist or Baptist does not have to attend confession on a regular basis to cope with the guilt which is aroused by his sense of sinfulness.

Although this argument appears to go against the grain of the apparently popular conception based on the work of sociologist Émile Durkheim (1952) that Catholics have lower suicide rates than Protestants, a closer investigation of this argument raises some doubts about its validity. Firstly, Durkheim (1952) actually claimed that predominantly Catholic countries have lower suicide rates than those which are mainly Protestant, which is a far more generalized statement than claiming that Catholics have lower suicide rates than Protestants. Moreover, Stengel (1970) in his study of suicide notes that although it is true that some predominantly Catholic countries, such as the Republic of Ireland, Spain, and Italy have very low suicide rates, other predominantly Roman Catholic countries such as France, Austria, and Hungary have high suicide rates, Austria and Hungary being among the top five in the world.

On the Nature of Man scale, Catholics scored significantly higher than Baptists and Anglicans. This suggests that in relation to the latter two denominations, Catholics tend to see man as essentially good, and are more able to resolve the goodness-evil, masculine-feminine, selfishness-unselfishness and spirituality-sensuality dichotomies in the nature of man. Although it might appear as if this tendency contradicts the above premise that Catholics are more prone to guilt out of a heightened awareness of their own sinfulness, it can also be argued that these two tendencies actually support each other. If a Catholic sees man (but not himself) as essentially good, this disposition is likely to increase his sense of guilt about his own sinfulness, and therefore his own shortcomings in relation to the idealized conception he has about the nature of man.

On the Religious Orientation Scale, the Catholics and the HCG group scored significantly higher than Methodists, Baptists, Anglicans and others. This suggests that the former two denominational groups are relatively more prone to use religion for their own ends, for example to provide security and solace,
sociability and distraction, status and self-justification. For these groups the embraced creed is selectively shaped to fit the above-mentioned more primary needs. The research into religious orientations, which was reviewed in chapter 4 of this study, does not seem to include any studies comparing religious orientation across religious denominations. This question certainly does seem to be worthy of future considerations for empirical research.

Moreover, in the literature reviewed for the present study, there was no mention of any research having been done on the relationship between self-actualization and any of the demographic variables discussed above. This was with the exception of sex differences, as discussed. It was therefore not possible to compare the trends found in the present study with any other norms.

7.3 The Relationship Between Religious Orientation and Self-Actualization

To recap briefly, the aim of the present study is an attempt to clarify the unclear relationship that has thus far been shown to exist between religion and psychological adjustment. As discussed in chapter 4 above, it is my contention that a tendency to regard religion as a unitary concept has prevented previous researchers from achieving consistent results with regards to the relationship between religion and personal adjustment.

The aim of the present study is therefore to determine whether religious orientation will significantly affect personal adjustment. In accordance with previous research into the personality correlates of religious orientations, my hypothesis is that extrinsically oriented people will tend to be significantly less self-actualized than intrinsically oriented people, as reflected on the Personal Orientation Inventory. In relation to the present research design, this implies that confirmation of this hypothesis would be provided by a significant correlation between subjects' scores on the ROS and their scores on the subscales of the POI. For the twelve 'healthy' dimensions, this relationship should be negative, i.e. the higher a subject scores on the ROS, and therefore the more extrinsically oriented he is, the lower he should score on the POI. For the two 'unhealthy' dimensions (Time Incompetence and Outer Directed) this relationship should be positive, i.e. the higher a subject scores on the ROS, the higher he should score on the relevant subscale of the POI.
If the results of the present study are evaluated in this light, it can be seen that once the contributing effects of the demographic variables have been partialled out, only Time Incompetence ($r = 0.3707$), Time Competence ($r = -0.2625$) and Outer Directedness ($r = 0.1690$) are significantly correlated with religious orientation. The former two scales are the converse of each other; therefore the opposite directionality of these two correlations reflects the same relationship.

This implies that the more extrinsically oriented the subjects are, the less able they are to live in the present. It therefore seems as if those people who are more prone to use religion for social and psychological gain are also more likely to live in the past, with guilts, regrets, and resentments, and/or in the future, with idealized goals, plans, expectations, predictions, and fears. This relationship therefore supports my hypothesis that extrinsically oriented people will be less self-actualized.

This hypothesis is further supported by the second significant relationship - that between religious orientation and Outer Directedness. This suggests that those subjects who tend to use religion for social and psychological gain also tend to be largely influenced by their peer group or other external forces, rather than by internalized principles and motivations. There seems to be a degree of logical consistency between these two modes of functioning, in that both extrinsic orientation and Outer Directedness - appear to entail a similar dynamic - a tendency to have one's behaviour guided by external rather than internal needs and forces. In other words, it might be postulated that both these modes of functioning are determined by an external locus of control, which is clearly antithetical to Maslow's (1970) depiction of the self-actualizing individual, who is more prone to use his own internal norms as a basis for constructing a meaningful lifestyle.

Although the fact that none of the remaining subscales of the PCI are significantly correlated with religious orientation might be seen to detract from support for the hypothesis that self-actualization and religious orientation are significantly related, it should be noted that Shostron (1980) suggests that if a quick idea of a person's level of self-actualization is required, the first two dimensions - Time Competence/Incompetence and Inner/Outer Directed - can be regarded as the most representative of the overall level of self-actualization.
Given that these are the two dimensions which in the present study have been shown to correlate significantly with religious orientation, it seems as if one would be justified in making certain tentative conclusions about the relationship between religious orientation and self-actualization in general.

In conclusion, then, the present study revealed that intrinsic religious orientation is associated with a psychologically healthy, self-actualizing mode of being. In other words, the degree to which a person practices his religion because of some internal, intrinsic value that he or she wishes to express behaviourally in life is the degree to which that person is psychologically healthy or well-adjusted. On the other hand, the degree to which the person’s religious behaviour is motivated by an extrinsic orientation is the degree to which that person is likely to be psychologically unhealthy or maladaptive.
Dear Friend,

I am an M.A. (Clinical Psychology) student at the University of the Witwatersrand doing a research study on the benefits of religious commitment. It would be of great assistance to me if you would complete the enclosed questionnaire, place it in the included stamped envelope, and return same by post as soon as possible.

The questionnaire should take you no longer than 20 to 30 minutes to complete. Try to answer the questions without giving them too much thought, answer as quickly as possible.

Please do not sign your name. This survey is anonymous and no attempt will be made to identify respondents.

This study is being conducted under the supervision of Professor G.A. Tyson, to whom any enquiries may be sent at the above address. If you would like any information about the results of this study, you can write to me after June 1984 at:

15 Taplow Court
Elizabeth Street
Robertsam, 2190.

Since this questionnaire is being sent to a few people only, it is important that you return it.

Thank-you for your kind co-operation.

Tim Mux
DIRECTIONS

PLEASE READ EACH STATEMENT AND MARK THE RESPONSE YOU THINK, OR MOST CLOSELY AGREE WITH, BY TYPING THE LETTER CORRESPONDING TO YOUR CHOICE. IF NONE OF THE RESPONSES APPLY TO YOU, OR IF THEY REFER TO SOMETHING YOU DON'T KNOW ABOUT, YOU MAY OMIT THE ITEM. THERE ARE NO "RIGHT" OR "WRONG" ANSWERS - GIVE YOUR OWN OPINION OF YOURSELF AND DO NOT LEAVE OUT ANY ANSWERS IF YOU CAN AVOID IT.

AGE: _______
SEX: MALE _______ FEMALE _______
MARRIED: SINGLE _______ DIVORCED _______ WIDOWED _______
HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION: ________________
RELIGIOUS DOMINATION: ________________
OCCUPATION: ________________

WHAT RELIGION OFFERS ME MOST IS COMFORT WHEN SORROWS AND MISFORTUNE STRIKE,
A. I DEFINITELY DISAGREE
B. I TEND TO DISAGREE
C. I TEND TO AGREE
D. I DEFINITELY AGREE

ONE REASON FOR MY BEING A CHURCH MEMBER IS THAT SUCH MEMBERSHIP HELPS TO ESTABLISH A PERSON IN THE COMMUNITY
A. DEFINITELY NOT TRUE
B. TENDS NOT TO BE TRUE
C. TENDS TO BE TRUE
D. DEFINITELY TRUE

THE PURPOSE OF PRAYER IS TO SECURE A HAPPY AND PEACEFUL LIFE
A. I DEFINITELY DISAGREE
B. I TEND TO AGREE
C. I TEND TO DISAGREE
D. I DEFINITELY AGREE
DIRECTIONS

PLEASE READ EACH STATEMENT AND INDICATE THE RESPONSE YOU PREFER, OR MOST CLOSELY AGREE WITH, BY TILTING THE LETTER CORRESPONDING TO YOUR CHOICE. IF NONE OF THE RESPONSES APPLY TO YOU, OR IF THE ITEM IS SOMETHING YOU DON'T KNOW ABOUT, YOU MAY OMIT THE ITEM. THERE ARE NO "RIGHT" OR "WRONG" ANSWERS - GIVE YOUR OWN OPINION OF YOURSELF AND DO NOT LEAVE OUT ANY ANSWERS IF YOU CAN AVOID IT.

AGE: ________
SEX: MALE ________ FEMALE ________
MARRIED: SINGLE ________ DIVORCED ________ WIDOWED ________
HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION: ___________________________
RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION: ___________________________
OCCUPATION: ___________________________

WHAT RELIGION OFFERS ME MOST IS COMFORT WHEN CORDRONS AND MISFORTUNE STRIKE,
A. I DEFINITELY DISAGREE
B. I TEND TO DISAGREE
C. I TEND TO AGREE
D. I DEFINITELY AGREE

ONE REASON FOR MY BEING A CHURCH MEMBER IS THAT SUCH MEMBERSHIP HELPS TO ESTABLISH A PERSON IN THE COMMUNITY,
A. DEFINITELY NOT TRUE
B. TENDS NOT TO BE TRUE
C. TENDS TO BE TRUE
D. DEFINITELY TRUE

THE PURPOSE OF PRAYER IS TO SECURE A HAPPY AND PEACEFUL LIFE,
A. I DEFINITELY DISAGREE
B. I TEND TO AGREE
C. I TEND TO DISAGREE
D. I DEFINITELY AGREE
IT DOESN'T MATTER SO MUCH WHAT I BELIEVE SO LONG AS I LEAD A MORAL LIFE.

A. I DEFINITELY DISAGREE
B. I TEND TO DISAGREE
C. I TEND TO AGREE
D. I DEFINITELY AGREE

ALTHOUGH I AM A RELIGIOUS PERSON I REFUSE TO LET RELIGIOUS CONSIDERATIONS INFLUENCE MY EVERYDAY AFFAIRS.

A. DEFINITELY NOT TRUE OF ME
B. TENDS NOT TO BE TRUE
C. TENDS TO BE TRUE
D. CLEARLY TRUE IN MY CASE

THE CHURCH IS MOST IMPORTANT AS A PLACE TO FORMULATE GOOD SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS.

A. I DEFINITELY DISAGREE
B. I TEND TO DISAGREE
C. I TEND TO AGREE
D. I DEFINITELY AGREE

ALTHOUGH I BELIEVE IN MY RELIGION, I FEEL THERE ARE MANY MORE IMPORTANT THINGS IN MY LIFE.

A. I DEFINITELY DISAGREE
B. I TEND TO DISAGREE
C. I TEND TO AGREE
D. I DEFINITELY AGREE

I PRAY CHIEFLY BECAUSE I HAVE BEEN TAUGHT TO PRAY.

A. DEFINITELY TRUE OF ME
B. TENDS TO BE TRUE
C. TENDS NOT TO BE TRUE
D. DEFINITELY NOT TRUE OF ME

A PRIMARY REASON FOR MY INTEREST IN RELIGION IS THAT MY CHURCH IS A CONGENIAL SOCIAL ACTIVITY.

A. DEFINITELY NOT TRUE OF ME
B. TENDS NOT TO BE TRUE
C. TENDS TO BE TRUE
D. DEFINITELY TRUE OF ME

OCCASIONALLY /
Occasionally, I find it necessary to modify my religious beliefs in order to promote my spiritual and economic well-being.

A. Definitely not true of me
B. Tends not to be true
C. Tends to be true
D. Definitely true of me

The primary purpose of prayer is to gain relief and protection.

A. I definitely agree
B. I tend to agree
C. I tend to disagree
D. I definitely disagree

Religion helps to keep my life balanced and steady in exactly the same way as my citizenship, friendships, and other memberships do.

A. I definitely agree
B. I tend to agree
C. I tend to disagree
D. I definitely disagree

I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life.

A. I definitely disagree
B. I tend to disagree
C. I tend to agree
D. I definitely agree

Quite often I have been keenly aware of the presence of God or the Divine Being.

A. Definitely not true
B. Tends not to be true
C. Tends to be true
D. Definitely true

My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life.

A. This is definitely not so
B. Probably not so
C. Probably so
D. Definitely so
IF NOT PREVENTED BY UNAVOIDABLE CIRCUMSTANCES, I ATTEND CHURCH:

A. MORE THAN ONCE A WEEK
B. ABOUT ONCE A WEEK
C. TWO OR THREE TIMES A MONTH
D. LESS THAN ONCE A MONTH

IF I WERE TO JOIN A CHURCH GROUP, I WOULD PREFER TO JOIN (1) A BIBLE STUDY GROUP, OR (2) A SOCIAL FELLOWSHIP.

A. I WOULD PREFER TO JOIN (1)
B. I PROBABLY WOULD PREFER (1)
C. I PROBABLY WOULD PREFER (2)
D. I WOULD PREFER TO JOIN (2)

RELIGION IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO ME BECAUSE IT ANSWERS MANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MEANING OF LIFE.

A. DEFINITELY DISAGREE
B. TEND TO DISAGREE
C. TEND TO AGREE
D. DEFINITELY AGREE

I READ LITERATURE ABOUT FAITH (OR CHURCH)

A. FREQUENTLY
B. OCCASIONALLY
C. RARELY
D. NEVER

IT IS IMPORTANT TO ME TO SPEND PERIODS OF TIME IN PRIVATE RELIGIOUS THOUGHT AND MEDITATION.

A. FREQUENTLY TRUE
B. OCCASIONALLY TRUE
C. RARELY TRUE
D. NEVER TRUE
1. a. I am bound by the principle of fairness.
    b. I am not absolutely bound by the principle of fairness.

2. a. When a friend does me a favor, I feel that I must return it.
    b. When a friend does me a favor, I do not feel that I must return it.

3. a. I feel I must always tell the truth.
    b. I do not always tell the truth.

4. a. No matter how hard I try, my feelings are often hurt.
    b. If I manage the situation right, I can avoid being hurt.

5. a. I feel that I must strive for perfection in everything that I undertake.
    b. I do not feel that I must strive for perfection in everything that I undertake.

6. a. I often make my decisions spontaneously.
    b. I seldom make my decisions spontaneously.

7. a. I am afraid to be myself.
    b. I am not afraid to be myself.

8. a. I feel obligated when a stranger does me a favor.
    b. I do not feel obligated when a stranger does me a favor.

9. a. I feel that I have a right to expect others to do what I want of them.
    b. I do not feel that I have a right to expect others to do what I want of them.

10. a. I live by values which are in agreement with others.
    b. I live by values which are primarily based on my own feelings.

11. a. I am concerned with self-improvement at all times.
    b. I am not concerned with self-improvement at all times.

12. a. I feel guilty when I am selfish.
    b. I don't feel guilty when I am selfish.

13. a. I have no objection to getting angry.
    b. Anger is something I try to avoid.

14. a. For me, anything is possible if I believe in myself.
    b. I have a lot of natural limitations even though I believe in myself.

15. a. I put others' interests before my own.
    b. I do not put others' interests before my own.

16. a. I sometimes feel embarrassed by compliments.
    b. I am not embarrassed by compliments.

17. a. I believe it is important to accept others as they are.
    b. I believe it is important to understand why others are as they are.

18. a. I can put off until tomorrow what I ought to do today.
    b. I don't put off until tomorrow what I ought to do today.

19. a. I can give without requiring the other person to appreciate what I give.
    b. I have a right to expect the other person to appreciate what I give.

20. a. My moral values are dictated by society.
    b. My moral values are self-determined.

21. a. I do what others expect of me.
    b. I refuse to do what others expect of me.

22. a. I accept my weaknesses.
    b. I don't accept my weaknesses.

23. a. In order to grow emotionally, it is necessary to know why I act as I do.
    b. In order to grow emotionally, it is not necessary to know why I act as I do.

24. a. Sometimes I am cross when I am not feeling well.
    b. I am hardly ever cross.
25. a. It is necessary that others approve of what I do.
   b. It is not always necessary that others approve of what I do.
26. a. I am afraid of making mistakes.
   b. I am not afraid of making mistakes.
27. a. I trust the decisions I make spontaneously.
   b. I do not trust the decisions I make spontaneously.
   b. My feelings of self-worth do not depend on how much I accomplish.
29. a. I fear failure.
   b. I don’t fear failure.
30. a. My moral values are determined, for the most part, by the thoughts, feelings, and decisions of others.
   b. My moral values are not determined, for the most part, by the thoughts, feelings, and decisions of others.
31. a. It is possible to live life in terms of what I want to do.
   b. It is not possible to live life in terms of what I want to do.
32. a. I can cope with the ups and downs of life.
   b. I cannot cope with the ups and downs of life.
33. a. I believe in saying what I feel in dealing with others.
   b. I do not believe in saying what I feel in dealing with others.
34. a. Children should realize that they do not have the same rights and privileges as adults.
   b. It is not important to make an issue of rights and privileges.
35. a. I am “whit my neck out” in my relations with others.
   b. I avoid “sticking my neck out” in my relations with others.
36. a. I believe the pursuit of self-interest is opposed to interest in others.
   b. I believe the pursuit of self-interest is not opposed to interest in others.
37. a. I find that I have rejected many of the moral values I was taught.
   b. I have not rejected any of the moral values I was taught.
38. a. I live in terms of my wants, likes, dislikes and values.
   b. I do not live in terms of my wants, likes, dislikes and values.
39. a. I trust my ability to size up a situation.
   b. I do not trust my ability to size up a situation.
40. a. I believe I have an innate capacity to cope with life.
   b. I do not believe I have an innate capacity to cope with life.
41. a. I must justify my actions in the pursuit of my own interests.
   b. I need not justify my actions in the pursuit of my own interests.
42. a. I am bothered by fears of being inadequate.
   b. I am not bothered by fears of being inadequate.
43. a. I believe that man is essentially good and can be trusted.
   b. I believe that man is essentially evil and cannot be trusted.
44. a. I live by the rules and standards of society.
   b. I do not always live by the rules and standards of society.
45. a. I am bound by my duties and obligations to others.
   b. I am not bound by my duties and obligations to others.
46. a. Reasons are needed to justify my feelings.
   b. Reasons are not needed to justify my feelings.
47. a. There are times when just being silent is the best way I can express my feelings.
   b. I find it difficult to express my feelings by just being silent.

48. a. I often feel it necessary to defend my past actions.
   b. I do not feel it necessary to defend my past actions.

49. a. I like everyone I know.
   b. I do not like everyone I know.

50. a. Criticism threatens my self-esteem.
   b. Criticism does not threaten my self-esteem.

51. a. I believe that knowledge of what is right makes people act right.
   b. I do not believe that knowledge of what is right necessarily makes people act right.

52. a. I am afraid to be angry at those I love.
   b. I feel free to be angry at those I love.

53. a. My basic responsibility is to be aware of my own needs.
   b. My basic responsibility is to be aware of others' needs.

54. a. Impressing others is most important.
   b. Expressing myself is most important.

55. a. To feel right, I need always to please others.
   b. I can feel right without always having to please others.

56. a. I will risk a friendship in order to say or do what I believe is right.
   b. I will not risk a friendship just to say or do what I believe is right.

57. a. I feel bound to keep the promises I make.
   b. I do not always feel bound to keep the promises I make.

58. a. I must avoid sorrow at all costs.
   b. It is not necessary for me to avoid sorrow.

59. a. I arrive always to predict what will happen in the future.
   b. I do not feel it necessary always to predict what will happen in the future.

60. a. It is important that others accept my point of view.
   b. It is not necessary for others to accept my point of view.

61. a. I only feel free to express warm feelings to my friends.
   b. I feel free to express both warm and hostile feelings to my friends.

62. a. There are many times when it is more important to express feelings than to carefully evaluate the situation.
   b. There are very few times when it is more important to express feelings than to carefully evaluate the situation.

63. a. I welcome criticism as an opportunity for growth.
   b. I do not welcome criticism as an opportunity for growth.

64. a. Appearances are all-important.
   b. Appearances are not terribly important.

65. a. I hardly ever gossip.
   b. I gossip a little at times.

66. a. I feel free to reveal my weaknesses among friends.
   b. I do not feel free to reveal my weaknesses among friends.

67. a. I should always assume responsibility for other people's feelings.
   b. I need not always assume responsibility for other people's feelings.

68. a. I feel free to be myself and bear the consequences.
   b. I do not feel free to be myself and bear the consequences.

GO ON TO THE NEXT PAGE
60. a. I already know all I need to know about my feelings.
   b. As life goes on, I continue to know more and more about my feelings.

61. a. I hesitate to show my weaknesses among strangers.
   b. I do not hesitate to show my weaknesses among strangers.

62. a. I will continue to grow only by setting my sights on a high-level, socially approved goal.
   b. I will continue to grow best by being myself.

63. a. I accept inconsistencies within myself.
   b. I cannot accept inconsistencies within myself.

64. a. Man is naturally cooperative.
   b. Man is naturally antagonistic.

65. a. I don't mind laughing at a dirty joke.
   b. I hardly ever laugh at a dirty joke.

66. a. Happiness is a by-product in human relationships.
   b. Happiness is an end in human relationships.

67. a. I only feel free to show friendly feelings to strangers.
   b. I feel free to show both friendly and unfriendly feelings to strangers.

68. a. I try to be sincere but I sometimes fail.
   b. I try to be sincere and I am sincere.

69. a. Self-interest is natural.
   b. Self-interest is unnatural.

70. a. A neutral party can measure a happy relationship by observation.
   b. A neutral party cannot measure a happy relationship by observation.

71. a. For me, work and play are the same.
   b. For me, work and play are opposites.

72. a. Two people will get along best if one can
   b. Two people can get along best if each feels free to express himself.

73. a. I have feelings of resentment about things that are past.
   b. I do not have feelings of resentment about things that are past.

74. a. I like only masculine men and feminine women.
   b. I like men and women who show masculinity as well as femininity.

75. a. I actively attempt to avoid embarrassment whenever I can.
   b. I do not actively attempt to avoid embarrassment.

76. a. I blame my parents for a lot of my troubles.
   b. I do not blame my parents for my troubles.

77. a. I feel that a person should be silly only at the right time and place.
   b. I can be silly when I feel like it.

78. a. People should always repent their wrong-doings.
   b. People need not always repent their wrong-doings.

79. a. I worry about the future.
   b. I do not worry about the future.

80. a. Kindness and ruthlessness must be opposites.
   b. Kindness and ruthlessness need not be opposites.

81. a. I prefer to save good things for future use.
   b. I prefer to use good things now.

82. a. People should always control their anger.
   b. People should express honestly felt anger.
82. a. The truly spiritual man is sometimes sexual.
   b. The truly spiritual man is never sexual.

83. a. I am able to express my feelings even when they sometimes result in undesirable consequences.
   b. I am unable to express my feelings if they are likely to result in undesirable consequences.

84. a. I am often ashamed of some of the emotions that I feel bubbling up within me.
   b. I do not feel ashamed of my emotions.

85. a. I have had mysterious or ecstatic experiences.
   b. I have never had mysterious or ecstatic experiences.

86. a. I am orthodoxly religious.
   b. I am not orthodoxly religious.

87. a. I am completely free of guilt.
   b. I am not free of guilt.

88. a. I have a problem in finding sex and love.
   b. I have no problem in finding sex and love.

89. a. I enjoy detachment and privacy.
   b. I do not enjoy detachment and privacy.

90. a. I feel dedicated to my work.
   b. I do not feel dedicated to my work.

91. a. I can express affection regardless of whether it is returned.
   b. I cannot express affection unless I am sure it will be returned.

92. a. Living for the future is as important as living for the moment.
   b. Only living for the moment is important.

93. a. It is better to be yourself.
   b. It is better to be popular.

94. a. Wishing and imagining can be bad.
   b. Wishing and imagining are always good.

95. a. I spend more time preparing to live.
   b. I spend more time actually living.

96. a. I am loved because I give love.
   b. I am loved because I am lovable.

97. a. When I really love myself, everybody will love me.
   b. When I really love myself, there will still be those who won't love me.

98. a. I can let other people control me.
   b. I can let other people control me if I am sure they will not continue to control me.

99. a. As they are, people sometimes annoy me.
   b. As they are, people do not annoy me.

100. a. Living for the future gives my life its primary meaning.
    b. Only when living for the future does my life have meaning.

101. a. I follow diligently the motto, "Don't waste your time."
    b. I do not feel bound by the motto, "Don't waste your time."

102. a. What I have been in the past dictates the kind of person I will be.
    b. What I have been in the past does not necessarily dictate the kind of person I will be.

103. a. It is important to me how I live in the here and now.
    b. It is of little importance to me how I live in the here and now.

104. a. I have had an experience where life seemed just perfect.
    b. I have never had an experience where life seemed just perfect.

105. a. Evil is the result of frustration in trying to be good.
    b. Evil is an intrinsic part of human nature which fights good.
A person can completely change his essential nature.
A person can never change his essential nature.

117. a. I am afraid to be tender.
b. I am not afraid to be tender.

118. a. I am assertive and affirming.
b. I am not assertive and affirming.

119. a. Women should be trusting and yielding.
b. Women should not be trusting and yielding.

120. a. I see myself as others see me.
b. I do not see myself as others see me.

121. a. It is a good idea to think about your greatest potential.
b. A person who thinks about his greatest potential gets bored.

122. a. Men should be assertive and affirming.
b. Men should not be assertive and affirming.

123. a. I am able to risk being myself.
b. I am not able to risk being myself.

124. a. I feel the need to be doing something significant all of the time.
b. I do not feel the need to be doing something significant all of the time.

125. a. I suffer from memories.
b. I do not suffer from memories.

126. a. Men and women must be both yielding and assertive.
b. Men and women must be both yielding and assertive.

127. a. I like to participate actively in intense discussions.
b. I do not like to participate actively in intense discussions.

128. a. I am self-sufficient.
b. I am not self-sufficient.

129. a. I like to withdraw from others for extended periods of time.
b. I do not like to withdraw from others for extended periods of time.

130. a. I always play fair.
b. Sometimes I cheat a little.

131. a. Sometimes I feel so angry I want to destroy or hurt others.
b. I never feel so angry that I want to destroy or hurt others.

132. a. I feel certain and secure in my relationships with others.
b. I feel uncertain and insecure in my relationships with others.

133. a. I like to withdraw temporarily from others.
b. I do not like to withdraw temporarily from others.

134. a. I can accept my mistakes.
b. I cannot accept my mistakes.

135. a. I find some people who are stupid and uninteresting.
b. I never find any people who are stupid and uninteresting.

136. a. I regret my past.
b. I do not regret my past.

137. a. Being myself is helpful to others.
b. Just being myself is not helpful to others.

138. a. I have had moments of intense happiness when I felt like I was experiencing a kind of ecstasy or bliss.
b. I have not had moments of intense happiness when I felt like I was experiencing a kind of bliss.

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139. a. People have an instinct for evil.
   b. People do not have an instinct for evil.
140. a. For me, the future usually seems hopeful.
   b. For me, the future often seems hopeless.
141. a. People are both good and evil.
   b. People are not both good and evil.
142. a. My past is a stepping stone for the future.
   b. My past is a handicap to my future.
143. a. "Killing time" is a problem for me.
   b. "Killing time" is not a problem for me.
144. a. For me, past, present and future is in meaningful continuity.
   b. For me, the present is an island, unrelated to the past and future.
145. a. My hope for the future depends on having friends.
   b. My hope for the future does not depend on having friends.
146. a. I can like people without knowing a lot about them.
   b. I cannot like people unless I also approve of them.
147. a. People are basically good.
   b. People are not basically good.
148. a. Honesty is always the best policy.
   b. There are times when honesty is not the best policy.
149. a. I can feel comfortable with less than a perfect performance.
   b. I feel uncomfortable with anything less than a perfect performance.
150. a. I can overcome any obstacles as long as I believe in myself.
   b. I cannot overcome every obstacle even if I believe in myself.
REFERENCES


Ellis, A. The Case Against Religion, 1962.


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