RESEARCH REPORT

THE REINTEGRATION OF EX-COMBATANTS IN THE ANGOLAN PEACE PROCESS

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A research report submitted to the Faculty of Management, University of the Witwatersrand, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Management (in the field of Public and Development Management).

February, 2000
Abstract

Between 1994 and 1998 Angola underwent a major attempt to create peace. The programme for the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian society was a component of this process. The purpose of this research report was to examine the nature of this programme comparatively in the international context and, in particular, to explore which of a few broad frameworks was used in the programme. These were identified as the Human Training (HT), Human Resources Management (HRM), and Human Development (HD) approaches. This examination also investigated the appropriateness of the framework.

The social, political and economic context in which the programme took place were also explored, including the lessons learnt from the Angolan experience, which might have implications for similar processes elsewhere.

The main finding of the research was that, in the case of Angola, the optimal approach would be one of Human Development, which is a broad approach encompassing the improvement of social, economic and political policies.
DECLARATION

I declare that this report is my own, unaided work. It is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Management (in the field of Public and Development Management) in the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.

Irma Sofia Chavez Chavez
Johannesburg, February, 2000
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I am most grateful to my supervisor, Professor Gavin Cawthra, for the guidelines he provided and for his strong motivation.

Special thanks to the Angolan people who, in the face of their hardships, were willing to collaborate with me on my research in different ways.

I dedicate this work to all those persons and organisations.
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<tr>
<td>ADEMO</td>
<td>Association of the Demobilised</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIAV</td>
<td>International Commission of Support and Verification</td>
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<td>CORE</td>
<td>Reintegration Commission</td>
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<td>DWRS</td>
<td>Demobilised Women Reintegration Syndrome</td>
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<td>GRAE</td>
<td>Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FAA</td>
<td>Angolan Armed Forces</td>
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<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Front for the Liberation of Mozambique</td>
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<td>FMLN</td>
<td>Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>National Front for the Liberation of Angola</td>
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<td>GTZ</td>
<td>German Technical Cooperation</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<td>IRSEM</td>
<td>Institute for the Social and Professional Reintegration of Ex-Military Personnel</td>
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<td>MINARS</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Action and Reintegration</td>
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<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>MONUA</td>
<td>United Nations Mission for Angola</td>
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<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organisation of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUCA</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Group in Central America</td>
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<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations for Mozambique</td>
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<td>ONUVEN</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Nicaragua</td>
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<td>PDA</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Angola</td>
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<td>PIO</td>
<td>Public International Organisations</td>
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<td>PLUA</td>
<td>Party of the United Struggle of Africans of Angola</td>
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<td>ProDoc</td>
<td>Project Document</td>
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<td>QUIPs</td>
<td>Quick Impact Projects</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>National Resistance for Mozambique</td>
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<td>SA</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>SECOR</td>
<td>Counselling and Referral Service for Reintegration</td>
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<td>SEED</td>
<td>Soldiers Employed in Economic Development</td>
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<td>TPLF</td>
<td>Tigray People's Liberation Front</td>
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<td>UCAH</td>
<td>United Nations Co-ordinating Unit for Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<td>UNAVEM</td>
<td>United Nations Angolan Verification Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children Fund</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola</td>
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<td>UNO</td>
<td>United Nations Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Projects Service</td>
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<td>UPA</td>
<td>Union of Angolan Peoples</td>
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<td>UPNA</td>
<td>Union of the People of North Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>URSS</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>US Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>UVAB</td>
<td>Uganda Veterans Assistance Board</td>
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<td>ZWVA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe War Veterans Association</td>
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

From the outset of the civil war in Angola, after independence, various failed attempts took place to reach an agreement between the factions. The explanation for the Angolan situation and for the repeated failures of its peace process was elusive. The partial analysis of certain factors in the country's environment did not offer clear insights on the causes and solutions for the conflict. Only a deep and comprehensive analysis of all the different phases, the actors and events within different paradigms may, in time, result in possible explanations and solutions to the conflict.

Having been a witness of the Angolan process, from April 1995 to September 1997, I decided to undertake an analysis of a small component of the last peace process, set up by the Lusaka Protocol, that is, the Reintegration Project.

The Reintegration Project (1995) was designed to fulfill some of the agreements of the Lusaka Protocol (Awepa, 1994) and the Bicesse Peace Accords (Republic of Angola, 1995). In these documents the formation of a unified army for the country, based on the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) forces was considered, as well as the reduction and conversion of defence resources, which included the collection and destruction of weaponry and the reintegration of soldiers into civil society.

The personnel conversion (see conversion concept in section 2.1) process was divided into two phases, demobilisation and reintegration. Demobilisation dealt with the gathering of UNITA soldiers and police in quartering areas, their registration, the selection of active and surplus personnel, the incorporation of actives into the army, the demobilisation of surplus, and the distribution of financial support for veterans. Some underage and disabled soldiers from MPLA
were also demobilised. Reintegration consisted of a support programme for veterans during the period of their transition to civilian life. This involved the implementation of financial support and training for economic activities and health care for disabled and underage groups. Two different coordinating bodies undertook the two phases.

The demobilisation process was undertaken by the United Nations Coordinating Unit for Humanitarian Assistance (UCAH), a UNO agency, supervised by the Joint Commission, which was a forum formed by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA), the United Nations Organisation (UNO) and the Troika comprising Portugal, USSR and USA.

The Reintegration process was undertaken by a partnership between the Institute for the Social and Professional Reintegration of Ex-Military Personnel (IRSEM) and the organisation Counselling and Referral Service for Reintegration (SECOR). IRSEM under the umbrella of the Ministry of Social Action and Reintegration (MINARS), on the government or MPLA side, included delegates from UNITA. During the process of reintegration the leaders of IRSEM and SECOR attended meetings with the Joint Commission, submitted progress reports, and discussed general guidelines, in addition submitted reports, to their headquarters.

1.1 Background to the Research Proposition

Throughout the 20th century Angolans were forced to endure continuous armed conflicts. Since the skirmishes with the colonial power, through the independence struggles and the current civil war, the Angolan population has had neither peace nor the opportunity to implement a steady development process (Warner, 1991, p.1 to 50; Birmingham, 1992).
Consistent organised struggles against the Portuguese began during the 1950s, and gradually three different movements emerged. According to Warner (1991, p. 26) the first political group formed against colonialism was the Party of the United Struggle of Africans of Angola (PLUA). By December 1956 PLUA had joined forces with other groups and formed the MPLA with the objective of forging Angolan independence through a united front of African interests. However, the party could not avoid taking on an urban, intellectual image, as its members were mainly mulattos and educated black people. This image was the basis for later ethnic complaints.

Another movement, the Union of Peoples of Northern Angola (UPNA), was founded in 1954. Most of its members were Bakongo people, from the northern provinces of Zaire and Uige. The movement was based in Leopoldville, now Kinshasa. Later it changed into the Union of Angolan Peoples (UPA), which in 1958, and in 1962, after joining a small Congo movement: the Democratic Party of Angola (PDA), changed its name to the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) (Warner, 1991, p. 27, 30). In 1962, the FNLA set up the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE). Even though it had support from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Zaire and Algeria, it did not make any territorial gains. The refusal of its leaders to join other groups and to share leadership caused the resignation of Jonas Savimbi in 1964. He then created UNITA (Warner, 1991, p. 30, 32).

In 1965 Savimbi travelled to the People’s Republic of China. On his return in 1966 he refused to join the MPLA. During the same year UNITA attained recognition through its attack on to the Benguela Corridor Railway, in the city of Luau, on the border on Zaire. Following his Maoist training, Savimbi chose to represent the Ovimbundu, who lived mainly in the Benguela plains, the majority of whom were illiterate black peasants, with little or no knowledge of the Portuguese language (Warner, 1991, p. 32).
None of these movements was able to achieve independence for the country. The independence was a consequence of the political changes in Portugal. After a coup d'état in 1974, Portuguese officials requested their government to grant independence to the colonies in order to stop the large loss of lives and resources. Within this context Angola and Mozambique obtained independence in November and June 1975 respectively (Matloff, 1997, p. 35, 36, 38).

After independence, the Angolan liberation movements were unable to establish a functioning state and to control their competition for personal power. Thus the civil war began, at first between MPLA and the union of UNITA with FNLA. By January 1976 only two factions were still fighting: UNITA and MPLA. However, there were other hidden participants, from the regional and international sphere (Birmingham, 1992, p. 50; Warner, 1991, p. 38, 39, 40).

Both movements tried to defeat MPLA, FNLA from the north with the express support of the USA and UNITA from the south with the support of SA. The Cuban troops helped the MPLA to repel the South Africans and to defeat FNLA, but MPLA did not obtain a complete military victory. The internationalization of the conflict within the cold war context, and the internal conditions of the country converted Angola to a battlefield for the superpowers through their allies, SA, Zaire, Cuba, and other countries (Birmingham, 1992, p. 50, 51, 52).

The USA and USSR played ambivalent roles, supporting one of the two national combatants but at the same time trying to develop peace in the international forums. Portugal tried to maintain a neo-colonial influence and trade links, and eventually also became a mediator in the conflict. Other countries intervened in the conflict mediation but were discreetly supporting one party. For example Zaire and Zambia supported UNITA (Birmingham, 1992, p. 51, 80, 81, 84, 85, 113).

The civil war process continued sporadically. Meetings and agreements between UNITA and MPLA led to a series of failed peace attempts. For instance
both the Kenya meeting and the Alvor agreement in Portugal in 1975, the Bicesse Accords, signed in Lisbon in 1991, Luanda in 1991, the Abidjan meeting, in 1993, Libreville, and the Lusaka Protocol in 1994 were the most important (Republic of Angola, 1995).

The UNO made various attempts to forge peace in Angola. In 1988 the Security Council established a Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) with a mandate to verify the total withdrawal of Cuban troops. After that, in 1991, UNAVEM II was set up with a mandate to verify the implementation of the Bicesse Peace Accords. This process failed and another civil war erupted in November 1992. In 1993 UNO resumed mediation between the two warring parties. After some disruptions, peace appeared to be a reality with the Lusaka Protocol in 1994. UNITA and MPLA accepted the 1992 elections and agreed to establish a shared government. The Protocol set up an agenda for the peace talks, and addressed military and political issues, such as the acceptance of the Bicesse Peace Accords (AWEPA). The Protocol included the proportional demobilisation of both armies, the conversion of surplus of military personnel (involving their reintegration to civilian society), the integration of troops from both parties into a national army, and disarmament. UNAVEM III was established in 1995 and in 1997 its name was changed to MONUA. UNO therefore undertook progressive tasks: verification of accords, elections, mediation, demobilisation and reintegration (UNAVEM II, 1994).

During the UNO mission, the peace was sometimes broken by minor violent events, and in 1998 civil war resumed.

1.1.1 The Reintegration Project

Within the context of the guidelines of the Lusaka Protocol, two main programmes dominated the scenario of reintegration in Angola: the National Reintegration Programme (NRP) and the Support for the Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers. These programmes were developed respectively through
two institutions: the Institute for the Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-military (IRSEM), a national organisation, and its international counterpart the Counselling and Referral Service for Reintegration (SECOR). The NRP was based on the terms of a national document elaborated by the Joint Commission, and the SECOR Project Document (ProDoc) was elaborated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in consultation and co-ordination with contending parties. The NRP will be discussed in section 5.1.1.2 (UNDP, 1995; Joint Commission, 1996).

Even though SECOR was a component of the NRP due to mainly financial capacities, SECOR became significant in that it represented the core of the reintegration activities.

According to the ProDoc, the main target of the UNDP programme was to provide assistance to veterans, with a final objective of national reconciliation and peace (UNDP, 1995). This assistance was defined as follows:

1. technical assistance to the IRSEM in administration, financial management, programme planning and project development, monitoring and evaluation, mediation and conflict resolution, and information management systems;
2. establishing an organisation called SECOR together with IRSEM, at central level and in the 18 provinces, with the objective of setting up counselling and referral services for veterans; and
3. offering a decentralised Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) fund to support small projects developed by NGOs and other organised groups, which could facilitate reintegration through agriculture, small-scale rehabilitation and income generating projects (UNDP, 1995, p. 1 and 4).

The target beneficiaries of the project were the veterans of both armies consisting of approximately 103,000 soldiers. The distribution was: 23,000 soldiers from UNITA, 47,000 from government, plus 30,000 disabled troops and 3000 underage soldiers equally distributed within both parties. The execution of
the project was planned to begin immediately after the first veteran demobilisation (UNDP, 1995, p. 2 and 9).

Offering veterans assistance for a smooth transition to civilian life targeted their swift reintegration into communities, considering that as a volatile group they were a potential threat to peace. Effective demobilisation and reintegration processes would underpin sustainable peace. Reintegration was defined as "dependent on a clear definition and successful delivery of the material benefits to which beneficiaries were entitled" (UNDP, 1995, p. 3 and 8). Taking into account the examples of El Salvador and Nicaragua, the ProDoc highlighted the need to establish a decentralised mechanism comprising counselling, information and referral service to effect the linkage or interface between the veterans and the reintegration options and to help veterans to take decisions regarding vocational training, general education, job placement initiatives and QUIPs (UNDP, 1995, p. 3 and 8).

The sub-objectives and components of the programme included the following:

a) Technical assistance to MINARS in its endeavor to set up policies favorable to reintegration.

b) General and specialised training of staff, such as negotiating skills and conflict resolution.

c) Capacity building within IRSEM.

d) Establishment of a data processing unit to underpin the counselling and referral service as well as other projects.

e) Dissemination of information about benefits and reintegration options.

f) Development of reintegration options for vulnerable groups.

g) Evaluation of the interests of ex-military individuals contacting SECOR.

h) Coordinating with other institutions at provincial or national level.

i) Development of mechanisms for family tracing and reunification.

j) QIPs.

k) The International Labour Organisation (ILO) project, for vocational and business training.
I) Development of social and economic profiles of provinces to identify priority areas in order to implement productive activities.
m) Creation of project evaluation committees.

Based on these premises the expected results of the project were that:
• Ex-combatants would resettle and receive some assistance, and afterwards would become beneficiaries of the secondary projects developed by the Community Rehabilitation Programme (CRP).
• The organisational, administrative, financial and planning capacities of IRSEM consoli... ted.
• SECOR would assist a significant number of veterans with information about reintegration possibilities.
• Veterans would acquire skills and experience through QIPs.
• During the process of reintegration, communities would receive direct inputs from veterans, such as reconstruction and agricultural projects.
• Linkages developed between the government, UNITA, UNO, NGOs and other institutions.
• The reintegration would contribute to the stabilisation of the political and economic environment, by consolidating peace and opening the possibility of long term development programmes (UNDP, 1995, p. 9,10).

There were two predicted risks to the smooth development of the project: a breakdown of the agreements, and changes to the timetable (UNDP, 1995, p. 31).

The ProDoc established that delegates from the government, the executing agency and UNDP would review the project implementation through tripartite meetings, which had to be held at least every six months. The meetings would also review a final evaluation and report (UNDP, 1995, p. 32).
QIPs, as a component of the programme, had to facilitate the reactivation of productive activities in rural and peri-urban areas by providing funding and establishing partnerships to implement projects. The priorities were defined as agricultural, food security, and income generating projects as well as social and economic infrastructure rehabilitation (UNDP, 1995, pg. 14 and 26).

Another component, the programme Vocational Training and Micro Enterprise Promotion for Demobilised Soldiers comprised a partnership between MINARS, ILO, and UNDP. It focused on vocational training, credit for small business and micro-enterprise promotion (UNDP, Nov. 1995, p. 5, 14).

By analysing the reintegration programme guidelines it was possible to identify its framework. The programme aimed to contribute to the building of sustainable peace mainly by promoting the economic stabilisation of ex-military personnel through prioritising productive activities and economic self-sufficiency. The objective of the counselling and referral service was to implement interface mechanisms between veterans and reintegration opportunities as well as to disseminate information about the process. The reintegration alternatives were to be created through QIPs and the Vocational Training Programme. A special component was family tracing and reunification, which aimed at social reintegration.

The counselling service was restricted to information and linkages with productive activities and training. There were no references to the psychological damages inflicted on soldiers by war, to the needs for healing, for special human training, for addressing the change of mentality (from a military to a civilian position and way of thinking), for reconciliation, and for political reintegration. Social reintegration was to be achieved through resettlement and productive activities.

1.2 Research Question
Considering the complex Angolan environment (social, political and economic), what would be a suitable framework for a reintegration programme for veterans?

Considering that, the conversion process needed to ensure effective demobilisation and reintegration in order to avoid remobilisation and to underpin the peace process, it would be useful to know if the programme needed a special framework. Other approach than the one that offered veterans limited possibilities for economic self-sufficiency only. Such as training, tools, cash payments, technical assistance and credit support for self-employment, and temporary jobs. These possibilities for organised reintegration were considered to be limited because of the Angolan general context of poverty, scarcity, political instability and underdevelopment.

The literature regarding demobilisation and reintegration tended to group countries into specific classes, such as Latin American, Sub-Saharan countries, the Horn of Africa, and Eastern Europe. Despite this grouping of country experiences, the evaluation of and recommendations for any process generally took place within a human resources approach. In the case of countries with high rates of poverty, this provides only limited support for veterans through economic reintegration activities, which involves mainly employment, some medical aid and support for the disabled, and financial subsidies for the short phase of transition and training.

Attempts to forge peace in Angola failed, which implied that there must be missing elements in the process that prevented finding a solution to the conflict. It would be important to find these missing elements. This would entail a comprehensive research within the peace, political and conversion processes.

Because conversion is a component of the peace process, its implementation should take into account the characteristics of the peace process and the nuances of the environment.
With the objective of finding a basis for building a reintegration framework consistent with the Angolan peace process and environment, this research examined the levels of interdependence between the SECOR, the peace process and the general social, economic, and political environment.

This research project was developed around the following sub-questions:

- what specific framework was defined for the programme?
- what were the main features during the implementation of the programme? Were there gaps between the programme's design and its implementation with reference to the framework?
- what were the results with reference to social, economic and political reintegration? Did the project help to underpin the peace process and vice versa?
- What were the social, economical, cultural and political context?
- Are there similarities between this case and those described in the literature review?
- In the case of similarities or not, does this mean that the project needed a different framework?
- the utilisation of a different framework, could have helped to obtain better results and to underpin the peace process? By ensuring integration of demobilised personnel into communities and thus setting up a stable environment?

This report did not intend to be an evaluation of the project, but rather an analysis of the social and political conditions in Angola. In order to assess whether a certain type of framework would be an optimal approach for the reintegration of demobilised soldiers. The analysis also intended to show the close relationship between this project and the demobilisation process, and the extent to which weaknesses in the demobilisation process could negatively impact on reintegration.

1.3 Limitations of the Research
The fact that the Angolan parties never stopped fighting, and that after July 1998 the conflict worsened, made it difficult to collect information with the required accuracy. Interviews and contacts with UNITA members, which were necessary to obtain objective information, were very limited. Some interviews with people who had already left the country were carried out through the post or by electronic mail.

Interviews with the beneficiaries of the project were not possible. This was firstly because of the prevailing situation in the country, and secondly because the needed size for a sample to provide statistically meaningful results would require broader research than the one defined in the proposal, which could involve hiring personnel and the utilisation of equipment. Funds were insufficient for this.

The current research intended to serve as an exploratory investigation focusing on the framework of the programme, opening the debate for further research and experimentation if possible. A definitive answer was not the objective of this research report.

1.4 Rationale and Relevance of the Research

As explained in Section 1.1, since the arrival of Europeans in territory, Angola experienced a turbulent historical process, which seemed to involve an endless chain of conflicts. Events developed in such a way that national, regional and international powers competed for the control of resources and the defence of ideologies to the detriment of the Angolan population which have had to endure a situation of continuous war (Birmingham, 1992; Warner, 1991).

For different reasons, neighboring and other African countries including SA, Morocco, Togo, and Zimbabwe as well as overseas powers such as the USSR, the USA, Cuba and Portugal, played a role in the conflict. The cold war, the opportunity for high profits through weapons sales and diamonds trading; and the defence of oil enclaves, were reasons for foreign intervention, whether
Caught in this combination of forces, with foreigners participating also in the battlefields (SA and Cuba), it was the Angolan population, which suffered most. The unstable political environment blocked the country's development and the establishment of human rights. Living conditions in Angola, especially in the provinces, were harsh and miserable, with a preponderance of disease, famine, displacement, bombing, and other problems typical of war. Respondent 34 (1998): “The population is suffering indiscriminate attacks on villages, tortures, kidnapping, theft of belongings, villages are burned, administrators and traditional authorities called Sobas are killed. A significant number of attacks are carried out by UNITA but also by the MPLA. The Angolan National Police regularly abuses its power, demanding goods, harassing the population in check points ... There are gross violations of human rights”.

A continuous degradation of living conditions occurred in Angola. Humanitarian workers reported cases in which the circumstances were beyond human endurance. However, without a clear vision of its extreme situation, the population did not have a strong reaction against the war.

A Human Rights Watch (HRW) document reported abuses by both contending parties. The 205-page report (HRW, 1999) noted that a new form of abuse emerged, which has a clear political message: that of mutilations. Children were beaten, raped, enslaved for sexual purposes, forced to work, and forced to become UNITA soldiers. Women and young girls have become the primary targets of widespread rape, sexual slavery, and other forms of sexual violence. The sexual violence against women was also a way for the military to express dominance over the community, and it played the role of a rewards system for troops. Furthermore, the HRW reported that government troops generally behave as an occupying army. Heavy-handed actions were undertaken by government forces in areas in process of incorporation to its control. Some
abuse was reportedly carried out by poorly and irregularly paid individuals from the security forces, but a number of attacks appeared to be launched under the instructions of a superior officer. For example in the area of Kilolo near Luanda the Government’s inability to pay the army resulted in frequent and widespread extortion and theft (IRIN, 1999; HRW, 1999).

Respondent 50 (1999): “We went to a village ... the village lacked health services and medicines and some people were in need, schools had been destroyed and lacked equipment, houses were extremely poor. I saw war debris everywhere, tanks, jeeps and so on. In order to trade population had to travel on foot, taking many days and facing land mines dangers”

International Human Rights agreements establish the right of the population to enjoy peace and a consistent and continuous development process. But these were meaningless premises in the context of the Angolan political process. It would be thus, important to support any effort aiming at finding a solution to the conflict.

The complexity of the Angolan process requires support in the form of different types of analyses, such as theoretical explanations, an analysis of elements and background, and an analysis of proposed and already used solutions. Attempts to explain the diverse components of the civil war will contribute to solving the conflict.

Thus the rationale of this research report is to contribute a short analysis of an important component of the failed peace process: the reintegration of demobilised soldiers to civil society.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

In the last decade attempts to reduce military expenditure and resources resulted in large cuts in the capacity of the defence forces (BICC, 1996, p. 144). The main cause for this reduction was the end of the cold war. It was no longer necessary to maintain costly armies and financial difficulties created pressure for the reduction of the defence resources (BICC, 1996, p. 147). Another reason for the reduction was the transition from conflict to peace that brought about the conversion of war resources to civilian ones. Reduction and conversion were both components of the peace process (BICC, 1996, p. 16 to 19, 25; Cilliers, 1995, p. 4).
The Angolan conversion process was part of a political agreement with the objective of ending the civil war. The focus of this chapter is on the conversion processes undertaken in developing countries in the context of peace building. The expectation was that these processes would provide valid information and parameters for the analysis of the Angolan experience.

2.1 Definitions and General Considerations

Demilitarisation is the reduction of all military efforts in a society including cultural and psychological factors. Demilitarisation is considered a requirement for development following the logic that expenditure in military purposes dissipates scarce resources, political priorities and mentalities to emphasise conflict instead of development (Kaldo and Eide, 1996, p. 18).

Demilitarisation leads to disarmament. This includes the reduction of personnel (soldiers) including civilians working in associated areas, financial resources, land and infrastructure (bases), production and import capacity (weapons and other equipment), and science (military research and development). Reduction is proportional to installed capabilities. For this reason, in the post-cold war period, reduction in defence research and development has been carried out only in highly industrialised countries. Eastern European countries experienced downsizing mainly in defence production, eastern and western Europe (and other countries hosting foreign troops) experienced base closures; and African and central American countries experienced reduction of personnel and weapons only (BICC, 1996, p. 22).

Different authors see conversion as the transference of military resources for civilian purposes. Reduction and disarmament of personnel and their conversion to civilian life is facilitated through demobilisation and reintegration. In demobilisation, the armed forces, either from contending parties, the government or guerrillas, downsize or completely disband. Reintegration addresses the transference of veterans and their families from an unstable
military life to a peaceful civilian one, entailing psycho-social, political and economic changes and physical resettlement. The conversion process is very complex and results in both successes and failures. The chances of success depend, not only on the effectiveness of the process, but also on largely external factors, such as the economic situation of the country and the political context of the transition (BICC, 1996, p. 16; Cilliers, 1995, p. 13; Kazzora, 1998, p. 34; NGO Networking Service, 1995, p. 74).

Conversion requires investment. New machinery and marketing are necessary to change defence industries into other types of factories, and demobilisation involves training. The benefits of the short term financial disbursement for conversion can be appreciated mainly in the long term. However, as long term results are more difficult to assess than short term ones, investments are underestimated, and often rejected, with reintegration generally receiving less funding than other development endeavours (BICC, 1996, p. 20).

Conversion has some short term disadvantages such as job losses, economic dislocation, and social and political instability, which can be diminished if it takes place gradually. The advantages in the long term are reparation of war damage, resettlement, public works programmes, and the availability of skilled personnel to play a productive role in society. In this sense, conversion is a dynamic process, the benefits of which do not stop immediately after it is effected, but continue through time (BICC, 1996, p. 18 to 20).

The benefits of conversion, or the peace dividend, might not be evident, either because the military expenditure for it was effected through grants and loans from international donors which would not be available for civilian endeavours, or because reintegration expenses were high and absorbed the initial savings of demobilisation. One positive example was in Ethiopia, where there was a clear peace dividend that permitted increased allocation of resources to the health and educational sectors in spite of structural adjustment measures (BICC, 1996, p. 20; NGO Networking Service, 1995, p. 79, 80; Kazzora, 1998, p. 34).
On a general basis, conversion management should entail the assessment of available resources, the alternatives for application and accompanying costs, the decision making process, and the evaluation of results. Evidently a tension exists between the need for planning and the political uncertainty of countries in the transition from conflict to peace. However, there is an urgent need to link demobilisation and reintegration, to mobilise resources, to assess needs and to sensitise stakeholders (BICC, 1996, p. 21 and Kingma, 1998, p. 18).

Conversion might be smooth or otherwise depending on the type of resources, the economic environment and the conflicting interests of stakeholders. Some resources can easily be redirected for civilian use while others do not have an application in civil life or may require an initial investment for the conversion. For instance, cars can immediately be applied to civilian use, but soldiers need training. An economy providing funds and possibilities for personnel absorption facilitates conversion. However a depressed economy that is incapable of absorbing veterans would not satisfy the high demands of a transition period. Different standpoints could be difficult to co-ordinate, that is the private sector could ignore unemployment and conversion, veterans could exercise pressure for more benefits or they could lack motivation, the government might not wish to spend large sums on reintegration, opposing parties might not be cooperative and/or international organisations would not risk money and effort for a reintegration process (BICC, 1996, p. 21, 22).

Generally, authors consider demobilisation and reintegration as intertwined events which become complex because of the large number of people within the target group, the need to disperse soldiers in a short period of time, the need for institutional capacity, planning and supervision, and the security repercussions of a failed programme (Taju, 1998, p. 6). Furthermore, they include a large variety of activities, such as logistics issues, resettlement, weapons collection and control, political balancing, conflict resolution, support for psycho-social
problems, co-ordination of external assistance, employment efforts, and training (Kingma, 1998, p. 12; Ball, 1998).

**PHASES OF PERSONNEL CONVERSION.** Based on a comparative analysis of authors, Ball (1998, p. 21, 22) summarises demobilisation - reintegration as having four phases:

1. **Assembly:** soldiers go to camps for registration. They hand over their weapons, receive identification documents and attend briefings. The objective is to ensure weapons collection, to build personal confidence and trust in the peace process. In some cases soldiers are demobilised directly from barracks (Ball, 1998, p. 21, 22; Kingma, 1998, p. 14).

2. **Discharge, demobilisation and transport of soldiers to areas of resettlement:** Ex-fighters receive food and funds. The objective of transporting soldiers is to diminish costs and to ensure security. The recommendation, in a peaceful period, is to demobilise gradually over a period of years, but in the case of transition from conflict to peace, demobilisation is generally set up for a one-year period.

3. **Short-term reinsertion** provides veterans with basic support for a period, usually of two years. This includes shelter, medical care, food, clothing, tools, cash, advice, information and support for physically handicapped veterans. Psychological problems receive less attention.

4. **Long-term reintegration:** the objective is that veterans should attain financial independence through productive activities. Donors prefer assistance to be linked to economic revitalisation at a community level and to be not only for veterans but also for refugees and the internally displaced. The most commonly used support devices are cash payments, counselling, vocational training, apprenticeships, formal education, job generation, access to land, credit and technical assistance (Ball, 1998, p. 21, 22).

Phases One and Two constitute demobilisation and Phases Three and Four reintegration (Ball, 1998, p. 21).
Other authors found it useful to divide the process into two phases but recognise that there is an overlap in the nature of the demands inherent in demobilisation and reintegration, which become extended towards development and civilian life. These phases are as follows:

1. **Encampment**: veterans are disarmed and sent back to their home areas. This is an appropriate time to undertake surveys about veteran's profiles and preferences.

2. **Reintegration**: once in their homes, veterans need food assistance until they are able to harvest their own or to receive the first benefits of their work. They also need tools, draught animals, credit assistance and maybe family tracing. Communities have ongoing problems with living conditions which will be increased by the arrival of ex-combatants (NGO Networking Service, 1995, p. 84)

In Uganda the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB) defined four phases for the whole process:

1. **Discharge**, when a veteran was declared a civilian;
2. **Resettlement**, during a transition period of six month after discharge, when the veteran had to be assisted to set up a home;
3. A transitory 'safety net' package, or total cash payment given to veterans for resettlement, and 20 corrugated iron sheets;
4. **Reintegration**, comprise the total process through which the veteran is integrated into a community in the resettlement area. The veteran should feel part of, and be regarded as part of, a community (Mondo, 1995, p. 92).

The major actors in the demobilisation-reintegration process are:

- The government, which is normally responsible for the four phases. In countries where there is not a clear central authority, responsibilities need to be shared.
- The armed opposition which shares responsibilities with the government.
Veterans generally have little input in the transition process. In some cases they are involved in developing and implementing benefits and in counselling.

UNO peace keeping operations, which provides military, political and technical assistance to countries in transition. Main activities are selection, establishment, monitoring and provision of assembly areas (camps), discharge of soldiers, transportation, design and implementation of reintegration programmes and mediation on the whole political process.

UNO agencies and the World Bank, which help to fund the processes and which participate in development, implementation and monitoring of reintegration programmes.

Bilateral arrangements occur between governments for countries in transition.

Bilateral aid agencies that participated in funding, development, implementation and monitoring of reintegration programmes, for example USAID.

NGOs and PIOs, may also be involved, sharing development, implementation and monitoring of reintegration programmes (Ball, 1998, p. 24). NGOs present the advantages of their involvement in community based programmes, better capabilities to assess the needs of project beneficiaries and more flexibility to relate to communities and government (Spencer, 1997, p. 33)

As can be seen, the word ‘reintegration’ is widely used and the concept can take on different meanings depending on the nuances of the process. However, there has been some criticism against the use of this concept in the sense that it does not strictly consider the sociological implications. The main problem is
that the term can be misconstrued as the return of ex-combatants to communities that maintain past social characteristics and remain static. Instead, even though war dislocates people specially soldiers (among other groups), and exposes them to a different social and geographical environment, dramatic changes also occur in the country undergoing conflict, and the whole society is deeply damaged at all levels (Taju, 1998, p. 2)

For this research, the conversion of personnel is considered to imply the reduction or disbanding of a group of combatants or an army, including their geographical dispersion and their reinsertion into families and communities (Taju, 1998, p. 14; Brito & Mussanhane, 1997, p. 17). The reintegration aims would be to change the mental perception of the group of demobilised personnel, from identification of themselves as soldiers, to their identification with the community. This is in order to avoid possible disruption of the peace process and security (Brito & Mussanhane, 1997; Taju, 1998, p. 14). It is understood that the war affected everyone in the communities (stayers, newcomers, the displaced, those who return, and refugees) as well as the general environment, and that reintegration involves a sense of belonging to a community with all its activities: economic, social, cultural and political (Taju, 1998, p. 13 and 14).

2.2 Some Reintegration Experiences in Countries that Went Through Peace Processes

Various countries in central America and Africa underwent demobilisation and reintegration as a consequence of peace agreements or post-conflict arrangements. Examples of this are: Namibia, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Nigeria, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Haiti and Guatemala, amongst others (BICC, 1996, p. 150, 152).

Some demobilisation and reintegration exercises were not successful. Somalia failed in an attempt to reduce the size of the army mainly due to political

In addition to the justifications for the use of comparison between countries, given at the beginning of this chapter, further reasons for seeking information from the experiences of other countries are that, firstly UNO participated in nearly all the reintegration processes in these countries, including Angola, and secondly that some staff who participated in other reintegration experiences with UNO also worked in Angola. This meant that approaches, techniques and information that were previously applied to other countries could also have been used in Angola. Consequently, the experiences of other countries might have had influence in the Angolan process.

### 2.2.1 Namibia (1989 – 1994)

In Namibia reintegration only started because ex-combatants created problems and perpetrated violence, complaining about lack of support from the government in their transition to civilian life (BICC, 1996, p. 150).

Two main features characterised the reintegration context: the ex-combatants' lack of skills, and the scarcity of jobs in the small private sector. The solutions were to implement vocational training and viable projects where the veterans could be productively deployed. This meant that the process was focused on the economic area (Shikangalah, 1995, p. 70; Taju, 1998, p. 7).

The Development Brigades created under the Ministry of Lands Resettlement and Rehabilitation constituted the central body for reintegration. It engaged in, for example water drilling, brick making, poultry farming, and the construction of houses and others (Shikangalah, 1995, p. 70).
ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION: Until mid-1994 about 4,000 trainees had passed through the Brigades, of whom 15% afterwards found jobs in the private sector, 20% in the public service, and 55% ran their own businesses, which were mostly co-operatives and partnerships. Nonetheless management skills and financial assistance continued to be problems, but in general some success was achieved (Shikangalah, 1995, p. 70).

THE LESSONS learned from Namibia were that planning is a basic requirement for success. Pre-definition of targets, coordinating with stakeholders, analysis of the long-term perspectives, and consultation would avoid future delays, and compulsory, costly and difficult corrections of the project design. Another lesson was that the socio-economic rehabilitation of ex-combatants should be treated as a national endeavour regardless of political affiliations, because hunger and marginalisation lead to instability (Shikangalah, 1995, p. 70).

2.2.2 Zimbabwe (1980 - 1993)

In Zimbabwe armies and guerrillas were integrated prior to demobilisation. The mandate of the Demobilisation Directorate (within the Ministry of Labour and Social Services) was to assist veterans in their placement within public and private sectors. This included training for those wanting to implement micro-business. Trainees received some cash during the training period, for a maximum of two years (Rupiah, 1995, p. 28, 34).

Internal and external factors hampered demobilisation and reintegration. The internal political context was not stable. Lack of co-operation, some sabotage and bad propaganda emerged during reintegration. Factions were still not integrated and as weapons had not been effectively collected during demobilisation, violence arose in some regions, with harassment of the population and disturbance of the projects led by veterans. The peace agreements tied the country to the old establishment for a period of 10 years, and African fighters' expectations of a big change in the economic context were
disappointed, especially regarding the old problem of land taken by Europeans. Externally, Zimbabwe suffered from the destabilisation policies of South Africa (Rupiah, 1995, p. 28, 30, 39, and De Waal, 1990, p.). Some problems evidenced during conversion were corruption, speculation, administrative problems and lack of adequate planning and counselling. The conversion programme was grossly inadequate to prepare ex-combatants for their return to civilian society because of the inefficient assessment of the needs of veterans, the environment, the labour market, and the lack of adequate support. For example, the monthly allowance allocated to veterans was too small. Because of the lack of adequate counselling some veterans lost money at the hands of unscrupulous dealers. The lack of management skills and shortage of capital were the main reasons for the failure of business and co-operatives. After that the Department of Co-operatives began to support planning and design of projects, administering surveys prior to making any disbursements. Nonetheless, there were some successful cases where members were skilled and had experience (Museumwa, 1995, p. 46; Rupiah, 1995, p. 35, 36).

The government’s first initiative was to implement a large-scale programme called Operation SEED, which aimed to provide agricultural work by ex-combatants on land acquired by the government. However, the lack of information and consultation with veterans promoted the failure of the project. Ex-combatants regarded the project with suspicion and considered it to be a government’s device to move them away from the army. White Rhodesians increased the suspicion with their anti-government propaganda (Museumwa, 1995, p. 46).

In terms of employment, the private sector did not absorb ex-combatants on a significant basis. The lack of skills and the antipathy towards ex-fighters were the main reasons. The establishment of minimum wages and subsidies for companies employing veterans was seen as an excessive measure.
Furthermore, ex-combatants were seen as a possible source for importing socialist doctrines (Musemwa, 1995, p. 47).

The idea of co-operatives was well received by ex-combatants, but the weight of reality and the lack of adequate assistance (including psychological advice and assistance) destroyed them (Cilliers, 1994; Moyo, 1985, p. 7). The biggest problem was a serious drought during the period 1982 to 1984 which had a negative impact on the new co-operatives. Violent conflicts between ex-combatants from different factions also affected co-operatives and their members. Other negative factors were the absence of general ancillary services such as preferential credit, technical advice, pricing schemes, market contracts and surveys, and foreign exchange support, as well as fraud and the irresponsibility of members. Co-operatives did not have access to credit because a lack of collateral capacity, they had to compete with well-established small and large enterprises, and also had to cope with high overhead expenses.

To improve the situation some institutions were created, as for example the Zimbabwean Development Bank and the Small Enterprises Development Corporation, but they could not change the situation (Musemwa, 1995, p. 47).

SOCIAL REINTEGRATION: Female ex-combatants faced many social and psychological problems in their path to reintegration. They did not accept a return to traditional roles of submission after having lived within the same status as men in the bush. Civilian men were frightened by ex-combatants and found them difficult to deal with, particularly because they could not be intimidated and knew how to defend themselves. For these reasons some female ex-combatants married male ex-combatants, reinforcing social patterns inherited from the war (Musemwa, 1995, p. 50).

All these problems illustrated the lack of government support, and veterans decided to form an organisation, the Zimbabwe War Veterans Association (ZWVA), the objective of which was to support ex-combatants and to liaise with the government to improve assistance. In the midst of the political difficulties politicians regarded the ZWVA with suspicion. The association was regarded as
a contending political party. As a consequence, the bureaucracy and politicians created obstacles to the establishment and implementation of ZWVA (Musemwa, 1995, p. 51).

ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION: The total number of ex-combatants was 70,000. Demobilisation began by 1981. Figures varied according to sources, but Srivasta (1994, p. 7) noted that from the first 35,000 demobilised, 54% were absorbed into economic activities by 1983, and the rest presented a variety of problems. Some other authors noted that between 44.4% and 51.02% of veterans received some type of support, and that by the end of the programme a large number of veterans were unemployed (Rupiah, 1995, p. 28, 34; Musemwa, 1995, p. 45, 46). Thus by 1993, 12 years after demobilisation, ex-combatants were still struggling to find economic self-sufficiency.

Summing up: The main characteristics of the conversion in Zimbabwe were the integration of armies prior to demobilisation, the implementation by the government of a fairly uniform national programme, rather than a group of sub-projects, and an emphasis on agriculture. Reintegration was based on training, education and work on commercial projects, without adequate planning, administration, counselling and assistance. Micro-business and co-operatives lacked the special economic facilities necessary to survive. The government failed to define the role of veterans in the new society. Corruption and speculation had a negative impact on reintegration activities. Politicians created more tension for veterans due to arrogance and lack of sensitivity in considering veterans' problems. Finally, internal and external political factors increased the difficulties of reintegration, such as South Africa's foreign policies (Musemwa, 1995, p. 50 - 55)

2.2.3 Mozambique (1993 - 1997)

In Mozambique, under the general framework of a peace agreement, both contending parties, the National Resistance for Mozambique (RENAMO) and
the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) proceeded to demobilise and reintegrate during the period from 1993 to 1995. This included the disbandment of private armed groups such as those hired by overseas investors for the security of installations (Stephen, 1995, p. 58).

The United Nations Organisation for Mozambique (ONUMOZ) oversaw, implemented and funded the whole process. A division of responsibilities between different organisations took place (Stephen, 1995, p. 59, 60). After handing over weapons and equipment, the demobilised soldiers were registered. Then received an identity card and a demobilisation certificate. Discharged soldiers received clothes, seeds, agricultural tools, and cash subsidies. They and their dependants were transported to their areas of resettlement, and were entitled to a cash compensation. After that, they entered the reintegration system (Stephen, 1995, p. 60; Taju, 1998, p. 50).

Many problems during demobilisation caused delays in the process, beyond the planned period. The cease-fire, established by the peace agreement, was interrupted due to political tactics, distrust and communication problems. Bureaucracy with regard to conversion was slow and inefficient. Whilst Srivastava (1994, p. 6) noted that, in the assembly areas, soldiers received counselling and information about the peace process, civilian life, the reintegration programme, basic literacy, public health and, the environment, for Stephen (1995, p. 61) demobilisation included some programmes for literacy, and counselling but little of this could be implemented on the large scale.

The Mozambican reintegration focused narrowly on economic activities, especially peasant agriculture (Coelho & Vines, 1995, p. 8). Efforts focused on small-scale projects nationwide, opposed to the Zimbabwean approach of centralised development brigades. The government created the Reintegration Commission (CORE) to support veterans after demobilisation (Stephen, 1995, p. 59). Thirty-one NGOs co-operated in the areas of socialisation, training and job creation through a working group, which included the Association of the
Demobilised (ADEMO). The understanding that sustainable development was, “likely to depend to an unknown extent on the successful outcome of reintegration projects country wide” promoted the participation of NGOs (Stephen, 1995, p. 63).

The UNO approach prioritised the well being of ex-combatants over other groups, giving them more support (for example more food), during the transition period, in order to ensure order, discipline and stability during the peace process (Ajello, 1996, p. 10). Underdevelopment, the consequences of war and the land mines problems constituted a negative environment for reintegration (Stephen, 1995, p. 63).

**SOCIAL REINTEGRATION.** Some child soldiers were reunited with their families, while others failed to adjust to rural life and returned to the bush or joined gangs of urban street children (Stephen, 1995).

Stephen (1995, p. 63, 65) noted that there was a flow of veterans to urban areas, not only as a natural consequence of poverty, but also because payments had to be collected at provincial capitals where the bureaucracy was set up which in turn increased the pressure for employment in those areas. Ex-soldiers with illegally held weapons led to an increase in armed robbery. And in 1994 ADEMO threatened a national strike in order to pressurise the government regarding more support for reintegration.

During the war many women were forced to assume the role of sex workers, and some kind of hierarchy existed between them. Some women were considered to have a kind of spousal or wifely role, or used as ‘sexual company’. One of their duties was to recruit women for sexual purposes. Others did manual work. For these reasons women avoided resettling in areas where they were known, so that they could hide the fact that they had previously been RENAMO members which often implied that they were sex workers or recruited sex workers for the soldiers them (Taju, 1998, p. 35, 36).
Traditional healing ceremonies helped to soothe sensitivities between demobilised and other groups, and somehow communities pressured ex-combatants to carry out those rituals (Taju, 1998, p. 56).

Some problems that appeared in the resettlement process were, some discontent when demobilised personnel returned home with nothing for their families, some prejudice from the communities regarding veterans, some arrogance manifested by veterans who wanted to maintain their old military dominance, and some resentment from other groups regarding the assistance given to ex-combatants. However, generally speaking, the veterans achieved good social integration into communities (UNRISD, 1997, Part II, p. 10, 11).

ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION: Comparison of all four reports showed the following:

- Through the joint support of the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), and an open fund for demobilised soldiers, many ex-combatants found employment (GTZ, 1998, p. 10).

- For the United Nations Institute for Research and Development (UNRISD), the reintegration programmes had little influence on the reinsertion process, which was spontaneously underpinned by families and communities (UNRISD, 1997, Part III, p. 4). This report had dichotomous viewpoints. On the part of the government and staff responsible for the reintegration programme, the situation of ex-combatants after two years of demobilisation was that they faced the same conditions of living as other groups. The veterans' opinion was that the programme did little to give them equality, and they demanded more support (UNRISD, 1997, Part II, p. 10,11). The process in rural areas was smooth, whilst some 30,000 ex-combatants in the cities of Maputo and Beira found themselves isolated and lacking support for employment (Project Group for Mozambique, 1997).

- For Taju (1998, p. 61), the Mozambican process targeted neither demilitarisation nor a wider social transformation, but only the dismantling of
the contending armies and the formation of a new one. The ex-combatants' reintegration process departed from the violent and miserable life within a war context, and changed this context to one of poverty and scarcity in the villages. Employment was the major source of the tension and complaints between ex-combatants. In rural areas farming work could not provide them with cash for new investments, there were some problems regarding land access, and the market was small. These problems added pressure for jobs to the already existing demand from urban ex-combatants. Nonetheless, Taju accepts that the overall portrait is that veterans are living in the same poverty, unemployment and growing inequality as other groups (Taju, 1998, p. 41, 44, 45, 61).

POLITICAL REINTEGRATION: With the funding from international donors, the guerrilla force, RENAMO, was transformed into a political party. However, it was difficult to attract the support of donors, and some countries lacked the legal instruments for financial transfers (Ajello, 1996, p. 11).


- The reintegration process should be planned in advance; preferably before a peace agreement is reached.
- The following factors should be taken into account when planning: the socio-cultural characteristics typical in resettlement areas, the social profile of soldiers, reintegration strategies that should be complementary (being one a complement of each other); and the need for an efficient mechanism for dissemination of information and for mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation.
- The basis of reintegration efforts should be families and communities. These represent an investment to ensure acceptance and support of ex-combatants through productive and social networks. Such facilitation would
consolidate the socio-economic and psychological stability of veterans, gradually effacing their identity as demobilised soldiers.

- Urban reintegration needs more study, and is more complex because of the absence of networks of solidarity.
- The dialogue between ex-combatants and the government should be continuous and should include other stakeholders such as employers and the disabled.
- Policy processes need to be more participative (Taju, 1998)

**Summing up:** Due to the fact that the reintegration programme policy process was 'top down' there were two different concepts running in parallel. Leaders and staff responsible for the programme expected veterans simply to return to the same poor conditions as other social groups, while ex-combatants wanted to be part of a wider process of reconstruction that would acknowledge their roles in society and reward them for the losses of war. For the first group reintegration was a success, but for the second group it was not (Taju, 1998, p. 10, 17; Dolan and Schafer, 1997, p. 180).

### 2.2.4 The Horn of Africa (1991 – 1994)

Conversion of personnel took place in regions that were devastated by decades of war during which food production and infrastructure were commonly destroyed, violence and famine brought about displacement, military costs were a burden on budgets, and health and educational systems became very weak. Consequently the needs of the population were enormous (NGO Networking Service, 1995, p. 79).

In the case of Somalia, UNO operations withdrew in March 1995, and its mandate was largely unfulfilled (Liu, p. 3).

Experience showed that reintegration programmes had to be integrated within the wider social context to address the needs of veterans and the community.
together. This was that ex-combatants were not considered to be a special group for a long time. For instance, in Ethiopia the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) undertook in-depth discussions with the community on areas of resettlement, to incorporate their opinions in the programme planning (NGO Networking Service, 1995, p. 79).

Resources were allocated for the provision of land, credit and training. Due to the fact that in agricultural regions land was a key to reintegration, and also because of the Ugandan success with land grants, allocation of land was a goal; even though the programme encountered problems in this endeavour. For example, some veterans were away for long periods, and on their return the probabilities of maintaining land claims were small. In Eritrea veterans returned to areas with high population density and little or no land was available (NGO Networking Service, 1995, p. 80, 81).

The lack of formal employment in Ethiopia and Eritrea called for the promotion of self-employment. Learning from Uganda’s experience, where access to credit was a big problem, Ethiopia suppressed the need for collateral and interest was charged in a ‘soft’ manner. This resulted in some criticism from an economic standpoint because the administration of this system was more costly than it would be to install a grants mechanism. The Reintegration Commission, however, felt that the scheme had a social objective: to afford ex-combatants the possibility of being self-reliant and responsible by repaying their loans. For the donors, it was difficult to accept this idea and its value needed to be analysed in the light of results (NGO Networking Service, 1995, p. 80, 81).

Training was extremely important, particularly for credit schemes, and for the disabled who were not capable of returning to agricultural work. A high investment in training created capabilities for the disabled which obviated the resentment that arose in Uganda where there was no special provision for them, and where the government transferred this responsibility to the communities. In
addition to training the need for political education was an issue (NGO Networking Service, 1995, p. 80, 81).

The demobilised came from different backgrounds. Some, were mostly conscripts from structured armies, others emanated from less structured militias, or from clan militia groups operating freelance style, and from armed groups that used to engage in banditry. Soldiers could have an urban or rural background, could be part of the police force or members of district committees or regional groups. The most disadvantaged were women (around 30% of soldiers in Eritrea), children, the disabled, and dependents (NGO Networking Service, 1995, p. 75, 76; Klingebiel et al, 1995). It is important to highlight that in Ethiopia soldiers from three armed groups were demobilised but another militia in the East and South was not demobilised although they received support from NGOs (Spericer, 1995).

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL REINTEGRATION. The changes suffered by veterans during the war, and the political differences between them and the community made reintegration difficult. How veterans coped with reintegration varied according to their cultural backgrounds. Thus, programme approaches had to recognise cultural differences in their effort to alleviate psycho-social issues. Food security was, of course, top priority, but counselling was not a luxury. There would always be a percentage of veterans who were incapable of leaving bad experiences in the past and who would definitely need assistance. At least a few trained individuals and a support system was needed (NGO Networking Service, 1995, p. 82, 83).

Women faced special difficulties with regard to reintegration. They took steps towards autonomy during the war but upon their return to civil society they suffered a confrontation with the expectations of traditional African roles for women. The gender based limitations for jobs constituted another hurdle to their adjustment. In Eritrea and Ethiopia, some efforts opened new opportunities for women. In Eritrea nonetheless the support was Insufficient. There were
problems between couples, and divorce was a clear trend among veterans (NGO Networking Service, 1995, p. 83; Klingebiel et al., 1995, p. 3,5).

Child soldiers were numerous, and their reintegration was very difficult because they knew only the military style of life. There were some family reunification efforts by UNICEF and Swedish Save the Children. In order to support the disabled a high level of input was needed (NGO Networking Service, 1995, p.75, 76, 83).

Soldiers were a high-risk group for sexually transmitted diseases. For example, in North Omo, Ethiopia, the incidence of AIDS cases grew as a result of the arrival of veterans. This created an urgent need for training, counselling, information and family support (NGO Networking Service, 1995, p. 75, 76).

THE LESSONS stemming from this experience were as follows:

• Peace-builders and humanitarians should work together in an effort to consolidate peace and security through conversion, which is an important link to regional and human security, and consequently to development (Erskine, 1995)

• The conditions for successful conversion were: a) political will and cessation of hostilities by all parties, and the need for a credible central authority, b) reconciliation, by improving civil-military relations, prevention and management of conflicts, and consideration of social and economic implications, c) an agreed framework and advance planning, including a peace treaty, the needs assessment, the mobilisation of resources, and, overall, a vision of the situation of the soldier after the conflict, d) disarmament which should ensure transparency and safe disposal of surplus weapons, taking into consideration the cultural issues attached to the use of light weapons. Control of light weapons
would help to strengthen the peace process, d) reintegration support should analyse some factors of the ex-combatants' profile, such as gender, age, disabilities, rural or urban background and experience. Special consideration should be given to psycho-social counselling, capacity building and donors' commitment to a long term process (Kingma, Mason and Stiebens, 1995).

- Constraints on reintegration were a lack of resources, poor socio-economic conditions, resistance to change by soldiers, limited access to land for agriculture, and environmental degradation. One useful parameter for effectiveness could be to avoid possible pressures in reintegration. For instance, in Ethiopia fighters chose a low-density area to resettle and avoided high-density regions with all their economic implications of scarcity (Sayers, 1995 and Mason, 1995).

- Consensus that the lack of economic alternatives encouraged fighting opened the debate between two concepts. The first one was that a peace agreement and the cessation of hostilities are requirements for demobilisation. The second one was that, in the case of persistent violence, another solution would be to give soldiers an alternative source of income to encourage them to voluntarily demobilise, in this way promoting national reconciliation. For instance Somalia and Sudan (Spencer, 1995; Sayers & Gwi-yeop, 1995).

- Frequently there was a gap between the funds planned for a project and the amount received from donors. The slow response from donors was attributed to their lack of awareness and inexperience with demobilisation and reintegration activities, avoidance of military issues, competition with other projects and scarcity of resources on the Horn of Africa (Spencer, 1995).

- There was a need to balance the support given to ex-combatants as a target group, with the support to community development. This was to avoid social disturbances due to complaints from groups that were not receiving benefits (Spencer, 1995).

- In Somalia and Sudan it was a sign of prestige to carry a weapon, but
different methods of control could have been implemented, such as control of ammunition, compulsory hand-over, or a gun-back programme (Spencer, 1995).

- The political tendencies in the Horn of Africa called for a regional approach for demobilisation and reintegration (Spencer, 1995).
- Reintegration needed a general process of democratisation (Spencer, 1995).
- There was a need for evaluation as to how reintegration addressed economic and social objectives (NGO Networking Service, 1995, p. 81, 82).
- Training had to be designed to take into consideration the market’s characteristics so as to provide a means of living for veterans. Training could be capital intensive in some cases when infrastructure required initial investments (NGO Networking Service, 1995, p. 81, 82).
- Political education for veterans was a difficult issue for governments and donors. The unstable political environment of Africa and its weak democracies rendered it sensitive for veterans, as new citizens, to receive tools that would permit them to participate in civil society. For instance the Ugandan army undertook political education prior to demobilisation, holding group discussions during encampment. This concerned donors because of its undertones of political indoctrination (NGO Networking Service, 1995, p. 81, 82).

2.2.5 El Salvador (1992 - 1996)

After the peace accord was signed in 1992, El Salvador demobilised 8,000 soldiers and 6,450 injured non-combatants and politicians from opposition (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, FMLN), and the army downsized by 50% (30,000). Reduction applied to diverse bodies, such as the Treasury Police and the National Intelligence Department, as well as five other counter-
insurgency forces. The process fell under the observation, mediation and participation of ONUSAL (BICC, 1996, p. 152; ONUSAL, 1997, p. 3).

The main weakness of this demobilisation was the poor management of disarmament, which promoted the dispersion of weapons, increased the crime rate and opened possibilities for violence in the unstable political context. A positive lesson learnt from this process was that early and adequate planning for demobilisation and encampment proved successful (Spencer, 1997, pg. 61 and BICC, 1996, pg. 164).

The reintegration programme was part of the National Reconstruction Plan financed mainly by international funds and developed by the Secretariat for National Reconstruction (SRN). Participation by NGOs was limited in the beginning, but improved later. Apparently, NGOs that had worked previously in FMLN areas faced more obstacles in acquiring funds for projects (Spencer, 1997, p. 51, 52).

Reintegration, as defined in the Chapultepec Accord, constituted diverse efforts including employment opportunities, pension programmes, housing schemes, business activities, temporary payments, scholarships, counselling, ‘start’ packages, vocational and technical training, credit for micro-business, treatment and technical assistance for the disabled, as well as training and credit for mid-level commanders, and reconciliation, educational and psychosocial care for children suffering from war trauma, and addressed needs if literacy, water, rural electrification, health and education. The core reintegration effort was the programme for land transference and titles, including agricultural credit and technical assistance (Spencer, 1997 p. 53 to 59 and BICC, 1996, p. 166).

Reintegration was also composed of technical assistance to the SRN in the design and implementation of programmes, in the purchase, storage and distribution of emergency packages and, after one year of demobilisation, the
assessment of the status and needs of ex-combatants. It also included capacity building with local NGOs (Spencer, 1997, p. 56, 57).

The reintegration process was affected by an insufficiency of funds, as donors preferred to support environmental and infrastructural projects. This was also aggravated by the government's poor administration, implementation and abuse of power (as the major receptor of funds). The land distribution project faced problems with administration, credit, poor quality of land, a greater number of beneficiaries than originally expected, and problems with owners, landholders and veterans. These caused delays and had a negative impact on complementary projects such as training and credit for agriculture. Only one third of the land was distributed. All these problems resulted from an apparent lack of political will on the part of the government. Finally, there was a lack of coordination between the government, military, donors and NGOs regarding the programme implementation, and projects had the characteristic of temporary assistance, without offering any long-term development possibilities (BICC, 1996, p. 166; Spencer, 1997, p. 44, 45, 46, 66).

The environment during the transition period was characterized by politically and economically motivated violence, with the presence of armed groups and death squads. The police could not control the high crime rate due to financial problems, weak organisation and a proliferation of organised crime and weapons. The judicial system was unable to guarantee citizens' rights, and the new police force was responsible for human rights violations. The Truth Commission reported that military and death squads were responsible for violence. This incurred the anger of top officials who thought a similar investigation should be carried out with FMLN. Furthermore during the first years of reconstruction, contending parties experienced counterproductive disagreements. The government wanted to provide assistance in war areas and to implement reintegration programmes while the FMLN desired to effect changes in the economic areas which wealthy people used to dominate (Spencer, 1997, p. 44, 45, 46; BICC, 1996, p. 164).
SOCIAL REINTEGRATION. Reintegration support for the 11% of veterans who were female was limited and they faced similar problems to those of Uganda and Nicaragua. The problems were labelled as the 'demobilised women reintegration syndrome' (DWRS). During the war women were treated as equals but on their return to civil society and their communities they faced a male dominated society and a poor economy. They could not be trained since no childcare was available. It was obvious that women needed special assistance in terms of legal matters, counselling, health services, education, training, and employment. The consequence was the emergence of a feminist movement led mainly by female ex-combatants, and the positive impact was the creation of at least a dozen women's organisations (Spencer, 1997, p. 47).

In El Salvador children were systematically used in the wars by force; nonetheless, reintegration efforts were very poor for them.

By late 1994 reintegration was still far from complete, and ongoing violence created discontent between veterans who began to form associations to pressurise the government to implement the benefits negotiated in the Peace Accord. Sometimes complaints took a violent undertone. Several associations of demobilised soldiers held forums and created strategies for development, regarding physical, psychological and occupational rehabilitation. The associations participated in negotiations to protect the rights of the disabled, and held workshops and training programmes (Spencer, 1997, p. 48, 49).

Violence was a resistant characteristic and showed the importance of training veterans in conflict resolution skills (Spencer, 1997, p. 63).

POLITICAL REINTEGRATION. The Joint Group for the Investigation of Politically Motivated Illegal Armed Groups was created to address the problem of violence against former FMLN commanders, which was composed of ex-combatants, activists and politicians. The group found that besides common criminal violence, there were some actions that were aimed at discourage
people from participating in reforms within the country. The new economic policies, coupled with the existing underdevelopment, resulted in the creation of an organisation to retaliate against the government, The Revolutionary Front for the defence of the People (FRDP). There were five other clandestine groups operating as vigilantes against crime whose members expressed frustration about poor economic conditions (Spencer, 1997, p. 48, 50).

**ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION.** The complaints of ex-combatants regarding the economic policies, the lack of support for reintegration and reconstruction, and the high crime and unemployment rates, showed clearly that economic reintegration was not successful. A UNO report in January 1996 stated that reintegration still experienced problems with credit, technical assistance and human resettlement. Veterans were not able to fulfil their own needs. There was a danger in the possibility of social unrest, but on the positive side was the improvement of the Land Transfer Programme (Spencer, 1997, p. 46).

Due to various factors the government was unable to accomplish successful reintegration; the economic reforms and the stabilisation package made it difficult to finance. The poor economic conditions of the country, the incomplete disarmament, the complaints of ex-combatants and their lack of skills, and a weak judicial system combined with the policies regarding budget allocations hampered reintegration. Social security, welfare and education received very low budget allocations compared with those for defence (Spencer, 1997, pg. 43, 68).

**2.2.6 Nicaragua (1990 - 1996)**

The Managua Protocol on Disarmament was signed in 1990. This agreement set up a basis for demobilisation, free elections and some political reforms. Demobilisation applied to 68,000 Popular Sandinista Army (EPS) that is government troops, and 23,000 National Resistance (RN), also known as Contras or the opposition (Spencer, 1997, p. 9, 10, 17, 18).
The main weakness of demobilisation was the poor management of disarmament that later influenced the crime rate, opened possibilities for violent complaints from groups in the process of reintegration, and deepened political differences. Other problems were that UNO, OAS and USAID activities lacked co-ordination; the number of Contras ex-combatants to be demobilised was larger than planned; and ONUCA’s mandate was too limited. It was also very difficult to control movements of Contras and Sandinistas because demobilisation was on a voluntary basis (Spencer, 1997, p. 17, 25 to 28).

Contras were encamped in eight security zones, where they handed over weapons, uniform and equipment voluntarily. They received briefings preparing them for civil life and training for literacy, numeracy, agriculture, art and crafts, income generating activities, health and sanitation. Upon discharge veterans were provided with a Demobilisation Certificate and received clothes, a bag of rice, and beans providing for seven months of assistance. The Special Disarmament Brigade, composed of members of both contending parties, negotiated for the demobilisation of other groups. The Sandinista Army was converted into the Nicaraguan Army and a gradual retrenchment was carried out from 1990 to 1995 (Washington Post, 1997, p. 15; IISS, 1997, p. 6; CAII, 1997, p. 32, 33).

Typical characteristics of veterans were their youth (60% of NR were under 25 years of age by 1990), and their lack of skills. They had fought for many years without previous education and work experience; some of them had a farming background and wanted to return to this activity but needed land and credit (Spencer, 1995, p. 22).

The economic environment was not supportive of reintegration. Lending institutions imposed adjustment programmes as a prerequisite for more assistance. Foreign aid that helped to reduce inflation increased the debt and was withdrawn by the early 1990s; 80% of foreign loans went to debt service.
The unemployment rate was 60%. Consequently the government lacked resources for conversion (Spencer, 1997, p. 21, 22).

The political environment was very unstable and there was a general state of public insecurity, however, violence decreased towards 1996. The northern regions continued suffering under violence. The incapability of the government to succeed with the reintegration programme, the struggles for land, and the 'jealousy' about what other groups were receiving or possessed gave rise to armed groups. These groups fought among themselves or against the government, kidnapped and killed people, robbed banks, effected takeovers of private and public property, set up blockades and used death-squad tactics. In 1993, after an amnesty offered by the government, many groups disarmed, but some continued their association, changing their tactics to those of negotiation (Spencer, 1997, p. 26 to 28).

In this context reintegration was developed as a combination of different reactive efforts and not as a national integrated programme. For example, an armed group was successful in obtaining a favourable agreement with the government which included an agricultural development plan, the withdrawal of the army from that area (Quilali), the inclusion of Contras in the local police force, and US $1.5 million to support development (Spencer, 1997, p. 28).

Another example was the 'development Poles' negotiated by the NR. In 23 development areas the Contras would receive land, assistance for agriculture, infrastructure, credit and development. The government promised schools, hospitals, water, electricity, roads, start-up costs and titles for land. Some members saw the poles as a path to reintegration but others saw them as a tool used by the government to keep veterans far from the daily life of the country. Sandinistas were envious of the Polés project because the government did not offer the rest of the population anything similar. Finally, this endeavour failed because of lack of assistance (Spencer, 1997, p. 18, 23).
Reintegration programmes dealt with housing, land, training, health care, education, agriculture, fishing, schools, health centres, construction of roads, small-scale loans for production and employment. It also included reconciliation, distribution of materials, medicine and food; and support for the disabled in a broad context like medical assistance, workshops and the production of prostheses, crutches and wheelchairs; psycho-social rehabilitation, training; and an integrated project for accommodation including co-operatives, infrastructure, houses, services, workshops with machinery and technical assistance. Other projects contemplated counselling, support for social reintegration, and capacity building; the attaining of legal documents, other legal and technical assistance, especially technical assistance for project design, the empowering of women's and disabled people's organisations; (Spencer, 1997 p. 30, 31; Speth, 1997, p. 31; WB, 1997, p. 31, 32; CAII, 1997, p. 33).

An 'Action for Peace' project offered courses in conflict resolution, and project and community development, after which a network of promoters was created from the successful participants of those courses (Spencer, 1997, p. 33, 34).

Reintegration was negatively affected by the lack of planning, the government's inefficient implementation of programmes, and the negative reaction to support projects from some organisations, which apparently favoured resistance. The lack of funds made training, counselling, technical support, access to credit and support for the disabled insufficient. Coordination between donors, government, military and NGOs was weak. The 'land reform' was ineffective due to inappropriate policies from the Sandinista and the new governments. Mines added another hurdle to this reintegration (Spencer, 1997, p. 23, 35).

SOCIAL REINTEGRATION. Female ex-combatants faced similar problems to those reported in other countries. Returning home meant returning to traditional roles. In addition women were excluded from land distribution. Many women were forced to enter the informal sector and to live in conditions of poverty.
Some organisations were established to support female ex-combatants, widows, and mothers of the victims of war (Spencer, 1997, p. 25). Even though they endured extreme difficulties women were instrumental in the reconciliation process. Mothers encouraged reconciliation between family members and friends (Spencer, 1997, p. 25).

Lack of sufficient support for reintegration gave way to the creation of armed groups, which fought against the government and among them. However, some groups, despite different ideological origins, were able to build an alliance such as the National Peasant Alliance that sought for changes in agrarian policies, in order to negotiate with the government or to overcome their difficult living conditions. The Association of the War Disabled of the NR and the Sandinista Organisation of Revolutionary Disabled lobbied to increase government pensions. These two organisations also organised training, sport activities and services for the disabled. The National Peasant Coordinators, composed of former farmers from both contending parties, pressured the government for land titles, credit and improvement of infrastructure. Sandinistas and Contras worked together to extend a town's drinking water system, developed fund-raising activities, sought solutions to overcrowded schools, fought for legal land titles and other joint projects (Spencer, 1997, p. 27)

ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION. It was clear from the report of Nicaraguan reintegration that most ex-combatants did not achieve a satisfactory level of economic autonomy during the years following demobilisation. However, the CIAV-OAS estimated that by late 1991 most of the former Contras were self-sufficient. This was contradicted by the World Bank, which reported high rates, over 50%, of unemployment and underemployment (WB, 1997). The difficulties of the reintegration process led to violence, which at the same time hampered production.

POLITICAL REINTEGRATION. In spite of many obstacles and inconsistencies, the war in Nicaragua and El Salvador ended. Armies were reduced and irregular groups disbanded. Nonetheless, the two opposing factions still
disagreed about the reintegration process results, and some former combatants felt resentment against the government; violence prevailed for some years after demobilisation (Spencer, 1997, p. 13, 14, 35).

LESSONS learnt from EL SALVADOR and NICARAGUA experiences. Underdevelopment, lack of resources, lack of adequate response from donors and difficulties in donor coordination, socio-political tensions, and the poor management of disarmament negatively affected reintegration in Central America. A core issue during reintegration was the lack of available fertile land. The possession of land by those people could have afforded them food security, because they did not have many other opportunities in their environment of poverty and scarcity (Spencer, 1997, pg. 66 to 69).

Early planning and a clear vision of the targets were necessary to balance the negative factors described above. Awareness of the conversion benefits could be a way to encourage ex-combatants to commit themselves to reintegration and to diminish resistance to change. At the same time, treating veterans as a special target group created some tensions with other groups who were also waiting for support from the government. It was important to consider that training had to be in proportion to the market for those skills. The poor results of economic reintegration had a negative impact on the stabilisation of the political environment and violence still prevailed some years after demobilisation (Spencer, 1997, p. 66 to 69).

2.2.7 Summary and Analysis of Reintegration Experiences

Peace agreements, peace building, conversion and development formed part of a continuum with a strong link between demobilisation and reintegration. Dividing the process into phases helped with better management of the analysis, and planning and implementation. However, authors and analysts recommend that planning and implementation take into consideration the concept of a continuum as well as the social, political, economic and cultural features of the environment, and to effect linkages with other phases of peace.
building. In countries undergoing conflict, reintegration depends mainly on the evolution of the political environment and the facilities offered by the economic system (BICC, 1994, p.1, 2; King, 1995).

Analysis of the reintegration experiences previously discussed, evidenced it as a long, slow and complex process involving both reintegration and demobilisation, with many requirements and linkages which take different characteristics according to the context of the country and the visions of those involved.

With regard to demobilisation, there were two main approaches: some countries integrated armies previous to demobilisation, and other countries demobilised different factions in separated endeavours. It was noticed that the first approach is a further step towards national reconciliation.

The different revised experiences presented some common features, such as the same groups of stakeholders (opposing parties, donors, ex-combatants, NGOs and the military). Similarities in the environment were that all countries were facing underdevelopment with its consequences of poverty and scarcity that represented strong obstacles to reintegration, such as poor capabilities of absorption of ex-combatants. Some of countries had to implement structural adjustment programmes during the transition. Countries suffered some violence immediately after demobilisation, and reconciliation processes were extremely slow. Disarmament and donor co-ordination were weak in nearly all cases. The reintegration programmes faced the high expectations of soldiers, and were costly, especially during first attempts towards resettlement. Projects lacked sufficient resources, and it was evident that the success of reintegration depended on the strong financial support and capacity building of local institutions. The management of programmes was often weak. The costs of weak planning and reintegration support proved to be higher in terms of banditry and the resumption of conflict.
The dominant reintegration activities in all countries studied were training, support for micro-enterprises, credit schemes, civic education, employment, resettlement, distribution of cash, seeds, food and tools for ex-combatants. They faced problems in proportion to the weaknesses of programmes, particularly in terms of access to employment and credit, and psycho-social and counselling support, or in their relationship with the traditional roles for people, the lack of available and fertile land, weak support for vulnerable groups (women, children, and the disabled) and lack of preparation for all the nuances of civilian life.

Even though workshops and conferences recommended that reintegration programmes should consider the overall development programme for the country, the need for capacity building and the impact of AIDS in communities through the resettlement of ex-combatants, there were not measures that were strongly taken within these fields. The main difficulties of these actions appeared to be lack of planning, funds, and capable institutions on the community level; and also that institutions were not able to co-ordinate effectively. An important issue was that the whole country needed to support reintegration programmes as a basis for stabilisation, and this need entailed an awareness campaign (BICC, 1994, p.1, 3; Kingma, 1998, p. 19; Obasanjo, 1995, p. 14, 33).

Reintegration can be evaluated through social, economic and political indicators, which can vary slightly according to personal standpoints from ex-combatants, communities and consultants. Generally social reintegration was the easiest part and the most often achieved, political reintegration was the next easiest and economic reintegration was the most difficult and least often achieved. Cases of economic reintegration were generally very low. However, clear performance indicators were not available in all the revised programmes.

The role of donors and NGOs was very important within the reintegration processes. Donors' policies and bureaucracies influenced the processes by
hampering or promoting them. Action was needed to ensure flexibility and a positive impact from donor involvement. NGOs, with their knowledge of local realities and flexibility, took a positive role in promoting reintegration, but the fundamental actor in conversion, particularly in reintegration, had to be the ex-combatant. Even though creativity was needed in project design and the overcoming of obstacles, the veterans' role entailed greater creativity and motivation. Ex-combatants had to find their own path to build up a livelihood and to reintegrate into civil society (BICC, 1994, g. 2). The best way of promoting motivation was through decentralised management and the inclusion of ex-combatants and community inputs within programme design and feedback (BICC, 1994, p. 1, 3).

2.3 Approaches for Reintegration

2.3.1 Human Resources Management as a Framework for Reintegration

In an analysis of Human Capital (HC), Human Development (HD) and Human Resources Management (HRM) theories, Nubler (1997) recommends HRM as the most suitable framework for reintegration processes.

Nubler states that in order to set up objectives for a conversion process it is necessary to define long, medium and short term goals within the economic, social and political fields. The long term objectives would be to enhance HD in order to foster and sustain political stability, security and peace. Short and medium terms objectives would be the social and economic reintegration of veterans and their families into civil society, targeting autonomy and self-reliance (Nubler, 1997, p. 2, 3).

The achievement of these objectives calls for the appropriate use of the ex-soldiers' capabilities and of the available resources for the programme. In this context, Nubler (1997) recommends HRM as the most suitable framework for conversion programmes.
For Nubler HC is a narrowly defined concept that considers human health, skills and knowledge as economic values; and contends that labour gains importance only when it refers to productivity, profits and income. The basic assumption is that the wage rate is determined by the marginal productivity of the worker. Labour is reduced to quantitative terms (Nubler, 1997, p. 3, 4)

The most important differences between HC and HRM theories are that for HRM theory, skills cannot be seen as a value added to the individual but the value is the skilled individual him/herself. HRM considers that it is not only knowledge that influences human productivity but also other factors such as individual traits, motivation and affective dimensions. HRM theory is oriented towards development in that it attempts to deploy individuals or groups effectively for organisational purposes. In this sense HRM underpins HD, by addressing the productive value as well as the social, political and economic human objectives, such as meeting ends, reducing fertility rates, transmitting cultural values, and preserving national identity (Nubler, 1997, p. 4, 5; Fisher, 1997, p. 4; Cohen, 1997, p. 5).

In a series of international forums, the UNDP defined the concept of HD as "enlarging people's choices, where the choices range from political, economic and social freedom to opportunities for being creative and productive, enjoying personal self-respect and human rights" (UNDP, 1997, p. 5). From this definition stems the concept of HD as the ultimate goal; the human being becomes the means and end of development. To enhance human capabilities, the economic, social, political and cultural factors become very important issues. In order to achieve HD is essential to create equitable access to opportunities, to ensure productivity, growth and sustainability, and to empower people to exercise their choices. Thus the formation and use of HR is a tool for HD, and is the best analytical framework for discussing issues of conversion (Nubler, 1997, p. 5).

At the same time, the HD approach can be regarded as too wide a concept, in that it is not only human beings who are needed as means, but other tools are
also needed, these include the redistribution of productive assets, especially land reform, the redistribution of income through fiscal policy, equity in political opportunities, voting rights reforms, and the establishing of temporary social ‘safety nets’. Consequently, through this approach an excessive scope for demobilisation and reintegration activities is undertaken. Besides this, Nubler argues that the HD theory embraces all of society, and its definition as a theory is still weak, (Nubler, 1997, p. 5, 6).

Nubler highlights the importance of training in the implementation process of a reintegration programme. Prior to training, implementation is extremely important to build a data base with reliable information about the environment, to plan the quality and quantity of training, to try to transfer military skills to the civilian context and to set up possibilities for formal education.

It is possible to conclude that, Nubler takes the HRM approach as the best framework for conversion activities because he considers HC theory too narrow and HD theory too wide. This limits conversion activities to the effective implementation of HRM, which involves the formation and utilisation of the veterans’ capabilities in addressing economic, social and political objectives, and taking into consideration psychological, social, political, and economic factors (Nubler, 1997). This could result in a certain ambiguity with the HD approach, but Nubler delineates a clear distinction between HRM and HD, by noting that some HD activities, like distribution of land, political, fiscal and other deep reforms, are HD endeavours exclusively, and consequently not part of a reintegration programme.

Nubler (1997) develops the HRM approach based primarily on Human Resources Development, emphasising training as a main component in strict correlation with market demands, and the appropriate use of existing skills. This involves building a database to provide information about existing skills and markets, for the improved execution of planning activities, training strategies, and activities supporting employment efforts.
2.3.2 Human Training Approach

Writing about the Nicaraguan case, Bendana (1997, p. 3) presents a different alternative for a reintegration programme approach. He considers that successful employment reintegration is unlike, given the conditions of the country during the transition period.

After the civil war Nicaragua implemented a structural adjustment programme, within the context of an unemployment and underemployment rate of 60%. The most conflictual zones lacked police and judiciary authorities, and the situation was one of distrust. The society was deeply polarised, and commitments of aid provision were insufficient. Even for those veterans with land, severe constraints existed with reference to marketing and credit. Conversion of personnel became as stressful as the war itself, and bad management exacerbated the problem (Bendana, 1997, p. 1, 2; and Spencer, 1997).

In this context, the policy focus regarding vocational training and micro-enterprises could not guarantee jobs for ex-combatants. In some cases expectations and frustrations led to personal and social rebellion, which negatively affected attempts towards reconstruction and peace. As a consequence many of the ex-combatants rearmed themselves as a way to ensure their livelihood or to secure direct concessions from the authorities. Thus the challenge was to find an appropriate strategy encompassing reintegration and peace building through stabilisation (Bendana, 1997, p. 1, 2, 3).

The Education and Action for Peace Programme, implemented by the Center of International Studies (CEI), undertook a different approach to reintegration. Their aim was to link the growth of the veterans' self-esteem with the ability to obtain meaningful employment. This was facilitated through training in basic human skills (Bendana, 1997, p. 1, 2).
The training addressed community building skills (including team and coalition building), conflict analysis, problem solving, family rehabilitation and the practice of non-violence. This was aimed at dealing with trauma, polarisation, reinsertion and development proposals. This training promoted the creation and strengthening of links with the community in order to avoid societal exclusion and self-exclusion (Bendana, 1997, p. 1, 4)

To equip veterans with these skills it was necessary to transfer knowledge on the following:

- Technical civil training to increase the veterans’ understanding of citizen’s rights and legal instruments. The goal was to encourage the conjoint participation of communities and veterans in identifying and prioritising areas of intervention, and in finding solutions (Bendana, 1997, p. 3).
- Personal development and effectiveness, as well as training towards an ability to cope with the daily threats of insecurity, exhaustion, frustration and despair. The self-exploration of methods, and organising skills (Bendana, 1997, p. 3).
- Leadership skills (Bendana, 1997, p. 3).

This type of training was often a prerequisite for technical and vocational training and for retaining a job, because it enhanced human capabilities in preparing the soldier for his/her return to productive activities. Furthermore these skills were highly valued by some prospective employers like developmental organisations (Bendana, 1997, p. 2).

There was no evidence that this model reduced unemployment levels significantly, but it increased the veterans’ self-esteem and tolerance levels, enhanced their stress and time management skills and human interaction abilities. It increased community building consciousness, their capacity to market themselves, to manage conflict and to trust others. It developed listening
skills, constructive assertiveness and responsiveness, and changed the focus of demands from the government to themselves (Bendana, 1997, p. 2, 3).

The methodology was participatory, and based on open learning packs. Even though planning was necessary, rigidity was avoided (Bendana, 1997, p. 3).

Such skills often tended to be neglected or ascribed to the religious sphere, but Bendana (1997) considered therapy and self-therapy a very important part of rehabilitation and consequently reintegration, because violence occasioned both visible and invisible damage. Infrastructures as well as human sensibilities had to be reconstructed (Bendana, 1997, p. 4).

Bendana added that employment was not a 'magic' solution to reintegration, because not all jobs were meaningful and/or remunerated according to the minimum needed wage. Some of them were humiliating and insecure. Planning was considered important, but overall political will and institutional capacities, especially at veteran and community level. These would become multipliers of reintegration, reconciliation, and rehabilitation, thus preventing conflict (Bendana, 1997, p. 2, 4).

It is possible to conclude that this programme for reintegration was based on an awareness that, in a country devastated by war and underdevelopment, setting up projects mainly offering employment and vocational training, but ignoring the psychological and cultural rehabilitation of the ex-combatant, would not lead to successful reintegration. The extremely disadvantageous social, political and economic environment would hamper the assistance to ex-combatants, such as technical training, sub-projects for job promotion, handouts and so on.

Thus it was dealt that a better approach would be to empower veterans with human training, which would diminish the impacts of frustration and stress and enable them to develop a positive attitude to face the struggles for stabilisation,
and avoid the temptation of remobilisation and conflict as a 'quick fix' to the problems of poverty and scarcity.

2.3.3 Other Approaches

Searching for solutions to improve the results of reintegration in Uganda, Kazzora (1995) presents the welfare and development approaches.

a) The WELFARE APPROACH: Its implementation would be aimed at certain categories of persons, during an unspecified period of time, to help them become autonomous. This included people who were physically handicapped, the chronically ill, orphans and widows. Generally their needs were medical rehabilitation, wheelchairs, medical support, and training (Kazoora, 1995, p. 35).

b) ETHIOPIA. Contrary to the common assumption that veterans should reintegrate into communities, in Ethiopia a different approach was undertaken. In order to avoid high-density areas, veterans resettled in a fertile lowland, even though there were disadvantages such as the high incidences of malaria and snakes. Between 5,000 to 7,000 ex-fighters went to that area and the final figures were expected to be 20,000. Funds and equipment were allocated (NGO Networking Service, 1995, p. 83). The justifications from the government were: that the amount of resources required to support ex-combatants in the informal sector were enormous, thus it was preferable to avoid more demographic pressure in already dense areas, that support for veterans would also underpin the economic development of the region, and that the common background and discipline of veterans would form a community. Donors were sceptical, and concerned about the presence of large numbers of ex-fighters on the border with Sudan. It would be important to monitor the effort and to evaluate results (NGO Networking Service, 1995, p. 83).

2.4 Conclusions of the Chapter
One can conclude from this chapter that common characteristics in the studied reintegration processes were: a negative post-war context encompassing a restrictive economic environment, some violence prevailing after cease-fire which included the proliferation of light weapons and crime, political turmoil and distrust, and some ethnic/racial issues embedded in the conflict. The reintegration programmes faced insufficient financial support, lack of capacities from governments and, sometimes, lack of political will. Summing up underdevelopment meant few possibilities of employment or self-employment. In this context reintegration undertaking mainly employment, self-employment, and training was like swimming up the stream. Counselling and psycho-social support were generally neglected.

In the case of Mozambique, for designers and implementers, reintegration was a success because after implementation veterans shared the same level of poverty and scarcity as their communities; for the ex-combatants this type of life did not mean reintegration. They were waiting for a broader developmental process that could open doors to a better future as a reward for their sacrifices during the war.

The observation of some different approaches showed that planners and designers were looking for frameworks that could satisfy the needs of the reintegration programme.

Under the light of these achievements and considerations the Bendana' approach appears as a creative alternative for a reintegration approach. The search for economic, social and political reintegration (including psychological and cultural reinsertion) could be done through the indirect means of a Human Training approach.
CHAPTER 3 : RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Initially the nature of the research and the objects of analysis were defined (Leedy, 1980, p. 88, 89). In this case the object of study was a suitable framework for the Reintegration Programme in Angola (Yin, 1985, p. 19).

According to Yin's parameters the dominant research methodology here involved an exploratory case study. This was because the following reasons: the type of research question could be defined as a what (what would be an effective framework?), the investigator had no control over the events, and the research focused on contemporary events that is it was not a dead past (there were still people alive who could report events) (Yin, 1985, p. 13, 17).

The general information about the reintegration programme was expressed in qualitative form. Some quantitative data was used for the better description or
evaluation of the dimensions of one event, such as the quantity and profile of
demobilised soldiers (van der Merwe, 1996, p. 283, 284; Yin, 1985, p. 25).

This study investigated holistically a single case with some traits of embedded
methodologies. It was holistic in the sense that viewed the Programme as a
global device, its framework. In order to move beyond the abstract level, and to
verify the validity of information, some sub-projects were also discussed such as
the QIPs and the Vocational Training Programme (Yin, 1985, p. 36).

Based on the sub questions of section 1.2, the analysis and observation units
were defined as follows: The unit of analysis was the framework needed for the
project. As it would be very difficult to arrive to any findings by observing
frameworks only, the unit of observation included frameworks and other
additional components as the programme's documents (design, evaluation
reports, implementation documents and so on), and documents with information
about the national context. Interviews about the country context and the
programme implementation were also undertaken.

The primary data emerged from interviews with participants (direct or indirect) of
the reintegration event, from observations by the researcher during participation
in the process and documents with a direct link to the programme (reports,
Prodoc, evaluations, memos, and so on). Secondary data was composed of
documents and media information (Yin, 1985, p. 29 to 31; van der Merwe, 1996,

The strategy for analysis followed the proposed sub-questions, that is to
establish a framework for the programme by analysing its strategies, the lessons
learnt, the country context and the impact of the programme. The mode of
analysis was the pattern-matching device taking into account three proposed
approaches for the framework (HR, HT and HD) (Yin, 1985, p. 99, 100, 105).

In order to link collected data to the research question and sub questions a
comparative analysis was carried out between the literature from other
countries' experiences, the Angolan context and the data collected, in a mode of pattern-matching (Yin, 1985, p. 33 to 35, 99, 100).

The structure applied was linear analytical because the sequence of topics involved, and evolved around the theme being studied, around the used methods, the findings from the data collected and analysed and the conclusions and implications of the findings (Yin, 1985, p. 132).

Interviews were administered during two trips and based on two types of questionnaires (Questionnaires 1 and 2, see Appendix 1). The first was a semi-structured questionnaire designed to elicit information about the Angolan social-economic-political context. It was administered to two groups of subjects: those who took part in the implementation of the reintegration programme, and those who did not participate directly in it, but took part directly or indirectly in the general peace process, demobilisation, or were relevant members within the Angolan society. The interviews were flexible with the objective of discovering possible unknown information. The questions in each case were adapted to the nature of the respondent's participation in the Angolan peace process or society.

The second questionnaire was designed mainly for people who participated in the implementation of the programme, but with a few exceptions. This questionnaire had more structured questions and the information elicited concerned the suitability of the framework and the needs of the programme.

Interviews were not recorded to ensure the comfort and openness of the interviewed people due to the fact that the theme was sensitive. The majority of respondents agreed to undertake interviews on the basis of strict anonymity. For this reason names and identifying statements were eliminated from this report. Interview responses were transcribed, codified and tabulated to obtain consolidated data and text.
The researcher made two visits. During the first visit, from approximately 23rd September to 21st October 1998 a total of 38 persons were interviewed; 37 of them direct, one by letter. During the second visit, from 10 to 24 July 1999; 16 persons were interviewed; four were by letter and the rest direct. A further five interviews were conducted by electronic mail. In total 54 people were interviewed. Some persons were interviewed in pairs, and others were contacted twice with different material in each interview. For this reason each contact was given a different code. All but one person were then living in Angola. One respondent was overseas because his/her contract in Angola had expired.

All respondents were staff members of NGOs, the UNO peace mission, agencies and projects, foreign and native professors at the university in Luanda, and senior staff in the public service and private organisations. The levels of their positions ranged from top senior staff to operative staff in the field (see annex 2). The respondents were: a) senior, medium or junior level foreign staff at HQ (headquarters), b) senior or medium level local staff at their HQ, c) medium level local staff at the provinces, or d) medium and junior level foreign staff at the provinces.

Some interviews were conducted in English, some in Portuguese and some in Spanish. Afterwards they were translated into English when needed. The quality was controlled by comparing information in different documents and interviews, the establishment of a chain of evidence that is, a chain of factors through time leading to an event, and a database. A final comparison of patterns of other experiences was undertaken. All those mechanisms had the objective of ensuring internal validity and reliability (Yin, 1985, p. 36 to 39).

The narrative was linear and simple, but utilising tables to systematise some important information about opinions, events, the general country context and chronological development of the programme design (Yin, 1985, p. 122, 124, 127; Miles and Huberman, 1984, p. 79; Leedy, 1989, p. 127).
CHAPTER 4: THE ANGOLAN CONTEXT

This chapter will discuss the features of the Angolan environment that influenced and shaped the evolution and implementation of the Reintegration Programme. It will show that the Angolan context was highly unfavourable for reintegration activities, and that early peace negotiations had to take into account the needs of the conversion process in order to ensure transparency, neutrality, success and consequently underpinning stability.
4.1 The demobilisation Process

Demobilisation was defined as a technical process to be carried out in quartering areas (QA) for UNITA troops and in the barracks for the government’s army. The main activities would be the reception of weapons, physical demobilisation, the registration and identification of quartered personnel and the provision of humanitarian assistance to them. After demobilisation the ex-military and families received transport support to resettlement areas. It was noted that demobilisation would need the participation of contending parties in the sense of building an environment of trust and confidence (UCAH, 1994, p. 5; UCAH 20th Oct. 1995 p. 2, interviews).

The process was coordinated by the Co-ordination Unit for Humanitarian Assistance (UCAH) and UNO. UNITA soldiers were assembled at centres for selection and demobilisation, and disabled had special centres. From the government side only children and disabled troops were demobilised. (UCAH, March, 1998, p. 4, 7; UCAH, Nov/1996, p. 8; TWGDR, 18/10/1996, p. 6; TWGDR, 27/09 1996, p. 4, 5; Respondent 52, 53).

The provision of humanitarian assistance included food distribution, health services and programmes of civic training for soldiers and families. The civic training aimed at the creation of social and psychological conditions that could promote reconciliation within the peace process, but not a real mentality change. The training included workshops on the culture of peace, the dissemination of information about fundamental civic values, human rights and national reconciliation, and the organisation and representation of the Angolan society. It also involved basic courses on literacy and numeracy, cultural, sports and recreational activities (UCAH, 20/10/1995, p. 2, 7, 8, 11, Respondent 51).

Some international personnel considered the programme to be limited in the social and psychological areas, since it did not the objective of facilitating an
attitude of reconciliation and peace in the soldiers (Rangel, 1997 p. 1 - 3; interview 51).

4.1.1 Disruptive Factors

Demobilisation was difficult from the beginning to end; from planning to implementation. Due to the political process and technical problems, some disruptive factors appeared which later had important consequences on the reintegration programme (UCAH, Nov. 1996, p. 1). Disruptive factors were as follows:

For underage soldiers:

- The basic principles defined for underage demobilisation were not adhered to. This hampered resettlement and reintegration (UCAH, Nov. 1996, p. 1). The principles stated the need to respect children’s rights to free communication with their families, to family reunification, to receive priority attention within the process, to avoid discrimination between children, and to ensure free access to all benefits of the conversion process (UCAH/UNICEF/MINARS/SCF-UK/CCF/IOM/Medico International, 1996, p. 2).
- High rate of absenteeism. Prior to 29/10/1996 half of the child soldiers were absent from their QA (UCAH, Nov/1996, p. 2).
- An environment of intimidation and lack of information prevailed in the QA and UNITA officials openly influenced the change of the resettlement areas previously selected (new resettlement areas were situated in UNITA-controlled regions). This occurred even when there were children’s parents in the areas initially chosen. Children were frightened by the information from officials that they would be harassed in government areas and changed their choices for resettlement areas. Others were forced to change choices while on the road after demobilisation. Some times UNITA hampered the process of finding relatives. For example, UNITA’s Radio did not broadcast information for family reunification (UCAH, Nov/1996, p. 2, 5). Respondent 04: “the official attended interviews with underage, he translated the answers
and sincerity was according to the interest of the official... sometimes the child was obliged to declare a supposed uncle living in an UNITA region, who received various children. For this reason monitors from NGOs had difficulty in finding child ex-soldiers after demobilisation. Respondent 04: "monitors were treated as spies in the field... it was possible to find and to reintegrate 1,600 children, IOM should have transported around 4,100, the difference: 2,500 we do not know where they are". During transport 55.56% of the children disappeared. (UCAH, Nov/1996, p. 5, 6).

- There was a lack of representatives from both parties in the convoys transporting demobilised children (UCAH, Nov/1996, p. 6).
- The participation of government and population in the awareness campaign (addressing information and motivation of local authorities and officials) was very weak. The campaign needed the participation of teams formed by representatives of MINARS, army, UNITA, IRSEM, and UCAH (UCAH, Nov. 1996, p. 7; interview 50).
- For security reasons some families did not want to recognise their children (UCAH, Nov/1996, p. 7; Respondent 4, 3).
- Respondent 04: "Children arrived to their villages with cash, tools and food, this broke the traditional social structures where the chief of the family had the economic power". Respondent 50: "some children had problems because relatives, took their belongings" Respondent 04: "benefits should have been given to an organisation in order to develop projects including the community, because without counselling the money was wasted. Children bought radios, shoes, spent the money, when they arrived to their villages they even did not find salt or water. Now they are complaining because the lack of schools, books and money to obtain the national ID"

According to the UNO Convention on Children's Rights, child is a human being younger than 18 years, unless the law that is applicable for him/her permit age-majority earlier. The minimum age for military recruitment according to international rules in use is 15 years, but there are efforts to increase the age to 18 and to request all countries to sign the Convention. It has been found that the majority of children soldiers are between 15 and 18 years old, and their
recruitment begins from the age of 10 (League to Stop Children Soldiers, 1999, p. 1, 7, 9, 11)

For the General Demobilisation

- Lack of free circulation of people and goods hampered the whole process. Angola resembled two countries, the government side and the UNITA side, with different administration, currencies and type of relationship between the authorities and the population (UCAH, Nov/1996, p. 6). Respondent 50: "I met a UNO's military observer, who worked near Andulo. UNITA troops did not permit him to patrol some areas, for example the airport... UNITA harassed him and threatened to take his life. He had to be transfer to other province immediately. After that military observers did not monitor that area". Respondent 01: "there was not conditions for free circulation of persons and goods, thus families could not resettle". Respondent 02: "IRSEM personnel could not go to dangerous areas because resumption of violence, before they used to go with UNAVEM". Respondent 26: "the lack of free circulation influenced the flow of population to the cities". Respondent 18: "UNO was not allowed to monitor the whole country". Respondent 23: "UNITA never permitted patrols in some areas, for example Andulo and Bailundo, only limited observation from the airport to the team site".

- The flow of information and co-ordination between and within institutions was weak. Middle and lower level personnel did not attend co-ordination meetings (UCAH, Nov/1996, p. 7; Rangel 1997, p. 2; Respondent 14). Respondent 12: "during meetings, the problem of assembling peasants and not proper soldiers was not given so much importance, the meetings were focused on the administrative and humanitarian issues ... in the QA the duties of each staff was not clear and there were many irrictions because of this. It would have been better to have an integrated command and one person in charge". Respondent 15: "there were interagencies of UNO and high level meetings with local leaders but there are
was not a deep co-ordination and spreading of information to middle level staff"

- UNITA members hampered demobilisation by raising objections to transport planning because they wanted to avoid the transit through government areas. Sometimes they stopped the process on the basis of lack of information, while at times some violence noted in the area delayed transport (UCAH, Nov/1996, p. 5). Respondent 15: "the process was long because concrete actions required a political will from contending parties"

- Payment of subsidies was irregular and late (UCAH, Nov/1996, p. 2). Respondent 04: "the distribution of money in the provincial capitals did not work for underage"

- The civic education training appeared much too 'utopian' for the reality of quartered people. Soldiers and families did not experienced free movement; thus they lacked the right and opportunity to look for and meet relatives. They could not freely express opinions. Education and access to health services were limited. Consequently the situation of the quartered people made it difficult for them to absorb the concepts of the civic education training and to trust the peace process (Rangel, 1997, p. 1; interview 51).

- The delays in negotiations and the lack of efficiency of the process resulted in an extended period of demobilisation, which created instability among quartered personnel. There was a gap between the programmes planned for a five months quartering time and the real time of one year. In one year a good programme for literacy and some vocational training could have been undertaken in the QA (Rangel, 1997, p. 1; interview 51).

- The lack of an evident and strong civic education programme for the whole population, especially for government members, originated distrust among UNITA soldiers in the QA. Some times they were afraid of resettling in government areas (Rangel, 1997, p. 2; interview 51).
Logistical problems, roads and weather conditions coupled with insufficient financial resources, hampered the provision of materials for quartering areas (Rangel, 1997, p. 2; UCAH, March 1998; interviews).

Some expatriate personnel could not entirely respond to the needs of the process, that is quick and effective measures and a deep committed response during the implementation. These needs were originated in the situation of poverty, undernourishment and illiteracy of the quartered population (interviews).

UNITA officials installed a strict hierarchy and control in the assembly areas. They often use threats to impose their desires around food distribution, medical attention, civic education, literacy and resettlement areas. For instance, until the beginning of November nearly 90% of ex-combatants were installed in UNITA-controlled regions. Previously only 65% had chosen these regions for resettlement. Respondent 12: "the principal problem was the strict hierarchy of terror in UNITA, in those terms a peace process is difficult " Respondent 16: "UNITA officials asked for food radically, with insistence and threats" Respondent 53: "UNITA, under threats, requested food, there were some rumors that this food went out of the QA".

"The database system for the QA was designed by persons who did not know the reality of the bush. Long questionnaires did demobilisation process bothersome. UCAH would have to use modern technology and would have to co-ordinate with all the organisations participating in the process. For example, the design did not foresee an efficient control of families and of food distribution (this could have avoided big loses of food in the QA). The data about soldiers were divided between two files, one with the photo and another one with the personal information, at the end there were mistakes attaching photos to data. This created problems in demobilisation and threatens to the staff. We could not say that the system was inefficient, it was useful, but it could have been better" (Respondent 53). "During registration it is possible to do some analysis of the person, for example his status as soldier or peasant, but that was
never required from us. Sometimes the registration process lasted long
hours diminishing the level of quality of the interview" (Respondent 12).

- "Many of the quartered men were not soldiers, some of them claimed to
be tradesmen from ex-Zaire. This situation was reported" (Respondent
12). Respondent 16: "it was easy to recognise soldiers from civilians.
The bad situation of civilians was evident in front of the well-dressed
soldiers. In the QA Y for example, each soldier had a lot of dependents,
which was logically impossible due to the mobile situation of soldiers.
During demobilisation ex-combatants followed some patterns: they
disappeared, changed destiny at the last minute, got out of the vehicle in
another place than the chosen one, or went to previously chosen place "
Respondent 28: "many of the quartered people were peasants".
Respondent 03: "the majority were peasants that wanted to return to their
community but they did not know what they would find there" Respondent
04: "the long time in the ODA contributed to many things, some under age
were collected by UNITA just before demobilisation, they were not
soldiers; sometimes when children met their families, the mothers said I
did not see him since two months ago, what confirmed that they were not
soldiers".

The Joint Commission tried to resolve these problems. It was stated clearly that
the government of Angola was the first responsible for the conversion process
and that together with UNITE it had to be deeply involved in the whole process,
in order to provide security, information and motivation (UCAH, Nov/1996, p. 9,
10; interviews).

4.1.2 Constraints

It was difficult to accomplish the guidelines of the Lusaka Protocol, and some
changes had to be made during the implementation of the conversion process.
For example, the responsibility for setting up the assembly areas was
undertaken by UNO because UNITA was not capable of implementing this task.
The process of selection and retirement of soldiers was extremely slow and complicated. The integration of soldiers into the national army involved fewer than planned due to the stringent parameters defined for the selection process, and few high-ranking officials were included. The plan contemplated 26,000 military and only 10,000 were integrated (UCAH, Nov/1996; p. 2, interviews 13, 23, 29).

Even though documents, reports and interviews presented discrepant figures, the proportions were similar for quartered and demobilised people. One credible source (Respondent 13) declared that the troops quartered were 71,055 soldiers. Whilst only 33,818 demobilised and some 10,000 were incorporated. The difference between these figures indicates the number of soldiers who deserted the assembly areas and who appeared to be the genuine and the most capable UNITA troops. Respondent 16: "during the quartering phase around 30,000 soldiers deserted. Those who remained were old people, underage and civilians with families". Sources estimated that from the total of assembled people only 45% were soldiers. As UNITA officials had the task of helping with registration procedures, they used the opportunity to exert pressure over UNO staff to register as soldiers people who clearly appeared to be peasants. For some it was easy to see the difference between soldiers and civilians for other not. Respondent 17: "there were problems to identify a peasant from a soldier" (see section 5.1.1, For the General Demobilisation). Respondent 29: "in September 1996 the demobilisation began with underage from UNITA and the MPLA; after 8 months mainly UNITA demobilised plus underage of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA – MPLA), disabled not yet. The MPLA demobilisation was planned for four months after UNITA but then the political problem began". The demobilisation in situ in many cases resulted in double registration of soldiers (interview 13).

4.2 Political Instability
There was generally a lack of motivation for reconciliation between contending parties. This originated from the lack of will of some internal groups within each party and from the evolution of the political process (interviews 07, 13, 14, 17, 27, 28, 30, 31, 55). The conversion process was conducted according to the premise that both contending parties were willing participants, but as the process progressed the sole participant pushing it was the UNO. Each party aimed to obtain a good political position conceding the minimum (Respondent 13). Both parties had military power and used this in a struggle for control of territories (Respondent 18).

All sectors of the country distrusted the process. For example: Respondent 29: "change of destination gave UNITA control over demobilised and partly originated the aggressions from government to ex-UNITA". Respondent 13: "UNITA was not convinced of the political dispensation and felt that future elections will either not be held or will be coerced by the MPLA, thus covertly retained its cadres". Respondent 31: "the majority of military observers, top level leaders and soldiers did not trust the peace process".

Respondent 13: "UNITA received political recognition without an effective disarmament". Respondent 14: "60% of surrendered weapons were useless. Savimbi was convinced that MPLA was trying to destroy UNITA and that surrendering weapons meant to loose power. Thus he never intended to demilitarise. Savimbi's ambition is to rule Angola. He accepted the Lusaka Protocol only because he was loosing at that moment. The Protocol was signed by representatives of both parties". Respondent 30: "Savimbi authorised Manuvaco to sign and after that he put him in jail. As Savimbi did not sign, afterwards it was easy to say that he did not believe in the agreement. During the process UNITA was inventing excuses, putting conditions. I see the peace process as having a weak foundation from the beginning because a doubtful commitment of Savimbi". Eugenio Manuvaco said that many UNITA members condemned his attitude of signing the Protocol and because of that he was
punished (Souza, 1998, pg. 5). Respondent 31: "By the end of 1993, the government recovered territories. The Protocol was discussed in this context".

Diamond areas appeared to be in the hands of few high-ranking military who had vested interests in controlling these regions. Apart from the war, diamond mines contributed to private wealth. In this sense a retirement pension of a limited number of dollars, and reintegration programmes are not attractive for leaders of diamond regions, so they would continue to support war (da Rocha, 1999, p. 15; interviews 13, 28, 32).

Embedded in this context, each step of the peace process entailed extremely difficult and slow negotiations within parties, some examples are:

The establishment of the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN), that is the installation of a unify administration of the state, very soon appeared as a source of conflicts. Respondent 30: "I think the UNITA people were sincere when they said GURN could not continue as it was, because the process was a military occupation by MPLA's police. The plan was a combined state UNITA plus MPLA. Respondent 50: "During the GURN's implementation, in some villages of Moxico, UNITA harassed MPLA's officials and threatened UNO staff. UNITA did not want to accept the GURN" Respondent 16: "In some areas UNITA leaders harassed government's officials, there were accusations from both sides around harassment and torture. Near Menongue the officials were threaten by UNITA, but UNITA said that these officials left the region because they did not receive economical support from the government" Respondent 29: "GURN was a problem because UNITA did not want to hand over territory" Respondent 31: "there was power sharing during GURN, but demobilisation was a farce".

Free circulation could not be implemented. Respondent 50: "UNO asked the government to install free circulation and to close check points but this took a lot of effort and time, afterwards the political problems resumed. In the UNITA
regions, control was always strict, control over circulation and every activity". (also see section 4.1.1, General Demobilisation).

UNITA lacked motivation and delayed sending cadres to integrate national commissions and institutions including IRSEM (interview 17).

A multiparty system was not established. Respondent 17: “We jumped stages. The GURN, the Parliament (UNITA and MPLA), this should have not began without the principal stage of handing over weapons. We believed in the good will of the parties. The government and mediators tried to accommodate Savimbi but he did not come to Luanda. There was security, but this had to do with cultural issues, power searching”. Parties displayed some propaganda against UNO to cover their lack of commitment to comply with the agreements (Angola News, 1998; Carvalho, 1998; Muanza, 1998; interview 18).

There were three more variables contributing to create a difficult context:

1. the extent of the problem of land mines, which was huge and influenced all sectors: economic, transport, agriculture, resettlement, health services and disabled people (interview 19),

2. the negative intervention of other countries through weapons and diamonds. Savimbi built relations with other African and East Europe countries (Angola News, 1999; interviews 13, 17, 30, 31).

3. Respondent 17: “the African culture of power is still based in the chiefs system whose mentality is not democratic. Chiefs are used to giving instructions”, Respondent 21: “chiefs still have a linkage to the old style of power. Law is not respected; they think law is not for chiefs. Law is produced only to give an image of modernity. For instance, the President of Guinea after 18 years has begun to read the constitution”. Respondent 31: “the West thinks democracy is unique, democracy is a technique; and in Africa, in the ballot boxes, people put political and spiritual powers”

4.2.1 Society Fragmented
Angola lacks unity, particularly in the context of administration, education, economic activity and ethnic issues. This differences hampered integration of the population, divided the territory in at least three regions and influenced the political development since independence (Birmingham, 1992, p. 26).

Respondent 31: "Angolan history is taught until 1940, after that there is no agreement about facts and dates. There is a collective memory around clans; there is not a national collective memory. There are cultural and ethnic components not only in the conflict but in the daily life of the nation".

Respondent 30: "for me the ethnic component is the degree of westernisation of Angolans, in the coast the white, mulatto and black people are more westernized, a large number are Catholics, in the central plains they are pure Africans, there are more Protestants, Savimbi's father was a Protestant Preacher"

From the beginning of this century three groups appeared to be prevailing: the Ovimbundu, the Kimbundu and the Bakongo (Matloff, 1997, p. 30)

The Kimbundu concentrated in the central coastal areas of the country and tended to mix more with the Portuguese than other ethnic groups. The use of native interpreters, teachers, traders, and caravan operators by Portuguese originated a new local bourgeoisie. And the interaction of Portuguese with natives originated the 'mulattos' (mixed people). As the Portuguese cared equally for their white and 'mixed' children, a large Creole population of mixed ancestry appeared (Birmingham, 1992, p. 8, 9; Matloff, '997, p. 30).

Respondent 16: "Kimbundus had a good relationship with the Portuguese. They had mainly Portuguese names. Some of them traded Umbundus (Ovimbundus) as slaves, thus these remained suspicion and resentful with Kimbundus".

Mainly 'mulattos' and Kimbundus formed the MPLA. Its leaders were well integrated into the Portuguese culture, and had middle-class material values but ideologically were Marxists. The concentration was on the coastal cities and there were problems in accommodating the rural populations of northern region
and central plains (Birmingham, 1992, p. 36, 74; Matloff, 1997, p. 33).
Respondent 24: "there is a large quantity of mulattos and Kimbundus within senior public service, and very few people from the central plains".

The Bakongo were based in the northern provinces and had strong ethnic and language linkages with the people of former Zaire and Congo. They had in common the Baptism mission's education instead of the Catholic one promoted by the Portuguese. Their contacts with the capital of Luanda were tenuous, and the labour system launched by the Portuguese that originated riots during 1961 forced the exile of thousands of Bakongo in Zaire. This increased the differences between north and south. Even now they are called the 'Zairenses' by the other groups. (Matloff, 1997, p. 30, 31; Birmingham, 1992, p. 36, 41).
Respondent 50: "one driver told me: I know how to work, I know what time means, if the boss says at eight I will be there at eight, not later, and I do not drink, it's because I studied in Zaire, these Angolans they do not know how to work and they drink. Another staff told me in a pejorative wa, 'those are Zairenses, they do not speak Portuguese well, they speak French".

The FNLA was strong among the Bakongo, and some of its leaders had family relations with Mobutu Sese Seko. They enjoyed support from the USA for a while before they decided to support UNITA. The long exile had trained the majority of them in private business (Matloff, 1997, p. 33; Birmingham, 1992, p. 48).

The Ovimbundu was the largest group, concentrated in the central plains of the country. Linguistically they were the most homogeneous group. They remained mostly peasants (Matloff, 1997, p. 30).

Savimbi with a Maoist training chose his grassroots within the Ovimbundus. Respondent 17: "Savimbi created a myth saying that the government's leaders were mulattos and were against the natives of the central plains". UNITA leaders were educated in local schools or were preachers. They presented
hostility to city-dwellers, administrators and bureaucrats. Respondent 27: "MPLA are mixed people, UNITA are 100% natives this created a clash between them" Respondent 28: "Savimbi preferred the ethnic component"

During the civil war both parties effected ethnic cleansing (Matloff, 1997, pg. 1,149 to 152, Birmingham, 1992, pg. 82; Araujo, 1998). Respondent 50: "a girl told me about the second war in Benguela, she said the cleansing of UNITA sympathizers was done house by house" Respondent 16: "when UNITA occupied Huambo there was cleansing of mulattos ... the people assembled in QA were Umbundus" Respondent 28: "I am afraid of ethnic cleanings, if we do not get peace, tribalism can increase. In some cities Umbundus, that did not sympathized with UNITA, were obliged to escape when government troops arrived because they would have been linked to UNITA. In this country there is a linkage between UNITA and Umbundus and the country is divided"

These explanations showed that ethnic differences were embedded in the conflict. Although they are not as strong as in other regions of the world, they are nonetheless hampering reconciliation.

Another problem adding to the fragmentation of the country is the language problems. Throughout the country there were many dialects and they were not spoken by the whole population; neither was Portuguese widely enough spoken.

4.3 The Economic Situation

Despite the availability of vast natural resources (for example oil, diamonds, water and land) Angola is classified as one of the countries with poorest economic development in the world (USAID, 1997, p. 2)

The primary sector of the economy was very weak because war paralysed the agricultural activities in the north and central regions by creating insecurity, and causing migration of the rural population. Fishing did not suffer much from war because coastal areas suffer less from war, and that received private investments (Government of Angola, 1994, p. 2; interviews 21, 28).

Industries came to a standstill due to destruction caused by war; lack of raw materials and spares parts for equipment; deficient services of water and electricity and obsolete equipment. The consequence of a weak primary sector and industry was the trend of economic structure towards importation to supply the country's needs for goods (Government of Angola, 1994, p. 2, Interview 01, 07).

The entire economy suffers from the lack of free circulation of persons and goods, but particularly the commercial sector whose network was destroyed. Banks and insurance companies existed only in some cities. Transport was weak following the political upheavals. After the signature of the Lusaka Protocol there were some periods where land transport was possible, but generally the most used means were air transport and cabotage (Government of Angola, p. 2, 3; interviews 01, 03, 16, 23, 26, 50).

Private investment is minimal, and public investments have been disadvantaged by the restrictions on international funding. The informal sector is very large. Apart from the main cities (such as Luanda, Benguela, Lubango and maybe the oil and diamond areas) economic activity is very simple throughout the country (Government of Angola, p. 3). Respondent 50: "expatriates working in QA could not to find food there, only those working near big cities were able to buy food or other goods".
Lack of efficiency of the public management resulted in problems such as: inflation, excessive allocation of foreign currency to the public sector, channelling of foreign currency to the black market, price controls and subsidies. Large percentages of national resources were allocated to the defence sector, external debt increased, and local services provided to oil companies were inefficient and lacked competitiveness (for example construction and transport). Taxes and customs systems were inefficient. The country failed to implement structural adjustment measures and thus macrostabilisation, and lacked a plan for human resources development (Government of Angola, 1994, p. 5; USAID, 1997, p. 12; interview 21). Respondent 21: "Angola trained human resources in a disorganised way. There is a plan for the economic sector but as a matter of fact nothing is done, everything is subordinated to war".

Other social and economic indicators were as follows: 65% of the population live below the poverty line, and 15% live with less than one US dollar per day. Only 18% of the population has access to sanitation, and 34% to safe water. There is a high rate of children giving up school. Levels of unemployment and underemployment are very high, affecting especially women. The migration rate is also high, and the workforce lacks mobility within the country (da Rocha, 1999, p. 2; USAID, 1997, p. 2).

Da Rocha (1999, p. 2) defined the whole situation of the country as a social injustice regarding access to education, primary health care, water and basic sanitation.

The only sector that underpins the economy is the extraction industry. Mining diamonds and oil. Even these industries suffered some attacks. The country’s capacity to refine and thus the value added are very low. (Government of Angola, 1994, p. 2, interview 21). Respondent 21: "the economic situation is a disaster, Angola only survive because oil and the money is used in the war not in development".
4.3.1 Corruption

An important negative factor within the described economic context is corruption, which is deeply rooted in Angola. The government lacks institutional rigour, discipline and transparency in economic policy and execution and the parliament has not been able to monitor the state's expenditure. Corruption has eroded the legitimacy of the state administration, prevented the correct use of services and resources, perverted social and ethical values, reduced the availability of private and public resources for development, discouraged private investment, and promoted nepotism and political cronyism. In this context, economic policies for development would have little chance of success (da Rocha, 1999, p. 1, 2, 8, 9).

Corruption is deeply entrenched, large-scale and endemic. It is increased by cultural factors as the traditions originated in the old rural African society where the power conferred to chiefs gave them the opportunity to enrich themselves. For example, provincial governors behave like monarchs. Corruption affects all sectors from upper to the lower classes (da Rocha, 1999, p. 4, 7). Respondent 16: "during demobilisation, UNITA people working in maintenance in the QA took equipment, tools, spare parts and materials. And the situation was in such a way out of control that some expatriate personnel preferred to resign to their posts". Respondent 21: "they are doing something similar to what the ancient nomenclature in the URSS did after Perestroika, when they remained with the economic power, the leaders here only consume. The unique solution for them was to utilise illegal ways to obtain resources. For example the privatisation process, there were not biddings, but businesses were just given to citizens and the money did not go to the national treasury, there was not transparency". Respondent 24: "they took this enterprise from the state and gave it to some top level persons. They did not do bidding, I do not know if they pay to the national treasury, they said they are privatising. Some people think they deserve this as a reward for the past years of scarcity during war"
In general there is a mentality of complicity, and the problem caused citizens to lose sight of nationhood and patriotism in favour of individual gains. Institutions do not have independence to fight corruption. According da Rocha Angola has a level of 1.427 with reference to transparency and efficiency of public affairs. The range between the worst and the best levels in Africa, according to Business in Africa was 1.4 for Cameroon and 6.1 for Botswana (da Rocha, 1999, p. 7, 9, 15 to 17). Respondent 28: "early after Neto died corruption started, today we have some families leading the country. Military forces take a lot. In UNITA there are some persons enjoying of diamonds trade. There is not distribution in UNITA"

The Reintegration Programme was also influenced by corruption. Lack of transparency and equity in funds and resources distribution, pressure for nepotism and political cronyism, serious problems with equipment, tools and spare parts disappearance were the main problems detailed by sources (interviews 06, 09, 45, 50)

4.4 Conclusions of the Chapter
The demobilisation process within the general Angolan context presented enormous problems that combined to create a negative force against reintegration.

Demobilisation did not achieve its main objective; the humanitarian assistance programme was unsuccessful in preparing ex-soldiers for peacetime life. The limitations of the civic education programme some how added distrust by implementing this programme only on UNITA side.

The change in the selection of resettlement areas completely disrupted planning for reintegration. New planning was done at the last moment. This hampered food and pensions' distribution, and the implementation of the referral service.
Good living conditions, economic and political powers were concentrated either in the coastal elites or in a few UNITA leaders. Population as a general view suffered under extreme poverty. This limited the scope of reintegration projects that could be implemented. For example the lack of electricity was an obstacle for training in welding. In this sense the need to emphasise agriculture appeared strong. Furthermore the lack of a wide awareness campaign addressing reconciliation, peace building and reintegration did not promote motivation and commitment within elites and population in the government side.

The survey undertook in quartering areas could not be easily integrated within the reintegration programme database obliging to new inquiries.

The weak economy and institutions acted against reintegration by not offering enough employment possibilities, by the lack of policies promoting small projects, micro-enterprises and credit schemes, by the lack of a system for private property which could encourage agriculture, by the lack of infrastructure and structures that could help to underpin reintegration projects, and because corruption.

CHAPTER 5: THE ANGOLAN REINTEGRATION CASE, PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION

This chapter analyses the planning and implementation process of the Reintegration Programme for Ex-combatants in Angola. The discussion will include information about the NRP but emphasising the SECOR, because funding was concentrated in the latter. The objectives of the chapter are: to define and analyse the frameworks adopted for the above mentioned programmes, to discuss and explain the findings of the research in terms of the description of the process, the lessons learnt and the preferences around HT and HR approaches.
5.1 The Reintegration Process

Planning and implementation were the result of long negotiations and upheavals. The process went back and forth through movements towards peace and stability, until the final return to war at the end of 1998.

5.1.1 Planning

The description of this process had the objective of showing that initially the idea was to give the programme a broader framework (based on previous research) encompassing psychological and cultural features of reintegration.

5.1.1.1 Outlining Strategies

During 1994 staff from UCAH, taking into consideration contributions from other UNO agencies, outlined a series of strategies for the reintegration programme (UCAH, 1994). The document proposed two stages for the transition process: demobilisation and reintegration (UCAH, 1994, p. 5).

Reintegration was understood to be a complex process, which would plan and allocate benefits for ex-combatants in three stages. The document recommended the use of a principle of symmetry (equality) in the assigning of opportunities to members of both parties, and the active participation of NGOs, and the international community (not only with funds but in the designing phase), and highlighted the need for a strong willingness of both parties towards peace (UCAH, 1994, p. 6).

According to the document it was recommended in that there be five stages of demobilisation and reintegration:

a) the take off stage: involving planning for conversion, including feasibility studies and analysis of the profile of the target group; and the participation of both parties, UNO and NGOs (UCAH, 1994, p. 9);
b) the Demobilisation stage, during which, activities would be registration, identification, information and humanitarian assistance. The last two components had to be part of the Social Promotion Programme (SPP) (UCAH, 1994, p. 10); c) the resettlement stage involving transportation of ex-combatants to communities, and distribution of material aid (UCAH, 1994, p. 11, 12); d) the rehabilitation stage with the basic objectives of social, economic, political and psychological reintegration. Social reintegration had to promote community participation and interaction between members of contending parties. The economic reintegration had to build employment opportunities and productive capacities for veterans and families. The political reintegration had to support national reconciliation, participation of veterans in political activities and organisations of the country and to strengthen institutions prioritising community level ones. The psychological reintegration had to promote self-confidence and esteem in a non-violent environment (UCAH, 1994, p. 35). The overall co-ordination would be under the responsibility of the Institute for Reintegration, which had to ensure transparency, neutrality and autonomy for the reintegration process. (UCAH, 1994, p. 12, 13); e) and reconstruction and development, promoting primary forms of self sufficiency (UCAH, 1994, p. 14).

In order to avoid possible failure, the document included the discussion of some variables that had hampered previous processes of conversion in other countries. Firstly, it was clear that the unstable post-war environment would make it difficult to plan an institutional framework and strategies to support the process. This was because the wide scope of environmental changes included the transformation of the defence forces, of the government administration and economic structural adjustments. Secondly, the problems of co-ordination and lack of flexibility and understanding created by the weak linkages between donors and other stakeholders of the conversion process. Finally, the sectoral
nature of the process exposed it to the influences of politics (UCAH, 1994, p. 15 and 16). In this sense the challenges of reintegration were foreseen as the large number of people to be demobilised which included vulnerable groups, the deteriorated situation of the country (social, economic, political and cultural), a polarised environment, distrust and lack of confidence between parties and strong pressure on the institutions tied to reintegration (UCAH, 1994, p. 34).

The main activities of the SPP within QA would be: to inform soldiers about the process, and their benefits, rights and duties, to offer seminars on the basic institutional, productive and professional aspects of civilian life, and a scheme of options. The system of options would include a variety of vocational alternatives, and would liaise with other programmes (UCAH, 1994, p. 40 to 43).

The efficiency of the reintegration process had to be judged by its capacity to promote the social and economic welfare of ex-military and families within a context of reconciliation and a framework of democratic institutions (UCAH, 1994, p. 34).

The guidelines for sub-projects emphasised the need to prioritise the integral development in rural areas, to implement quick impact projects, and to progressively expand the targeted population (UCAH, 1994, p. 37 to 40).

The development activities in rural areas had to take into account the situation of land ownership, the diversification to non-traditional economic activities, demining projects in production areas, rural resettlement policies and rehabilitation of large areas. The emphasis in rural areas would not be an obstacle to activities in urban and semi-urban areas (UCAH, 1994, p. 38).

Quick-impact project characteristics had to incorporate a high degree of community participation, rapid generation of income, training, a multiplier effect and high possibility of absorption by the beneficiary (UCAH, 1994, p. 38, 39).
The initiatives of self-sufficiency in the community should take into account that the war had generated vertical behaviour and strong dependency among soldiers (UCAH, 1994, p. 39). Examples of the degree of dependence of soldiers with reference to the army were very clear in the interviews:

Respondent 24: "During the second war, I saw that some of the bodies of UNITA soldiers were castrated. We supposed that they were elite forces. The fact that an African man could never be capable of having children obliged him to be extremely loyal to Savimbi". Respondent 31: "the Savimbi's bodyguards are castrated. They leave personal feelings only for the chief. Bodyguards of Hassan II are also castrated". Respondent 3: quoted an ex-combatant: "what is SECOR going to do with me? Because I only know how to shoot, I have already killed people and like to shoot!" Respondent 3 answered him: "Then you are wrong! you should go to the army and not being demobilised!" The ex-combatant's response was: "I am not going to the government side".

In order to avoid inequalities the reintegration programme had to be incorporated into similar programmes for the war-affected population. This strategy would avoid duplication of efforts, optimise available resources, and define more integral rehabilitation actions (UCAH, 1994, p. 40).

**Analysis:** This document built the scaffolding for the conversion process and divided it into two sections: demobilisation and reintegration. Notwithstanding this division, the document acknowledged that the process is a continuous flow, by presenting five steps for the conversion process. In this sense the reintegration activities included the last three steps, from resettlement to development. Thus the concept of reintegration in this document includes features of human development.

In demobilisation the document did not clarify what the component of humanitarian assistance entailed and the concept is ambiguously linked to the SPP, which did not include any provision for psychological support or human training.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOCUMENT</th>
<th>THE TACIT FRAMEWORK</th>
<th>IMPACT INDICATORS</th>
<th>RECOMMENDATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCAH Guidelines (Strategies for Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme)</td>
<td>This framework aimed to stabilise veterans by introducing them to social economic, educational and political activities; taking into account the human and psychological dimensions, and the need for community and integral rural development.</td>
<td>Degree of social, economic, political and psychological reintegration.</td>
<td>Symmetry, neutrality, transparency, efficiency, participation of NGOs, and interaction between veterans of contending parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRP (National Reintegration Programme)</td>
<td>The programme aimed at social and economic stabilisation by targeting social, economic, political and cultural reintegration</td>
<td>Social, economic, political and cultural reintegration (tacit, stemming from the objectives).</td>
<td>To target both groups: ex-military from Bicesse / Lusaka the need for flexibility, to build linkages, to avoid privileged target groups and to be operational at the field.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECOR Pro Doc (Counseling and Referral Service)</td>
<td>The programme sought to contribute to the peace building process by promoting social and economic stabilisation of veterans prioritising economic self-sufficiency. It would need to implement a service with the objectives of linking ex-military and reintegration possibilities, and informing and counseling them around the best alternatives.</td>
<td>The reception of assistance by veterans through: work experience, resettlement, acquiring skills, employment, micro-enterprises and auto-employment. The development of linkages between UNITA, NGOs, UNO and other institutions. Empowerment of IRSSM. Stabilisation of the political and economic environment, peace consolidation and opened possibilities for long term development (from expected results).</td>
<td>IRSEM to incorporate the concepts of parity and financial transparency, to become operational at central and provincial level and to build linkages</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References: 1) UCAH, 1994; 2) Joint Commission, 1996; 3) UNDP, 1995
Reintegration was defined as the provision of social promotion and assistance to veterans, defined as basic conditions for stabilisation of ex-combatants. The document needed to better clarify the concepts of social promotion and assistance as requirements for stability, but the inclusion of the components of promotion of psychological capacities, community development, and self-sufficiency showed that the document defined a wider scope for the programme framework, limiting it neither to economic rehabilitation nor to a human resources management process, but including clear trends towards a human development approach that targeted an integral rehabilitation of the ex-military within communities as spaces of civil society.

The document highlighted the importance of symmetry (equality) in the distribution of benefits, and the neutrality, transparency and efficiency of the institutions, as well as the participation of NGOs, and the interaction between veterans of contending parties.

Some tensions appeared between the planning and these requirements. Firstly, since the two parties had different schedules for demobilisation, and the transference of international funds was not done according to the plans, it was very difficult to guarantee symmetry. Secondly the establishment of IRSEM under the responsibility of the government, and dominated by government staff, could hardly ensure neutrality and even less an image of neutrality. Transparency and efficiency depended on the impact of capacity building, and could be achieved only by the end of the project.

The impact indicators were directly defined as the degree of social and economic reintegration of veterans and families within a context of reconciliation and democracy.

5.1.1.2 The National Reintegration Programme (NRP)
In August 1996 the Joint Commission approved the NRP. An important issue during those discussions was the need to take into account the lessons learnt from the Mozambican process (Joint Commission, 1996).

The document defined the philosophy of the programme and the strategies for, in the short-term, the social and economic stabilisation of veterans and the war affected population. The parameters were the guidelines of the Lusaka Protocol in its third annex: "a national reintegration programme, implemented by the government of Angola with UNITA participation and with the help of the international community" (Joint Commission, 1996, p. 1, 2).

Other requirements for the programme were: the avoidance of privileges, the programme should be flexible as to create diverse options and partnerships (specially liaisons with the Community Rehabilitation Programme, CRP), should include two target groups (those veterans from Bicesse Accords and Lusaka Protocol peace processes) and to establish reintegration options for vulnerable groups (Joint Commission, 1996, p. 1, 2, 4).

The benefits for ex-combatants were defined as: disablement and retirement pensions, reintegration programmes and reserve subsidies. For the Lusaka Protocol group there were additional benefits, such as transport, tools, food and cash payments (Joint Commission, 1996, p. 4, 6, 8).

The reintegration programmes were defined as follows:
1. SECOR, which would last 30 months. It would begin attending the veterans of the Lusaka Protocol and would extend its services to the Bicesse ones (Joint Commission, 1996, p. 8)
2. QIPs (Joint Commission, 1996, p. 8).
3. A physical Rehabilitation Programme for Disabled should be implemented through a partnership between UCAH, Handicap International, the Health Ministry and NGOs. The main objective was to support the National Programme for Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation through the
establishment of a net of prostheses workshops, the distribution of locomotion tools, support for family reunification, and counselling. The programme was aimed at 30,000 ex-military individuals.

4. The open Fund for Reintegration, should be launched with the co-operation of GTZ. It should focus on economical integration, including some Bicesse ex-combatants. Main activities were defined as agricultural resettlement, rehabilitation of war handicapped people, micro-handicrafts, female gender projects and vocational training in reconstruction skills. It did not undertake psychological, political or cultural areas (Respondent 56).

5. The fund to Support Reintegration, it was not launched because of lack of funds.

The analysis of this document shows that the planning of the reintegration programme was influenced by the Mozambican process (a commission travelled to that country to acquire information), and that the framework of the programme entailed the social, economic political and cultural reintegration of the war affected population (TWG, 23 - 28 July, 1996).

To attend ex-military from Bicesse and Lusaka processes, was an excessively optimistic goal because the level in funds required was enormous.

It was clear that the Lusaka Protocol held the government responsible for the programme, with the participation of UNITA. This brought negative consequences during implementation (see section 5.1.3).

This document contained some ambiguity in the delineation of SECOR activities. While it define its objective as technical assistance to IRSEM, it also mentioned the representation of SECOR in the provinces and the provision of direct support to ex-military personnel. In short, SECOR had two functions: advisory and line.
5.1.1.3 Comparison of Planning Documents

The reintegration project was initially an ambitious project, covering the search for the holistic reintegration of veterans. The UCAH guidelines (section 5.1.1) defined a wide scope for the programme, but over time and diverse stages of the policy process the programme took on a narrower scope in the SECOR (TWGDR, 19 July, 1996).

Table “1” shows that differences appear in the stabilisation strategies; while UCAH and the NRP set up broad goals in the social, economic, educational, political, cultural and psychological dimensions, SECOR focused on social and economic reintegration only (Joint Commission, 1996, UNDP, 1995).

The matrix shows that none of the documents defined accurate and measurable ways to assess impact. SECOR ProDoc was slightly more specific, since it incorporated the objectives in terms of performance indicators. However, these were limited concepts, not consistent over time and unit; they were not simple, and they lacked a comparison with other indicators. They were not a form of statistical analysis and did not offer a strong basis for decision making (CIFPA, 1998; USA Government, 1998). Thus in the absence of impact indicators, the relationship between the components of framework, planning, implementation, efficiency and impact, could not be as clear as necessary for the evaluation of the programme. Particularly the suitability of the framework.

The three documents recognised the importance of neutrality, symmetry, efficiency, and the need for linkages and transparency.

During planning two different target groups were defined for IRSEM (Lusaka's and Bicesse's veterans) and SECOR (only Lusaka's ones, with plans to include Bicesse's veterans after an undetermined period). This would, later create tensions (see Section 5.1.3.1)
TABLE 2: COMPARISON BETWEEN SURVEYS RESEARCHING ABOUT SOLDIER’S PROFILE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SURVEY</th>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>TIME OF SERVICE</th>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
<th>RESETLEMENT</th>
<th>WORK PREFERENCE</th>
<th>EXPERIENCE</th>
<th>RECONCILIATION</th>
<th>TRADITIONS</th>
<th>ETHNIA</th>
<th>WAR</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1992 (1) (most soldiers were:)</td>
<td>Less than 30 years</td>
<td>6-10 years</td>
<td>Incomplete secondary</td>
<td>Preference</td>
<td>Agriculture plus other activity</td>
<td>Animal husbandry</td>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>Respected</td>
<td>Tribes Ovibumdu/ Umbundu, reaffirmation of ethnia</td>
<td>Had to be avoided</td>
<td>Gave importance to agricultural tools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAII (2) 1994</td>
<td>Average age</td>
<td>UNITA, 34% 2-5 years and 19% 6-10 years</td>
<td>MPLA, 26% 2-5 years and 38% 6-10 years (major concentration)</td>
<td>UNITA 33% reached middle or secondary school</td>
<td>MPLA 75% near same level of illiteracy in both parties</td>
<td>Slightly more than 50% of both parties want to live in urban areas, the rest in rural ones</td>
<td>Farming unpopular most popular mechanical and driver, after that preference for informal economy.</td>
<td>Majority lacked working experience</td>
<td>Majority think would be easy or possible</td>
<td>Reaffirmation of ethnia (around 70%).</td>
<td>Would like to forget war after reintegation (majority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>During quartering phase (3)</td>
<td>25 years old or less.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>86.28% primary or less</td>
<td>Rural areas 84.9%</td>
<td>39.5% wanted agricultural activities</td>
<td>21% training industry 12%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References: 1) Tavares, 1993; 2) UCAH, 1995; 3) Assalino, 1997
5.1.2 The Profile of the Target Group

Since 1992 at least three researches projects were conducted for information about the characteristics of the soldiers.

The first was conducted from May to July 1992, to build a profile for the ex-combatants of the Bicesse Accords. Three provinces were selected to conduct the interviews: Huambo, Huila and Malange (Tavares, 1993).

Although the sample was considered unrepresentative, the findings were used as a reference point. The main findings were that the majority of soldiers had served long years (between 6 and 10) in the army. They were young (40% of them less than 20) and their level of education was generally an incomplete secondary. Work experience was centralised around animal husbandry, and 44% had not had experience in agriculture. The majority expressed the desire to work in two parallel activities: agriculture plus other activity, they prioritised agricultural implements, did not own a house, and respected traditions. With reference to the conflict, the majority of soldiers expressed the opinion that co-existence with the contending party was easy or possible, and that further war had to be avoided. Soldiers were from Ovimbundo or Umbundo origin and reaffirmed their ethnic identity. The average number of family members in a household was almost six, and a slight majority of family members were male. The families had incomplete primary education (Tavares, 1993).

Another research project was developed during the period between October 1994 and May 1995 (CAII, 1995). The interviews were conducted with a sample of soldiers from UNITA and the government, ex-military from Bicesse Accords, provincial and municipal administrators, UNO staff members, disabled groups and other stakeholders of the conversion process. The sample was considered unrepresentative although somewhat reliable as a point of reference for planning and for a later and more complete survey (CAII, 1995).
The main findings were that most of UNITA troops had spent a long time in the army, lacked other work experience and on average were older than MPLA troops. UNITA and government troops were equally illiterate but the general educational level of government troops was higher, with illiteracy concentrated mainly among soldiers. In UNITA there was no relationship between rank and illiteracy.

Farming was an unpopular activity, while drivers and mechanics were the most popular occupations for both sides, and UNITA troops also favoured becoming teachers and health workers. A large percentage wanted to be salaried employees. A highly unrealistic ambition within UNITA was that a quarter of the troops wanted to become high-level professionals as engineers and physicians even though they lacked formal schooling. More than a half the sample preferred urban areas for their resettlement. With reference to the conflict soldiers did not express a preference for war. Instead, they reported that they had been forced to fight. The majority wanted to demobilise. UNITA troops attached their decision to demobilise to the existence of reintegration programmes, while government troops had a stronger desire for demobilisation. The answers around ethnic differences showed that soldiers and other people had no major prejudices and believed in the possibility of co-existence, but there were clear indications of a sense of ethnicity (CAII, 1995).

Veterans wanted support in more than one area, and prioritised employment, training, and housing. Many UNITA troops believed they had to be rewarded with higher status and job payment because of their long years of fighting. None of the troops accepted the existence of women soldiers (CAII, 1995).

In general troops were worried about the decision to demobilise because of uncertainties around their capabilities to make a living in civilian life. As a consequence they emphasised training and education to afford them a comparative advantage in civilian life.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>REPORTING INSTITUTION</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IRSEM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Summary of</td>
<td>Implementation under</td>
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<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>the PNDR (1).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Special subsidy in</td>
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<td></td>
<td>cash and goods (clothes,</td>
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Note: 1) National Programme for Demobilisation and Reintegration; 2) United Nations Fund for Childhood; 3) Christian Children Fund
Past experiences presented another hurdle to conversion. Active soldiers were aware that veterans from the Bicesse Accords were abandoned and that the disabled were begging in the streets. Even though UNO had promised better conditions this time, soldiers had some doubts. In this uncertain context, soldiers needed a stronger motivation to demobilise, than the offered support for the transition to civilian life. Training and educational programmes could fill in this space (CAII, 1995).

Rural areas presented more capacity for absorption and better possibilities for reintegration to productive activities, but the land mines were a great obstacle to the development of rural areas (CAII, 1995).

A survey conducted during the quartering phase provided more reliable data due to the size of the sample (Assalino, 1997). The main findings were that a significant percentage of soldiers were in the age range of 18 to 25. See main characteristics in Table 2 (Assalino, 1997).

Other characteristics were that the majority of the soldiers' origins were the provinces of Huambo (22.6%), Bie (18.8%) and Benguela (12%), and they wanted to resettle there; and approximately 59.5% had a family of three members or fewer (Assalino, 1997).

As in the second research project, interviews showed the ex-military to be a politicised class. Veterans thought they deserved a reward for their military services, and thus their expectatives were, many times, far beyond their capabilities and even beyond the programme's possibilities. Respondent 01: "Their feelings are that they have the right to only receive. During registration one Colonel who before the war used to attend a seminary, said that if he returned to religion he had to be a Bishop! Another soldier who had only Primary education, were 33 years old, and had ten women wanted to be physician ... the veterans first used up the cash and food. Only after that did they address their rights regarding reinsertion, and did they begin to think in training"
Respondent 3: "ex-combatants did not have an idea of civilian life. For example one said that he wanted to be mechanic to be able to travel, as a matter of fact he wanted to be assistant in a truck". Respondent 29: "the demobilised are a special target group different from displaced, because the ex-combatants can create problems".

The origin of most of the demobilised appeared to be rural and a portion of them, were not ex-combatants but common citizens (as stated in section 4.1.1).

Interviews showed the existence of women soldiers and that, in spite of the resistance of local leaders, 117 were registered in Kavaleka. There was also resistance to recognising large quantities of child soldiers (Respondent 09).

Respondent 10: "Many of the soldiers went to the troop very young, forced, and thought that type of life was their fate. It was necessary to listen to them and to give them training about the process. Generally soldiers had a very low level of education, spoke only local languages, thus the impact of civic education was low".

Analysis: The comparison in Table "2", shows some similarities among the three surveys. This could be a consequence of the long years of war that shaped the population with some characteristics, for example the lack of education due to destruction of schools or lack of salaries for teachers. It was evident that the population of soldiers was young, had spent some years in the army, and lacked significant education and work experience.

The fact that the soldiers had unrealistic ambitions about their future and that they were waiting for a reward constituted factors of pressure for reintegration programmes in the sense that soldiers needed a strong motivation to choose activities that could be absorbed by the country (CAII, 1995; interviews 1, 3).
The last survey's figures showed that a major effort of reintegration activities, needed to be concentrated on agricultural activities and rural areas. The low level of education and experience required that vocational training focus on occupations that were relatively easy to learn. Only 0.35% of veterans would have been able to cope with more sophisticated training. The existence of underage and disabled soldiers called for special programmes (Assalino, 1997).

Respondent 38 said: "Soldiers phantasised in their answers during the survey in the assembly area, they expressed preference for mechanics and other activities, but once in their villages, and assessing the reality of their country they changed their minds and prioritised agriculture" (CAII, 1995; interviews 4, 50).

Definitely a portion of demobilised were not ex-combatants.

The questions to obtain information about reaffirmation of ethnicity and opinions about the conflict were common to the two first research projects. The questions were approximately framed as: Do you think that your ethnic group has better qualities than other ethnic groups? Do you think that pacific co-existence between veterans from contending parties is possible? The answers to these questions showed a soldier looking forward to demobilisation and rejecting war. However, the fact was that the conflict could not be stopped and that soldiers remobilised to war constituted a contradiction to this premise. There were many reasons that could explain this contradiction; the two most plausible explanations were that either the questions did not address the issue deeply enough or that the conversion process did not address the soldiers' needs in a way to encourage resettlement and reintegration, and rejection of war.

5.1.3 The Implementation

The implementation process was dynamic, lacked some necessary clarification about policies and procedures, and faced important obstacles and the rise of new variables stemming from the political environment. The most important
consequence of these dynamics was that the management style was a more reactive one. (SECOR/ IRSEM 1997; IRSEM/ SECOR/ OIT 1998; interviews 37, 38, 45). Respondent 44: "the project needed better leadership. We needed always to react in face of the political forces instead of acting efficiently, according organisational theory. For instance we lacked a pilot project"

Table "3", shows that the implementation of the reintegration programme and sub-programmes included activities addressing mainly economic reintegration, some actions promoting social reintegration and virtually none targeting political, cultural and psychological reintegration. The programme did not undertake HT. Thus the approach for implementation was more in the field of HR, emphasising employment, self-employment and training, and with some activities underpinning community development (for example reconstruction of schools and rehabilitation of channels of irrigation). Respondent 09: "SECOR transformed itself in QIPs and counselling and other things were forgotten". Respondent 43: "the objectives were the social and economic reintegration of demobilised. The social area was small in the design and during implementation became smaller". Projects focused on the areas of income generating, agriculture and community endeavours (SECOR/ IRSEM 1997; IRSEM/SECOR/ OIT, 1998).

A comparison between tables 2 and 3 shows that implementation aggravated the limitations of the programme beyond what was set up during the policy decision process. This revealed process was negatively influenced by the scarcity of funds, the situation of the country, the Mozambican experience, donor policies and by the design of the policy documents.

In order to complement the analysis of the framework, this research project's interview included two questions around this theme: was the framework of the programme adequate for the country? and which framework would you prefer, HT or HR one?
The results were as follows:
For the first question: 60% of those interviewed said that the approach was not adequate to the country and/or needed some improvements; 26.67% expressed their approval of the framework and suggested the deficiencies were the instability of the peace process and the lack of funds. Some 13.33% did not answer to this question. Respondent 37: "Yes and no. The project could not foresee the dynamics of the population and the political context. Population is not uniform. The project did not take into account the behaviour or mentality of Angolans. The ProDoc addressed only some issues of the Angolan society". Respondent 44: "it was too complicated for Angola." Respondent 42: "the project was designed in a too technical way. It had to address the social sector more than to elaborate on sub-projects. Even though it showed positive results it lacked the ability to achieve more". Respondent 36: "in general terms it was well designed. In terms of work it achieved 80% of results".

For the second question, 73.33% preferred a mix of both approaches. Respondent 37: "matching the two could create an impact in reintegration". Respondent 44: "with out peace none of these theories could work, with peace both are complementary". Respondent 39: "To establish a Project's Directorate with emphasis in psychological issues. The UNITA troops, far from civil life, supported excessive discipline, they were not used to think, suddenly they saw themselves free, and that was a shock for them. Training would be very important to promote change". Some 13.33% favoured the HR one. Respondent 36: "the HT should have been done during quartering phase". Respondent 47: "Projects promoting employment are the best, because demobilised need to feed their families". Some 6.67% preferred the HT framework. Respondent 45: "I would choose the HT approach, it was necessary to change the mentality first and to give a subsidy during the training. It had to be done in the quartering area and after agricultural projects in the community". Some 6.67% did not answer the question. This question indirectly deepened the objectives of the first one, showing that interviewed persons acknowledged the need for an emphasis on training to address a change of mentality.
This enquiry showed that the majority of interviewed people thought the framework of the programme lacked changes and improvements but they were not keen on the idea of undertaking either an exclusive HT or HR approach, but to work with them as complements to each other.

The reasons in favour of HT, HR or a combination of both approaches used the following arguments:
That a HR framework would not yield useful returns without a previous basis of HT because it was very important to change the attitude of people first. For instance, local staff within IRSEM (coming from different parties) could not integrate themselves into the organisation, and often they worked in separate groups. Respondent 37 said: "ex-military have not been in a situation of diversity and need to learn to listen to different opinions, to identify their problems and to prioritise their needs but at the same time they would not pay attention if the programme is only based in HT".

In response to the belief that HR works only over a partial area, the material one, Respondent 41: "development is based more in mentality change than in material aid, for example a soldier who used to be drunk with more money would drink more". In the absence of basic values, it was felt that nothing could be done.

Respondent 51: "Trauma, uncertainty and frustrations were evident. What was necessary was a reeducation of the whole population, not only of ex-combatants. Education should concentrated in the mental structures, in the position around violence, in their capabilities of negotiation, of coexistence". Ex-military personnel had to revised their positions in the face of a new reality.

That veterans would not pay attention to HT without economic incentives, and in poor countries ex-military personnel need immediate aid because they need to support their families. Respondent 37: "They would not pay attention to training
if they are hungry”. Respondent 38: “Ex-combatants have to see future gains in order to be interested in training, pure theoretical training would not have an impact. Projects depend on the incentives given during implementation”.

Respondent 47: “in a first phase it should be necessary to guarantee food and cash for the ex-military because they would not be interested in only training”.

Respondent 42: “when working in the line of mentality change, results are not visible and donors cannot evaluate the work! For instance international journalists coming to report about the conversion process did not understand SECOR's actions. They wanted to see buildings, disabled, blood!”

Respondent 51: “the approach of HR would encourage the good will of ex-combatants by promoting better conditions of living and avoiding renewed violence”.

The enquiry also highlighted the fact that due to the war ex-combatants were remobilised, disappeared, saw their projects destroyed, were waiting for government decisions about their future, or continued barely surviving with their projects (a minority) (interviews 37, 39, 44, 47).

The programme was highly ambitious but was not backed by enough financial resources (Interviews 07, 39, 44).

5.1.3.1 Lessons Learnt

From the internal management of the programme the following was learnt: in order to diminish deviations due to the influences of the situation of the country, the planning phase needed to include communities in the process, to be based on a thorough research into the conditions of the country and of the attitudes of the veterans, to consider mechanisms for co-operation and fluent co-ordination between stakeholders, and during implementation, feedback
devices. Planning needed to include consideration of the weight and needs of the bureaucracy for a large-scale project (SECOR, 1998, p. 37; Interview 05).

An urgent need was the setting up of formal rules for fluent co-operation between different UNO agencies, the UNO peace mission, ministries of the government and the programme implementation (SECOR, 1998, p. 37).

Some of the opinions of contacted respondents were expressed as follows:
Respondent 07 "in the city of Luanda where life is so expensive it is not possible to do a reintegration project with US $ 200". Respondent 47: "funds were not enough, 200 dollars was an insignificant amount to reintegrate an ex-soldier".
Respondent 38: "There was not sufficiently thorough research to design the project. Provincial coordinators were at a crossroads between development and politics; sustainability parameters were influenced by politics. For instance, in terms of development, to repair a school that had not any attendees was not cost-effective, but in political terms was necessary. Another example was that if a man owned the land used for a sub-project, the whole community should benefit; otherwise we would remove the veteran from the community".
Respondent 43: "The two projects, ILO and SECOR, were of a highly political nature. To have IRSEM as counterpart brought sustainability problems for SECOR, because it was an institution with a deadline for life. Maybe SECOR would have worked better with the Ministry of Labour, which already had infrastructures and networks in the provinces, and could continue the endeavour afterwards. Capacity building would not tend to disappear ... the population live very poorly because of the long war, and they have created inertia, they are "waiting for what the international community can give". Respondent 44: "why not to work with the Ministry of Administration?". Respondent 50: "Staff from UNO Mission in the province help me a lot, with logistics, communication and other things, but as a matter of fact there was not any rule or paper saying that they had to do it. They did as a favour and on few occasions some UNO's staff blocked urgent activities. I think that for the general benefit of the programme we needed formal agreements of co-operation. Because they had the resources to
help". Respondent 54: "the co-operation of other UNO agencies functioned on the basis of a favour instead of having a system. The co-operation should have been based on a legal and clear commitment". Respondent 45: "I would have given training to district administrators to enable them to participate in the process".

The capacities of the implementing institutions needed to be strong enough to face the country's highly dynamic environment and the difficulties of the ambitious objectives. In this sense there was a need to set up clear policies and procedures, an efficient administration and an effective system for human resources management; including selection and training of personnel (local and expatriate). Respondent 37: "There was not a policy paper. People learnt things according circumstances. Due to this, interpretations were different throughout the provinces. Full co-ordination and management devices were implemented only by the middle of the project period". Respondent 44: "There was a lack of discipline in the programme. Contrary to the plans the programme spent more in administration in QIPs. It could have been good to hire and train Angolan staff, but initially it was not possible to work with Angolan staff because of the matter of neutrality". Respondent 42: "Some foreign staff lacked experience in the social sector"

The type of the programme and the challenges it presented called for the urgent application of the concepts of team work, fluent horizontal and vertical communication, experience sharing, service to those demobilised, stewardship, delegation and decentralisation. Respondent 38 "communication was very difficult and only vertical not horizontal; it was not possible to learn from the experience of other people. In this sense mistakes were repeated. Coordinators had to take decisions according to their understanding". Respondent 42: "staff needed to be socially conscious, to understand the concept of stewadship, to understand that their presence was originated by the demobilised and not the other way round. This was a big problem, especially for local staff"
Counterpart institutions needed to be organised in a way to facilitate implementation, integration of functions and of personnel, and capacity building. Respondent 37: "I would redefine the rules of partnership between IRSEM and SECOR, to give IRSEM a middle term between independence and control, to do rules of each one compatible and to totally integrate both organisations. At the end the result would be capacity building and consciousness. This would avoid IRSEM staff think about power rather than in terms of beneficiaries". Respondent 39: "IRSEM included Bicesse's and Lusaka's demobilised, SECOR only had Lusaka's ex-combatants, leaving a large number to be dealt with in IRSEM". Respondent 50: "IRSEM staff did not like the fact that local UNO staff had better benefits and salaries, and received them on time. To solve the problem SECOR had to establish some subsidies for IRSEM's staff". Respondent 09: "IRSEM's staff capabilities were very weak".

The relationship with ex-military personnel needed to be carefully managed. Promised benefits (cash, food, pensions, alternatives of reintegration) needed to be effectively distributed. In another case frustration and distrust were reinforced. Respondent 50: "This Director from IRSEM convened a meeting with Bicesse ex-soldiers in the office, without previously consulting us, SECOR. This man called the ex-combatants only to give a speech! He had nothing to offer. Those veterans were already resentful because they were abandoned after the war, and became very angry and aggressive. They beat the man up and tried to destroy the office".

Neutrality needed to be dealt with as a wide concept. Management, the organisational structure, the selection and quantity of personnel, the geographical localisation of offices and the proper work of staff needed to be considered in terms of transparency and neutrality. Respondent 06: "there was an ambiguous situation because the programme was controlled by the government. Initially it was not possible to work with local staff because of the issue of neutrality. Due to the fact that SECOR was under UNDP umbrella, which was an intergovernmental organisation, there was pressure to reinforce
provincial governments. Thus offices were established in the provincial capitals instead of the places where ex-combatants were concentrated, ". Respondent 39: "When they come to Luanda, the UNITA staff goes first to see their peers, now acting as senior staff here. They consult them, obtain information and only after they go to see the person in charge from MPLA. Until now they do not trust us". Some reasons that influenced selection of geographical places for offices were also the proximity to a UNO communication system, to IOM and accessibility to roads (UNDP, 1996, p. 3, 5).

Security conditions for staff, particularly for local staff, needed to be improved. Respondent 50: "local staff did not want to travel alone. When travelling with the cocoordinator they felt safe. There was this problem of identification cards. Local staff did not have a UNO identification card. They could not prove their neutrality". Respondent 44: "The project was implemented in conditions of extreme risk for the staff".

From the Implementation Activities the following was learnt:
Vocational training programmes needed more thorough research into the conditions of the country, of the market and of the cultural issues embedded in the labour sector. Respondent 38: "The ILO project was a blueprint not flexible and not culturally sensitive. In that poor province nobody would pay money to have his/her hair cut. In that society, it was not a respected job. For a veteran to become a barber was coming down in level. To make pots was like a punishment for ex-combatants. In terms of the market, to become a bicycles' mechanic was frustrating because in the province a friend would help you without paying. In the case of candle making, there were others cheaper and of better quality. Nobody would by those candles, and in this province raw materials were not available. ILO did not have an emphasis on agriculture". Respondent 05: "Co-ordination between SECOR and ILO was easier in the paper than in the practice. The core of the problem was that the budget for the ILO programme was too small; there was a big gap between resources and objectives. Another problem was that these projects are designed to be
implemented in a time of peace. Projects do not make miracles in an unfavourable macroeconomic environment; you need time, at least one year. Or you need to know what do you want with the project, a cushion effect? emergency aid?, transition?, stabilisation?, entertainment?, or a vocational training programme?... Currently, due to the general context, the programme is dealing with a cushion effect. The Angolan reality is that the population prefers to work in commerce than in the services sector. To create a culture of services like carpentry, masonry and so on, that is much more difficult! Here it is different from Mozambique there you could find craftsmen everywhere, but not here". Respondent 42: "some tools distributed after training were not adequate for Angola".

Vulnerable groups needed to receive more attention and opportunities. There was a lack of adequate health services for the disabled (SEC0R1, 1998, p. 14, 24; SECOR II, 1998, pg. 5; QIPs, 1997, p. 7). Respondent 09: "the general population was not involved in the evolution of projects for vulnerable groups. The rehabilitation centre was not created. They did not even receive all the pensions. Banks were defaulted and were incapable of responding to the challenge of paying pensions to disabled. There were problems of transport and distance for payment of pensions. The army should have helped to fulfil the promise of paying in situ"

The QIPs called for specific co-ordination with local authorities, in order to promote macroeconomic policies targeting the revitalisation of the entire economy, which was a sine qua non requirement for the sustainability of projects. Respondent 43: "when a project begins in the sector of income generation is very difficult because it is a matter of inventing market. The project will be sick with the same problems of the environment". Respondent 54: "the formulation of a solid macroeconomic context for reconstruction is a priority. Government policies would have to ensure that expenditure was prioritised for rehabilitation, the provision of basic social services, the fulfilment of promises regarding pensions and subsidies to ex-combatants, and some other necessary
economic policies such as stabilisation, the establishment of an accurate budget, and accountability'. Respondent 05: "the individual needs the appropriate macroeconomic environment because projects do not do miracles. Time was short, a project needs at least one year".

Given the economic and institutional situation of the country, reintegration should have prioritised agriculture (which had major absorption power) as an economic alternative for employment and auto employment, searching to effect linkages between this activity and the community, commerce and micro-industry endeavours (SECOR1, 1998, p. 24). Respondent 07: "agriculture, especially food production, is abandoned mainly because of migration and land mines". Respondent 45: "agricultural projects have more advantages, so we should have motivated the demobilised soldiers for this". Respondent 38: "latest surveys showed that ex-combatants' priorities are agriculture and the tools needed for that". Respondent 43: "in order to have a market for the services sector it is necessary to have agricultural surplus. Other needs would appear, such as carpentry. Only after solving the food shortage. Here agricultural activities do not work because of the war. In this phase the best projects are those involving agriculture and fishing for food ones, including aspects of microcredit, training, and involving women". Respondent 50: "in face of the weak macroeconomic environment, especially in some provinces, the obvious solution was to emphasise agriculture, mainly food production but involving some related activities such as animal husbandry, fish farming. We needed to consider the fact that some provinces had a strong tradition in agriculture". Respondent 41: "It is very difficult to create sustainable micro enterprises in a few months. To change an ex-soldier (that came from the bush) in to a business man".

Planning had to include the high probability that the funds committed by the government would not be transferred due to the underdevelopment situation and the influences of the conflict. In this sense other contingent alternatives should have been planned.
The programme had to consider an aggressive general awareness campaign in order to motivate local leaders and population to adhere strongly to the reintegration and reconciliation activities. Respondent 43: "The investment in a national reconciliation programme was small, insufficient. The government and national institutions should have been involved in this, for example the big current campaign against Savimbi is having an impact. (See also comments by Respondent 51 in section 4.1.1: For the General Demobilisation)

The reintegration activities needed to be integrated within the national programme in order to avoid duplication and overlapping with other programmes. Respondent 08: "the programme implemented by the international community was a duplication. They were doing the same things that were set as the goals of the Community Rehabilitation Programme (CRP)". Respondent 09: "SECOR offices would have to function as representatives of UNDP in the provinces, empowering MINARS as institution, both provincial coordinators SECOR and MINARS would have to work together, but nobody took the decision".

The reintegration projects needed to address community needs and to avoid creating an image of a privileged class around ex-combatants because this hampered reintegration. Respondent 39: "the fact that SECOR targeted only veterans from the Lusaka Protocol caused resentment within Bicesse's ex-combatants who began a campaign to discredit SECOR/IRSEM, saying that its goal was to support UNITA. Afterwards we found funds for them, but the increasing political instability permitted only a few actions". Respondent 54: "the benefits and subsidies for ex-combatants, many times, instead of promoting reintegration, created separation from the community because these ex-combatants arrived at their villages in a privileged situation. Other groups forgotten were widows of war, some disabled, war displaced. All this did not helped to reintegration".

The programme needed to create a system for local staff recruitment that could avoid the high pressure exerted by local leaders. Respondent 44: "some local
staff was hired because top local leaders exerted high pressure to do so. For example Y recommended X, although there were other candidates far better than him/her. This influenced the efficiency of the project'. Respondent 50: "social promoters should have been selected by SECOR from a list presented by IRSEM, this could have avoided preferences due to nepotism and political cronyism. Several social promoters created a lot of problems; they used to drink and fought. In some provinces co-coordinators established a selection committee, with local and international members. This was a good method to ensure impartiality and efficiency in the selection of personnel".

The inclusion of ex-military as staff members, for example as social promoters, should take into consideration the persistence of the military style in working relationships where officials used their rank to prioritise their opinions and desires over those of their subordinates. Apparently social promoters needed a background in social work, and could have been partially enabled with more extensive training. Respondent 42: "The ex-military did not have experience in the social area. They kept the relationship in terms of the rank. One wrong idea was that to deal with ex-combatants, the staff had to have a voice of command, whereas instead we needed personnel with open minds. Maybe the staff needed better training". Respondent 45: "I disagreed with the project of ex-combatants as social promoters, because they acted according to their political preferences. I would have preferred to have people with a technical background".

The programme needed to develop a conjoint system (IRSEM, SECOR, other local institution) in order to avoid deviations caused by corruption. Respondent 45: "some transferences of funds (from IRSEM) lacked transparency. I achieved to implement a lot, because I always checked the transferences. I know the system. The office in my province always had resources".

The programme needed to set up indicators for impact assessment, preferably quantitative ones. Respondent 43: "it was necessary to have quantitative
indicators from the beginning of the programme, in order to have a notion of the impact". Respondent 41: "any project needs clear assessment parameters from the beginning, and this project lacked them, indicators for evaluation" (UNDP, 1995; interviews).

Reintegration included social, economic, political and psychological aspects. And the programme prioritised the economic reintegration due to the fact that wide scope would have demanded from the programme implementation competence in various specialties, and not only the reference to services but also the provision of services. Respondent 44: "the programme should have developed activities at many levels but there were not experienced and qualified personnel". Respondent 54: "at the beginning a wide scope of objectives was considered for the project, including counselling, post-trauma health support and basic social services. But the wide approach showed to be unacceptable because it created confusion between the concepts of service provision and the referral to services. The first one would demand that the project involve competence in many specialities, and to increase expectations of veterans who would see SECOR as a provider of integral services. Around 1998 it was decided to focus on referring accessible activities and to stop using the word counselling to better clarify the issue. Referral concentrated on health and physical rehabilitation, employment, training and education" (SECOR, 1998, IRSEM/SECOR/OIT, 1998).

5.1.3.2 Strengths

The programme management was able to react to the deterioration of the political environment by creating a contingency plan (Respondent 01)

Respondent 39: "IRSEM showed it could have been a guarantee to change the lives of ex-combatants by opening possibilities in the area of employment, agriculture, community endeavours, micro enterprises, and training".
Respondent 44: "personnel from the programme worked in areas where other organisations did not go. We counted with personnel in every province thus there was a good net for information".

Respondents 47 and 50: "the awareness campaign in some provinces emphasised reconciliation, family reunification, local authorities' and traditional leaders' co-operation, and reintegration". Respondent 48: "the programme recommended the welfare of those demobilised citizens in a new society without weapons".

Respondent 46: "the motivation of the staff who planned the programme towards reconciliation and reintegration, including a philosophy of support to the demobilised and families".

Respondent 47: "identification of projects in the productive areas contributed to economic development".

Some projects produced quick impact and were sustainable. They created employment and reactivated economic activities in some provinces. Respondent 42: "demobilised had the possibility of implementing some projects".

Respondent 49: "a good aspect was the support for the reintegration of the demobilised in the whole province". Respondent 48: "Many demobilised found employment what facilitated their reintegration to communities".

Training activities permitted posterior employment, Respondent 43: "more than 80% of those ex-military personnel who received training were working afterwards". According to the ILO Report (1998), 7.3% of veterans who received training were employed, 71.7% self-employed and 21% unemployed.

Respondent 43: "11,000 veterans benefited from vocational training. The programme was designed to benefit 25,000 ex-combatants. The political environment hampered implementation"
Respondent 04: "the family reunification and awareness campaign for underage ex-combatants helped to enhance a net of social workers throughout the country based in the catechists' net".

Respondent 04: "NGOs co-operated in the reintegration of underage soldiers. They implemented projects in the fields of housing, traditional healing, civil registration, and micro-business".

5.1.3.3 Constraints

The Angolan government contributed only with a small portion of the funds committed, thus IRSEM lacked funds for investment in projects, and could be sure only of funds for salaries and some equipment. Respondent 39: "IRSEM had to receive more international support for capacity building and equipment. The international community thought that to demine the country was more important than to reintegrate". Respondent 01: "In the practice the contribution of the Angolan government was not effected". Respondent 07: "IRSEM received 10% of the promised funds the first year, 14% the second year. Only 9% of the necessary funds could be invested in the reintegration programme".

IRSEM lacked management transparency and accuracy. Respondent 07: "there was not transparency and rigour in the public management" (and interview 45, 44).

 Provision of premises by the government was insufficient considering the size of the programme. Respondent 10: Providing premises for offices was the government's responsibility. "Some provincial offices had to close because of lack of funds to rent premises". Respondent 42: "to rent an office was a burden on the budget" (see next paragraph: Respondent 50; IRSEM/SECOR/ OIT, 1998, p. 26 SECOR, 1998, p. 11, 18).
It was felt that local administrators and leaders took too much time to adhere to the reintegration programme and they did not fully commit themselves. Respondent 3: "There were problems with the authorities. At the beginning it was very difficult because there were two governments one in Luanda and another one in Bailundo". Respondent 50: "even though there were some buildings available, the provincial authorities did not offer them to Secor. And we had to rent and repair private buildings. Those expenses could have served to repair a government building or to be used in projects. That’s not deep commitment".

It was difficult to involve other institutions and NGOs, particularly international NGOs, which had already, a work plan approved by their headquarters. Emerging national NGOs had limited resources and mobility, and weak organisations and problems of trust (QIPs, 1997, p. 7). Respondent 50: "Some institutions, such as the church and certain NGOs, distrusted the process and therefore mistrusted the potential consequences of their participation in reintegration activities. They therefore excluded themselves from involvement in the process. Some local NGOs had big problems with corruption". Respondent 44: "there were small subcontracts or partnerships with national and international organisations".

Respondent 01: "the war context made it difficult to make advocacy in the donor’s countries, some donors understood the difficult environment others not"

Some ex-combatants, families and communities distrusted and feared the programme’s activities. Some veterans wanted to reintegrate but many of them were rejected by their families and/or the community. At the same time they feared massacres and death. Local staff was treated as spies (Respondents 3, 4, 45). Respondent 09: "some people said to me: the individual that used to kill is still receiving money!".
Some people within communities resented the privileges received by ex-military, and the civic education programme was not strong enough to prepare demobilised and communities for reintegration.

Respondent 04: "UNITA infiltrated some personnel within the catechists net working with reunification of families".

Respondent 07: "the international community did not fulfil the promise made in Brussels. They created false expectations but made available only a small portion of the promised funds, less than 10%".

There was political instability and distrust within contending parties.

The differences between staff from SECOR and IRSEM regarding benefits, salaries, rules and other factors increased the problems with co-ordination.

Respondent 37 said: "motivation of the SECOR's co-coordinators at the province was far higher than that of the co-coordinator from IRSEM, or its counterparts. and opinions about implementation were also different". Respondent 47: "IRSEM staff did not participate much in the reintegration activities". Respondent 50: "as a general vision the production of IRSEM staff was lower than the SECOR one, throughout the country. In some provinces IRSEM staff had many difficulties to carry on their tasks. The bad conditions of living, such as being poorly and irregular paid, influenced their performance. The staff did not have access to basic social services, health support for example. They needed extensive training. Some provinces had to began with basic things like training staff about working schedules. To build basic capacity, would have taken at least one year on the condition of improved salaries and living conditions".

5.2 Conclusions of the Chapter
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<th>SOLDIERS PROFILE</th>
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<th>RESULTS</th>
<th>CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGICA</th>
<th>OBSERVATIONS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low educational level, lack of skills and resources. Average soldier had 5 dependents, 4 years of Primary school, 32 years old, lacked non military skills, were born and wanted to resettle in rural areas.</td>
<td>Low possibilities for formal employment, poverty and underdevelopment. War did not destroy cities. Existence of some industries and infrastructure. State administration more spread in the country. Structural adjustment. Absence of ethnic problems. War originated in political differences.</td>
<td>Focused in economic issues emphasizing agriculture, employment creation through micro-projects, and small scale projects nation wide. Design top-down.</td>
<td>Flow of ex-military to urban areas, increasing armed robbery, creation of demobilised association, child soldiers faced problems. More than 90% felt integrated into the civilian society. DWRS.</td>
<td>Political stability. NEI about participation of ex-combatants in the political life of the country or in civilian organisations.</td>
<td>Ex-combatants are leaving their families in the farms and they go to look for jobs mainly in the informal sector in the cities. Nonetheless some success was achieved.</td>
<td>Left to the communities on the understanding that indigenous societies have great capacity for interaction and support.</td>
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<td>SOLDIERS PROFILE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of skills, food, and shelter. They had high expectations</td>
<td>Small private sector with low capacity of absorption for workers. The war was originated by racial differences.</td>
<td>Focused in the economic area, centralised. Establishment of development brigades under the umbrella of the Ministry of Lands.</td>
<td>Social stability</td>
<td>Inadequate funding and lack of managerial expertise hampered the programme. Some success, 15% of development brigades members.</td>
<td>not addressed</td>
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<td>AGDS. Reintegration only started after violent complaints of demobilised. Need of more funds and training Stability achieved after reintegration</td>
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<td>SOLDIERS PROFILE</td>
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<td>Lack of skills and resources, high expectations. Many of them with liaisons to churches.</td>
<td>Private sector rejected ex-combatants. The Lancaster agreement obliged to accept the maintenance of socioeconomic structures for a period of ten years. The war was originated by racial differences.</td>
<td>Focused in the economic area. Centralised, large scale programme promoting agriculture, co-operatives, auto-employment.</td>
<td>Social stability. Creation of a veteran's association Women veterans faced big problems during reintegration (DWRS).</td>
<td>After a period of riots relative political stability. NEI about participation of ex-combatants in the political life of the country or in civilian organisations. Inadequate funding and lack of managerial expertise hampered the programme. Violence between ex-combatants and climate conditions harass co-operatives. 44 to 51% of demobilised received some support. At the end large number of veterans unemployed</td>
<td>Not addressed according to some authors the cultural and religious background of the country and specially of the leaders helped reconciliation (De Waal, 1990). AGDS, army and guerrilla integrated prior to demobilisation. After some violence achieved relative stability.</td>
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<td>SOLDIERS PROFILE</td>
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<td>REINTEGRATION PROCESSES, HORN OF AFRICA</td>
<td>CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGICA</td>
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<td>Lack of skills and resources, high expectations. Origins heterogeneous, from army, militia, and armed bands, rural or urban High risk group for sexually transmitted diseases. Large number of disabled in Eritrea &amp; Ethiopia</td>
<td>Region devastated by decades of war. Weak: food production, infrastructure, education and health systems. Lack of opportunities for formal employment, difficulties with the provision of land. Some political instability in Ethiopia and some stability in Eritrea at the beginning. Ethnic problems plus independence originated the war.</td>
<td>Focused in the economic area, i.e. demobilised and community, training, employment, credit schemes. Participative planning. Political education. New strategy launching resettlement areas exclusive for demobilised to avoid high density regions in Ethiopia. Not really organised &amp; funded in Ethiopia and Eritrea.</td>
<td>Women faced problems to reintegrate (DWRS). In general some success. New conflicts arose in Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Resistance to change by soldiers</td>
<td>NEI According to topical situation appears to have been low. Criminality rate increased after demobilisation. At the beginning appeared that there would be some success. But reintegration did not mean an improvement with reference to prevailing poor conditions of living in the region. In Ethiopia difficult access to land.</td>
<td>Some limited professional counselling in Eritrea. As a general basis psycho-social issues were not addressed. Notwithstanding it was evident the need for its implementation.</td>
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<th>REINTEGRATION PROCESSES, EL SALVADOR</th>
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<td>Poverty, scarcity underdevelopment, difficulties with provision of land. Structural Adjustment. Weak judicial, social security, and education systems War based in economic and ideological differences.</td>
<td>Part of the national reconstruction plan, it focused in the economic area, i.e. employment, training, credit schemes, treatment for disabled, public works, land transference and titles including agricultural training and credit</td>
<td>DWRS led to the creation of at least 12 women organisations. Other several organisations were created by ex-combatants to deal with development, negations, rights protection, psychological and physical rehabilitation and employment.</td>
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<td>Political and economic motives for violence during transition.</td>
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<td>Not successful according UNO report in 1996, but some success in the programme for land transference.</td>
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<td>Addressed reconciliation, and educational and psychosocial care for children with war traumas.</td>
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<td>AGDS and PMD Not enough funds. Poor administration of the programme and abuse of power by the government. Problems with donors coordination After some years the country achieved stability.</td>
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<td>SOLDIERS PROFILE</td>
<td>GENERAL ENVIRONMENT</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of resources and skills. Mainly young. Long years fighting. Ideological differences between groups.</td>
<td>Underdevelopment, scarcity of land, structural adjustment programme War based in economic and ideological differences.</td>
<td>A sum of different reactive efforts, not an integrated national programme. Each party negotiated reintegration conditions separately. Focusing on the economic sector: training, housing, land, public works, loans, agriculture and fishing projects.</td>
<td>DWRS, establishment of some organisations. Women instrumental in reconciliation. Creation of several organisations and alliances to deal with different issues as agrarian policies, pensions, land titles, credit, infrastructure &amp; others.</td>
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TABLE 4.7: COMPARISON BETWEEN REINTEGRATION PROCESSES, ANGOLA

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<th>SOLDIERS PROFILE</th>
<th>GENERAL ENVIRONMENT</th>
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<th>RESULTS</th>
<th>CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low educational level, lack of skills and resources.</td>
<td>Region devastated by decades of war. Weak: industry, food production, infrastructure, institutions, educational and health systems and human rights. Lack of formal employment. Country divided between two administrations and a fragmented society.</td>
<td>One integrated programme focusing mainly in economic reintegration emphasising: micro-projects, training, some public works and agriculture</td>
<td>The resumption of war did not permitted a deep assessment. Some features are: There were problems with family reunification due to fears of families to recognise children. Political conditions hampered relatives reunification. Resettlement was undertaken under compulsory parameters established by UNITA, i.e lack of freedom to choose resettlement areas.</td>
<td>A few demobilised were integrated into public service, notwithstanding some of them could not effect any work because the country division and aggressions of the containing party. More training was needed for ex-combatants working with reintegration.</td>
<td>Programme was limited to economic reintegration. Cultural and ethnic matters were factors adding to the difficulties of implementation. It was evident the need for the implementation of measures dealing with psychosocial and cultural issues as for example HT.</td>
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<td>Average soldier had only primary school level, was younger, than 25 and wanted to resettle in rural areas. Many times they had unreal expectations.</td>
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<td>One party demobilised alone under Lusaka Protocol. PMD. Problems with demobilisation had negative influences on reintegration. Lack of enough resources. Poor administration of the government institute for reintegration.</td>
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Notes: PMD = Poor management of disarmament, AGDS = Army and guerrilla demobilised together, DWRS = Demobilised women reintegration syndrome.
Earlier stages of planning defined a wide framework for reintegration activities, on the understanding that the needs of the ex-combatants were multidimensional (social, economic, political, psychological and cultural) and their stabilisation would contribute to the stabilisation of the peace process. The subsequent planning and policy-making stages narrowed the approach, which finally, during implementation, addressed mainly economic reintegration with some linkages to community endeavours. The reason given was the difficulties to provide services. Afterwards the urgent need for those not provided services was evident.

During the implementation process there was evidence of the need for an HT approach, which could address the need for changed mentality amongst all members of the Angolan society. HT would promote, within ex-combatants understanding of civilian life, its uncertainties and difficulties, in order to prepare them to cope with the pressures of underdevelopment without recurring to violence and to set up basis for the vocational training and quick impact projects. Within the host community and the general society would promote a good reception of ex-military, co-operation with reintegration as well as to adopt an attitude of co-existence and peace.

The challenges regarding reintegration were enormous, considering the number of soldiers and dependents to reintegrate, and the extremely low capacity of absorption of the economy; the unstable political environment, the fragmented social and cultural context, the difficulties in building an efficient organisation, and the problems of providing technical assistance and building capacity. Furthermore funds for the programme comprised only a small amount of what was promised by the government and the international community. The size and quality of the challenges and the weak resources to cope with this meant that the reintegration task had to be the duty of the entire society and not only of one institution. Therefore an awareness and information campaign had to be launched aggressively in order to mobilise all strata of society, especially those
with important roles in the conversion process, such as the medium level administrators, police officials, community leaders and so on.

Despite prior research and efforts in planning, the implementation process nevertheless underwent turmoil, with difficulties stemming both from the context of conflict and from the complexity and exigencies of the task.

The absence of clear and quantitative assessment indicators, and the influence of the war made it difficult to evaluate the impact of the programme. The Lusaka Protocol held the government responsible for the reintegration programme. This resulted in the creation of IRSEM. In a process of conflict resolution, transparency, accuracy, and neutrality of involved local institutions is very important in order to show the good will of contending parties towards peace, and to ensure symmetry. Thus, planning needed to consider mechanisms to enable these institutions to satisfy these requirements. A transparent, efficient and neutral organisation would build credibility and encourage participation of the contending parties and of society as a whole.

CHAPTER 6: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

This chapter will discuss the similarities of the Angolan reintegration programme with other country’s processes with the objective of determining the applicability of the previously mentioned approach of HT or in another case the preference for a HR or HD frameworks.
6.1 Interpretation of Findings

This research showed that the framework of the Reintegration Programme in Angola prioritised the economic reintegration of ex-military personnel with some projects underpinning community development.

The implementation process was difficult due to internal and external obstacles. Internally the challenges were the ex-combatants' expectations, capacity building, effective management and coordination, creating more open policy processes, better integration between stakeholders, and security conditions for the staff. More attention would have had to be paid to researching the market, and to take into consideration ethnic and cultural issues, the really wide target group, including both Bicesse and Lusaka veterans, and a need for a change of attitude within staff ex-military.

Externally, challenges were the low level of funds coming from donors and from the government, the need for attitudinal change within the general society regarding the responsibility of all citizens for the reintegration and reconciliation processes. Additional problems were the negative consequences of the demobilisation process, such as poor disarmament and hidden troops, the lack of freedom of ex-combatants to choose resettlement areas and to avoid remobilisation, the general condition of poverty and underdevelopment in the country, deep and endemic corruption, the fragmentation of society, and finally the most influential: insufficient commitment of the parties to overcome the difficulties of the conversion process.

The NRP was absorbed by SECOR, it was not possible to effect a final liaison with the CRP, and a consistent assessment of the programme's effectiveness was not possible. This was due both to the resumption of the war and all the difficulties noted above. The performance indicators lacked both measurable form and clear definition prior to implementation.
The situation of the country was highly unfavourable to the reintegration process, and the implementation of the programme was not able of building a strong enough reintegration process to underpin the peace process in terms of avoiding remobilisation and the further outbreak of war.

6.2 Pattern-matching

A pattern-matching mode of analysis compares an empirically based case with a predicted one in order to establish future premises or outcomes (Yin 1985). Comparison of the data from the experience in other countries and the Angolan situation should establish similarities and the possible needs for the reintegration framework.

Table "4" shows that the Angolan process was similar in various ways with reintegration processes in other countries.

Main similarities are the characteristics of ex-combatant, whose profiles are similar in that they lacked skills and experience, and their level of education was very low. They were young and some had unrealistically high expectations. They spent many years fighting and depended on the army for their survival. Consequently such persons, that is indigent and without opportunities, are vulnerable to ethnic, ideological and economic propaganda. They respond to differences and inequity with violence and engage in conflict easily.

All the processes showed in Table "4" focused on economic reintegration. Some countries launched integrated programmes; others had a sum of reactive efforts. Only three of the seven countries undertook limited activities in the psychological sector, or change of attitude. Trauma, counseling, psychological care and reconciliation were not main issues in the reintegration programmes.

All countries presented limited success in economic reintegration. In comparison, the level of social reintegration was superior with the exception of
the women who appeared to find difficulties during reintegration in various countries.

Nonetheless, after a period of politically and economically based riots and high criminality rate, all countries except Angola and the Horn of Africa achieved a certain level of social and political stability. Both regions presented some ethnic problems.

In most of the countries army and guerrilla demobilised simultaneously, and they presented a poor management of disarmament.

The origin of conflict in Namibia and Zimbabwe was racial and economic; on the Horn of Africa and in Angola it was ethnic, political and economic; El Salvador, Mozambique and Nicaragua had the origin of conflict in ideological differences. Angola fits very well in the general framework of these countries which underwent peace and reintegration processes. This is in terms of the target group profile, the situation of the country, the strategies for reintegration, the impact in social, political and economic reintegration and the lack of activities addressing cultural and psychological issues.

The main differences are that in Angola only one party demobilised, there were ethnic problems embedded in the conflict, and other countries participated as stakeholders.

6.3 Angolan Reintegration Programme Needs

According to the findings in chapters 4 and 5, in order to achieve success, it was important to create favourable conditions in the social, economic, political and cultural environment as well as to address the internalisation of the concepts of reconciliation, peace building and civilian life between ex-combatants.
Thus the needs appeared as follows:
In the economic sector: the re-activation of agriculture and commerce, the establishment of favourable economic policies for micro-projects, for credit schemes, for the creation of employment and of an indigenous industry. The building of equity in the distribution of income, the enhancement of public services as health care and education, and a revision of the private property and titles system. The establishment of free circulation of goods and persons, the improvement of roads and the fight against corruption.

In the political sector needs are: firstly, the good will of contending parties to surmount the obstacles to reconciliation. A sacrifice from current leaders attached to the rich extractive sector of the country, because the system of distribution of profits would have to be changed. Internalisation of the concept of democracy, the separation of the concepts of political power and private profits, democratisation of the general institutions of the country, including nominations of authority figures such as governors, district administrators and judges. An affirmative action programme to include people from the central plains in the public administration. Finally, the cooperation of other countries, which share economic interests in Angola. Effective disarmament and demobilisation is a requirement.

Socially the needs are: a major campaign to promote the integration of the population, a policy of affirmative action for the integration of people from the central plains in the cultural and social activities of the country, reconstruction of the cultural tissue in the country. Respondent 15: "to build a national feeling independent of other factors as economic, ethnic, political"

Psychologically the needs are: to heal the spiritual traumas of war, to promote reconciliation, co-existence, team action, voluntary work, solidarity and courage to face the difficulties of living in Angola. It is possible to see that all requirements need a change of attitude, including those involved in the economic sector particularly concerning corruption.
Change of mentality could be built through a HT programme that includes, besides the basic human skills expressed in section 2.4.2, the concepts of nation and service to society.

Respondent 28: "UNO would have had to address power sharing and distribution". However the government did not accept a UNO multidisciplinary body but, apart from the peace mission, only specialised agencies and humanitarian activities (Angola News, 1999). Respondent 15: "the limitations of UNO come from the mandate. Angola is a sovereign country; it can create limitations, thus the mandate of UNO depends on the strength Angola wants to give to it. UNO is effective to the extent the contending parties permit".

Respondent 30: "Bicesse agreements did not contribute to solving the problems of power sharing, and military and economic imbalances"

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Given the similarities of the conversion processes in different countries (section 6.2), Angola, in the same way as Nicaragua, could be said to benefit from a HT approach, with the emphasis on a change of mentality within ex-combatants.

However, the exposition of needs in Section 6.3, leads to the premise that the Angolan Reintegration Programme needed a broader approach, which could open opportunities for veterans to make choices for themselves regarding reconciliation, the cessation of violence and avoidance of remobilization, resettlement areas; and about other issues in the reintegration process. Such an approach should encompass ways to improve their economic conditions of living, by way of their meaningful participation in the policy process of the country. The possibility of such choice suggested that an HD framework was necessary.

The study showed that addressing only the economic aspects of reintegration was insufficient. It did not satisfy even the goals of economic reintegration for the large majority of ex-combatants. After a period of years the situation of many veterans was still unsatisfactory.

Consequently, in a situation comprising a conglomeration of forces, most of which were negative, the Angolan reintegration programme, was limited in its scope of action, and this limitation was increased by the scarcity of funds.

Addressing only a part of the reintegration needs (only economic reintegration) left the other needs under the responsibility of the spontaneous action of the society. However, the problems of the Angolan society were so complex (ethnic, political, economic, leadership, psycho-social) that the country needed an organised and comprehensive process to be able to achieve stabilisation and peace. This would have had to include motivation, promotion of peace, and attitudinal change, in order to overcome the challenges.
Some countries achieved successful reintegration of veterans despite the weaknesses of their conversion processes. These included Mozambique, Nicaragua, Zimbabwe and El Salvador. In the case of Angola, the complex situation of the country, particularly the ethnic and economic problems, appears to be the reason for the repeated failures of the peace process.

For these reasons mediators and contending parties should design the peace and conversion processes with multidimensional strategies. Therefore in addition to reintegration devices, additional strategies are needed to addressing all the factors of the country's situation that could lead to stabilisation. For instance policies addressing equity, and democratisation.

Researching the situation of the country and the market appears to be an important requirement for planning, taking into consideration cultural and ethnic issues of the country's society.

Poverty and lack of education create opportunities for violent conflicts. Foreign or internal stakeholders, who can fund troops and destabilise a society, can always use ethnic prejudices and the resentment by some groups. In this context HD provides a sustainable approach to stability.

Thus, a reintegration programme is multidisciplinary and has various dimensions, which can be grouped as economic, social, political, psychological and cultural.

In general terms social reintegration appears to have been more successful in different countries, nonetheless, the situation of the women ex-combatants was difficult. In the case of Angola, the conflict has reinforced the fragmentation of the society and the situation of vulnerable groups (women, children and disabled) is difficult.
In terms of political reintegration, countries gradually included veterans in the political life of the country. Some countries were more successful than others. Excepting Angola and the Horn of Africa, stabilisation has been an achievement.

In Angola, the first achievements, such as integration of veterans from contending parties in national institutions (parliament and armed forces) and organizations, vanished with the resumption of the conflict.

In general, results have been low regarding economic reintegration. In the case of Angola success has not been massive and the resumption of war destroyed or stopped sub-projects.

The psychological rehabilitation and a change of mentality appeared to be the most neglected issues. There is very little information about their potential or applicability, and these aspects require further study.

All the phases of the demilitarisation process, including the peace agreement, demobilisation and reintegration, are deeply interrelated and they have to be considered on a continuum with regard to strategic planning.

A reintegration programme has to begin simultaneously with the peace process and negotiations. Mediators and stakeholders have to negotiate an accurate, neutral, transparent, and plausible programme. This should include effective disarmament and demobilisation, democratisation and the equitable distribution of economic benefits and public services. Mediators and negotiators need to take into consideration long term goals, such as development, and to avoid certain short term measures towards stabilization, which could create more problems than solutions. For instance the quick and separated demobilisation in Angola.

Policy processes are difficult to implement. In the case of the Angolan programme a broad approach was drastically reduced through the policy
process. The inclusion of the intended beneficiaries in the policy process could help to ensure that the whole range of needs of the target group is included in the programme.

The target group was clearly to some extent heterogeneous, and therefore a range of possibilities needed to be planned for the reintegration process, although the emphasis needed to be on agriculture and community activities.

It was evident that to overcome all the obstacles of the Angolan situation, ex-combatants, leaders, and the population needed to have a strong conviction towards the establishment of peace; and they lacked it. Thus the first step would have had to imbue that sense of conviction. In this sense a general awareness campaign, with a strong participation of contending parties was an imperative, as well as the motivation of leaders.

A reintegration programme should pay special attention to vulnerable groups such as the disable, women, and children. It could be an opportunity to involve women in healing and reconciliation activities as was used to achieve positive results in other countries.

It is necessary to find ways to motivate donor support for projects that address psycho-social issues particularly a change of mentality.

Only a few reports were available about reintegration experiences that produced a clear evaluation report. Thus it was not easy to find the relationship between planning-implementation and impact. Setting up measurable impact indicators would be a way to facilitate and ensure evaluation.

Generally, the costs of a peace mission influence its timing. International organisations such as UNO, pressurise towards a rapid process. However, in the case of Angola, it was clear that in order to create the foundation for sustainable peace and conversion processes, some stages needed more time.