CHAPTER 3: NATIONAL LIST-PR ELECTORAL SYSTEM : TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

3.1: INTRODUCTION

Democratic transition is one very important phase of the democratisation process. The transitions in Angola and Mozambique shed light on the theories of democratisation. The transitions in these two countries were driven by popular participation but their outcomes were conditioned by respect for democratic norms and procedures on the one hand, and unacceptable “grabbing of power”\textsuperscript{49}, the intolerance of political competition and the resort to military intervention, on the other hand.

Transitions to electoral democracy require some procedural instruments. They require the establishment of the transition mechanisms that deal with issues such as the electoral processes, organising elections and not least, lifting the ban on political parties, reviewing and modifying existing electoral laws, the registration of political parties and the changing of the constitution into one which represents the wishes of the people. The constitution should, among other things, indicate the electoral system to be used.

Democratic transition is a radical departure from a one-party rule, or from a totalitarian or a praetorian regime. Political liberalisation introduces a competitive party system, as well as a growing private mass media, freedom of organisation and assembly. In Africa, post-
Cold War reality offered fresh opportunities to promote transition to democracy, especially in the round of regime transitions that Africa experienced in the early 1990s.

Building on the theoretical scholarship of liberal democracy, this chapter attempts to generate a framework for analysis of the study of African transition to democracy in Angola and Mozambique that embraces the current dominance of liberal values and its impact on democratisation.
3.2: TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

This section is very important, because the mode of transition shapes the prospects for democracy or for the return to authoritarian rule or military conflict. This work attempts to broaden the comparative study on democratic transition, by adding lesser known or undermined small cases to the set of analysed ones. This comparative study has generated important insights and findings that will enrich the knowledge about the process of democratic transition in Sub-Saharan Africa.

It also seeks to provide possible explanations of the path of transition of this comparative two-case-study, and its relationship with the PR electoral system. The argument advanced here is that the process of transition to democracy in Angola and Mozambique must not be confined only to elections and the PR system, all of which may fall under the risk of the “fallacy of electoralism”\cite{5}. Rather it should be historicised and contextualised in order to incorporate local conditions and other circumstances that may have or have not made the transition viable in these two countries.

While the PR system-factor may explain marginally why a particular democratic transition was successful, such a model does not explain entirely all the transitional democratic processes occurred within their respective socio-economic and political contexts. There are other factors that may influence the final outcome of political transitions.
The notion of the democratic transition concept in literature on democratisation has varied meanings. A clear definition of the concept is critical for the valuable theoretical insights that are linked to the theory of democracy. The first task is therefore to define ‘transition to democracy’ or ‘democratic transition’, and that for the purpose of this work, both notions have the same meaning and are interchangeable.

Theoretical guidance for defining this concept comes from Bratton and de Walle 1997:194. This literature holds that “… A transition to democracy can be said to have occurred only when a regime has been installed on the basis of a competitive election, freely and fairly conducted within a matrix of civil liberties, with results accepted by all participants. The acceptance of the validity of founding elections by losing parties is crucial because it makes the first tentative consensus on democratic rules”. Some argue that democratic transition is a painful and a protracted process which cannot be compressed into a few short years or imposed by outsiders, Dunn (1986).

Others in attempting to conceptualise transition to democracy refer to it as being an interval between an authoritarian and a democratic regime. However, this interim period has at least three possible tenets of democratic transitions: (i) transitions driven by external forces; (ii) transitions emanating from violent intervention or by internal armed forces, such as wars, revolutions or coup d’etats; (iii) transitions initiated by an internal crisis of the regime. Events of the democratic transitions in Southern Europe, Latin America and in some cases in Africa fall under the third and last categories, O’Donnell et al. (1986).
Huntington, for instance, in the Third Wave (pp. 113-14), in making an analytical and historical assessment of democratic transitions, consolidations, and collapses, unfolds the variety of dynamics involved in the processes by distinguishing four possibilities: First, transformations - when the elites in power take the lead in bringing about democracy; Second, replacement - when opposition groups take the lead in bringing about democracy. Thirdly, transplacements - when democratisation takes place as a result of a joint action by government and opposition groups, because both government and the opposition recognise that they are “incapable of unilaterally determining the nature of the future”\textsuperscript{52}. Fourth, when democratic institutions are imposed by an outside power.

Herman Giliomee (1995) based on O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and drawing on the authoritarian rules from Spain over Brazil, Greece over Argentina; and in Poland, Chile, and South Africa, argues that for any transition to occur there must be a changing of balance of forces within the incumbent regime. In other words, there must be divisions between hard-liners and soft-liners that can trigger a response by the regime to initiate a multiparty reform. In their understanding political liberalisation is an elite response rather than an elite initiative.

Giliomee (1995: 94-97) in examining the character of democratic transition from the authoritarian order to a democratic system, points to three transition types: Transition through Transformation; Transition after Regime Breakdown; and Transition as Transplacement. Transition through Transformation occurs when through procedural means, the authoritarian order secures its legitimacy by forcing the democratic opposition
to capitulate, as were the cases of Spain and Brazil. Transition after Regime Breakdown takes places in transitions such as in Greece, Romania, and Argentina, where there was a complete breakdown of the military juntas that lost touch with their social bases. Transition as Transplacement is widely regarded as a positive tool in facilitating transitions for democratic reform. This is so because the cases of Poland, Uruguay, Korea, Chile and South Africa demonstrate that the democratisation processes occurred as a result of combined actions between government and opposition. Generally it is a process characterised by the fact that neither the government nor the opposition is capable of unilaterally determining the political course of events. Therefore, there is an assurance of the parties to the cessation of hostilities and to the holding of negotiations leading to elections.

This situation can be applied in the case of Angola and Mozambique where by the end of the 1980s the 16 year-long civil wars had produced such a political transformation that the MPLA and FRELIMO-led governments were forced to embark on negotiations with the rebels to replace a one-party state and form a government of reconciliation and national unity.

In the case of Carter Center (1991) there are eight phases of democratic transition in Sub-Saharan Africa which start with the process of decay whereby the incumbent government loses its ability to manage its affairs. Then follows the political mobilisation through which different groups opposed to the government, make their voices heard for fundamental political reform. In the face of this, the incumbent government takes the
decision to institute a more legitimate political system based on the principle of competitive elections. After this achievement follows the formulation phase, that entails the drafting of the new constitution and a schedule for elections. This is then followed by electoral contestation in which political parties and voters campaign and vote, and electoral results are declared and accepted by all parties. Soon after this, there is a handover of power to a democratically elected government. The following phase is the legitimization of the government through the acceptance of the basic rules and norms of a democratic system. The final phase is the democratic consolidation aimed at respecting the fundamental provisions, namely the rules and procedures governing succession in office, Healey and Robinson (1992:133).

Do all these definitions really matter? At this conceptualisation level, the answer is an obvious yes. First, because the democratic transition is a highly fragile institutional order in which its outcomes ‘hurt’ some constituencies and ‘help’ others. Second, broadly speaking these definitions capture the notion that underlines the prospects and constraints on the transition to democracy in countries like Angola and Mozambique with their numerous related variables such as commitment to democracy and the political economy. Third, the central argument informing these definitions is that the prospects for the survival of democratic transition must be based on serious commitment of the key players to the agreement during and after the transition and the acceptance of the electoral results by the losing parties. As Ian Shapiro (1993:138) puts it “If authoritarian decay is to be followed by a democratic transition, then key elites must develop commitment to democracy”53.
The transition to democracy in Angola and Mozambique followed a similar logic despite the many obvious differences between the two cases, including the sizes and complexities of both countries, and the degree of aborted transition and electoral success.

The 1991 Bicesse Peace Accord for Angola, and the 1992 Rome General Peace Agreement, for Mozambique were in essence political compromises in which both the Angolan and the Mozambican governments and their respective armed opposition groups of UNITA and RENAMO decided by the end of 1989 that the Angolan and the Mozambican civil wars were at stalemate as neither side had achieved a military victory under the prevailing political conditions.
3.3: ANGOLA - BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Diogo Cao discovered Angola for Portugal in 1484 and since then Portugal colonised it until 1974.

On 25 April 1974, when the Portuguese military officers overthrew the dictatorship of Marcelo Caetano in Lisbon, it was decided that the decolonisation process of the former Portuguese colonies (Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Sao Tome Islands) had to start.

In the case of Angola, because there were three Liberation Movements, it was decided to enter into an agreement called Alvor, signed by **MPLA**, **FNLA** and **UNITA** under the Portuguese auspices on 15 January 1975, which provided for a Portuguese-led transitional government with effect from 28 March 1975, that would lead Angola until elections, and the independence date set for 11 November 1975.

Unfortunately this agreement broke down sometimes later, leading to a full-scale civil war. The civil war placed the **MPLA** backed by Cuba and the Soviet Union, and **FNLA** and **UNITA** supported by South Africa and Washington, to oppose an **MPLA** military victory, leading the **MPLA** to proclaim unilaterally the establishment of the People’s Republic of Angola, based in Luanda, whereas the **FNLA** and **UNITA** established a short-lived provisional government in the Huambo highlands. As the armed conflict gained other dimensions, **FNLA** forces disintegrated and the polarisation of the civil war became more and more between **MPLA** and **UNITA**.
Because of the ideological differences between these two Angolan armed political parties, the internationalisation of the conflict became obvious, with Western diplomatic sources demanding the withdrawal of the Cuban forces from Angola, to which the MPLA-led government responded that the Cuban presence in Angola as sovereign country, was justifiable under the UN Charter because of the South African invasion and occupation of Southern Angola and its continued military support to UNITA. The Cuban issue became more complex as MPLA’s foreign policy stood for providing sanctuaries in Angola for all Liberation Movements, namely ANC, ZANU/ZAPU and SWAPO of Namibia.

In 1978, a Western Contact Group was established that comprised of USA, Britain, Canada, France and West Germany, and was aimed at serving as broker between SWAPO and South Africa because of Pretoria’s illegal occupation of Namibia to promote the independence of that territory. The mechanism found for a Namibian settlement was the UN Security Council Resolution 435/78.

Owing to privileged relations between US and South Africa, and acting against the letter and the spirit of the UN Security Council Resolution 435/78, the US administration embarked on a policy of “constructive engagement”, by proposing the “Linkage” formula of the granting of independence to Namibia to the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola. Although this approach was not initially accepted by Angola and SWAPO, they did so later on, especially after the battle of Cuito Cuanavale in 1988, which strengthened Angola’s hand at the
bargaining table with Apartheid South Africa, with the absolute assurance by Pretoria to settle the war by political means.

This accommodating framework for all the parties involved, culminated with the signing of the New York tri-partite agreement between Angola, Cuba and South Africa that facilitated the phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, the withdrawal of South African forces from southern Angola and the independence of Namibia.

With this successful diplomatic initiative and the MPLA’s declared abandonment of Marxism-Leninism at its Third Congress in December 1990, Angola was in the condition to enter into the political liberalisation with the signing of the Bicesse Accords on 31 May, 1991 between the MPLA and UNITA as the settlement of the long civil war and holding of the first multiparty elections set for 29-30 September 1992.

But the Bicesse Accords were preceded by a short-lived diplomatic initiative of the Gbadolite Accord by the former President Mobutu of Zaire who orchestrated a meeting between President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi on 22 June, 1989 at a summit of 17 African Heads of State in Gbadolite-Zaire. The Gbadolite Accords made provision for a cease-fire, effective from 24 June 1989, an amnesty for UNITA members and the integration of UNITA members into Angolan society and government. These accords were reversed soon after its
signing and on each side the blame was ascribed to the new interpretation of the agreement and the launching of full-scale military offensives for military advantage.

Despite numerous delays and problems in terms of crucial issues such as assembly points, disarmament and demobilisation and the formation of one single army during the pre-election period, UN-monitored multi-party elections were held on 29-30 September 1992 in Angola. A significant number of political parties amounting to eighteen and twelve presidential candidates participated in the presidential and legislative elections. Political parties were required to submit 1,500 signatures, with at least 100 from each province as evidence of a national rather than purely regional support base.

The first ever multiparty elections took place under the watchful eyes of the UN and foreign and national observers who unanimously declared the freeness and fairness of the electoral process. The results of the legislative and presidential elections showed that **MPLA** won 53.7 percent of the National Assembly seats while **UNITA** obtained 34.1 percent. For the presidential race, the **MPLA**’s candidate, Jose Eduardo dos Santos obtained a narrower margin of 49.6 percent of the votes which was less than 50 percent and **UNITA**’s candidate, Jonas Malheiro Savimbi achieved 40.1 percent. A second run-off was now necessary to conclude the electoral process that would determine the winner of the presidential election. But soon after the announcement of the official results was the
resumption of war because UNITA refused to accept the outcome of the elections.

On the basis of complaints lodged by UNITA that there had been fraud during the entire electoral process, the National Electoral Council set up investigative commissions integrating UNITA elements and assisted by UNAVEM in all of the 18 provinces to examine issues such as consistency of polling records, security of ballot boxes, control of surplus electoral kits and supplementary polling stations. The results of these investigations were conclusive in stating that there was no fraud committed.

The electoral results demonstrated that the MPLA won 129 seats in the 220 seat parliament against UNITA’s 70 seats. The allocation of seats for other contending parties was as follows: AD-Coalition 1 seat; FDA 1 seat; FNLA 5 seats; PAJOCA 1 seat; PDP-ANA 1 seat; PLD 3 seats PRD 1 seat; PRS 6 seats; PNDA 1 seat and PSD 1 seat (see Appendix 3, p.82).

From the legal point of view, the Bicesse Accords were binding on both parties, Government and UNITA. Therefore, any unilateral position taken by any of the parties, either by force or other illegal means in order to alter or subvert the recognising peaceful procedures and clauses to attain political goals, was regarded as a flagrant violation or breach of the agreement. The Bicesse Accords were therefore opposed to any step taken by either one of the main two parties,
aimed at replacing any existing governmental bodies and taking over their functions, without first negotiating with the relevant authorities (UN representative and troika of US, Russia and Portugal).

The main purpose of the Bicesse Accords was the enforcement of order and stability and to guarantee a peaceful transition and coerce the main participants to the agreement into solving political differences peacefully and constitutionally with an explicit renunciation of violence. This transitional phase was to forge national unity, heal the wounds of the people and rehabilitate the social fabric, after many years of violence and conflict.

The UN on its part, had the task to create a permanent atmosphere of non-war as a mean of attaining peaceful transition and effecting much desired political and social changes by monitoring and supervising the elections.

Thus, the Angolan transition to a democratic political regime had its starting point with the challenging task of implementing the Bicesse Accords, signed in Lisbon, Portugal, on May 31, 1991 by the two formerly belligerents, the Government and UNITA, namely the Fundamental Principles for the establishment of peace in Angola (Angola White Book about the Peace Process, pp. 53-54).

First, under the fundamental principles for the establishment of peace in Angola, it was necessary for Unita to recognise the Angolan state, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and the Angolan Government until the time of the elections.
Second, the fundamental principles for peace also ensured the cease-fire agreement, that is, a cessation of hostilities between the Government of Angola and Unita and that such cease-fire would guarantee the free movement of people and goods across national territory. Also under these provisions of cessation of hostilities, cease-fire would mean to be total and definite across the country. Furthermore, after coming into force, the cease-fire would compel the Government of Angola and Unita to refrain from acquiring lethal material. To this end, the US and the then Soviet Union vowed not to provide any such material to either party and asked other countries to act in the same way, in order to support the implementation efforts towards the cessation of hostilities.

Third, attached to the fundamental principles for the establishment of peace in Angola were the Annexes that made provision for the creation of the verification and monitoring structures of the cease-fire such as the Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (CMVF) and Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM). These commissions whose main task was to ensure the verification and monitoring of the cease-fire were composed of representatives of Portugal, the United States of America and the Soviet Union as observers, as well as representatives of the Government of Angola and Unita.

Fourth, the core of the fundamental principles for the establishment of peace in Angola around which its democratic transition revolved, was the consent given by the Angolan government to work with all the parties including Unita, to draft
laws that would regulate the electoral process as well as the establishment of the exact date of the elections, through consultation with all recognised political parties.

Another related issue was that the voting would be secret and that the President would be elected by direct and secret suffrage, through a majority system, with recourse to a second round if deemed necessary. On the other hand, the National Assembly composed of 220 parliamentarians elected for a four-year term, would be elected by direct and secret suffrage through a system of proportional representation (PR). The established criterion for the election of parliamentarians was that each province out of eighteen provinces, would in its own right be represented in Parliament by five parliamentarians, being each province considered as one electoral constituency. This amounted to 90 parliamentarians. The remaining 130 parliamentarians had to be elected at national level, the country had to be considered as a single constituency.

Fifth, in addition to all these issues, the agreement also stated a crucial point, that immediately after the cessation of hostilities, there would be the establishment of the formation of the neutral Angolan Armed forces (FAA) made up of 50,000 troops from Angolan government forces and UNITA’s forces, to be distributed as follows: Army- 40,000; Air Force – 60,000 and Navy- 4,000. This process of the creating the new Armed Forces had to be complemented simultaneously with the
process of assembly points, disarmament, and integration into civilian life of the
demobilised troops from the Government of Angola and UNITA.

As part of the political bargaining, the Government of the Republic of Angola
and the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), signed the
Lusaka Protocol in Zambia, on November 15, 1994, under the UN mediation led
by the UN Special Representative in Angola, Mr. Alioune Blodin Beye, and
assisted by representatives of the US, the Russian Federation and Portugal
governments.

The Lusaka Protocol as a result of trade-offs, was basically an extension of the
Bicesse Accords but structured on a power-sharing arrangement aimed, in
principal, at ensuring the acceptance of the electoral results by UNITA, namely
the need for a regular and normal functioning of the institutions that came about
as a result of the elections held on September 29-30, 1992, and also the need of
establishing a just and long-lasting peace within a true and sincere national
reconciliation.

The offer (see Appendix 5 ) made by the Government of Angola was clearly
serious, for UNITA was no longer insisting on resorting to war. The Lusaka
Protocol was in essence a political compromise in which the Government and
UNITA agreed to resolve the most difficult issues derived from the post-electoral
crisis, such as the hand-over of UNITA-held territories to the Angolan
Government, disarmament, demobilisation, cease-fire, reincorporation of UNITA troops into the single army (FAA) and the promulgation of the Amnesty Law. The Lusaka Protocol would culminate with the offer by the Government, of executive and municipal seats to UNITA (See also Appendix 5). In short, UNITA formally accepted the political inclusion and accommodation at the price of military capability.

The Lusaka Protocol’s principal objective was to institutionalise the new and democratic rules of the political game sealed with the multiparty elections. Thus, the Angolan Government also sacrificed key interests of the MPLA hardliners and of the military and not least its own national constituency. The main problem was that like the Bicesse Accord, the Lusaka Protocol also necessitated a reasonable degree of mutual confidence and compliance, and not least the political will that could reinforce the commitment of both parties to carry out the terms of the peace agreement.

Once again, UNITA after signing the Lusaka Protocol, was reported to have systematically committed violations of the peace agreement, following a substantially similar insurgent path to democracy, as happened immediately after the announcement of the electoral results in October 1992.
3.4: MOZAMBIQUE - BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

“The 1994 elections were at the same time a supreme event of the crowning of the peace process and the formal foundation of the democratisation process. Hence, as from the beginning the elections incorporate and reflect the demands of
the competition and of seeking the consensus. Therefore, each election represents an opportunity to promote democracy and conflict management, but at the same time, it contains volatility for the resumption of conflicts or the creation of the new one’s. This means that peace is not in itself an evident sign that the country can only be governed on a legalistic basis… For example, during elections it is not suffice to apply the rules, it is also necessary to seek a mutual accord and a common understanding in order to be able to manage tensions...Seeking consensus is essentially a manner of conflict management whereas democracy gives legitimacy to a governing majority”56.

This analysis of the transition process in Mozambique attempts to look beyond the electoral outcomes that put an end to sixteen years of civil war and its impact on establishing democracy. As Manning 2001:140 put it : “On the surface, it would seem that Mozambique’s gamble was successful, at least in terms of providing a return to peace. As for its success as a democratisation project, however, important questions remain”57.

Vasco da Gama discovered Mozambique for Portugal in 1498 but the latter colonised it from 1505 to 1974.

As a liberation movement created in 1962, FRELIMO headed a successful anti-colonial struggle against Portuguese rule which culminated in a cease-fire, and
the Portuguese hand-over of power to **FRELIMO** which was preceded by the transitional government from September 1974 to June 1975.

The post independence era of Mozambique witnessed the gradual transformation of **FRELIMO** into a more radical Marxist-Leninist vanguard party and the transformation of Mozambican society along Marxist ideology. This policy was put forward and approved by the 1977 **FRELIMO** Congress which adopted Marxism-Leninism as the official ideology of the state.

This meant that **FRELIMO** had to be transformed into “The Vanguard Party of the worker-peasant alliance”\(^{58}\) that would ignite the class struggle in order to prevent the growth of an exploitative capitalist class in Mozambique. Still as part of post-independence, **FRELIMO**’s long-term objective of achieving Communism was the establishment of the collectivised communal villages as the source of food for the urban population.

These internal political dynamics within **FRELIMO** added to its nationalist, anti-imperialist and anti-neocolonial stand in relation to liberation movements, namely **ZANU, ANC** and **SWAPO** of Namibia. It made Pretoria aware, backed by Washington, by having a firm resolution to combat Communism wherever it raised its head, especially in the Southern African region.
Thus, in retaliation to FRELIMO’s official opposition to apartheid and support to liberation movements, Pretoria backed RENAMO, through the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation, which assisted Pretoria in its destabilisation campaign against Mozambique and other Frontline States, as from 1975.

Faced with the harsh realities of Pretoria to use RENAMO under the ‘total strategy’ to destroy socio-economic infrastructures in Mozambique, the FRELIMO government proved unable to contain RENAMO-led insurgency and was forced to enter into negotiations with that rebel movement.

The bloodiest civil war between the FRELIMO government and RENAMO culminated in talks that started in 1990 and which led to the General Peace Agreement signed on 4 October 1992, in Rome, under mediation of a Santo Egidio group from the Catholic Church. The General Rome Peace Agreement set out mutual guarantees as a basis for ending the war, namely a cease-fire, demobilisation of both armies, being about sixty two thousand FRELIMO troops and twenty one thousand RENAMO troops, and the formation of a new unified army before the national elections, which were initially set for October 1993, later postponed and finally held on 27 October 1994.

The Rome agreement also provided RENAMO with the recognition as a political party and RENAMO’s acceptance of the authority of the FRELIMO government as well as a UN internationally supervised transition. In other words,
the UN was entrusted with the task of verification and monitoring of the political, military, electoral and humanitarian aspects of the Peace Agreement.

The 1994 elections in Mozambique were generally characterised as a peaceful electoral transition. As Manning (2001:146) put it: “The 1994 general elections in Mozambique were very much a part of the war-to-peace transition and were seen in that light by all concerned”^59.

The turnout was considered to have been excellent, scoring 87.87% of the registered voters, as shown on pag. 93. For Presidential elections, President Joaquim Chissano was the winner by receiving 53.66%, against 33.7% in favour of Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama. The third position was occupied by Wehia Ripua who gained 2.87% of the valid votes cast. For legislative elections, FRELIMO was able to secure an absolute majority in Parliament, winning 44.33%, which represents 129 seats in a 250-Parliament seat. While RENAMO receiving 37.78% of the valid votes, was able to secure 112 seats, becoming the leading opposition party. For reasons arising from the 5% threshold clause of the Constitution, the Democratic Union (UD) was the only minor party that qualified for representation by receiving 5.15% of the vote, securing 9 seats in the legislature.
### Presidential elections

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### Candidates, votes and percentages

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<td>Joaquim Chissano (Frelimo)</td>
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<td>Afonso Dhlakama (Renamo)</td>
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<td>Domingos Arouca (Fumo)</td>
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<td>Carlos Joque (Ind)</td>
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<td>Casimiro Nhambambo (Sol)</td>
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<td>Mario Machete (Ind)</td>
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<td>Fadimbe Kambati (PPPMM)</td>
<td>24,208</td>
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### Legislative elections

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<td>Democratic Renewal Party (PRD)</td>
<td>48,030</td>
<td>(1.01%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique Democratic Party(Pademo)</td>
<td>36,689</td>
<td>(0.77%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique National Union(Uniao)</td>
<td>34,809</td>
<td>(0.73%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party (PT)</td>
<td>26,961</td>
<td>(0.56%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Deputies by province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Frelimo</th>
<th>Renamo</th>
<th>UD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Delgado</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhambane</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manica</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo City</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo Province</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nampula</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niassa</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sofala</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tete</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambézia</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total**: 129 | 112 | 9

Source: Al Bulletin Vol 34, n.-5, 1994, p.3.

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1.3.3: THE 3.5:
3.5: THE ROLE OF THE CONSOLIDATION OF PARTY SYSTEM

One means of promoting democratic transitions is through the activities of oppositional parties. The premise rests on the position that during the transition all parties running for elections must develop democratic values in deep roots of the society. This means that oppositional parties should defend and further the process of democratic transition in order to sustain in the early post transition period the effective checks and balances on the new elected government and to rise and nurture the multiparty politics in the country concerned.

On the same realm, John Stuart Mill as an advocate of libertarian democracy argued that at the core of multiparty politics lies the expression of dissenting points of view.

Baylies and Szeftel (1992:90) equally argued that the role of the oppositional parties is to put on the political agenda a whole string of public demands for government to be efficient, honest, representative and accountable. John Ssenkumba (1991) also in the same line argued that the very essence of democracy lies in the right of individuals and groups to differ, publicly canvass their opposing views, and choose either to cooperate with or oppose those in authority within a legally-constitutionally-established framework.
Within the paradigm of liberal democracy, the quality of a country’s democratic transition can best be judged by the level of organisation, autonomy, and diversity of its political forces. In other words, how best is structured the political party system or the extent to which the effectiveness of the political parties that have been created brought about their meaningfully influence on the country’s political landscape.

Ssenkumba (1991) makes the point that an effective opposition party has main tasks, which can be summarised on the following: First is to serve as a check-and-balance mechanism against the government. Second is to gain credibility before the electorate by presenting coherent challenges to the government’s policies and practices. Third is also to become an alternative to the government, waiting as it were in the wings to take over in case the government falls or is defeated in an election. As he put it: “As a political structure with the main function of providing checks and balances in the broad political process, the opposition does several things. It participates in deliberations in Parliament. It opposes objectionable policies by voice and vote. It compels the government by all acceptable (legal and constitutional) methods to modify its policies. It also attempts to create public sentiment against the government and public sympathy for itself as a precondition for winning the next election. Above all, and this is the essence, of its very existence, it proposes alternative programmes”.

In a multiparty arrangements, political parties as effective institutional vehicles for safeguarding democratic rights should not be preoccupied with seeking and protecting their own private positions and privileges or to promote an unscrupulous ambition for
power by undermining the right of the free choice of the electorate or violating the
principles of legitimate authority and democracy. Instead, political parties should
sustain and reinforce “The three basics of democracy, i.e., representation, accountability
and regular, peaceful changes of leadership”\(^{61}\).

The Angolan experience suggests that at one level the main leading opposition party
\textbf{(UNITA)} by rejecting electoral politics and their outcomes in inconclusive electoral
process, and making recourse to violence challenged the very essence of democracy and
derailed the enabling environment for a successful democratic transition. At another
level, the main opposition did not take advantage of the political liberalisation process to
transform itself from an armed opposition into a mere political party.

The democratic transition in Angola in 1992 was held hostage by the main opposition
party for personal greed and lack of compromise with the simultaneous processes of
democratisation and democratic transition. To this effect, Nzongola-Ntalaja and Lee,
\cite{Nzongola-Ntalaja1997} asserted that a very disturbing development is the tendency among losers, even
those in elections that are widely seen as free and fair, to reject the verdict of the ballot
box. Such a contempt for the popular will and democratic processes has been manifested
as much by warlords and separatist leaders, as by rulers who were once part of the
democratic opposition.

In Mozambique, the main opposition party \textbf{RENA\textit{MO}} embarked on different and
distinctive path of democratic transition compared to \textbf{UNITA} in Angola. Cognisant of the
fact that Mozambique was a country consumed by a 16-year civil war, and in spite of
initial allegations of rigged elections and return to war, RENAMO ultimately allowed the
democratic transition to unfold by accepting the electoral outcomes. In Mozambique, the
opposition as an armed opposition understood in the course of electioneering that only
with complete disarmament could peace be attained as a catalyst force for successful
democratic transition.

RENAMO also understood that electoral outcomes were not seen as a zero-sum victory
of the incumbent government versus its defeat. Instead, it was a question of respecting the
will of the people so that democracy could have taken its root. Peace in democratic
transition was considered by both FRELIMO and RENAMO to be a condition sine qua
non for national reconciliation and national building. This explains why was important
for the opposition to be consistent with the respect for constitutional order and the
democratic rules of the game which could ensure the effective implementation of the
Rome General Peace Agreements and thereof the democratic transition.

In the final analysis, and in this particular case, the opposition by embracing and
respecting the deepest aspirations of the electorate became a promotional and sustainable
vehicle of democracy and successful democratic transition which would create the
environment within which the consolidation of democracy could take place.