SOUTH AFRICA’S POLICY ON CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION IN POST CONFLICT PEACE BUILDING:
BURUNDI 2000-2008

By

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A research report submitted to the Faculty of Law, Commerce and Management, University of Witwatersrand, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Management in Public Policy.

12 June 2014
ABSTRACT

The South African policy for peace missions is found in the 1999 “White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions” of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation\(^1\). The White Paper adopt a comprehensive approach for the creation of peace in conflict and post conflict societies. The comprehensive approach includes the employment of military and civilian actors. Activities of these actors are determined by the nature of the peace mission which includes preventative diplomacy, peace making, peace building, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance and humanitarian intervention. The policy further promotes the strategy of South African actors addressing the underlying causes of conflict instead of symptoms.

The research seeks to investigate whether or not South African institutions implement the civilian peacebuilding aspect of the policy and adopts the use of the Burundi peace mission (2000-2008) as a case study. Qualitative research, which includes the use of document research and personal interviews, is the adopted research methodology. Through application of the variables of the 5-C protocol (coalitions and clients, commitment, capacity, context and content) the research established several implementation challenges. The research also utilised the 5-C protocol variables for recommendations on possible reforms.
DECLARATION

I, Nozizwe Lucia Mtshali, declare that this research report is my own work. It is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Management in Public Policy with the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in this or any other University.

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NOZIZWE LUCIA MTSHALI

12 June 2014
DEDICATION

I am grateful to my parents who supported me during my earlier studies which paved the way for my MM-PP studies. A special appreciation and dedication goes to my father, Joseph Musi, who passed away from cancer during the first year of my studies. To my son, Simphiwe, I hope this will provide an inspiration to you. Finally to my dear friend, Molai, thank you for your support and encouragement.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Special thanks to my supervisor and mentor, Prof Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk, for his guidance and patience. Asha Sekomo, for support provided, and Jennifer Croll, for the excellent editing.
Finally, thanks to all respondents and Welile Nhlapo, a true comrade and friend.
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<tr>
<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>African Renaissance Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BINUB</td>
<td>UN Integrated Office in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, India, China and South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>National Council for Defence and Democracy – Forces for Defence and Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRCO</td>
<td>Department of International Relations and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPSA</td>
<td>Department of Public Service and Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRODEBU</td>
<td>Front Pour la Democratie au Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of 8 Governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICGLR</td>
<td>International Conference on the Great Lakes Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOCPM</td>
<td>National Office for Co-ordination of Peace Missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palipehutu-FNL</td>
<td>Parti Pour la Liberation Du Peuple Hutu/ Forces National de Liberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBC</td>
<td>Peace Building Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF</td>
<td>Peace Building Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBOC</td>
<td>Peace Building Organisational Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBSO</td>
<td>Peace Building Support Office</td>
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<td>PFMA</td>
<td>Public Finance Management Act 1/1999</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
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<td>R2P</td>
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1 Chapter 1: Conceptualisation

1.1 Introduction

Chapter 1 provides an overview of the conceptualisation of the study. It identifies the research - problem statement, objectives, questions, proposition, and field of study, regulatory framework, limitations, methodology and conceptual framework. The subsequent chapters address issues in the following manner: Chapter 2 discusses national and international peacebuilding institutions. Nationally, the chapter explores South Africa’s “White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions”. The white paper is used to explore the peacebuilding architecture and how institutions found therein affect implementation of civilian peacebuilding activities. Internationally, the chapter investigates peacebuilding institutions at regional and international levels and also their effect on implementation of the white paper. The exercise reveals a complexity of institutions and actors informed by different interests and motives and their pursuit of different agendas. Chapter 3 provides insight on the Burundi case study. The chapter explains how context, historical and regional, introduced different dynamics to the peace process and peacebuilding in that country. The chapter focuses on the actors involved in the Burundi peace process and therefore discusses issues of conflict and processes found in peacebuilding missions. The chapter also identifies the root causes of the conflict and identifies appropriate activities that should have been adopted to ensure the creation of durable peace in Burundi. Chapter 4 focuses on data presentation, interpretation and possible recommendations. Chapter 5 provides a summary and recommendations on suggested policy and institutional reforms.

1.1.1 Problem Statement

The “White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999), hereinafter referred to as “the policy,” views comprehensive peace missions as vital for the creation of peace in conflict ridden
countries (Malan & Kent, 2003, p. 1). According to the policy, actors and their activities differ in missions of “preventative diplomacy”, “peace making”, “peace building”, “peace enforcement”, “humanitarian assistance” and “humanitarian intervention” (1999, p. 7). The policy adopts the stance that actors should address the underlying causes of conflict instead of symptoms, and cautions that failure to do so results in the recurrence of conflict (1999, p. 19). It then identifies peace mission actors as being inclusive of both civilian and military personnel (1999, p. 9) and supports the view that “civilians are a crucial component of any contemporary peace mission” (1999, p. 23).

Landsberg (n.d, p. 20), in a paper prepared for South Africa’s (SA) fifteen year review process, and inter alia, informed by SA Foreign Affairs 2007/2008 strategic document, states that “No other state in the continent has played such a pivotal role in post-conflict peace-building and development”. The policy’s prescripts and these assertions add to the policy gap and problem statement as research literature indicates that policy implementation and research on SA civilian peacebuilding activities is limited. These observations have been developed by a study of the following:

a. Research institutions, scholars and Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) activities have mainly focused on aspects of “preventative diplomacy, peace-making and peace-enforcement” (ACCORD, 2007; Ayebari, n.d; Ameir, 2008; Dlomo, 2010).

b. Serwer and Thomson (2007, pp. 369-370) note that the lack of civilian inclusion in peace missions is an international oversight, and that some countries\(^2\) have recently undertaken initiatives to improve the status quo by “beefing up their civilian capacities”.

c. Paudel (2009) describes research on policy implementation as insufficient and calls for a revival of interest. He also notes that scholars in the field have focused their attention on policy implementation on sectors of “education, health, environment, social and economic policy” resulting in studies on implementation of foreign policy being “conspicuously rare -1-2 per cent of all publications” (2009, p. 48).
1.1.2 Research Objectives

“costs of security policy failures … [are] deadly” (Brown, 2007, p. 47)

The main purpose of this research is to provide policy decision makers and actors in the field of peace and security with knowledge and meaning on current debates around the research question in order to prevent these deadly costs. The study also aims to investigate and, if necessary, suggest additional reforms on the existing peacebuilding institutional arrangement, the policy and its implementation. Exploratory and descriptive research is used to interpret and determine questions of “what”, “how” and “who” in relation to understanding the causes of the conflict, peacebuilding tools and peacebuilding activities.

1.1.3 Research Questions
The primary research question is: did SA implement the civilian peacebuilding objectives of the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions (the policy) in the Burundi peace mission during the period of 2000-2008? Supplementary questions attend to;

a. How did civilian activities, by SA intervening actors, address the root causes of the conflict?

b. How did peacebuilding institutions facilitate or impede the participation of civilians in peacebuilding activities?

c. What, if any, are the suggested reforms?

1.1.4 Proposition
The research is premised on the proposition that peacebuilding institutions negatively affect outputs of civilian peacebuilding activities and the attainment of SA objectives of comprehensive peace missions as envisaged by the white paper on South African participation in international peace missions.
1.1.5 Field of Study
Policy (5-C protocol) and institutional analysis is utilized to identify issues that impede or facilitate implementation of the policy through research on civilian peacebuilding.

1.1.6 Regulatory Framework
The White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions (1999), resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 1719 and General Assembly (GA) 7191 and the Arusha Agreement of August 2000\(^3\) are the regulatory documents used for the study.

1.1.7 Limitations of Study
As the research is qualitative, the social context of the research question informed the first three limitations. Firstly, the single use of the Burundi case study is restrictive, as there may be different implementation results (outputs) in other peace missions. Secondly, the period under review is confined to peacebuilding during a certain period whilst policy implementation may have different results in other time periods. Thirdly, peacebuilding activities are confined to civilian national departments and the exclusion of security services may distort findings on the general South African Government’s implementation of the policy. Lastly, financial constraints deterred the researcher from conducting research in Burundi, however validation was ensured through desk top research and engagement with experts on the subject matter.

1.2 Research Methodology

Research Design
A qualitative research design is adopted. Judgemental selection (Neuman, 2011, pp. 241, 268) is used in the identification of experts e.g. international relations bureaucrats and security analysts.
Research Approach

The single case study of the Burundi during 2000-2008 was adopted to interpret and explore the hidden complexities of peacebuilding and its implementation. According to Neuman (2011, p. 42), the approach is valuable as it permits use of “multiple viewpoints”, highlights issues of learning from experience and encourages the construction of new theories. South Africa’s prominent role in the peace mission of Burundi (Malan & Kent, 2003, pp. 5-6) and the existence of the policy during the time frame selected, informed the choice of case study. Whilst findings must be understood in the context of location (Burundi during 2000 to 2008), Neuman (2011, p. 217) notes that the approach produces results capable of being generalised.

Research Techniques

Interviews and documentary evidence was used for data collection and analysis. Opinions, experiences, views and observations informed these tools. Newman (2011, p. 172) advises that data from these tools assist in narrowing the focus of a study. Primary data was sourced from interviewing persons with first-hand experience and knowledge of the Burundi peace process (bureaucrats and security experts). Secondary data was sourced from those who had studied the peacebuilding environment. Semi structured interactive interviews, conducted from standard open ended questions, were prepared before the interview (see attached questionnaire in annexures 2 and 3). The unambiguous questions specific to the research objectives were organised according to themes to enable future linking, consolidation and interpretation of data. Interactions allowed flexibility and space for clarification of viewpoints, introduction of new information, expression of own interpretation and elicitation of new insights. The first challenge in the tool lies in the prevention of interviewer and interviewee bias. Validation of interviewee’s data was achieved by checking for consistency with other evidence collected.
Data Presentation and Analysis

The chapter summarises data collected and indicates relationships or patterns between activities, institutions and policy implementation. The chapter also undertakes a process of analysis that includes defining the research issue, the division of the issue into different segments, narrowing the issue into manageable sub issues, evaluating the connection between the different parts, considering how the narrowed issues relate to the whole question, and finally interpreting the findings. To achieve this, Dawson's (2002) and Zandamela's (2012, p. 90) approach was followed, i.e. summaries of interviews attached to transcripts compiled during the interview process and analysis of all data was progressively revisited. Thematic and comparative analysis of all data was undertaken. There was cross referencing and checking of data between interviews, summaries, transcripts, documents and notes prepared on each subject under review.

Operationalisation

The interview questions address issues that determine the success or failure of implementation of the policy related to the proposition that institutions inform policy implementation (output). The questions are directed to unpacking the relationship between institutions, activities and implementation. Eight interviews were conducted from one DIRCO official involved in the Great Lakes region, one NOCPM member, one from ARF, three from other national departments and two from independent security experts.

The first theme determines whether or not there was a common understanding and on the objective of the peacebuilding exercise, e.g. what was sought to be addressed and how. The second interrogates issues of the policy understanding and knowledge, e.g. resource bank and reasons for its successes or failure. The third focuses on bilateral and multilateral activities. The fourth theme relates to institutions and institutional arrangements and understanding on their impact on implementation of the policy. The 5-C protocols of implementation are used in an over-arching manner to analyse the data and provide possible reforms.
1.3 Concepts

1.3.1 Institutions and institutional approach

Institutional studies provide valuable insight on institutions at various levels. Firstly, it discusses how formal and informal institutions affect the behaviour of actors by revealing “both the degree of pressure an actor can bring to bear on policy and the likely direction of that pressure”. Secondly, it provides understanding on the evolution of institutions (Hill, 2005, pp. 81-82). Thirdly, it provides insight on relationships between structure, agency and action (Hay & Winscott, 1998; Hill, 2005, p. 83) and, fourthly, an understanding on the distribution of power between actors. Lastly, it provides insight on required institutional reforms. The institutional approach is therefore a valuable tool for understanding institutions, providing insight on how institutional arrangements impede or frustrate the aims of political policy, and providing insight on reform for enhancing policy implementation.

Critics note concerns about the institutional approach (Hill, 2005). The first relates to the wide definition of the term ‘institutions’. According to critics, this wide definition introduces numerous variables under one topic, e.g. norms, ideas, values. The wide variables are then said to impose divergent constraints on the exercise of power and authority. Lastly, other critics note that the approach addresses issues of change post facto instead of in advance and therefore insist that the concept is better used to explain issues of change than stability.

The research addresses issues of peacebuilding in post conflict societies. As indicated later in the peacebuilding concept, these societies are characterised by weak institutions. It is argued that properly configured peacebuilding institutions would assist post conflict societies minimise the prospects of recurrence of conflicts.

The peacebuilding institutions in the study will also provide insight into the rules and parameters that enable or impede interactions between actors, bestow power and authority and inform on how these are exercised. The institutional approach therefore presents an opportunity to suggest reforms and improve quality of peacebuilding institutions.
Development of the concept

The definition of institutions is informed by different academic disciplines. Hall & Taylor (1996, p. 938) provide a definition of institutions as involving “formal or informal procedures, routine, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy”. The research however, for reasons discussed later, adopts the definition of historical institutionalism which identifies institutions as “Formal ..., private or public ... structural properties of society (or groups within them) which are constituted by the rules and procedures that constrain some forms of behaviour and interaction between people and groups and enable others in social, economic and political domains” (Leftwich, 2007, p. 11). External intervening actors form part of this definition and in relation the research refer to SA; civilian national Government departments, chapter nine constitutional institutions and civil society organisations (Orjuela, 2003) which are directly sponsored by a national Government. The terms excludes security services as defined in Chapter 11 of the Constitution (1996) i.e. defence, police services and intelligence services.

In the development of the concept, Hall & Taylor note that political science is currently “informed by not one but three new institutionalisms” (1996, p. 955) introduced in 1980’s. The three schools of thoughts are; historical, rational choice and sociological institutionalism.

1.3.1.1 Historical institutionalism

Historical institutionalism uses “historical analysis, to trace the evolution of policy over a long time” (Hill, 2005, p. 80) and the approach results in historical preferences and interests informing the adoption of current policy decisions (Thoenig, 2002). Moe (1994) further notes that it concerns itself with “time, culture and personality”.

Historical institutionalism accepts conflict and scarce resources as determinants of political and social outcomes and that, in the presence of competing interests, the state acts as a non-neutral agent (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Due to viewing “public administration as part of political life” (Thoenig, 2002, p. 128) historical institutionalism becomes useful
for analysing and providing reform measures for institutions characterised by political competition. Their viewing of institutions as non-neutral agents is advantageous as it enables investigations on issues of “conflict and process” (Leftwich, 2007; Thoenig, 2002) and therefore identifies issues of how uneven power relations affect functioning of different institutions (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 938). Due to these reasons and others enumerated later, historical institutionalism is adopted in this study.

1.3.1.2 **Rational choice institutionalism**

Political scientists informed rational choice institutionalism. The approach is premised on the thinking that policy actors possess preferences and strategically apply these to achieve specific goals. Since the actions of actors are rational, the approach particularly pays “attention on the constraints imposed on rational actors” (Hay & Winscott, 1998, p. 952). Rational choice institutionalism defines institutions according to formal rules, procedures or norms (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 947) and views institutional existence as directed to “help capture gains from cooperation” (Leftwich, 2007, p. 22).

1.3.1.3 **Sociological institutionalism**

The definition of institutions by sociological institutionalism is informed by the garbage can theory, sociology of institutions, organisational theory, “symbol systems, cognitive scripts and moral templates” (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 947). The sociological institutionalism gives prominence to culture rules and behaviour of policy actors (Hill, 2005). The relationship between individual action and institutions is considered as “highly-interactive and mutually-constitutive” (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 948). According to Moe (1994, p. 20), sociological institutionalism does not attend to issues of conflict, does not pay attention to interests and strategies of individual actors and therefore, unlike political scientists, fails to answer questions of “why political actors do what they do”.

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Hill notes that unlike historical institutionalism, sociological institutionalism draws a distinction between institutions and organisations and therefore states that “the term organisation … refers to an expandable tool, a rational instrument engineered to do a job. An ‘institution’, on the other hand, is more nearly a natural product of social needs and pressures – a responsive adaptive organism” (2005, p. 79). Kumssa & Mbeche’s definition of institutions as “Governmental … and non-Governmental social systems and their underlying values, rules, norms of behaviour and traditions that govern social relations” (2004, p. 841) falls within the thinking of Hill (2005).

As indicated earlier, the historical institutionalism definition is adopted in this research due to the considerations provided hereafter. The approach is advantageous since it embraces both the calculus and cultural approaches in its analysis, and, as Hay & Winscott state, it “represent a considerable advance on their rationalist and sociological antecedents” (1998, p. 954). Secondly, it pays attention to issues of time and addresses big substantive issues (Leftwich, 2007, p. 23). Thirdly, it includes organisations in its definition and views these as “instruments” and “sub-set of institutions” (Leftwich, 2007; Thoenig, 2002, p. 131). Fourthly, it pays attention to constraints and focuses the discussion on the fact that actors have to abide by certain rules when making decisions. Fifthly, its views of the state as non-neutral agent enables the discussion to contribute on issues of “conflict and process” (Leftwich, 2007, p. 23; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2006) and thus extend the argument to substantive issues instead of concentrating only on procedural aspects. Lastly, its conflict and process dimension also enables investigations on relationships between actors, institutions and the impact of uneven power relations.

**Power in institutions**

The understanding of power and decision making is critical in institutions. Power is studied as an outcome (Bowe, Ball, & Gold, 1992) and relates to “the ability to make people (or things) do what they would not otherwise have done” and denotes forms of “force, persuasion … coercion and manipulation” (McLean, 1996, p. 396). Authority in this document is confined to power that is prescribed in terms of legal instruments.
The study of power strives to place into context how relationships, institutions, interests, and different actors impact on the decision making process and its outcomes and adopts the elite theory view which provides room for the exploration of decision making being influenced by one actor “across different issue areas” (Lukes, 1993, pp. 51-52). It is argued that in the implementation of the SA policy (peace mission), the presidency and other actors possess this power and use their authority to ensure conformity from other national actors.

In conclusion, in identifying institutions, Leftwich provides a framework that recognises institutions as “non-neutral”, “formal or informal” structures which “express ideas, interests, purposes and power of those who designed and supervise them and not (usually) those of the people who oppose them”. They are said to also “last over time” and are “the object of an on-going political contestation” (2007, pp. 10-11). These characteristics provide a picture of their role and importance in the policy environment.

Kumssa & Mbeche (2004, p. 852) note “development problems of African countries can be partly attributed to the weak institutions and unresponsiveness of their administrative systems”. The institutional approach, whilst applicable in all political environments, is specifically important in weak states as it assists in addressing reforms that could contribute in developing measures that could create political stability and certainty, crucial elements in the rebuilding of weak states.

It is also argued that, in order to attend to the complex issues of peacebuilding, the institutional approach provides an opportunity to suggest reforms not only on procedural issues but also on substantive matters of peacebuilding. Lastly, it is evident that the field of policy implementation is a contested political terrain between different actors and influences where power and authority are continuously at play (Bowe, Ball, & Gold, 1992, p. 10). The approach therefore provides an opportunity to identify institutional power and interests and their effect on policy implementation.
1.3.2 Implementation

De Coning & Cloete (2006) provide various models of policy processing. The identified models include those of Dunn, Muhaba et al and Wissink. Dunn’s model consists of agenda setting, policy formulation, policy adoption, policy implementation and policy assessment (De Coning & Cloete, 2006, p. 50), whilst Muhaba et al (De Coning & Cloete, 2006) includes policy formulation, implementation and monitoring and evaluation. Wissink (De Coning & Cloete, 2006, p. 51), on the other hand, details stages of initiation, agenda setting, processing the issue, consideration of issues, making choices, publication, resource allocation, implementation, adjudication, impact evaluation and feedback. Whilst the models differ, they share some common features, including the phase of implementation. Brynard & de Coning (2006, p. 180) thereafter identify implementation as “one of the critical pillars” of policy management.

Despite its importance, the concept is still ill defined and its variables still a topic for scholarly debate. On bringing understanding to this, Brynard & de Coning (2006) argue that definitions of implementation differ due to the different perspectives of different scholars e.g. some view it as a process, whilst others as an outcome and others as an output. The different perspectives influence the angle of measurement of success or failure of implementation. As Paudel (2009) states, scholars who view it as a process investigate steps and action taken to achieve directives of decision makers, whilst those concerned with output, interrogate the extent to which goals have been achieved and outcome driven perspectives relate to the abstract level of achieving “measurable change” attained.

Due to these different outlooks, the various definitions include measures undertaken “to carry out, accomplish, fulfil, produce, complete … so as to obtain desired results”, measures undertaken by “public or private individuals (or groups) that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions”, the “conversion of mainly physical and financial resources into concrete service delivery outputs …. aimed at achieving policy objectives” (Brynard & de Coning, 2006, p. 183) and “what develops between the establishment of an apparent intention on the art of Government to do something or stop doing something and the ultimate impact …” (Paudel, 2009, p. 37).
### 1.3.3 Implementation variables

Fotaki (2010) argues that implementation studies on failure or success of policies are also dependent on different variables influenced by different disciplines of researchers e.g. economics, political science, public management, or organisational theory. Paudel (2009) therefore notes that consequently the concept “is heavily dominated by many variables but lack crucial variables”. Paudel’s (2009) observation is important as it informs the presence of the variety of analytical outlooks on implementation. However, despite these differences, there is general agreement among researchers on categorising studies of implementation as ones concerned with “policy change” (Pulzl & Trieb, 2007, p. 89).

Spillane et al (2002) also add that there is general agreement amongst researchers that the concept of implementation includes the existence of a relationship between agent and principal where the principal (decision makers) requires assistance of the agent to ensure the carrying out of the decision. The argument presented is that fault lines of implementation are found within this relationship. The common faults usually identified by scholars are ones relating to; ambiguity of policies which result in the agent being unable to interpret and decipher the authoritative decision, institutional and organisational arrangements that affect “structure principal-agent relations”, unwillingness or incapacity of agent to carry out tasks and sense-making which relates to the interpretive nature of the agent and influences that affect that interpretation. e.g. prior knowledge.

The development of the concept, through three generations, provides insight on how different variables and understanding of the concept emanated and informed implementation research.
1.3.3.1 **First generation studies (1970’s – 80’s)**

Prior to the 1970’s, research on the topic was scattered under various topics (Pulzl & Trieb, 2007, p. 89). Pressman and Wildasky have been identified by scholars as renewing interest on the subject matter in the 1970’s (Brynard & de Coning, 2006, p. 183; Paudel, 2009, p. 36) and are referred to as the first generation researchers. This generation viewed policy implementation in a rational, linear, top down and administrative manner where implementation systems were "highly rationalised, legalistic, authoritarian and hierarchical" (Brynard & de Coning, 2006, p. 185). The generation focused on how single authoritative decisions were carried out at single or multiple places (Paudel, 2009, p. 38). The thinking was that decision makers at the top created policy and that automatic implementation occurred at the bottom if the policies were “authoritatively proclaimed” (Brynard & de Coning, 2006, p. 185). The approach is viewed as elitist and prescriptive in its governance outlook since the few elected representatives take ownership of decision making in implementation (Pulzl & Trieb, 2007).

According to this approach, researchers question; “to what extent were the action of implementing officials and target groups consistent with … policy decision, to what extent were the objectives attained over time, what were the principal factors affecting policy outputs and impacts and how was the policy reformulated over time on the basis of experience” (Brynard & de Coning, 2006, p. 187). Paudel (2009) observes that the generation’s research is “atheoretical, case specific and non-cumulative” and that, due to its “policy centered” approach, it firstly relies on the policymaker’s capacity to control the environment and implementers and, secondly, assumes the convergence of actions of implementers and goals of authoritative decision makers, which may be lacking.
1.3.3.2 Second generation studies (1980’s – 90’s)

The second generation, including Mazmanian, Sabatier and Lipsky, questioned the assumptions of the first generation’s reliance on the rational model and highlighted the complexity of process and political influences (Brynard & de Coning, 2006, p. 185) and viewed implementation as a bottom up process. This generation developed an “analytical framework” which analysed and described causal links between policy and practice, brought into prominence the importance of time period factors and recognised variables that contributed to implementation success or failure (Paudel, 2009, p. 39). The generation also advocated for an analysis that focused “on those who are charged with carrying out the policy rather than those who formulate and convey it,” with some even advocating for the “desirability” of “discretion” at lower levels (Brynard & de Coning, 2006) and identifying “street level bureaucrats” as instrumental for guiding the day to day activities of implementation.

Some researchers paid regard to “the multi-actor and inter-organizational character of policy delivery” and therefore advocated for a stakeholder analysis and how these stakeholders attended to implementation issues (Pulzl & Trieb, 2007, p. 93). Unlike the top down elitist approach, the bottom up approach included participatory democracy principles of governance and recognised the power and interests of citizens at local levels of society (Pulzl & Trieb, 2007, p. 94).

Table 1: Bottom up and Bottom down implementation models adopted from Paudel (2009, p. 40)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Top-down perspective</th>
<th>Bottom perspective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy decision-maker</td>
<td>Policy maker</td>
<td>Street level bureaucrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starting point</td>
<td>Statutory language</td>
<td>Social problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>Both formal and informal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process</td>
<td>Purely administrative</td>
<td>Networking, including administrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Centralization</td>
<td>Decentralization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output/outcomes</td>
<td>Prescriptive</td>
<td>Descriptive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discretion</td>
<td>Top-level bureaucrats</td>
<td>Bottom-level bureaucrats</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.3.3.3 Third generation studies – combination (1990’s onwards)

Instead of focusing on the top down and bottom up approach, the third generation attempted to synthesise and bridge the gap. This generation studied the weaknesses and strengths of preceding generations and how different variables impacted on implementation and sought to understand “how it works in general and how its prospects might be improved” (Brynard & de Coning, 2006, p. 184). The researchers aimed to be “more scientific” in their research methodology (Pulzl & Trieb, 2007, p. 89) and suggested research designs guided by forward and backward mapping analysis, studying the effects of ambiguity and conflict and conducting tests dependent on comparative case studies and statistics (Paudel, 2009).

The generation also introduced the notion of linking implementation analysis to policy formulation, recognising multiple effects of other policy disciplines and the impact of policy types (Pulzl & Trieb, 2007, p. 97). Wildavsky later joined this generation and discarded the notion of a linear, rational top down approach, and argued that implementation was an evolving concept and decisions of policy makers at the top could be modified by implementers during the process. This generation regarded policy bureaucrats as political actors in their own right (Pulzl & Trieb, 2007, p. 96).

1.3.3.4 The 5-C Protocols

Brynard & de Coning (2006, pp. 182-184) present another form of analysis through introducing 5 common variables (5-C Protocols) of implementation. The 5-C protocols approach considers the three different generations. According to Brynard & de Coning, the 5-C protocols are driven by issues of content, context, commitment, capacity and clients/coalitions. Issues of the means and measures adopted to achieve the policy objectives are informed by content. Context provides institutional understanding on where and how the policy operates or travels. Commitment addresses issues of implementers and their attitude (willingness and ability) towards implementation. Capacity informs on the existence or non-existence of administrative and other
capabilities for doing the job. Finally, clients and coalition support or lack thereof identifies issues of interests and how these affect actors in promoting or frustrating implementation.

The debates of different generations confirm Paudel’s (2009, p. 36) observation that implementation “takes different shapes and forms in different cultures and institutional setting” and therefore the research acknowledges that implementation possesses salient elements of subjectivity, values and characteristics or context. Pulzl & Trieb (2007, pp. 100-101) on summarising the studies of the different generations adds to the debate on how the different generations resulted in the concept being developed by perspectives of; accepting the third generation model which combines the authoritative direction and local participatory style of governance, the value of the political process and its influence on redefining the direction of the authoritativie policy maker introduced by bottom up generation, the interdependent nature of policy formulation and implementation, the influence of different disciplines in implementation, and finally, the context of different implementation styles. It is argued in this research that the 5-C protocols outlook lives up to the observations of Pulzl & Trieb (2007) and, due to its incorporation of all the other generations, the research therefore adopts that approach. The adoption of the 5-C protocol approach provides the study with the “crucial variables” identified as lacking by Paudel above. The research also adopts the view of defining policy as an output. Implementation therefore in the research relates to actual activities undertaken by different SA intervening actors to ensure execution of the SA policy on peace missions. The definition excludes issues of processes and outcome of implementation.
1.3.4 Peacebuilding

*Development of the concept*

Cousens (2001) traces the current peacebuilding approach to the end of the cold war when the international community realised that a comprehensive approach to securing lasting peace could not be achieved through reliance on short term military and security peace missions. In pursuance of a comprehensive approach, the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Boutros-Ghali introduced “An Agenda for Peace Document” in 1992. The document recognised “post conflict peacebuilding” as a fourth and complementary pillar to activities of “preventative diplomacy”, “peacemaking” and “peacekeeping” (Cousens, 2001, p. 2). In 1996, the UN produced a list of peacebuilding tasks in its “inventory of post-conflict peacebuilding activities” (Lambourne & Herro, 2008, p. 277). In 2000, the UNSG, Kofi Annan, appointed Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi as chair of a high level panel to “produce tangible and implementable recommendations to improve UN peacekeeping and related activities” (Durch, 2000, p. 3). The findings of the Brahimi report mainly informed the establishment of the current UN peacebuilding architecture. Later Annan in the “No Exit without Strategy” document further developed the concept and linked peacekeeping as a UN entry strategy into peace missions and peacebuilding as the exit strategy. According to this peacekeeping should “include elements of peacebuilding in their mandate to dismantle the structures of violence and create the conditions conducive to peace and sustainable development” (Sriram, Martin-Ortega, & Herman, 2011, p. 10). Conditions of peace and sustainable development were viewed as central to the peacebuilding agenda.

Kings & Matthews (2012) note positive steps undertaken in the last twenty years, since the adoption of the agenda for peace document. Firstly peacebuilding was institutionalised by the UN, regional organizations and individual states. Secondly the acceptability of the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle was entrenched in international law. According to Powell (2005, p. 1), the effect of the R2P is that sovereignty of the state is “conditional” and dependent on its ability to capacity and willingness to protect its citizens. Kings & Matthews in pursuing this thinking further note that in peacebuilding the R2P further empowers external actors with the “responsibility
to prevent and the responsibility to rebuild" states where a sovereign state is unable or unwilling (2012, p. 280).

Apart from discussing the positive elements, Kings & Matthews (2012) also discuss the shortfalls attributed to the agenda for peace e.g. the action and outcomes of intervening actors and their failure to establish durable peace, failure to coordinate activities and mandates on the ground and challenges in implementation of the R2P principle informed by its contested nature.

### 1.3.4.1 Defining the term

Kings & Matthews (2012), Sriram et al, (2011, p. 8) Jenkins (2008, p. 4), and Cousens (2001) agree on the lack of a uniform definition, activities and roles of actors in peacebuilding. Cousens (2001) and Jenkins (2008) suggest that the divergent views are influenced by angles of interrogation and interests of actors. Cousens (2001) distils the differences into two main thrusts of deductive or inductive approaches. The deductive one refers to “where the content of peacebuilding is deduced from the existing capacities and mandates … inductive where the content of peacebuilding is determined by the particular matrix of needs and capacities in individual cases” (Cousens, 2001, p. 5).

Cousens (2001) links the deductive approach to the 1992 agenda for peace document and criticises the approach for focusing on “what” the needs of post conflict societies are and “who” could address them. According to Cousens (2001), the approach ignores questions associated with “how”, “why” and “to what end”.

The agenda for peace document defined peacebuilding as action designed to “identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. Sriram et al (2011), on the other hand, identify peacebuilding as activities that “seeks to prevent the recurrence of conflict through the provision of technical assistance to transform national structures and capabilities and strengthen new democratic institutions” (2011, p. 9). Ali & Matthews (2004, pp. 7, 395) view peacebuilding as involving the existence of positive peace instead of negative peace.
Busumtwi-Sam links political, social and economic development to the achievement of “sustainable peace” and states that the linkage is “integral to the notion of peacebuilding” (2004, p. 315). Sustainable peace is defined as “peace that can be expected to persist without extraordinary international intervention” by Serwer & Thomson (2007, p. 372).

To reach a definition of peacebuilding, the research adopts the view that achievement of sustainable peace as defined by Serwer & Thomson (2007) is critical in peacebuilding. To understand the influence and quest for ensuring sustainable peace, questions of the common characteristics of post conflict societies, commencement of peacebuilding and activities of actors are interrogated to inform a suitable definition of peacebuilding.

1.3.4.2 Characteristics of post conflict societies

There is general consensus that peacebuilding applies to societies emerging from conflict. Ball (1996) provides an understanding of these societies and identifies four common characteristics which relate to; institutions, economic and social conditions, security and context of peace process. Ball (1996) paints a bleak picture of these societies and argues that to avoid a one size fits all approach to peacebuilding, activities should be designed around, and address, these characteristics. Ball (1996) describes the characteristics in the following manner.

Institutions: Public and civil society institutions are weak. The state, whilst appearing to be in control and better organised than other formations cannot in reality perform its functions. Needs of citizens are not met by state institutions. Trust levels between groups and political authorities are low and power struggles are pronounced as different groups fight for limited resources.

Economic and social conditions: Infrastructure is either destroyed or out dated e.g. communication, roads, banking systems, health care and educational facilities. There is a reduction of trade and economic activity resulting in contacts with international actors being reduced or terminated. There is migration and displacement of the population and human capacity is affected as professionals seek greener pastures.
Security: During the conflict, the societies prioritised their security budgets to the detriment of other commitments. After the conflict, the societies are expected to reconfigure their resources, including security personnel and budgets. The demands of the security sector and general social sector have to be sensitively balanced e.g. demobilisation, integration and provision of social services to the general population. The security services are also expected to conform to internationally recognised standards of behaviour e.g. principles of accountability and transparency which were either absent or minimally observed during the conflict.

Context: Isolation at different levels exists. During the conflict, the societies faced isolation from the international community, combatants from communities, and environment and politicians from the general populace. After the conflict, the different actors are expected to integrate into the society. Ball’s observations depict abnormal settings where, after the conflict, the society has to hit the ground running and ensure a functional society within a limited period. Intervening actors are called upon to assist these societies in a manner that takes into account their individualised challenges (1996, p. 612).

1.3.4.3 Commencement of peacebuilding

Divergent views influence the notion of commencement. The first relates to termination of hostilities and the other to timing of activities. The two views ultimately influence the reasoning of whether it is a post conflict activity or not.

Timing of activities
Jenkins (2008, p. 4) notes that whilst peacebuilding can be viewed as “process that takes place after conflict; for others, it can also encompass preventive actions undertaken before conflict breaks out”. Ball (1996, p. 612) in attending to this issue, draws attention to the different stages of peace processes. The first stage is identified as conflict resolution and is informed by phases of negotiations and cessations of hostilities, whilst the second stage is peacebuilding. The
peacebuilding stage includes transitional and consolidation phases. According to Ball (1996), peacebuilding occurring after the establishment of a peace framework is a post conflict exercise. Boutros-Ghali’s document and the Brahimi report also placed peacebuilding in the context of post conflict. Ali & Matthews (2004, p. 6) state that it occurs at “the last phase in the cycle of conflict, beginning when a ceasefire has brought an end to fighting and efforts are initiated to revive an economy and to restore its polity”. Sarigiannidis (2007) also agrees with this outlook and observes that, since the agenda for peace document, the concept has evolved and includes a “broader post-conflict agenda”. The research informed by the outlook of the SA policy, therefore adopts the understanding of confining peacebuilding to the post conflict phase of the conflict.

Termination of hostilities
The Brahimi report and Ball (1996, pp. 611-12) indicate that the manner of terminating hostilities determines the nature of peace activities and the question of whether or not the activities are linked to peacebuilding. The report (2000, pp. 12-13) makes the distinction that termination due to the victory of one party “may attract outside reconstruction assistance …[since] the political-military question at the heart of the conflict is settled” whilst those that terminate due to negotiations “transfer their fight to a political arena” and external international actors are called upon to assist in resolving those political questions and ensuring the establishment of durable peace.

Ali & Matthews (2004, p. 4) disagree with this reasoning and note that “no matter how civil wars end, the task of building an enduring peace cannot be escaped” and by this observation, caution against the artificial divide introduced by the debate. The reasoning of Ali & Matthews (2004) is supported since the distinction does not address the core issue of ensuring sustainable peace which is not dependent on how hostilities end but on the nature of activities undertaken to ensure the existence of sustainable peace i.e. there is no guarantee that because one party won, sustainable peace will prevail as the defeated party may still persist with some form of destabilisation. Therefore in its formulation of a definition, the research adopts the approach of focusing on the nature of peacebuilding activities regardless of how the conflict terminated.
1.3.4.4 Objectives and activities of peacebuilding

Ball (1996, p. 612) argues that different phases of peacebuilding encompass different objectives. Cousens (2001), Serwer & Thomson (2007) and others do not follow that logic but argue for the establishment of a common framework which influences priorities of activities.

Objectives

According to Ball (1996), the transitional phase includes objectives of “establishing a Government with adequate legitimacy to enable it to rule effectively, implementing reforms to build political institutions … inaugurating economic and social revitalization efforts”. The consolidation phase includes “continuation and deepening of reform processes” and “continuing economic and social recovery programs”.

Cousens (2001) asserts that frameworks are generally guided by five objectives which focus on addressing broader political contexts in order to “open political spaces”. Cousens (2001) identifies the five as “self-enforcing cease-fire” i.e. non-recurrence of conflict, “self-enforcing peace” i.e. the prevention of new conflicts, “democracy, justice and equity”. Serwer & Thomson’s (2007) framework includes; “safe and secure environment, rule of law, stable democracy, sustainable economy and social well-being”.

Pursuant to the agenda for peace and the Brahimi report, the UNSC, in 2001, noted that “peacebuilding is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms” and later, in 2006, categorised the activities in four themes of security and public order, justice and reconciliation, governance and participation and socio-economic well-being (Lambourne & Herro, 2008, p. 278).

Whilst differing on the number of objectives and labelling, the argument presented is the need for international actors to be guided by a framework of activities informed by a “hierarchy of priorities” (Greener, 2011, p. 365) which encompass “end-states and objectives” (Serwer & Thomson, 2007). In addition to assisting with prioritisation, the
approach additionally assists in the establishment of common goals and benchmarks, identification of areas of intervention, coordination of activities, resource allocation and sharing, monitoring and evaluation.

On prioritisation, Cousens (2001) identifies the goal of achieving “self-enforcing peace” as the most important one. Richmond (2011), Greener (2011) and Serwer & Thomson (2007) provide insight on other issues that influence the prioritisation debate through discussions of the liberal peacebuilding consensus.

**Liberal peacebuilding**

Richmond (2011) asserts that the liberal peacebuilding consensus states that “democratic, market and development processes produce sustainable solutions to conflict” with peacebuilding activities that focus on free markets, democratization, elections, promotion of rule of law and other human rights (2011, p. 44). Greener (2011) adds that it conforms to Cousens’ opening of political spaces “with speedy democratisation, with swift establishment of market economies and the reconstruction or construction of a viable centralised state” (2011, p. 357). Richmond (2011) and Greener (2011) critique the approach and note that it fails to address issues of context.

**Rule of law**

Richmond (2011) identifies weaknesses linked to prioritisation of the rule of law. Richmond (2011) observes that the concept is, inter alia, premised on the existence of a social contract between citizens and the state where the former “defer some of their freedoms in return for resources and security provided by the state”. Richmond (2011) further notes that the social contract theory results in the elevation of individual rights and freedoms and constrains actions of the state. The argument presented therefore is that societies emerging from conflict cannot enter into this social contract with its citizens since they lack capacity and control. Richmond’s assessment can be linked to Ball’s study which identified institutional weaknesses of these societies.

Richmond (2011) also observes that the rule of law debate assumes the presence of a common understanding of a certain form of “rule of law institutions and processes” and places these at the centre of prioritisation. Richmond (2011) argues against this
assumption and identifies its deficiencies. Firstly, the rule of law concept lacks uniform interpretation and application in different societies and therefore the assumption ignores the existence of different cultures and rules. Secondly, the imposition of a uniform interpretation and application may result in negative consequences e.g. the creation of new institutions and elite. Richmond (2011) further argues that, due to its form, the concept of rule of law results in recipient countries viewing it suspiciously as a tool that assists intervening actors in pursuing their own political interests and agendas.

Whilst not totally discarding the liberal peacebuilding thinking, Richmond (2011) then directs the debate to the variation of “peace as governance” which “focuses on the institutions of state as a basis for the construction of the liberal peace international actors … focus upon reordering in the distribution of power, prestige, rules, and right in the state and state institutions. NGOs … focus on the governance of society” (2011, p. 46). Richmond (2011) argues that the peace as governance “permeates bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding”. Loumbourne & Herro (2008, p. 276) concur with Richmond (2011) on the need for a bottom up approach to peacebuilding. However, Loumbourne & Herro (2008) disagree on whether or not the peace as governance approach achieves a bottom up approach due to the fact that it ignores the “human factor” and, according to their assessment, results in a top down approach to implementation.

Democratization
Apart from the rule of law priority, some liberal peacebuilding practitioners place emphasis on the goal of democracy. Proponents link democracy to the establishment of peace by arguing on two major fronts. The arguments advanced are that democratic societies are more prone to be peaceful towards each other and the other that they are “peaceful in and of themselves” and therefore establish the existence of a “positive relationship between democratic political systems and levels of domestic peace” (Greener, 2011, p. 360).

Critics, on the other hand, do not challenge the validity of democratic principles, but question its blanket approach and expectations imposed on societies emerging from conflict. The main thrust is that democratic principles are by their nature conflictual and
need to operate in mature and functional political systems. The principles are viewed as inappropriate in post conflict societies because of the characteristics of their institutions and democratisation is therefore viewed as a potential source of conflict in such societies. Ottaway (2007) thereafter introduces the notion of differentiation between coercive and spontaneous democratization.

Coercive democratization is described as “the attempt to use outside pressure and support to bring about democratic transformation in countries where the domestic balance of forces by itself would not lead to democracy” (2007, p. 611). Ottaway (2007) notes that peace processes have limited time frames and intervening actors tend to be guided by these in ensuring the achievement of the goal and provide an example of the goal achieving democracy through holding of elections. Here, intervening actors are said to focus their resources on processes of successful elections after the signing of peace agreements and neglect issues of sustainability of future elections.

Ottaway (2007) argues that coercive democracy results in; lack of buy-in from local actors who proceed with programs imposed by intervening actors for fear of isolation, lack of capacity and willingness to continue with programs after the departure of intervening actors and the possibility of further polarisation of different groups due to redistribution of power, including the entrenchment of majoritarian rule (which could be problematic where societies have issues of ethnic and religious divisions).

Similar to Richmond’s variation of peace as governance, Ottaway (2007) suggests the adoption of “spontaneous democratization” as it permits states to adopt democracy at a pace determined by the context of each recipient country.

Spontaneous democracy views the pace of democracy as a slow and drawn-out process which starts “with the emergence of new political forces and coalitions and eventually culminating in the development of democratic political systems, often in stages” and coercive democracy is viewed as the process where “the initial period of development of new political forces and coalitions is reduced to months or years, new constitutions and laws are quickly written with outside technical advice and elections are held as soon as the international community can organize them – two years from the time of agreement is reached has become the standard in postconflict situations” Ottaway (2007).
In conclusion it is noted that all authors from Cousens (2001) to Ottaway (2007) agree on the need for activities directed at capacity building for local institutions and on the importance of involving local actors. As Cousens (2001) suggests, capacity building of political institutions provides international actors with “exit strategies” or “reduced commitment strategies” which allow “self-enforcement … over time without new international intervention” and therefore enables local institutions to manage conflict without resorting to violence (2001, pp. 12-14). The main argument therefore is that sustainable peace is not achieved through the imposition of ideas, and that intervening actors should instead focus on “helping local actors establish the conditions that will enable them to make choices in an atmosphere free of large-scale violence, fear, deprivation, and privation” (Ali & Matthews, 2004, p. 14).

As discussed above, issues of discourse arise on the prioritisation of activities where discussion by Richmond (2011) and Ottaway (2007) on prioritising democracy and rule of law draw attention to the dangers of adopting rigid peacebuilding approaches. The discussion also informs the debate that prioritisation of objectives should not be imposed by intervening actors, but should be context driven, and take into account the peculiar characteristics of each society as failure to do so may result in failure to secure a sustainable peace. Context driven prioritisation ensures that other themes of end states are not ignored but that their timing and pace is determined by the requirements of the society being reconstructed.

Considering the above discussion, the study defines peacebuilding as “long term post conflict activities and tools jointly adopted by local and intervening actors to ensure the existence of sustainable peace”.
Chapter 2: Peacebuilding Institutions: National and International
Chapter 2: Peacebuilding Institutions: National and International

2.1 Introduction
The chapter provides an overview of the institutions utilised for peacebuilding at national and international level. The exercise reveals a network of numerous and complex sets of institutions. The research is premised on the understanding that these institutions possess different peacebuilding interests, opportunities.

2.2 South Africa

South Africa’s white paper on peace missions
The policy adopts the view of implementing comprehensive and holistic peace missions. It provides an understanding of what the policy framers envisaged in the different concepts found in peace missions, the objectives of participation and activities within those concepts. An illustration of the comprehensive peace missions is provided in the following diagram.

Diagram 1: SA Peace Mission Design (adopted from the white paper 1999: page 9)
According to this policy, peace missions are informed by activities and concepts of “preventative diplomacy”, “peace-making”, “peace keeping”, “peace enforcement” “peacebuilding”, “humanitarian assistance” and “humanitarian intervention” (1999, pp. 7-10). The policy later refers to “preventative diplomacy”, “peacebuilding” and “peace-making” as “the essential pillars of any peace mission” (1999, p. 19). The isolation of these three suggests an acknowledgement of their importance and, according to the researcher, creates an expectation of prioritisation.

The policy recognises that types of mission determine the nature and objective of the activities (1999, p. 10) e.g. in preventative diplomacy, diplomatic efforts strive to prevent or limit the development of disputes and the escalation of conflict between parties, whilst peacebuilding activities (1999, pp. 7-8) aim to “support … measures and structures that … promote peace and build trust … in order to prevent a relapse into conflict”. Peacebuilding activities are identified as long term and directed to attending to the root causes of the conflict and not symptoms through “inculcation of respect for human rights and political pluralism; the accommodation of diversity; building the capacity of state and civil institutions; and promoting economic growth and equity” (1999, p. 19). The policy draws a link between issues of governance and capacity building in peacebuilding. It identifies the importance of capacity building in matters that relate to the “adherence to the rule of law; competent and fair judiciaries … professional civil servants with an ethos of democratic governance, and the re-orientation of the state and its personnel away from partisan interests towards developmental goals” (1999, p. 19).

The policy does not confine peacebuilding to certain stages of the conflict but states that it is important in the different phases of the conflict and especially in post conflict phases where it involves diplomatic/developmental efforts (1999, p. 8).

As with activities, there is an acknowledgment of different actors in the different concepts. These vary from military to civilian actors and acknowledge the essential role of civilians in peacebuilding. DIRCO thereafter commits to initiating and supporting mechanisms that would ensure the presence of civilians in peace missions e.g. it undertakes to initiate a civilian regional and national system for a data base that will “facilitate, and support the selection of civilian volunteers for” peacebuilding, however
the policy also admits that existing institutional limitations may hamper this goal (1999, pp. 22-23, 31).

In conclusion, one observes several features of the requirements of the policy. SA commits to a comprehensive approach to peace missions which are inclusive of civilian and military endeavours. Activities of peace missions are determined by the nature of the mission. Peacebuilding missions are long term and whilst these may happen in all phases, SA places more emphasis on the post conflict stage and they seek to address the root causes of the conflict which can, inter alia, be achieved through institutional capacity building activities. DIRCO, the lead department, acts in collaboration with international and national stakeholders in the implementation of the policy. Identification of the stakeholders (actors) provides insight into their interests and how they can facilitate or impede the implementation of the policy. Finally the policy recognises that peacebuilding actors are located at national and international levels.

**Actors and peace processes**

Brown (2007, p. 40) argues that, in the security field, effective policy makers adopt a strategy of engaging other international actors. The policy also recognises this and provides that South Africa cannot, in third countries, secure peace on its own and adopts the stance of collaborating with UN authorised “coalition of the willing” (1999, p. 19). This reasoning is informed by the realisation that addressing challenges of state failure demand long term commitment from different actors who must make choices, set priorities and share the burden (Crocker, 2007, p. 365). However, the collaboration outlook suggests that all actors would have the same end state goals which in Burundi would have been the implementation of the United Nations Action Plan for Burundi (Landsberg, n.d, p. 22). This collaboration also assumes an existence of common interests, motives and values from the different actors. However, it is submitted that where the “coalition of the willing” does not share these, then individual actors and policy makers tend to push for their preferred course of “action within their own systems of Government” (Cousens, 2001, p. 188).
The understanding of interests, motives and values of the actors in the coalition of the willing therefore becomes critical as it determines the forum (multilateral or bilateral level) for implementation of policies. Kumar (2001, p. 187) suggests that to accomplish this understanding, policymakers must in the different stages of the conflict, analyse these by mapping actors’ interests, constituencies, possible impact, existing and longer term relationships because, as Cousens (2001) cautions, public pronouncements by actors should not be taken at face value.

The mapping analysis therefore (a) separates publicly stated rationale from real ones (b) reveals the real beneficiaries of the conflict (c) identifies those that have a real interest in the creation of durable peace and those that could impede or frustrate the process (d) provides insight into how the actors can contribute in peacebuilding initiatives and (e) enables policy makers to identify and tap into the systems and relationships of actors e.g. in the event that the primary actors impede the peace process, policy makers can use secondary actors to ensure the occurrence of peacebuilding (Cousens, 2001, p. 189). Mapping therefore truly reveals the real “coalition of the willing”. Reno (2004, pp. 132-133) indirectly illustrates the value of this exercise when providing the example of President Taylor in Liberia, who used the peace process to maintain minimum level of security and liberalized markets so that he and his associates could access and exploit national and regional resources. This was despite his public pronouncements of commitment to the peace process. It is presented that an exercise of mapping could have acted as a risk management tool and warned actors about his personal motives i.e. the use of the peace process as a tactic and leverage to gain access to power and resources.

Identification of actors
Cousens (2001) makes a distinction between primary, secondary, and external intervening actors and notes that primary actors in the conflict are usually ranked in a hierarchical order informed by their prominence in the conflict and extent of their resources. The secondary actors are said to relate to those associated with the conflict whilst intervening external actors include inter-Governmental organizations,
Governments, non-Governmental organizations, the private sector and prominent individuals. The research pays attention to all three types.

South African Actors

Presidency

The policy confines itself to the role of the presidency in the deployment of military contingents. However, Malan and Kent (2003, p. 3) identify the direct involvement of the presidency in driving and influencing South Africa’s foreign policy agenda, and Anderson (1997, p. 64) presents similar observations about the United States of America and implies the acceptability of this practice. Therefore the observation is that although not directly stated, the decision making process of the presidency directly influences the peacebuilding programmes and activities of different national departments. The arrangement raises issues of commitment, power and coordination of executive dictates and priorities. The dilemma lies with fulfilling commitments of the presidency where line departments have not budgeted for particular peacebuilding activities and the capacity to coordinate the dictates of presidential preferences.

National departments:

According to the Government, South Africa utilises its different departments to “lay the basis for permanent stability through economic reconstruction, reconstitution of the state and nation-building” in its peace missions (Presidency, 2009, p. 62). Therefore different departments directed their competencies to addressing peacebuilding initiatives in post conflict settings, including Burundi. The arrangement raises issues of whether or not departments possess any power in relation to their ability to; choose and prioritise on peacebuilding activities; co-ordinate activities between departments, determine their entry and exit strategies and ensure availability of resources. Noted also, is that departments, whilst positioned at lower levels of decision making in foreign policy, control departmental activities and allocation of budget expenditure. These factors could directly impact in the implementation of peacebuilding activities.
The policy indicates that authorisation and deployment of civilians in peacebuilding missions is functionally managed between the sending department and DIRCO (1999, p. 27). Their participation can be through bilateral or multilateral engagements.

DIRCO
The policy dictates that DIRCO be the custodian and lead department for coordinating Government’s participation in peace missions as it is viewed as an extension of SA’s foreign policy (1999, p. 27). DIRCO is supported in this function by its departmental structure of the National Office for the Co-ordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM) (Malan & Kent, 2003). The functions of the NOCPM are central to the implementation of the policy as it is an “institution charged with administering the civilian readiness system” (1999, p. 30) and ensuring “ad hoc” civilian deployment. The civilian readiness system is envisaged as a resource bank for registering, controlling and deploying expert civilians in peace missions.

NOCPM and the civilian readiness system
The policy acknowledges the existence of civilian human resource experts in the country who could assist during peace missions. Included in this are civilian skills in the fields of; statisticians, human rights, electoral, mediation and medical experts (p.22). DIRCO therefore commits itself to;

a. encourage, facilitate and support the selection of civilian volunteers for specific peace missions;

b. create a “suitable readiness system or resource bank of competent personnel residing in South Africa who are available for international assignments which promote democracy, human rights and peacebuilding”. This civilian data base would profile private individuals and civil servants who have expertise in “foreign relations and diplomacy, democracy, and good governance, safety and security, justice, transportation, communication and health”;

c. ensure that the resource bank is located “within a stand-alone non-profit organisation”;

d. submit names of experts and their details to the UN secretariat for employment;
e. actively track UN openings;
f. train some volunteers, and to support the establishment of “relevant civilian training courses for those earmarked for international services”;
g. maintain the option of using the standby list to select and possibly fund secondment of individuals to international peace missions;
h. use the standby system to contract out administrative and logistical support to international organisations and NGOs who have an “established presence in the field”; and
i. nationally, and regionally, promote the idea of a civilian resource bank.

The policy recognises the inherent limitations of implementing the idea of the resource bank e.g. civilian participation, as opposed to military deployment. One is its posture of being a voluntary exercise left to “individual choice” (p. 29). The placing of a name in the data base would therefore not guarantee the availability of that individual during a particular deployment. Secondly, DIRCO realises its limited influence in the deployment of individuals to the inter-Governmental bodies since the demands of the receiving body determine the level and size of civilian contribution. Lastly, procedures for deployment are identified as dependent on the “enthusiasm” of DIRCO and “efficacy of the civilian readiness arrangement” (p. 31).

African Renaissance Fund (ARF)
The policy indicates that DIRCO should take the lead in securing finances for South African participation in peace missions (1999, p. 28). This demand was met with the establishment of the African Renaissance Fund and International Co-operation Fund (ARF) through Act no 51 of 2000. ARF was created to operationalise and give effect to the African Renaissance policy introduced by President Mbeki (Landsberg, 2012, p. 440). The fund provides a “mechanism through which donor (third party) funds could be channelled to recipient and/or joint tripartite projects” (DIRCO, 2003).

It is financed by the SA Government and other sources, which may include third party donors. Section 4 states that the fund is to be used for;
a. "co-operation between the Republic and other countries in particular African countries; and
b. the promotion of democracy and good governance
c. the prevention and resolution of conflict
d. socio-economic development and integration; and
e. humanitarian assistance and human resource development”.

DIRCO is the principal custodian of the fund and manages it under the direction of its Minister. Section 5 provides for the creation of an advisory committee led by the Director-General of DIRCO and supported by two members from the Department of Finance. The funds are dispersed by the Minister of International Relations after consultation with the Minister of Finance and upon receipt of recommendations from the advisory committee. The funds are dispersed after project and programme applications are received from different national departments. The receiving departments have to utilise the funds in accordance with the agreement between the ARF and the spending department. Parliament has an oversight role on ARF expenditure.

The creation of the ARF provides added leverage and availability of funds for departments to fund projects excluded from their financial planning cycle and departmental objectives. Besharati (2013, p. 32) notes that due to the “limitations” and ineffectiveness of ARF, “the SA National Treasury in 2006 started an internal evaluation of the ARF” which could inform debates around a formation of a new SA development agency i.e. The SA Development Partnership Agency (SADPA). A discussion of the institution is not pursued as it has yet to operate in the SA’s peacebuilding initiatives.

According to the policy, DIRCO sits at the apex and highest decision making function on peace missions, whilst reality indicates that the presidency has immense influence on the agenda setting of the country’s peace missions. DIRCO is also the main coordinator of the policy, whilst implementation is vested with different departments and the international community. However, Landsberg (2012, p. 447) observes that in reality DIRCO has “struggled to be effective and to bring about greater synergies between peace missions on the continent and [its] Africa desks”. Landsberg’s (2012) observation suggests that implementation of the civilian participation in peacebuilding activities is
hampered by DIRCO’s internal institutional arrangements and that a need arises for policy reform in this instance.

Parliament
Parliament’s role in the deployment of civilians during peacebuilding activities is limited. The thrust of parliament’s responsibility is limited to its financial oversight function where it monitors and calls officials to account on Government spending and financing of individuals engaged in peace missions. This was influenced by the design on the policy which indicates that its parliamentary adoption secured approval for all future civilian deployment and participation “in international peace missions” (1999, p. 27). This is in contrast to the rigid constitutional employment requirements for military personnel.

Individuals
Individuals access peacebuilding initiatives through three different routes. Individuals can be seconded to implementing bodies, directly employed by an implementing body or directly engaged by the sending Government. The nature of employment has different financial implications for the Government. Individuals directly appointed within inter-Governmental organisations are paid by the employer (UN). Seconded individuals and those directly employed by the Government may be jointly funded by the sending department and the responsible receiving inter-Governmental organisation. Sending departments include the item and extent of financial implications for the deployment in their annual departmental budget (1999, pp. 27-28).

Authorisation for deployment is managed between the sending department and DIRCO. The policy dictates that civilians seconded or employed through inter-Governmental bodies report to the Head of Mission (1999, p. 16). Civilians directly employed by departments report directly to their sending department.

The different arrangements of civilian employment raise issues of influence, power relations and control. Civilians directly placed by the Government in recipient countries are in a position to directly pursue the mandate and interests of their sending departments whilst those seconded or directly employed by the receiving body have to
pursue the mandate of that collective body even for activities and programs that oppose their national agenda. Their level of authority and their capacity to influence the agenda of the receiving organisation may also be a challenge since agenda setting discussions of peacebuilding may be discussed at higher levels e.g. UNPBC and not at the level of implementation.

Organised civil society and NGO groups
The policy lists NGO’s, such as CARE and Save the Children Fund, policy as examples of organised actors that may be involved in peace missions. Other groups can be community based organisations and civil society organisations. This category of actors is found at local and international level.

Costy (2004, pp. 170-171) and Murithi (2005, p. 47) reflect on the role of these organisations. The authors state that theoretically the organisations address root causes by strengthening democratic institutions and increasing the role of citizens in political, social and economic processes. However in practice, they may pose a threat to the establishment of durable peace. To support this assertion, Costy (2004) uses the case of Mozambique to illustrate how agendas of local civil society groups driven by external donor funders dictate the focus of activities, style and content of issues to be addressed. Murithi (2005) also notes that research indicates that “many international aid organisations had subordinated their aims and principles in order to cooperate … with global powers to achieve desired outcomes in particular countries” (2005, p. 47). Costy (2004) also mentions that these organisations also encourage dependency relationships which undermine the true participatory nature of citizens in processes of peacebuilding. Richmond (2011, p. 55) also observes that the relationship between civil society, NGOs and international actors is fraught with contestation and points out that intervening international actors drive and influence the local civil society agenda of peacebuilding by introducing their own form of liberal peacebuilding. Implications of the liberal peacebuilding approach were discussed in the previous chapter.
2.1 The African Union and other regional institutions

The African Union
The Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established in 2004 through article 5(2) of the African Union (AU) Constitutive Act and article 2(1) of the protocol (AU). The protocol\(^9\) directly speaks to the need for the AU to undertake peacebuilding measures for the prevention of conflict or “resurgence of violence” as establishment of peace and security in the region is among the top priorities of the AU (Moolakkattu, 2010). The PSC, situated under the office of the chairperson of the commission is supported by institutions of the panel of the wise, continental early warning system and African standby force. The PSC undertakes peacebuilding projects through “formal state institutions, whether at continental, regional, national or local levels” (Moolakkattu, 2010, p. 161).

Tieku (2012) analyses the post war reconstruction doctrine of the AU. Tieku (2012) notes that the doctrine is informed by the determination to ensure; that peacebuilding frameworks are results of “political rather than technical” processes, are informed by priorities and actual need of recipient countries, and respect for local institutions and practices. The AU developed six principles to guide countries in negotiating and the framing of peacebuilding frameworks and these are ‘African leadership, national and local ownership, inclusiveness, equity and non-discrimination, cooperation and cohesion, and capacity building for sustainability” (Tieku, 2012, p. 384).

Criticism of the implementation of AU strategies is the subject of various writings. Adebajo (2008) indicates the existence of turf wars between AU structures e.g. NEPAD\(^10\) in 2005, and the AU in 2006 separately developed “post conflict reconstruction frameworks” (Adebajo, 2008, p. 139) and institutional “tensions” have affected the implementation of activities.

PSC’s criticism relates to firstly its reliance on the envisaged role of REC’s which were identified as crucial implementers of AU policies (Landsberg, 2012, p. 442). The role would have resulted in South Africa engaging the SADC for implementation of its peacebuilding activities. However in reality they have been found to be weak, lacking in financial and logistical capacity (Adebajo, 2008)
These challenges are not only confined to the REC’s and PSC but permeate through all institutions of the AU. Moolakkattu (2010, p. 161) also identifies lack of funding and resources (including human) which lead to the AU being reliant on donor funding which result in its independence being undermined. In addition, Moolakkattu (2010), also notes that the AU suffers from challenges of poor coordination of activities, specialised capabilities being “spread across others arenas of the AU commission” and the lack of synergy between policies and implementation of programmes. According to Adebajo (2008, p. 136), “Political will and commitment” seems to be the solution to solving these challenges. Finally, whilst acknowledging the importance of the AU peacebuilding policy and its link to other AU policies, peacebuilding ideas are criticised for being “general and imprecise, and at time contradictory and incoherent” (Tieku, 2012, p. 386).

Other Governments and their formations
Actors involved in this category, include the European Union, BRICS, G8 countries and different Governments. The AU (Moolakkattu, 2010, p. 158) and ARF and departmental structures provide avenues for the funding of peacebuilding projects by these actors through bilateral and trilateral arrangements. In these instances, trilateral agreements can be between ARF or AU and recipient countries or between SA national department, donor country and recipient country. These actors have their own agendas and priorities and thus place different demands on the use of their funds. The trilateral agreements concluded in partnership with these actors may therefore work against the priorities of the recipient Government and, as stated by Moolakkattu (2010), may challenge the independence of the AU or SA in the choice and prioritisation of peacebuilding activities.
2.2 The UN and its agencies

The UN, due to its involvement in peace keeping, is regarded as a central player in post conflict peacebuilding initiatives (Sriram, Martin-Ortega, & Herman, 2011, p. 3) and the policy acknowledges this and the possible involvement of other regional organisations (1999, pp. 14-18). Moolakkattu (2010, pp. 153, 159) notes that the overextension of the UN from issues of peacekeeping to peace making and peacebuilding propelled the UN to increase utilisation of regional bodies, consequently in African affairs the UN PSC and AU PSC frequently interact and cooperate to ensure the existence of peace and security.

The head of the civilian representative of peace missions (SRSG) liaises and coordinates activities of the different actors on the ground e.g. UN agencies, regional bodies, civil society and others. In addition, the SRSG representative must also consider the line functions of the PBC and its structures on the ground. This mammoth task has resulted in the UN being frequently criticised for its lack of capacity to coordinate and prioritise its peacebuilding activities.

This is compounded by the fact that the different actors possess different interests, benchmarks and goals e.g. whilst the UN Secretary General pushes for donors to assist build capacity of regional organisations, the five UNSC permanent members are said to have adopted a laissez faire attitude and refused “to fund or sometimes even recognise… [regional] efforts, while insisting on maintaining political control over these missions” (Adebajo, 2008, p. 135).

The Peacebuilding Commission

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 1645 and United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions 1645 and 60/180 respectively established the inter-Governmental structure of the Peace Building Commission (PBC) in 2005 (Mingst & Karns, 2007, p. 508). The PBC was established because the UN realised that responses to questions of resolving post conflict situations was affected by “shortage of funds, lack of coordination and the tendency to leave too hurriedly” (Murthy, 2007, p.
47). Article 2, which provides the functions of the PBC, sought to address these concerns by focusing on activities that would strive;

(a) to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on, and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery;
(b) to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development;
(c) to provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post conflict recovery”.

The research explores implementation of activities of SA actors identified in article 2b.

Diagram 2: Structure of the PBC as provided for in article 4 (own illustration)

The PBC directly links peacebuilding with the UNSC and other UN agencies. It is composed of the Organizational Committee (PBOC), the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). The PBC seeks to work with local, national and regional actors. Lambourne & Herro (2008) note that it has been found wanting since New York held meetings and their “procedures” have virtually excluded meaningful participation of local NGO’s and civil society groups.
Murthy (2007) also notes two peculiar features on the structural arrangement of the PBC. The first relates to the composition of its actors and secondly, its lines of reporting. The composition of the PBOC draws personnel from three different organs of the UN and also includes a group of other actors. In addition, unlike other UN committees, the PBC submits its annual reports directly to the general assembly. In addition to its direct reporting lines to the general assembly, it also has direct reporting lines to the UNSC, and indirect ones to Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the secretariat office of the Secretary General (Lambourne & Herro, 2008).

As illustrated in diagram 1, the PBOC is represented by stakeholders with different interests and values (Jenkins, 2008, pp. 3-6) including the option of inviting “supplementary actors” who would add value to country specific meetings dealing with specific peacebuilding missions (Lambourne & Herro, 2008, p. 282) and it is credited with its consultative approach. Yet some have indicated that the consultative nature of the PBC is its greatest weakness since it contributes to non-delivery of its mandate (Jenkins, 2008). Murthy (2007, pp. 46,52) also finds fault with the fact that its decisions are advisory and recommendatory, and therefore not binding on other actors and lastly that its level of authority is problematic as it is pitched at a lower level compared to other UN commissions e.g. Commission for Human Rights (2007, p. 52).

The PBSO is the engine for administration and secretariat work of the PBC. It “supports the work of the PBC”, “oversees operations of the PBF”, “coordinates” all meetings of the PBC and “liaises” will all actors and advises the secretary general and the UN system on the development of peacebuilding strategies (Lambourne & Herro, 2008, p. 282).

The PBF is financed through voluntary contributions and this is identified as a weakness, since it results in lack of adequate funding for the commission (Murthy, 2007, pp. 45,52). The PBF supports peacebuilding of post conflict countries and those under consideration for funding by the PBC (Lambourne & Herro, 2008, p. 282).

However, the structural configuration of the PBF could be viewed as advantageous since it allows countries who have accessed the PBC to directly access funding from the PBF e.g. Resolution UNSC 1791 (2007) and UNGA 1719 (2006) mandated the PBC to carry out its function in Burundi in 2006. The act enabled Burundi to receive funding
from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Murthy, 2007, p. 53) and thus implement its peacebuilding activities through the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB)\textsuperscript{12} (Ayebari, n.d, p. 85; Ameir, 2008, p. 108) in accordance with the recipient’s country peacebuilding framework (UNPBC, 2007) and the PBOC peacebuilding framework (Lambourne & Herro, 2008, p. 282).

2.3 Conclusion

SA’s comprehensive approach to peace missions places a huge burden on DIRCO and its function of coordination and collaboration with different stakeholders at national and international levels. The institutions identified in the chapter are numerous and pose a challenge for implementation of the policy. It is evident that according to the policy implementation is not only dependent on SA actors, but also on others at the regional, international level and the recipient country. The identification, mapping and formation of partnerships with different actors who possess different and varied interests become pivotal for determination of the “coalition of the willing”.

Apart from the different interests, the exercise reveals different deficiencies within the different institutions which vary from lack of; financial and human resources, proper coordination mechanisms due to duplication and blurring of reporting lines, and clarity on policies. It is observed that it is possible to find that even when actors are capable of forming coalitions through sharing of similar interests, the said coalition could be jeopardised by institutional deficiencies. It is therefore suggested on identifying suitable partners within the coalition of the willing SA should not only be guided by abstract considerations (interests and values) but also by practical ones (availability of resources that could enhance implementation).
Chapter 3: Burundi case study
3 Chapter 3: Burundi case study

3.1 Introduction

The chapter provides context on the Burundi case study including the political and historical background of the conflict. Peacebuilding institutions are discussed and insight is provided on appropriate peacebuilding activities that should have been adopted. The argument presented is that the historical context of conflict informs peacebuilding activities and demands attendance to issues raised by Ball (1996) when discussing the common characteristics of post conflict societies.

3.2 Historical context of Burundi

Political history of Burundi

The Burundi conflict occurred over various time frames and intervals. This is relevant since Levy (2007, p. 20) notes that any study of conflict must contextualise the violence and explore why it occurred at a particular period. The period under consideration in this research therefore relates to atrocities and peace initiatives after the 1994 plane crash which claimed the lives of the Rwanda and Burundi Presidents (Ameir, 2008; Mezzera, Pavicic, & Specker, 2009). It is presented that the crash triggered existing grievances, resulting in another cycle of violence. The intervention of the international community during this cycle culminated in the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement in August 2000. The agreement did not in itself bring an end to the violence as atrocities persisted, albeit at lower levels, e.g. 1,657 rapes were reported in 2004, whilst Save the Children Fund in the same year reported Burundi as one of the worst conflict zones in the world for women and children (Eggers, 2006).

Burundi attained independence from Belgium on 1 July 1962. Levy (2007, p. 19) categorises the post-independence conflicts of Burundi as “intrastate war” with a “transnational dimension”. Similar to other intrastate conflicts (Brown, 2007), it led to ethnic and group violence, coups, regional and national political instability, displacement of citizens, human rights violations, ethnic killings, reprisals and acts of genocide at
different time periods e.g. in 1965 about 5000 Hutus were killed in retaliation to the killing of about 500 Tutsis, in 1972 about 200,000 deaths occurred with about 300,000 persons exiled, in 1988 about 15,000 died and 50,000 were exiled, in 1991 about 3000 died and 38,000 were exiled and in 1993 about 300,000 were killed or displaced (Oleynik, Alexander, & Cherepanya, 2005; Ndikumana, 2005, p. 421)\textsuperscript{13}.

In June 1993, Presidential elections were conducted and Ndadaye, a Hutu leader of FRODEBU, won the elections and replaced President Buyoya in July 1993. In October 1993, President Ndadaye and some cabinet members were assassinated in a military coup. The coup leaders were forced by international pressure to relinquish their power in favour of civilian rule, and yet again, FRODEBU assumed control of the country (Daley, 2007, p. 81). The 1993 coup resulted in another cycle of genocide. In April 1994, President Cyprian Ntaryimana, together with the Rwandan President, died in a plane crash and this led to the Rwandan genocide and the formation of a coalition Government in Burundi led by President Ntibantunganya (Hutu) and Prime Minister Nduwayo (Tutsi). The coalition Government collapsed in June 1995 (Daley, 2007, p. 85), and in July 1996, President Buyoya re-entered the political scene through a military coup. The regional leaders (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Ethiopia), in their summit of 31 July 1996, condemned the coup and imposed sanctions against Burundi (Ameir, 2008) whilst the western countries supported the coup as they thought Buyoya would bring stability in the country (Daley, 2007, p. 87).

\textit{Phases of the Arusha agreement}

Mwanza (April to June 1996) and Arusha 1 (1996 – October 1999)

Due to the continued political instability after the 1993 coup, Tanzanian President Nyerere was appointed by the regional heads of the Great Lakes as a mediator in November 1995. The peace process was viewed by these leaders as a regional initiative where other stakeholders were to play a supportive role. The regional efforts under the leadership of Tanzania initially began in Mwanza in April 1996, and on its failure to produce required results, relocated to Arusha in June 1988 (Ameir, 2008, p. 75).
According to Daley (2007, pp. 196-198), the region held numerous meetings and finalization of the talks was delayed due to reasons of uncooperative behaviour between the political parties, employment of delaying strategies, procedural differences and the Government’s reluctance to succumb to regional influences which included the involvement of external mediators and a “regional peace keeping force”. The intervention force was, in 1996, eventually introduced as an Organisation of the African Union (OAU) observer mission and was reduced from the initial plan of “180 soldiers and 30 civilians” to “46 civilian and unarmed military personnel”.

Whilst lasting peace was not achieved, Nyerere is credited with having brought together the major political actors to discuss a political solution and the guarantee of a neutral military component to protect the leaders of the different political parties and the establishment of demobilisation areas (Ayabare, 82).

Pretoria and Burundi - Arusha 2 (October 1999 – 2006)

On the demise of President Nyerere in October 1999, Ugandan President Museveni temporarily occupied the role of mediator until SA President Mandela assumed the role of facilitator in December 1999. Mandela is credited with bringing further international attention to the Burundi peace process and exertion of pressure on political actors which culminated in the signing of the Arusha Agreement in 2000 (Oleynik, Alexander, & Cherepanya, 2005).

After the signing of the agreement the SA Deputy President of South Africa, Zuma, replaced Mandela. Zuma was mandated to bring to the table forces that had not signed the Arusha peace agreement e.g. the Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD). The CNDD-FDD signed the Pretoria protocol on political defence and security power and the power sharing agreement in 8 October 2003 (Oleynik, Alexander, & Cherepanya, 2005). Zuma is also credited with ensuring the establishment of the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), the AU deployment of its peace keeping force and later its takeover (re-hatting) by the UN.

Charles Nqakula, a South African minister for public safety and security, was appointed in May 2006 as a facilitator after Zuma. Nqakula’s main mandate was to ensure the
inclusion of Palipehutu-FNL in the peace process and this was achieved in December 2008.

Burundi conflict

The pattern of violence in Burundi cannot be divorced from the history of regional colonial history and its regional post-colonial conflicts. After the end of World War 1, Rwanda and Burundi initially German colonies, joined the DRC as Belgian colonies (Oleynik, Alexander, & Cherepanya, 2005). Daley (2007, p. 1) illustrates the impact of this historical interconnectivity and notes that the 1994 Rwandan genocide resulted in the death of 7000 lives whilst between 1998-2005 the DRC reported deaths of about 3.8 million.

Oleynik et al (2005) and other authors converge and identify ethnicity as central to the regional conflicts of the Great Lakes. The question posed is whether or not ethnic issues were the cause of the conflict or the manifestation of other existing grievances? The establishment of this question is relevant since the policy under consideration directs actors to attend to the underlying causes of conflict in order to create durable peace. Secondly, the inductive approach of peacebuilding (Cousens, 2001) adopted in this research demands proper understanding of conflict root causes as the exercise provides insight into the nature of grievances and motives for participation in the conflict. The inductive approach also provides policy makers with tools that assist in the identification of appropriate policies that reduce the risk of future violent conflicts (Stewart & Brown, 2007, p. 227; Mack, 2007, p. 531).

Root causes of the Burundi conflict

Brown (2007, p. 47) argues that understanding violent ethnic conflicts demands the drawing of a distinction between “parochial motivations that galvanize these conflicts and the ethnic consequences that follow”. Authors (Ndikumana (2005), Stewart and Brown (2007) De Rouen et al (2010) and Daley (2007) agree with Brown, and note that in Burundi, ethnicity was the “consequence” and not the underlying cause of the conflict. Authors have identified different parochial motivations and the discussion below sheds insight into these.
Access to power and weak institutions
Ndikumana (2005, pp. 413-414,418) and De Rouen et al (2010, p. 341) attribute the Burundi conflict to institutional failure caused by the unequal distribution of power and resources between different ethnic groups. The argument of power relations is also given credence in the Arusha Agreement. Protocol 1, article 4, of the agreement draws a link between politics, ethnicity and power as root causes of the conflict in Burundi. It attributes the conflict to the “struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power”. The existence of these types of conflicts is acknowledged by Stewart & Brown (2007, pp. 220-221) who specifically categorize the type of conflict in Burundi as one “fought to gain (retain) political supremacy by particular groups representing specific cultures (ethnicities or religion)”. It is evident that power relations were a critical factor and informed the grievances of certain sections of the population. The state, through its weak institutions, contributed to galvanizing these grievances.

Colonization
Busumtwi-Sam (2004, p. 321) and Levy (2007, pp. 29-30) present the negative influence of colonialism and its contribution to conflicts and Daley (2007) contextualises this argument and suggests that post-colonial conflicts in Burundi are consequences of Belgian misunderstanding of African institutions. Daley (2007) further argues that the misunderstanding fuelled cultural differences, violence/genocide and inequalities and supports this reasoning with reference to an official 1938 proclamation which provided that:

“the Belgian government is convinced that it must continue to maintain and consolidate the traditional position of the Tutsi governing class because of its great qualities, its undeniable intellectual superiority, and its potential to lead” (Daley, 2007, p. 49).

A reflection of the different authors, phases and consequences of the conflict in Burundi supports the view that the conflict was based on fighting between two major ethnic groups (Hutu and Tutsi). The group in power sought to maintain its grip whilst the excluded one tried to assert itself into power. Their actions suggest elements of rationality in their decision making in relation to aspirations to gain or fear of losing
power. Secondly, scarcity of resources were also material to the conflict and this is supported by the understanding that perusal of the different phases of the conflict indicates that the group in power used its access to state resources (civil service and security forces) to purge or exclude other groups. The combination of these two observations supports the view that the conflict in Burundi cannot be divorced from issues of how colonisation re-configured the society, informed “inequality” and assumptions of “ethnic … differences”. Whilst Ndikumana (2005), Stewart & Brown (2007) and De Rouen et al (2010) do not give prominence to the role of colonialism, their findings are not negated by this additional element i.e. political and economic inequality and use of ethnicity to exclude others from power and resources. The research adopts this stance, and informed by the readings of these authors, concludes that whilst the conflict manifested itself in ethnic consequences, the underlying causes of the conflict were informed by weak institutions initially introduced by colonisation and the fight over access to power. The weak institutions resulted in the exclusion and marginalisation of certain ethnic groups in the political, economic and social activities of the country. This exclusion of others, based on ethnicity and gender, led to group motivation for participation in the conflict. 

It is therefore suggested that successful peace initiatives must address these causes and that peace efforts that ignore them will result in failure. It is further argued that the parochial motives identified link with the study of Stewart & Brown (2007), discussed below, on the need to address horizontal inequalities of the Burundi society. Oleynik et al (2005) also illustrate the dangers of failure to adopt this reasoning and note as an example the result of 1996 piecemeal approach which failed to address the root causes of the conflict i.e. the Government of Burundi then banned ethnic labelling and this act failed to produce the desired results of establishing durable peace and political stability (Oleynik, Alexander, & Cherepanya, 2005).
3.3 Identification of peacebuilding activities

Stewart & Brown (2007) interrogate factors that demonstrate the vulnerability of countries to conflict relapse and failure of ensuring sustainable peace for countries emerging from conflict. The vulnerability factors relate to low income, low human development, and history of conflict in the last thirty years, severe horizontal inequalities and transitional societies emerging from “strong repressive regimes”. Burundi, according to the study, is susceptible to another cycle of conflict as it possesses more than one of these factors. Aspects of the study relevant to this research are summarized and provided in the table below.

Table 2: Policies that address root causes sourced from Stewart & Brown (2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose of policy</th>
<th>Intervention policies</th>
<th>Examples of policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy framed to address horizontal inequalities</td>
<td>Policy must be directed to the reduction of group inequalities which provide group motives. The purpose is to ensure inclusivity.</td>
<td>Political inclusivity in decision making and institutions of the country. Social and economic inclusivity and creating equal access and opportunities through adoption of measures that address past imbalances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy framed to reduce the functionality of the conflict</td>
<td>Policy must be directed to private motives</td>
<td>Increase economic opportunities and access to institutions that enable economic independence of individuals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy structured to promote equitable and sustainable development.</td>
<td>Policy must be directed to social contract and environmental pressures.</td>
<td>Extension of basic services to all and improving the security of the country.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Stewart & Brown (2007) identify Burundi as being in need of measures that address group motives due to the existence of horizontal inequalities informed by non-access to, and exclusion of, one group to political, social and economic resources. According to their study, severe horizontal inequalities which meet resistance for inclusion by those holding political power, trigger violent conflict by “giving group leaders a powerful motive to organize in order to gain support” (2007, p. 223). Their study therefore indicates that efforts directed towards achieving political inclusivity, even in the presence of other horizontal inequalities, reduce prospects of violent conflict. An analysis of the peace agreement, undertaken in the next section, provides insight into whether its content was geared towards addressing horizontal inequalities. The study of Stewart & Brown (2007) is used in this research to determine whether or not firstly the Burundi peace agreement was designed to address the root causes of the conflict, the horizontal inequalities and group motives and secondly whether the activities of SA actors also focused on these factors.

3.4 Peace agreements

The Arusha agreement is used as a reference point for investigating Stewart & Brown’s (2007) study. This is important since the research is premised on the understanding that conflict resolution through peace missions includes addressing root causes of conflict, therefore conflict resolution institutions, including peace agreements must be sensitive to adopting strategies that prevent relapse into conflict. Cousens (2001, pp. 195-196) and Daley (2007, pp. 191, 220) observe that contextually crafted peace agreements reduce prospects of further conflict and determine the success or failure of peace initiatives. Cousens (2001) also notes that addressing root causes assists in; meaningful transformation of political systems, the introduction of new rules of engagement and levelling of playing fields, reconfiguration of balances of power and enables parties to compromise on their demands as they are incentivised to participate in bringing an end to the conflict.

As noted in the previous chapter, the political context of the Burundi conflict brought to the fore issues of powers struggles which resulted in exclusion of certain sections of the
population based on ethnic considerations, the consequence of weak institutions and fight over scarce resources including power. Therefore an appropriately drafted agreement would direct actors to attend to these horizontal inequalities.

De Rouen et al (2010) and Daley (2007) criticise the drafting of the agreement. Their study draws a link between issues of state capacity, intervention and peace agreement implementation. They argue that peace agreements that fail to address state capacity of weak states results in the failure of peacebuilding and implementation of peace agreements. They argue that the Arusha agreement failed to address the root cause of weak institutions. The observations of Daley (2007) and De Rouen et al (2010) can only be investigated through a content analysis of the agreement and how it addressed issues of root causes.

Arusha agreement and attendance to root causes
The Arusha Agreement was signed by 19 primary actors, and co-signed by 8 secondary actors, on 28 August 2000. The agreement consisted of five protocols and five annexures which addressed issues in the following manner.

Protocol 1 addresses the “nature of the Burundi conflict, problems of genocide and exclusion and their solutions of the conflict and problems of genocide and exclusion and their solutions”. Chapter 1 pays attention to the various historical phases of the conflict and potential solutions, basic principles that will ensure the elimination of exclusion and the creation of a peaceful and just society. Protocol II focuses on “democracy and good governance”. It details issues of the final constitutional principles/state and institutional arrangements during the transitional period. It therefore addresses matters of institutional reforms and the separation of powers and different spheres of Government. Protocol III on peace in security matters attends to a general understanding of the concept of peace and security, causes, responsibility, victims and results of the insecurity and violence in Burundi. Chapter II attends to security sector reforms that would protect the citizens and the state in a non-partisan manner. Chapter III addresses issues of ceasefire and the cessation of hostilities. Protocol IV attends to matters of reconstruction and development. Chapter 1 focuses on the repatriation of exiles and internally displaced persons and their integration into society. Chapter II seeks to attend
to physical and political reconstruction of the society whilst chapter III addresses issues of economic and social development. Protocol V talks to the guarantees on the implementation of the agreement and draws to the attention the roles and responsibilities of different actors and institutions including the international community and the region.

Assertions of Cousens (2001), Daley (2007) and De Rouen et al (2010), discussed above, are investigated to determine whether the content of the peace agreement provided a good foundation for addressing the root causes of the conflict.

The preamble of protocol 1 states that the parties “Resolved to eradicate genocide and to reject all forms of division, discrimination and exclusion”. This aspiration links to article 4(a) and (b) which recognise that “the nature of the Burundi conflict” is informed by “… fundamentally political, with extremely important ethnic dimensions” which emanate “from a struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power”.

The protocol reaches this conclusion after an exhaustive descriptive narrative of the history of the country from pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial phases and notes in article 3(3) that atrocities have been committed since independence “against Tutsi and Hutu ethnic communities”.

The agreement therefore recognises issues of exclusion, access to power and the political context i.e. effect of colonisation, and the institutionalisation of ethnic differences of Burundi as root causes of the conflict. Article 3 however fails to adequately speak and address how issues of the weak state contributed to the violence.

Article 5(1) of Protocol 1, Chapter 11, inter alia, speaks to the “reorganization of the State institutions to make them capable of integrating and reassuring all the ethnic components of Burundi”. The article introduces common values that should guide this new dispensation. These values speak to “justice, the rule of law, democracy, good governance, pluralism, respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, unity, solidarity, equality between women and men, … tolerance …”. The issues enumerated in this article could speak to the assertions of Daley as they support a liberal mode of peacebuilding.

Article 7 addresses principles and measures that would ensure equality and inclusion of all in areas relating to public administration, education, security sector, justice,
economy, social services and cultural spheres. The article lists activities that have to be undertaken by the state and the citizens e.g. article 7(7) states that “Training, in such a way as to include all components of Burundian society, of civil servants, particularly for regional and local Government, by establishing a national school of administration”.

In addressing the political connotations of the Burundi conflict, article 13 in chapter II of protocol IV states that “Physical reconstruction and political reconstruction must be mutually supportive” with political reconstruction aiming at building a tolerant society and the “establishment of the rule of law”. The article thereafter lists activities that should be undertaken. The activities include the promotion of human rights, democratisation, development and national reconciliation etc.

The question posed is whether or not the weak state has the capacity and resources to implement these provisions. The study of De Rouen et al (2010) is significant in this regard, as it links the success or failure of peace agreements’ implementation to availability or non-availability of capacity to implement of weak states. The agreement in various articles realises this limitation and indicates that its success relies on the assistance of external actors to implement the agreement. It is therefore argued that this was a weakness of the agreement as it placed numerous implementation obligations on a state that had no capacity to implement. The success of implementation of the agreement was therefore dependent on the commitment and resources of external actors. It should be noted that the agreement was also the foundation for the Burundi peacebuilding Strategic Framework and Priority Plan. The argument presented is that the Arusha agreement therefore transposed its deficiencies to other processes and tools of the Burundi peacebuilding programmes.

3.5 International Actors involved in Burundi Peacebuilding

In 2006, Burundi was placed on the agenda of the UNPBC and thus allowing access to the UN peacebuilding machinery for its post conflict recovery (Ayabare 85). Resolutions of the UNSC 1791(2007) and UNGA 1719 (2006) mandated the PBC to carry out its functions in Burundi. As indicated above, the study argues that the foundation (Arusha agreement) of peacebuilding in Burundi failed to sufficiently attend to questions of weak
institutions and their contribution to the conflict and that this oversight impacted on other peacebuilding measures (Strategic Framework and Priority Plan). In 2007, the Government of Burundi in consultation with the PBC and other actors developed a Strategic Framework for peacebuilding, which included the 2006 Priority Plan of peacebuilding (Burundi Government, 2007). The 2006 Priority Plan focussed on issues of building strength in matters of; good governance, rule of law within the security forces, justice system and human rights and land. Gender mainstreaming was viewed as critical in the “entire process of peacebuilding”. The objectives of peacebuilding activities were therefore linked to these priorities. The Strategic Framework paid regard to the broader political context and this is important as Greener (2011, p. 357) notes that disregard of this ensures “meaningless” peacebuilding exercises. The PBC and the Government of Burundi called upon all actors to support the plan and align their activities to the implementation of the Strategic Framework.

Zartman & Touval (2007) argue that parties involved in conflict mediation are not impartial and harbour desires of fulfilling their own self-interests, and therefore peace mediators calculate the timing of their involvement, and the timing is usually premised on a threat to their interests or “an opportunity to advance their interests”. Oleynik et al (2005), in determining the interests of the mediators of the Burundi peace process, observes that the peace process was mainly personalised between countries and sub regions with the main actors being the Great Lakes region, President Nyerere of Tanzania and South African facilitators. The research identifies the motives and interests of these main actors.

Note should be taken that actors identified in chapter 2 were limited to those that directly impact on peacebuilding and the implementation of the policy. The current chapter extends the network of actors to those with interest in the peace process and therefore those who would directly and indirectly impact on implementation of the policy. The link between the two chapters further indicates the level of complexity of actors and their involvement in peace missions.
South Africa and its interests

South Africa joined the regional initiative in December 1999, on the demise of President Nyerere (Ameir, 2008) and was, through the different phases of the peace process, represented by different senior political heads. South Africa overtly states that its objective in Burundi was to ensure regional peace and stability. President Mbeki summed this up in his 2007 State of the Nation address when he said “… we will continue to work with … Burundi… to ensure that conditions of peace and stability thus far obtained translates … into … economic reconstruction and social development” (ACCORD, 2007, p. 11). However Ameir (2008, p. iv) observes that South Africa used its involvement to “penetrate both politically and diplomatically … and consolidate its economic presence in the sub- region”. Ameir (2008) and Oleynik et al (2005, pp. 231-232) question the neutrality of South Africa’s role and argue that it used the Burundi peace process to advance its foreign policy and international footprint. According to these authors, the establishment of peace and security in Burundi was not the only reason for South Africa’s involvement.

Zartman & Touval (2007, pp. 442-443) indicate that actors use a cost and benefit analysis to determine involvement in peace processes. In view of the discussions above, it is argued that the timing of South Africa’s involvement in the peace process was indeed opportune, since South Africa had recently attained its freedom and was on a political moral high ground of having a politically untainted Government in the continent. It therefore used the peace mission to spread its influence. The success of the peace mission meant recognition that South Africa could be taken as a serious player in international politics. Therefore whilst “moral” considerations cannot be ruled out, issues of “national interests as well as international interests” identified earlier by Neethling (1997) in chapter 2, played a role. These views support Oleynik et al’s (2005, pp. 231-232) observations that South Africa used the opportunity to promote the national renaissance agenda and establish a footprint into the politics and economy of the Great Lakes.
Barundi actors
Daley (2007, pp. 89-91) provides a list of 23 political parties, rebel movements and militias in Burundi, in 2000, divided on ethnic preferences. The peace talks of 7 August 2000 resumed with 19 political parties in Arusha (Tanzania) and a meeting in SA consisting of representatives of the CNDD, FNL and Government (Daley, 2007, p. 214). Oleynik et al (2005, p. 232) notes that whilst some participants viewed the involvement of South Africa as beneficial as it would ensure the inclusion of a “neutral” player and assist in it accessing economic markets (trade), others (including Tutsi’s) feared the imposition of democracy through principles of majority rule. Some actors questioned the “neutrality and even-handedness” and also accused SA of having a “Government-centric bias” (Landsberg, n.d).

De Rouen et al (2010, pp. 341, 343) argue that Burundi was a low capacity state where the state was unable to “sustain its autonomy over the society” and the numerous peace agreements signed in the period of 1989 to 2006 resulted in failure because intervening actors were “unable to supplement state capacity”. This observation is relevant in view of the fact that the research identifies that the Arusha agreement also relied heavily on external actors for its implementation.

The Great Lakes Region and the ICGLR
Ameir (2008, pp. 89-91) asserts that the conflict directly affected the security, economy and development of Tanzania. Tanzania’s participation in the peace process was therefore informed by humanitarian obligations, securing of national interests and the need to “preserve and continue with its influence in the sub-region”. During the term of Nyerere, the peace negotiations were personalised around his leadership (Ameir, 2008, p. 75; Oleynik, Alexander, & Cherepanya, 2005, p. 228). On his death in 1999, President Museveni of Uganda took over the peace process whilst the United Nations dispatched an envoy to identify a replacement. Museveni was later replaced by Mandela after the intervention of other UN member states (Oleynik, Alexander, & Cherepanya, 2005, p. 228).

Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, initially constituted the regional initiative founded on enhancing regional “political co-operation”

and solving regional “problems without the help of outsiders” (Oleynik, Alexander, & Cherepanya, 2005, pp. 229-230). Zambia and South Africa subsequently joined the regional initiative (Ameir, 2008, p. 78). The regional leaders viewed the peace process as territorial and argued that the Burundi peace challenges would be solved within that context hence their initial resistance to the appointment of Mandela (Oleynik, Alexander, & Cherepanya, 2005, p. 228). Ameir (2008, p. 84) notes that act of transferring talks to Pretoria further increased this resentment as they perceived it as a mode of usurping the regional role in the process and of South Africa attempting to penetrate the region.

The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), first established in 2004, includes regional countries of; Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. It is a creation of the AU and UN and is geared towards addressing challenges faced by countries affected by the conflict in the region (Murithi, 2005, p. 94). It is evident that the interests of the individual countries are also varied. Of note too is that it also includes countries found in other AU REC’s. The configuration of this institution could pose an overlap of not only country interests and influences but also those of other AU RECs.

Other actors
Envoys from the EU, USA, Canada, OAU, Sant’Egido and UN were involved in the Arusha 1 talks (Daley, 2007, p. 211). According to Daley (2007, p. 213), these actors sought to control the work of the thematic committees and the decision making processes of the mediators e.g. whilst Mandela had made an undertaking that draft agreements would not be amended, the contrary occurred after pressure from Belgium, which resulted in one of the protocols being amended. Daley (2007, p. 213) further notes that this occurred even though Burundi actors had refused to accept the suggested amendments and Mandela unilaterally proceeded and based his decision on the need to secure future Belgian funding for the country.
Contestation for influence by different actors is also considered by Daley’s illustration of how, after the 1996 second coup by President Buyoya, different actors expressed
different views. African countries rejected Buyoya whilst western countries, international NGO’s and the USA supported his resumption of presidency. The different interests and motives for involvement in the Burundi peace mission by the different parties confirms the findings of Zartman & Touval (2007, pp. 442-443) when noting that different actors use a cost and benefit analysis to determine their involvement in the peace process and also aspire to influence the outcome of the process. The cost and benefit of the actors included the advancement of their own foreign policy norms and agendas, protection and addressing of domestic pressures e.g. spill over effects of conflict, utilizing the mediation to domestically and internationally build political profiles and influences for individuals and their Governments. Zartman & Touval (2007) note that the balancing act also affects the primary actors in the conflict e.g. their interests in accepting the mediation and peace processes differ and includes acts of balancing results of continuing in the conflict, or being party to the conclusion of the conflict, and the possibility that the outcome of the process would benefit or disadvantage parties.

3.6 Conclusion

The root causes of the Burundi conflict were informed by factors of colonialism, weak institutions which resulted in horizontal inequalities and provided reasons for group motivation, and the fight for access to power by the two dominant ethnic groups. The agreement rightfully identifies the root causes. However its attendance to the issue of weak institutions was not sufficient and this weakness found itself in future peacebuilding institutions. The framing of the peace agreement also placed a heavy burden on the Burundi actors who lacked the capacity to act. This act ensured that implementation was dependent on external actors whose commitment was also dependent on their own national interests. The actors as illustrated were varied and found in different institutions and sometime even duplicating their presence in some e.g. ICGLR members are from different AU RECs and would therefore represent different interests and result in the formation of different coalitions
Apart from coalitions and their interests, the contents of the agreement also raised deficiencies of context, capacity and commitment on implementation of Burundi peacebuilding activities.
Chapter 4: Data presentation and interpretation
Chapter 4: Data Presentation and Interpretation

4.1 Introduction

The chapter presents and interprets data collected from eight respondents (Annexure 4). The list includes two security experts who are former employees of Government and were at some point directly involved in the Burundi peace process. One respondent represents civil society and the other five are Government officials. The interview questions provide insight into the primary and secondary research questions. To achieve this, the questions address issues related to the 5-C protocols (content, context, capacity, commitment, client and other coalition support or non-support). Through interviews, respondents provide insight into their understanding of the peace building policy, its requirements, institutions, objectives and links between addressing of root causes and activities, direct and indirect influences affecting implementation and possible institutional reforms.

The 5-C protocol, introduced by Brynard & de Coning (2006), is used to interpret the data. The authors indicate the inter-connectivity of variables of clients and coalitions, capacity, context, commitment and content. In some instances the interconnectivity results in some data being scrutinized through one or more aspects of the 5-C protocols.

4.2 Data Presentation

4.2.1 SA Burundi Agreements

On 16 September 2007, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, N.C. Zuma, signed a general cooperation agreement with Burundi. Article 1 of the agreement lists areas of sectorial cooperation in the fields of education, science, health, agriculture, information and communication, construction, financial services, trade and investment. Five national departments gave effect to the 2007 agreement. The Department of Health concluded
its agreement on 16 September 2008 whilst Departments of Higher Education, Agriculture, Sports and Recreation, Trade and Industry signed on 11 August 2011. The list of agreements signed between RSA and Burundi in pursuance of the general cooperation agreement is attached as annexure 1.

Randomly chosen state actors not identified within the eight respondents of the study i.e. Rural Development and Land Reform, Communications, Justice and Constitutional Development and the Human Rights Commission had no MOUs with Burundi. The institutions indicated that they had also not provided direct assistance to Burundi.

4.2.2 Root causes

Respondents were questioned on whether or not they interrogated root causes of conflict prior to engagement in peace missions. Respondents were also requested to identify the root causes of the Burundi 1993 conflict. The question aimed at gauging whether or not the respondents understood the link between national departments’ mandate and implementation of the policy and understood that, according to the policy, peace building activities should be aimed at addressing root causes and not symptoms of conflict.

Understanding the nature of root causes
Respondents 1, 2, 3 and 5 positively confirmed having officially interrogated the root causes of the conflict. Respondents 7 indicated that, although not having officially discussed the root causes, had instead given consideration to these. Respondents 4, 6 and 8 had not personally or officially interrogated the issue.

Respondent 1 states that "SA politicians involved in the peace process understood and addressed root causes" and “in Burundi this was supported by the role politicians played in the finalization of the Arusha agreement … which addressed concerns of ethnic minority and dominant majority through power sharing”. According to the respondent, “the agreement ensured that there was representativeness in all structures of Government including the armed forces”. Respondent 2 identifies that “politicians
engineered ethnicity tensions” and the “effect of ethnicity reflected itself in institutions and in all aspects of the society e.g. industry, army etc. hence coinage of the term Tutsi oligarchy. The conflict was rooted in Belgians empowering minority Tutsis and this led to their domination especially militarily”. Respondent 2 also states that “that exclusionary and unrepresentative politics informed the conflict and that the exclusionary policies were directed to ethnic and gender differentiation”. The Respondent further states that “the constitution of Burundi addresses question of root causes in terms of its demands of enshrining quotas”. According to the respondent, “the quota percentages were directed to ensuring inclusion of all instead of exclusion of some based on gender and ethnicity”.

Respondent 3 indicates that “most conflicts are informed by failure of those in power to meet the needs of people… which can be personal and for women these are usually not in their hands”. “Peace,” according to the respondent, “only exists if there is adequate development”. The respondent also asserts that “in Burundi ethnicity was an issue as it determined how people felt about themselves and their looks (Hutu and Tutsi)”. Lastly, the respondent indicates that “inadequate early warning systems failed to inform on the needs of the people”.

Respondent 5 states that “the ethnic conflict was initially informed by unfair distribution of resources between Hutu, Twa and Tutsis”. Secondly, the respondent states that the “French played a role that escalated the conflict” and lastly that “the regional conflict in Rwanda and DRC also contributed”.

Respondent 4 acknowledges “having not interrogated the issues” whilst respondent 6 states “lack of background information on the matter”. Respondent 8 states that “ARF does not concern itself with root causes of the conflict but instead focuses on requests of different departments”.

Respondent 7 indicates “gaining knowledge on the issue for personal development”. This respondent identifies that “colonialism sowed divisions among the different ethnic groups” and that “competition for scarce resources and unequal treatment and suppression of others led to ethnic tensions”.

4.2.3 SA’s motives and interests for participation in the Burundi peace process

The questions sought to understand South Africa’s motives and objectives for participation in the Burundi peace process and peace missions generally. It also sought to understand whether the respondents understood SA’s foreign policy and its links to the implementation of the policy. The respondents were also expected to provide an opinion assessing whether or not the objectives of SA foreign policy were achieved in the Burundi mission.

Respondents 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 provided feedback. Respondents 4 had no inputs. Respondent 4 states “lack of knowledge” and “having not paid attention to the question”. Respondent 1 indicates that SA peace missions are informed by considerations of “humanitarian, human rights and security issues”. Respondent 2 also states that “SA involvement was driven by its own foreign policy of wanting to ensure the creation of a better and secure world, a conscious decision to contribute in the negotiations of other countries and thereby assist them to settle problems in an amicable manner.”

Respondent 2 also identifies that SA participated because “it wanted to ensure stability in Africa which would result in the reduction of refugees and immigrants influx”, “expansion for economic and trade benefits” and the “presence of realisation that failed states in the north would have an adverse effect on the economy of SA”. In the Burundi mission respondent 2 states that there “was also awareness that deploying SA troops in the DRC could not succeed if there was a failed state in Burundi”.

Respondent 2 also indicates that SA intervened because of “requests from third parties”. According to the same respondent, the requests were from “President Nyerere, President Salim Ahmed Salim Salim and Hutu political leaders who had always said there was a form of apartheid dimension in their society and therefore wanted to learn from SA experiences”. Respondent 2 denies that “SA intervened for economic inroads and political influence (stature) into the Great Lakes” and states that “it was never a consideration. Economic inroads only became a factor when the Burundi Government and other countries in that region requested to forge economic ties with SA”. 
Respondent 3 states that “participation is informed by SA philosophy of taking care of its neighbours”. Respondent 5 also “dismisses the notion that SA wanted to use Burundi to gain international stature” and states that “SA did not need Burundi for that because it had already established its own stature through resolving its own problems without external intervention”. Respondent 5 states that “SA entered the fray because of requests from Burundi and not for political and economic reasons as the country is poor and does not have much to offer RSA”. Respondent 5 identifies the “humanitarian angle aimed at protecting returnees” and “troops were sent to provide VIP training, provide VIP support to politicians and protect the assets of RSA”. Respondent 6 states that “DIRCO is guided by Ubuntu principles”.

Respondent 7 states that “President Mbeki was the pioneer of a secure Africa and the African Renaissance and NEPAD programs were identified as important for driving peace in Africa. Secondly, during that period there was a morality and leadership gap in the continent and Burundi provided an opportunity for SA to make its mark in international relations”. Respondent 7 also comments that “there was an understanding that peace in the continent could curb the influx of migrants to SA” and lastly that “participation was informed by requests of other countries”.

4.2.4 Activities

The questions determined activities undertaken by different SA actors in Burundi. The questions also established whether the activities targeted the root causes and motives of intervention.

Respondents 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, provided inputs on the questions. Respondent 6, 8 could not provide inputs. Respondent 7 based information on knowledge gained on SA post conflict activities in the region. The three 6, 7 and 8 can be identified as having no direct knowledge about the question.

Respondent 6 indicates an “inability to answer the question due to lack of information”. Respondent 7 indicates a “lack of knowledge on any Burundi activities involving educational matters” but notes “that the department had facilitated training courses in
SA for other citizens of the Great Lakes region”. Respondent 8 indicates that “according to personal knowledge, ARF did not fund any peacebuilding activities in Burundi”. Respondent 1 observes that in “civilian peacebuilding, PALAMA played a major role in the training of Burundi civil servants”. The respondent (1) notes that “projects and activities of other departments could not continue because SA’s presence in Burundi became unpopular after SA’s insistence on the inclusion of Paliphetu-FNL led by Agathon Rwasa movement in the peace agreement”. According to the respondent, “South African departments were then faced with a hostile environment”. Respondent 2 indicates that “ACCORD assisted the Burundi Government and provided training on land issues, evaluation mechanisms to monitor ethnic and gender issues and PALAMA had projects for training civil servants”. Respondent 3 states that “Government, parastatals [state owned entities] and private sector funded SAWID programs directed towards gender issues of Burundi. The program involved engagement of women through dialogue to share experiences and skills”. Respondent 5 identifies that “ACCORD’s projects were designed to train on negotiation and reconciliation skills so parties could address issues of conflict”. The respondent (5) indicates that “SAWID’s projects assisted in social cohesion and reduction [of] poverty issues”. Respondent 4 states that “in 2008 [a third country] through its reconstruction capacity development program entered into a trilateral agreement with SA for a period of five years where SA would act as an implementing partner and train civil servants of Rwanda, Burundi and Sudan. Outputs of the capacity development program focus on promotion of service delivery and are informed by AU and NEPAD obligations”. Respondent 5 notes that “whilst DIRCO was not directly involved in projects it initiated a study where different departments determined areas of possible assistance i.e. research on how different departments could assist and these involved University of South Africa, African Development Bank, Transnet, and Agriculture. Reports were consequently compiled for principals although there was no action thereafter”. Respondent 1, 2 5 provided insight on this. Respondent 1 cites reasons of how SA became “unpopular”, respondent 2 states that “the SA mission was neglected for a long time” and respondent 5 observes that “South African Government tends to tackle
symptoms and not root causes of conflicts and DIRCO is not structurally geared towards addressing root causes”.

4.2.5 Policy knowledge

The section assesses knowledge and understanding of the policy by implementers. The questions on the resource bank below were used to assess understanding on internal and external issues that could affect successful implementation and also provide insight on the content of the policy. Respondents 1, 2 and 6 indicate having read the policy whilst 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 stated otherwise. On their understanding of the policy, respondent 1 states that “when the white paper was drafted SA lacked experience in peace keeping and consequently there is no coherence between structure and objectives. It therefore has institutional design flaws and focuses on mandate issues instead of practicalities e.g. there is poor institutional coordination during peace missions”. The respondent added that a “review of the policy is long overdue as it needs to be operationalized in its design to address structural weaknesses”.

Respondent 2 indicates that “the white paper informs on the mandate of different departments involved in peace mission”. Respondent 6 adds that “the policy is sufficient and challenges are within DIRCO and its capacity to implement”. Respondent 6 further states that the “white paper is a good guiding document as it provides clarity on issues of mandate, procedures and protects functionaries and those deployed”. The respondent 6 concludes by stating that “the policy is a very important instrument that informs on who does what, when and how and that problems of implementation are not linked to the content of the policy”.
Resource Bank provision

All respondents 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 indicated a lack of knowledge on the provision of the resource bank. Despite their lack of knowledge on the provision, respondents 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 expressed their views on the matter. Respondent 1 states that the provision “was similar to the outlook of SADC and the AU” and that “implementation would be impractical”. To support these assertions, respondent 1 cites the following; “post conflict projects require specific experts and NGOs usually have those capabilities hence NGOs are usually hired as implementing partners; persons in the data (especially civil servants) usually lack an understanding of UN rules and procedures especially those related to procurement and therefore whilst competent in the requirement of the national countries may lack such competency in inter-Governmental organizations. Due to this, adverts for recruiting members into peace missions are usually placed in the public domain”. The respondent provides an example noting that “even the AU failed to implement and use its data base and resorted to placement adverts for the recent 2013 Mali mission (MINUSMA)”. The respondent also clarifies the issue that “competency should be considered at different levels e.g. financial experts might lack language requirements of peace missions therefore an accountant from SA might not possess Arabic or French needed for a specific mission”. Lastly, the respondent (1) notes that “whilst persons may be in the data base they may lack willingness to deploy during certain periods”. Respondent 1 suggests that “South Africa should build experience and find mechanisms of teaching people to get employment at inter-Governmental organisations from lower ladders so as to gain experience and understanding of the operational issues of those systems”.

Respondent 3 “supports the approach as a good network system”. Respondent 4 states that “the department had not utilised the resource bank mechanisms and had instead employed persons on the ground for project implementation”. On being questioned why they opted for this approach, respondent 4 indicates the following challenges with regard to employing South Africans to run the projects; “SA’s lack of understanding of local dynamics in countries being assisted, the need for dedicated persons on the ground who could manage the project locally instead of distant management, language
proficiency shortcomings of South African personnel and the need for buy-in by local players to the program which could be better attained by people familiar with the terrain”.

Respondent 5 states that “the DIRCO placement of people in peace missions is ad hoc process”. Respondent 6 states that, “having a list of names would be problematic as funding and availability of trained personnel would not be guaranteed”.

4.2.6 Institutions

The questions focused on peacebuilding institutions at national and international level and their influence on implementation of the policy. The questions sought to understand whether or not respondents understood the link between national and international institutions involved in peace building.

4.2.6.1 National institutions

NOCPM

Respondent 3, 4 and 7 indicated their lack of knowledge of the NOCPM and its functions.

Respondents 1, 2, 5 and 6 provided observations on the weaknesses confronting the NOCPM. Respondent 1 states that the “NOCPM has been dysfunctional for many years as it fails to execute its primary function of acting as nodal point in the coordination of departmental peace mission activities.” The same respondent identifies various reasons to support the assertion; “it is not the first point of entry for requests and Government departmental plans for peace missions e.g. defence in the past received direct instructions from the presidency to act on certain missions, it lacks assessment and analysis capacity and cannot provide principals with different options, it plays the role of a postal box and acts as a conduit of information between DIRCO and other departments, it lacks the capacity to coordinate activities between departments, meetings are an information sharing session. Due to its structural design it has poor decision making capacity e.g. departmental representatives are at low levels (Lt Colonel, Deputy Directors etc.) who consequently listen and report to their superiors,
and secondly, the unit is headed by a director not regarded as a serious decision maker in peace mission issues”. The respondent (1) finally notes that “the structure is more informed by politics and lacks leadership and direction”\(^{18}\).

Respondent 2 states that “the NOCPM looks good on research but has operationally failed due to certain constraints i.e. coordination is negatively affected by its level of authority and mandate therefore decisions are taken at higher and different levels without engagement with the NOCPM”. According to the respondent “these issues create disjuncture in the NOCPM”.

Respondent 5 notes that “power relations and dynamics of higher authorities determine issues and therefore the NOCPM ends playing a facilitating role”. Respondent 6 indicates that the “NOCPM advises and coordinates activities but cannot decide on actions of departments e.g. drafting and contents of MOUs”.

**Funding and ARF**

Respondents 3, 4, 5, 6 7 and 8 commented on the funding of peace missions.

Respondent 3 indicates that “funding from ARF may suffer as party and Government politics affect relationships of Government and civil society e.g. after President Mbeki lost leadership of the ruling party SAWID’s plans of developing early warning systems were terminated in 2008”. Secondly, the respondent (3) states that “Treasury is not geared towards addressing issues of development and poverty. Instead it focuses on figures and balancing of books at the expense of human issues”. The respondent (3) suggests that “the involvement of civil society in the work of Treasury could remedy the challenge”.

Respondent 4 notes that “since timelines and accounting systems differ between countries e.g. budget cycle there is a constant challenge of compliance as some recipient countries lack understanding of SA rigid systems established by the Treasury Department”.

Respondent 5 states that the “financial accounting systems of ARF are not practical in some post conflict settings e.g. Burundi was a cash economy after the conflict and, although funds were available for projects, there were no internal structures in Burundi that could receive the money. SA Government could not therefore transfer money as
Treasury and the Public Finance and Management Act (1 of 1999) (PFMA) requirements could not be satisfied. SA policies were therefore not aligned to the practicalities on the ground”.

Respondent 6 states that “ARF concerns itself with practical implementation of projects. On presentation of project proposals, ARF demands detailed answers on the achievement of outcomes at different levels of the project”. The respondent also states that “the ARF panel has stringent requirements and hold their ground when approving funding and demand a high level of monitoring expenditure”.

Respondent 7 observes that “DIRCO dictates programs for departments to implement and fails to commit funds for those programs. DIRCO programs are therefore not aligned to departmental programs and plans”. According to the respondent, “the arrangement results in planning without budgets, and on numerous occasions, departments have had to source funding from third parties (trilateral arrangements)”. The respondent also notes that “ARF has its own demands on departments and implementation of projects therefore securing funds from that source is a drawn out process”.

Respondent 8 indicates that “the current mandate of the ARF is implementable and there are adequate systems for implementation of mandate”. According to the respondent “ARF has never rejected projects because of lack of funds instead rejection has been mainly attributed to non-compliance with requirements of ARF”. The respondent indicates that “ARF maintains a data base used to monitor, evaluate and track progress of programs until finalisation. ARF focuses on compliance to RSA systems of accountability as enshrined in the PFMA and supply management prescripts”. The respondent further states that “the relevant desk has oversight on the implementation of the project” and that “ARF requires that budget allocation must talk to project implementation”. 

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4.2.6.2 International institutions

Respondent 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 acknowledged a lack of understanding of UN and AU peacebuilding institutions. Respondent 1, 2 and 5 had practical experience in these institutions and provided the following observations.

**UNPBC**

Respondent 1 notes challenges of the PBC and states that “funds and projects are aimed at ensuring the entrenchment of democracy and therefore do not have a holistic approach, the PBC fails to create synergy among actors since different actors pursue their own agenda at the exclusion of the PBC e.g. activities of bilateral arrangements do not align themselves to the agenda of the PBC and the PBC works with regional organizations instead of individual countries”.

According to respondent 2 “the main weakness of peacebuilding is found within the PBC and its lack of resources”. The respondent (2) also states that “this weakness is informed by decisions initially taken at its inception that the PBC would use its existing resources (which were absent) and that the PBC would be financed through voluntary contributions”. Respondent 2 asserts that this “led to uncertainty because individual actors were funding projects on the ground and yet also expected to fund projects through the PBC”. In addition to issues of resources respondent 2 indicates that “the UNSC’s insistence of its inclusion in the PBC became problematic in practice because it establishes an obligation on the PBC to have two lines of reporting on peacebuilding matters e.g. BINUB continues to report to the DPKO as if it is part of that structure”.

Respondent 5 indicates that “internationally the PBC is part of the ICGLR and this is problematic since the ICGLR has expanded its mandate to such an extent that it no longer focuses on traditional peace and security issues after conflict. There is now a lack of direction as their agenda now includes social issues e.g. HIV, poverty, and humanitarian issues”. The respondent (5) also notes that “another problem is that security issues of the Great Lakes cannot be divorced therefore any credible peacebuilding strategy must simultaneously address issues of the DRC, Burundi and
Rwanda”. Respondent 2 also finds the need for better coordination between ICGLR and East African Community and states that “if these are coordinated and streamlined it could ensure a better Burundi. Burundi has to be better integrated into the East African Community and they must be treated as equal partners”.

**AU and SADC**
Respondent 1 addresses issues of SADC and the AU and states that the “SADC REC has limited knowledge and capacity for involvement in peacebuilding activities” and also notes that “the REC’s lack of funding also affects implementation of policies”.

**Donors and their interests**
Respondents 2, 4, 5 and 6 commented on the issue of how donors affect implementation of peacebuilding activities.
Respondent 2 identifies “challenges confronting implementation of the Arusha agreement e.g. amnesty provisions are found in the ARUSHA agreement yet UN structures demand that the UN tribunal should be used to determine issues of immunity”. This respondent (2) states that “this is the opposite of the will of the Burundi people and as a result the TRC process has been delayed”. Respondent 2 also identifies a challenge of “Burundi and donor collusion with insistence that new negotiations should be held for those initially excluded from the 2000 Arusha agreement”.
Respondent 4 observes that “at the UN different states have different interests and in order to advance their interests major powers bully smaller states and therefore major external powers direct programs to suit their own interests”. Respondent 6 notes that “the influence of external third forces might be strong and play a bigger detrimental role in the goal of achieving peace in post conflict societies”.
Respondent 5 notes that “the UN system is not result orientated since their HQ produces numerous resolutions that have no effect on the ground and in the UN field and its agencies hold various coordinating meetings instead of implementing their mandates”.
4.2.7 Other issues

Unsustainability of projects
Respondents 4, 5, and 7 indicated a donor dependency relationship exhibited by some recipient countries. Respondent 4 indicates that recipients “lack initiatives and tend to develop a dependency syndrome. Instead of independently managing projects they constantly seek guidance and funding”. Respondent 5 states that “although there is political will to peacebuilding there is no support to sustain it” and indicates that to “most countries seem to be focused on receiving funding than in initiating their own projects and SA should adopt an approach that teaches them how to fish”. Respondent 6 observes “the commitment of implementer’s is not questionable”. Respondent 7 notes that “SA mainly focuses on security sector issues in conflict management and other departments enter the fray at later stages”. Respondent 7 also observes that “institutions created by SA crumble after departure of SA implementers as there is lack of political will and lack of ownership on the part of receiving countries”. Respondent 8 states that “SA (Government and desks) cannot shoulder the blame for failure of projects in those countries as the beneficiaries should manage their own projects”.

Communication
Respondent 2, 3, and 4 made observations on communication challenges. Respondent 4 notes that receiving countries have “poor infrastructure e.g. the lack of reliable internet, in post conflict countries render communication and project management difficult”. Respondent 2 identifies the “need for Government to have outreach programs and educate people about its policies including peace missions”. The respondent (2) also notes that “due to weak Government communication systems other actors occupy the gap for their own interests”. Respondent 3 notes that “Government systems do not have structures that coordinate and transmit policies consequently there is no knowledge of the peace mission policy”.

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Control systems and corruption

Respondent 7 and 8 indicated challenges related to lack of controls and corruption in societies emerging from conflict. Respondent 7 provides general observations on peacebuilding activities in different countries and states that “certain events demotivate SA officials”. The respondent provides examples of “disappearance of donated equipment, scholarships provided for the general population were allocated to associates of those in power and recipients brought to study in SA would neglect their academic obligations and on arrival, those that completed studies relocated to third countries instead of benefitting countries of origin”. Respondent 8 notes the “existence of practises alien to SA officials. This includes beneficiaries requesting permission to divert funds and use them for unbudgeted items and projects” and that “ARF systems prevent unlawful diversion of funds”.

Capacity and coordination

Respondents 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 identified challenges of capacity and coordination at different levels. Respondent 1 indicates a “general presence of poor coordination in SA institutions during peace missions”. Respondent 2 states that “the main weakness is DIRCO, its desks and its missions”. Respondent 3 also notes that “there is lack of coordination in peacebuilding activities”. Respondent 4 notes that “DIRCO fails to coordinate training outputs of different departments”. Respondent 6 negates the notion of lack of coordination and states that “there is coordination as the NOCPM holds regular meetings to consult and share information on issues” and further notes that “these meetings are important for understanding challenges”.

Respondent 3 indicates that “Government has no department responsible for pooling of information and a central place for storage of information. Consequently it is difficult to find nodal points”. Respondent 4 states that the “lack of coordination is indicated by the fact that there is no central data base at DIRCO which records efforts of different departments”. On being questioned about this challenge, respondent 6 indicates that
“there is no lack of the information as DIRCO compiles country reports which are found in DIRCO archives”.

At a regional level, respondent 2 observes that “better coordination of ICGLR and East African Community could ensure a better Burundi” and that “Burundi needs to be integrated into the East African community and also be treated as equal partners”. Respondent 5 notes a “lack of coordination between different actors involved in peace missions”.

Respondent 2 states that the “capacity of DIRCO is limited and given this adherence to commitment is always going to be a challenge” and points out that “SA should rethink how it addresses issues of too many commitments in different forums as this places a strain on implementation”. Respondent 5, in addition, states that “DIRCO seems to be doing a lot of things at once and then loses focus on some projects”.

Respondent 2 notes “disjuncture and lack of coordination of agreements due to the absence of program coordination, un-streamlined activities and over stretched capacity of DIRCO functionaries since they have to implement a wide range of agreements”. The respondent (2) suggests that “DIRCO should operate on a project management basis”.

Respondent 4 states that “DIRCO has not structured itself to evaluate and monitor projects and different MOUs”. Respondent 5 indicates that “there is no follow up on designed projects as there is no proper planning … projects and activities are taken on ad hoc basis”.

**Political context**

Respondent 2 indicates that “structures in Burundi cannot implement policies due to the high turnover of political heads which affect continuity” and that “in Burundi SA failed to reap the benefits of its investment due to political changes within SA Government, lack of structured consistency and engagement, and neglect of adequately staffing missions”.

Respondent 3 indicates “numerous problems between Government and civil society which culminated in the termination of peacebuilding activities in Burundi. The first relates to ARF and Government politics, e.g. the partnership between DFA and SAWID fell apart when champions of SAWID within the DFA were deployed on external
postings and post 2009, new political actors and other civil society groups entered the space previously occupied by SAWID”.

Respondent 6 notes that the “breaking of political links has an impact on continuity of projects on the ground”. Respondent 7 indicates that “the reconfiguration of Government departments in 2009 affected existing programs. Resources of old departments had to be shared with new departments and in that process some programs of action were left unattended”.

Respondent 3 notes that “civil servants exit with their knowledge and departments lack systems of recording that knowledge”. Respondent 6 attributes the “lack of continuity in DIRCO projects to the dynamic nature of the organisation as there is high personnel rotation in different directorates thus affecting institutional memory of different internal structures”.

**Decision making**

Respondent 3, 4, 5, 6 pointed out that policy issues are controlled by the top structure of Government.

Respondent 3 indicates that “the lessons learnt over the years include the observation that political patronage determine activities undertaken and affect funding of projects. Secondly political personalities play a crucial role in the execution of activities since elected officials are powerful and there is no filtering of their exercise of their discretionary powers”.

Respondent 4 indicates that “the management and direction in policy administration is top down as departments act on agreements signed by the executive (presidency and relevant minister). The function of the department is to implement decisions reached by the executive”. When questioned about whether this system was the best and if the recipient country’s motives for requesting certain projects were not questioned the respondent 4 states that “departmental functionaries concern themselves with issues of legality at international and national level. The request must be acceptable at UN, UN or SADC levels and the function must fall within the mandate of the implementing department”. The respondent states that “officials cannot influence the choice of activities in peacebuilding as requirements are from top down”.

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Respondent 6 indicates that “ownership of the process by lower levels of the bureaucracy is limited”. Respondent 7 notes that “the top down implementation model has an emphasis on supporting peace through security sector measures instead of involving civilian departments” and that “officials are confined in their work as perimeters are outlined by their scope of work. Officials in the different sectors are not expected to consider issues of root causes nor are they allowed to place concerns of root causes into the mandate of the department. In reality officials only work towards what is delegated to them by the executive”.

Respondent 5 further indicates that “the executive ignores advice from officials and continue with their own projects and programs of action and this tendency leads to policy failure”. Respondent 6 notes that “the problem may lie with principals relying on numerous consultants and therefore having difficulty in sifting through different messages received”.


4.3 **Data interpretation on 5-C protocol**

4.3.1 Introduction
The 5-C protocol is used to analyse data collected. The 5-C protocols entail variables of; clients and coalitions, capacity, context, commitment and content (Brynard & de Coning, 2006) and discussed in detail in chapter one.

4.3.2 Discussion

4.3.2.1 Clients and coalitions

Chapter two’s discussion on peacebuilding institutions identified how Kumar (2001) and Cousens (2001) advise policymakers to map and analyse actors involved in peace missions. According to the authors, the exercise reveals true motives for participation in peace initiatives and therefore assists in identification of possible coalition partners, an issue regarded as beneficial by the policy. Brynard & de Coning (2006, p. 203) also support this outlook and urge implementers to “identify key relevant stakeholders” who would “support a particular implementation process”.

Brown (2007, p. 40) in chapter one also argued that, in the security field, effective policymakers must adopt a strategy of engaging other international actors, a fact also advocated by the policy which provides that South Africa cannot, in third countries, secure peace on its own and adopts the stance of collaboration with “coalition of the willing” (1999, p. 19).

In addition, Spillane et al (2002) in chapter one, also brought attention to the fact that implementation requires cooperation between agent and principal as the principal (decision makers) requires assistance of the agent to ensure the carrying out of the decision.

The above literature informs the research of the importance of collaboration between actors in implementation of the policy and therefore the need to map and identify coalition actors. It is further argued that the exercise provides policymakers with a risk
assessment tool that would enable SA to determine actors that would impede or facilitate implementation of the policy.

The data collected suggests, however, that SA executive policy makers and bureaucrats do not sufficiently engage, map, and analyse key actors found at different levels of implementation (Government, recipient country and international institutions). Secondly, it’s observed that SA bureaucrats play a minimal role in decision making processes that inform the identification of possible coalition partners. Thirdly the advice of Spillane et al (2002) seems to be overlooked as the principal and agents (executive and bureaucrats) fail to realise their connectivity in implementation. The data also indicates that in Burundi, SA neglected to utilise its pivotal role of facilitator to mobilise and strategically co-opt other external and civil society actors to support its peacebuilding activities. Supporting data for these observations is discussed below.

Executive

The DIRCO executive failed to co-opt and ensure that other national departments timeously implemented DIRCO commitments undertaken in the 2007 general cooperation agreement. Some sectors have still (2013) not signed any sectorial agreements. One department signed in 2008 and five others in 2011. The omission or delay in signing suggests one of the following possible explanations; the different departments either did not view themselves as DIRCO implementation partners, or that DIRCO committed them to programs that did not fall within their own departmental planning, or that the departments lacked the capacity to ensure implementation of DIRCO’s commitments.

Respondents 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 provided a range of different motives for SA intervention in Burundi. The motives listed varied from economic, political and even moral considerations, whilst respondent 4 did not consider it necessary to pay attention to the question. Apart from respondent 2, 5, 7, the other respondents related their opinions on the general SA foreign relations policies. The responses indicate DIRCO’s lapse in communication i.e. did not sufficiently communicate and bring on board implementers to the specific motive for that peacebuilding mission.
Respondent 7 observed that the executive viewed SA civilian activities as secondary and not the priority for peace missions and that the security sector was identified by the executive as being the primary one. The statement could provide insight on how DIRCO and the executive neglected to ensure “buy” in from SA civilian actors.

**Bureaucrats**

Respondents 4, 6, 7, 8 professed not having officially interrogated the root causes of the conflict as they viewed this exercise as not being part of their mandate. This is despite their mandate to implement a policy that requires attendance to root causes of the conflict, as opposed to symptoms. Respondents 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 provide insight on how they viewed the relationship between bureaucrats and the executive observing that the former possessed limited decision making influence on implementation of the policy.

**SA actors outside government**

The ability of SA departmental actors to form coalitions with other SA actors outside Government also posed challenges. Respondents 2, 3, 6 observed how the introduction of new SA executive members of Government affected the direction and support of existing DIRCO peacebuilding activities as new political entrants identified new coalition partners and terminated contact with previous ones. It is therefore observed that choices of coalition partners, outside Government, are not necessarily informed through analysis and mapping of common interests but through personal preferences of the executive.

**Barundi actors**

SA and Barundi actors’ relationships also exhibit signs of lack of communication and expectations on end state objectives for SA’s intervention. SA activities identified by respondents seemed to be limited and confined to coalitions between the two Governments and excluded sustained participation between SA Government sponsored actors (SAWID and ACCORD) and local civil society actors. There is also no indication
of any direct engagement between SA government actors and Burundi civil society actors.

Respondents of 4, 5, 7 indicated a donor dependency relationship exhibited by some recipient countries, with respondent 7 observing that “institutions created by SA crumble after departure of SA implementers as there is lack of political will, commitment and buy in on the part of receiving countries”. Respondent 8 however stated that “SA cannot shoulder the blame for failure of projects in those countries as the beneficiaries should manage their own projects”. The responses above reflect the possibility of different understandings by different actors on the end state objectives of activities, lack of sustainability on SA’s approach to its activities and lack of support on SA activities by other actors.

*International institutions*

Apart from respondents 1, 2, 5, SA actors seemed to lack knowledge of peacebuilding institutions found at the international level. The other respondents could not draw a link between their mandate, implementation of the policy, international peacebuilding institutions and engagement of actors beyond their sector. Data illustrating this is informed by the fact that respondents 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, including two from DIRCO structures, indicated lack of knowledge on the functions and roles of multilateral peacebuilding institutions. It is suggested that this lack of awareness would therefore prevent implementers from understanding and identifying threats and opportunities to implementation. The actors would therefore be unable to systematically identify “coalition of the willing” actors found in international institutions e.g. UN, AU, SADC and ICGLR.

Despite the general oversight on mapping of actors in peace missions, respondents 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 understand that actors pursue their own national interests in conducting international affairs and invariably in peacebuilding activities.

In conclusion, from the data, it is observed that SA actors do not sufficiently engage in the process of identifying the coalition of the willing as envisaged by the policy and this weakness is found at all levels.
4.3.2.2 Capacity

Brynard & de Coning relate the capacity variable to Government’s ability to “have the requisite administrative and other abilities to do the job” (2006, p. 199). Capacity is viewed as ranging from “availability of and access to concrete or tangible resources (human financial, technology, logistical, etc.) … [to] … intangible requirements of leadership, motivation, commitment, willingness, courage, endurance…” (Brynard & de Coning, 2006, p. 199).

The data collected reveals capacity challenges found on issues of leadership, knowledge and coordination. The mapping and forming coalitions with other actors, discussed above, is an illustration of capacity weakness since it reveals issues of weak leadership, ability and motivation from the executive.

The data collected also suggests high levels of lack of knowledge on the policy and its content among implementers at the bureaucratic and street levels. It is observed that this lack of knowledge mainly informs this variable of implementation. Support for this is gained from the following data.

Only three respondents 1, 2, 6 of which two were non-Governmental security experts, had read the policy whilst 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 had not. It is argued that this lack of knowledge affected the capacity of implementers as they were expected to implement a policy which they had no knowledge of. Further, the lack of policy knowledge could have led to bureaucrats’ failure in linking issues of mandate, activities and requirements of the policy. The following is support for this observation.

Respondents 4, 6, 7, and 8 indicated not having officially interrogated the root causes of the conflict and viewed this exercise as not being part of their mandate. Respondents 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 professed to have (officially and unofficially) interrogated the root causes, but their responses indicated general observations on the root causes of the Burundi conflict and not the trigger for the 1994 conflict. The Burundi conflict occurred over various time frames and intervals. Levy (2007, p. 20) was noted in chapter three for advising policy makers to contextualise and explore why conflict occurred at a particular period. The lack of appreciation of identifying specifics of cycles of violence could be viewed as a lack of understanding of the requirements of the policy and general
peacebuilding thinking, i.e. the need to address root causes of conflict instead of symptoms and the need to identify causes of conflict in each particular cycle of violence. It is further argued that this weakness could result in SA failure to draw “distinction between parochial motivations that galvanize … conflicts and the ethnic consequences that follow” as previously identified by Brown (2007, p. 47) and others in chapter two. Lack of knowledge of the policy could also negatively affect the prioritization and identification of SA activities as actors could not have had the capacity to direct their activities to the 1994 cycle of violence but to the general root causes of the Burundi conflict.

Of concern was the fact that after identification of the general root causes of the conflict, only respondent 5 referred to the Twa dimension and respondents 2, 3 included the gender dimension in the exclusionary politics of Burundi. This is despite the inclusion of these two categories in the Arusha agreement. It is suggested that the omission or oversight of respondents to identify these matters indicates a further lack of appreciation on how other peacebuilding tools (Arusha agreement, Strategic Framework and Priority Plan) should inform the choice and prioritisation of activities by intervening actors.

Lack of knowledge also manifested itself on other questions relating to, inter alia, specific provisions of the policy, SA motives and interests in intervention, domestic and international peacebuilding institutions and finally on peacebuilding activities adopted by other SA actors. These are discussed in the variables of content, context and commitment.

In addition data suggests that SA actors’ lack of knowledge on the policy led to SA’s failure to undertake risk assessment, beyond that identified in the clients and coalition variable. Responses indicate that SA planning neglected to fully appreciate and consider characteristics of post conflict societies. As previously discussed in chapter one, Ball (1996) cautions intervening actors to consider these when undertaking peacebuilding activities and provides insight on the existence of weak public institutions, the economy and poor infrastructure. SA actors seem not have fully appreciated these in their planning and implementation of the policy. The observation is supported by data from respondents 4, 5 who indicated that implementation by SA actors was hampered by lack of technological infrastructure (internet, banking systems) and human capacity
to implement on the part of recipient countries. According to the respondents these affected timelines and funding of projects. The responses indicate SA accounting systems as not being in sync with challenges facing post conflict societies and suggest the need for SA actors to plan around issues mentioned in Ball’s characteristics and realities of each individual post conflict society.

Apart from the knowledge dimension, challenges of capacity are further identified at the practical level of coordination within SA institutions. Respondent 6 observes that “challenges are within DIRCO and its capacity to implement”. Respondents 2, 4 suggested that DIRCO lacked capacity to track and generally monitor its obligations. Respondent 2 advised on the need for the RIRCO to adopt a project management approach in its planning and execution of its programmes and obligations. Respondents also generally observed disjuncture between commitments and execution by DIRCO missions, internal structures (NOCPM, ARF) and desks. The following supports the statement.

Respondents 1, 2, 4, 6 further observed that NOCPM weaknesses relate to issues of structure, capacity, leadership, analysis, coordination, decision making, authority level and power relations. Respondent 1 summarised the capacity challenges of the NOCPM and referred to it as a “postal box” that acted as a “conduit” for information between DIRCO and other actors. The NOCPM was portrayed as an institution unable to carry out its primary mandate of coordinating peace mission activities. Evidence from this was illustrated by participants of ARF and NOCPM. The ARF respondent indicated lack of knowledge on peacebuilding activities executed outside ARF and NOCPM respondent did not possess or have knowledge of activities directly undertaken by the SA Government. The responses affirmed observations of respondents 3, 4 who identified the need for DIRCO to maintain a central data base on Governmental peacebuilding activities. Despite this, respondent 6 dismissed the concern and referred to the existence of DIRCO archives. It is suggested that remarks of respondents 3, 4 are valid and the existence of such a data base would be informative for DIRCO structures (desks, missions and other structures) and other actors and could assist in the coordination of activities and knowledge management.
Respondents 1, 4 also identified an additional weakness of SA actors to operate within international domains. The weaknesses relate to practical issues of SA actors capacity to operate in international forums e.g. language barriers and lack understanding of UN systems. Apart from highlighting capacity limitations of SA actors to operate in some third countries, the responses also discuss factors that could limit SA’s ability to form coalitions on the ground, especially local actors.

It should be noted that the data collected suggests that SA does not lack funds for peacebuilding activities and, as respondent 8 remarked, “ARF has never rejected projects because of lack of funds instead rejection has been mainly attributed to non-compliance with requirements of ARF”. In view of these statements it would therefore seem that capacity issues of SA in peacebuilding are not informed by lack of funding but other considerations.

*Burundi and capacity*

Respondent 7, 8 also identified capacity deficits in recipient countries. These relate to issues of human capacity and systems capacity. However the discussion informs this variable on the need for SA actors to engage and assist recipient countries with capacity building activities in governance issues. It is evident that capacity building in governance issues would build capacity on accounting, transparency and reduction of corrupt activities and therefore ensure that donated materials and benefits are not misappropriated and that funding is used for budgeted items.

*International institutions and capacity*

International institutions also seem to suffer from capacity problems associated with financial and human resource and issues of mandate. Respondent 1, 2, 5 provide supporting evidence for this observation.

Respondent 1 highlighted lack of capacity within the UNPBC. The respondent identified lack of funding, proper direction to appropriate end state goals and lack of ability to create synergy among peacebuilding actors. Respondent 2 reiterated inputs of respondent 1, and suggested that the lack of resources was informed by the approach adopted at the inception of the UNPBC. In addition, respondent 1 raised similar
concerns on lack or resources and peacebuilding knowledge base found within AU and the SADC REC institution. The ICGLR was identified by respondent 2, 5 as lacking in its capacity to perform due to its expanded and open ended mandate, lack of coordination and lack of ability to systematically attend to issues confronting the region and Burundi. Observations of respondents 1, 2, 5 correspond and support writings of Jenkins (2008), Moolakkattu (2010) and other authors identified earlier, on challenges bedevilling international peacebuilding institutions. Apart from financial, human and coordinating challenges in international institutions, it is further observed that open mandates and numerous obligations stretch the capacity to perform and place more demands on other resources.

In conclusion it is evident from the research that SA peacebuilding activities are not affected by a lack of Government financial resources as ARF has adequate resources. It would appear that the main challenge is found within SA implementers at lower levels where actors lack capacity due to lack of knowledge and understanding of the policy, its requirements and their mandate. It is also evident that implementers at lower levels of SA departments view their responsibility in a sectorial manner and therefore fail to link their activities to national and international dynamics and institutions. SA systems and planning also appear not to consider the characteristics of post conflict societies. Lastly it is noted that capacity challenges are found not only within SA, but also at the different peacebuilding institutions.

4.3.2.3 Context

Context in implementation, according to Brynard & de Coning (2006), focuses on understanding of the institutions in which the policy operates and travels. The focus provides insight on issues of support or lack of support from clients and coalitions. In chapter one, Hay & Winscott (1998) also identified that studying institutions provides insight on relationships between structure, agency and action therefore reveals issues of power, authority and influences within which implementation policy travels.
Issues of power in this research were indicated earlier in chapter one as relating to “the ability to make people (or things) do what they would not otherwise have done” and denotes forms of “force, persuasion … coercion and manipulation” (McLean, 1996, p. 396). The power relations investigation is valuable in this variable as it reveals how coalitions, institutions, interests, and different actors impact on decision making processes, outcomes and output of the policy. The application of historical institutionalism assists the interpretation of data on revealing issues of conflict and process and how the uneven power relations affect the functions of different institutions (Leftwich, 2007; Hall & Taylor, 1996) e.g. executive and bureaucrats.

Lastly, as indicated in chapter one, the adoption of the elite theory in the research provides for the possibility of decision making being influenced by one actor “across different issue areas” (Lukes, 1993, pp. 51-52).

The data collected indicates an elitist approach in implementation of the policy and decision making in SA institutions. The elitist approach informs the adoption by SA institutions of the top down model of implementation, discussed by Paudel (2009) and illustrated in table 219 of the research. The data collected further reveals that this elitist, top down approach negatively affects policy outputs and finally minimum power levels of the SA executive actors at domestic and international peacebuilding institutions

**National institutions**

**Decision making**

Chapter two discussed how Malan & Kent (2003, p. 3) and Anderson (1997, p. 64) identified Presidents as instrumental in driving and influencing foreign policy agendas. As observed in that chapter this common practice, by most countries, directly positions the executive at the centre of implementation of foreign relations activities. The discussion on SA actors also revealed that DIRCO as the lead department, in conjunction with other departments, has to ensure execution of the policy.

The collected data reveals that SA decision making of the policy is concentrated in the executive and therefore suggests SA as being confined to the thinking of the first generation i.e. top down approach of policy implementation. It is further suggested that the approach and the perception of bureaucrats results in bureaucrats failing to
interrogate issues of linkages between activities, root causes and motives of intervention. These observations are informed by the following data.

Respondents 4, 5, 6, 7 view their role as ensuring that instructions of the executive are fulfilled and on their not having any leeway of influencing direction on activities and decisions on peacebuilding. According to respondent 7, civilian activities are viewed by the executive as secondary to security sector activities and results in civilian departments being roped in as an afterthought by the executive. Advice of bureaucrats on implementation of the policy is, according to respondent 5, treated lightly by the executive with no indication of what and who informs decision making of the executive and, according to the respondent, this contributes to policy failure.

SA’s ability to influence direction of PBC activities and its decision processes were unclear since most respondents lacked knowledge on that institution. It is however observed that the ability to coerce PBC actors in peacebuilding would be limited since SA does not play a direct role in the PBC (refer to diagram 2 above) and since the variable on coalition and clients identified SA’s weakness in mapping and formation of coalitions around implementation of the policy.

Retention of authorities

Respondents 2, 3, 6, 7 indicated that the exit of certain actors affected continuity in policy implementation. The critical actors identified were members of the executive and bureaucrats who left the system with institutional knowledge. The observations of the respondents indicate power as being endowed on individuals instead of governmental structures. Respondent 3 referred to this practise as political patronage in funding and decision making around peacebuilding activities.

Funding

Availability of funding for peacebuilding activities seemed to be an issue within some SA departments. Respondent 7 indicated the dilemma faced by other departments expected to implement DIRCO commitments and observed that departments end up planning for peace building activities without budgets. Inputs received from other respondents 3 4, 5, reveals that Government budget planning systems are not geared
towards funding of ad hoc peace mission projects as departments are expected to adhere to strict protocols of accounting and other requirements imposed by the Department of Finance and Treasury e.g. PFMA and budgeting cycle.

It is observed that the inflexibility of SA accounting and budgeting systems affects implementation of the policy. To address this dilemma DIRCO established ARF yet despite respondent 8 indicating sufficiency of funds within ARF, other respondents 3, 5 7 expressed frustration with sourcing that funding. Respondents 3, 5, 7 suggested that ARF accounting systems as being still heavily influenced by demands of Treasury instead of practicalities on the ground.

Respondents 6, 8 appreciated the ARF systems, alluding to their usefulness as a tool for project management and prevention of fraud. The arguments of these respondents illustrate the need to balance demands of monitoring projects and accountability in the funding of projects at sometimes short notice (falling outside the three year budgeting cycle of government) in countries lacking in resources and systems. The arguments of 6, 8 is further useful, especially when consideration is given to the source of the funds which includes external donors and SA taxpayers who all require DIRCO to account for use of ARF expenditure.

Respondent 4 provided insight into another avenue of funding projects i.e. trilateral agreements concluded between a SA national department, Burundi Government and funding country. The benefits of this route are two-fold. It enables SA to access funding without the rigorous procedures of ARF and to also enable departments to form coalitions with other third party actors. However, the route does not address the challenge of accounting and satisfying SA requirements e.g. timelines and systems. In addition, the receiving department also faces new challenges of adherence to donor conditions on reporting and accounting.
International institutions

Decision making

In chapter one, Richmond (2011) and Ottaway (2007), on discussing liberal peacebuilding and prioritisation of activities, cautioned against the imposition of priorities on receiving countries. According to the data, the warnings of these authors seem to elude some intervening actors at the international level. The UN and PBC are used to illustrate this aspect.

Respondent 2 suggested that, despite the Barundi people having expressed their preferences in the Arusha agreement in relation to the reconciliation path, UN actors placed demands informed by their own preferences. According to the respondent this practise has delayed implementation of key Arusha provisions. Respondent 1 also noted that the PBC, in its activities, seem to neglect paying particular regard to the context and characteristics of the receiving countries and instead focused on the priority of entrenching democracy.

Funding

Respondent 1 indicated that prioritisation of activities by intervening actors affected the funding of those activities consequently the PBC seems to focus on the “entrenchment of democracy” end state in its funding model. None of the respondents expressed a view on how funding dynamics of the AU and SADC impacted on SA and its choice of activities. It can however be observed that minimum levels of influence would be expected, in choice of activities for SA, since evidence including inputs from respondent 8 suggested SA as not facing issues of financial capacity and would therefore not request funding from these institutions.

Burundi

Ball (1996) identified four common characteristics of post conflict societies. As discussed in chapter one, these relate to; weak public and civil society institutions, outdated or weak economic and social infrastructure, highly securitised state and a society operating in a context of isolation. The variable on capacity further delved into
challenges faced by SA actors in implementation in the presence of institutional weaknesses of Burundi.

The challenges of Burundi were further exacerbated by the provision of the Arusha agreement which imposed certain obligations on the Government which were to be achieved through assistance of intervening actors. These relationships placed Burundi on the back-foot since even if its actors identified priorities of peacebuilding those could only be addressed if and when the external intervening actors provided the necessary resources.

In Burundi, as in most post conflict societies, the policy therefore travels in a terrain of weak institutions, that lack resources and most probably has powerless actors. These factors could therefore provide insight on the unsustainability of SA projects after departure of SA actors. The observation therefore calls on SA actors to ensure that their planning and choice of activities pays particular focus on development and resourcing of Burundi institutions and according to observations of respondent 5, 7 SA seems to fall short in this regard as it focuses on security activities more than civilian ones.

Retention of authorities

Similarly to SA, implementation of the policy seems to also suffer from the exit of members of the executive and respondent 2 provided insight by stating that “Burundi cannot implement policies due to the high turnover of political heads which affect continuity”.

In addition it would seem that the influence and power relations between SA and Burundi shifted in later years. Whilst SA was instrumental and a key actor during the Arusha process respondent 1 notes that in later years “projects and activities of other departments could not continue because SA’s presence in Burundi became unpopular after SA’s insistence on the inclusion of Paliphetu-FNL led by Agathon Rwasa movement in the peace agreement”. According to the respondent (1), “South African departments were then faced with a hostile environment”. Respondent 2 offered similar sentiments and suggested that at a certain point SA lost momentum in its Burundi peace mission.
In conclusion it would be noted that availability of resources plays a major role in influencing prioritisation of activities. The data suggests that intervening actors with resources use these as a tool to advance their interests and coerce or influence the direction of peacebuilding in recipient countries. In addition the data reveals that SA possesses limited influence on international peacebuilding institutions. Domestically it would also appear that whilst some actors (executive) possess the necessary authority their power is also limited and this results in limited outputs of the policy.

4.3.2.4 Commitment

Proponents of the bottom up model of implementation consider commitment as an important variable, noting that even the best policy, with an ideal bureaucratic structure fail “if those responsible for carrying it out are unwilling or unable to do so” (Brynard & de Coning, 2006, p. 198). In addition, Brynard & de Coning (2006) note the importance of investigations at different levels (regime, state, street and those in between) through which policy travels and that influences and linkages on commitment are informed by the other variables of the 5-C protocols.

In the event of countries being unable to form coalitions, Cousens (2001, p. 188) in chapter two, suggests that actors can advance their peacebuilding objectives by taking action “within their own systems of Government” i.e. bilateral arrangements. The data collected indicates varying levels of commitment by different actors in pursuing this option. The greatest fault lines contributing to this unwillingness and/or inability to implement are mainly linked to the other variables of context, capacity, clients and coalition. Commitment levels of different actors are discussed below.

Executive

The SA executive has, through the policy adopted, an approach of comprehensive peace missions. The policy aims to ensure the creation of durable peace in world affairs. According to the policy, engagement of security and civilian peacebuilding measures are essential for successful implementation. The data however, indicates that
the SA executive has largely neglected co-option of the civilian component and adoption of long term measures for ensuring durable peace in its peace missions. Instead its approach seems more biased towards short term security initiatives. The observation is informed by the following responses discussed below.

On the motives for SA participation, respondents 2, 5 identified requests of third parties as being focused on the amicable conclusion of hostilities. The respondents 2, 5 stated that the goal was achieved through the conclusion of the Arusha agreement, securing of returnees, protection of VIPs, and protection of SA (military) assets and provision of military training to the Burundi military forces. According to the two respondents, these were tangible outputs for measuring the success of SA’s participation in the peace mission. However, it is observed that the interpretation fails to consider SA commitment to long term approach of the peacebuilding policy. It casts a view of short term solutions of SA peace missions.

On the inclusion of civilians in peacebuilding activities, respondent 7 observed that civilian departments played a secondary role to the security sector. The observation of the respondent is supported by evidence gathered in terms of SA activities (indicated in the previous paragraph). However it should be noted that SA did also undertake some civilian peacebuilding activities and it is observed that these were insufficient and could not have contributed significantly to the creation of durable peace.

The data indicates that immediately after the peace talks, SA undertook activities directed at creating capacity building on evaluation of land, gender and ethnic issues, reconciliation and conflict management. However, responses also revealed that apart from the 2008 civil service capacity building project, others terminated during the infancy of the intervention. Secondly, respondent 5 indicated that DIRCO commissioned national departments to undertake research assessments in Burundi and that despite compilation of reports, the process terminated without implementation. Thirdly, respondent 7 observed that whilst DIRCO “dictates” to other departmental projects/programs on international relations, it neglects to allocate funding for those projects. Fourthly, the oversight by some executive members of other national departments to timeously conclude sectorial MOU’s after DIRCO’s commitment to the
general agreement of 2007, indicates lack of commitment and capacity by other members of the executive. Respondents 1, 2, 5 also indicated that DIRCO’s numerous commitments, in various arenas, contribute in informing questions of ability to perform. As a consequence of these numerous obligations respondent 2 noted that “capacity of DIRCO is limited and given this adherence to commitment is always going to be a challenge”. The assertion of respondent 2 provides insight on how the commitment is closely linked to the variable of capacity. It is therefore evident that DIRCO’s lack of commitment is heavily influenced by the dependency relationship between DIRCO and other national departments for implementation of the policy.

Barundi executive actors were also challenged by respondents 4, 5, 7 for lacking in commitment as they failed to sustain peacebuilding activities after the departure of SA actors. Respondent 6 even went further and suggested that this was proof that whilst SA actors were committed, actors of recipient countries were not. It is however suggested that the weakness lay with SA actors in failing to introduce a sustainable peacebuilding approach in receiving countries and failing to develop local capacity that would ensure sustainability of activities. In this regard, SA would be viewed as having fallen short of the demands of the policy.

**Bureaucrats**

It is suggested that lack of policy content informed the reduced commitment of bureaucrats as they could not link their mandate to the policy. This observation is informed by the following data.

Respondents 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 generally indicated an understanding of SA foreign relations policy and its possible application in the Burundi intervention. Respondent 4 did not consider SA foreign relations policy despite being an international relations manager of a national department. Instead the respondent linked and confined the departments’ activities to AU strategies. The responses of the majority provide insight on the inability of bureaucratic actors to implement the policy as they lacked understanding on issues of content of the peace mission.
The bureaucrats 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 also indicated several actions that demotivated them and which challenged their commitment and made them to question the commitment of recipient actors. The issues related to the unsustainability of projects on the departure of SA actors, lack of control and corruption system by recipient countries.

*International institutions*

Despite the existence of international peacebuilding institutions and the strides undertaken by the UN in producing debate and frameworks for peacebuilding it is suggested that commitment to comprehensive peacebuilding by international institutions needs to be improved. The conclusion is drawn from inputs from respondents 1, 2, 5. Respondent 5 indicated that UN systems were not “result orientated”. The respondent cited three examples to support this. Firstly observing that UN actors and their coordination in field operations hampered actual performance. Secondly the system of producing numerous resolutions on each item confused issues. Lastly the respondent noted how durable peace in Burundi could only be achieved through attendance of conflict issues in neighbouring countries and noted the failure of the UN and ICGLR in assisting with this.

Respondent 1 questioned the prioritisation of the end state of entrenchment of democracy by the UN. Respondent 2 questioned the role of the UN in the implementation of Arusha agreement and brought into focus the issue of the UN imposing its own issues on the reconciliation and demand for a UN tribunal contrary to the wishes of the Barundi preferences. Finally respondent 5 introduced the issue of the ICGLR. The respondent noted how the ICGLR wide mandate resulted in lack of focus on issues of peacebuilding.

Finally respondent 2 was highly critical on the funding model of the UNPBC. It is observed that this lack of resources within the UNPBC reflects issues of lack commitment to peacebuilding by international actors within the UN system.
4.3.2.5 Content

According to Brynard & de Coning (2006, pp. 196-97), policy content provides insight on the means and measures adopted to achieve policy objectives. Chapter two provided insight on SA’s approach to comprehensive peace missions. Considerations of the policy approach and different literature review consequently informed the definition of peacebuilding as being “long term post conflict activities and tools jointly adopted by local and intervening actors to ensure the existence of sustainable peace”20. The definition informed the research that meeting the objective of durable peace entailed involvement of different actors, over long periods who would in concert undertake certain activities.

Despite highlighting some weaknesses of content, observations of respondents 1, 2, 6 are pertinent as they provide insight on the importance of the policy, the context of its drafting (after democratization of SA) and its pronouncements on issues of mandate and approach to peacebuilding. It is therefore suggested that whilst the policy remains relevant reforms of content could improve its implementation.

The content discussion in this research uses data received on activities and the gaining of access by SA civilian actors to international institutions to understand issues of the “measures and means” adopted implement the policy.

Civilian access to peacebuilding institutions

As indicated in chapter two, SA provided for a readiness system (resource bank) in the policy for registering, controlling and deploying expert civilians in peace missions. Chapter two also drew attention to concerns raised in the policy on implementation of this provision. The concerns addressed issues of voluntarism of deployment for civilians, levels of SA influence on ensuring placement of its civilians in other organisations and the dependency on commitment or “enthusiasm” of DIRCO officials and “efficacy of the civilian readiness arrangement” (p. 31).

The data collected indicate that whilst aware of these challenges during drafting of the policy, there is no indication that SA actors sought to address them. As a result SA fell short of meeting the commitment and objective of placing its civilian experts in
institutions involved in peacebuilding. It is argued that lack of knowledge (capacity) and impracticality of the provision led to its non-implementation. Data supporting this argument is gained from all respondents as they were unaware of the provision. Lack of knowledge on the provision meant that respondents could not, and as evidence suggest did not, systematically engage in implementing the provision.

Despite the hindrance of knowledge, respondents 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 expressed opinions on the provision, based on their own personal experiences. Only respondent 3 supported inclusion of the provision. Respondents 1, 4, 5, 6, expressed reservations about practicability of the provision. The reservations relate to; how other institutions had failed to implement the provisions, challenges of management and capacity challenges found in SA actors. It is therefore observed that the retention of the provision in the policy is self-defeating for DIRCO since it contributes to implementation failure and that DIRCO should instead find alternatives of ensuring placement of SA actors in peacebuilding activities e.g. bilateral engagements.

*Activities: planning, nature and duration*

The policy intends using peacebuilding activities to address root causes of conflicts for the creation of durable peace. Data however reveals that the activities were not strategically planned, directed and coordinated to ensuring the creation of durable peace. Instead the data reveals SA actors as functioning in a sectorial manner and not linking their own foreign relations activities to the policy, general government programs and other departments. This is despite observations of literature found in chapter one where Greener (2011), Cousens (2001) and Serwer & Thomson (2007) argued for the importance of actors being guided by a common framework of activities which are informed by a hierarchy of priorities. The priorities and framework, according to the authors, are informed by end states and objectives of the intervening actors. The methodology according to the authors assists actors with the establishment of common goals and benchmarks, identification of areas of intervention, coordination of activities, resource allocation and sharing, monitoring and evaluation. The data collected indicates that SA failed to consider this and if the executive did consider them failed to inform
actors at the lower level (bureaucrats). Evidence for this is glimpsed from the following data.

SA bureaucratic actors did not link activities to implementation of the policy and consequently respondents 6, 7, 8 had no direct knowledge of Burundi peacebuilding activities. The other five respondents 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, identified activities undertaken by SA actors. Respondents 1, 2, 5, provided inputs on activities beyond their own sector and provided specific inputs on the objective of the Burundi peace mission. There is no evidence of the respondents having knowledge either on SA’s framework or of its priority plan, nor those of the Burundi government.

Despite the above discussion SA actors undertook peacebuilding activities in Burundi. The activities undertaken were identified in areas of: training of civil servants, training on land issues, evaluation mechanisms to monitor ethnic and gender dynamics, training on negotiation and reconciliation skills, assisting in social cohesion and reduction of poverty. It is acknowledged that these were appropriately directed towards addressing the root causes of the conflict, as identified by Daley (2007) and the Arusha agreement. However, durable peace could only be achieved if SA activities were strategically implemented.

Strategic execution of the activities would have entailed what Cousens (2001, pp. 12-14) labelled as “exit strategies” or “reduced commitment strategies” which permit “self-enforcement … over time without new international intervention” and therefore enables local institutions to manage conflict without resorting to violence. On the same note Ali & Matthews (2004, p. 14) provided insight on how intervening actors should focus on “helping local actors establish the conditions that will enable them to make choices in an atmosphere free of large-scale violence, fear, deprivation, and privation”, the ideas of these authors was discussed in chapter one. Influences on achieving these objectives are found in the duration and nature of activities.

The variable of commitment briefly discussed the duration of the activities. It is evident that apart from the training of civil servants activity (five years, having resumed in 2008), the other activities seem to have either not commenced or only lasted for short periods e.g. the DIRCO driven departmental assessment reports did not lead to any activities and other activities were undertaken for periods of less than five years.
Reasons for termination provide further insight on how coalitions and clients, capacity and commitment affect implementation of DIRCO policies. Respondent 1 indicated that political hostilities within Burundi actors towards SA led to termination of activities. Respondents 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 identified political preferences as influencing continuity of activities and all respondents identified lack of coordination as a factor. As discussed previously in chapter one too, long term peacebuilding measures are not only informed by duration of years but impact of activity e.g. sustainability of the peacebuilding activities and development of capacity of local actors who would then continue with the activities in the absence of intervening actors. The data as discussed previously indicated the opposite with respondents indicating how SA activities crumbled after departure of SA actors. It is therefore argued that SA activities fell short of the demands of building capacity to ensure durable peace as advocated by Ali & Matthews (2004) and Cousens (2001).

4.3.3 Conclusion
The data and its interpretation reveal major weaknesses in all five areas of the 5-C protocols. The investigation also provides an opportunity for reforms that could improve implementation of the policy. It is therefore envisaged that the knowledge generated by this exercise will contribute to the newly established Governmental institutions of DIRCO and the Department of Public Service (DPSA) which include the SA Development Partnership Agency (SADPA)\(^{21}\) and the School of Governance for civil servants. The summary of the conclusion and suggested reforms are detailed in chapter five.
Chapter 5 Conclusion and Recommendations
Chapter 5 Conclusion and Recommendations

5.1 Introduction

The research aims were to provide knowledge and meaning to policy makers and actors in the field of peace and security on issues of peacebuilding. In addition, the research investigates and provides recommendations on reforms on existing peacebuilding institutions, the policy and its implementation.

The policy provides for a comprehensive approach to peace missions and recognises peacebuilding and participation of civilian actors as essential elements in peacebuilding. However, research indicated a research gap on policy implementation and lack of sufficient focus on civilian peacebuilding activities.

The research was premised on the proposition that peacebuilding institutions negatively affect outputs of civilian peacebuilding activities and the attainment of SA objectives of comprehensive peace missions as envisaged by the white paper on South African participation in international peace missions. To prove or disprove the proposition the research focused on a primary and three supplementary research questions.

The primary research question was; did SA implement the civilian peacebuilding objectives of the “White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions” (the policy) in the Burundi peace mission during the period of 2000-2008?

Supplementary questions addressed how did civilian activities, by SA intervening actors, address the root causes of the conflict, how did the peacebuilding institutions facilitate or impede the participation of civilians in peacebuilding, and finally what, if any, are the suggested reforms?

Exploratory and descriptive research was undertaken and a qualitative research design was adopted. The Burundi case study during the period of 2000-2008 was utilised to provide specific and general observations on implementation of the policy.

The current chapter links the findings to the research questions and utilises the 5-C protocols to provide a summary of findings and suggest possible reforms.

The researcher is of the opinion that the policy is an informative tool and provides a necessary framework for actors involved in SA peace missions. The research however
indicates the existence of weaknesses in its implementation. It is suggested that as SA advances towards its 20 years of democracy and as DIRCO and other government stakeholders review their policies, the reforms suggested in this research could contribute to providing knowledge to policymakers to improve on the weaknesses identified.

5.2 **Summary of findings**

The findings of the research confirm the proposition that peacebuilding institutions negatively affect outputs of civilian peacebuilding activities and the attainment of SA objectives of comprehensive peace missions as envisaged by the white paper on South African participation in international peace missions. The findings of the research indicate that SA did not sufficiently implement its civilian peacebuilding policy in the Burundi mission during the period of 2008-2008. These findings are informed by the observation that SA activities did not address the horizontal inequalities of Burundi as discussed in chapter 3 and advocated by Stewart & Brown (2007). Secondly, the research indicates that peacebuilding institutions impede implementation of the policy due to issues of content, context, coalition and clients, commitment and capacity discussed below.

*Clients and coalitions*

The findings indicate that SA actors fail to systematically identify and form coalitions of the willing as required by the policy. The findings indicate the existence of this weakness at both domestic and international level. Domestically, the executive at the level of Presidency and DIRCO drive implementation of the policy without co-opting other levels of Government deemed instrumental for successful implementation i.e. other members of the executive and bureaucrats. The executive, generally, neglect to systematically co-opt civil society actors in implementation of its peacebuilding policy. In the event of co-option, termination of coalitions was informed by issues of political choices.
The findings also indicate that SA’s top down model of implementation of the policy alienates bureaucrats. Consequently bureaucrats confine their mandate to delivering instructions determined by political heads and therefore neglect to map and analyse motives and interests of other intervening actors.

Limited knowledge of the policy, by SA’s bureaucrats, significantly contributes to weaknesses of implementation since bureaucrats do not understand the value of mapping and analysis of different institutions and actors found within those institutions. The findings indicate that the bureaucrats, due to lack of knowledge, could not have formed coalitions with other actors found in international institutions as they indicated lack of knowledge of these institutions and their mandate.

Finally, the data collected did not indicate that the executive and other SA actors leveraged on their role of facilitators of the Arusha agreement. The oversight meant that SA did not use its power to influence the direction of peacebuilding activities of other intervening actors. The finding suggests that SA actors do not apply the rational choice institutionalism in their decision making and fail to use institutions to “capture gains from cooperation” identified by Leftwich (2007), and discussed in chapter one.

**Capacity**

The research revealed the availability of financial resources, within SA, for implementation of peacebuilding activities. However, capacity weaknesses which hamper implementation of the policy were found in domains of structures, actors and systems.

SA peacebuilding structures exhibited signs of weak leadership, coordination, and knowledge base. Leadership was not exhibited by the SA executive and this resulted in failure to co-opt and mobilize other actors around proper implementation of the policy. The SA structure charged with coordination of peace missions was identified as weak and unable to carry out its function. In some instances the different structures of Government were unable to feed and process information to and between each other e.g. ARF, NOCPM and different national departments and there was no central database for knowledge management of SA peacebuilding activities. International structures, charged with implementation of peacebuilding exhibited signs of lack of
resources (human, financial), wide mandates and different actor interests. Due to this, they could not perform their mandate within stipulated deadlines e.g. extension of BINUB timeframes and failure to implement the Arusha reconciliation provisions. Bureaucratic lack of knowledge negatively affected their capacity in linking issues of mandate, and prioritisation of end state activities as determined by recipient country needs and SA’s strategic focus. Systems and planning of SA Government revealed themselves not to being aligned to realities on the ground e.g. accounting and reporting systems hampered by lack of capacity (human and infrastructure) found in recipient countries.

**Context**
The findings support the view that domestically the executive exercises power and authority on implementation of the policy. The exercise of power by the executive revealed itself to be hierarchical and elitist. The arrangement reflects a power structure where the President is at the apex and first level. DIRCO is positioned at the second level and then other national departments. Bureaucrats and civil society actors are at the bottom of the hierarchy. The authorities at the higher levels are perceived as directing and influencing implementation of the policy at all levels domestically. However their power is in actual effect limited, since, apart from pronouncements and internal decision making their reliance on disempowered bureaucrats for implementation reduces outputs of the policy. The arrangement therefore negatively affects implementation.

Similarly, SA’s ability to influence direction of PBC activities and other international actors at the multilateral level is viewed as also minimal, since SA is not a key actor in those structures. It is also evident that SA actors neglect to sufficiently take advantage and influence action on peacebuilding through forming strategic coalitions with other external institutions also negatively affects output of the policy.

The availability of financial resources from actors/donors appears to be critical in influencing and directing prioritisation of activities undertaken in peacebuilding. Consequently, implementation of national peacebuilding Strategic Frameworks and
Priority Plans of recipient countries seem dependent on the choices of the financially viable countries and their interests.

Finally, it is evident that intervening actors have to take into account the characteristics of post conflict societies for sustainability of their activities. In SA’s instance the collapse of activities after departure suggests SA’s lack of appreciation of context issues e.g. capacity challenge from both countries, hostility from recipient actors, and lack of follow through on undertakings. In conclusion, similar to SA, the exit of Burundi bureaucrats and executive negatively influence the continuity of activities.

**Commitment**

The variable of commitment confines itself to unwillingness or inability to perform. With regard to SA executive, the actors demonstrated a propensity towards short term security measures instead of long term civilian activities. This indicates an unwillingness of commitment to the creation of durable peace through employment of civilian activities. Limitation of DIRCO and the President to co-opt other members of the executive and bureaucrats reveals issues of inability.

It is also evident that SA’s incapacity to identify and form coalitions affected its commitment. The arrangement calls into question DIRCO’s commitment in assisting other departments in implementation of the policy. An example is that of DIRCO not funding or directing funding to other departments for civilian activities, despite the presence of sufficient funds of ARF. The unwillingness to assist resulted in one department forming a trilateral agreement with a third actor and placing an extra burden of accountability on that department.

The lack of knowledge and content of the policy reduced SA bureaucrats’ capacity and their level of commitment. Demotivation and alienation from decision making processes contributed to their unwillingness and inability to implement.

The Barundi actors, on the other hand, reveal elements of inability to implement which are informed by the lack of capacity variable. The same capacity variable also influenced the inability of international institutions and its actors e.g. lack of resources from PBC, AU and SADC and the open ended mandate of the ICGLR.
Content
SA intended to place civilian experts in peacebuilding institutions. The resource bank avenue was the adopted tool for this objective. Data indicates that despite its existence, the tool was never established and therefore never utilised.
Secondly, the policy identified its objective of attendance to root causes of conflict. The tools adopted for this was use of actors and activities. The data reveals that lack of knowledge, proper planning, and coordination by actors resulted in government activities being short term with some terminating without contribution to the goal of creation of durable peace.

5.3 Recommendation

Clients and coalitions
To attend to issues of clients and coalitions, the Presidency and DIRCO should systematically adopt steps that will result in the co-option of like-minded actors (coalition of the willing) in the implementation of the policy. This can be achieved through firstly ensuring knowledge of the comprehensive approach of peace missions and the policy is enhanced at all levels (building capacity within SA actors). Secondly introduction of the exercise of mapping and analysing institutions and actors should form part of SA’s risk assessment and be a standing requirement for planning and approval for each peacebuilding activity. Periodic reviews and reporting on activities must also include mapping of actors as a standing item. Thirdly SA should encourage the formation of coalitions with actors at different levels including civil society. Lastly decision making and implementation model should be based on a hybrid model as inputs of bureaucrats should also influence the decision making process instead of the current practice of top down implementation.

Capacity
Capacity weaknesses can be attended to by firstly ensuring that peace mission activities of SA intervening actors are centralised and streamlined to ensure successful coordination and this includes the establishment of a nodal data base for all peace
mission activities. Secondly bureaucrats should build knowledge and acquaint themselves with tools of implementation. Thirdly risk assessment, planning, institutions, activities and systems should be informed by Ball’s characteristics of post conflict societies. Fourthly SA should mobilise other international peacebuilding institutions (PBC, AU and SADC) to attend to their capacity building challenges. Fifthly capacity building training for SA policy makers and implementers should be undertaken so as to improve levels of policy management issues. Lastly SA should prioritise capacity building activities in areas of project management and governance for recipient countries.

**Context**
Weaknesses of context can be addressed by ensuring that SA in collaboration with local actors focuses on institutional capacity building in recipient countries. SA must also develop coalitions with key strategic members of peacebuilding institutions e.g. PBC.

**Commitment**
The researcher is of the opinion that attendance to issues of commitment could be addressed by the building of capacity of knowledge within SA actors and those of the recipient countries. Secondly the decision making role of SA bureaucrats should be elevated. Thirdly capacity building and resourcing of UN, AU ICGLR, and SADC peacebuilding institutions should be improved in order to enable the general implementation of peacebuilding activities e.g. SA could identify and form appropriate coalitions that could assist SA implement its own policy. Lastly DIRCO should acquire funds and manage them on behalf of other departments so as to streamline funding of peacebuilding activities instead of departments entering trilateral agreements with third party countries outside the control of DIRCO. It is recommended that once operational, SADPA should be configured in a manner that would best follow this model.
Content
Finally on content SA should instead of focusing on placing civilians within international peacebuilding, strengthen its approach to achieving peacebuilding objectives through the formation of coalitions and bilateral agreements with receiving countries. In addition SA should in each peacebuilding activity develop its own framework and priority plan which is linked to that of the recipient country and all SA actors should undertake activities informed by the plan. The adoption of this strategy would assist with monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.

5.4 Future research

The recommendations indicate a need for SA to establish a hybrid model of implementation in its decision making process for peacebuilding missions. Secondly there is also indication of the need to centralize some functions including those of; developing of risk assessment tools for peacebuilding, building of knowledge within SA actors on the policy and establishment of a common evaluation tool on implementation of the policy. It is the opinion of the researcher that further investigation on these matters would greatly enhance implementation of the policy and could also add value to implementation of other DIRCO policies.
6  Annexures
Annexure 1: List of agreements signed between RSA and Burundi as on 30 July 2013 (source: DIRCO)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date signed</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date of entry into force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992/02/06</td>
<td>Bilateral Air Transport Agreement.</td>
<td>1992/2/06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/05/05</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding contributing resources to the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB).</td>
<td>2004/05/05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annexure 2: Officials questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date &amp; venue</th>
<th>Name of interviewee</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Numb of interview</th>
<th>First second</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1. **Peace building and addressing of root causes**
   a. What in your opinion were the root causes of the 1993 conflict?

2. **Peace building objectives and motive**
   a. According to your understanding, what was the motive for South Africa’s participation in the peace building activities of Burundi?
   b. What were the objectives of the intervention?
   c. Were the objectives achieved?

3. **Peace building activities in Burundi**
   a. According to your knowledge what were the activities undertaken to address institutional building of Burundi directly by your department?
   b. Did the activities address the root causes? If yes indicate how?
   c. Did the activities address the motives? If yes indicate how?

4. **Peace building and institutional arrangements**
   a. What are the strengths of the current institutional arrangements
   b. What are the weaknesses in the current institutional arrangements
   c. What reforms would you like to see in the current institutional arrangement?

5. **Resource bank**
   a. Did you place anybody through the mechanisms of the DIRCO resource bank?
   b. If so, what were the challenges faced?
   c. If not, why did you not utilize the system?

6. **Policy framework (5-C protocol)**
   What are your observations on the following issues – motivate and support answers with examples (should have been addressed during the discussion of above questions.)
   a. The content of the policy?
   b. Institutional context?
   c. The capacity of implementers?
   d. The commitment of implementers?
   e. The support and non-support of the clients and other coalitions?
Annexure3: Questions for security experts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date &amp; venue</th>
<th>Name of interviewee</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Numb of interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1. **Peace building and addressing of root causes**
   a. Did SA understand the root causes of the 1993 conflict?

3. **Peace building objectives**
   a. According to your understanding, what was the motive for South Africa’s participation in the peace building activities of Burundi?
   b. What were the objectives of the intervention?
   c. Were the objectives achieved?

4. **Peace building activities in Burundi (linked to a above)**
   a. According to your knowledge what were the activities undertaken to address institutional building of Burundi?
   b. Did the activities address the root causes? If yes indicate how?
   c. Did the activities address the motives? If yes indicate how?

5. **Peace building and institutional arrangements**
   a. What are the strengths of the current institutional arrangements – locally and internationally?
   b. What are the weaknesses in the current institutional arrangements
   c. What reforms would you like to see in the current institutional arrangement?

6. **Resource bank**
   a. Have you heard of the DIRCO resource bank?
   b. Is it implementable

7. **Policy framework (5-C protocol)** – should have been addressed during the discussion of above questions.
   a. The content of the policy?
   b. Institutional context?
   c. The capacity of implementers?
   d. The commitment of implementers?
   e. The support and non-support of the clients and other coalitions?
Annexure 4: Respondents

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<td>7</td>
</tr>
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<td>25 July 2013</td>
<td>8</td>
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</table>
7 Bibliography


Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (August 18, 2000).


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1 The White Paper was concluded by the Department of Foreign Affairs which was later renamed by the SA Government as the Department of International Relations and Cooperation in 2009.

2 Included in the list are the United States, “Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, Denmark, Norway, and Canada who have designated advisers or established units to coordinate some aspects of civilian operations in societies emerging from conflict” (Serwer & Thomson, 2007, p. 370).

3 The Arusha Agreement was signed by 19 primary actors with an interest in the Burundi conflict. Further discussion of the agreement is addressed in chapter 3, particularly in the sections on historical context of Burundi and peace agreements.

4 See Zandamela (2012, p. 64) for further elaboration of this approach.

5 Researcher was employed by the department of defence secretariat during the period of 1996 to 2006 and was personally involved in the peace support operations environment during the period of 2000 to 2006.

6 Leftwich (2007) draws a distinction in his analysis of organizations and institutions and thus informs the debate that the two cannot be synonymous.

7 Paragraph 2.2 in the next chapter draws attention to the viewpoint of the policy and states “the policy does not confine peacebuilding to certain stages of the conflict but states that it is important in the different phases of the conflict and especially in post conflict phases where it involves diplomatic/developmental efforts (1999, p. 8)”.

8 Greener (2011) and Cousens (2001) allude to how liberal peacebuilding dominates the space.

9 Article 3(b), (c), 6 and 7.

10 NEPAD brings public private sector partnership and investment through the NEPAD business group and other Africans in the diaspora (Murithi, 2005, pp. 133-134).
The 31 member organisational committee is composed of 5 categories of “stakeholder” interests i.e. members of the Security Council (7 seats – 2 rotational and 5 permanent), Troop Contributing Countries (5 seats drawn from top ten troop contributing countries), Donor countries (5 seats from top 10 countries which voluntarily financially contribute to UN peace operations), ECOSOC (7 seats) and General Assembly (7 seats). The PBSO, located within the UN secretariat provides administrative, analysis and liaison function with other UN structures. The PBF accesses and distributes funding for peacebuilding efforts.

BINUB was established in 2006 through resolutions 1719 (UN, 2006) and 7191 (UN, 2007) for a term of two years 2007-2008.

The figures (ACCORD, 2007; Ameir, 2008; Boshoff, 2010) vary from author to author but the point illustrated is the high cost to human life and intensity of the conflict.

Others are wars of; “proxy”, “regional independence or autonomy”, “military interventions”, “revolutionary”, “political coalitions”.

Presidents Mandela, Museveni, Arap Moi, Mkapa; secretary generals of the UN and OAU, representative of the EU and Executive Director of the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation.

Article 11, chapter 11 of protocol IV states that “The transitional Government shall initiate and finance, with the support of the international community a programme of physical and political reconstruction …”. Article 17 then lists the actors that could provide resources for to an inter-ministerial reconstruction and development unit.

As detailed in the section dealing with Mwanza & Arusha.

The respondent did however note that the current director seems to possess those qualities and this might bode well for the institution.

Table 2 adopted from Paudel (2009, p. 40) is found at the end of paragraph 1.3.3.2

Chapter 1 on conceptualisation.

Brief background on SADPA is found in chapter 2 in the ARF section.