

**Urbanization and Poverty in Maseru: A Comparative Study of  
Sekamaneng, Motimposo and Thibella**

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## **Declaration**

I declare that this dissertation/ thesis is my own original and unaided intellectual work. It is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Development Studies) in the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted for any other degree or examination in any other university here in South Africa or elsewhere in the world.

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## **Abstract**

In the six decades since the mid 20<sup>th</sup> century, the world has experienced phenomenal urban growth, especially in the developing world. This growth has been closely associated with increasing levels of poverty and deprivation characterized by lack of access to safe water supplies, proper sanitation and access to assets. Other features include slums, informal settlements and low employment. In Africa, there has been subjection of cities to a profound disjuncture between demographic, economic and political structures. The urban population in the region has been doubling every seven years. This demographic shift is taking place within a context of low rates of economic growth and political engagement between the state and civil society. Lesotho, while sharing these experiences, is also one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking 158 out of 177 according to the UN Human Development Index. This has largely determined the nature of urbanization, with deepening economic problems in most of the country, rural and urban, resulting in poverty. Nevertheless, there has been a profound shift in location of that poverty. Whereas before it was overwhelmingly a rural phenomenon, now poverty is urbanized. In addition, due to the nature of urban development in the country, poverty is primarily concentrated in Maseru – the primary city of this small, land-locked country.

While literature concentrates much on developing world cities, including those of Africa, it is silent on the impact of urbanization on poverty in Maseru. This thesis attempts to fill this gap and argues that rapid and differentiated forms of urbanization have increased poverty in Maseru. The study aims at investigating the relationship between urbanization and urban poverty in Maseru, the capital city of Lesotho. It studies how differentiated forms and patterns of urbanization have affected the manifestations of poverty in different parts of Maseru. It also analyses the different livelihood strategies employed by the poor residents of such areas. Thus, this research study first analyzes the manifestations of poverty by the rapid and differentiated processes of urbanization among the poor in the three communities (Thibella, Sekamaneng and Motimposo) in Maseru. Second, it analyzes how the urban poor cope with poverty, as the increase in urbanization has unsettled conventional livelihood strategies, compelling them to employ different livelihood strategies to survive. Further, the study examines how the urban governance systems and people within them are coping with these pressures. The study engaged documentary review, interviews and observation to

unpack these main research objectives, and hence established the link between urbanization and urban poverty through interpretive analysis and inference.

The increased poverty in Maseru resulted from Lesotho and Maseru's historic development trends, as the results confirm. However, urbanization significantly exacerbated this poverty. The results also show that Maseru has experienced unprecedented and largely unplanned growth causing inadequate and skewed distribution of services. A city has arisen in an area that previously contained rural settlements scattered around a small (colonial) administrative centre. It is now exploding with people from remote villages around the country seeking employment opportunities and better services. Perceived employment opportunities draw them, resulting from the concentration of jobs and facilities in the city. Though the city has become a magnet for them, it lacks enough absorptive capacity. There is, hence, jobless growth and poverty escalation in Maseru. The continuing retrenchments in South African mines have also increased population in Maseru, adding to more strain on the existing basic services, which frequently remain inaccessible in the city. At the same time, Maseru continues to expand into peri-urban villages, which for a long time have been poor. These areas depended on subsistence agriculture. However, land previously used for cultivation is fast disappearing due to new settlers from other parts of the country. These varied processes of urban growth (inward migration and urban encroachment) have affected the manifestations of poverty and created different experiences of poverty in Maseru and, in turn, shaped the livelihood strategies of its inhabitants. However, urban governance is failing to cope with the demands of this growth, thus increasing poverty.

The study has eight chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction and methodological approach to the entire study. Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical debates forming the basis for the analysis of the study. Chapter 3 gives an account of Lesotho and Maseru's historic developments including urbanization and causes of poverty. Chapter 4 traces the history and development of Maseru, presenting an empirical analysis on the effect of urbanization on manifestations of poverty. Chapter 5 analyzes the response of urban governance to poverty, revealing challenges confronting local authorities particularly in basic services delivery. Chapter 6 exposes the urban household historical transition giving an account of gender dynamics and their influence on household vulnerability. Chapter 7 presents an empirical analysis of urban livelihoods as influenced by urbanization while chapter 8 concludes that the prevailing poverty in Maseru is largely a result of Lesotho and Maseru's underdevelopment, with urbanization only worsening the condition.

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## Abbreviations/Acronyms

AGOA	African Growth Opportunity Act
BCP	Basutoland Congress Party
BFC	Building Finance Corporation
BNP	Basotho National Party
CHAL	Christian Health Association
CPDO	Central Planning and Development Office
DDCs	District Development Committees
DDCS	District Development Council Secretariat
DFID	Department for International Development
EC	European Commission
FAO	Food Agricultural Organization
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GOL	Government of Lesotho
IDA	International Development Agency
IDS	Institute of Development Studies
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LCD	Lesotho Congress for Democracy
LHC	Lesotho Housing Corporation
LHWP	Lesotho Highlands Water Project
LLA	Lesotho Liberation Army
MT	Metric Tonne
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
OECD	Organization of European Community Development
PEMS	Paris Evangelical Missionary Society
PRS	Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SLF	Sustainable Livelihood Framework
SSA	Sub-Saharan African Countries
TNCs	Transnational Corporations
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCHS	United Nations Centre for Human Settlements
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNICEF	United Nations International Children Emergency Fund
USA	United States of America
VDCs	Village Development Committees
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Organization

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Over the past two or three decades, the world has experienced an urban revolution. As numerous reports (e.g. UN-Habitat, 2008/10, World Bank, 2007, UN, 2004/7/8/9, UNCHS, 2003) have noted, for the first time in human history the majority of the world's population now lives in urban areas. In the mid 20<sup>th</sup> century, only 730 million people were urbanized and most of these were in the developed world. In the six decades since then the world has experienced phenomenal urban growth, especially in the developing world. Thus in the relatively short period from 1950 to 1990 the world's urban population more than trebled from 730 million to 2.3 billion. It was estimated at 3 billion (48 percent) in 2003 and is expected to rise to 5 billion (61 percent) in 2030. This growth has coincided and has been closely associated with increasing levels of poverty and deprivation. Urban areas in less developed countries have experienced very high annual growth rates of approximately 2.4 percent since 2000 and this rate will be steady up to 2030 (UN, 2004:1). Among the less developed regions, Latin America and the Caribbean have an exceptionally high level of urbanization (78 percent), higher than that of Europe. Africa and Asia, in contrast, remain mostly rural, with 38 percent and 41 percent, respectively, of their populations living in urban areas. Over the coming decades, the level of urbanization is expected to increase in all major areas of the developing world, with Africa and Asia urbanizing more rapidly than the rest (Appendix III (a)).

Nevertheless, by mid-century, Africa and Asia are still expected to have lower levels of urbanization than the more developed regions as well as Latin America and the Caribbean. Despite its low level of urbanization, in 2007 Asia was home to about half of the urban population in the world. Europe has the second highest share, at 16 percent. Over the next four decades, Africa and Asia will experience a marked increase in their urban populations. In Africa, the urban population is likely to treble and in Asia population will more than double (Appendix III (b)). By mid-century, most of the urban population of the world will be concentrated in Asia (54 percent) and Africa (19 percent). The world urban population is highly concentrated in a few countries. In 2007, three quarters of the 3.3 billion urban dwellers on Earth lived in 25 countries, whose urban populations ranged from 29 million in South Africa to 561 million in China. China, India and the United States of America

accounted for 35 percent of the world urban population. Most of the 25 countries with the largest urban populations are highly urbanized, but seven have levels of urbanization ranging from 27 percent to just over 50 percent and they include some of the most populous countries in the world: Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Nigeria and Pakistan. Historically, the process of rapid urbanization started first in today's more developed regions. In 1920, just less than 30 percent of their population was urban and by 1950, more than half of their population was living in urban areas. In 2007, high levels of urbanization, surpassing 80 percent, characterized Australia, New Zealand and Northern America. Europe, with 72 percent of its population living in urban areas, was the least urbanized major area in the developed world. By 2050, Australia, New Zealand and North America are all expected to be over 90 percent urban while Europe's level of urbanization is projected to be lower, at 84 percent (Appendix III (b) and UN, 2007:7).

Between 2007 and 2025, the urban areas of the world are expected to gain 1.3 billion people, including 261 million in China and 197 million in India, which is 35 percent of the total increase. Nine additional countries are projected to contribute 29 percent of the urban increment, with increases ranging from 20 million to 62 million. The countries involved are: Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo in Africa; Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines in Asia, Brazil and Mexico in Latin America, and the United States of America. Among them, those in Africa and Asia will experience high rates of urban population growth, surpassing 2 percent or even 3 percent per year. A further urban increment of 1.8 billion people is expected globally during 2025-2050, with India being the major contributor (377 million) and China following (205 million). Together, the two most populous countries on Earth are expected to account for 32 percent of urban growth during 2025-2050. In 2050, China will still have the largest urban population (1 billion), followed by India (0.9 billion). In a few developed countries, the urban population will decrease. Despite the projected increases in the level of urbanization, overall population decline in several countries will lead to a reduction in the number of urban dwellers (UN, 2007:8).

The 3.3 billion urban dwellers in 2007 experienced uneven distribution in urban settlements of different size. Over half of the world urban population (52 percent) lived in cities or towns with fewer than half a million inhabitants. In the more developed regions, 54 percent of the urban population lived in small urban centres and 51 percent did so in the less developed regions. Between 2007 and 2025, small urban centres are expected to absorb nearly half of the expected increase in the urban population. Cities in the next size class, whose population

ranges from 500,000 to one million inhabitants, are numerous (460 in 2007 rising to 551 in 2025), but they account for just 10 percent of the overall urban population. Medium-sized cities, with more than a million inhabitants but fewer than 5 million, are also numerous (382 in 2007 increasing to 524 in 2025) and they account for 23 percent of the urban population. The distribution of the urban population by city size varies among the major areas (Appendix III(c)). Africa followed the increasing trend of urban population like other areas in the world.

### **Africa's Megacities**

Africa experienced economic growth in the 1960s but from the 1970s, a range of difficulties afflicted many national economies, reflected in declining levels of growth and then stagnation and decline (UNCHS, 2003:6). By the late 1970s population growth outpaced industrial growth leading to low employment, increased demand for goods and services, pushing up prices of these commodities. According to Mike, these problems manifested themselves dramatically in urban areas as delinking urbanization from industrialization, which dispelled earlier analysis (and perhaps hope) that economic decline would reverse urban-based migration. However, in low-income countries economic recession did not necessarily lead to a decline in urban populations from the 1980s (Mike, 2006:15-18). Lagos, Cairo, Nairobi, Johannesburg, as the major points of rapid growth in Africa, indicate continual population increases with repercussions on development.

Although LagosState is the smallest state in Nigeria, with an area of 356,861 hectares of which 75,755 hectares are wetlands, it has the highest population, which is over 5 percent of the national estimate. The state has a population of 17 million out of a national estimate of 150 million. The UN estimates that at its present growth rate, LagosState will be the third largest mega city in the world by 2015, after Tokyo in Japan and Mumbai in India. Of this population, Metropolitan Lagos, an area covering 37 percent of the land area of LagosState, is home to over 8 percent of the state population. The rate of population growth is about 600,000 per annum with a population density of about 4,193 persons per km<sup>2</sup>. In the built-up areas of Metropolitan Lagos, the average density is over 20,000 persons per km<sup>2</sup>. This phenomenal growth is largely attributable to rural-urban migration and natural population increase, with the latter more prominent in most urban areas. Current demographic trend analysis has revealed that the State population growth rate of 8 percent has resulted in its capturing 36.8 percent of Nigeria's urban population, which is 49.8 million people of the nation's population. The implication is that, whereas country population growth is 4-5

percent, Lagos population is growing ten times faster than New York and Los Angeles, with grave implications for urban sustainability (Olokesusi, 2011 and Lagos State Official Report, 2006). The growth creates challenges such as poverty, environmental degradation, inadequate infrastructure and finance, insecurity and inequality, all of which impact negatively on individuals, groups, societies and national development. These challenges hamper social welfare and hinder development and, in addition, place costs on the health and well-being of people. Exclusionary development limits the capacity for improved and sustainable livelihoods. Inequality and lack of opportunity also reduce productivity opportunities for poverty reduction, while also creating conditions that militate against sustainable social and economic development, like slums. Furthermore, gender inequality in access to social capital, for example, has implications for the capacity of women to pursue and encourage livelihood strategies requiring coordinated actions. It also weakens the prospector good governance and effectiveness of government policies (Olokesusi, 2011:2).

Like Lagos, Cairo in North Africa has also experienced a drastic urban population growth. Cairo has continued to represent the main historical, economic and urban pole for Egypt since its establishment more than 1000 years ago. The total population of the region is 14 million in addition to 1.2 million in new cities (Table 1.1), 22 percent of the total population of the country and 43 percent of total urban population. Within the last three decades, the total built-up area increased by more than 270 percent. In 1900, the total built-up area was 42 km<sup>2</sup>, in 1950, 120 km<sup>2</sup>, in 1970, 198, 2 km<sup>2</sup>, in 2000, 524, 4 km<sup>2</sup>. Being the seat of Government and the concentration of main services and facilities has contributed to the excessive growth of the region. The previous approach adopted by the government to mitigate this centralization problem has led to further development of the region (e.g., new urban communities around the region). Rapid urban expansion has resulted in encroachments on agricultural land. Total prime agricultural land lost to urbanization during the period 1952-2002 amounts to 300,000 acres. Urbanization has led to very rapid expansion of urban built-up areas which has taken place mostly within informal and squatter settlements on the peripheries of cities, with inadequate infrastructure and services. About 8-10 million live in informal or squatter settlements (World Bank, 2007:2).



**Table 1.1: The Current and Expected Growth in GCR (Greater Cairo Region)**

Built-up area	2006 (Current growth) 14 million	2022 (Expected growth) 17.2 million
NewUrban Communities	1.2 million	6.8 million
Total	24 million	

Source: World Bank Report, 2007.

The main challenges facing the Greater Cairo Region due to the population increase include the unplanned growth of the built-up area, the excessive pressure on infrastructure, environmental degradation and high rates of pollution, major traffic and transportation problems within the region, lack of coherent institutional framework to manage the region, and weak connectivity between existing built-up area and new urban communities (World Bank, 2007:20).

This urban growth is also a feature of Nairobi, Kenya's capital in East Africa. Kenya, like many other developing countries in Africa, is experiencing rapid urban growth (UN Habitat, 2008:102). Many cities and towns have grown in population size and also expanded spatially to form huge metropolitan regions. Kenya's capital city, Nairobi, is centrally located in the country and covers an area of 684 km<sup>2</sup> and holds a population of 3.3 million people. The projected population (2007) of the metropolitan region was estimated at 5,640,273 people (Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development, 2008:19). The metropolitan region population is projected to grow to 7.6 million people (2012), 10.8 million (2022) and 14.3 million (2030) (Appendix III (d)). Due to the rapid urbanization, it is estimated that by 2030, Kenya will have a predominantly urban population of about 61.5 percent. It is also estimated that the Nairobi Metropolitan region will accommodate the bulk of this urban population.

The rapid urbanization also generates many problems and challenges economically, socially and environmentally. Nairobi Metropolitan Region is faced with numerous problems and challenges. These include, among others, population growth, high unemployment and low incomes, massive urban sprawl and encroachment into rich agricultural and water catchment areas, haphazard and uncoordinated and incompatible urban and rural development, inadequate and informal housing, poor provision and inadequate infrastructure and utility services, poor and inadequate community and social services, poor transport services, environmental degradation and pollution, poor sanitation, poor and uncoordinated

governance system, poor safety and insecurity concerns and ineffective legal and governance institutions (Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development, 2009:38). Unfortunately, the rate of population growth is not matched by the rate of economic growth and equity. The result is decreased average per capita and household income. Nairobi metropolitan region is therefore faced with increased poverty (Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development, 2008:25). Nairobi has an overall poverty headcount index of 21 percent (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2007:51). Nairobi is home to some of the largest low income and informal urban settlements in Africa, particularly Kibera and Mathare (Omwenga, 2010:8).

Cities in Southern Africa including Johannesburg and Maseru, a particular focus area for this research, as well were not the exception of this urban revolution. The city of Johannesburg in the Republic of South Africa/RSA lies at the heart of a sprawling metropolis. This metropolis, which is called the Gauteng City Region, roughly corresponds with the boundaries of Gauteng Province. It stretches from Soshanguve in the north to VanderbijlPark in the south and from Carletonville in the west to Springs in the east (Crankshaw and Parnell, 2000:348). In the early years of its existence, as Johannesburg expanded, so did its need for African labour. After the First World War, establishment of a large number of factories took place and grew in size. More and more Africans moved to the city. As the African working class grew in Johannesburg, the population of the freehold townships expanded. The growing manufacturing sector early in the 1930s coupled with increasing levels of poverty in rural South Africa combined to produce increased levels of migration to the cities. The composition of those migrating during this period is significant. Although female migration was evident from the 1920s, Sophiatown tended to attract mainly single males in the early part of the 1930s that had come for mining employment. The exception was Basotho women who were attracted to Newclare as opposed to Sophiatown, where beer brewing became a lucrative trade (Bonner, 2009:71-72).

While Johannesburg is an obvious example of a large city in a relatively developed country but which is riddled by social and economic inequality, it is portrayed as a world city. It is a cosmopolitan city, with extensive demographic, political and economic connections with Africa, Asia, Europe, Australia and North America that date back to colonial times. Johannesburg is the economic hub of both South Africa and the Southern African region and thus dominates the southern African region. Besides urbanizing rural migrants, it increasingly hosts foreign immigrants from extremely poor nations such as Mozambique, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, and Swaziland (Cities Network, 2012).

In 1996, the urban population of the Johannesburg region was about 7.3 million, which was one third of the national urban population of 21.8 million. The population of the Johannesburg region as a whole has shown a higher and more enduring rate of growth. The annual population growth rate of the Johannesburg region grew from 4.0 percent between 1946 and 1951 to 6.0 percent between 1960 and 1970. Thereafter, the population growth rate declined, falling to a rate of 2.8 percent per annum between 1991 and 1996. The main reason for these divergent trends is that the boundaries of the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council are hemmed in by other urban settlements, except in the southwest. Consequently, whereas Johannesburg has almost reached the geographical limits of its expansion, the surrounding regions of the East and West Rand, Pretoria, and the Vaal Triangle have continued to expand outwards (Cities Network, 2011). However, several challenges are facing the city management.

In the townships, housing crises and squatter movements have sprung up all over, few services are provided by the municipal, including street lighting in some places, water supply and sanitation. As a result, diseases are easily spread through the water supply. Sanitation facilities are also vastly inadequate, further resulting in the spread of the diseases. Johannesburg Municipal claimed that the rates paid by the residents are not enough to cover the costs of installing a proper water and electricity supply in such areas (Cities Network, 2012).

Literature on urban revolution globally and in Africa explains the differentiated patterns of urbanization in major cities. Small cities, including Maseru, have not been much of a concern in the literature. Though Maseru is different in that it is a secondary city (in terms of the global city theory and its position in the sub-region) with lesser population and cannot be equated with major cities, the data on trends outlined confirm the similar urban revolution in Maseru. The city as also a low income city like many other cities of the developing world the city has also had phenomenal urban growth, particularly in the last three decades, posing similar challenges experienced by other primary cities globally.

The rapid urban growth of Maseru has affected household structure and gender relations. In the last two decades, the employment structure of Lesotho's population has changed significantly. So wives, being de facto female household heads during the previous period of male migrancy, now have lost this status with the continued presence of the de jure head of the household. This has provoked women to feel obliged to go out to find other means of

survival in the absence of income from the mines. As a result, women have been migrating to the urban areas of Lesotho seeking for jobs for the survival of their families, which previously depended on remittances (Sweetman, 1996:4), further increasing the urban population and poverty levels in such areas, with Maseru receiving more women migrants, as noted in chapter 5. Moreover, since the 1990s opportunities have emerged for women to work in Lesotho's rapidly growing textile industry as a result of the African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) of 2000. In 2007 the industry employed 47,040 workers (Bennet, 2006:173).

Maseru like other African cities is also experiencing urban poverty. A variety of socio-economic difficulties has accompanied urbanization. Although there have been instances where urban growth has coincided with economic growth (e.g. in china), the experience over the past four decades for the majority of inhabitants of cities in LDCs has been of marginalisation and poverty. What have been the main manifestations of this phenomenon? These include slums with no proper supply of water and sanitation. UNCH (2003:3) estimates that 40-50 percent of the population lives in slums and informal settlements. Some 40 percent of this population does not have access to safe water supply; over 50 percent does not have access to proper sanitation. Clearly urban poverty will continue to present a major problem and the scale of the problem is likely to grow in absolute numbers in Africa, where rapid urbanization and persistently high levels of poverty are quintessential features of contemporary life for the majority of the continent's inhabitants.

These processes have manifested themselves acutely over the past twenty-five years in Lesotho. This is one of the poorest countries in the world (ranking 158 out of 177), and this fact has largely determined the nature of urbanization with deepening economic problems. Poverty has affected most of the country – rural and urban. However, there has been a profound shift in location of that poverty. Poverty has now become an urban problem, whereas before it was overwhelmingly a rural phenomenon. Moreover, due to the nature of urban development in the country, it is primarily concentrated in Maseru – the primary city of this small, land-locked country.

Urbanization has resulted in the concentration of poverty in Maseru. Since independence in 1966, Maseru has experienced unprecedented and largely unplanned growth causing inadequate and skewed distribution of services. A city has arisen in an area that previously contained rural settlements scattered around a small (then colonial) administrative centre. It is now exploding with people from remote villages around the country seeking employment

opportunities and better services. Perceived employment opportunities resulting from the concentration of jobs and facilities in the city draw them. Though the city has become a magnet for them, it lacks the absorptive capacity to accommodate this influx of work-seekers. Consequently, unemployment has consistently increased, contributing to the increase in poverty levels. Furthermore, the city continuously expands into poor peri-urban villages, which are dependent on subsistence agriculture. However, land previously used for cultivation is fast disappearing due to new settlers from other parts of the country. These varied processes of urban growth (inward migration and urban encroachment) have created different experiences of poverty in Maseru and, in turn, shaped the livelihood strategies of its inhabitants.

### **Study's Aim**

This thesis aims to explore the relationship between urbanization and urban poverty in Maseru, the capital city of Lesotho. It examines how different forms and patterns of urbanization have affected the manifestations of poverty in different parts of Maseru, and then analyses the varied livelihood strategies employed by the poor residents of the areas of Sekamaneng, Motimposo and Thibella. Although the primary focus of this study is on Maseru, the history and current socio-economic status of the city is also understandable within the broader development of the country. The structural changes in the development of Lesotho including urbanization, resulted in general poverty across the country, but became more concentrated among the poor citizens in the city. The study argues that certain forms and patterns of urbanization have led to different experiences of poverty in different areas. It assumes a direct relationship between urbanization and poverty and that such urbanization has unsettled and modified the livelihoods of the urban poor.

The thesis has two overarching and overlapping aims. First, it analyzes the varied manifestations of poverty caused by the rapid and differentiated processes of urbanization in Maseru. Although Maseru has been in existence since the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, it has only developed as a significant urban centre over the past 25 years. During this period, urban poverty levels have escalated. However, the spatial variation in the ways in which poverty is experienced has received no attention in the broad literature on underdevelopment in Lesotho and Maseru specifically and this study seeks to fill such a gap. Second, the thesis proceeds from the hypothesis that the increase in poverty has unsettled traditional livelihood strategies, compelling residents to employ different livelihood strategies to survive. Comparing the varied livelihood strategies adopted in the three urban communities, namely Thibella,

Motimposo and Sekamaneng, explains these issues. The thesis pays special attention to the experiences of women, both as the most poverty-stricken section of the urban population and as key agents in the development of livelihood strategies, and compares them to men (See chapter 7).

### **Key Questions**

The main question this research project seeks to answer is how differentiated forms and patterns of urbanization have affected the manifestations of poverty in different parts of Maseru, particularly Thibella, Motimposo and Sekamaneng. Nonetheless, other secondary questions could also help to investigate the intense poverty in these areas, which are:

1. How have forms and patterns of urbanization led to varied experiences of poverty in these areas and what are the coping mechanisms adopted by the urban poor in these areas?
2. How have forms and patterns of urbanization unsettled and modified the livelihoods of the urban poor?
3. How are the different categories of the population affected by urbanization?

### **Rationale**

Until recently, Maseru has not featured in the fast-growing literature on urban Africa, mainly because the literature does not regard it as a significant urban settlement. The proliferation of research on urban Africa has made an enormous contribution to generating better understanding of the continent's urban history and the development challenges resulting from the contemporary urban revolution. Yet, as several scholars have noted, this research has tended to focus on the metropolitan areas and major urban concentrations (Simmonds and Hack, 2000; Hardoy, Mitlan and Satterthwaite, 2001; Jones, 2002 and Cohen and Vilar, 2005). Secondary cities, like Maseru, have tended to suffer neglect. One obvious problem arising from this bias is that major cities are representative of the urban experience in Africa. Undoubtedly, there are important similarities in African urban history and development. Cities in Africa were able to develop from non-agricultural activities particularly trade. Most of these cities, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, originated from the colonial occupation of Africa. They are also mostly a result of lack of rural sector development that has triggered rural-urban migration. However, as urban scholars have pointed out, there are also critical variances determined by complex histories, regional and national specificities (Nigel, 1990;

Gugler, 1997; Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2004 and Freund, 2007). Another important variable is the urban scale. In other words, we cannot simply equate smaller urban centres like Maseru to massive urban agglomerations like Lagos, Cairo or Johannesburg.

Most studies on the developmental challenges of Lesotho have focused on problems of rural poverty (Murray, 1981; Wallis and Van de Geer, 1982; Sechaba Consultants, 1994 and 2000 and Turner, 2003). However, as elsewhere in the developing world, the problem of poverty in Lesotho is increasingly manifesting itself as an urban phenomenon. Maseru, being the primary city of Lesotho (not dissimilar to the position of Cairo in Egypt and Nairobi in Kenya), has experienced this dilemma in a particularly concentrated form where, besides the natural population growth, it has been absorbing more people from rural areas since long before independence. Recently the city has encroached on peri-urban areas that used to be rural settlements. The relative absence of research in Maseru particularly in these areas means there is an endless list of unanswered questions. This research makes a modest contribution to this relatively new area of research by addressing aspects of urban poverty and responses thereto, and thus fills the gap in the literature on urbanization and poverty in Maseru, making it a new contribution to the literature on small cities in Africa and on Lesotho in particular.

The study focuses on three areas, Thibella, Motimposo and Sekamaneng, with the hypothesis that different forms and patterns of urbanization have caused varying manifestations of poverty and livelihood strategies. Testing this hypothesis, the study used the following criteria in the selection of the three areas. First, what forms and patterns of urbanization took place in each area (Appendix IV (a)). Second, how such forms and patterns of urbanization affected the manifestations of poverty (Appendix IV(b) and chapter 4), bearing in mind that poverty was not a new phenomenon in the areas, but has been an inherent feature in the experiences of the country as a whole, as expounded in chapter 3 of this research project. Third, which livelihood strategies existed in each area before urbanization and how this process modified these and lastly, which new strategies are in place to cope with the existing poverty (Appendix IV(c) and chapter 7). However, I must note that these areas are not necessarily the only places in the city where poverty is concentrated. I chose them based on their location, as they lie at different distances from the city centre, and their differences in concentration of population. The intention was to highlight their differences concerning the forms and patterns of urbanization they experienced and how these influenced poverty. The main concern for choosing these poor communities was to understand poverty in urban areas. Maseru is a localized city that has expanded and encroached into peri-urban communities,

most of which are poor. Only a few are well-off areas, mainly due to the spatial disparity of colonial development patterns. The three communities of Thibella, Sekamaneng and Motimposo are in this research study a reflection of poverty that exists in most of the areas of the city and therefore are representative and constitute this study's sample. Certain differences regarding the three areas were discovered in this research.

Thibella is an area which is at the centre of the city. A high concentration of population in the area due to natural population growth and rural-urban migration as processes of urbanization from the colonial period outpaced the facilities available faster than in other areas in the city. Its proximity to the mining recruiting agencies and business entities for job seekers were the main contributing factors to this growth. The population adopted multiple livelihood strategies, prominent among others being street vending and home beer brewing, dating back to the colonial times. Motimposo, which is an area adjacent to the city, was a peri-urban area as far back as the colonial era with a vast amount of land used for cultivation. As wives began realizing the importance of being closer to the country's main border in Maseru, the entry point used by their spouses who were mining migrants, they decided to meet them half-way, to reduce time constraints, as their spouses' contracts provided little time for home visits. At the beginning this was temporary, as most of these wives from rural areas lodged with relatives and other interested people. Several factors later made these partners want to settle permanently, including the changes in the contracts of the spouses who worked in the mines. Initially, upon recruitment miners had to stay in the mines for two years before visiting home. Later they were given six-month contracts, which did not warrant any movement of their spouses to nearby places. However, later, their employers allowed them visits home within the same contracts for one month, which prompted their spouses to move to places near to the border crossings. Moreover, some people moved from the rural areas which were far from town seeking for employment and ended up renting in Motimposo for several years. Those who decided to settle sought for land from those who had land, predominantly used for subsistence agriculture. This converted agricultural land into settlement areas, resulted in poverty in households, which initially depended on land for survival. They now depend on several types of livelihood strategies, including among others reliance on old-age pension and begging from passersby. Though forms of urbanization (natural population growth and rural-urban migration) experienced by Motimposo and Thibella are similar, the pace and the pattern at which urbanization took place makes them different. Thibella has been growing faster than Motimposo. This growth has affected these areas differently. For example, the



high concentration of population in a small space in Thibella has resulted in higher intensity of poverty than in Motimposo, where land was initially abundant as illustrated in Chapter 4. The livelihood strategies also differ depending on the environment in which people live (See Chapter 7).

I chose Sekamaneng on the basis that it is an area encroached by the city after redefining its boundaries in 1980. The area also experienced population growth from the same processes as those in Thibella and Motimposo of natural population growth and rural-urban migration. This means that these urbanization processes in a semi-rural environment with vast amount of land for both agriculture and rangeland experienced a different pattern of population growth leading into a different poverty situation from the other two areas. From the 1980s, when other areas next to the city-Thibella, Motimposo and other areas which are not part of this research, were burgeoning with population, some immigrants. In this research project, the word 'immigrant' represents the person not born in the place but came elsewhere and moved into places like Sekamaneng. Eventually many sought for land to settle. Many of the people who were born in the area and were in possession of land, concerned by the possibility of losing their land in the new urbanization process – encroachment, sold out their land to immigrants seeking places for settlement. Consequently, many households, which initially relied on land for survival, are now living in poverty (See Chapter 7). By engaging only poor households in this research project, the intention was to show how urbanization has affected the manifestations of poverty and which livelihood strategies the poor have adopted in coping with poverty. Only the lives of the poor could reflect that.

### **Methodology**

One of the main challenges confronted by this research project was the combination of a dearth of primary and secondary material and difficulties experienced in accessing official records. As indicated above, until recently the overwhelming focus of official and academic research on poverty in Lesotho has been on the rural areas, a bias reflected in the data held by the government. As a result, empirical data on Maseru is uneven at best. This is especially the case for the three areas that are the focus of this study. Material from different sources including books contained very little information on how different forms and patterns of urbanization affected the manifestations of poverty in Maseru, particularly the three communities (Thibella, Motimposo and Sekamaneng) and the livelihood strategies adopted in response to this poverty. Therefore a critical part of this project was simply to collect and

collate as much material from different sources as possible in order to establish a databank on development in Maseru, particularly since independence.

In order to meet this challenge, I decided to employ three research techniques, namely, archival research, life-history interviews and observation. In particular, I conducted numerous in-depth life-history interviews in the three communities while simultaneously observing the everyday lives of inhabitants.

In gaining access to the information, my position as an insider was an advantage. Being a citizen who speaks the language, familiar with the places and well-informed basis of knowledge about the Basotho culture and customs, was beneficial. Respect is foremost whenever one visits any household. The first thing was to greet the family by shaking a hand with everyone present, which serves as a receptive mechanism among the Basotho. As a result, it was also easy to gain their trust and for them to become free to talk to me about the issues under investigation in this research project. Besides the academic purpose of study I explained, I further explained my position as both a scholar and a teacher in one of the schools in the country, which further gave them confidence in what I was doing. They were delighted to meet a teacher of their children. They also believed that I would be in a better position to negotiate with the government concerning their long-standing needs. This is because the local authorities as part of government introduced me to them, which gave them that impression. Besides this, being a woman further gave an advantage of appreciation and respect from the respondents. According to Basotho tradition, a woman is a mother to the nation deserving respect. As such, as a sign of acceptance and respect, one male villager gave me an escort to every household to introduce me. However, there were some difficulties encountered.

Issues of poverty are often sensitive and difficult to research on, as households normally do not want to reveal their status to outsiders. It took some time to convince the respondents that whatever information obtained from them would be for purposes agreed upon only. This made me to spend quite a long time in collecting information in the three communities. Some people were annoyed by my presence and when they saw me, they declined even to talk to me. They said ‘What does she want? Is she going to give us anything? Let her leave us if she is not going to give us anything. We have had too many people coming to us asking questions but none has ever helped us’, while some people associated this research with the relief aid from elsewhere. Some thought that being part of the study would qualify them for relief aid,

mostly because they were poor, but when they heard a different explanation about the purpose of the research, they became angry. Nevertheless, local authorities played a key role in this research study. They served as an entry point into the communities in their own right as part of the government as they also introduced me to the respondents needed for the study. The local authorities convinced them about the need to do this research by mentioning that it is for academic requirements, and thereafter the information will assist in the formulation of policies by the government so that it can address their problems in future. Finally, I won their cooperation. On balance, taking account of the advantages and disadvantages, I achieved the key objective of obtaining information needed for this research project.

### **Archival Research**

Although the Lesotho government collects and holds a large body of data on the country and Maseru's development, it has managed the archives unevenly throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, resulting in significant gaps. This is true for both the colonial and post-colonial eras.

Most of the documents which were consulted for the 19<sup>th</sup> century and for the 20<sup>th</sup> century colonial period include Pim's 1935 Basutoland Economic Situation Report; Sanders, 1975; Kimble, 1978; Murray, 1981; Ambrose, 1993; Eldredge, 1993; Mothibe and Ntabeni, 2002; Thabane, 2002; Showers and Malahleha, 2002; Nyeko, 2002 and Pule, 2002. The material focused on Lesotho's economic and political developments during the colonial period. It reflected how Lesotho became a weak state, economically dependent on the Republic of South Africa (RSA). It further indicated how its collapse from a self-sufficient agricultural independent economy led to its integration into the regional cash economy, making Basotho to adopt multiple ways of earning cash for livelihood. This set of literature further gave a snapshot of the socio-economic as well as demographic developments of Maseru from being a camp to a town. Though the data indicated these developments in Maseru, which also indicated some form of urbanization that was taking place in the form of rural-urban migration, specifically it indicated the repercussions of this growth, including overcrowding that outpaced the existing facilities in Maseru at the time. This was already a symptom of poverty. The data did not reflect on manifestations of poverty and the impact of urbanization on these manifestations in the three areas under study. Furthermore, the data did not reflect how urbanization affected the livelihoods on which people living in these areas depended. These were the major gaps identified which needed further investigation as carried out by this research project. Nonetheless, the material allowed me to analyze how the Lesotho's

experiences have had a bearing on the prevailing poverty in Maseru. More specifically, I was able to establish how poverty emerged in different parts of Maseru.

For the post-colonial period, a variety of sources, including state archives (national and local); international agencies reports e.g. UN, Care International and World Vision International which have done surveys on poverty in Lesotho, and any other related sources were consulted. Among others were Lesotho Economic Performance Review reports from 1980 to 2007, Lesotho Population Census reports of 1976, 1986, 1996 and 2006, Government of Lesotho Five-Year Development Plans from 1980 to 2000, the Laws of Lesotho 2006, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2003, reports on Lesotho Poverty Situation by Food and Agricultural Organization and World Food Programme 2005, Country Profile 2005, Report on Decentralization and Development in Lesotho 1989, UN Human Development reports and UNCHS reports, Mabote Project and Lesotho Housing Project Reports 1982 to 2007, Municipal Services Distribution reports 1992 to 2007, and Water and Sanitation policy document, 2008. I also consulted several other reports and books on Lesotho. I accessed most of these documents in the National University of Lesotho/NUL library, while some were from the Ministries of Finance and Economic Planning, other important sources were the Bureau of Statistics, Local Government and Chieftainship Affairs, Natural Resources, Central Bank of Lesotho and Sechaba Consultants' offices in Maseru. As was the case with colonial period collected data, post-colonial documentation also did not reflect how differentiated forms and patterns of urbanization affect manifestations of poverty in the areas under study. However, it provided socio-economic and demographic data pertaining to migration of people within the country and to other African countries, mostly RSA, and reasons behind such movement as well as political developments in the post-colonial period, all of which exacerbated poverty in the country and the capital.

Overall, these archives provided statistical data and historical information on development in Lesotho that were useful in knowing the country's background, particularly how poverty emerged and developed and various development processes including urbanization in Maseru. The data was also very useful in providing the basis on which the empirical data collected later could be cross-referenced, as the experiences of both the country and the city were similar to those of the three areas under study.

I must acknowledge that to carry out a task of this magnitude, of gathering information to reflect the socio-economic, demographic and political transformations within Lesotho over a

period of time starting from the post-colonial period was an experience of its own nature. There were several challenges which came up during the research, where there were gaps in the data obtained from the country's official reports, in which case material from international agencies and individual scholars bridged the gap. It was again very frustrating when the country's records offered little or sometimes no information on important issues being researched, being the main source from which researchers expect to get information they need, in which case there was no way to find such information. This has left gaps in supporting data on some important issues in this research. However, such official reports were included to emphasize the significance/impact of such an issue in the research. Mostly the data was outdated dating back to the 1990s and could not reflect current trends. Finding recent publications was so tedious and time consuming due to using sources from the internet for almost all the five chapters. Huge data was a challenge, nonetheless, I managed to collate all the necessary information. I have presented such information according to categories, showing how different processes have happened. I have also provided evidence on how poverty emerged and developed involving a number of processes, which have taken place over a period. This was important in that poverty in Lesotho is not a recent phenomenon but inherited from the past. However, the information gathered was silent about the central focus of this study. This created a need for conducting interviews in order to obtain the missing links to fill the gaps. Such gaps included how differentiated forms and patterns of urbanization affected the manifestations of poverty in the three communities (Thibella, Sekamaneng and Motimposo) and how these modified the livelihood strategies in these areas.

### **Life History Interviews**

Life history interviews are one form of in-depth interviews used to obtain data from the participants based on shared social experiences that occurred years ago. This involves how individuals conceive of the world around them and how they make sense of the important events in their lives, as opposed to Key-informant interviews, Elite interviews and Phenomenological interviews. Key-informant interviews seek special knowledge from individuals with certain status only because they have access to information unavailable to the researcher. Elite interviews focus on individuals in an organization or community who may be influential, prominent and well informed about specific issues, while Phenomenological interviews study the meanings of lived experience among selected participants. The experience studied is usually something that has affected the individual significantly (McMillan Schumacher, 2001:443-449).The decision to engage in life history

interviews in this research project was influenced by two factors: first, the dearth of documentary material on the experiences of poverty and livelihoods of poor residents of Maseru and, second, through interviews I got a richer sense of the processes of urbanization, experiences and manifestations of poverty and, finally, the livelihood strategies employed by these people. The technique was useful as it involved direct interaction between the subjects and me. It allowed face-to-face interaction to probe some responses or seek clarification on those that were not clear or to get accurate responses if not provided in the first instance (see McMillan and Schumacher, 2001:446). This provided a high degree of objectivity and uniformity in understanding how urbanization influenced poverty in the areas chosen. In carrying out the interviews, priority was on engaging household heads to respond to the questions because they knew much of the details pertaining to households' living conditions and livelihoods. However, I also interviewed other members of the household who were economically active, for more information. This helped in collecting information on the poverty situation of the household and its livelihood strategies not only from an individual perspective but from many perspectives. Furthermore, I interviewed members who participated in the informal sector and contributed to the household means of survival. The main reason was that households participating in the informal sector as a strategy of survival differed from households that did not engage in such activity, and as such, their livelihoods and their experiences of poverty differed.

Specific interview questions administered under each theme (Appendix I/Questionnaire) enabled collection of information needed to ascertain how the differentiated forms and patterns of urbanization influenced poverty and livelihoods in the three areas. There were two categories of households interviewed: those of people who lived in Maseru prior to 1980 and those who only migrated into Maseru later than 1980. The first category comprised mostly natives ('natives' here refer to people born in the place) of such areas who had the knowledge of how urban life was before the drastic urban growth took place in Maseru (1980). They were able to provide information about changes that took place over a period of time that affected even their livelihoods. The second category comprised immigrants who settled in the areas after 1980. They provided information on the effects of urbanization on their lives. The collected data reflected lived social experiences of these two categories of people about the effect of urbanization on poverty and livelihoods. Specifically, the interviews focused on socio-economic variables, such as the level of education attained, employment, income, forms of livelihood, thus establishing any impact of urbanization. Though the study was not a

gender-based research, it further paid attention to aspects of gender by interviewing men and women in both categories. Most of the respondents were women because most of the households were female-headed. One reason is that most men search for income outside their homesteads and are hardly at home while women are normally at home most of the time as housewives. Another reason is that often women are single parents due to several reasons, in which case they become household heads, hence, more women (66) than men (54) were interviewed (Appendix II).

Nonetheless, there were some disadvantages in using the life history interviewing method. The technique required the participants to give information on their lived experiences sequentially over the years, but this was not easy, as many became emotional about their situation. They ended giving irrelevant details while expressing their history. To correct this problem, I had to probe to get the required data, which often consumed quite a substantial amount of time in conducting interviews. Furthermore, the interviews needed use of the local language understandable to the participants. Later, they required transcribing in English, a process that was difficult when one has to narrate the story the way it was from an interview. This became one limiting factor in finishing data collection in lesser time and extended the fieldwork to six months. However, the in-depth interviews alone could not fully explain what was happening around the poor. I further used observation to bring to light surrounding living conditions and problems in the poor households. I was able to note non-verbal behaviour to ascertain the validity of the responses.

### **Observation**

As a technique for gathering information observation means looking at a set of multiple variables as they naturally appear. This is important for the researcher in that he/she studies what occurs in real life as opposed to artificial settings. Another advantage is that using the observational method the researcher does not need to worry about the limitations of self-report bias, social desirability or response set, and the information is not limited to what can be recalled accurately by the subjects. Beginning with the research problem or question, the variables that needed observation are ascertained (McMillan and Schumacher, 2001:273). In this research project, I used systematic observation to examine specific socio-economic indicators of poverty in the households. This included inspecting living conditions, housing conditions and space used/congestion, access to services, assets owned and livelihoods. Observation helped me to confirm the narrative stories of lived experiences by the poor in their households. It revealed holistically the devastating conditions in which poor households

lived, most particularly in Motimposo and Thibella, not known before by Basotho citizens like me who do not live in these areas. The method gave the true reflection of the situation without information from the concerned people only. McMillan and Schumacher (2006:273) also state that,

As a technique for gathering information, the observational method relies on the researcher's seeing and hearing things  
And recording these observations rather than relying on  
subjects' self-report responses to questions and statements.

However, there were a few limitations encountered where consistency in observing all variables in each household was not easy to maintain during the fieldwork. I had to recall things during transcription, done at the end of each day's interviews. Nonetheless, this research project encountered limitations in the use of all the three methods. The archival research approach could not provide sufficient needed information, as indicated. The available data was not open to generalization as it mostly targeted specific areas not under research but useful for reference in the study. It needed complementary life history interviews to gather data from specific areas of research. These interviews compelled use of statistical tools of data sorting thus allowing statistical inference whereby frequencies for normative statistical statements could be easily obtained. The method could not sufficiently reflect the situation on the ground concerning the effect of urbanization on poverty and livelihoods. Observation complemented the other two methods. The data collected enabled comprehending of manifestations of poverty within the context of rapid urbanization in Maseru and different livelihood strategies adopted by the poor in the three communities. The data also enabled comparison of such different livelihood strategies employed by the three communities mentioned. The collated information has served as evidence in the analytical chapters of this research project. It will also serve as archival material for future reference in the National University of Lesotho.

### **Choosing the Respondents**

Purposeful sampling was used in choosing the three research sites and the respondents for this research. It allowed the selection of areas and respondents suitable for obtaining needed information, thus allowing an intensive in-depth research study (see Neuman, 1997). Additionally, McMillan and Schumacher (2001:400) state that purposeful sampling is



“selecting information-rich cases for study in-depth.” The sample comprised subjects with needed characteristics indicating poverty. The most important indicators which I wanted to establish were the availability of clean water for household consumption, proper sanitation that promotes good health in the household, availability of electricity, available sources of income to meet household needs and other means besides income the household depended on. In order to ascertain these characteristics during the fieldwork, respective chiefs identified poor households for interviews. The research comprised a total sample of 120 respondents from all three communities (Thibella, Sekamaneng, and Motimposo), with approximately 40 respondents interviewed from each area, and often involved more than one person per household. I interviewed household heads and other members who made direct economic contributions to the household survival. This means that in some cases there were households comprising a head and one member who were interviewed, mostly heads with the spouses, as both were active in the household survival means. The sample population was representative based on known, identified and observed indicated characteristics of their urban poverty, the focus of this research of understanding poverty in urban areas and how the poor engage in livelihood strategies to avert poverty. This reflects the fact that Maseru, the capital, has only a few middle-income areas as reflected in chapters 3 and 4. As such, the picture depicted by this sample is a reasonably accurate reflection of many poor communities in Maseru today, and indeed the country on general. When considering the population density of Lesotho of 2.2 million and Maseru in particular of 20 percent (197, 907 from 2006 Population Census) the sample is representative and can allow generalizations.

This sampling technique was chosen on the basis that it was manageable in terms of time and financial resources allocated for this research. This was in line with the argument that the study that utilizes a purposeful sampling is justifiable and appropriate on merits of being less costly, less time-consuming, easy to administrate, usually assuring high participation rate, enabling generalization of the similar subjects and assuring receipt of needed information as opposed to other types of sampling methods including simple random sampling. For example, simple random sampling was not useful in that it requires first the identification of the sample from the population and assumes that all members of the population have the same probability of responding. Second, though it requires little knowledge of the population, the limitation is that it needs certain procedures to avoid bias in the sample. One procedure could be assigning numbers to the sample elements to represent a certain characteristic and make a draw. If one does not follow this procedure correctly, what may be purported to be a random

sample may produce a biased sample - biased in the sense that certain population characteristics are over or under represented. This is often easy when using computer software in compiling and analyzing the data (McMillan and Schumacher, 2001:170-178). The process is therefore, considered costly and time consuming. In the case of this research project, understanding how different forms and patterns of urbanization affected manifestations of poverty in urban areas and the livelihood strategies adopted by the poor required the identification of the sample based on established criteria. The criteria included gender, generation/age, and length of stay in the urban area, employment status, income level, welfare recipient, asset ownership and access to basic services (water supply, proper sanitation and electricity as elaborated below) in measuring the differing levels of poverty. The hypothesis was that different forms and patterns have affected the poor differently. Purposeful sampling overcame the three limitations of the simple random sampling including simple random bias, complex and long procedures for sample arrangement and its costs and time consumption.

During the sampling process, certain criteria (including gender of respondents, their generation, and length of stay, employment, income level, welfare benefit, asset ownership and access to basic services) were established. Gender was fundamental in the selection of females and males. Already informed by the literature that often men and women are differently affected by poverty on several grounds including household headship, dependency ratio, differing responses to poverty due to the nature of their sexes, considering gender was key to this research, hence, 45 percent of men and 55 percent of women were interviewed. Generation/age was also crucial. The research was on how differentiated forms and patterns of urbanization affected manifestations of poverty and livelihood strategies of the poor. This warranted a historical investigation, going back to events of the past, tracing how life was before and how it is after urbanization. The experiences of different generations of both young and old embrace such details. Therefore, people referred to as natives in this research project were part of the sample to reflect on their life experiences before urbanization and after urbanization marked by that dramatic change of population growth in the urban areas that occurred from 1980. The younger generation included those born in the areas and immigrants whom I have referred to as people who sought for places of settlement in the areas as part of transition brought by urbanization. Many of these immigrants come from the countryside seeking for benefits of urbanization including employment. This young generation of mostly below 50 years of age could reflect well on the effects they experienced

from this process. Moreover, length of stay in the urban area was a very important criterion in determining the sample population. This point coincides with the already indicated point that the old inhabitants of the place would know important information on historical events concerning how life was before urbanization and after, better than the immigrants who have recently come into the areas. These differing views were critical in differentiating what impact resulted from which form or pattern of urbanization. Other criteria included employment status and income level of these urban inhabitants, which are very critical for human survival to be able to meet basic human needs, as argued in chapter 2. Employment formed one form of livelihood. In order to address the second objective of this study, which was to establish how urbanization in Maseru has modified and unsettled the livelihood strategies of the poor living in these urban areas and compare how such differ from one area to another, this criterion was considered in the sampling process. One important aspect was whether in a household, any member received the welfare benefit from the government. This was because households with such members would not be as badly off as those households that are not welfare recipients. Asset ownership was another criterion for assessing poverty. Households with assets normally have a better life than those without land, as land is beneficial in generating either income or cash in kind for survival. Furthermore, access to basic services (housing, water supply, proper sanitation and electricity) was a very important criterion used to understand how poverty has manifested itself in urban areas and establish the severity of such poverty in each area of study. The detailed analysis is in Chapters 3 and 4.

Since data collected were mostly qualitative, qualitative analysis techniques helped to analyze the data. First, I categorized the data into key issues, second, I established patterns among the categories and third, created meanings from these patterns by comparing the data with the literature. This in turn enabled synthesis of what these patterns meaning terms of the literature as the basis and framework for assessing relationship between urbanization and urban poverty. This synthesis has further enabled the development of the argument that poverty in the urban poor households in Maseru has escalated due to urbanization as seen by deteriorating living conditions. Thus, this research study used an interpretative data analysis and inferential techniques whereby I made sense of the data.

### **Study Outline**

This research study comprises three parts. The first part deals with introduction, methodology and organization (Chapters 1 and 2). The second part is the analysis based on archival

material and empirical data (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7) and the last part, which is chapter 8, the conclusion to the entire study.

Chapter 1 provides an overview to this study, methodology and its organization. Then follows chapter 2, which outlines the theoretical debates on urbanization and how it influences urban poverty, contributing to the methodological approach used in this thesis. In this chapter, the goal is to explain how different forms and patterns of urbanization account for increased poverty levels in urban areas. The chapter argues that the rapid urban growth poses a decline in welfare among citizens mostly the poor thus increasing poverty. This new urban revolution does not only pose a challenge to the poor but to the management of urban development who have to deal with it. Arguing further about urbanization in the developing world, Africa and Southern Africa, the chapter shows the causal relationship between urbanization and urban poverty. Various factors including colonialism explain this relationship. Colonialism developed the urban areas more than the rural areas. This urban bias in development triggered migration to the urban areas, the main cause of urban poverty (Gugler, 1997). By creating this spatial segregation, the chapter argues that the dependence on urban areas increased poverty levels as such areas lacked the capacity to absorb the soaring population. This legacy of underdevelopment has put these cities in a situation whereby poverty levels are unmanageable, leaving no hope for its mitigation (Mike, 2006).

Adopting a qualitative measurement of poverty as this study has done is important. The chapter argues that poverty is a welfare concept that defines a condition whereby a certain minimum living standard is not met (Vos, 2002), making such measurement relevant and useful to this work. The measurement pays attention to the fact that people differ and their classification cannot be made against a common index of measuring welfare but peoples' perceptions on the meaning of poverty, which encapsulates non-material deprivation and social differentiation, remain fundamental. This builds an understanding that people differ in how they see and explain poverty. Such differences are of the value given to things such as independence, security, identity, close and non-exploitative relationships, decision-making freedom and legal and political rights (Satterthwaite, 1995a and Wratten, 1995). Largely, this chapter highlights some of the aspects related to social exclusion including non-participation in decision-making and political processes, non-accessibility to employment opportunities and material resources and non-integration into common cultural processes (see Chapter 5). It argues that all these factors disable and disempower people from being active citizens and marginalize them from their citizenship (ILO, 1996) creating inequality between citizens.

This being the case, poverty cannot just be measured using quantitative metric measurements to allow reflection of these differentials across regions, countries and citizens. The chapter argues that the metric measurements apply a blanket approach assuming that all things are equal. These measurements have not been able to capture poverty as a multidimensional phenomenon, leaving a qualitative approach as the best approach to measure poverty. Here not only income as a quantitative variable is used but also other qualitative variables measuring the quality of life.

The chapter proceeds to show that the relationship between urbanization and urban poverty may be explored using a specific object. The urban household becomes an important object on which all indicators of poverty reflect. However, like any other object, the urban household has specific characteristics defining it, which the chapter highlights. Moreover, any structural change to this household implies a significant impact on the household poverty level. Different households experience poverty differently dependent on their structure, which affects their resource base (Moser, 1996). Some scholars suggest a gender- based approach to capture these differentials (Fukuda-Parr, 1999; Mtshali, 2002 and Chant, 2003) as this study has done. The chapter highlights how different households experience poverty and brings to our attention the theory of feminization of poverty. However, critics of this theory show that the application of this theory needs caution as it suggests that women are more vulnerable to poverty than men are. Some studies have shown that women are able to evade their status of being poorer and it is difficult for men to do that, making them to be poorer than women (Mtshali, 2002 and Chant, 2003).

The chapter further argues that with the growth and poverty faced by cities, there are considerable hidden economies, mostly in Southern Africa, which serve as a response to poverty. When households are in poverty, they adapt to ways of surviving, drawing our attention to the livelihood concept. The chapter perceives assets and capabilities people possess in creating opportunities for achievements, which is what livelihoods are all about. This is the approach used in this study in trying to establish if there is any link between urbanization and urban poverty.

In chapter 3, the study turns to the historical analysis of underdevelopment in Lesotho and Maseru and this chapter contributes to the methodological approach used in the study. The chapter analyzes the factors that have had an impact on development of the country, thereby examining the degree of poverty. One factor which the study examines is the colonial state,

its dispersion of political power and its influence on poverty. Drawing our attention to the political administration of the city since its founding, the chapter relates the underdevelopment of Maseru to Lesotho's underdevelopment showing how colonialism devastated the city the same way as it devastated the country through racial and spatial segregation. The chapter shows that this political development led to underdevelopment as it included social exclusion and marginalization of poor citizens. The segregation continued into the post-colonial epoch bringing about legacies of inequalities and poverty. The chapter proceeds by showing which factors were contributory to Maseru's underdevelopment and increased poverty levels. It examines the economic factors, including trade and industry among others. The market imperfections confronting Lesotho bear a direct effect on the country's economy mainly through unfair terms of trade, which put the country at the receiving end in the world trade chain. The industrial development is only oriented towards export-led type of industry to benefit the West trading partners, with Lesotho consistently maintaining its position at the end of the global market chain. This has contributed to poverty in the country and the city as well.

Chapter 4 analyzes the historical underdevelopment of Maseru starting from the colonial era when the town was set up. It argues that the sluggish development of Maseru has largely contributed to poverty in that, as the only place that was showing signs of improvement both socially and economically, it attracted more of the poor population seeking for alternative means of survival when their mainstay agriculture was fast declining and remittances from mining employment were decreasing. The growth of population in Maseru led to overstretching of the existing social facilities in areas around the city, a symptom of poverty. The situation slightly improved in the post-colonial era by the improvement of some facilities like water, but skewed towards better areas. Different processes of urbanization exacerbated the situation, bringing about further underdevelopment and increased poverty in the city.

Chapter 5 examines the role of urban governance in dealing with urban poverty. It focuses on basic services like housing and argues that at the heart of many cities is a population of marginalized and disenfranchised residents living in slums, often hidden beneath the facade of a thriving urban economy. Slums are a product of failed policies, bad governance, corruption, inappropriate regulation, dysfunctional land markets, unresponsive financial systems and a fundamental lack of political will (Cities Alliance, 2007). The chapter indicates that basic services are part of the livelihoods provided by the state. However, lack of services delivery to poor areas and lack of access to such services where infrastructure exists are

factors explaining why poverty levels are increasing among poor urban inhabitants in Maseru. The poor are unable to get decent housing due to stringent land and housing market conditions existing within the urban area resulting in occupation of land without security of tenure. This leads to overcrowding, which is a serious health risk, showing that urban poverty is a real threat in Maseru.

In chapter 6, the study turns to an examination of empirical data in a comparative historical analysis. Following the methodological discussion and the approach used, the study includes several cases of urban households for in-depth analysis and examines how they have experienced poverty based on the empirical study results and secondary materials. The selected areas of Sekamaneng, Motimposo and Thibella are more vulnerable to poverty due to pressures from urbanization given the exceptionally high growth of population in Maseru. The study analyzes the historical experiences of the country and Maseru in this comparative analysis, assessing how urbanization influenced specific variables, consequently poverty levels. Consistent with the methodological approach in this study, a narrative discussion is given of these variables using historical comparative analysis based on the literature. In comparative historical analysis, the chapter shows that the traditional household in Lesotho transformed into an urban household due to urbanization, changing the traditional household structure, which in turn, had an impact on the livelihoods of the urban household increasing its vulnerability.

Chapter 7 analyzes existing livelihood strategies in the context of urbanization adopted by the poor to continue their survival in Maseru. The chapter further indicates that the historical land tenure systems in Africa and Lesotho had an influence on the land ownership in Maseru with serious repercussions on livelihood thus leading to poverty. The chapter further examines employment as a livelihood in Africa and Lesotho forming a historical background to Maseru, which I examine last. These examples of what the chapter analyzed only indicate that the study used the historical comparative analysis.

The last chapter draws a conclusion of the entire research and provides recommended measures of improvement in government urban development policy. In concluding reflections, emphasis is on urbanization as a process, which only escalated poverty levels in Maseru making it to have a direct link to urban poverty. It means that poverty has long existed in Maseru as exposed by the historical developments of both the city and the country. Urbanization had an additional impact on urban poverty. Several indicators, including

housing, water, sanitation, electricity and income, explain this direct relationship. There is some variation in these indicators/poverty manifestations due to urbanization as the study has revealed, allowing the conclusion that urbanization has increased poverty levels among the urban poor in Maseru. There is again a reflection of this relationship in the livelihoods of the poor. Urbanization process has unsettled and shaped the livelihoods of the poor compelling them to adapt to unsustainable means of survival. This further confirms the conclusion that urbanization has escalated poverty levels in Maseru.



## CHAPTER 2

### URBANIZATION AND POVERTY: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

#### Introduction

This chapter discusses the pertinent theoretical debates on urbanization and poverty as they relate to Maseru. The debates on urbanization in the Third world, Africa and Southern Africa are engaged to contextualize urbanization in Lesotho, in particular Maseru. This is important in order to explain the broad processes and the dynamics involved and to compare these regions to Maseru. However, understanding the concept of poverty is important in this study. It is a concept defined differently by scholars depending on the phenomena under investigation. After clarification of this definition, the thesis focuses on the relationship between urbanization and poverty. In assessing the impact of urbanization on poverty, the study uses the urban household as a unit of analysis. This chapter discusses the household and its structure in the context of this research. It discusses the household as a resource system and analyses how internal household restructuring can affect its levels of poverty. The critical discussion is on factors influencing household restructuring believed to have an impact on the poverty level of the household. Furthermore, there is an analysis of livelihood strategies within the same household to understand how the household copes with poverty. In this case, I use the livelihood approach to poverty to conceptualize livelihoods and discuss the different livelihood frameworks used in the analysis of poverty in Maseru. Specifically, the chapter explicates urban livelihoods. It also elucidates how livelihood changes result in urban poverty. The chapter does this to show that urban livelihoods differ from rural livelihoods dependent on the nature of the economy, more especially in Lesotho. In order to show this differentiation, the chapter discusses involvement in the informal economy as a major livelihood strategy within the context of developing countries and Lesotho.

Finally, the role of the state in urban areas is analysed, with particular reference to the relationship between urban governance, urbanization and poverty. This is because urban governance plays a pivotal role in urban development, including, but not limited to, the provision of basic services.

## **Urbanization**

Urbanization is a change in the proportion of urban populations. We can understand it as a transition from a rural society to one in which a growing proportion of the population lives in cities (Beall, 2000:428). The dramatic growth of cities in the developing world has become something of a cliché. As explained in the previous chapter, between 1950 and 1990 the world's urban population more than trebled, from 730 million to 2.3 billion. Between 2000 and 2030, is expected to double to over 4.98 billion. The expectation is that a staggering 93 percent of this increase will occur in the developing world (World Bank, 1999:2). In 2002, some 70 percent of the world's urban population was living in Africa, Asia and Latin America (UNCHS, 2001a:1). The most striking current changes are the levels of urbanization in less developed nations: rising from about 27 percent in 1975 to 40 percent in 2000, an increase of more than 1 200 million people (United Nations Population Division, 2001b:3). Furthermore, there is every indication that the trend will continue for the next 30 years, adding 2 000 million people to the urban population of the presently less-developed nations (Ibid). Over the coming decades, the level of urbanization is expected to increase in all major areas of the developing world, with Africa and Asia urbanizing more rapidly than the rest (Appendix III (a)). In Africa the urban population is likely to treble while in Asia it will more than double (Appendix III (b)). However, around 330 million city dwellers, that is, 28 percent of the developing world's urban population, falls below the poverty line (World Bank, 1999:2). It is clear that urban poverty will continue to present a major problem and the scale of that problem is likely to grow in absolute numbers in most countries, particularly in Africa. This poses a huge challenge to those responsible for the management of urban development and provision of services. This growth is a fact which city managers must come to terms with if they are to have any impact on the situation (Devas and Rakodi, 1993 and Cohen, 2004).

Generally, the understanding is that people migrate both at local and international levels to urban areas in search of means of survival, work opportunities and basic services. Urbanization may occur when the city expands to cover peripheral areas, which originally did not form part of the city. Thus urbanization can occur through migration, natural population growth and through encroachment into peri-urban communities whereby the new urban populations spread out to these communities and they become part of urban centres (Gilbert and Gugler, 1992; UNCHS, 1996; de Han, 1997 and Beall, 2000). This research adopts these approaches in analyzing the impact of urbanization processes on poverty levels among the urban poor in Maseru. The study, however, starts by examining the development and growth

of cities in the developing world, especially Africa and Southern Africa, and specifically patterns of urban development and causes of poverty. It is assumed that the urbanization experiences of these regions do not differ from those of Maseru. These cities represent differentiated kinds of urbanization (migration, rapid population growth and encroachment) with different spatial organizations posing challenges on urban development, and subsequently leading to poverty.

From as early as the fifteenth century, with the beginning of colonial contact between Southern Africa and Europe, urban sites developed as centres of trade, which attracted people and thus over time constituted urban communities (Freund, 2007:37-39). The French colonial administration established their urban centre complexes within the 'indigenous villages', thus expelling the natives from their living environment. This promoted the emergence of 'new villages' next to the newly established urban perimeter, bringing about rapid growth of the urban centres as a whole (Mike, 2004 and Freund, 2007). The British colonial administration established urban centres next to 'indigenous villages' thus creating new ones next to old ones. Cape Town, Johannesburg, Durban and Nairobi are typical examples of the British model based on segregation according to race, class, gender and migrant labour patterns.

Policies of racial discrimination structured the national urbanization, economic and social trends of South Africa in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Prior to the early 1990s access to urban areas was restricted for the majority African population and only those regarded as necessary to the labour needs of the white owned economy were allowed access to urban areas and associated amenities. These policies deepened under apartheid when independent states or Bantustans were established to justify minimal contact between different racial groups. Based on ideologies of racial superiority, these policies resulted in severe poverty and deprivation for most of the African population and comparatively high living standards for the white population. Urban areas were distinctive in that the poor (African) population were located furthest from city centres in state planned 'townships' and in unregulated and under-serviced settlements on homeland borders closest to the main urban areas. The apartheid government secured urban apartheid (for whites) in the short-term by excluding blacks from the centres of economic power. It achieved this also by the minimisation of social and infrastructural expenditure for blacks, low wages and the creation of differentiated workforce based on few Africans having permanent access to the urban economy and having to protect their interests against other Africans (Hindson et al 1993 in UNCHS, 2003:1). In the post-Apartheid era, which began in 1994, urban areas largely continue to reflect the pattern of racially

homogenous and separate residential areas that are the product of the Apartheid. This is observable in most cities of South Africa. The spatial segregation is observable throughout from the colonial period to date in most urban areas in the Third World particularly in Black Africa (Mike, 2006:54).

In the post-colonial period, the spatial, social and cultural segregation introduced by various colonial administrations continued to infiltrate African society. The main features of the post-colonial cities were clearly defined urban perimeters and urban planning, with monumental areas and other features representative of European urban structures. Around these areas were the undeveloped, overcrowded, and unplanned indigenous villages with locally made houses, dependent on the cities (Ibid:52). These overcrowded and squalid areas inhabited by very poor people were a result of the segregation where 'native villages' were forced to accommodate both the original inhabitants and extra population that moved from the hinterland towards the urban centres seeking for benefits the city could offer, such as employment. The colonial administration, aware of this demographic shift, did not take any measures to overcome the problem of insufficient infrastructure and facilities, for example, housing.

The causes of urbanization have been the subject of considerable scholarly interest for a long time. In the past, most of the poor resided in the rural areas, but the shifting patterns of population means that a growing proportion of the world's poor now live in cities. In Africa, including Southern Africa, urbanization was largely due to migration of people from rural areas and natural increase of population in urban areas (African Development Bank, 1992:17). Migration is a result of the pull factors of urban settlements such as perceived job opportunities, better infrastructure and housing in addition to 'push factors' from rural areas such as shortage of land and declining returns from agriculture. Fragmentation of holdings, breakdown of indigenous farming systems, overgrazing and soil degradation are all manifestations of population pressure on resources in rural areas. Despite considerable economic development and employment opportunities in Southern Africa's urban centres, the rate of population growth and urban migration has exceeded the ability to create jobs and raise standards of living for urban residents (UNEP, 1997 and 2000).

Until recently, analysis of the causes of urbanization primarily focused on inward migration. The argument of many scholars has been that migration is the main cause of population growth in the urban areas of the Third World (Gilbert and Gugler, 1992; UNCHS, 1996; de

Haan, 1997 and Beall, 2000). Appendix III (a) indicates this growth since 1950. But this argument no longer holds today as migration is not the only cause of increasing urban population, since other processes such as natural population increase (reproduction) and physical expansion of cities into rural areas also lead to population growth. The 'new urban revolution'- the explosive growth of cities in developing countries – presents a serious challenge for national and local authorities. Meeting the challenges posed by rapid urbanization could be as important for the future as addressing rapid population growth itself has been over the last 50 years (UNCHS, 2003:32). In addition, other forces push people from the countryside to the cities. For instance, mechanization of agricultural, civil wars, and drought are the most predominant in Africa. Furthermore, structural adjustment, currency devaluation and state retrenchment have contributed much to rapid urban growth. Economic growth rates kept on falling from early 1960 to 1993 by 3.8 percent even though urbanization introduced industrialization. Nevertheless, industrialization had no influence on urbanization in the Third World during this period (Mike, 2006:13-14). This urban recession that resulted in decline of real wages, soaring prices and skyrocketing urban unemployment would, it was believed, slow, or even reverse migration from the countryside (Gugler, 1997:43). However, Nigel (1990 in Mike 2006:21-22) suggests that for low-income countries, a significant fall in real urban incomes may not necessarily produce in the short term a decline in rural migration.

Since 1980, African urban areas have recorded high rates of population growth greater than those ever recorded when developed nations were undergoing the process of urbanization. This makes it difficult for African governments to carry out socio-economic development programmes to keep up with the demands of the population, resulting in socio-economic problems such as overcrowding, unemployment, scarce housing and strained health services (United Nations, 2009 and UNCHS, 2003). The gap between urbanization rates, housing and service provision has created a wide range of settlement types with stark inequities in terms of tenure, access to land and shelter, and provision of services. Large informal settlements have developed on the periphery of towns and cities, furthest from economic opportunities, transport networks and urban amenities. In general, these informal settlements are characterized by insecure (or illegal) tenure, unstable structures, inadequate water supply and sanitation, lack of waste disposal facilities and poor electricity supplies, creating unhealthy living conditions and social problems (UNCHS and UNEP, 1997:1). UN Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS) (2003) also highlights that in many cities the rapid pace of population growth and enormous size of the population have overwhelmed the capacity of the municipal

authorities to respond. Millions of people in these cities cannot meet their basic needs for shelter, water, food, health and education as provision of these lags far behind urban population growth. For instance, most Southern African municipalities have not been able to keep pace with the demand for basic services such as housing, roads, piped water, sanitation and waste disposal. The overall result is that the environment has become hazardous to human health through rapid spread of water-borne and respiratory diseases and this situation is compounded by a lack of health facilities, low levels of education and employment opportunities and, hence, a reduced ability to afford improvements to living conditions (UNEP, 1997 and 2000). UNCHS (2003) estimates that 40 percent of the urban population in Southern Africa does not have access to safe water supplies, over 50 percent does not have access to proper sanitation and 40-50 percent of the population lives in slums and informal settlements. The situation is extreme in Lesotho, where only 7 percent of urban households have garbage collection facilities (UNCHS, 2003:1).

Africa as a whole is currently in what Mike call a 'dark age' of stagnant urban employment and agricultural productivity that has to support an annual urbanization rate (3.5 to 4.0 percent) higher than even European cities (Mike, 2006:15). 'Meanwhile any realistic hope for the mitigation of Africa's urban poverty has faded from the official horizon' says Mike (2006: 18). This is evidenced by the World Bank's warnings in the 1990s that urban poverty would become 'most significant and politically explosive, a problem of the next century' (Shi, 2000:14). I fully agree with these contentions, as this is evident in Lesotho where agricultural productivity is declining, the country faces food crises and relies on food imports and donations, and the unemployment rate keeps on increasing year after year, as highlighted in Chapter 3.

Consequently, many African governments have shown keen interest in research related to the process of urbanization in the hope that the findings would help to formulate appropriate policies aimed at alleviating socio-economic problems (including poverty) existing in urban areas today and affecting the development process of the nation as a whole (Beall, 2000). However, no research has yet been conducted on the influence urbanization has had on urban poverty in Maseru. This research study examines how urbanization has affected manifestations of poverty in Maseru in the hope that the government can benefit from its findings to formulate policies that will address the prevailing poverty situation. In addition, the research intends to fill the gap on Lesotho in the already existing wide spectrum of

literature on urbanization and poverty. Nonetheless, defining poverty from a broader perspective is important as it forms a framework for this investigation.

### **Urbanization of Poverty**

There are several discussions (for example, Anthias and Lazaridis, 1999, Byrne, 1999, Madanapour et al, 1998 and ILO, 1996) indicating the interconnectedness of poverty, exclusion, inequality and disempowerment and how these manifest themselves strongly in urban areas. These discussions show that poverty is a result of exclusion from and deprivation of citizenship rights that expose citizens to vulnerability and shock. Again, poverty is a result of marginalization within the society where there is deprivation of one group from enjoying the benefits accruing to society while another group enjoys these, leading to divisions between the rich and the poor. This creates inequality and eventually disempowerment of poor groups within society, further exposing them to poverty risk.

There are many ways to define poverty. It has been a subject of considerable debate, but it is possible to discern two broad approaches used to define poverty in a complementary manner. Conventional economic definitions use income or consumption complemented by a range of other social indicators such as life expectancy, infant mortality, nutrition, the proportion of the household budget spent on food, literacy, school enrolment rates, access to health clinics or drinking water, to classify poor groups against a common index of material welfare (Wratten, 1995:2). Rural anthropologists and social planners in the Third World allow for local variation in the meaning of poverty and expand the definition to encompass perceptions of non-material deprivation and social differentiation (Wratten, 1995 and Satterthwaite, 1995a). Anthropologists argue that people's own conceptions of disadvantage differ, societies attach great value to dimensions such as independence, security, identity, close and non-exploitative social relationships, decision-making, and freedom, legal and political rights (Masika et al, 1997:2).

In addition, there has been widening of the debates on poverty to include definitions such as vulnerability, entitlement and social exclusion. These concepts have been useful for analyzing what increases poverty and why people remain in poverty. Vulnerability refers to 'defencelessness', insecurity and exposure to risk, shocks and stress. Assets such as human investment in health and education reduce vulnerability, as do access to community infrastructure, productive assets like houses and domestic equipment, stores of money and claims on the government and the international community for resources at times of need

(Chambers, 1995:175). In this study poverty is dealt with from a holistic approach where not only income is used to define the well-being of an individual but also other dimensions of human deprivation such as social exclusion.

Urban poverty is a growing phenomenon in the Third World as people from the rural areas are attracted to urban areas and the natural population keeps on reproducing while again cities encroach into peri-urban communities, thus increasing the overall urban population and poverty. Income levels and the type and conditions of employment are useful criteria with which to identify poverty. Most workers who are employed work in low paying sectors. Hurley (1990:19) supports this by pointing out that in Third World countries, most people form a very large proportion of urban workers employed by others or may be generating income in many ways that are informal and can be grouped under self-employment, which include ownership of small businesses such as barbershops. This informal sector provides income below a living wage and usually serves as a hand-to-mouth activity. The excess labour is therefore under producing and most of it is not absorbed in the employment sector.

Lack of access to capital in any form makes it extremely difficult to make a living. Poor people do not inherit capital to invest in productive enterprises. They rely on their labour alone to generate income. Low income forces people to concentrate on consumption expenditure, that is, buying food and other necessities, and not investment, perpetuating the lack of household income. The formal lending institutions are mostly unwilling or unable to lend money to the poor if they wish to start small businesses. They lack collateral, which is a requirement to access a monetary loan, and are thus constrained. Often the poor resort to informal moneylenders who impose high and uncontrolled interest rates, yet may be the only source of credit for them. Too high interest rates lead the poor into permanent indebtedness (Duke et al, 1990:15).

According to Wratten (1995:4), effects of urban growth are borne by the poor including overcrowded housing and inadequate supply of clean water, sanitation and solid waste disposal services. UNCHS (1995) has also observed that inadequate incomes often combine with very poor and overcrowded housing and living conditions and insecure tenure. Lack of housing in the urban areas is the most central feature of urban poverty (UNCHS, 1995:10).

The price and availability of land and housing remain important influences on housing prices and conditions leading to the development of illegal or informal land markets where the poor have limited capacity to pay. In recent years, the increase in the number of people living in



shantytowns, slums, overcrowded or unsanitary housing or simply on the streets has been staggering as provision of good quality housing lags ever further behind. The urban poor have no choice but to rely on informal land and housing markets for access to land and shelter (UNCHS, 1995 and UNCHS, 2003). The main cause to slum growth is lack of access to affordable housing in the urban areas. For instance, Nairobi is a home of some of the largest low income and informal urban settlements in Africa, particularly Kibera and Mathare (Omwenga, 2010:8).

In Southern Africa municipalities have not been able to keep pace with the demand for basic services such as roads, piped water, sanitation and waste disposal. There has been a decline in investment by municipalities in urban infrastructure such as sanitation and water provision in many developing countries. Provision of health and education facilities has also lagged far behind urban population growth. This situation is compounded by a lack of employment opportunities and, hence, a reduced ability to afford improvements to living conditions (UNEP, 1997 and UNCHS, 2003). Upgrading informal settlements through the provision of services not only attends to environmental health but serves to raise the value of their land and structures. Lack of access to services such as water and sanitation are both a cause and symptom of poverty in low-income settlements (Beall, 2000:433). Beall states that poor urban services do not only affect the survival of the poor but also their efficiency both at work and in their families.

Poverty includes inadequacy or lack of income, constrained choices, unfulfilled capabilities and exclusion. Social exclusion is a state of ill-being and disablement or disempowerment. It manifests in patterns of social relationships in which individuals and groups have no access to goods, services, activities and resources associated with citizenship (ILO, 1996:3). Furthermore, social exclusion is a multi-dimensional process, in which various forms of exclusion are in combination: participation in decision-making and political processes, access to employment and material resources and integration into common cultural processes. When combined, they create acute forms of exclusion that find a spatial manifestation in particular neighbourhoods (Madanapour et al, 1998 and Byrne, 1999).

Social exclusion involves long-term unemployment and low benefits for those employed (ILO, 1996:3). Unemployment or low paid work represents the most significant kind of excluded life in society. Social exclusion also involves a wide range of social relations and outcomes relating to inequality and disadvantage. It means lack of opportunities in terms of

gaining access or inclusion within a range of arenas in society that determine life chances. It also depicts a range of hurdles or boundaries that set out to prevent groups from enjoying full rights to citizenship in its fullest sense. Social exclusion often stratifies the society into class, gender or ethnic groupings. Poverty usually most strongly manifests in lower strata. One dimension of social exclusion is migration (Ibid:74). Migration often entails exclusion from social and political rights and men and women experience this differently (Anthias and Lazaridis, 1999:72). This research adopts this framework of poverty analysis where income and other social indicators such as education, water and sanitation, and other outcomes of inequality and disadvantage are central in exposing the magnitude of poverty in the three urban communities (Sekamaneng, Motimposo and Thibella) in Maseru.

### **Urban Household**

In order to reflect the impact of differentiated urbanization processes on the manifestations of poverty in Maseru, I take a household as a centre of analysis where I examine certain indicators to understand how poverty manifested itself. Understanding the changes within the urban household will help unfold household structure and give details of how poverty manifests in Maseru.

Scholars have proposed varied definitions and categories of households. According to Sharma (1986:4), any household located within the limits of the city is urban, even if its members are engaged in agriculture. They have exposure to urban values and institutions. Kabeer (1994:108) considers a household as a distinct institution, given its close intertwining of economic and personal intra-household relationships. According to Moser (1996:29), a household is a group of people who normally live and eat together in the same dwelling and consider themselves as a unit in making plans and decisions about daily life. Netting et al (1984) defines the household as a unit of production, distribution, transmission, reproduction and core residence. As economic units, they allocate resources and increase their value. Based on age, gender and seniority, households consume and exchange resources. They also form a social core of socialization, emotional support, caring and feeding of their members. They mediate part of the economy through social reproduction, facilitate labour-force participation and produce consumption patterns based on age, gender, seniority and marital status. This is the framework used in analyzing the household in Maseru.

Smith and Wallerstein (1992:21) emphasize the fluidity of households. They observe that the household is “an entity whose boundaries and composition are subject to continuing change

and its structure influenced by cycles and trends of world economy". The household is seen as a social and economic institution of the world economy, influenced, moulded and remoulded by it. This contrasts with the concept of family, which recognizes social relations such as marriage and kinship but is less likely to capture other social relations and dynamics that take place within it. Within this context, this study will explain the urban household in Maseru, most particularly within the increasing process of urbanization.

At conceptual level, there is a difficulty of arriving at a definition of the household, which stands up to cross-cultural application (Netting et al, 1984). The study of domestic life has more usually taken family relationships as the starting point for research since in most societies households more often constitute kinship links than any other kind of ties. However, focusing on 'household' rather than the 'family' enabled Sharma to apprehend the household as a resource system, a group with its own internal economy yet linked with the wider economic system. There may be differential allocation of household resources according to age as well as gender, with young people, and sometimes the very old, having less access to or control over the goods and services which theoretically belong to the household as a group (Sharma 1986:4).

According to Sharma (1986) in many developing countries, there are few institutional sources of support outside the household and its immediate circle of kin. There is little public welfare provision in the form of state insurance schemes, pensions, or unemployment benefit and the free health services provided by the state are severely overburdened. In cases of crisis such as sickness, widowhood, or loss of livelihood, individuals, both men and women, have to rely on whatever resources the household can muster internally, or else upon the external sources of aid which its members have been able to establish and maintain, that is, kin networks, neighbours and other contacts. The household works most effectively as a group where members have been able to establish and make available to each other social resources as well as material resources. The maintenance of social resources is, in the long run, almost as important as the maintenance of material resources such as wages, property, housing, tools and equipment. However, where the social resources are not available, poverty can easily emerge. Social resources include social capital, social relations that exist between people. Social networks bring about solidarity and a sense of security to the group and its members and access to better social resources (diversity and quality of resources embedded in the networks) to the individuals or groups. In this formulation, functions (for groups or individuals) dictate differential effects of network features, as mediated through differential

forms of social capital and social resources (Lin, Nan and Fu, 2003:2). Furthermore, Moser (1996:53, 1998:2-4) clearly indicates that households function as both social and economic units. Socially, they operate as kinship networks through which members accumulate and share the resources among members and in the community. The household gives social and emotional support to its members to create a sense of belonging and oneness. Economically, households are units of production where members have to, individually and collectively, engage in some work to generate income for their survival. It operates as a decision-making entity regarding the consumption of its members. It is within this understanding that the research study assesses the households in Maseru as to whether they work as social and economic units, which collectively support their members, and whether households operate as a resource base, where members are able to accumulate and share the resources.

### **Household restructuring and vulnerability**

Studies done elsewhere in the world have shown that household restructuring leads to increased vulnerability. According to these studies, vulnerability is a symptom of poverty (see Moser, 1996; Moser et al, 1997; Moser, 1998 and Moser, 2009). A study on the Commonwealth area of Manila, Philippines, indicates a household as an important asset for the poor during times of economic adversity, for it acts as a 'shock absorber' and reduces vulnerability in the short run. Reduction in vulnerability depends on whether an additional member is able to make financial and labour contributions to the household. However, in the case where an extra member does not contribute to the resources of the household from which it can claim livelihood, such a household is at risk (Moser et al, 1997: 53-54). The study identifies both external and internal factors as causes to households restructuring. Internal factors such as birth, marriage, death, marital conflict, childcare and care of the elderly have implications for household vulnerability. The study further indicates that external factors such as lack of access to adequate housing, education and healthcare, lack of employment, income and security are potential threats leading to more vulnerability. In Manila, some of the changes affected the nature of the extended household where restructuring created temporary extension, whereas in other households it created shifts from the core household with individuals moving out to make different forms of domestic arrangements. The study noted that external factors contributed more to the household restructuring in this region than did internal factors. For example, employment abroad accounted for most of the changes in the households. Some members of the household who migrated to work abroad, rarely remitted money home. Others even stopped to send money

exposing the household to vulnerability. Other factors like childcare also had a substantial impact on household restructuring and composition, thus increasing vulnerability (Moser, 1996:56). Equally, according to Moser (1996) gender also influenced restructuring and the level of poverty within the household.

Several characteristics explained household restructuring in the Commonwealth region. The changes were mainly in types of household headship and extension, resulting in three main types of household restructuring: the formation of female-headed split households, the formation of female-headed extended households due to widowhood, and third, the formation of "hidden" female heads within existing extended structures. In all instances, households acted as safety nets reducing vulnerability invariably in both the long and the short term (Ibid:56).

Another study on eight households in Battersea, London conducted by Wallman (1984) indicated the changes in household structure as influenced by historical, personal and situational reasons, explaining how different processes influenced household restructuring. Battersea experienced changes over the last century such as change of governance, and a decreasing number of available jobs in the local industry. Other changes resulted from reactions to national and international events such as wars, population movements in and out, industrial growth and recession, the spread of state services and welfare bureaucracies, renegotiations of social division of labour between men and women, rich and poor, white and black. No subset of people or households was immune to these trends that historically explained different reasons for a change in household structure. The effects of social process - meaning changes within the local system as opposed to historical time - repeat themselves in every generation: families' progress through their separate domestic cycles, daughters grow into mothers and babies into grandfathers, households get bigger. There is continual shifting of the boundary of the household from its former state as influenced by the social process in the local environment (Wallman, 1984:4).

Another reason for household restructuring in Battersea was housing. As the social context shifts, so do the boundaries of the household unit. The area is not homogeneous, the variety of its housing has a mixture of people, household and types with an average of 2.6 persons. (Wallman, 1984:4-6).

In another study on Indio Guayas, in Guayaquil, Ecuador, during the period 1978-2004, Moser (2009) indicates that households are involved in constant restructuring processes

in response to internal life cycle factors as well as the external environment, particularly wider economic circumstances that affect issues such as employment opportunities and changing costs of living. Household restructuring is well known, according to Moser, to act as a shock absorber reducing vulnerability in the short-term or long-term during economic adversity. Thus, a household provides a safety net for protection from shocks (Carter and Barrett, 2006). Nonetheless, the success of various household restructuring strategies depends not only on the beneficiaries but also on whether such changes are short-term responses to shocks to reduce vulnerability or long-term to increase or sustain household assets. While the restructuring can support members that are more vulnerable, it can cause households to fall into poverty in the long-run, particularly during crises (Moser, 1996:53-55). This indicates that household restructuring has an impact on the poverty of the household.

Moser's study revealed the most dominant trends in the household restructuring as: first, the increase in extended households and second, the growth of female headship. The study indicates that during a ten-year period from 1982-1992, three out of four households (83 percent) had restructured not just once but on average 3.2 times (Moser, 2009:139). Most were long-term changes from nuclear to extended households or reconfigurations of extended units. Various factors caused the restructuring, including internal factors: life cycle events such as birth, marriage and death as well as marital conflict, childcare and care for the elderly. External factors were housing, employment (either loss of job or working elsewhere), lack of income and access to adequate education and healthcare. Although internal and external factors were interrelated, internal circumstances predominated in Indio Guayas. Different restructuring characteristics dominated as well in the form of household structure and expansion, and different categories of households (Moser, 2009:140).

Historically, there was predominance of small nuclear households (husband, wife and children) and extended households (husband, wife, own children and other relatives either of the wife or the husband), sharing the rooms of the house. Nevertheless, households underwent multiple changes during the ten-year period with new types reflecting the impact of economic crisis that coincided with the peak of the family life cycle expansion stage. The extended households also grew dramatically. Children had grown and were bringing their partners and children into the family, thus contributing to a decline in nuclear households. Couples were sharing arrangements around cooking and related domestic tasks, childcare and use of communal space on the plot making it difficult to know where one household began

and ended. While children assumed all space as communal, adults observed boundaries around sleeping space to ensure privacy.

These changes illustrate the expansion of nuclear households. While the processes of modernization that accompany urbanization are often associated with a decline in household size, this was not the case in Indio Guayas where the shift was more towards extended households. Household size was related to poverty, in that the poorer the household the larger the household size.

The general observation from the three studies is that they all uncover internal and external factors as causes of household restructuring and their vulnerability. They show that in the short-term household restructuring can act as a mitigating agent in reducing vulnerability but in the long-term, restructuring can decrease or increase vulnerability depending on whether beneficiaries are able to reduce vulnerability and accumulate assets. All three studies show the emergence of new forms of households and different categories with different household composition from different processes of restructuring. The most predominant causal factors to household restructuring are the internal factors but these are also dependent on external factors. In Maseru, as well there was household restructuring with conventional traditional households changing to other forms and composition (as shown in chapter 6).

Furthermore, a thorough poverty analysis is needed to show if, and under what circumstances, female-headed households are poorer than male-headed, rather than simply asking whether female-headed households are poorer than male-headed households, given the widespread economic inequalities between women and men. Chant suggests that it is more important to ask how female heads succeed in evading the status of “poorest of the poor” (Chant 2004:21). To do so, it is necessary to look beyond simple measures of income poverty. There is a need to include social indicators of poverty and to evaluate different vulnerabilities among different individuals and groups of people.

Consistent with the global trend, women headed-households in Lesotho/Maseru are increasing in number. Contrary to the common stereotype, households headed by women are not necessarily poorer than households headed by men. Often only women with independent means can afford to head a household. Most often, extended households are the poorest. These households consist of a couple, their children, and other related adults and children, a structure leading to high dependency ratios and low per capita incomes (Moser, 1996:8).

Usually, we link poverty of female-headed households to the fact that women are disadvantaged with respect to “either assets or activities, or some combination of both, linked to inequalities of access to resources and income generating opportunities” (Ellis, 2000:141). However, it is a misconception to assume that women’s individual disadvantages translate directly into household poverty (IFAD, 1999:3). In fact, even when female-headed households are disadvantaged in terms of access to resources like land, livestock, credit, education, and health care, it is not necessarily the case that they are poorer than male-headed households in terms of income. For example, a report by the International Fund for Agricultural Development on rural poverty in West and Central Africa (IFAD, 1999) shows that, despite women’s individual disadvantages, the poverty incidence among female-headed households is lower than among male-headed households. The report suggests that female-headed households perform so well because female heads are able to make their own decisions about the resources they have access to, independently from male spouses, and use these resources more productively than male heads of households. Moreover, in cases where women are married but where the male spouse is absent, for example due to work elsewhere, male spouses may transfer income that raises the total household income of the female-headed household.

Mtshali (2002), in her research area in rural KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, found that in a context of shared community poverty and vulnerability, male-headed households were more vulnerable than female-headed ones because female-headed households tended to diversify their income-generating activities more than male-headed ones. Men tended to spend money on personal luxury items and restrict women’s movements to eke out a living, as was also found to be the case in this study. Mtshali’s study raises attention to the fact that women living in male-headed households do not automatically overcome the risk of poverty (Mtshali, 2002:1). In fact, female household headship can be positive and empowering, having freed the women from dependence and male domination. Hence, even if women are poorer in income terms as heads of their own household, they feel less vulnerable (Chant 2003:25).

Besides income poverty, Fukuda-Parr (1999:101) suggests another dimension of human poverty to look at. Human poverty refers to the denial of choices and opportunities most basic to human life – a denial of a person’s human capabilities – and is thus distinct from income poverty. A focus on human poverty may be especially important when analyzing intra- and inter-household differences, as income poverty is an insufficient measure of the presupposed



‘feminisation of poverty’. For example, “Exclusion from participation in decision-making is not dependent on income levels. Participation in decision-making relates to freedom and to the respect of others in the community. Unequal opportunity in schooling for girls and boys restricts choices not only in employment, but also for a creative life” (Fukuda-Parr, 1999:101). Poverty is not only about income but also includes other dimensions, such as health, education, and having access to sufficient food. This research study also assesses poverty within households in the three urban communities (Sekamaneng, Motimposo and Thibella) in Maseru by not looking at income only but also the capabilities household heads have enabling them to make a living.

A few studies (Chant 2003; Fukuda-Parr, 1999; Moser, 1996 and Kennedy and Haddad, 1994) on poverty and female headship have addressed the fact that female-headed households do not form a homogenous group. One possible distinction is between *de jure* and *de facto* female-headed households. *De jure* female-headed households are households headed by single, widowed, divorced or separated women. In contrast, *de facto* female-headed households are headed by women whose male spouses are living elsewhere, such as is the case in polygamous relationships, or when the male spouse has migrated, lives in exile, or has been imprisoned. To look beyond differences between male and female-headed households, and to consider differences among female-headed households, may provide insights into the nature of poverty and vulnerability due to restructuring. For example, Kennedy and Haddad (1994:4) argue that the best predictor of poverty among female-headed households is not marital status but whether the female head does or does not have access to land or receives support from a partner or someone else in the extended family. The above discussion shows that reality is often more complex than is assumed. Besides these differences, there is a common understanding that gender determines household poverty levels (Moser, 1996:28). However, Glewwe and Hall (1995:181) assert that households headed by women are not necessarily poorer than households headed by men. This view suggests that both types of households, whether male or female headed, are susceptible to poverty. This research study, however, will establish if there is a relationship between gender and poverty within the households in the areas of study.

### **Urban Livelihoods**

The issue of livelihoods has become very important in development literature (Carney, 1998; Scoones, 1998; Ellis, 1998, 2000; Bebbington, 1999; de Haan, 2000; Devereux, 2001; de Haan and Zoomers, 2003; Ellis and Mdoe, 2003; Ellis et al., 2003; de Satge, 2004 and de

Haan and Zoomers, 2005b). Drawing from different concepts, approaches and theories, livelihood approaches to poverty inform the ‘actor’ ‘structure’ concepts and place actors at the centre of inquiry. People are at the centre of the livelihood framework and capable actors, not helpless victims (Chambers and Conway, 1992, 1997; DFID, 1998; Meikle et al., 2001; Hulme and Shepherd, 2003 and Rigg, 2006). According to Ellis and Biggs (2001), the foundation of the Sustainable Livelihood Framework was developed during the 1980s and 1990s by Robert Chambers (1983) and Chambers and Conway (1992) as well as from famine studies conducted by Sen (1981) and Swift (1989). Today many frameworks have been developed to analyze livelihoods, including: Sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF) (Carney 1998; Scoones 1998 and Ashley and Carney 1999), the Institute of Development Studies’ (IDS) framework developed by Scoones (1998), Capitals and Capabilities Framework (Bebbington, 1999), the Capital Asset Framework (Rakodi, 1999) and Framework for Rural Livelihoods (Ellis, 2000). These frameworks all emphasize different aspects of livelihoods (Chimhowu and Hulme, 2006). Within the last decade, several efforts geared towards the application of the Sustainable Livelihood Framework (Bebbington, 1999; Ellis et al., 2003 and Ellis and Mdoe, 2003). A range of donor agencies, such as the Department for International Development (DFID) in Britain, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), OXFAM and CARE International also adopted Livelihood approaches in their poverty alleviation programmes, with some modification. Nonetheless, the basic principles of the approaches implemented by these agencies have many key common features.

Since at least the 1980s, there has been a proliferation of literature on ‘livelihoods’ (see for instance Chambers and Conway, 1992; Bernstein, 1992; Carney, 1998; Ellis, 1998; Francis, 2000, 2002; Batterbury, 2001 and Rakodi, 2002). A widespread acknowledgement is that at the most elementary level livelihood is about the ways and means of ‘making a living’. Chambers and Conway (1992, in Carney, 1998:4) have extended the definition by arguing that ‘a livelihood encompasses the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living’. This definition is important in that it proposes thinking in terms of assets and people’s capabilities, as such a view acknowledges the fact that people are active agents. Chambers and Conway (1992) make an important link between the benefits of livelihoods at local and global levels. This also shows that the livelihoods people make can have an impact on other global livelihoods. Ellis (2000) has built on and refined this approach by pointing to the importance of ‘access’ that determines

the living gained by an individual or household. In an earlier intervention on this issue, Wallman (1984:17-24) insisted that livelihoods were more than just a matter of finding or making shelter, transacting money, and preparing food to put on the table or exchange in the market place. It is equally a matter of ownership and circulation of information, the management of social relationships, the affirmation of personal significance and group identity, and the inter-relation of each of these tasks to the other. These productive tasks together constitute a livelihood.

What is significant about this approach is that it places the emphasis on the idea that 'livelihood' deals with people, their resources and what they do with these resources. Livelihoods revolve around resources (such as land, crops, seeds, labour, knowledge, cattle, money, social relationships), but these resources cannot be disconnected from the issues and problems of access and changing political, economic and socio-cultural circumstances (Murray, 2001:1). Livelihoods are also about creating and embracing new opportunities. While gaining a livelihood, or attempting to do so, people may, at the same time, have to cope with risks and uncertainties, such as erratic rainfall, diminishing resources, pressure on the land, changing life cycles and kinship networks, epidemics such as HIV/AIDS, chaotic markets, increasing food prices, inflation, and national and international competition. These uncertainties, together with new emerging opportunities, influence how material and social resources are managed and used, and on the choices people make (Azmi, 2008:54-62).

A second wave of literature on livelihoods focused on the importance of "sustainable livelihoods" (Chambers and Conway, 1992; Singh and Titi, 1994; Chambers, 1995; UNDP, 1998; ISSD, 1999 and UNDP, 1999). Chambers and Conway also emphasize the importance of livelihood sustainability, where a livelihood must have achievements though it can also be exposed to vulnerabilities. They argue that a livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets and provide sustainable opportunities for the next generation and when it contributes net benefits to other livelihoods at local and global levels and in the long and short term.

The Sustainable Livelihood Framework recognizes the necessity to investigate the relationships between different activities that constitute household livelihoods, which in turn requires attention both to intra-household and to extra-household social relations (Murray, 2001). Although the concept was initially rural in focus (Chambers and Conway, 1992 and Singh and Titi, 1994), it is increasingly used both in peri-urban and urban contexts (Moser,

1996, 1998; Rakodi, 1997; Tacoli, 1998 and Beall and Kanji, 1999). Though there is a basic similarity in terms of the principle underlying the livelihood approach in rural and urban areas, there are contextual differences (social, economic, governance and environmental) between rural and urban areas, as well as among the urban areas themselves. These differences affect the specifics of both the nature of the poor's wealth and how they can make a living. It requires therefore a particular understanding of the urban context in examining the specifics of urban sustainable livelihoods (Wratten, 1995; Satterthwaite, 1997; Beall, 1997 and de Haan, 1997). These contextual differences have an impact not only on the character of sustainable urban livelihoods but also have implications for policy intervention (Meikle et al., 2001:1).

The sustainable livelihoods approach is people-centred and based on a number of core principles. It starts with an analysis of people's livelihoods and how these have been changing over time. It fully involves people and respects their views, focuses on the impact of different policy and institutional arrangements upon people/households and upon the dimensions of poverty they define (rather than on resources or overall output). It stresses the importance of influencing these policies and institutional arrangements so that they promote the agenda of the poor (a key step is political participation by poor people themselves). It also works to support people to achieve their own livelihood goals (through taking into account considerations regarding sustainability) (DFID White Paper, 1997:2).

The Sustainable Livelihood Framework requires the understanding that poverty is not a stable phenomenon. The poor move in and out of relative poverty as they respond to the opportunities, shocks and stress- social, economic and environmental- which they experience (Moser, 1996 and Chambers, 1995). The Sustainable Livelihood Framework implies the capabilities, assets (material and social) and activities which are available to poor men and women which together make a living (Sen, 1992; Chambers, 1995 and UNDP, 1999). The variety of opportunities differ according to whether people live in, and/or have access to resources, in rural or peri-urban or urban areas (Wratten, 1995; Satterthwaite, 1997 and Tacoli, 1998). Livelihoods may incorporate paid jobs, but these are not necessarily the most important of the web of functional relationships which together comprise a living (UNDP, 1997 and ISSD, 1999). Other elements include social networks and a variety of institutions which provide households with support and access to resources (de Haan, 1997; Dersham and Gzirishvili, 1998 and Douglas, 1998).

This research acknowledges the important contributions of other frameworks, but aligns itself with Ellis (2000), who draws mainly from the definition of Chambers and Conway (1992). Ellis (2000) emphasizes in his framework the need for identifying assets and mediating processes and activities, and motivates the thinking about the link between them. Ellis describes assets as a ‘stock of capitals that can be utilized directly or indirectly, to generate the means of survival of households or to sustain their material well-being at different levels above survival’ (Ellis, 2000:31). He categorizes assets as natural capital (land, water and biological resources), physical capital (buildings, irrigation canals, roads, tools, machines, and so forth), human capital (labour, skills, education, and health), financial capital (stock of money, access to credits) and social capital (community and wider social claims) and calls them ‘livelihood platforms’.

Although Ellis has modified the definition of livelihood provided by Chambers and Conway, he emphasizes the importance of assets. The importance of assets may vary according to the time and context in which they are studied. One of the important determinants of people’s ability to alleviate poverty and fulfil their various needs depends on their access to assets. Ellis explains how ‘social relations’ (gender, class, age and ethnicity), ‘institutions’ (rules and customs, land tenure, markets) and ‘organizations and associations’ (NGOs, local administration and state agencies) can modify the access to assets/resources. He further elaborates that access in the context of trends (population, migration, technological change, relative prices, and macro policy, national and world economic trends) and shocks (drought, floods, pests, diseases and civil war) which result in different livelihood strategies, modifies the asset status of households. These livelihood strategies may be natural resource based or non-natural resource based. Moreover, Ellis further argues that a livelihood also includes access to and benefits derived from social and public services provided by the state, such as education, health services, roads, water supplies. This means that family livelihood represents the general well-being and not just the economic well-being of the family members.

### **Household Livelihood Strategies**

The poor survive in their precarious state by employing a variety of livelihood or survival strategies (Chambers, 1995; Wratten, 1995 and Rakodi, 1997). Long (1997:11) indicates that livelihood best expresses the idea of individuals and groups striving to make a living, attempting to meet their various consumption and economic necessities, coping with uncertainties, responding to new opportunities and choosing between different value

positions. This view is also relevant to this study because people's various needs and necessities are easy to capture when they express themselves about the situation confronting them. It also indicates that livelihoods are not only about material well-being but also the lived experiences and different ways in which people deal with problems (such as poverty) within different contexts, mostly during this era of urbanization in the context of this study.

Furthermore, Bebbington (1999:2022) states that a person's assets such as land are not merely means through which he or she makes a living: they also give meaning to the person's world. He further argues that a person's assets are in large part determined by the structures and surrounding circumstances in economic and political spheres. They are, however, also – to some extent – both reflections and components of the meanings the person has tried to create through their livelihood strategies. Assets are not simply resources that people use in building livelihoods but they are also assets that give them the capability to act. This definition indicates the importance of assets as a means to empowerment. People can realize their potential through the assets they have, but at the same time, what an asset is and the importance people attach to assets may vary according to time and context. For example, Rakodi (1999) identifies capital in terms of rural–urban distinctions. Livelihoods are often different in many countries with rural and urban sectors of the economy, including Lesotho where Maseru forms part of the urban economy. This research study adopts rural-urban distinctions of livelihoods in order to expose the relationship between urban livelihoods and urban poverty, thus showing how the urban poor in Maseru cope with the existing poverty.

Many people living in urban areas are engaged in continuous struggle to secure a livelihood in the face of adverse social, economic and often political circumstances that define their poverty. Murray (2001:1) argues that households may, for example, derive part of their livelihood from farming, part from migrant labour undertaken by absent household members in other urban areas, rural areas or abroad and a part of the livelihood from a variety of other activities, more or less informal, such as petty trade or beer-brewing. The variable combinations of these activities are often themselves subject to rapid change over time.

According to Rakodi and Lloyd-Jones (2002:6), the 'livelihoods' concept is a realistic recognition of the multiple activities in which households engage to ensure their survival and improve their well-being. Poor urban families respond to poverty through several strategies. Faced with stress or risks, households devise coping strategies to protect their social reproduction and enable recovery. These may be ineffective in the long run if consumption

declines and/or assets are lost permanently or resources on which households or communities call decline. Poverty is thus characterized by lack of assets and inability to accumulate them, and choice with respect to alternative coping strategies. The poorest and vulnerable households forcefully adopt strategies which enable them to survive but not to improve their welfare. Urban area households seek to mobilize resources and opportunities and to combine these into a livelihood strategy which is a mix of labour market involvement, savings, borrowing and investment, productive and reproductive activities, income, labour and asset pooling and social networking (Ibid:7).

Urban household livelihoods involve not only production but also consumption. However, declining incomes have put increasing pressure on urban households, not only to generate income but to engage in multiple strategies for survival and betterment. Urban studies (Chant, 1991, 1996; Kanji, 1995 and Moser, 1996) have shown how economic liberalization and cuts in social sector spending and subsidies have had greater impact on urban families and that the social response to economic crisis and austerity has produced a variety of changes at the household level. These include increased labour force participation by women and income earning on the part of children and the elderly. However, they also extend to changing expenditure patterns, reduced overall consumption, and changes in family diet, increased indebtedness and rise in self-production of food, shelter, child care and health care. Women have often engaged in the cultivation of crops from small plots as additional economic security. They supplement purchased food by self-grown food, with the surplus of this sometimes sold in local markets. During economic crisis, urban working women have turned increasingly to agriculture as an additional mechanism to avert hunger (Sheldon, 1996:123). These factors will be assessed in the households in Sekamaneng, Thibella and Motimposo to identify what type of livelihoods exist in these households, and who are active in bringing about survival in such households.

Besides all these aspects, there are often important rural-urban linkages in the livelihood systems of urban households. People who migrate to cities in search of employment become urban workers and send remittances to family members in rural areas. They equally rely on relatives in the countryside during stringent times, for example, for agricultural produce, medicines, family labour or extended periods of childcare (Beall and Kanji, 1999:8). There is also evidence of increased income transfers within families and growing importance of social networks and informal social security at household or community level as a resource for poor

urban dwellers (Gonzales de la Rocha, 1994 cited in Beall and Kanji, 1999:17). What this means is that, in pursuit of livelihoods, poor urban dwellers can engage in a number of responses ranging from labour market involvement to changing patterns of consumption, social networking and the re-arrangement of household responsibilities. However, these responses are put under severe strain during periods of economic stress and, as welfare services are inadequate, they are replaced by reliance on the caring capacity of families and communities (Beall, 1995 and Moser, 1996). This research study will also evaluate the existing rural-urban linkages and any existing forms of social networking the urban households have engaged in to cope with poverty in the areas of study. Among the livelihood strategies that people resort to, the informal sector often serves as a means of income generation in poor urban families (dealt with in the latter sections of this chapter). However, several livelihood approaches show how a livelihood can be a response to poverty.

According to Moser (1998:4), there are three characteristics of urban life identified as differentiating urban from rural areas: commoditization, environmental hazard and social fragmentation. The highly commoditized nature of the urban sector means that labour is the most important urban asset, generating income either directly in terms of monetary exchange value through wage employment, or indirectly through production of goods and services, sold through informal sector self-employment (World Bank, 2008:4). Another aspect of the commoditization context is that urban households pay for their food and shelter rather than rely on their own production. They may also be more dependent on purchasing services such as transport and education than rural dwellers. Although access to land and housing varies widely from one context to another and is often illegal and insecure, where available it represents more than shelter to ensure physical well-being. In the urban context housing is an important asset that generates income through, for instance, renting out rooms and the use of its space for home-based production activities. Though the urban poor may benefit from public sector service provision, poor quality housing and inadequate water supplies, sanitation and waste disposal are all environmental hazards that often have serious impact on the urban poor's human capital health and well-being (Moser, 1998:4).

Furthermore, the poor are vulnerable to social fragmentation. Greater social and economic heterogeneity associated with wider distributional ranges of incomes, opportunities and access to infrastructure and services and political influence in the urban areas can weaken community and interhousehold mechanisms of trust and collaboration. This contrasts with the moral economy of rural areas where the right to make claims on others and obligation to



transfer a good or service is embedded in the social and moral fabric of communities (Moser, 1998:4). However, the capacity to respond to the external environment depends not only on community level trust and collaboration but also on social cohesion embedded in household and interhousehold level relationships. At the household level, internal life cycle factors that affect the structure and composition of households, such as marriage, birth and death can affect their ability to respond to external changes. Within households, asymmetries in rights and obligations based on gender and age translate into differences in the ability to cope with economic difficulties. Furthermore, the more assets people have, the less vulnerable they are and the greater the erosion of their assets, the greater their insecurity. Analyzing vulnerability involves identifying not only a threat, but also the 'resilience' in exploiting opportunities and resisting or recovering from negative effects of the changing environment. The means of resistance are the assets that individuals, households or communities can mobilize in the face of hardship (Moser, 1996:24). She classifies these assets as both tangible and intangible: labour- the most important asset of the poor; human capital - health status, which determines people's capacity to work, and skills and education which determine the return to their labour; productive assets - such as land and housing, of particular importance for the poor urban households; household relations- a mechanism for pooling income and sharing consumption; social capital- reciprocity within communities and between households based on social ties. She has further developed an Asset Vulnerability Framework that will form the analytical framework to establish poverty and livelihood changes in this study. This study therefore recognizes the work of Moser (1996, 1998) in identifying the distinctive features of urban vulnerability in terms of assets that the urban poor control and uses this framework to assess vulnerability in poor households of Maseru. Only elements that are relevant to this analysis are included, thus implying modification of the original framework (Appendix IV(c)).

Willis et al. (2007: 317-318) point out that '[t]he framework you decide to use in your own research may not reflect the belief of any single framework. Instead, it is a reflection of own thinking that draws from the scholarship in several compatible frameworks'. This research is also the reflection of what the researcher found in the field on the poverty situation in poor urban households in Maseru, a social phenomenon which is more complex and constantly changing in the context of increasing urbanization. The study, therefore, in order to make this phenomenon understandable, draws extensively from other relevant frameworks discussed in the preceding paragraphs. This synthesis helps in presenting the findings in a sound way.

The researcher uses both the frameworks developed by Moser (1996, 1998) and Ellis (2000) who categorize assets in more or less similar categories. Ellis (2000:9) states that access determines people's ability to engage in any type of livelihood. Access is a crucial aspect for many people in pursuit of a livelihood. Different structural, cultural and political forces modify access to livelihoods. Individual factors also modify the access. This implies that assets and access together make it possible to perform various livelihood activities, though the context (local, regional, national and global) strongly influences access to assets. Often people have to seek their livelihoods within different contexts, not always fixed in time and place and most of the time beyond their control. While this context provides opportunities, there can also be constraints. Ellis therefore attests that livelihood studies should incorporate the local, regional, national and global contexts. However, this study looks at the livelihoods as influenced by the local and national contexts while regional and global contexts are an additional dimension that could form another investigation in future.

Livelihood activities people engage in can result in losses as well as achievements. The chances of overcoming poverty and attaining various objectives of a 'good life' depend on the enabling environment. At the same time there may be many factors beyond the control of people and these may exert a negative influence. Thus, some livelihood activities may help the people to achieve their various objectives and empower them, while others will place them in a vulnerable position. This study aims to understand losses (vulnerabilities) and achievements (positive changes) of the urban poor. Vulnerability has been a key concept in livelihood studies (Chambers, 1990; Moser, 1998 and Ellis, 2000). Chambers (1990:2) defines vulnerability as 'defencelessness, insecurity, and exposure to risk, shocks and stresses as well as difficulty in coping with such situations'. This definition suggests that vulnerability has two sides: one related to the external 'risk aspect', the other to the internal 'coping capacity' necessary to deal with loss.

While emphasizing that poverty and vulnerability are different concepts, Chambers also points out that losses can result in economic impoverishment, social dependence, humiliation, and psychological harm. The ability of individuals to withstand stresses, shocks and risks depends on a range of factors, including individual or household levels of human and physical assets, production, income and consumption, and, importantly, the ability of individuals or households to diversify their sources of income and consumption, to reduce effectively the effects of the risks that they face at any given time. External economic policies

and globalization can create vulnerability contexts, where scholars study the concept of vulnerability in terms of market, though we will not address that in this research.

Nonetheless, this research places a livelihoods approach at the centre of analyzing poverty in the three communities in Maseru, where it is to show theoretically and empirically that increasing urban poverty is resultant from the urbanization process that has affected the livelihoods of the poor. In understanding poverty and different responses to it through livelihood changes in the context of increasingly urbanizing society it is necessary to understand how people generate livelihoods to provide a more comprehensive view of actors and the subjective dimensions of poor conditions in which they live and have been living. This will reveal why and how people are changing livelihoods. In this way the analytical framework provided in the study that contributes to place the people at centre of the inquiry will be useful in this research.

### **Urban Informal Economy**

There is need to focus on the informal economy because among the most significant livelihood strategies that people resort to in many developing countries to cope with poverty, as earlier indicated, is the informal sector. It serves as a means of income generation for poor households in many cities. The informal sector serves as a cushion on which the urban poor can fall back in times of economic hardship. It is relatively easy to join since it does not require a huge amount of capital, as is the case with the formal sector. In many developing countries, the informal sector is growing fast due to economic setbacks from, among other factors, the Structural Adjustment Programmes (Women Street Vendors Research Project in Africa, 2001 and WIEGO, 2005a). In Lesotho, also, the sector is growing. This research study shows the significance of this sector in reducing poverty among poor households, particularly in Lesotho, with the assumption that Maseru being the capital is not an exception. The research findings test and confirm this assumption in the subsequent analysis (chapter 7).

Hart in his study of Accra, Ghana, was the first to formally introduce the concept of the informal economy in the early 1970s. In the context of growing unease over Third World urban unemployment, Hart defined the informal economy as ‘small scale and unregistered economic activities’ that take place outside the framework of bureaucratic public and private sector establishments (Hart, 1973:61-89). Hart argued that the masses that were surplus to the requirements for wage labour in African cities were not without employment but had positive employment, even if often for erratic and low returns. He proposed comparison of these

activities with the 'formal' economy of government and organized capitalism as 'informal income opportunities'. Moreover, he suggested that the aggregate inter-sectoral relationship between the two sources of employment might be of some significance for models of economic development in the long-run. In particular, the informal economy might be a passive adjunct of growth originating elsewhere or its dynamism might be a crucial ingredient of economic transformation in some cases. Thereafter, this dualism (formal–informal) and some of the thinking behind it received immediate publicity through the ILO 1972 report on incomes and employment in Kenya, which elevated the 'informal sector' to the status of a major source for national development (Chen et al, 2003:16). The theoretical concept on informal sector arose in response to the proliferation of self-employment and casual labour in Third World cities (Allen et al, 2000 and Memory Bank, 2006). This dual economic approach does not represent the situation on Lesotho. However, this research highlights the importance of this sector in the reduction of poverty in Maseru.

In many developing countries, planned economic development has not created sufficient jobs to reduce unemployment or erode the informal sector (Chen, Jhabvala and Lund, 2002:3). The informal sector suffers problems where policy makers and governments ignore its activities. The informal sector is frequently unregulated, rarely supported and sometimes discouraged (Charmes, 1998a:4-6). Informal sector employment is regularly without secure contracts, workers' benefits, or social protection (Lund, 1998 and Chen, 2003). Despite all these problems, the informal sector has continued to witness a tremendous growth and it serves as a response to economic crisis. Retrenched workers usually move into it and households often need to supplement incomes earned in the formal sector (ILO, 2000:14).

The informal sector is evident everywhere especially in the developing countries. African governments neglect its contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Nonetheless, the level of income generated from the informal sector is still at a reasonable level despite the fact that most African countries are facing economic hardship accompanied by Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) (WIEGO, 2005a, Women Street Vendors Research Project in Africa, 2001 and UNDP Human Development Report, 1993).

Informal employment is a larger source of employment for women than for men in Africa. The majority of low-income women and a high percentage of economically active women are in the informal sector with a marked gender gap in resources, opportunities and earnings (Esim, 2002 and WIEGO, 2005a). This marginalisation, as WIEGO notes, is the result of the

absence of rights and social protection of workers in the informal sector, while from the economic point of view, the formal and informal sectors form an integral part of the economy.

Sethuraman (1998) has also noted that in developing countries the informal sector employment is concentrated in the urban areas, with clear repercussions on the urban employment situation. UNDP Human Development Report (1993:1) described this situation as 'jobless growth' caused by cuts in government spending owing to SAPs and rising capital intensity in the production and distribution of goods and services in the private sector. In addition, due to the failure of both the public and private sectors to keep pace with urbanization, an increasing number of the urban labour force is turning to the informal sector, adding to this growth. Hence, according to Sethuraman (1998), there is evidence that shows that there is a link between urban poverty and informal employment. In Lesotho as well the informal sector employment has been rising.

According to Alejandro et al (1989:11), much of the earlier literature on the informal sector used the dual economy approach that maintained that formal and informal sectors are autonomous entities, operating within different labour markets, with little or no relationship between them. This view represents the present situation in Lesotho, where the two sectors operate as separate entities.

Historically, Lesotho has been a labour reserve economy, depending upon the remittances of its migrant labour, most of whom worked in the South African mines. With the increasing retrenchments where Basotho men are returning in large numbers without sustainable income, the informal sector represents a central economic activity in the country. In addition, the country faces the economic structural reformation caused by the decline in agricultural output, retrenchment of migrant labour from mines in South Africa, decentralization, urbanization, job insecurity in the formal sector and new entrants into the labour market (Ministry of Planning in Economic Options for Lesotho, 1997 and Global Policy Network, 2004). This makes the informal sector a means of livelihood. Equally, a 1998 political instability in the country resulted in massive destruction of property, drastic fall in the overall economy and loss of income among the business community. All these contributed to economic recession and loss of jobs by many Basotho (SADC Trade, Industry and Investment Review, 2003:64) leaving the informal sector as an alternative for income generation. The informal sector will continue to grow as many people are losing jobs with the

closure of some textile industries in the country. The informal sector has become one of the survival strategies for many Basotho; thus a quarter of all households are engaged in some type of informal business (Gay et al, 2000:160). These are more visible in Maseru as the centre of economic and demographic growth. This study discusses the informal activities undertaken by the poor urban households as a means to cope with poverty (as chapter 7 illuminates).

Since there are no recent published statistics in Maseru on the informal sector, it is difficult to tell how many people are engaged in this sector presently. However, according to Roever (2007:16), street vending is one of the most visible segments of the urban economy of third world countries. It comprises the informal traders who sell goods and services outside business premises, while some work under covered space in the market premises. While some work in large concentrations in open markets, others work in smaller concentrations or alone on street corners and sidewalks. Street vendors choose the location of their workplaces based on maximizing their client base and often congregate in strategic commercial areas of the city, such as outside bus terminals and shopping centres.

Roever (2007:16) further states that lack of a defined legal framework that protects vendors against hazards like expulsions from their workplaces, and specific, legal provisions to resolve when and where vendors may occupy public space have allowed local authorities to evict vendors spontaneously when the public views them as a nuisance. Local authorities often confiscate vendors' merchandise, exacerbating economic hardships for those who have little to fall back on. This scenario, which Roever describes, is no different from what the Maseru informal sector has experienced over the years, making the poor urban households vulnerable to increasing poverty (as discussed in Chapter 7).

Maseru does not differ from the situations described in the extensive research on the informal sector and poverty alleviation in Third World countries cities. This research therefore, draws from the discussions above to analyze how the informal sector has served as a livelihood strategy for the urban poor in Maseru. It fills the literature gap on the role of the informal sector as a livelihood strategy in alleviating poverty in Maseru. Moreover, this research study expounds on how the state responds to the perilous poverty situation.

### **State in development**

Generally, the development of state institutions and governance in Africa after independence was marred by state fragility and failed development. The weakness of democratic

institutions notwithstanding, the state became the primary face behind post-colonial development. One of the contentious debates in the 20<sup>th</sup> century is that states have played the pivotal roles in development (in the post-depression, post-WWII and in the post-colonial countries). Nevertheless, states, especially undemocratic ones, have also been an important cause of problematic or failed development. The role of the state in promoting development has been a subject of debate since the 1960s (Doornbos, 1990:179-180 and Simutanyi, 2006:1). The nature and character of the African state remains problematic and its role in promoting sustainable development far from attainment. It is possible to argue that the advent of neo-liberal economic orthodoxy in the 1980s and the end of the Cold War has also contributed to a different understanding of the state in Africa (Simutanyi, 2006:1).

The post-colonial state in Africa arguably resembles the colonial state. Like the colonial state, the post-colonial state has been authoritarian, divisive, predatory and exclusive and an instrument in the service of the dominant capitalist class (Simutanyi, 2006:1). The overarching desire for economic development in the immediate post-independence period leads to justifications for the state to play a prominent role in promoting economic development. Thus, the notion of the developmental state dominated the discourse in the 1960s and 1970s. According to this notion, economic development was a state project. The idea of the developmental state predicated that the state would take the lead in promoting economic development, on grounds that there was a less developed entrepreneurial class, absence of a national capitalist class and the suspicion that foreign capital would accumulate wealth and not use it for the benefit of the country (Collier, 1998 and Leftwich, 2000).

One of the assumptions of the developmental model was that economics would take precedence over politics. The view concerning democratic institutions was that they were an obstacle to the process of nation building as they encouraged divisions. This was to give justification for one-party states in most African countries. The state project of 'national development' was an attempt to establish dominance of state over the popular domain. The opinion was held that political participation and democratic debate were divisive (Neocosmos, 2001:359-360). Development was to be state-directed and thus top-down. The strategy was paternalistic in the sense that the state claimed to know what the people wanted. National development projects were state projects, which were often at variance with the real needs of the people on the ground. The notion of a developmental state does not imply that the state possesses technical capacity to ensure that development takes place, but it also means the success of economic projects. However, what development means and whose

development it is, and on whose behalf the state claims to promote development remains controversial.

Development involves both quantitative (economic growth) and qualitative changes (involving improvements of people's living standards). It is a process and not a project as portrayed by members of the state. Real and sustainable development is not possible without redistribution of income (Ake, 2001:11). The concept and discourse of a developmental state has its empirical roots in the post-World War II developmental trajectory of the East Asian countries, such as Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. The specific state intervention policies driven by national development projects explain the success of economic growth and economic development in this region (Mbabazi and Taylor, 2005:5). However, the African experience with the developmental state model has been disastrous. Apart from a few examples, such as Botswana and Mauritius, most African states that adopted the developmental model presided over empty treasuries, unequal income distribution and mass poverty (Simutanyi, 2006:2). The project of development in the era of neo-liberalism and global capitalism cannot remain solely the responsibility of the state but has to involve the participation of the people. The developmental state suffered serious setbacks in Africa, as the role of the state in promoting development became discredited due to incompetence, authoritarianism, corruption and neo-patriamonialism. All apparently good things done in the name of the developmental state, such as nationalisation, state enterprises, subsidization of the products and inputs were, at the same time, wasteful and undermined economic growth. The economic decline was due to state intervention. Thus, there was call for the rolling back of the state, liberalizing markets, abolishing of subsidies, privatization and deregulation of interest and currency rates. From the beginning of the 1980s, international financial institutions urged African countries to adopt neoliberal economic policies and structural adjustment programmes. However, the failure of neoliberal policies has been nowhere more evident than in Africa. Instead of promoting development, neoliberal policies have exacerbated unemployment, poverty, marginalization and destitution. Social indicators on income distribution, education, health conditions, access to water and other social amenities have been depressing. The overall economic and labour productivity have declined (Simutanyi, 2006:3).

Furthermore, the formation of modern states in developing countries did not gear them towards the development of institutions for promoting economic growth or transformative development as in Europe or elsewhere (Soviet Union and Japan), whether on a capitalist,



socialist or mixed economy basis. Most of the challenges have been those of democratic and redistributive demands, which far exceeded the capability of many newer states. This is explained by diverse political forces and coalitions formed during and after the colonial era which battled for control of the institutions of the modern state. These political forces, representing varying kinds of socio-economic elites and interests, seldom had the interest, the will or power to establish or encourage growth-promoting institutions. This is why so many states in the contemporary developing world have been associated with weak or uneven development performances. The problems have been those of how to establish and sustain the institutions of rule, which promote the momentum of economic development within or outside democratic polities, whether state-led or market-led, in an increasingly globalized political economy (Leftwich, 2004:152). Lesotho had similar experience to other countries in the developing world (as presented in chapter 3).

The 1960s economic fortunes of most African countries, changed in the late 1970s. The agrarian economy of the early independence years brought relative prosperity: food sufficiency, adequate inflow of official aid, favourable terms of trade and healthy balance of payments. As the economic crisis of the late 1970s reached serious proportions in the mid-1980s, most African regimes were forced into a set of structural adjustment loans from IMF (Gordon, 2007:87). There was a change in the 1980s when most African countries' economies experienced adverse economic trends. Factors accounting for such a reverse included the failure of the import substitution approach to industrialization, the massive expenditure of the newly independent governments to improve social services and infrastructure, the substantial decline in the flow of official assistance and the increasingly adverse terms of trade of most of these countries. The profligacy of many African governments helped to exacerbate these adverse trends, as discussed earlier. Faced by chronic balance of payments deficits and riddled with debt, most countries in the late 1980s came under SAPs. The Structural Adjustment Lending was due to the hostile economic environment that slowed, and in many cases, reversed growth in the developing countries (World Bank Annual Report, 1986:47). The IMF was to provide temporary assistance to correct Balance of Payments problems in member countries, while the World Bank (WB) emphasized growth and development through long-term project lending, initially focused on reconstruction after the Second World War, but later extended to developing countries (Gordon, 2007:10).

Among the SAP policies were cuts in government spending, which compelled governments to engage in downsizing in both the public and private sectors. Consequentially, the falling

formal-sector employment since the 1980s has witnessed corresponding growth in informal sector employment. The growth and size of the informal sector is, thus, a direct measure of the failure of the socio-economic policies of the SAPs, which produced large numbers of unemployed who were absorbed by the informal sector. Simultaneous with the downsizing in both the public and private sectors following the inception of SAPs was the dramatic rise in the number of graduates from primary, secondary and tertiary institutions. With little and diminishing employment opportunities in the formal sector, many of these new graduates looked to the informal sector for jobs. With the virtual collapse of the formal sector in several countries of the world particularly in Africa, the informal sector has kept the economy going, making the sector a source of subsistence income. The informal sector has provided work for at least 80 percent of the workforce in Zaire and 75 percent in Morocco and Nigeria (UNDP Human Development Report, 1993; Sethuraman, 1994 and 1998; World Employment Report, 1995; Barwa, 1995; Charmes, 2000; ILO, 2000 and Iyanda, 2002). Informal employment is a larger source of employment for women than for men in Africa. The majority of low-income women and a high percentage of economically active women are in the informal sector with a marked gender gap in resources, opportunities and earnings (Esim, 2002 and WIEGO, 2005a).

Those countries applying for loans find themselves subjected to strict preconditions, underpinned by the market agenda. For example: the international organisations prescribed cutbacks, “liberalization” of the economy and resource extraction/export-oriented open markets as part of their structural adjustment, the role of the state was minimized, privatization was encouraged as well as reduced protection of domestic industries. Other adjustment policies also included currency devaluation, increased interest rates, and flexibility of the labour market and the elimination of subsidies such as food subsidies. For the economy to be attractive to foreign investors, various regulations and standards were removed (Havneik, 1987; World Bank, 1989a; DeLancey in Gordon and Gordon, 2007 and Gordon, 2007).

The extent of devastation caused has led many to ask if development is really the objective of IMF, World Bank and their ideological backers. The failure of SAPs has been so dramatic that some critics of IMF and the World Bank argue that the policies imposed on African countries were never intended to promote development. For the past two decades, the structural adjustment policies have led to greater social and economic deprivation and

increased dependence of African countries on external loans. SAPs have required poor countries to reduce spending on health, education and development, while debt repayment and other economic policies have been made the priority. In effect, the IMF and World Bank have demanded that poor nations lower the standard of living of their people. Declining living conditions and reduced access to basic services have led to intensified poverty in many African countries (Colgan, 2002:1). Lesotho was also faced with these problems (as discussed in chapter 3). Nonetheless, by examining further the role of urban governance in the developing world cities, the research depicts how civic engagement in decision-making processes is a solution to poverty.

### **Urban governance**

In countries where electoral processes exist, the state is composed of an elected government and an executive branch. The state's functions are manifold - among them being the focus of the social contract that defines citizenship, being the authority mandated to control and exert force, having responsibility for public services and creating an enabling environment for sustainable human development. This involves mediating interests for the public good and providing effective and accountable public services. In all these roles, the state faces a challenge - ensuring that good governance addresses the concerns and needs of the poorest by increasing the opportunities for people to seek, achieve and sustain the kind of life they aspire to. The state can do much in such areas as upholding the rights of the vulnerable, protecting the environment, maintaining stable macroeconomic conditions, maintaining standards of public health and safety for all at an affordable cost, mobilizing resources to provide essential public services and infrastructure and maintaining order, security and social harmony (UNDP, 1996 and Leftwich, 2004).

State institutions can also empower the people they are meant to serve - providing equal opportunities and ensuring social, economic and political inclusion and access to resources. Parliaments of freely and fairly elected members representing different parties are crucial to popular participation and government accountability. States should also decentralize political and economic systems to be more responsive to citizens' demands and to changing economic conditions (UNDP, 1996:1). This research study focuses on local government institutions as state institutions responsible for the development of urban areas in Maseru by assessing their response to the basic service needs of the poor in the increasing urbanization.

It is observed, however, that in the developing world the urbanization process has had adverse effects in this area. This is due to the fact that governments/local governance have failed to cope with its effects. This includes the failure of governments to provide basic needs such as land, shelter and services for the growing city population. It is, however, not urban growth itself that is a problem but the rapid rate of growth outpacing the institutional, administrative and financial capacity to cope with it and the mainly unaddressed inequity. Most problems which are a result of urbanization arise largely from a failure of government institutions to manage rapid change and tap the knowledge, resources and capacities among the population within each city (UNCH, 1996 and Satterthwaite, 1999). The entire range of institutional arrangements is proving to be unsuitable for handling the challenges of urban development in the late 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries. The combined effect of accelerated growth, pervasive poverty and increased marginalization has impaired the performance of existing municipal systems (Halfani, 1997:19).

As early as before the 1980s, the development focus in many developing countries was on rural areas. There was a presumption among the policy architects, urban managers and researchers that urban areas were better off in terms of social and economic infrastructure (Mascarenhas, 1994 and Cooksey, 1996). However, Stren and Cameron (2005) attest that cities have gradually decayed mainly due to the presumption that unhealthy conditions like poverty were predominantly a feature of rural areas. The implication of this policy framework was that the municipal authorities were fully responsible for responding to the ever-soaring rate of urban population without a corresponding increase in investment in the infrastructure, a condition that made them unable to respond to the hazards of rapid urbanization. This research will examine the urban local authorities' policy framework within which they operate in their response to the basic service needs of the poor within the Maseru urban area.

Performance of municipal government has not been impressive elsewhere in Africa. In addition to the perennial problem of weak institutional capacities, urban authorities from Cape to Cairo and from Dar es Salaam to Dakar demonstrate a serious absence of popular trust, lack of accountability, weak institutional capacities and extremely poor delivery record. Most of them have not been able to perform their basic functions, including the delivery of social and economic services (Halfani, 1997:20). For example, Olowu and Akinola (1995:23-27) demonstrate that excessive centralization in Nigeria and a style of public policy management that alienates the people are the main factors which perpetuate the urban crisis.

Bello-Imam (1995:7-9) indicates that in terms of financing, central governments have assigned urban governments with functions to perform tasks which do not match their resource allocation. Their capacity to mobilize and utilize resources is very weak. There is an observation of similar trends in Ghana, where the local government system has been ineffective. Local government has become almost wholly dependent on central government for financing. It has neglected its base of revenue and suffers from managerial and manpower problems. Local governments are finding it difficult to provide basic services to the expanding population, the majority being poor (Yankson, 1995 and 2000a). In Gambia as well, urban authorities have not succeeded in improving sanitary and drainage conditions in the urban areas. Gambian municipalities are under excessive control of central government. Other deficiencies relate to the preponderance of central government in the overall decision-making process. In exercising the process of supervising and coordinating different communes, the central government deprives local governments of necessary autonomy in some critical functions of management, for example, budget and fiscal administration (Halfani, 1997:20).

The rapid growth of urban population has obvious implications for infrastructure and service needs of cities. The failure to expand water supplies, sanitation systems, housing and transportation to match the growth of the population has been a major problem in the cities of the developing countries. Approximately, 40 percent of urban population does not have access to safe water supplies, over 50 percent does not have access to proper sanitation and 40-50 percent of the population lives in slums and informal settlements (UNCHS, 2003 and UNICEF, 2009). These informal settlements provide unsatisfactory living conditions and have inadequate essential infrastructure. Other services too are quite inadequate to meet the rapidly growing needs. Municipal authorities only collect a quarter of solid waste in most cities of the developing world. Much of the uncollected waste ends up on open ground or in watercourses with the remainder burned in open areas near habitable places, with obvious consequences for public health. Inadequate road networks result in severe congestion as the volume of traffic grows.

Moreover, provision of social services such as health and education lag far behind the needs. The health facilities for high-income groups may be very good while those of the poor are often so inadequate that their health conditions are as bad as those of the rural population. UNCHS (2003:1) further points out that the costs of providing satisfactory urban services are high. Thus, in order to meet the basic infrastructure needs of additional urban population, the

governments of developing countries need to spend \$80-\$120 billion per year. This is just to cater for the additional population without any provision for improving conditions for the existing urban population. It is within this framework that this research assesses the response of urban governance in Maseru to the needs of the poor, including basic services delivery (See Chapter 5).

### **Conclusion**

The theoretical debates presented in this chapter have revealed that urbanization is a major cause of escalating poverty in many cities of the Third World and Africa, making these discussions relevant to ‘establishing how differentiated forms of urbanization have affected manifestations of poverty in Maseru’, the main aim of this research. The literature further argues that rapid urbanization implies rapid growth of the population, leading to serious repercussions on the livelihoods of the urban poor and worsening their poverty status. It further confirms that poverty is not just an economic phenomenon but it is also social and can be consequent to political changes in a given society, which makes it relevant therefore to examine the role of the state/urban governance in dealing with urban poverty in Maseru. These discussions form the basis for assessing manifestations of poverty in Maseru and inform the framework for assessing livelihood strategies in coping with this poverty in this era of increasing urbanization, which are the two overarching objectives of this research. Furthermore, the literature cited provides a criterion for assessing the role of urban local governance in basic services delivery as part of urban livelihoods. Subsequently, Chapters 5 and 7 deal with these issues. This chapter serves to provide the methodological approach used in this thesis.

## CHAPTER 3

### ANALYSIS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND POVERTY IN LESOTHO AND MASERU

#### Introduction

In order to understand the contemporary manifestations of poverty in Maseru, it is essential to comprehend the historical development of Lesotho, especially the underlying processes and causes that have over time created one of the poorest and most underdeveloped countries in the world. Scholars who have sought to explain the structural weakness and underdevelopment of former colonial societies have undertaken similar analyses (See Walter Rodney, 1982; Virginia DeLancey, 2007; Donald Gordon, 2007; Crawford Young, 1994, 2000). The purpose of this chapter is not to provide a detailed analysis of underlying causes of Lesotho's socio-economic malaise but, first, to offer an overview of political and economic development since the early 19<sup>th</sup> century and, secondly, to identify some of the salient trends in that history that impacted on the manifestations of poverty. This discussion is in two phases, the colonial and independence periods, analyzing the political economic history of Lesotho and indicating causes of underdevelopment.

The main argument of this chapter is that Lesotho's history serves as a framework for comprehending its contemporary underdevelopment. The argument suggests that Lesotho's weak economy, its heavy dependence on South Africa and various social cleavages that characterize the country's social structures have all shaped the contemporary manifestations of poverty and social exclusion in Lesotho. Colonialism deepened existing inequalities, created new social divisions in the country, and, as elsewhere, left a legacy of inequality and marginalization. Economically, the previously relatively prosperous agricultural sector experienced ruin, forcing the land-locked country into a relationship of almost complete dependence on its more powerful neighbour, South Africa. Lesotho is arguably a classic case of colonial underdevelopment. While the source of its economic independence – agriculture – was undermined, the colonial powers did next to nothing in terms of economic and infrastructural development. For various reasons this neglect continued during the post-colonial era. These processes have become concentrated in Maseru, especially due to rapid urbanization since the mid - 1980s.

The chapter shows how the colonial past comes alive in the present as its influence takes shape in the post-colonial present. It demonstrates how lines drawn between identities of the settler and native, the government and the people, men and women, formal and informal over decades have led to the creation of poverty through the decline of farming and the instigation of rural-urban migration in the country. The chapter traces the influence of colonialism on urbanization and its impact on dispossession, exclusion and marginalization of the natives. The chapter starts by illustrating how the emerging Lesotho state was exposed to a number of new external influences that came through different agents and changed the socio-economic and the political landscape of the country.

### **Basotho autonomy challenged (1833 - 1868)**

The country developed from a traditional hierarchical organization of chiefs to the colonial state. Colonialism in Lesotho undermined traditional agricultural systems and livelihood practices and exposed the country to increased poverty levels. This section argues that poverty in Lesotho increased due to colonialism, introduced first by missionaries who integrated Lesotho into the cash economy and later through the indirect rule from the Cape Colony whereby Afrikaners annexed most of the Basotho's agricultural land, causing Lesotho to lose its food self-sufficiency. These factors turned Lesotho into a labour reservoir for the South African mines, making the country dependent not only for jobs but also for food imports. Within Lesotho disparities continued to widen as chiefs became part of the colonial governance structure. It used chiefs to promote its interests at the expense of ordinary citizens (e.g. collecting taxes from commoners). Chiefs received rewards and therefore became richer than the commoners.

Scholars presume the colonial era in Lesotho/Basutoland to have commenced in 1833 with the arrival of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society (PEMS) in the region. The missionaries introduced Christianity, the money economy and modern agricultural technology to the area. The introduction of the ox-drawn plough as a new form of agricultural technology led to increased production for subsistence and subsequently for sale of surplus in the market, making Lesotho agriculturally self-sufficient and thus it became integrated into the regional market economy (Kimble, 1978:102 and Eldredge, 1993:68).

Furthermore, the introduction of the cash economy triggered consumption of European goods and pushed Basotho into wage labour, primarily in the form of labour migration (Mothibe, 2002:41-42). Although missionaries pioneered the colonial contact with Basotho, the most



significant changes in the economy of Lesotho occurred when the settler communities began arriving in the area.

Around the same time as the arrival of missionaries, Afrikaner settlers arrived in the Mohokare valley and occupied Basotho territory. The relations between the Afrikaners and the Basotho were initially friendly, because the Basotho regarded the new arrivals as mere passers-by to whom they granted grazing rights, as was the practice with other African neighbours. The Afrikaners settled in the Mohokare valley (today part of the Orange Free State). It is difficult to specify how many they were, as all sources consulted do not reflect the statistics. However, the Afrikaners' settlement resulted in conflict between Basotho and the Afrikaners from the 1840s, because not only did both communities depend on land as their main means of production but they also had diametrically opposed systems of land ownership (Mothibe and Ntabeni, 2002:43). Sanders (1975:60) has explained that in Basotho society land belonged to the community, albeit under the control of the chief, who allocated various rights of use, but never of ownership, to his subjects, while for the Afrikaners, individuals could own land and transfer it among themselves. These opposing views brewed conflict between the Basotho and the Afrikaners over land as the Afrikaners ignored Moshoeshe I and continued to expand within Basotho territory. This encroachment caused conflict between the Afrikaners and the Basotho, threatening Moshoeshe's authority (Mothibe and Ntabeni, 2002:44).

Missionaries advised Moshoeshe I to seek protection from the Cape Colony, ruled by the British. Moshoeshe I embarked on a protracted process of seeking British alliance and protection between 1841 and 1868. Treaties signed from 1843 to 1858 between Basotho and the British Cape Colony effectively reduced Moshoeshe to the status of a British civil servant. Moshoeshe could not rule his people directly. Instead, he was required to be an ally of the Cape Colony Governor, thereby instituting one of the first instances of the British indirect rule system. Critically, the treaties reduced Moshoeshe's power and drastically reduced the land held by the kingdom (Mothibe and Ntabeni, 2002:44-45).

During the period 1843-1869, Lesotho was a 'shrinking kingdom' because of loss of fertile land to the Afrikaners. At the same time, the Basotho population continued to increase, thereby creating pressure on the land. Tensions between the Basotho and Afrikaners inevitably increased leading to violent clashes, which the Basotho lost due to the greater firepower possessed by the Afrikaners. The continuous struggle of Basotho for survival and

protection of their land ended due to the wars of 1865 -1867, when the Basotho suffered the most terrible defeat, with the Afrikaners permanently granted a right to settle in the Free State (Basotho land) by the British through the Bloemfontein convention of 1854. The Afrikaners were victorious with the help of the British, who provided them with arms among other things. The Basotho were not able to defend their territory from conquest by the Afrikaners and made desperate calls to Britain for protection. This forced Moshoeshoe to seek British protection, granted in 1868. The British feared the consequences of Lesotho's possible conquest by the Free State. This was against their colonial interests of dominance in the region. The British, therefore, formally incorporated Lesotho as their colony in 1868 and administered it from the Cape. Throughout the 1870s, Lesotho retained its position as the granary to the neighbouring communities. By this time, in addition to mercantile trade characterized by exchange of British manufactured goods for locally produced items, trade included minerals for England's industrial production- mineral exploitation was becoming an important economic sector in the Southern African colonial economic sector. Therefore, Lesotho supplied the already existing food market of the communities around mining towns such as Kimberley (Eldredge, 1993:61-65; Mothibe and Ntabeni, 2002:47 and Thabane, 2002:106). As Germond (1967 in Thabane 2002:106) states, missionaries observed that there was an export of thousands of bags of wheat and maize to feed the mining camps, the Free State and some districts of the Cape Colony. However, the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was a major turning point in the fortunes of Lesotho. In the nearly one hundred years during which Lesotho was formally under British colonial administration, the country's marginal position was entrenched and its economy remained largely underdeveloped.

### **Colonial Administration (1869-1966)**

The British introduced a system of indirect rule based on control through a weakened tribal authority and modified the chiefly institution by incorporating it into the colonial administrative and judicial machinery. The Cape Colony's introduction of colonial law and undermining of Basotho customs and practices provoked war against the Cape Colony in 1879 and 1880 as a sign of resistance. A full account of the war and its effects are given in detail in the next chapter on Maseru, as it took place there. Consequently, the colonial administration allowed the traditional authorities to keep their customary civil code, while colonial laws were introduced to guide the colonial administrative staff on the colony's administration in Lesotho, thus forming a dual legal system. The political system that took shape in the country was such that power and authority were shared between a colonial

administrator (whose main interest was political stability, security from external aggression and general colonial administration) underpinned by colonial interests and chiefs, left with local economic control especially on matters pertaining to land allocation, use and management of that land. The colonial government created an institution called “the Sons of Moshoeshoe” and gave it certain powers, for example, the expectation was that chiefs would enforce colonial regulations such as tax collection and assist in the labour recruitment within the Basotho body politic. In return, the colonial government provided material benefits to the chiefs, creating a symbiotic relationship between them. The chiefs could only remain in office on condition that they enjoyed the confidence of the colonial officials, making chiefs entirely dependent on them (Thabane, 2002:121-122). According to Thabane, the subordinate position of chief under colonialism did not fundamentally change relations with ordinary Basotho. In fact, their authority was entrenched in enforcing colonial policies, straining the relations between them and the commoners (Thabane, 2002:105-106).

Colonial taxation increased the burden on the Basotho people, in ways that echoed colonial policies across the African continent. Walter Rodney argued three decades ago that the taxation system aimed at providing requisite funds for administering the colony as a field of exploitation and Africans had to pay tax to governors and the police who oppressed them and served as watchdogs for capitalists (1982:65). Between 1868 and 1884, the Cape Colony insisted on financing all expenses related to the establishment of a colony by taxing Basotho. Much of the funds generated developed the mother Colony- the Cape Colony and Britain, with little left for the development of Lesotho, and that little was reserved for colonial administration headquarters and offices in the districts of Lesotho, leaving large parts of the country without basic services (Thabane, 2002:104). Besides problems associated with the non-delivering colonial state, other problems also set in.

A number of factors interrupted the prosperity and growth during the 1920s. Around 1 500 Basotho joined the South African Native Labour Contingent and served in the First World War (WWI) and 633 lost their lives in the war. The Lesotho nation still celebrates their memorial each year. Furthermore, the influenza pandemic, which followed the WWI, had a devastating effect on the country. It is estimated that 15 000 people died, the greatest mortality being amongst the people aged 20 to 40, which resulted in a shortage of schoolteachers and a considerable setback to the development of the country (Ambrose 1993:121). Generally, there is an acknowledgement that Lesotho moved from an

agriculturally self-sufficient to a weak and dependent state in the century it was under colonial control.

### **Decline in Farming**

Several overlapping and mutually reinforcing factors contributed to Lesotho's economic decline. Population growth and environmental problems led to a precipitous decline in agricultural productivity at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, which in turn created a structural dependence on South Africa. In fact, it appeared for a brief period (1868-1871) that revival of agriculture was on the cards as the Basotho had surplus produce, which they sold in the new and emerging market in the booming mining sector in South Africa. However, that prosperity was short-lived. Lesotho transformed from a granary to becoming dependent on South Africa for agricultural produce. Furthermore, and arguably of greater significance, was the collapse of household livelihoods which forced Basotho men to RSA mines for survival (Murray, 1981:15-21).

In 1867, a new war broke out between Basotho and Afrikaners when the Afrikaners commandos set out to clear Basotho who had been resisting removal from the territory following the signed treaties resulting in major losses of arable land. When the colonial boundaries were finally fixed in 1890, the land occupied by the Basotho was considerably smaller than when Moshoeshe first established the kingdom (Thabane, 2002:83). During the period 1890 to 1950, Lesotho moved from prosperity to famine.

From 1893 onwards, the country continued exporting maize cereal, wheat, wool and mohair. The number of sheep and goats increased and their quality improved in correspondence with the similar development in the Free State. However, from 1929 a fall in prices of wool and mohair adversely affected the economy. A severe setback occurred in 1895 owing to the ravages of rinderpest, estimated to have destroyed some 90 percent of cattle, and this was responsible for the great fall of exports of wheat from 1896 to 1901. In 1902, wool and mohair had become the most important exports with a value of £46,794 and £10,691, and rose to values of £139,022 and £49,721 respectively in 1909. In 1932 wool and mohair exports declined to £105 435 and £10, 136 due to reaction to prices. Many farmers had held back this commodity with the hope of higher prices, which never improved. Again, they sold the commodity in lump without any classification, which triggered low prices. Similarly, the yield of wheat declined. Woollen manufactures were the largest import throughout the period 1901 to 1918. The peak of both imports and exports was in the year 1928 when imports were

valued at £921, 574 (Appendix V (a)). There was a rapid decline in 1932, with imports worth £652,325 while exports were valued at £1,013,392 in 1928 but declined to £308,378 in 1932. Up to 1928, overall, Lesotho was prosperous and its reserves and property accumulated (Pim's 1935 Basutoland Economic Situation Report: 193).

In 1929, the country faced a serious blow from falling commodity prices, which continued in the succeeding years resulting in depression. The depression coincided with a very severe drought during 1932 and 1933, which caused heavy losses of livestock and compelled sale of large numbers of plough oxen, causing serious difficulties during the ploughing season of 1933-1934. In 1934-1935, sheep and goats also showed a reduction of 50 percent due to drought. Cattle also dropped to 50 percent. In response to the famine, the government issued food to 3,015 workers, 36,793 non-workers and dependants with a total expenditure of £45,000. Assistance also included seed wheat at the cost of £8, 649 while provision of £3,750 covered losses by traders. Nonetheless, exports and imports balanced in the five years' period of 1929 to 1933. But in 1933 the country was overwhelmed by a harsh winter with hailstorms, a windy spring that left the country like a desert swept by heavy dust- *leroele le lefubelu* (meaning red dust), followed by heavy rains towards the end of the year. These rains drove a quick recovery of crops and pastures though this was again reduced by the menace of locusts, which destroyed a large portion of the wheat crop particularly in the lowlands resulting in economic crisis and distress (Pim's 1935 Basutoland Economic Situation Report: 31-32). Lesotho continued experiencing further decline in agriculture until the late 1950s.

The agricultural productivity continued to decline due to soil erosion, causing major food shortages. The main factors contributing to the decline were, firstly, the Basothos' non-compliance with colonial policies on land management and soil conservation. For instance, they ignored the rules regulating range management by continually grazing their animals on the same piece of land without changing to other pastures or farming the same crop on one piece of land without revitalizing the soil, a situation that aggravated soil erosion, causing damage particularly on farming land in the late 1950s. Secondly, many Basotho rejected the introduced anti-erosion technology, as they perceived this to be borrowed technology. For example, in some cases they vandalized anti-erosion structures because the perception was that they aggravated erosion. The colonial administration blamed chiefs for not reinforcing land management policies. However, the colonial administration was to blame for failing to make efforts to conduct meaningful popular consultations before implementing anti-erosion

schemes, which Basotho did not support. Consequently, soil erosion worsened across the country, reducing food production (Showers and Malahleha, 2002:117).

A combination of the above factors- lack of popular consultations and the application of borrowed and modified anti-erosion methods- severely limited the success of colonial soil conservation activities. Poor land usage and management of the nation’s natural resource base has continued to the present. Lesotho’s wealth decimated as agriculture declined (Table 3.1). The table indicates such a decline in agricultural production from 1950 to 1960, particularly of the staple food, maize, from 214 down to 121 tons.

**Table 3.1: Agricultural Production 1950-1970**  
(in thousand metric tons)

Year	Maize	Sorghum	Wheat
1950	214	54	58
1960	121	49	50

Source: IBRD (1975:38) in Murray (1981)

### **Migrancy**

The dramatic decline in maize production is indicative of the problems experienced by Lesotho’s agricultural sector which led to rural impoverishment, rising dependence on income from migrant labour employment and on food imports. The decline in agriculture led to dramatic shifts of population from the rural areas to the primary administrative city, and even beyond to South African mines as an alternative for income and survival (Ambrose, 1993:121 and Thabane, 2002:119). From 1890, as the population continued increasing steadily, the number of men going out to the mines, and to work on farms and railways increased. Approximately 30,000 Basotho worked in South Africa in 1892. The number jumped to 47,141 in 1921 and further to 101,273 in 1936. In 1956, the number had increased to 154,782 (Breytenbach, 1975:29). Later the number declined to 58,678, largely due to the imposition of stricter immigration controls by South Africa in 1963. Table 3.2 below further shows the increase in number of Basotho men employed in the South African mines of about 7, 848 from 1963 to 1965, the year ending the colonial rule in Lesotho, showing an average change of 88 percent over a two-year period. This shows a high labour mobility to South Africa in the given period.

**Table 3.2: Lesotho Citizens Employed in South African Mines, 1963-1965**

Year	Monthly Average Number Employed
1963	58,678
1964	62,653
1965	66,527

Source: Department of Labour, Maseru in Murray (1981)

## Trade

Apart from the declining agricultural productivity, which subsequently exposed the country to increasing dependence on the South African economy, other economic activities that could be used to improve the lives of Basotho within Lesotho were inaccessible. For instance, the colonial regime adopted measures to exclude Basotho from commerce in order to protect white traders from competition. Consequently, Europeans dominated trade and set up trading stations both in colonial administrative camps as well as in the rural areas. According to official records in the early 1930s three Basotho traders owned licenses, representing less than 2 percent of all licenses issued, while Indians accounted for over 8 percent and the Europeans over 90 percent of all licenses (Thabane, 2002:113). Some Basotho who took initiative in entrepreneurship suffered from the prejudices of the white colonial administrators who questioned their commercial skills. This monopoly characterized by discrimination against Basotho was described in the newspaper '*Mochochonono*' by Modibedi (1935) quoted in Thabane (2002:113):

Besides a few Government officials we have a few European traders whose success depends upon Basuto (sic) people. Here and there you find a few Indians who also own some good stores... I have really no objection to any of these people trading among my people, but I have my greatest objection in the monopoly of trade circulating only amongst one and the same people other than the Basuto. For reasons best known to the administration, all avenues for possible trade by the Basuto people are closed against them. Obtaining a trading license in this territory by Mosotho is like flocking over the body of a dead horse.

British firms controlled over 33 percent of the total trade directly or indirectly: for example, Frasers' influence extended widely so that competition ceased to exist (Pim's report 1935 quoted in Thabane 2002:113). Although the colonial administration liberalized the issuing of licenses from the 1930s, the colonial financial institutions also practiced racial prejudices against the Basotho, making it difficult to access credit from banks, thus blocking their way into business.

Some Basotho traders, in the 1960s, were able to start business after saving money from their employment in South Africa but faced stiff competition that did not allow them to establish their businesses in the more populated district headquarters or camps. For example, Basotho business people like E. Monaleli had to establish themselves up to five kilometres away from the commercial centre. Only two of them, G. Sekhibane, who owned a bakery and P. Ramarou owner of a retail store, were able to set up business in the commercial centre Maseru. European and a few Indian traders continued to monopolize trade in such areas. Nevertheless, the colonial government faced pressure to allow Basotho traders in Maseru, but only conceded to allow them to open up business in the areas peripheral to the city centre, around Pitso Ground and Airport Road. These retailers still had to buy their merchandise from European wholesalers, also dominated by Frasers (Sekhibane, 1999 in Thabane 2002:113). This racially exclusive practice continued after independence because the government had inherited the colonial practices of favouring whites and Indians over the Basotho. Again, the financial institutions have been mostly foreign owned, with stringent conditions to accessing credit, which obviously the poor Basotho could not afford, thus promoting a monopoly of foreign owned business.

Basotho, however, tried to act against the European monopoly by establishing an association – *Theko 'moho*, meaning to buy goods together in bulk. The association acted on behalf of businesspersons and ordered goods from suppliers in South Africa. On arrival, the goods were distributed per received orders from members. However, *theko 'moho* did not last for long because their merchandise from suppliers in South Africa was sabotaged and perished at the railway lines, leaving the European traders dominating the economy, making Lesotho undeveloped and impoverishing Basotho further. With the colonial administration showing very little interest in promoting economic activity in Lesotho, Basotho were left with two options, to depend more on the remittances from migrants and subsistence agriculture



(Thabane, 2002:115-119), the two economic means of survival still existing in Lesotho today. These features of underdevelopment at the national level were more visible in Maseru, the then colonial administrative centre.

In sum, the colonial authority undermined Basotho in driving their own development by subjecting the traditional authorities to its control and this widened inequalities among the nation. Loss of land to the Afrikaners resulted in a decline of agricultural productivity particularly the staple food (maize), while bad environmental management contributed further to the decline, increasing the country's dependence on South Africa for food. This decline not only exposed the country to food imports but also led to migrant labour in the South African mines whose income served as a means of survival for many households for several decades. At the end of colonialism, Lesotho had lost self-sufficiency and was exposed to great dependency on the South African economy. Other avenues which Basotho could use to improve their lives, including trade, were inaccessible. Some of these conditions continued into the post-independence era with challenges undermining development in the country, further widening the inequalities and thus increasing poverty, as described in chapter 4. The thesis discusses the development of Lesotho in the post-independence epoch in the next sections, examining the role of the state in the development process.

### **Post-colonial Lesotho: the persistence of poverty**

Lesotho achieved independence from Britain in 1966, during the period when large parts of Africa gained freedom from colonialism. The wave of decolonisation sweeping across the continent held the promise not only of political independence but also of socio-economic and cultural prosperity. However, the post-colonial experience proved to be very uneven. Although some countries prospered, many faced debilitating difficulties caused by a combination of the legacies of colonialism, neo-colonial policies and internal political problems. The broad processes of Lesotho's political, economic and social developments during the first decades of its independence were characterized by weak but authoritarian political structures, which played a significant role in the country's stagnation. Since independence, a combination of political problems led to Lesotho's continuous dependence on South Africa while massive rural to urban migration also entrenched and exacerbated poverty. The post-colonial government, as a carrier of the colonial baton, did not do much to abet the processes of marginalization. Instead, the leadership fought amongst each other for decades. While some endeavours were made to initiate state-driven development, for

example, through development plans, due to political squabbles and poor leadership the country ended up adopting Structural Adjustment Programmes which further fomented processes of abandonment of rural land and migration into cities. As if marking the margins of the devastating damages of capitalism and poor governance, urbanization as part of a broader colonial and post-colonial power dynamic is interspersed with international forces of economic change creating more poverty in Lesotho and Maseru.

### **State and governance**

For the purposes of understanding the history of Lesotho's post-colonial state, it is useful to follow Matlosa's periodization. According to Matlosa (2006:17), one can divide the evolution of Lesotho's post-colonial state into five distinct phases: embryonic democracy of 1966-1970, de facto one-party rule of 1970-1986, the military rule of 1986-1993, fragile democracy of 1993-2002 and a stable democracy since 2002. This periodization traces the post-colonial political processes, discussing how they affected the development of the country, particularly Maseru, the capital. This approach serves as a basis for understanding the existing poverty in the capital.

Lesotho gained political independence from Britain on 4<sup>th</sup> October 1966, after years of political mobilization by various nationalist protest movements: the Basotho Progressive Association (BPA) founded in 1907, led by the educated graduates of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society (PEMS) schools and colleges, the Lekhotla la Bafo (LLB), meaning the Council of Commons, founded in 1919 led by Josiel Lefela and Lekhotla la Toka (LLT) founded in the mid-1920s as a breakaway from LLB, led by Justice Malitsane Mphanya Ratšiu (Bardill and Cobbe, 1985; Nyeko, 2002; Pule and Thabane, 2002 and Matlosa and Sello, 2005). Elections in 1965, won by the Basotho National Party (BNP) with 42 percent of the total votes, preceded self-government. The Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) had 40 percent of the total votes. The BNP won 31 out of a total of 60 parliamentary seats while the BCP secured 25 seats. The two parties had differences in policies to be pursued once in government. The BCP, formed from the BAC in 1959, was not just a change of a name but much more of a transformation of the original party. Ideologically it followed the path of the LLB while at the same time drew inspiration from the ANC of South Africa. It called for a broad nationalist campaign against the colonial policies and demanded quick constitutional change. It criticized the colour bar and racial favouritism practised by the colonial state in Lesotho and upheld Lefela's (the LLB leader and founder) claim that the medicine murders (*liretlo*) were a British creation to try and weaken the Basotho nation. The medicine murders

involved the ritual killing of people with the intention of extracting their body parts for use in making medicine. It is usually associated with witchcraft and used by people who want power or prosperity (Nyeko, 2002 and Murray and Sanders, 2005). The BCP party also supported the British plans for Lesotho and Basotho's strong attachment to traditional chieftainship in order to gain national support. Consequently, the party gained popularity across society and was successful in uniting chiefs and commoners, Protestants and Catholics, workers and peasants in opposing the colonial administration (Weisfelder, 1961:6). Leeman (1985:72) points out that members of the PEMS, Anglicans, Roman Catholics, AME members, members of the educated elite, chiefs and members of the Lekhotla la Bafo (LLB) all joined the BAC (BCP), attracted by its nationalist appeal. The BNP leader, Leabua Jonathan, was initially a member of the BAC when it was formed in 1952 but had become increasingly worried by the organization's orientation over the years and decided to form the BNP with Patrick 'Mota and Gabriel Manyeli, who shared his sentiments. The BNP had similar objectives to the other main Lesotho parties, including BCP. The BNP's objectives were to oppose South Africa's plans for the incorporation of Lesotho. It wanted to stop racial discrimination in Lesotho through African participation in both the civil service and in business and wanted government to be accountable to Basotho. The party emphasized the need for close cooperation with South Africa on matters of mutual interest, continuity of reliance on the skills of expatriates in the public and private sectors and the important role of chieftainship in the future of the country (Bardill and Cobbe, 1985:33).

As soon as the BNP government came to power, it formed the Police Mobile Unit (PMU) in 1964, which took over the state security. This was to assist the BNP government in maintaining security of the country and to suppress opposition (Leeman, 1985:25-53). In 1980, the PMU was renamed the Lesotho Paramilitary Force (LPF), in 1986 it changed to the Royal Lesotho Defence Force (RLDF) and in 1993 to Lesotho Defence Force (LDF). The BNP enjoyed the support of the army for the 23 years of its rule (Pule, 2002:179).

The BNP formed the first government in independent Lesotho but faced major challenges from the BCP (Matlosa, 2006:19). This was evident in local government structures set up by BNP in the villages, the Village Development Committees. These structures had become strongholds of the opposition, BCP, and consequently the BNP government abolished them in 1968 (Van de Geer and Wallis, 1982:24). During the period from 1966 to 1970, Lesotho had an embryonic democracy, that is, the post-colonial state was new and democratic institutions were still in early stages of development of legitimate and constitutional rule and political

stability (Bardill and Cobbe, 1985:127). Formation of the state itself was not yet sufficient. Its key institutions like the civil service were weak, relying heavily on external assistance, especially from apartheid South Africa (e.g. most advisors to the Prime Minister, including the economic advisor, were white South Africans). Moreover, the positive developments towards a democratic dispensation in Lesotho's young democracy proved ephemeral as the political situation experienced crisis from 1970 (Matlosa, 2006:18).

The advent of one-party dictatorship shattered the early experience of this multiparty democracy. Lesotho held its first post-colonial elections in January 1970 but the ruling party suspended these when it sensed a possible defeat. Invoking political intimidation, national security and communist threat, the ruling party annulled the electoral process and declared itself still a legitimate government, much to the disappointment of the BCP, deemed as winners of the 1970 elections with 50 percent against 43 percent of the total votes of BNP. The two had twenty-three constituencies each (Pule, 2002:175 and Matlosa, 2006:21). The 1970 elections were, therefore, a serious political debacle that plunged Lesotho into dictatorship and political instability (Matlosa, 2006:20). The BNP government banned political parties and suddenly a country that had seemed poised for a stable democratic dispensation took the route of authoritarian rule with conflict and instability that further compromised the legitimacy of government. The instability was in the form of, among others, armed struggle waged against the government by the armed wing of the BCP known as the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) between the 1970s and 1980s (Pule, 2002:230-238). Beginning in 1979, the LLA launched a series of attacks on Lesotho, which ranged from sabotage of government installations and frequent skirmishes with the Lesotho security forces around the country to assassination of prominent political leaders. 1983 was a particularly active year for the LLA with government claiming over forty separate incidents of LLA attacks during the twelve-month period (Pule, 2002:230). Weak governance institutions meant the BNP resorted to politics of repression and power centralization.

Contestation over the role of the monarchy also contributed to the post-colonial political instability. As explained earlier, the position and role of the paramount chief and lesser chiefs underwent significant changes during the colonial era. The succession of Paramount chiefs was according to a patriarchal customary royal hierarchy. The colonial administration gave them executive powers, through which it exercised indirect rule for the Cape Colony. However, this changed in the post-colonial state. Lesotho shared with a few African countries the presence of the monarchy introduced into the country's political system by the

independence constitution. The monarchy was styled on the former paramount chiefs, the descendants of Moshoeshoe I who had ruled in the colonial era. As in the rest of the former colonies, other institutions that the government of newly independent Lesotho had to grapple with included the bureaucracy, the security establishment and structures of government. The post-colonial nationalist politics challenged not only the colonial rule but also the role of chiefs in the new order. The Paramount Chief (later renamed King) became the constitutional monarch without any political power and was no longer to be a chief but head of state. During the colonial administration the Paramount Chief was at the helm of the traditional political structure with statutory powers on judicial and administrative matters. However, from independence, there was centralization of these powers with the establishment of the new democratic governance including the monarch. The King became a reigning monarch without political and administrative powers (Van de Geer and Wallis, 1982:14). The new arrangement encountered difficulties when effected. The on-going educated elite rivalry against the government on how it would assert authority over the monarchy became a problem for the new state. The government used law and force against the King to accept his new position. Exile and frequent threats of dethronement, far from being solutions have tended to provide temporary solutions for successive regimes, but the problem continues (Pule, 2002:177-178). During the colonial period, chieftainship played a pivotal role in local governance. Chiefs were responsible for local administration, settling of domestic disputes, and land allocation under customary land tenure system and were custodians of peace, order and local security. Nevertheless, they were still accountable to the colonial administration (Thabane, 2002:121-122). Chiefs maintained this position up to independence. After independence, there was a shift in the relationship between the central and local governance structures. Lesotho experienced increased central control of local government. In 1968, two years after independence, the Basotho National Party (BNP) government abolished District Councils (development councils and committees) through the Local Government Repeal Act with chiefs only remaining as customary leaders in such structures without political power (Van de Geer and Wallis, 1982:25) (See Chapter 5 for a detailed analysis).

The type of government after independence was such that the executive moved away from being cabinet ministers only but were also representatives of the people. However, BNP appointees dominated the cabinet along with co-opted members from other parties. The government also put in place the civil service. The civil service had its roots in the former Native Administration made up of clerks and interpreters serving as a link between the

colonial rulers and the indigenous population. The BNP government took over this same administration when it came to power. The government adopted a strategy of indigenisation of the public service slowly, preferring to keep expatriate, both British and South African, officials at the top as they were regarded as less subversive. Nonetheless, to show its commitment to localisation, the government promoted 133 local personnel in 1967. Nevertheless, following the events of 1970, there was an expulsion of between 600 and 800 staff from the civil service, on suspicion of being BCP supporters (Bardill and Cobbe, 1985:134). The effect of this sectarian political act was to destabilise the administration of the civil service at the point where democracy and development were essential. In the following years, all the rulers failed to ensure the autonomy and neutrality of the public service. They had their own people in key positions, further creating institutional problems (Pule, 2002:179). The politicisation of the public service ensured constant internal squabbling that deepened the administrative malaise.

### **From dictatorship to democracy**

It is certainly to the era of de facto one-party rule that we can best trace the roots of Lesotho's major governance problems. Following the abortive elections of 1985, boycotted by the opposition parties, the BNP regime collapsed. Several reasons contributed to this. First, the BNP went to the 1985 elections uncontested, as the opposition did not participate because they considered the BNP to have been in power illegitimately since 1970. They protested to the international community to put pressure on the BNP to hold talks with a view to forming a unity government, but without success. In response to this, South Africa put in place a border blockade, which allowed little traffic in between the two countries. Within days Maseru, the capital, began feeling the effects as foodstuffs and fuel supplies were diminishing. Second, the BNP had refused to expel the ANC as requested by the South African government, which believed Lesotho had harboured UMkhonto we Sizwe combatants for a long time. The South African Defence Force twice raided Maseru to eliminate ANC operatives, in 1982 and 1985. This triggered tension between the BNP and the army. The LDF blamed the government for its foreign policy. Third, soldiers were discontented due to the fact that the BNP Youth League, armed by the government, was performing security activities - erecting and manning roadblocks as well as providing security for ministers, and demanded its disarmament and banning. Consequently from 17 to 18 January, fierce fighting ensued between the LDF and the Youth League. Some soldiers allied with the Youth League. The LDF succeeded in arresting the Youth League activists and their

leaders as well as their supporters in the army. On the 20 January, an announcement was made by the army on the national radio, Radio Lesotho, of its takeover of the government. Lifting of the border blockade followed. The military dislodged the BNP, ushering in a new period of repressive politics, which further consolidated authoritarian rule between 1986 and 1993. Democracy seemed continuously elusive in the mountain kingdom (Edgar, 1987; Edgar, 1990; Matlosa, 1998; Matlosa and Pule, 2001 and Pule, 2002; Matlosa, 2006).

The military, however, did not make substantial changes to the local governance structures established by the BNP government. First, it increased the powers of the chiefs whom the BNP rule had relegated to customary leadership only. Instead, it made them ex-officio members and chairpersons of the development committees. Second, it introduced a number of new structures, including the District Secretary who was responsible for coordination of development activities and the Military Office for ensuring law and order in the districts. Third, the regime launched the first Municipal council known as the Maseru City Council/MCC and its operations in the capital, Maseru. Fourth, the regime suspended local participation because it saw *Lipitso* as destabilising the government and used orders in ruling the country(See Chapter 5).

An era of fragile democracy followed the military dictatorship between 1993 and 2002 in which Lesotho's political development witnessed the introduction of multi-party democracy. Fragile, because, although the transition to democracy was achieved, various forms of violent conflicts between and among key governance institutions had generated so much instability that the institutionalisation (let alone consolidation) of democracy was gravely threatened (Matlosa, 2006:24). According to Beall and Ngonyama (2009:1), fragile states have emerged as sites of colonial extraction. They have adapted to colonial systems of governance in the past and engaged in a variety of states (one-party state, military junta, democracy) over many years and in a range of ways. For instance, there is struggle for control of state institutions. In addition, they are fragile, in that these states are often characterised by ongoing violence and insecurity, a legacy of conflict, weak governance and the inability to deliver the efficient and equitable distribution of public goods and services. They have consistently grown more slowly than other low-income countries, and the rate of extreme poverty is rising within them (World Bank, 2007:8).

The first democratic elections delivered a landslide victory for the BCP in 1993 and many observers interpreted this outcome as the 'righting of the 1970 wrong' when the BCP was

denied its rightful claim to state power (Southall and Petlane, 1995). The BCP won 74.7 percent of the total votes and secured all the 65 parliamentary seats. The BNP won 22.6 percent of the votes, yet did not get even a single seat in the legislature. Despite the excitement and enthusiasm that greeted the onset of multiparty democracy following decades of authoritarian rule of both civilian and military varieties, Lesotho's democracy remained fragile, manifested mainly in political instability between the monarchy, the executive, the legislature, the public service, political parties, the army and the police. There were divisions and contestations, which undermined the stabilisation of democratic institutions. The monarch's discontentment about his power experienced the usual silencing through his exile by the BNP and finally his dethronement by the military in 1990. The army was also not happy about the BCP plans for replacing army personnel with LLA combatants. The BCP deemed the LLA friendlier and more supportive to their government interests than the army recruited by the BNP (Pule, 2002:200-204). In the end, severe weakening of the state led to a paralyzed and dysfunctional state. Lesotho's young democracy immediately became a turbulent and conflict-ridden political experiment mainly due to the power struggle between and among the political elite (contestation over state power), a struggle over meagre resources whose access is facilitated more by control of the state machinery (resource conflict) and personalization, rather than institutionalization of the political process (personality cult syndrome) (Matlosa, 2006:24).

Since 1993, regular elections have continued to be a norm, notwithstanding conflicts and contestations, indicating that at last democratic practices are beginning to take root in the country. Following the 1993 elections, the second general elections were in 1998. In both elections, citizen participation was relatively high as illustrated by voter turnout of over 60 percent. Given the serious problem of factionalism within Lesotho's political parties, they have been prone to splits. For example, the ruling BCP, in 1997, suffered a major split which in turn divided the then one-party parliament. Several reasons contributed to this division. First, since the BCP emerged from exile in 1988 already deeply divided, there were some disagreements within the party on the dominant personality cult of its leader, Ntsu Mokhehle, with some members challenging his leadership. Second, Mokhehle's advanced age and failing health gave the different contenders added impetus to articulate their positions more forcefully than before. Third, since 1970 the party had been fighting for survival through the armed struggle, and questions and arguments over the use of the party monies surfaced. Fourth, Lesotho's economy and the resources available to the ruling party were never



sufficient to allow an elaborate patronage system to develop thus helping to sow dissatisfaction, more particularly among those who participated in the armed struggle. Consequently, the party divided into two factions: *Majelathoko* and Pressure Group. *Majelathoko* were a group organized around the personality of the leader. It comprised older members of the party who portrayed themselves as real BCP. The Pressure Group organized itself around the emerging personality of the then deputy leader, Molapo Qhobela. It portrayed itself as an enlightened progressive group with young BCP members, many of whom had not been in exile. Due to the split, a new party, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) emerged and later formed a new government (Pule, 2002: 206-207 and Matlosa, 2006:24).

Despite the fact that the 1998 elections was proclaimed as free and fair, they were immediately followed by the worst violent conflict in Lesotho's independence involving the government and some opposition parties-mainly BNP, BCP and MFP. These parties contested the outcome of the 23 May 1998 elections with LCD having won 79 out of 80 constituencies while BNP won only one constituency. From May to August, the opposition parties challenged the election results by filing petitions in courts of law and even to the King, requesting him to dissolve the government and form a government of national unity. Eventually, the opposition parties enforced stay-aways, the closure of government offices, parastatals, seizure of government vehicles, the closure of the national radio station- Radio Lesotho. There were also sporadic clashes between the army and the police. On this account, the government sought mediation from South Africa and a commission of enquiry was set up to investigate the alleged irregularities. Other events also took over. The armed clashes between the army and the police escalated to a mutiny that saw the expulsion of the LDF commander and 28 officers of rank. The government lost control and requested military intervention from Southern African Development Community (SADC). The conflict escalated when these forces (South African Defence Force (SADF) and Botswana Defence Force (BDF)) entered Lesotho. They were seen as an invading force and the situation developed into violence on a large scale resulting in massive destruction of property, widespread looting and severe loss of income among the business community and workers alike (Pule, 2002 and Matlosa, 2006). The disruptions led to income losses of around R145 million (Matlosa, 1999:20).

The current phase of Lesotho's political development has a relatively stable multiparty democracy. The state in Lesotho moved from volatility to stability by instituting a

representative type of democracy where all parties formed the parliament through proportional representation. Furthermore, the state promoted civic engagement through participation in local governance. This has led to the greater stability of democratic institutions. Key institutions of democracy are operational, even if their capacity remains wanting. These include the three main arms of government (the executive, the legislature and the judiciary), political parties, civil society organizations and statutory watchdog institutions such as the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), the Auditor-General and the Ombudsman. The media (print and electronic) has also become more active and continuously keeps government in check. They have developed programmes where people deliberate on issues of governance including evaluating the effectiveness of government in service delivery. Local government structures have received revamping and restructuring in order to provide an organic linkage between central and local governance, and development efforts. Although characterized by low voter turnout (less than 40 percent) the local government elections held in May 2005 represented a significant political transformation in Lesotho's local governance (Matlosa, 2006:24) as Chapter 5 illuminates. While Lesotho was undergoing all these changes, the state took a lead in the development process.

### **State and development**

In Lesotho where the economy was weak, the role of the state was even more crucial. Lesotho adopted the model of a developmental state at independence to promote economic development by controlling the economy and engaging in formulation of five-year development plans. However, in practice, the BNP regime used the model to meet its own political ends. A number of overlapping factors were responsible and these included the weak/underdeveloped private sector in the almost complete absence of civil society. Just like other post-colonial states in Africa that adopted the developmental model, the state fragility in Lesotho increased unequal income distribution and mass poverty, signs of failed development. Corruption and the fiscal crisis in the 1980s and 1990s crippled the democratic institutions, making it impossible to undertake development. Therefore, the fragility of the state in Lesotho had a major impact on development. The state was mostly undemocratic, unstable, divided and weak. The effect of the changes in the political sphere had an impact on the economy and development.

The Lesotho state focused more on sustaining its power throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. It was more concerned with safeguarding its political interests, more so when from the 1970 elections the government was illegitimate, resulting in opposition. It had no time to establish

economic growth promoting institutions or encourage the private-led businesses but rather allowed foreign businesses to invest in the country (as discussed later in the section). Like in most African countries, the responsibility for development failure in Lesotho rests with the state. The state remained largely a one party state for 23 years in the post-colonial era and only purported to engage in decentralization but in practice did not devolve power to the local structures. Development remained centrally driven leading to its failure. While the Lesotho urbanization policy remained unimplemented leading to unplanned and unbridled settlements without infrastructure, a trend which is continuing.

It is therefore apparent that underdevelopment and poverty in Lesotho since independence are outcomes of state failure in undertaking sound economic development. The state has increasingly been dependent on external assistance since independence, with a clear political objective as indicated, further limiting its efforts to undertake development. Consequently the economy has largely been surviving on aid, which limits its potential to develop due to conditionalities attached to it, making the state a non-delivering entity. The adoption of structural adjustment programmes in Lesotho as an alternative in promoting development from the 1980s to 2000s had a limited impact on the economy. The masses of the population remain in poverty. Stringent state controls also strain efforts of the private sector in stimulating the economy (e.g. increase in taxation). Brett has argued that corruption and the fiscal crisis have been common features in large parts of Africa and have made it impossible to pay a living wage or fund adequate services to improve the administrative capacity. As a result, weak or failed states govern the continent. Their deficiencies constantly undermine most attempts to build successful liberal democratic capitalist institutions (Brett, 2008:2).

It can therefore be argued that the state in Lesotho was in crisis during both the one party rule and the neo-liberal democracy. As elsewhere in African states, like Uganda and Zimbabwe (Brett, 2008), the Lesotho state had characteristics of clientelism and corruption caused by favours to parties' affiliates to the detriment of development, as diversion of public resources for individual gain happened. This is what Brett refers to as 'The criminalisation of the African' (Ibid: 344).

Since independence, governance in Lesotho featured political instability accompanied by serious rebellion from the opposition in the form of the LLA movement. The annulled elections of 1970 provoked this, where the BCP was the winner, resulting in dictatorship from Jonathan's regime, which oppressed and excluded many people believed to form the

opposition (BCP) from participating in decisions that affect their lives. During the 23 years of political instability and dictatorship from 1970 to 1986, the BNP regime concentrated on security of government from the attacks by the liberation movement of the BCP faction and consolidation of political power, without much effort to promote development. The government was also not willing to allow BCP members, who then formed the majority, to participate in any way, including even to take part in community development projects, resulting in immeasurable poverty (Wallis and Van de Geer, 1982:47-51). The military regime of 1986 to 1993 concentrated on promoting security as the BNP regime had done, as the LLA was still active. It also oppressed the nation through the rule by orders without due respect for human rights. The nation never got an opportunity for expressing their political opinion on the country's administration as the constitution suffered suspension until 1993, when the democratic government of BCP came to power. Later the LCD, the new breakaway from BCP also came to power in 1998 with serious opposition which boiled into conflicts with devastating effects on the economy. While the political situation was unstable, the state concentrated on consolidating power to the detriment of development. It could not stimulate economic growth institutions or promote market-led development. Even with the development assistance from elsewhere, the economy remained stagnant. It is not only political affairs which affected Lesotho's economic development and brought underdevelopment and poverty, but other factors also had serious impacts.

### **State plans for economic development**

As the previous chapter has explained, the pervasive poverty of Lesotho is a product of the long period of underdevelopment during the colonial era. Colonial taxation increased the burden on Basotho people, forcing them to the mines in South Africa, and the treaties on land signed during the British Indirect Rule granted land rights to Afrikaners who had encroached into Moshoeshoe's land, reducing the land held by the kingdom. Other factors such as population growth and environmental problems led to a precipitous decline in agricultural productivity at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, which in turn created a structural dependence on South Africa (Murray, 1981; Pim, 1935; Mothibe and Ntabeni, 2002, Thabane, 2002, Showers and Malahleha, 2002).

As observed above, the state in Lesotho was characterized by political instability throughout the period from 1970 to the late 1990s. Nonetheless, it engaged in the development process by adopting the developmental state model, which proved unsuccessful and poverty increased. The economy declined drastically, particularly in the 1980s, requiring more

attention from the government. This was due to, among other factors, lack of a private sector and manufacturing base, making the country only a consumer not a producer, the continual decline in revenue of the government as remittances declined due to retrenchment of mining labour migrants from South Africa, escalating unemployment levels, declining agricultural productivity and deteriorating living standards.

Among other strategies to uplift the economy and reduce poverty, the Lesotho government drew up the Five-Year Development Plans and later in 2003 adopted the Poverty Reduction Strategy from the IMF. Between 1967 and 1999, Five-Year Development Plans (1967-1972, 1970/71-1974/75, 1980/81-1984/85, 1986/87-1990/91 and 1996/97- 1998/99) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) of 2003 were implemented. The programmes mostly comprised agricultural community development projects. Table 3.3 shows some of these projects and their donors. The First Five Year Development plan was intended to be the basis for planned development. Lesotho had a shortage of private enterprises and had to rely on the competent public sector for the solution of its development problems. It found it necessary to secure administrative capacity at all levels. Hence, it was necessary to have administrative machinery performing the primary role in development. The priority was to make the service more development oriented (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976:54). The Plan called for reorientation of government policies and a rethinking of established administrative patterns. A thorough investigation of the overall structure of the administration had to be undertaken. No progress was made in that no in-depth analysis of the structure and effectiveness of the administration had been undertaken when the Second Plan started in 1975 (Wallis and van de Geer, 1982:31).

**Table 3.3: Major Area Agricultural and Rural Development Projects since 1970**

Name	Duration	Foreign Backers	Target groups/Area
Leribe pilot Agricultural scheme	1970-1975	UNDO/FAO	Small experimental effort for Khomokhoana project
Khomokhoana Rural Development Project	1975-1980	SIDA/USAID	8000 farming households 26 000 ha
Thaba-Bosiu Rural Development Project	1973-1977	IDA/ USAID	17 500 farming households 121 000 ha
SenquRiver Agricultural Extension Project	1974-1977	UNDP/FAO	Seven areas, each 20 000 ha
Thaba-TsekaMountain Development Project	1975-1984	CIDA	46 000 ha

Source: Wellings, P. "Lesotho: Crisis and development in the Rural Sector" *Geoforum*, 17 (2) 1986.

The Second Five Year Development Plan recognized that the administration inherited from the colonial authorities needed reorientation. The urgency of making the administration more responsive to the developmental needs of the country was re-emphasized. It also emphasized that the costs involved in reorienting the administration should not exceed what the country could afford (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976:54). It stressed the need to appoint qualified personnel to lead the development programmes in the districts in an effort to put in place district and regional planning, thus encouraging the establishment of senior posts (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976:57). There was minimal attention given to local administration in the two development plans due to the high degree of centralization of public administration which made the local administration a mere appendage of the overall administration. There was no discussion on local level institutions, reference was only to the district, thus underestimating their importance for the country's development. Again, the neglect of local administration in the Development Plans was caused by events in the country's political arena, when the government felt the local councils had to be abolished on political grounds as explained earlier in this chapter and in chapter 5. Nonetheless, the Plan put more emphasis on agricultural improvement resulting in establishment of area-based agricultural development projects, as shown in table 3.3, which were basically donor funded. It was formulated against

a background of declining efforts to produce crops. The main objective of the Plan was to achieve crop production to attain self-sufficiency in basic grain and vegetable production. The Plan further emphasized conservation through Range Management and Grazing control.

The Third Five Year Development Plan was launched in 1981. It emphasized the reduction of imported grains and vegetables, marketing services to ensure that farmers increase production of cash cropping and the establishment of market oriented research programme and improvement of extension services (Wallis and van de Geer, 1982:85). There were several challenges in implementing the plan. The implementation was divided into two phases by the donor (the West German government), which set up a programme, Basic Agricultural Services Programme, in 1978. The first phase dealt with putting up appropriate infrastructure (roads, stores, staff, housing and workshops). These demanded a great deal of effort, as the road network remained extremely poor since independence and this is still the case in many places (Wallis and van de Geer, 1982:95-96). There were challenges encountered as B.A.P.S was run by the Ministry of Agriculture, and so its budget was centralized. There were delays in paying for expenses of the programme resulting in delay of completion of its first phase. It was seen as a waste of resources because the work done was of low quality and incomplete. The second Phase, which was intended to train farmers on the use of inputs, credit, the routinizing of marketing operations, the efficient running of stores, selling the inputs and farm mechanization, was difficult to be implement when Phase one was incomplete. The lack of needed physical infrastructure was the main hindrance in taking services to the farmers (Wallis and van de Geer, 1982:100). Hence, the Third Plan proved unsuccessful in achieving its main objective of improving agriculture.

The objective of the Fourth Five Year Development Plan (1986/87-1990/91) was to restructure the economy with a view to stimulate an accelerated economic development to adequately meet the basic needs in providing better living conditions for the Basotho. The government intended to maximize the national income and employment in achieving a more equitable distribution of national wealth, and reduce the poverty level through rural development. However, the implementation of the Plan forced the government to seek donor funding which rose from R10.0 million in 1985/86 to R55.2 million in 1990/91 representing a full take up of donor funds such that the proportion of the capital budget rose from 10.2 percent to 34.2 percent over a period of six years. In the mid-1980s economic performance was characterized by low and uneven growth, widening budget deficits and substantial

deterioration in the balance of payments. Real GDP growth averaged only 2.4 percent in 1985/86 and in 1986/87 GNP declined by an average of 1.1 percent. However, with the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programme in 1988/89 and the implementation of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), economic development took a positive turn. Real GDP averaged 7.0 percent in 1989/90, GNP growth was 3.4 percent. Other contributory factors included the strengthening of the manufacturing sector and substantial fiscal and balance of payments adjustment. The manufacturing sector grew by 13 percent against the Plan target of 9 percent. The overall fiscal deficit was reduced from 9.4 percent in 1988/89 to 0.6 percent of GNP in 1990/91. But the economic growth could not translate into improved living conditions for the Basotho as the Plan intended, as there were several layoffs of workers to improve the fiscal deficit, meaning that the main objective was never achieved.

The fifth Plan (1991/92 – 1995/96) aimed at the achievement of a better life for every Mosotho through alleviation of poverty, generation of more productive job opportunities and promotion of equity and social justice. Thus during the plan, government intended to promote democracy and popular participation as essential elements of the development process. The Plan aimed at transferring political power from the military government to the people through the multi-party system. It would be the era of people's full involvement at all levels. The major objective of improving people's lives was not achieved. Nonetheless, power was transferred from the military to the civilian government in 1993 to promote democracy and popular participation. As earlier indicated, since 1993, the country has never attained political stability. Popular participation, as discussed in Chapter 5, was just a wish as local governance has been dysfunctional. This means then that the five development plans have not been successful in facilitating the improvement of the living condition of the Basotho, hence, the adoption of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) in 2003. However, this strategy also was never implemented as it required more funds than the country could afford. These efforts failed to effect any change in the lives of the people, and thus increased poverty in Lesotho.

The Third Plan and the Second Plan were almost similar in their emphasis of improving agricultural productivity to reduce food imports while the Fourth and Fifth plans aimed at reducing poverty which continued to escalate. The failure of these plans to effect change was attributable to the fact that the development planning strategies and resource allocation have remained centrally driven and controlled by technocrats in the central government with very limited consultation with the Basotho. Those implemented through projects, which mostly



emphasized improvement in agriculture, were disappointingly unsuccessful, as they used a ‘top-down approach’ (Matlosa, 1999:10). The development plans have also remained centralized for a long time with not much engagement with primary stakeholders resulting in implementation failure and underdevelopment of the country.

### **Finding a place in the global economy**

The state has been unable to undertake huge industrial investment. Commerce has largely remained in the hands of foreign traders (Pule, 2002:217) showing that the country has been in a precarious economic position. This position has not improved as foreign companies are still largely owning business including industrial investment (for example, South African companies and Chinese investors), eroding the financial resources (in the form of capital flight), leaving the country facing serious challenges of underdevelopment and continuing poverty. Consequently, Lesotho continues to depend on other states.

From the late 1970s the government adopted an industrial promotion policy consisting of import substitution and export-oriented production to promote the garment sector (Matlosa, 1999:12); however, this intervention failed to overcome the structural weaknesses of the economy (Lundahl et al., 2003:26). Economic stagnation in South Africa, combined with rising budget and current account deficits, led to an increase of public debt in the 1980s. The ensuing economic problems resulted in the government approaching international financial institutions (IFIs) for assistance aimed at macroeconomic stability and structural reform. At the end of the decade, the country embarked on these sets of reforms (further details provided later under Lesotho’s economic development) while poverty continued to increase.

Local economic development unfortunately has not mitigated the adverse effects of the sharp decline in mining employment and remittances received. First, lack of production ownership hampers Lesotho’s economic development and second, trade with other countries subjects it to international controls, eroding its financial resources for investment in local development. This is to argue that underdevelopment in Lesotho is also due to unfavourable terms of trade pertaining to exports especially garments, the country’s main export, thus increasing poverty levels in the country.

The garment sector has replaced the continuously declining agricultural sector since 2000 as the main contributor to economic growth in the country. The origins of the industry date back to the early 1980s, when garment operations were moved from South Africa to Lesotho, to

avoid international sanctions against apartheid and take advantage of cheap and relatively more productive labour (Atema et al, 2004:15). The access to the preferred European Union (EU) and the United States of American (USA) markets and the provision of incentives contributed to attracting more investors. The first East Asian investment by Chinese firms was in 1986 and the sector grew for more than a decade. A major boost to the industry came from the approval of the African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2000 (Gibbon, 2003 and IMF, 2004). AGOA is an agreement between the USA and Sub-Saharan African countries (SSA) including the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) to increase trade and investment between these countries through market access for products from SSA (Langton, 2008:1).

The Lesotho garment and textile industry employs a more significant proportion of the population than the public sector. It was estimated to have 43 firms with 43 000 employees (90 percent being women) in 2003 and increased to 54 000 workers in 2004 while the government employed about 36 710 people as civil servants in 2005. However, the figure declined to 40 000 workers in 2005 when 14 000 workers lost their jobs (Bennet, 2006:166) as a result of MFA (Multi-Fibre Agreement) contraction and currency appreciation which forced many firms to exit Lesotho while those remained retrench staff thus increasing the level of unemployment in the country. A further decline occurred in 2008 (Kipling, 2010:2). Table 3.4 below indicates the growth of the sector until 2009. As the table indicates, in 2007 the industry employed 47,040 workers. In the same year, the government employed 39,048 civil servants while the number of migrant workers in RSA mines stood at 53,877. The industry is currently the country's second largest formal sector after the mining industry in RSA that has employed many Basotho, thus showing extensive dependence of the economy on foreign direct investment. Besides, these employees receive low wages, which they have to augment by working overtime. Even so, this cannot sustain them meaning they are trapped in the poverty cycle.

**Table 3.4: Employment in the Lesotho's Textiles and Garment Industry, 1999-2007**

Industry	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Employment	9,847	16,417	23,518	33,140	44,345	53,087	40,364	45,889	47,040	40,499	38,449

Source: Bennet, M. 2006 and Kipling, J. 2010.

Exports grew markedly during the 1990s and increased even more dramatically at the end of the decade due to the AGOA. They now make up over 50 percent of GDP, with garments

accounting for three quarters of this figure. Approximately 95 percent of garment exports are to the US market under AGOA at a very low price. In 2004, the value of total exports to the US amounted to \$467 million, 96 percent of these exports being in textiles and garments. Even though all inputs to the garment industry are imported from Asia and South Africa, the sector's export growth has contributed to lowering Lesotho's large trade deficits. Nevertheless, in 2002, imports (including food, building materials, vehicles, machinery, medicines and petroleum products) stood at more than double the value of exports and came mainly from the countries of the SACU providing 90 percent of such imports and Asia with 7 percent and 3 percent from elsewhere (GOL Economic Review Reports, 2001-2002 and OECD 2005 and Bennet, 2006). Lesotho always has a trade deficit, further indicating a dependent economy without ownership and control of production resulting in erosion of financial resources needed to develop the country; hence it remains underdeveloped. This is, however, not the only setback to the economy of Lesotho.

### **Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs)**

After a decade of financial stability and relatively high growth in GDP and GNP during the 1970s, the performance of Lesotho's economy began to decline with low growth, rapidly rising fiscal deficits and substantial deterioration in the external current account and the overall balance of payments. Financial imbalances of the economy were caused by the sluggish growth of migrant remittances and customs union revenue in combination with an expansive fiscal and monetary policy. As a result, real net income from abroad increased until 1982 and subsequently fell. The period 1980 to 1986 was characterized by uneven economic growth. On average, the growth rate of real GDP and GNP were 1.2 and 2.1 percent, respectively. With a population growth of about 2.6 percent this meant a declining per capita income. After 1986 the growth rate of GDP recovered significantly to about 8 percent during 1986-1989 while the GNP has been about 5 percent. Lesotho was undertaking a large project, Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), with the intention to export surplus water resources to South Africa and to generate power for local use. The LHWP related activities and increased exports of manufacturing products were the source of growth of the economy. But the overall government deficit, which started in 1979-80, reached a peak at 9.8 percent of the GNP in 1981-82. It again rose to a second peak at 10.4 percent of the GNP in 1987-88 (IMF, 1993; IMF, 1989 and Central Bank of Lesotho, 1989). At the same time there was deterioration in the external current account, where the large overall government deficit has

had a direct influence. The domestic credit market was also expanding during this decade. Increased credit to the private sector went to consumption rather than investments, and it created demand for imports rather than for domestic production. The current account was in deficit every year during the 1980s. The highest deficit of 8.8 percent as a proportion of GNP was in 1988 (Petersson, 1991:4). Against this background, Lesotho was faced with a number of constraints in pursuing its economic policy. The government of Lesotho first adopted and implemented a set of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) policy prescriptions on structural adjustment in 1987, the second in 1993, and the last in 2000. The objectives of the SAPs were to restore and maintain a reasonable economic growth, expansion of employment opportunities and improve living standards by strengthening fiscal and current account balances. This research analyzes only the recent 2000 to reflect the economic progress of the country in relation to poverty.


In March 2000, the government of Lesotho entered into a three-year agreement with the IMF. The agreement committed the government to adopt prudent economic policies, aimed at addressing problems associated with the recession caused by the collapse of the business sector due to the political turmoil of 1998. The agreement also guaranteed the IMF and other development partners' support for the country's efforts to improve social and economic welfare. As a result, technical and financial support has steadily been flowing into Lesotho from various sources. During 2001/2002 the IMF disbursed more than M70 million as part of a concessional loan (GOL Economic Review Report, 2005:1).

As part of these policy prescriptions, the government also developed the Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (PRS) in 2003, aimed at addressing poverty related problems. The aim was to confront poverty from various angles including employment of labour-based methods to build infrastructure, creating an enabling environment for self-employment, supporting and encouraging local enterprises (PRS, 2003:8). This strategy has not been implemented due to lack of capacity and lack of funding as the funding which was provided by the IMF was utilized during the first phase of this initiative – the Feasibility study. The government has, however, adopted alternative measures of using part of the revenue generated locally from the Lesotho Highlands Water Project to create temporary employment across the country using labour-based methods in community development projects (*fato-fato*). In addition, the government has provided funding for small projects like manufacturing of petroleum jelly using medicinal plants within the country which is sold in the local market. But even with

these in place, poverty continues to be the greatest challenge facing the nation as the mentioned projects only employ a small proportion of the population while the majority is left without jobs.

Lesotho's economic growth rose during 2001 due to structural reforms in the financial, telecommunications and electricity subsectors. The manufacturing sector also performed well despite the global economic downturn with real GDP rising by 3.5 percent (Figure 3.1). A sharp decrease is however observed between 1996 and 1998 when the remittances from mining employment in South Africa which comprised a significant proportion of the country's income began to decline. It reached the worst stage in 1998 when the business sector was looted and burned down when the opposition was contesting the outcome of elections and the SADC forces entered the country to intervene. The economy registered -4.2 percent of the GDP in 1998. Though the growth rates fluctuated in the years later, Lesotho further achieved higher growth of 8.1 percent in 2006 due to the benefits from SACU agreement where Lesotho derived more revenue as an outturn. The growth rate was not sustainable after 2006 showing a downturn to 2.0 percent in 2009 (Table 3.5). This is, however, far below the 5 percent annual growth needed to reverse the present trend of increasing poverty among Basotho (GOL Economic Review Reports, 2005 and 2009).

**Figure 3.1: GDP Growth Rates in Lesotho, 1980-2003**



Source: IMF Country Report, 2004

**Table 3.5: GDP Growth Rates in Lesotho, 2000-2009**

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Growth (%)	4.5	3.5	1.5	3.9	4.6	0.7	8.1	5.1	3.2	2.0

Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning National Accounts, 2010

SAPs impacted on agriculture by failing to promote food security in households. The country also engaged in privatization and market liberalization policies of SAPs. In pursuit of agricultural policy goals aimed at poverty alleviation, attainment of household food security and creation of employment, it allowed private crop production and liberalized the market to allow competition. However, the structure and practices of the private crop production sector continued to reflect a regime of manipulated prices rather than one that allowed the influence of market forces affecting the producers. The SAPs also recommended subsidy removal in the agricultural sector, which impaired the economy further. It affected crop diversification in that producers had to engage in inappropriate production practices as production costs had gone higher when subsidies were removed, for example, every year maize production has degraded soils seriously affecting the economy. It has exacerbated poverty among the majority of maize consumers in favour of the minority of producers by not promoting food security.

The state also became a non-delivering entity as the SAPs forced some conditions on the state. Most notably, the privatization policy transferred resources to inefficient state enterprises, which simultaneously impaired the ability of the private sector to compete thereby delaying the development of the economy further (GOL Economic Review Report, 2005:1). The effects of SAPs were also felt in the public sector when employment of civil servants declined. This could be a possible area for future research. On the other hand, the labour force keeps on increasing with graduates (about 12,000 each year) who cannot be absorbed by the labour market, further showing the worse position of the economy which has contributed to the increasing poverty in the nation (GOL Economic Review Report, 2005 and Lesotho National Situation Report, 2009). The declining agricultural productivity and high unemployment have drawn many people to the urban areas to engage in the informal sector to avert poverty, an observable fact in many African countries.

Observably, in Lesotho also the informal sector continues to grow. There are no current statistics on the number of existing informal businesses in Lesotho except data from the 2000

survey by Sechaba Consultants on the 831 informal businesses drawn from six districts only, while the country has ten districts. However, from observation, this sector has expanded dramatically most particularly in urban areas from what it used to be in 2000. However, it is difficult to tell whether the same scenario holds as in other countries where there are more women than men due to unavailability of documented data thus warranting a new investigation to close the existing gaps. The main business categories are production, services and trade (Sechaba Consultants, 2000:160).

Furthermore, it can be observed that the current government does not recognize the informal economic activities in the urban areas and imposes frequent arrests, evictions and confiscations of items for sale by the street vendors. This has increased the incidence of poverty, as residents are not able to get money needed for their survival out of what are regarded as 'illegal' business activities while on the other hand people continue to flow massively into the urban areas especially Maseru. Nevertheless, the informal business sector continues to serve as a cushion for many households in the country since the country's formal economy fails to cater for them. As the informal sector only remains a hand to mouth activity, poverty levels remain high in Lesotho.

### **Land and development**

One of the persistent and critical challenges faced by the country has been the continuous decline of agricultural productivity, the economic base of the country (Ambrose, 1993:172 and Thabane, 2002:116). Land degradation, loss of land, and population pressure on land have been prominent factors in this decline. Land degradation continues to pose a threat to a rural population whose production is declining. One effect of this is rural-urban migration, causing urban population to swell, particularly in Maseru. This growth has had two effects. First, it has led to pressure on land resulting in soil erosion and land degradation, as the poor often rely on gathering fuel for cooking from the land. Second, it has resulted in more loss of land that formed part of the livelihood, due to selling of land for settlements to both immigrants from the countryside and those born in Maseru and who are now expanding to other areas either for settlement or for business. Land was of significance for food production. As a result, the country faces food insecurity from year to year, compensated through food imports and donations from other countries. Much of the staple food, 78 percent, is imported from South Africa, the country's main trading partner, while WFP

donates 8.6 percent, compared to only 19.2 percent produced in the country (FAO/WFP, 2006:23) as indicated in Table 3.7.

Again, changes in the traditional land tenure system of Lesotho have affected the agricultural productivity. The traditional system allowed free ownership of land to citizens in that every Mosotho had access and user rights to land allocated to him, though women had only user rights to the land allocated to their husbands. The system did not allow private land ownership by non-citizens either for settlement on agricultural land or for investment in agriculture. The Land Procedure Act of 1967, then the Land Husbandry Act of 1969 and the Land Act of 1973, which introduced the lease system and gave the government greater control over land particularly in urban areas, introduced the new changes first. The system was such that no one could have access and user rights to the land unless the government through the department of Lands and Survey granted a lease certificate. The government has not found it easy to implement these laws because of serious opposition from the traditional authorities, the people and opposition parties. However, these laws have provoked sale of arable agricultural land across the country by the people fearing the government is going to take their land in an attempt to allow private ownership, particularly by foreign investors. As a result, agricultural land is disappearing at an alarming rate in various urban communities. New settlements of people from both the countryside and Maseru occupy the sold land, hence, the country faces food deficit (Mokitimi, 2006 and FAO/WFP, 2006).

Furthermore, since independence the number of chiefs proliferated because the sons of chiefs became new chiefs in their own right, thus wanting more land for cultivation. Land that was initially allocated to the commoners, widows and old destitute women has been repossessed (Thabane, 1998:10) as they are unable to cultivate it due to lack of resources (e.g. ploughing equipment). Chiefs' expropriation of land has left people who had previously owned land living in poverty as they have insufficient food to sustain themselves. The situation reflects women's marginalization and exclusion from their citizenship rights of owning land, exposing them to vulnerability and poverty. It is evident with some of the widows who lived in Motimposo. For example, 'Mamotaung Motaung had owned agricultural land in her former place in the Thaba-Tseka district, but even if she wanted to go back as she aspired to, she found it difficult as she claimed her land had been taken away by the chief (Interview, 'Mamotaung Motaung, February, 2009).

In spite of this, the majority of the population still lives in the rural areas (Table 3.6).



**Table 3.6: Population by Urban and Rural residence**

Residence	Percentage distribution of the de jure population by urban and rural residence: 1976-2006			
	1976	1986	1996	2006
Urban	10.5	11.8	16.9	23.8
Rural	89.5	88.2	83.1	76.2
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: Lesotho Bureau of Statistics, 1999, 2006.

Only 9 percent of Lesotho's land is arable and is used to grow mainly staple food including maize, sorghum and wheat and much of the workforce is engaged in subsistence farming. Around 40.6 percent of the employed population aged 15 years and above engages in subsistence farming (Bureau of Statistics of Lesotho Labour Survey Report, 2009:2). However, there is need to import much of the staple food from South Africa, the country's main trading partner, due to population increase while the available arable land is shrinking. As maize is the major cereal, with over 77 percent of country's production (FAO/WFP, 2006:19), it captures well the status of cereal food flows in the country (Table 3.7). According to Table 3.7 (referring to 2002/03 to 2004/05 agricultural seasons) Lesotho's cereal domestic production averaged a low 80,000MT. This corresponds to just 19.2 percent of the country's estimated annual cereal requirements of 416,000MT. Lesotho has an open economy allowing free flow of goods and services across its borders with South Africa. This has greatly facilitated the role of commercial imports in bridging the food deficit gap. Commercial cereal imports continue to dominate the coverage of the domestic cereal gap, averaging 78 percent of the domestic cereal gap and about 63 percent of the national cereal requirement. A significant proportion of the Net Cereal Balance is believed to be covered by informal cross-border imports (conducted on a private and small-scale individual basis) and other food aid imports through other channels like religious-based organizations and occasionally Government-to-Government bilateral arrangements (FAO/WFP, 2006:20).

**Table 3.7: Domestic Cereal Requirement, 2002/03- 2004/05**

<b>Annual average estimates (2002/03-2004/05)</b>	<b>Quantity in Metric Tons (MT)</b>	<b>Percentage requirement</b>	<b>Percentage Total</b>	<b>Percentage Domestic Gap</b>
Total Cereal Requirement	416 000	100%		-
Domestic Cereal Production	80 000	19.2%		-
Domestic Cereal Gap	-336 000	80.8%		100%
Commercial Cereal Imports	262 000	63.0%		78.0%
WFP Cereal Food Aid Deliveries	29 067	7.0%		8.6%
Net Cereal balance	-44 933	10.8%		13.4%

Source: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Reports 2002-2005 and WFP Lesotho CO Data 2005

Although maize production in the country has declined in recent years (Table 3.7), it remains the country's staple food, constituting over 80 percent of the rural diet. Most of maize production is in the lowlands and least in the mountain areas, which mostly produce wheat. Leribe, Maseru, Mafeteng and Berea are the three leading districts in maize production. Jointly they constitute about 75 percent of the total national production. The majority of maize farmers are small-scale subsistence farmers with very low productivity and average yields of less than 1MT/Ha. Inputs for maize production (hybrid seeds, fertilizers and pesticides) are also imports from South Africa. They are significantly more costly in Lesotho than in South Africa thereby raising production costs to Basotho farmers and lowering their competitiveness against cheaper maize imports from South Africa. In addition to being more expensive than imports, domestic maize production is very low even during good years covering just about 30 percent of the total national consumption requirements (FAO/WFP, 2006:20).

Over the years, there has been an obvious reduction in agricultural production as indicated in Table 3.8, mainly caused by soil exhaustion, erosion and recurring drought reducing Lesotho's food self-sufficiency, forcing the country to rely on food imports, meaning a shift

from once being a net exporter to net importer of food. Sheep produce wool and goats mohair but the global price of these products has steadily been declining under the pressure of massive synthetic production, increasing rural poverty, as this was previously a source of income. Moreover, livestock production is constrained by poorly maintained pastureland and armed livestock robbery. All these factors have contributed to agricultural decline resulting in rural-urban migration (FAO/WFP: 2005:3).

**Table 3.8: Total Cereal Area Harvested, 2004 to 2006 by Crop**

	Maize (ha)			Sorghum (ha)			Wheat (ha)		
	2004/05	2005/06	Variation	2004/05	2005/06	Variation	2004/05	2005/06	Variation
Lesotho	161 559	139 139	-13.9%	36 104	34 523	-4.4%	10 510	10 425	-0.8%

Source: Bureau of Statistics (BOS) and Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission (CFSAM), 2006

As a result there has been a national food deficit of over 40 percent for a decade since 2002 (GOL Economic Review, 2007:1-2) compelling the country to depend on food imports and food aid. Approximately 50 percent of people in a population of 2 million people experience shortage of food due to low production of food in the country (Ramsamy, 2002:4). This continues to expose the country to dumped foods under the pretext of liberalized cheap food imports and aid. Household food insecurity has become a permanent feature in the lives of many Basotho and high levels of unemployment, which is around 45 percent nationally but 80 percent in the rural sector, exacerbate this problem (GOL Economic Review Report, 2005:1).

### **Migrancy and remittances**

The importance of migrancy to Lesotho's economy dates far back to the colonial period. The introduction of a cash economy which imposed a demand for income to spend on commodities and a heavy taxation on every male adult pushed men to South African mines, with serious impact on agriculture. These migrants left behind women, the elderly and children, who only produced for subsistence. A fall in migrant mineworkers and related remittances accompany the decline in agricultural contribution to the economy. The number fell from 126 361 in 1990 to 65 727 miners in 2000 and to only 46 520 by the end of 2007. The fall in the number of migrant mineworkers has translated into a fall in income for the majority of households in Lesotho (Turner, 2003 and Cobbe, 2004) posing a threat to growth, maintenance and development of the agricultural sector due to intensified rural-urban

migration. This has left the already declining agricultural sector in a state of severe weakness, lack of sustainability and further dependence on migrant labour system.

As such, migrant labour has played a significant role in the socio-economic history of Lesotho. Here I would like to emphasize two aspects: the migrant system locked Lesotho into a dependent relationship with South Africa and at the same time offered a very basic livelihood for thousands of Basotho migrants and their families who had few other options available to them. This section argues that while the economy was showing a sign of decline from adversities in the agricultural sector, migrant labour served as a livelihood for many Basotho households. Its decline from the early 1990s has adversely affected many lives in Lesotho, particularly in the rural areas which were dependent on income from this employment, making Lesotho to remain an economy perpetually dependent on RSA through the migrant labour system.

Lesotho has been the second largest supplier of labour to the South African mining sector for over a century. Up to the early 1970s, any able-bodied male could obtain a contract to work on the mines. There was a significant increase between 1930 and 1940 from 10,439 to 22,306. This again rose substantially from 63,988 in 1970 to 96,309 in 1980 reaching a high point in the 1990s. The table 3.9 indicates that the South African mining industry recruited migrants from almost every other country in the region, with Lesotho and Mozambique supplying exceptionally high numbers of labourers. This indicates that from the 1920s to early 1990's labour migration from Lesotho to South African mines showed a steady increase. The numbers, however, declined in the 1950s. Since the wages were very low in the 1950s Basotho worked a few contracts to accumulate cash and retired thereafter to the agricultural sector. In the 1960s, the numbers were still low due to tighter migrancy controls by RSA (Breytenbach, 1975 and DeLancey, 2007). It was 21 percent of the total male labour force (Table 3.9).

**Table 3.9: Contract Labour Migration to RSA Mines, 1920-1990**

Year	Lesotho	Total Labour Force
1920	10,439	99,950
1930	22,306	99,355
1940	52,044	168,058
1950	34,467	172,816
1960	48,842	233,808
1970	63,988	265,143
1980	96,309	182,449
1990	108,780	192,044

Source: TEBA, 2005

Between 1996 and 2005, there was a dramatic decline in the male migrant labour force from 101, 262 to 52, 450. A decline in remittances from R887, 172 in 1999 to R47, 320 in 2000 clearly indicates the loss of national remittances (Table 3.10). The initial causes of this sharp decrease were mechanization coupled with problems in the mining industry. Furthermore, South African mines began favouring local labour at the expense of migrant labour (Cobbe, 2004:4) resulting in loss of income by many households in Lesotho particularly those in rural areas. The remittances were income from savings that had accrued to the miners over their contract period, remitted to the government of Lesotho, where it formed part of government revenue. At the end of their contract, the miners had to collect their money from the Lesotho Government with arrangements through the Lesotho Bank to carry out such transactions. This system no longer exists as the bank is now in private ownership. The government is no longer pursuing deferred payments<sup>1</sup> policy as it used to increase its revenue. The Employment Bureau Agency (TEBA) in Lesotho is now responsible for recruitment of miners and

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<sup>1</sup> Note: Deferred pay was income designed for repatriation later, through other institutional arrangements by the employing country and those of the country where the labour came from. Its payment was in the home countries of the migrant labourers at the end of their contracts. Home country legislation compels migrants to remit 60% and 30% respectively of their earnings home. The amounts involved are large and constitute a significant proportion of the foreign exchange earnings and GNP of Lesotho Bureau of Statistics Lesotho Statistical Report No. 19 2007 and FAO, 2009.

disbursement of their savings. Mineworkers have opened personal savings accounts with the Agency, and at the end of their contract term, they collect their savings.

**Table 3.10: Distribution of Mine Migrant Workers (1996-2005) in R000**

Year	Average number employed	Deferred pay	Remittances Payments
1996	101,262	264,624	174,676
1997	95,913	169,418	127,386
1998	80,445	131,263	894,470
1999	68,604	136,911	887,172
2000	64,907	38,334	47,320
2001	61,412	152,877	102,797
2002	62,158	182,479	112,496
2003	61,416	208,450	118,333
2004	56,357	293,334	131,793
2005	52,450	169,229	167,386

Source: Bureau of Statistics Lesotho Statistical Report No. 19 2007 and FAO, 2009.

Mining was not the only sector that employed migrants. Commercial farms, factories, domestic service, transportation and construction also hired migrants although the exact numbers are unknown. Recruitment of Basotho men, besides for mining, includes a range of manual work in South Africa, on farms, in factories and on the railways. Basotho women were recruited into farm and factory work and into domestic service for white families (Mikell and Skinner, 1983:1) and this is continuing though it is difficult to tell their numbers due to lack of statistical data. This is another area of investigation in future.

Migrant labour extracted the able-bodied Basotho from the economy, leaving the domestic front with very limited manpower to develop the country. Men dominated internal and cross border migration leaving only women, children and the old behind who struggled to sustain the local subsistence economy (Thabane, 2002:107 and Crush, Williams and Peberdy, 2005:14). Migrant labour also separated families leading to many female-headed households in Lesotho who, among other things, had no legal right to asset ownership. Lesotho relied heavily on remittances as a source of livelihood in response to its declining food self-

sufficiency. Thus, literature now refers to this country as a ‘poor labour reserve’. Its reliance on labour migration has made it solely dependent on her only neighbour, South Africa. Natural hazards like drought and untimely off-season rain, snowfalls and frosts seriously affecting agriculture and the economy aggravated this dependency. Continuous heavy rain during the growing season negatively affects yields particularly in the Foothills and Highlands often hit by early frosts. In many cases, these frosts occur before grains (including maize) reach maturity making them unsuitable for consumption (FAO, 2006:14).

Migrant labour as a source of income has been important to Lesotho. It contributed from 35 percent in 1989 to 27 percent in 1993 of the GNP (See Table 3.11). Though it has been declining due to retrenchments (Table 3.11), it remains an important source of income to the country and livelihood to families in Lesotho contributing 29 percent of the GNP in 2009, as Table 3.11 indicates.

**Table 3.11: Miners’ Remittances and National Income (2000-2009)**  
(GNP in millions of Rands)

<b>Year</b>	<b>GNP</b>	<b>Miners’ remittances as a % of GNP</b>
2000	5,434	55
2001	6,180	52
2002	6,893	54
2003	7,348	51
2004	8,702	45
2005	9,937	39
2006	11,581	36
2007	13,588	34
2008	15,427	32
2009	16,504	29

Source: IMF, 1994 and GOL Fiscal Report, 2010

Furthermore, the importance of miners’ remittances to the economy of Lesotho can be seen by looking at expenditure patterns. The miners have been bringing home foreign exchange,

which the country needs for imports, while they also consume and invest in spending money on local and foreign consumption and capital goods. The period 1989-93 was the high point of labour migrancy, but even then, the overall benefits to Lesotho were minimal. This is explained by the continuous fall in 'local economic effect' against a relatively higher 'import economic effect' that was also on a downswing due to retrenchment. As table 4.10 indicates, in 1993 migrant workers brought in 33 percent of foreign currency, a significant contribution to the balance of payments. However, this disposable income had only minimal effect on the local economy as a large proportion of it was spent on purchasing imported goods (33 percent), while a mere 13 percent was spent on purchasing local goods, which meant the effect of remittances on the local economy remained dismally low. Thus, while the Migrant Labour System (MLS) created employment for a section of the population, it did not translate into overall poverty reduction in the country as its contribution to the national income (GNP) has been declining over the years with a low multiplier effect on the local economy (Sparreboom and Sparreboom-Burger, 1996:15). The decline in mining employment has caused unemployment levels to increase. At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, unemployment stood at 45 percent (GOL Economic Review, 2005:1). Table 3.12 below presents remittances as a percentage of imports and of local goods.



**Table 3.12: The Effect of Miners' Remittances on the Local Economy (Imports in millions of Rands, Import and Local Effect in percentage)**

Year	Imports <sup>2</sup>	Miners Remittances/ Imports <sup>3</sup>	Imports/GNP <sup>4</sup>	Import effect <sup>5</sup>	Local effect <sup>6</sup>
1989	1,586	52	68	43	20
1990	1,937	50	69	42	19
1991	2,376	44	77	44	13
1992	2,568	43	73	38	14
1993	2,983	38	72	33	13

Source: IMF, 1994

### **Dependence on donor funding**

The weakness of the economy and trade not only led to the escalation of poverty but also increased Lesotho's dependence on external assistance. By the early 1990s, donors had acknowledged that 'bad governments' had turned many states into a 'source of man-made economic decline'. Aid increased but was often used to support inefficient state projects which were based on inappropriate capital-intensive technology and were used for political clienteles (Brett, 2008:13). The illustrated aid projects cases in Lesotho (see Table 3.3) led to economic decline and poverty.

Britain did very little to develop Lesotho, and seemed for a long time to be guided by the idea that Lesotho would be incorporated into South Africa (Spence, 1964; Weisfelder, 1967 and Pule 2002). At independence in 1966, Lesotho's dependence on migrant labour was evident as shown in Table 3.9 and 3.10. The bulk of migrants worked in South African mines while the rest worked as farm labourers, domestic labourers and industrial workers providing cash income to numerous rural households and jobs for over 100 thousand Basotho. Thus, migration provided revenue in the form of deferred pay for the state (Leys, 1979:106). Lesotho became a member of the Southern African Customs Union Agreement (SACU) in

<sup>2</sup>. Imports mean products of foreign origin into a country (www.Businessdictionary.com).

<sup>3</sup>. Miners' remittances /imports refers to income transfer from foreign mine workers to their home country needed for imports. This is a contribution to Balance of Payments.

<sup>4</sup>. Imports/ GNP refers to foreign products as a percentage of Gross National Product

<sup>5</sup>. Local economic effect refers to percentage of remittances spent on goods from the local market in a given year.

<sup>6</sup>. Import economic effect refers to percentage of remittances spent on goods and services from the foreign market in a given year.

1910. By this agreement, members shared revenue from trade, which mainly took the form of South Africa compensating the smaller countries for the skewed trading relationship. At independence, Lesotho was already dependent on amounts accruing to it (Lundahl and Petersson, 1991). Moreover, the country's precarious condition worsened due to the fact that commerce was largely in the hands of traders and industry was non-existent. Agriculture contributed half of the GDP (Lundahl and Petersson, 1991:34), and dependence on maize imports was already evident to cater for food shortage. A further constraint on Lesotho's development was that the British government insisted that any locally collected revenue be for reducing indebtedness from grants, further preventing the government from expanding social services (Pule, 2002:217). Lesotho continued acquiring different types of aid (Grants in Aid, Colonial Development and Welfare Fund and Overseas Aid Scheme). All aid combined exceeded locally raised revenue (GOL, 1966:10-11) but without visible results of any improved economy and living conditions

The bulk of aid from Britain was in the form of grants (Weisfelder, 1974; Jones, 1977 and Wellings, 1982). The government's major bargaining tools for aid were the country's small size, impoverishment and landlockedness. These were reinforced by donors' belief that aid would be temporary therapy to set Lesotho on a growth path and would be terminated once this was achieved. British economic assistance during the early days of Lesotho's post-colonial history was earmarked primarily for recurrent expenditure (budgetary aid) and capital expenditure (development aid). Budgetary aid, however, did not have a long life span. Estimated at around R0.8 million in 1960-61, it rose sharply to R5.5 million in 1965-66. Over the same period, development aid totalled only R2.3 million (Jones, 1977:171). The total UKaid rose to a peak of R8.6 million in 1966-67. In 1970-71 it dropped to its lowest ebb when aid was suspended for a brief period in response to the political coup in the country over elections. It revived somewhat afterwards but reached only R3.8 million in 1972-73. Most British assistance was in the form of budgetary aid but the proportion devoted to this sector decreased gradually, especially after the redistribution terms of the Customs Union were made more favourable to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in 1969, and was eventually phased out in 1970-71 (Wellings, 1982:268). From 1970 to 1984 aid was mostly for agricultural development backed by various donors as illustrated in Table 3.3. The main donor countries to Lesotho are currently Ireland and the United States of America.

Ireland's donations to Lesotho have been the longest running aid programme. The Irish Government has donated aid to Lesotho since 1975. On 14 February 2005, Lesotho announced that Ireland was the largest bilateral donor with financial support in excess of M70 million in each of the previous three years. Ireland also supports Lesotho's Flying Doctor service, education, sanitation, water and various health initiatives such as the fight against AIDS with the Clinton Foundation ([http://www.lesotho.gov.ls/articles/2005/PM\\_Visits\\_Ireland.htm](http://www.lesotho.gov.ls/articles/2005/PM_Visits_Ireland.htm); <http://www.irishaid.gov.ie/lesotho.asp> and <http://www.lesotho.gov.ls/about/health.php>).

The United States was one of the first four countries to establish an embassy in Maseru after Lesotho gained its independence from Great Britain in 1966. Since this time, Lesotho and the United States have consistently maintained warm bilateral relations. The Southern African regional office of the U.S Agency for International Development (USAID) in Gaborone, Botswana, now administers most of the U.S. assistance to Lesotho of approximately \$2 million in the financial year 2004. Total U.S. aid to Lesotho is over \$10 million, including humanitarian food assistance. The Peace Corps has operated in Lesotho since 1966. About 100 Peace Corps volunteers concentrate in the sectors of health, agriculture, education, rural community development and the environment. The Government of Lesotho encourages greater American participation in commercial life and welcomes interest from potential U.S. investors and suppliers. In 2007, the Government of Lesotho signed a compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation to provide \$362.5 million in support to develop Lesotho's water sector, healthcare infrastructure and private sector (United States Department of State, 2007 and <http://www.lesotho.gov.ls>).

Other area-based rural development projects were those at Thaba-Phatsoa in Leribe and Ts'akholo in Mafeteng (Ngqaleni, 1991:130). The basic feature characteristic of all these projects has been their collapse linked to corruption in public offices, misuse of aid funds and mismanagement. Over 200 rural development schemes in Lesotho, nine of which were large expensive area-based projects focusing on agricultural development, failed to achieve their objectives. No matter how many failed, it appeared a norm to keep on trying with yet another project. Eventually, there was no development achieved in Lesotho through these projects (Murray 1981 and Ferguson, 1990).

Some of the projects used the "top-down" approach during the execution and alienated local communities. Thus local farmers were not included in the decision-making process about

crucial matters related to production, distribution and marketing. Furthermore, there seems to have been no plan to develop the skills of the local farmers or other members of the community integral to the broader agricultural economy. Instead, skilled people were imported to run enterprises (Ngqaleni, 1991:132). The traditional land tenure system inhibited the efficacy of other projects in that it used chiefs as customarily responsible for land allocation but they were not an integral part of these projects that needed land from the chiefs for their establishment and productive activities. Therefore, at times chiefs did not provide the necessary administrative support/community leadership and security for the community projects' activities, property and land allocation. Projects concentrated heavily on the peasantry alienating chiefs from the developments in their areas. It became difficult for the government to negotiate for such land for projects from the chiefs who were local customary land allocators. In addition, the efficacy of these projects declined in that women performed the 'triple role' encompassing reproduction role, production role and community management role where they concentrated much more of their effort and time on the reproductive than on the productive role (Wellings, 1986: 227:8). Another important aspect of failure of these projects was that the BNP regime used most of them for its political ends rather than for genuine developmental purposes (1986:6).

Some aid-funded projects (e.g. Khomokhoana Rural development project) served to consolidate local political constituencies and increase political power of the ruling class, causing donors to become disillusioned in the process. According to Matlosa, overwhelming state involvement in these projects was also part of the primitive accumulation aimed at creating an economic base for the ruling class in the name of developmentalism. Although undertaken in the name of national development, state intervention in the entire economy facilitated wealth accumulation by the ruling class. This also increased the political power of the ruling BNP (Matlosa, 1996:32). The situation echoed Africa as a whole where state intervention has often advanced the interests of the elite and their political supporters, and of state functionaries. The Basotho elite did not have any meaningful economic base. Economic power was (and still is) vested predominantly in the hands of foreign capital, which meant that after independence, this new elite attempted to use the newly found political freedom to create and expand its base of accumulation (Mengisteab and Logan, 1995:5). Lesotho's continual dependence on aid prevented the government from expanding social services (Pule, 2002:217). Lesotho continues to receive different types of aid from other countries but even

with all aid combined there are no visible results of any improved economy and living conditions. The country is also unable to feed its population.

### **Food insecurity**

The political instability and the decline of the economy that characterized Lesotho in the post-colonial era led to food insecurity. The state concentrated more on maintaining political power than on real investment in agriculture leading to a drastic fall in food quantities produced within the country. This increased dependence on food imports from South Africa. The state also relied on food aid/relief and donor funded projects to increase agricultural productivity. As these projects continued to collapse one after the other (Leribe pilot Agricultural project in 1975, Thaba-Bosiu Rural Development Project in 1977, Senqu River Agricultural Extension in 1977, Khomokhoana Rural Development Project in 1980 and Thaba-Tseka Rural Development Project in 1984), the country experienced systematic agricultural decline coupled with long drought spells and dependence on food imports from South Africa. Food aid channelled largely through the World Food Programme (WFP) and the European Community (EC) became the norm. Food aid constitutes a considerable proportion (above 60 percent of national yearly food-requirements) of the overall development assistance to Lesotho. The country received a high proportion of its food aid from WFP. Other major donors have been the EC Commission and Japan. The United States has been the principal source. It supplied food and resources and is the major provider of food to WFP (Shaw and Clay, 1993:121).

Provision of this assistance is in two forms: project food aid (WFP) and programme food aid (EC since 1978). Food aid has been generally more effective than other types of aid, particularly in terms of containing rural poverty in the context of declining agriculture and sporadic droughts. However, there have been instances where the political elite for purposes of patronage, constituency building and self-aggrandisement subjected such aid to abuse. There is evidence that the BNP also used aid for patronage and constituency-building purposes. In 1965, H. F. Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa, donated 100,000 bags of grain to Lesotho, used by the BNP during the election, which facilitated Leabua Jonathan's premiership. A large proportion of that grain served as handouts distributed in the Mpharane constituency where Jonathan fought and won a by-election (Khaketla, 1972:32).

The country survived on aid even beyond Jonathan's regime indicating greater dependence on external assistance. Initially donors did not react too negatively to the military junta.

However, their financial assistance to the country experienced fluctuations. In 1986, external assistance amounted to \$89 million (17 percent of GNP) and this increased to \$114 million (12 percent of GNP) in 1990. It dropped to about \$108 million (11.8 percent of GNP) in 1991, but further picked up to \$115 million (9.9 percent of GNP) in 1992. It declined to \$111.3 million in 1993 (8.9 percent of GNP) (Matlosa, 1999:20). This downward trend was due to the fact that the authoritarian character of the military junta made it difficult for external donors to be associated with the regime, especially in a world that was changing by the late 1980s. The repressive nature of that regime and the deteriorating human rights record of the country undoubtedly contributed to the determination of Lesotho's major aid donors to pressurise the military to withdraw, and make way for the return of civilian government (Southall, 1994:581). The anticipation was that with the return of democratic rule, donor support would increase. Although donors did not publicly denounce the military take-over and threaten suspension of economic assistance, they played quiet diplomacy exhorting the military to return governance to multi-party rule in 1993 (Matlosa, 1999:19).

### **Social consequences**

The levels of poverty in Lesotho are not likely to go down due to inadequate social services critical for survival. Lack of education was also an outstanding feature of the country. The Paris Evangelical Mission opened a few schools in 1893. However, the strict church rules and discipline at the mission schools deterred many parents from sending their children to schools (Ambrose, 1993:51). The main inhibiting factor was the cultural values of the Basotho. As part of culture male children had to engage in initiation, which was not acceptable according to the religious values of Christian churches, hence restraining boys from getting education. After initiation, they were believed to be grown up and aspired to mining employment imitating their elders, thus giving less value to formal education. This education, meant for creating Christian elite, excluded the majority of the people who adhered to traditional belief systems. Again, primary education offered throughout most of the colonial epoch was targeted at producing helpers, half teachers and half evangelists (GOL Report, 1982:63). This was typical of colonial Africa, as Rodney (1982:250) noted, 'education was limited to producing only clerks and messengers'. Later, in 1940, government constructed a few schools in Maseru, the capital town, to allow Basotho higher education (Ambrose, 1993:47). These schools were only for the elite not for ordinary poor Basotho who only acquired their education through schools run by churches.

After independence churches in Lesotho continued to play a prominent role by providing services such as education as the state could not adequately provide these services. To date, churches and private individuals own almost 80 percent of the schools and the government owns 20 percent (Atema et al, 2004:15). The state has been the main financier in paying teachers' salaries, upgrading schools run by churches and building extra schools, and providing schools with book supplies and food supplies. Nonetheless, the relations between different regimes and these institutions have often been strained by state domination and direction resulting in conflict where churches wanted to maintain their power in the use of their resources (school property) yet the government has been the main financier of such schools (Bardill and Cobbe, 1985 and Eldredge, 1993). This polarization has increased inequality among schools where the meager national resources have been unevenly distributed with government schools getting more resources. However, the government schools have been performing poorly compared with church or privately owned schools.

There is no statistical data on education budget and expenditure since independence until 1994, thus making it difficult to indicate how much the government paid for primary and secondary education. The expenditure on primary and secondary education was 10.8 percent from 5.9 of total public expenditure in 1995. This is in comparison with the SADC regional average of 6 percent. There has been a simultaneous increase in enrolment levels, from 72 437 in 1999 to 83 104 in 2003 (Maleleka, 2009:16). Despite these increases, the pupil-teacher ratio has always been an area of concern where teachers teach large class sizes. Lack of investment in teacher training, recruitment and retention have worsened this problem. In addition, non-availability and poor distribution of teaching materials, physical facilities and equipment prevent pupils from gaining practical skills this compromising the quality of education, and restricting their entry to higher school levels thus resulting in delinquency and truancy (GOL Annual Report, 1994:41) contributing negatively to development of the country.

Since 2006, primary education has been free while subsidization of secondary education commenced in 2007. However, there are concerns about lack of adequate capacity to accommodate all primary graduates, as there are fewer secondary schools than there are primary schools (Maleleka, 2009:15-16). It is estimated that Lesotho has 1, 249 primary schools and more than 60 secondary schools. The primary enrolment is 374, 628 of the total enrolment which is 67 percent, secondary is 68, 132 which is 31 percent and higher level (tertiary) is 4, 614 which is 2 percent. Female enrolment rate is high at 57 percent at primary,

36 percent at secondary and 3 percent at higher level (World Bank, 2009:1). There are several challenges regarding the male population enrolment in Lesotho. The process of learning has been more difficult for male children of Lesotho when fathers are part of the migrant labour system and spend long periods in the mines of RSA and the mothers have to take more responsibility than usual. With fathers gone, a new tension with lasting effects on the academic progress of male children is there. The male children exhibit negative attitudes toward learning. The absence of fathers could be part of the problem behind the high dropout rate and the relatively small number of children who go beyond primary level (Cranmer, David and Woolston, 1999:6).

Approximately 25 percent of children do not attend school particularly in rural areas where families are involved in subsistence activities. In many cases, families cannot afford the cost associated with attendance. Uniforms, books and other educational materials are beyond the means of many families where family stress, poverty, the spread of HIV/AIDS and divorce have led to a rise in child homelessness and abandonment, creating growing numbers of street children. Boys are more affected by nonattendance than girls. Again, in traditional Basotho society, livestock herding by young boys is a rite of passage and prerequisite to manhood in community. In the absence of fathers, boys are exposed to this heavy burden to tend flocks all day for months at the very young age of twelve, sometimes even for a yearly or monthly payment either in cash or in kind (Cranmer, David and Woolston, 1999:6).

### **HIV/AIDS Impact on Poverty**

Lesotho's overall HIV-prevalence rate of 28.9 percent is among the highest in the world. It has the distinction of being the only place in Southern Africa where more men than women are HIV positive, believed to have been mostly a result of the relative affluence of former miners when they had jobs. They lived in single-sex hostels at the mines and often had access to sex workers (Cobbe, 2004:1). The impact of this pandemic is expected to increase in terms of vulnerable groups, including the orphans, widows and widowers, an inactive or disabled labour force increasing household dependency ratio and absolute rural and urban poverty (FAO/WFP, 2005:5).

About 60 percent of the population is below the poverty line of R149 ((UNAIDS, 2012:1) while the HIV/AIDS pandemic has risen drastically (Table 3.13), reducing household income for much of the population and worsening poverty in the country. These already poor households, many of whom have lost employment as their source of income, and residing in



the rural areas, divert scarce resources away from basic needs for expenditure on medical care and funerals indicating clearly the causal linkages between unemployment, poverty and HIV/AIDS. Consequently, poverty levels have risen as many of these households sink further below the poverty line thus widening the existing inequality in the country (Ibid).

**Table 3.13: HIV/AIDS Incidence and Impact in Lesotho**

<b>HIV/AIDS Impact</b>	<b>Numbers</b>
Estimated No. of persons living with HIV/AIDS (14-49 years)	360,000
Women living with HIV/AIDS (14-49 years of age)	180,000
Children living with HIV/AIDS (0-17 years)	27,000
Children Orphaned by HIV/AIDS	130,000

Source: UNAIDS, 2012 and UNICEF, 2009

Besides free primary education, the government of Lesotho has provided funds for a universal primary school feeding scheme and a schoolbook loan scheme at secondary level. This is a cheaper method for pupils to access prescribed schoolbooks, particularly for pupils from poorer families who could not afford to purchase them. Assuming no administrative bottlenecks, the scheme is likely to be significantly helpful in terms of dealing with issues of affordability for low income families, as well as addressing the problem of availability of school textbooks in many secondary schools (Maleleka, 2009:16-17). Education, however, has not been the only problem. Other services as well have lagged far behind.

### **Provision of basic services**

From independence until 1975, the government had directed its efforts almost entirely towards meeting the needs of civil servants and expatriate technicians. The government of Lesotho began to show interest in increasing resources in the low-income sectors in 1978 as noted in the Second Five Year Development Plan (1975-1980). The Plan indicated that the government was to erect only 700 low-income housing units, 215-government pool housing for civil servants and 15 Chief's executive housing. According to the Plan, there was a need for about 9,000 units in Maseru and other growing secondary urban centres and over 6,000 for low-income households in these areas. However, the GOL was unable to provide housing for the poor as the average income for a household was about R50-R60. The middle household income was about R100-R120. Building costs were high relative to income levels, and the solution to affordable housing was confined largely to sites and services, and self-

help housing provided on a non-subsidized basis for low-income poor households. Subsequent to the Second Five Year Development Plan, there has been no specific housing policy targeted to provide housing to poor households. Parastatals provide the available housing (e.g. Lesotho Housing Corporation), only affordable to the middle and high-income households (AID, 1978:2). Consequently, most housing in Lesotho is self-provided. As such, the country lacks decent housing especially in urban areas, with a considerable number of inhabitants living in slums, an indication of underdevelopment.

The owner mostly finances housing from individual savings both in the rural and urban areas of Lesotho. House construction normally uses the natural resources like grass and stones, though recently people use bought material like bricks and corrugated iron, in rural areas. Owning a house therefore in the rural areas is not as demanding as it is in the urban areas where one has to have enough funds to either buy land to construct a house or buy a house from private land and housing markets existent in the urban areas only. However, housing in the rural areas merely provides shelter and does not promote hygiene, which should be the case according to health standards. It lacks enough space for inhabitants, as households are bigger in size comprising of an average of 5 members sharing the space (FAO, 2009:3). This is an indicator of underdevelopment and poverty. Decent housing provided with basic services particularly in the rural areas of Lesotho is not foreseeable in the near future. Housing in the urban areas is characterised by occupation of poorly constructed housing units built with mud or corrugated iron sheets (shacks) or cement bricks of low quality sometimes made by the owner. There is overcrowding, poor ventilation -as windows provided are too small while others do not have windows - lack of essential services including water, sanitation, electricity and pollution of the surrounding environment through garbage accumulation around housing units of the poor. All these conditions have influenced negatively health conditions, as indicated by the incidence of infections such as TB and other illnesses that reflect poor urban conditions, including bronchitis and water-borne diseases (GOL Report, 2007:9). This has been observed to be pervasive particularly in Thibella and Motimposo in Maseru where the research was undertaken (Field Survey, 2009), used for illustrative purposes in the next chapter.

There was significant progress in the provision of clean water in the 1990s, rising from 52 percent to 63 percent of households. The achievement was largely through the efforts of the Department of Rural Water Supply. However, Lesotho's need for water has reached levels never anticipated 30 years ago. The situation has deteriorated in the peri-urban areas,

especially with regard to the number of people per collection point (PRSP, 2003:115). The government has been slow in addressing this problem by developing sources to supply the fast growing urban areas of the lowlands. Some evidence from the three areas studied have proven that the majority of the people is living without water supply using unprotected water sources or paying for each litre of water from those who have water taps as alternatives (Field Survey, March 2009). The most distressing situation is that even the public water supply system that used to cater for the needs of those who did not own taps, is now converted to the prepaid system with high costs unaffordable to the poor. The rich have taken advantage of this system. They pay for water and in turn sell it to the poor at a higher price. For instance, if the poor were to buy this water from the supplier (Water and Sewerage Corporation) they would pay R0.08 cents per 20 litres but they pay R1.00 (Field Survey, 2009) further showing marginalization of the poor citizens and deprivation of a decent life, indicating underdevelopment.

Achievement of similar progress with sanitation has been recorded, with the percentage of households having some form of latrine increasing from 31 percent in 1990 to 49 percent in 1999. However, less than 20 percent of households had proper VIP latrines, considered the only standard that affords adequate protection from a health point of view, indicating that the majority of the population is vulnerable, a sign of poverty and underdevelopment (PRSP, 2003:114).

Furthermore, there is scanty electricity provided unevenly in urban areas, leaving a majority of the people unconnected, yet Lesotho generates electricity through the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. The country also gets supplies from ESCOM in South Africa to meet the current demand. Lack of adequate supply and dependence on imported electricity indicates a low level of development that impairs the welfare of the people (PRSP, 2003:115).

Electricity access was limited to about 10 percent of households in 2002 and most connections are in the Lowlands. There are no current statistics but still many families are without electricity even in Maseru. Paraffin is important for cooking, heating and lighting, but its availability in the rural areas remains a problem mainly due to inaccessibility and high prices. Other fuels such as gas and coal play a minor role in rural areas, showing underdevelopment.

The poorer households spend considerable time of more than two hours a day collecting fuel. Women and children suffer most severely, as they are the ones responsible for collection. In

some mountain areas, schoolchildren spend almost one day a week collecting fuel for the school kitchen, seriously impairing their education. Between 1993 and 1999, the percentage of households that depended on collected fuel rose from 55 percent to 66 percent. In short, energy is both an environmental and a poverty issue in Lesotho (PRSP, 2003:115). Thus, the poor in Lesotho are living in distressful conditions. This is a predicament of the intense poverty within the country.

### **Conclusion**

Lesotho's underdevelopment has escalated poverty in the nation. This is attributable to socio-economic and political changes the country has undergone. The country experienced continuous agricultural decline that led to the economic setback and vulnerability of many households who resorted to the migrant labour system. However, with the waning employment in the mines, many households are living in poverty. Women, who used to be household caretakers in the absence of men in the past, are migrating in large numbers to the urban areas of Lesotho and South Africa and taking low-income jobs with minimal impact on the households' poverty situation. At the same time poverty transits through migration from the rural to the urban areas, particularly Maseru urban area. At the same time, HIV/AIDS has devastated the nation through deaths and loss of income and property by many households in caring for their members thus crippling the economy further. Notwithstanding this situation, successive governments have not changed the situation in the country but have rather worsened it. Conflict over votes and political power that has been going on for years putting development plans on the sacrificial table and promoting political parties' interests, not those of the entire nation, thus increasing inequality and burying Lesotho's prospects of development. The adoption of SAPs eroded both the financial and human capital leaving the country underdeveloped and entangled in poverty.

Provision of basic services is far from meeting the demands of the nation. People, particularly those in the urban areas, still live in very bad housing conditions/slums without basic services, putting many lives at health risk. Water and sanitation provision is inadequate, and where there is some provision the cost hinders poor families from accessing them. In the case of water, the available alternatives are unprotected sources while in the case of sanitation they are the nearby gullies/streams making life very difficult. Only the well-off nationals who can afford the cost of connection access electricity. It looks unlikely that in the near future Lesotho will resolve this problem. Hence, many Basotho are still living under very devastating conditions.

These intrinsic characteristics of underdevelopment and poverty in Lesotho during the post-colonial epoch are shared by Maseru, the capital city of Lesotho. Besides, poverty existing in the city today emanates from the burgeoning population due to urbanization processes. The perilous living conditions consequent on the underdevelopment of Lesotho by the post-colonial administrations have increased rural-urban migration that has served as an option to escape from rural poverty thus increasing population growth in the urban areas of Lesotho, with Maseru absorbing more. The insufficient social development to meet the growing demands of people has resulted in many poor households living in distressing conditions as exposed in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER 4

### HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF MASERU

#### Introduction

This chapter argues that Maseru, the capital and primary city of Lesotho, has experienced persistent underdevelopment and poverty from urbanization processes. It discusses the processes and patterns of urbanization as they unfolded in this region, in order to lay the foundation for a better comprehension of the varied manifestations of poverty in Maseru. It first discusses briefly the history of Maseru and second, the contemporary development and conditions. The chapter does this in the context of the post-colonial development of cities in the Third World, particularly Africa. Prior to and for some time after independence (1966) poverty and underdevelopment in Lesotho were overwhelmingly rural matters, much like in many other parts of Africa. During the first two decades of independence, this trend began to change as Maseru experienced significant growth due to natural population increase, rural-urban migration and encroachment. Since the 1980s, urbanization has accelerated so that poverty has become concentrated more in Lesotho's primary city, namely, Maseru.

As the previous chapter explained, the country's rural areas suffered a wide range of difficulties that placed enormous strain on the agricultural sector, especially household farming. Consequently, a growing number of rural inhabitants had to leave the deprived rural areas in search of better opportunities in Maseru. Nonetheless, the city was ill prepared for the scale of this influx and unable to provide basic services or employment to the majority. Ambrose (1993:194) has demonstrated that the burgeoning population growth from the 1980s overwhelmed the city. This was evident from the lack of social services, mainly in the places occupied by poor residents, undermining welfare of the majority of the population surrounding the capital. The main factors contributing to the growth of Maseru are natural population increase, rural-urban migration together with city encroachment into already marginalized and impoverished areas, which have worsened underdevelopment and poverty. Rural-urban migration is a response to the perilous poverty in the rural areas of Lesotho where most of Basotho depended on subsistence farming, faced calamities like long spells of drought, shortage of farming land, declining levels of welfare, especially as remittances were declining as described in Chapter 3. Maseru became the centre of attraction where many

Basotho hoped to avoid poverty. The city, however, had no capacity to cater for these job seekers. As a result, they crowded in areas around the city centre and engaged in self-help activities to generate income for survival. This chapter explains that contemporary Maseru features increasing inequality with the poor people leading a distressing life while the rich continue to live luxuriously. The chapter traces the growth of Maseru from the colonial period to the integration of the city, then a town into the regional economy galvanised through process of migratory labour. The establishment of the case studies begin to feature here as part of history of marginalization.

### **The colonial origins of Maseru**

While many of the problems have worsened over the past two to three decades, many of the underlying structural problems are located in the historical development of Maseru. Maseru, the Place of Red Sandstone, was established as a police camp by the Cape Colonial administration in 1869. The Cape Colony in 1871 accorded this place the status of a capital of a separate territory under its colonial administration. It was a small town with a population of approximately 500 people. About one third of this population were the elite (both white and black working for the colonial administration and white businesspersons) and three quarters were blacks. The elite resided in town and Africans were scattered some few kilometres from the town. Maseru developed at a snail's pace because the colonial administration showed little interest in making any serious investment in infrastructural development. The buildings erected in Maseru (Post Office and government headquarters) in its early years enjoyed financial support from taxation imposed on Basotho (Leselinyane Newspaper, September 1871 in Ambrose, 1993:38).

From the outset, Maseru contained features of the British colonial model<sup>7</sup> of developing urban areas. Its primary initial purpose was to serve as an administrative outpost for the colonial government. Ambrose noted that rural villages established during the reign of Moshoeshe surrounded the small centre. Furthermore, the colonial authorities did little to develop the settlement beyond its original function and where investment took place it aimed at servicing the needs of the very small elite, mainly White colonists and, to a lesser extent, the small emerging black elite. The colonial administration segregated the rest of the

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<sup>8</sup>. The British colonial model refers to the spatial organization in the British colonial settlements whereby urban centres were created next to 'indigenous villages' thus creating new ones next to old ones. This model differed from the French colonial model. The French colonial administration on the other hand, established their urban centre complexes within the 'indigenous villages' thus expelling the indigenous people from their living environment promoting the emergence of 'new villages' next to the newly established urban perimeter (Elate, 2004:54).

indigenous population from the aforementioned group, thereby instilling a model of racial and class segregation<sup>8</sup>. Basic services were made available in areas occupied by the few whites and the black elite<sup>9</sup> within the colonial administration while areas peripheral to the capital occupied by poor Basotho lacked basic social services (Ambrose, 1993:171), indicating their segregation. This reflected early colonial urban developments in other parts of Africa (Elate, 2004 and Freund, 2007). Provision of various services including roads was scanty. Mostly, their provision was in the administrative quarter for whites. Repetition of this experience is observable in other cities of Africa like Ibadan and Freetown (Freund, 2007:70, 79) showing segregation. There was only one main street passing through the city centre and Maseru was a settlement that depended on ox-wagons at the time (Ambrose, 1993:63-62).

Lack of education was also a main feature of Maseru. In 1873, the Evangelical Mission opened two schools in Matukeng and Masianokeng close to the centre of Maseru. The education curricula were designed to create a Christian elite and excluded the majority of the people who adhered to traditional belief systems. The strict church rules and discipline at the mission schools deterred many parents from sending their children to schools (Ambrose, 1993:51). For example, as part of traditional Basotho culture male children had to engage in initiation, which was not acceptable according to the religious values of Christian churches. After initiation, young men believed themselves to be grown up and aspired for mining employment, imitating their elders, thus giving less value to formal education. Again, secondary education was rare and other forms of higher education were virtually non-existent throughout most of the colonial epoch, which means that those who were educated received mostly only primary education that produced helpers who worked in mission schools, assisting teachers and evangelists (GOL Report, 1982:10). This was typical of the colonial Africa, as Rodney (1982:250) has noted(see Chapter 3). In May 1880 another new school, the Model School by the British, developed in the interior of the town but burnt down in October of the same year when Maseru was under attack during the Gun War between the Cape Colonial government and the Basotho who were objecting to the Disarmament Proclamation<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>8</sup>.Segregation means placing something apart. According to Ambrose (1993:157) what he referred to as the ‘dark city’, a place of Africans was set apart from the ‘White city’ where colonial officials lived.

<sup>9</sup>Black Elite (*Bahlalefi*)refers to educated Basotho (See Nyeko, 2002 and Ambrose, 1993)

<sup>10</sup>.Basotho were discontented by the Cape Colony interfering with the traditional laws of the Sotho people and seeing part of Basutoland demarcated for whites only. The Cape Colony introduced the law - the Disarmament Proclamation in 1879 designed to ensure that all fire arms in the hands of Basotho were surrendered to prevent



Though the effects of the Gun War destroyed Maseru, which was slowly developing, in the 1890s Maseru looked different, as rebuilding of destroyed buildings during the war took off and new ones were built in the centre of the town (Ambrose 1993:85-86). Ambrose noted that the Maseru population at the time was 500 persons. Nonetheless, only housing for senior colonial officials was expanded (Ambrose, 1993:84) further showing that there were other segments of the marginalized Basotho population already living in Maseru. The Maseru town had two types of housing at the time: thatched buildings on the foothills for Basotho and some new buildings down the hill with corrugated iron roofs for white traders and colonial officials (Ibid:84). This was not only the case with Maseru; in Nairobi, as well, housing expanded to accommodate colonial government officials only (Olima, 2001:4).

Maseru however, continued to see further developments. Health facilities provision was also scanty and skewed. A hospital was erected in 1875 in Maseru West, an area occupied by the white population, which formed the colonial administration elite and the hospital catered only for this population (Ambrose, 1993:47). This was the only hospital at the time, further showing the exclusion of Basotho in their land. Despite these restrictions, economic activities were becoming visible in the town.

### **Integration into the southern African economy**

Maseru continued to develop from being an isolated subsistence economy into a modern cash economy. In the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, Maseru was still a small town with only a few developments. The effects of the Gun War of 1880, however, seriously damaged such developments and increased Maseru's integration into the Southern African economy. The British provoked the war and required all Basotho in possession of guns to surrender them to the colonial government. However, Basotho divided into two, those willing to surrender their arms, the *Mateketoa* ('joiners'), and those opposing the Cape Proclamation, the *Mabelete* ('rebels'). The *Mateketoa* were those who had accepted colonial rule and supported it while the *Mabelete* were those rebelling against colonial rule. The *Mateketoa* were under Chief Koali Makhobalo. The commander of the *Mabelete* was Lerotholi, Chief Maama's older brother. As soon as the *Mateketoa* had surrendered their arms, the *Mabelete* attacked them and deprived them of their possessions and cattle including the repossession of merchandize from storeowners. This provoked war as the *Mateketoa* defended themselves and the Cape Government assisted them for the defence of Maseru. The *Mabelete* fought fiercely from

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conflict. This however, provoked open rebellion and the Gun War of 1880-1881 between the British and Basotho.

morning to the night of 10<sup>th</sup> October 1880 though they suffered a terrible defeat. When the night fell, they set fire to the thatched roof of the hospital to provide light. As Ambrose has noted, the consequences of the war in Lesotho were extremely serious. The gun war resulted in the burning of most public buildings including the hospital and the model school, the newest and the most substantial buildings in Maseru at the time, leaving the town devastated (Ambrose, 1993:58-59). By mid-1881 a peace settlement was made whereby Basotho were allowed to retain their guns on payment of an annual licence fee. At the same time, the Cape Government was making rapid arrangements to disannex Lesotho into a separate territory. In 1884, Lesotho became a separate colony and Maseru became a colonial capital. After a few years, Maseru was able to recover.

At the turn of the twentieth century the town of Maseru remained small, both in terms of its population of approximately 1000 and physical size covering an area of 23 km<sup>2</sup> (Ambrose, 1993:9). However, important changes occurred that connected the place more to the emerging modern economy in South Africa. During the Anglo-Boer War Maseru became a place of refuge, which temporarily stimulated local development, as was reflected in the opening of boarding houses and the opening of the first branch of Standard Bank in 1901. Critically, Maseru ended up linked to the major railway line that ran from Cape Town to the interior of the country in 1905 (Ambrose, 1993:89-91).

Maseru became a centre of mining recruitment from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. Lesotho had already been a source of labour for South African mines since the 1830s, but in the early years, migrant workers often walked from various rural settlements to the mines, especially in Kimberley. Initially the numbers of Basotho engaged in migrant labour to the mines were quite limited because farming remained self-sufficient and the demand for labour in the diamond mines was not significant. Nonetheless, as explained in the previous sections, the decline in agricultural productivity and the rapid growth of gold mining triggered a surge in migrancy from Basutoland. In this context, Maseru became the critical recruiting point for migrants from the territory. Labour recruiting agencies set up offices here and from the early 1900s packed thousands of young men in trains to the gold mines in the Witwatersrand.

This crucial addition to the function of Maseru triggered important changes in the character of the town. Although the overall population of Maseru remained modest at approximately 1000 in 1910, the total area covered by the place had expanded to 23 km<sup>2</sup> signalling the first major development outside of the original core, the administrative part of the town. However,

these developments continued to have spatial and racial discrimination (Ambrose, 1993:9). The area had two sections lying adjacent to each other, the one with traditionally thatched houses with enclosures made of reeds and cattle pans owned by Basotho. The other area had corrugated iron roofed houses owned by the white and black elites. Elite refers to a group or class of persons enjoying superior intellectual, social, or economic status (<http://www.thefreedictionary.com>). According to Ambrose (1993), Maseru was until the 1930s a centre for colonial officials and traders.

Maseru absorbed more population when South Africa instituted the South African Land Act of 1913 and abolished the system of 'Farming by halves'<sup>11</sup>, which enabled Basotho to live and work on farms in South Africa. The abolition forced Basotho to return home to the countryside. Since the country's economy was already declining, many could not cope with rural living conditions without employment. Some of them migrated to Maseru. There are no statistics available to illustrate the increase in population. However, Ambrose argues that Maseru, the only developing town at the time where recruiting agencies were located, absorbed these people, adding to the population in the town and resulting in poverty (Ambrose, 1993:160-161).

### **History of Thibella, Motimposo and Sekamaneng**

The early villages in Maseru originated because of placement of Moshoeshoe's sons. Sekamaneng was named after *sekama* or ilmnite, a black mineral, used for cosmetic purposes in ancient times. The ilmnite has been in use for several centuries (Arboursset, 1846:51). The descendants of Chief Majara, the youngest son of Moshoeshoe I (Ambrose, 1993:39), ruled Sekamaneng area. It is still under one of the Chief Majara's descendants, Napo Majara.

Chief Theko Letsie established Motimposo in the 1870s. According to Ambrose, there is a consensus that Motimposo is a word derived from the English, 'Meeting Post'. It was the site of an important meeting between the chiefs Lerotholi and Masopha in the 1890s. The local chiefs and their followers used to meet there on horseback before making a combined entrance into Maseru for important occasions. No record of the name has been found before the 1950s and it has been recorded that the Royal Visit of 1947 was the occasion when horsemen first met there and the name originated. It is now under Chief Leloko Lerotholi Khoabane Theko, a descendant of Chief Theko Letsie, the third son of Letsie by his principal

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<sup>11</sup>This was not necessarily share-cropping. Basotho worked on farms where in return they received part of the production generated by the farm owner as payment. But for them to have permission to stay on the farm, they would pay with part of what they received from their labour (Ambrose, 1993:102).

wife. Thibella, one of the original settlements in Maseru in the 1870s, developed as a location in the Seapoint area (given the name from Seapoint in Cape Town as the Caledon river passes next to it) (Ambrose, 1993:46).

Importantly, from the 1870s, residential areas for Africans experienced growth, particularly Thibella and Motimposo. Thibella expanded in three ways. First, on seeking mining employment, Basotho men spent time queuing in the mining recruiting agencies. Some found it convenient to stay around in the nearby places like Thibella until their recruitment. Most of them were thus temporary lodgers. Second, those working in the mines when they returned home after they had served their contracts often invited their families to meet them in Maseru. Third, those returning after expiry of their contracts, were invited by their girlfriends to Thibella on arrival in Maseru from the mines, and eventually stayed longer (Ambrose, 1993). Some who were coming home for family visits or leave holidays used to meet their girlfriends who entertained them until they returned to South Africa. Hence, the name 'Thibella' to mean 'contain/or stop going anywhere'. In most cases this ended up as cohabitation whereby men were having permanent stays with their girlfriends in these areas, eventually abandoning their families in the countryside (Interview, Chief Mofoka, March, 2010) adding more to the population in the city. Motimposo originally developed as a peri-urban area and later expanded in two ways. First, instead of returning home after two years, which was their contract term, the miners were returning after a few weeks finding Motimposo as a convenient place to stay. Second, some mine workers and their families found it convenient to relocate within easy access of border crossings such as Maseru and found places to stay in Motimposo. Some rented while others bought land for settlement. Other areas which had developed around the town including Matsoatlareng, earlier known as Maqhaqheng, the name which originated from refugees who camped there with their wagons during the Anglo-Boer War (1899), experienced population growth. They hosted many of the mining job seekers who added more to the population in Maseru. Other problems experienced by Lesotho in the years which followed hampered the development of Maseru.

The 1920s were a period when Maseru experienced some infrastructure developments including public buildings. They included the Post Office housing the Maseru telephone exchange and the Technical School, *Fokothi*, that opened in 1925. In 1940, a few government schools were constructed in Maseru, among them, the Basutoland High School and the Lerotholi Technical Institute to allow Basotho higher education (Ambrose, 1993), but even these catered only for a minority. As the trading community continued to prosper, individual

traders and persons making profit from the labour recruiting industry put up more buildings. Maseru expanded steadily throughout this period, as opportunities for Basotho to find employment in Lesotho diminished and mining in South Africa became an alternative. Other commercial activities included transportation. Basotho boarded trains from Maseru through to Natal and the Cape. Motor Post cars operated by traders were also available for use at a cost to different places in the country for both transport and mail delivery. In the late 1920s, Maseru was fully alive with different activities including music, sports and church services (Ambrose, 1993:128-132). However, as Ambrose noted, the most appalling phenomena in its known history visited Maseru during the worldwide economic depression of 1929-1933 and the Second World War (WW II).

### **An Era of Economic Stagnation (1929-1945)**

The depression put more strain on Basotho especially in rural areas, resulting in further population rise in Maseru (Ambrose, 1993:102). Wool and mohair were the exports of Lesotho, particularly from the rural areas, and their prices plunged, as indicated earlier, forcing Basotho to move to the capital to find means to survive. In the city, many of them could not have food to eat, leading to burglary<sup>12</sup> of stores to get food and other necessities to survive. Furthermore, in 1933 Lesotho had the worst ever drought in its history. Ambrose (1993:133) notes that people were literally starving in many parts of Lesotho. A long-lived drought that took several months was followed by extraordinary rainfall, which washed away the topsoil and vegetation and enlarged the already existing gullies, while rivers reached record levels. Maseru lost some of its stores and houses due to this heavy storm. The phenomenon left Lesotho in an economically precarious position forcing more people from the rural areas into the capital and the areas around the capital.

Another factor which affected the economy was World War II (WW II) of 1939 to 1945. Funds worth £100, 000 from the colonial administration raised from taxing Basotho bought 20 war aircrafts in 1940 for the British to use in WW II. In addition, in 1943 Lesotho made a substantial contribution to the 30 000 troops from the High Commission Territories who were recruited for the African Auxiliary Pioneer Corps. Though the war did not affect Lesotho directly, the country incurred a substantial loss of resources. Basotho suffered their greatest casualties in May 1943 when about 633 died trapped beneath the ship (*Erinpura*) decks on the way to the Italian Peninsula to build defences against the German advance: only about

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<sup>12</sup>Burglary of stores refers to breaking and entering stores to steal.

100 survived. Maseru served as a training centre for 20 000 men recruited for the war and later the training camp became the Police Training School. The school later became the headquarters of the Police Mobile Unit used to create the Lesotho Defence Force (Ambrose, 1993:141-142). Nonetheless, Maseru's expansion after World War II continued along the patterns of segregation established by the colonial authorities.

From the 1950s, Maseru continued to expand in all directions. The overall picture of Maseru in 1951 was still of a town very much contained within the reserve boundary (an area initially marked as town boundary). Even in 1961 there was little overspill of population outside the reserve to areas such as Motimposo. To the north, only the black population resided and towards the southwest the white and black elite occupied the area. The name given to the black area was "Dark city", a name that echoed the popular nickname given to Alexandra Township in Johannesburg. Naming of the area as the Dark city was because, like Alexandra, it had no streetlights. "White city" was the name given to the area the whites and black elites occupied. The White city did not only have streetlights but had whitewashed houses that looked more attractive than the traditional huts found in the Dark city (Ambrose, 1993:157).

Moreover, most social activities in Maseru were still racist. Only Maseru's wealthiest residents and white traders visited specific places earmarked for their entertainment such as the Maseru Memorial War Club and Maseru Café (Ambrose, 1993 and Thabane, 2002). Ordinary Basotho citizens had no permission to visit these places indicating that Basotho experienced social exclusion in their own territory. There were some activities which allowed both the whites and the Basotho, like the horse races, but even there, Basotho horses could not win the races, only the white owned horses won, further showing marginalization of Basotho. Nonetheless, Maseru continued to show progress.

Basotho-owned businesses flourished in the whole Basotho area commonly referred to as 'Maseru Location', imitated from the South African practice of separate black locations. Among them was the most remarkable woman entrepreneur 'Mamak'hanakisi (this was a name gained from her reputation of cooking *lik'hana-k'hana*, a word which means food which is both spicy and delicious). This woman ran her business from Thibella in the 'Maseru Location' and gained popularity among the police officers who used to buy food from her business (Ambrose, 1993:157).

During the period 1960-1965, Lesotho had minimal socio-economic development beyond what had already been achieved in the years before. For example, there were no paved roads

or industrial development. For decades, the only means of transport between South Africa and Lesotho was the passenger train that discontinued its service in 1963 (Ambrose, 1993:171). During this period, the colonial government experienced frustration due to instability from the discontented Basotho nation. It was working towards giving Lesotho independence, which was granted in October 1966 (Nyeko, 2002 and Pule, 2002). Consequently, Lesotho at independence did not have the infrastructure of a modern state and Maseru was ill equipped to serve as the capital city (Ambrose, 1993; Nyeko, 2002 and Pule, 2002).

### **Growth of Maseru (1966-2006)**

Like capitals elsewhere in Africa (Kinshasa, Khartoum, Dar es Salam, Nairobi, Cairo, etc.)(Davis, 2004), Maseru grew much faster in the post-colonial period. At independence in 1966 less than 1 percent of Lesotho’s population lived in Maseru, that is, 36 688, most of whom lived in largely underserviced peri-urban communities. A decade later the population had nearly doubled to 62 312. Between 1976 and 1986 the town’s population grew at an annual rate of 6.9 percent reaching a figure of 98 017 in 1986, meaning that the city’s population was growing faster from the late 1980s. In 1996 the population had grown to 137 837 and in 2006 had reached 197 907, a growth of 57.3 percent (Bureau of Statistics Population Reports 1996, 2006). Table 4.1 indicates the growth of the population in Maseru. Between 1966-1976 growth rate was modest and population increased approximately by 70 percent. Still Maseru was very small. It had fewer people than a single one of South Africa’s large townships (Ambrose, 1993:172). There was major growth from 1976-1996. Again, Maseru experienced a significant growth in the period 1996-2006. Several factors contributed to this growth.

**Table 4.1: Total Population in Maseru, 1966-2006**

Year	1966	1976	1986	1996	2006
Total population	36 688	62 312	98 017	137 837	197 907

Source: Bureau of Statistics Population Reports, 1996, 2006.

The first reason is rural-urban migration. The real value of migrant earnings trebled in the 1970s as the gold price increased as a response to international pressure. Remittances received by families from miners led to commercial life flourishing in Maseru. The money became a source of buying goods. As a result many stores were established adjacent to the labour recruiting agencies for South African mines, attracting people into the city for

different motives, to do business or to find employment and finally opting for longer stay, accounting for the approximate 70 percent growth in the period 1966-1976 (Ambrose, 1993:172).

Furthermore, from 1980 the country experienced massive exodus of the rural population from the highlands to the lowlands, which ultimately resulted in serious congestion in Maseru and other urban areas, and overcrowding of the part of the country which is most suitable for crop production. A total of 38, 317 males and 71, 985 females (about two females for every one male) were internal migrants indicating that women formed a significant proportion of those who moved to the urban areas of Lesotho. The districts of Maseru, Leribe and Berea gained the largest numbers of migrants, while Quthing and Mafeteng were the highest losers of migrants. Maseru district absorbed about one-third of the migrants (36,767) mostly in the Maseru urban areas (Sembajwe and Makatjane, 1992:252) such as Thibella and Motimposo, which at the time could provide opportunities for income-generating activities, thus expressing an increase of population in Maseru. One main reason for this movement was that the RSA mining sector on which Lesotho labour relied in terms of income was beginning to shrink resulting in retrenchments. This had an impact on many households, particularly those which resided in the rural areas of the country, as this affected agricultural production as well as their subsistence. Members of these households were pushed to find means of getting income for survival in the urban areas with more women than men having to move (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1982:103). Like elsewhere in Africa, for example, in Cairo, apart from rural-urban migration, Maseru also expanded into areas which had previously been rural.

### **Physical Expansion/Encroachment of Maseru**

During the colonial era, Maseru was growing slowly in terms of physical infrastructure and population size. Ambrose (1993) has noted that rural villages established during the reign of Moshoeshe surrounded the small centre. From the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, Maseru became a centre of mining recruitment. From the early 1900s, the overall population of Maseru remained modest. It was approximately 1000 in 1910. The place had expanded and covered an area of 23 km<sup>2</sup>, signalling the first major development outside of the original core, the administrative part of the town. However, Ambrose has argued that the population kept on increasing due to increased poverty and increasing need for men to migrate to find work. Maseru, the only developing town at the time where recruiting agencies were, absorbed these people adding to the population in the town (Ambrose, 1993:160-161).



In 1961 there was little overspill of population outside the reserve to areas such as Motimposo. Importantly, residential areas for Africans experienced significant growth after independence, particularly Thibella and Motimposo as they were very close to the centre. During the period 1960-1965, the town had minimal socio-economic development. For example, it had only one paved road running throughout the town linking it to the nearby colonial town in South Africa, Ladybrand. As such, at independence in 1966, Maseru was ill equipped to serve as a capital city (Ambrose, 1993; Nyeko, 2002 and Pule, 2002). The reserve area remained 23 km<sup>2</sup>.


The boundaries of the urban area were redefined (set anew from an area of 23 km<sup>2</sup> through the Land Act 1979) in 1980 resulting in new city boundaries. The area increased to 138 km<sup>2</sup>, which was six times as large with 50,000 people living outside the planned area of the town (Ambrose, 1993:37). Figure 4.1 below shows the colonial boundaries of Maseru and the redefined boundary of 1980. Ambrose states that from 1968 until 1980 the newly incorporated area was legally not part of the city and this led to growth of unplanned settlements in the peri-urban area about 3 km from the city centre. The area was still under the jurisdiction of chiefs and administered according to the Land Act of 1979, which gave power to chiefs to allocate land. Within this area, growth of settlements proceeded by acquisition of fields for house plots as free land had diminished as the population kept on reproducing and occupying such land (1993:193). It means then that those who were newly coming into the areas had to acquire occupational space from extra land other people had, which mostly was agricultural land. This is evident in Sekamaneng and Motimposo, which have been peri-urban to the city in the past. This indicates that it is not only migration that led to population increase in the city, but also its expansion/encroachment into unplanned poor peri-urban areas and the natural population growth further increasing poverty in Maseru.

One distinctive feature of Maseru is that it expanded into the 'traditional villages' including Thibella, Sekamaneng and Motimposo. It is observably different from cities in South Africa, which have expanded on free space. This 'town encroachment' occurred by government declarations through the 1979 Land Act that gave the power to the Minister of Land Authority to extend the boundary of the former colonial demarcation of what was then a police camp to what was called Maseru Urban Area. The area was extended further in 1991 and again in 2006 through legal notices (Laws of Lesotho, 2006). This process incorporated into the city administrative areas, which previously were rural, which upon this new decision became part of the new Maseru city, showing encroachment into previously rural areas.

However, let us note that the declarations made neglected to provide adequate urban services (De Beer and Swanepol, 1997). Consequently, these changes forced people to sell their land, which was a source of livelihood, thus exposing them to vulnerability and destitution.

Some have sold their land to rural-urban immigrants settling in their areas while others have lost land from repossession by government authorities and have had to find new means of survival, while some have become destitute, as indicated in the subsequent chapter. Additionally, the immigrants who have come to seek employment in the city have worsened the poverty situation as indicated by Sembajwe and Makatjane (1992) and findings of this research in chapters 7 and 8 of this study. All these people now constitute the population of the 'urban poor'. This concentration of poverty in urban Maseru creates new and growing demands for urban land, infrastructure and services. These people had to seek self-help mechanisms to meet their needs and to generate strategies of survival. The following section unfolds the problems associated with rapid urbanization in Maseru, among which inadequate basic services critically reflects how poverty has manifested itself in Maseru in post-colonial times.

Figure 4.1: Changing Maseru urban area administrative boundaries



Source: Romaya, S. & A. Brown, 1999: 123-133.

## **Housing in Maseru**

Like in many African cities, housing in Maseru is inadequate to accommodate the burgeoning population. Until 1975, the Lesotho's government housing efforts were almost entirely aimed at meeting the needs of civil servants and expatriate technicians. It is estimated that 215 housing units worth R2 130 were financed by the government and 700 units at the cost of 1 000 were low-income housing units. However, the rapid growth of the urban areas in Lesotho kept aggravating the shortage of suitable housing in Maseru and secondary urban centres, such as Mafeteng. The main reason is that the Second Five-Year Development Plan of 1975-1980 emphasised industrial development, which attracted job seekers to these centres. It is estimated that the new urban housing units needed during the five-year plan period (1975-80) were 9 000 of which 6 000 were for the low income households with family income of about R100 to R120 (R1.00 = US\$1.15) in Maseru. Building or contracting costs were too high for these income levels leaving many poor people without access to housing. Consequently affordable shelter solutions remained largely sites-and-services and self-help housing schemes which could be provided on a non-subsidized basis for the low-income group (International Development Agency (IDA), 1978:1). This indicates that efforts to provide public housing in the country were planned with only a limited number of housing units for low-income people.

According to the IDA, there were factors that restricted development of an effective housing and shelter policy within the economy. The first factor had been the absence of any financial vehicle to marshal resources for the sector until the legislation to create a new financial institution for housing and shelter, the Lesotho Building Finance (BFC), was enacted in 1976. The second factor was an inadequate legal structure to permit the transfer of interests in land which the Land Act of 1973 and Administration of Lands Act of 1973 could not solve, as they were not fully operational because of political concerns regarding the allocation of land (IDA, 1978:3).

Other additional restraining factors to the development of private housing in Lesotho include a high level of government intervention through the provision of heavily subsidized housing for civil servants and expatriate personnel, and the fact that the responsibility of housing is spread through government and quasi-government agencies (e.g. Buildings and Maintenance department). Moreover, weak institutional structures for the production of housing and lack of housing policy have further constrained the development of an effective housing program

(Shale, 1997 and Leduka, 2004). This explains the lack of sufficient housing to cater for the increasing population in Maseru.

The urban authority still has failed to keep up with the demand for urban housing. The rate of urban growth in Maseru for a long time has had an effect of creating an imbalance in terms of demand and supply of urban housing as well as between the income of families and housing costs. In his report on housing in Maseru, Metcalf (1981:24) indicates that,

The Maseru housing market has been poorly served by the economics of demand and supply. There is a service shortage of decent, safe and sanitary shelter for low and middle-income families that cannot be alleviated in the near future.

The relationship between demand and supply in urban housing is not improving. Though there is no current statistical data on housing to show the current picture in Maseru, from observation the demand is still higher than supply as people are without accommodation. There are also some substantial problems in the housing sector, e.g. poor conditions, lack of physical planning and infrastructure, lack of finance for private house construction and land tenure problems. The central problem is the high cost of housing and land. The heavy cost of acquiring land impinges on municipal financial resources making it difficult for the municipality to acquire land for the people who need housing. This is particularly difficult since the country itself is in debt and crippled by corruption and embezzlement of public funds. Though the government was determined through the Poverty Reduction Strategy of 2003 (PRS) that the residents of the peri-urban areas, areas that are filling with new arrivals searching for work, should not be neglected and comprehensive infrastructure plans were to be implemented to ensure that not only the factories but also the people who work in them should be well catered for (PRSP, 2003:23), all proved in vain as the PRS was never implemented.

The general situation in Lesotho is that the vast majority of housing is owner-constructed and financed. In the urban areas, and to some extent in rural areas, owners typically collect materials over time and eventually build the houses after the assembling of all the building materials. In this way, it normally takes a household a minimum of three years to put the building materials together before the actual construction of the house starts (PRSP, 2003:23). Rakodi and Leduka (2000:1) have observed the trend elsewhere in Africa that

housing, whether in areas of illegal subdivision or in areas with tenure based on indigenous systems of land allocation, is built on an individual rather than mass produced basis. They argue that lack of capacity in housing finance, construction and building materials in many African cities is a constraint in housing production. Households in Maseru with unreliable or irregular incomes tend to experience this situation.

In rare cases, homebuilders are able to access limited credit. Even where credit exists, it is unaffordable to the majority of the poor people because of the stringent conditions imposed by commercial banks, including high interest rates and deposits of around 10 percent of the loan. In this case, only the elite are able to benefit, as they are able to meet the requirements in most cases. The formal real estate market is poorly developed and private sector developers are discouraged from playing a role in housing provision because of difficulties they experience in obtaining land (PRS, 2003:116). Some private developers like the Lesotho Housing Corporation (LHC) provide housing and land at exorbitant prices and only the elite in the country are able to afford them. The situation is such that the elite continue to live in better places including the areas such as the 'White city' where private developers have secured land and housing for sale. These areas enjoy all the benefits and privileges that the city can offer in terms of services. The poor are restricted to overcrowded areas, which used to be the 'Dark city' during colonial times. The name is no more in use today but these areas still bear the same features of the Dark city- the squalid areas of squatter settlements without social services. This spatial segregation indicates the dynamics of development in Maseru, which have increased the level of poverty among the poor people.

To substantiate this point the PRS assessment of the housing sector undertaken in 1998 revealed that, while people are generally successful in their efforts to provide some measure of shelter for their families, most of this housing is provided informally, constructed by the owner and financed by individual savings. In the urban areas, it is often constructed on illegally-held land without basic services (as shown in the aerial photograph of Ha Leqele below), the situation prevailing in many African and Southern African cities, where there are large informal (illegal) settlements that are neglected in terms of providing basic services (UNCHS and UNEP, 1997 and Elate, 2004). Nairobi is one such city with slums like Maseru, though it is at a greater magnitude but similarly neglected in terms of basic services (a slum refers to a heavily populated area of a city characterized by poverty, including poor housing without basic services) (Olima, 2001; Beckel, 2001 and UN Human Settlements Programme, 2003). Africa Environment Outlook (2000) also maintains that rapid urbanization in Africa

has given rise to enormous problems including the emergence of informal settlements and slums, shortage in basic urban services and encroachment on agricultural land, as we have seen with Maseru city, leading to increasing urban poverty.

**Picture 4.1: Informal settlement on the outskirts of Maseru- Ha Legele**



Source: Leduka, 2004:11.

The poor confront tenure problems in their informal settlements. Even though the land tenure system in Lesotho allows every citizen access to land, as land is a public asset, those who have migrated to the city do not have access to land because they left their former settlements where they had user rights. It has become difficult for them to secure land again because land has become a commodity with high prices not affordable to them. The urban poor in Maseru have no security of tenure. They build illegal settlements risking possible forced eviction at any time or rent inferior housing. These houses lack proper construction (being made up of corrugated iron sheets or even mud) and tend to be unsafe slums prone to natural hazards. Thus, urban poverty has worsened since the post-colonial period because of the continuous migration of the rural poor into the urban areas in search of livelihood and failure to find adequate means to support themselves, which has resulted in growth of slum life in the city, particularly in places like Thibella. Local policies aggravate these problems, because they do not make ample developed land available to the poor or upgrade the slums. Urban development policies are not flexible enough to regularize tenure or provide forms of tenure security in some unauthorized settlements as an upgrading scheme. Regulations and procedures for acquiring urban land for settlements are cumbersome and characterized by red tape (Shale, 1997 and Leduka, 2004). Moreover, Leduka (2004:34) states that

Formal delivery systems are regarded as too expensive because a lot of money has to be paid out, chief amongst which are survey fees. In addition, there is an obligation to pay ground rent once a leasehold has been secured.

These bureaucratic standards and codes make housing unaffordable and create lack of access to credit for the poor. For one to acquire a plot of land, firstly there must be production of the plan of the house to the municipality. To have a plan is a costly exercise in Lesotho, which the poor cannot afford, let alone the payment for the land, which is also not affordable. Thus, social stratification is created within Maseru where prices of sites differentiate between social groups that can or cannot afford them, pushing those who cannot afford into disastrous polluted areas and widening the inequality gap between the rich and the poor and hence worsened poverty in Maseru. Even with the proposed development policies and plans, Maseru remained an underdeveloped city.

### **Maseru urban development policy**

Even as the city boundary was redefined first in 1980 and the peri-urban areas legally became part of the city, Maseru lagged behind with physical planning. The Urban Government Act 1983 provided for the development of settlement areas and planning of the town. This policy initiative saw an increased foreign aid for upgrading settlements and providing low-income housing. However, with the difficulties on achieving land reform where land remained a public asset and the problem of agricultural land loss to uncontrolled urbanization, it became difficult for the government to implement this policy further compounding on housing problems (as discussed in chapter 3 and the previous section in this chapter) and leaving the poor without proper housing.

The physical planning that was eventually established was within the central government which developed the Maseru Development Plan in 1990 to deal with town planning, land use, infrastructure and administration. However, it was difficult to implement development plans, as there was no unit responsible since the District Councils had been abolished. Later the Maseru City Council was established in 1989 but since then the Maseru Development Plan of 1990 did not go ahead. The challenge that has been facing the Council has been that of developing the resources and the implementation capacity necessary to provide for the development and redevelopment of Maseru. Another challenge has been that the provision of urban corridors and the relief roads as part of the plan is complex due to mainly unplanned housing development that has covered the landscape. Therefore the MCC has not been



successful in implementing the Plan. As Ambrose (1993:194) noted, even if it were to be successful, it would improve quality of life for only 10 percent of the total population of Lesotho. The largest part of the current Maseru consists of developments without proper physical planning. Luxurious houses mingle with substandard housing (*'Malaene'* - from the English word 'line') made up of small cement blockhouses, as shown in the aerial photograph below indicating densification of *Malaene* and residential houses in one of the areas next to the city centre, Lower Thamae, a similar case with Motimposo and Sekamaneng. Plots are relatively large as they were obtainable from subdivisions of units of the field size by the field owners. However, it seems that every migrant who settles in Maseru aspires for *Malaene*. He/she uses the land for horticultural activities until he/she acquires sufficient capital to construct *Malaene*, perceived as better investment for future (Ambrose, 1993 and Leduka, 2004).

**Picture 4.2: Densification through *malaene* and residential houses at Lower Thamae**



Source: Leduka, 2004: 30.

The population of Maseru constitutes about twenty percent of the total population of 1.8 million. Slums also are a feature of urban areas in Maseru. They lack access to basic services. In the same way as in other African cities, slums without basic services are a sign of increased poverty. World Bank and IMF have always insisted these are not the consequences

of neo-liberalism, especially structural adjustment programmes but of bad governance (Mike, 2004:11). A full account of the situation in Maseru is in the next section and in Chapter 5.

### **Challenges facing the urban poor**

The growth of Maseru has been by haphazard, unleashing an agglomeration of unplanned settlements, which have sprung up without proper planning and development control requirements. Consequently, these settlements do not get recognition from the city authorities, who describe them as 'illegal'. Consequently, the Municipal authorities have also tended to ignore them in the provision of the necessary basic services such as water, refuse collection, electricity and sewerage disposal. According to UNCHS and UNEP (1997), when such settlements are described as 'illegal' and so are not provided with security of tenure, stable structures, adequate water supply and sanitation, waste disposal facilities and have poor electricity supplies, all these factors create unhealthy living conditions and social problems. The situation in Lesotho is reportedly extreme, where only 7 percent of households have garbage disposal facilities (UN, 1996). As can be observed, the situation continues to worsen as many households still dispose of garbage openly (as shown in the aerial photograph below). The urban poor lack the provision of free clean water, sewerage, vector control and other related basic needs. For example, several times the Municipal has tried to correct the situation on garbage disposal by introducing a levy for collection of the refuse but without success. Poor urban households show resistance and are heard over the media in the country claiming not to have money to pay for the refuse collection, indicating that they are unable even to raise money to pay for their funeral schemes. That being the case, garbage is dumped everywhere; some residents burn it within their yards.

**Picture 4.3: Disused access road turned into solid waste disposal dump at Lower Thamae**



Source: Ledula, 2004: 30.

The above situation has made the urban areas occupied by poor citizens in Maseru hygienically dangerous. Overcrowding and unhygienic conditions affect the well-being of these people (a typical example being Thibella). There is vulnerability to diseases due to poor quality air, water and sanitation. These poor people also experience unsafe working conditions especially for those in the informal sector; those working in the industries also suffer from industrial occupational risks such as inhaling dangerous chemicals. Housing and dumping places are dangerously adjacent in Maseru city, thus making residential environments prone to air pollution, further aggravating bad conditions for the health of the poor urban dwellers. Health hazards also include injuries and deaths arising from traffic and laborious unsafe factory jobs.

There are sporadic evictions causing loss of physical capital, social and informal networks, and this reduces the sense of security among the poor. The formal sector institutions in Lesotho have failed to respond effectively to the needs of the informal settlements and lower income households. The scenario exposes the fact that, though there are policy related causes of these problems such as land and housing regulations that make proper housing unaffordable, the poor find their way through the informal markets. Ledula (2000:201) supports this by saying that the excluded people in Maseru force their way around the rigidity of existing urban development policies to accommodate themselves by getting land from the 'informal' markets. This has led to overcrowding in Maseru city and there is emergence of squatter settlements and increasing numbers of pavement dwellers, indicating a failure of government to develop Maseru to match the population increase. The same trend has

occurred in many Third World cities including those of Africa to this day where there is failure to match the growth of population with the infrastructure and services (UNCHS, 2003:4). The poor are unable to meet the cost of the utilities which is exorbitantly high thus depriving them of the opportunity for a decent life. This is a symptom of underdevelopment and poverty.

Various services in Lesotho like electricity, water, sanitation, health, education, roads and telecommunications show scanty and uneven provision. The greatest part of Maseru's population has no access to drinkable potable-piped water, especially in the peri-urban areas, as exposed in Chapter 5, even though water is Lesotho's only significant natural resource. It is being exploited through the 30-year, multi-billion dollar Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) and transferred from the Orange River System and sent to South Africa's Free State and greater Johannesburg area, a large concentration of South African industry, population and agriculture (GOL Report, 2000:1). Lesotho does not make use of this water to supply the thirsty nation beyond deriving huge sums of money as revenue. Nonetheless, efforts are underway to supply Maseru with water by 2015. In addition, only a few people have electricity connections, while most of the nation including the urban poor living in Maseru remain unconnected because the cost of installing electricity in Lesotho is not affordable to ordinary citizens: only the rich can afford it. Inequality continues to exist in Maseru thus showing its underdevelopment and hence poverty levels have escalated. The economy as well has not benefited the urban poor.

### **Maseru Economy**

Since the 1980s, new firms were steadily set up in Maseru particularly in the clothing industry due to Lesotho's access to market in Europe via Lome, then to USA via AGOA, attracting more people from the rural areas into Maseru and resulting in population growth. The industries were mainly financed from aid particularly in the period between 1980 and 1996. Lesotho received \$306 million aid from the US, UK, WB, IMF, EU, UN and Ireland (Matlosa, 1999). Beyond the 1990s, Lesotho's industrial development has been mainly due to AGOA. However, the repercussions of this type of investment in Lesotho, as argued earlier in the previous chapter, do not differ from those felt across Africa, as Rakodi and Nkurunziza (2007) and Sklair (1994) have observed, including low wages. Even so, the clothing industry is estimated to have employed around 50,000 Basotho of whom the majority is women (Nduru and Phiri, 2005). However, they are marginally paid thus living unsustainable lives as

this meagre income is outweighed by living costs surrounding their daily lives (see chapter7), and hence, they are living in a vicious cycle of poverty.

The Maseru urban poor are dependent on cash for purchase of essential goods and services. At the same time, their employment is sporadic in casual jobs, which are insecure. Due to their unskilled labour and lack of qualifications for well-paid jobs, their labour experiences underpayment and exploitation. Effective labour law enforcement is lacking. Within this country, the voices of the poor remain unheard even when under terrible working conditions, as is the case of the exploited textile industry labour, mostly women. The inability to hold jobs due to bad health conditions has precipitated them into low-income status worsening living conditions. The Maseru urban poor are in most cases living on the periphery of the city and, due to lack of job opportunities, they have to achieve a trade off between a very long walking distance to a job and the cost of housing (renting). Low-income earnings without safety nets, social support for families and young people characterize the urban poor, hence, they live in poverty.

This problem is connected to policy related factors formulated by the state or local government. The microeconomic crisis condenses or devalues real incomes, thus, the lack of large operating markets which can absorb the poor promotes the prevailing perilous situation as Maseru city and other urban areas in Lesotho lack job opportunities. Moreover, the regulatory constraints on small enterprises perpetuate “informality” of work available to the poor, discourage asset accumulation and access to credit and increase vulnerability of workers. Other aspects of poverty then develop, that is, powerlessness to afford housing and land, resulting in underdevelopment.

The capital serves as a business centre and the economy reflects that of the nation. In spite of many attempts at decentralization of bureaucracy, government is heavily concentrated in the capital and Maseru contains most of the private sector services. With the establishment of the industrial zones, Maseru has become the focal point of the most modern manufacturing. Parallel to the formal economy, the informal sector is growing fast with hundreds of small and micro-enterprises. The informal sector absorbs a significant number of the city’s labour force, as outlined in the previous chapter, and observation suggests that the sector seems to be expanding, though no current data is available to confirm this.

Informal employment is also expanding at a faster rate than the formal. With the current macroeconomic situation in the country of declining GNP, the formal sector, mainly

government, has frozen posts. Most of the labour force including university graduates has to turn to the informal sector. Moreover, with the increasing retrenchment of migrant labour from mines in South Africa resulting in large numbers without sustainable income, the decline in agricultural output, urbanization, job insecurity in the formal sector and new entrants into the labour market (Ministry of Planning in Economic Options for Lesotho, 1997 and Global Policy Network, 2004), the informal sector serves as a means of livelihood. Equally, the drastic fall in the overall economy and loss of income among the business community due to the 1998 political instability in the country which resulted in massive destruction of property and contributed to economic recession and loss of jobs by many Basotho (SADC Trade, Industry and Investment Review, 2003:64), means that the informal sector is an alternative for income generation. The sector is likely to grow as many people are losing jobs following the closure of some textile industries in the country resulting in what UNDP Human Development Report (1993:36) refers to as 'jobless growth'. The informal sector has become a survival strategy for many Basotho where a quarter of all households are engaged in some type of informal business (Gay et al, 2000:xv)

Female participation in labour is observably high in the informal sector in Maseru. However, it is difficult to tell whether the same scenario holds as in other countries where women are more involved in this sector than men, due to unavailability of documented data, thus warranting a new investigation to close the existing gap. The scenario resembles other cities in Africa including Cairo (see Sims, 2007). Nonetheless, examining how poverty affects women in Maseru is of paramount importance as the view is that women are more vulnerable to poverty than other groups in most societies (Sharma, 1986; Moser, 1996 and Chant, 2003, 2006).

### **Women in Maseru**

Women have played an important role as both formal workers and informal urban entrepreneurs in shaping the development process in Maseru. They have been active agents of change in the urban economy and have minimized the impact of poverty in their households. They have also been important agents in promoting rural-urban linkages, which have also minimized poverty in Maseru. This is no different from the country's general situation where women have played a significant role in development.

Literature on development in Lesotho (Eldredge, 1978; Murray, 1981; Mashinini, 2000; Thabane, 2002; Cobbe, 2004; Crush, Williams and Peberdy, 2005 and DeLancey, 2007) has

shown how women have substantially contributed to development by engaging in agriculture among other activities. In the absence of men who worked in the mines in South Africa, women remained behind with the bulk of work. However, since the late 1980s, men have been returning in large numbers due to retrenchments and their role in maintaining agriculture and families with the income they earned has diminished.

Maseru has been receiving more women migrants from other parts of the country, further increasing the population in the last two decades. The change in the employment structure of Lesotho's population has had implications for conflicts and relations within households (Slater and Mphale, 2008:8). They state that gender relations have worsened following the retrenchment of some 200,000 Basotho mineworkers in South Africa in the 1990s. This is because men feel disempowered by losing income. Sweetman (1996:4) also confirms this by saying that 'for retrenched miners ... unemployment ... results in despair, feelings of emasculation and inability to relate to life – and the family – at home. So, wives, from being de facto female heads of household during migrancy, must come to terms with the continued presence of the de jure head of the family'. This has provoked women to feel obliged to go out to find other means of survival in the absence of income from the mines. As a result, women are migrating to the urban areas of Lesotho seeking jobs for the survival of their families, which previously depended on the remittances, further increasing the urban population and poverty levels in such areas, with Maseru receiving more women, migrants as noted earlier in the chapter.

Since the 1990s, opportunities have emerged for women to work in Lesotho's rapidly growing textile industry due to AGOA. In the absence of their husbands' mining income, women are keen to find secure wage labour in the factories in Lesotho, creating further tension within households. Though Crush and Ulicki (2007:21) suggest that the decision of who should migrate depends on negotiations between the husband and the wife, many times women choose to migrate for different reasons. One reason is to escape their husbands' domination in decision-making, which during their husbands' absence they had enjoyed. The second reason is that they want to be financially independent like before when their husbands were sending them money to spend in managing households in their absence. The third reason is that men now have to earn money from piece-jobs, which is very little, and only spend it when they wish. Women have to beg for the same money to meet household needs, which often leads to conflicts (Slater and Mphale, 2008:8). This has prompted migration of women to towns and even to South Africa to work in industries and as domestic workers.

Women now form a large proportion of the population in the urban areas of Lesotho, particularly Maseru. The textile industry has absorbed many of them, others are domestic workers and some work in the informal sector. However, women's productive work, especially as domestic workers and textile factory workers in Maseru city, suffers underpayment. They are treated as secondary earners and lack sufficient skills to make a better living. Moreover, the SAPs, which were aimed at reducing 'urban bias' through cutting of state subsidies particularly on food, made life much more difficult than in the countryside as food prices skyrocketed and this resulted in pushing women into the informal sector. These anti-urban politics of SAPs, according to Potts, 1997 in Freund (2007:157) has largely been directed at people already "impoverished and under siege."

Those who work in the informal sector are normally self-employed and do diversified business. They sell cooked food and other goods in the market and in the streets, always subjected to regulations of the city authorities. Some do laundry for middle and high-income households while some are engaged in brewing beer and selling it. They have formed strong social groups that serve as safety nets in times of hardships in the city. These include small associations they call 'societies' either of burial or income-generation, as described in chapter 7. These associations according to Little, 1974 in Freund (2007:92) have been historic in promoting sociability and community formation throughout Africa and Southern Africa and women have been pioneer African urban entrepreneurs.

Despite the precarious conditions under which women live in the city, some have escaped from the patriarchal oppression, where their status was under male domination and family obligations characterized by extreme dependence. This is immoral according to Basotho tradition, but women feel liberated in the modernizing city as they can have their own lifestyle. Hake, 1974 in Freund (2007:155) has observed that 'the parasites, the shack dwellers, the unemployed women, instead of being seen as dragging down healthy forms of development in the city, are looked at as authentic builders of African cities, as part of a development process from below'. They are able to create very effective structures in an African city completely different from the patriarchal forms of rural societies.

Some of the women still maintain links with their places of origin, with their maternal or marital homes, in order to survive in the city (see details in chapter 7). These social networks are still important mainly because they serve as support structures for both those in the city and those in the rural areas. Those in the city get assistance with childcare because parents



can lodge and raise their children while those in the villages often get assistance in the form of cash to obtain necessities. Muzvidziwa (2003:24) maintains that, in many instances, women in the urban areas have 'double-rootedness', that is, one foot in town and the other in the village.

### **Conclusion**

The picture portrayed above indicates that the city was gradually experiencing population growth due mainly to rural-urban migration but with little infrastructural development. Maseru was further underdeveloped by the post-colonial administration and hence seriously incapacitated to accommodate the burgeoning population. While the post-colonial government continued to enact reforms in the city, including extension of city boundaries without corresponding development, these were to the detriment of poor people living in the city, further worsening poverty in Maseru. This study therefore examines the response of government in providing necessary infrastructure for the people living in the city, which is critical to the country's development and eradication of poverty, as exposed in the next chapter (5).

## CHAPTER 5

### URBAN GOVERNANCE AND URBAN POVERTY: BASIC SERVICES DELIVERY IN MASERU

#### Introduction

This chapter argues that the dire lack of basic services is an important manifestation of poverty in the three urban communities (Sekamaneng, Motimposo and Thibella). As Ellis (1998:3) points out, ‘a livelihood also includes access to, and benefits derived from social and public services provided by the state such as education, health services, roads, water supplies and so on’. The focus of the chapter is on the role of the state in the provision of these services because it has a primary responsibility in this regard. This responsibility extends to providing public services affordable and accessible to all citizens, especially to the most marginalised sections of society. Leftwich (2004) and UNDP (1996) support this, stating that the role of the state is central where electoral government exists. The state has the responsibility for maintaining standards of public health and safety for all at an affordable cost, mobilizing resources to provide essential public services and infrastructure and creating an enabling environment for sustainable human development. Moreover, there is a view that ‘at the heart of many cities is a population of marginalized and disenfranchised residents who live in slums, often hidden beneath the façade of a thriving urban economy. Slums are thought to be the product of failed policies, bad governance, corruption, inappropriate regulation, dysfunctional land markets, unresponsive financial systems, and a fundamental lack of political will’ (Cities Alliance, 2007). Thus, this research focuses principally on the local authorities responsible for urban development in Maseru, assessing the extent to which they have incorporated the needs of the poor in their development agenda, particularly the basic services. As chapter 3 discussed the fragile character of the national state, this chapter focuses on the various problems that beset the local authorities in Maseru and the impact of these on development in the three areas. It looks at the struggles for institutional restructuring by the post-colonial government and the impact it had on local governance in Maseru. The chapter reflects on the implications of this leadership on housing, water and sanitation to the particular three case studies. The experiences of service delivery is obviously very poor and way below expectation. The chapter emphasises colonial and post-colonial perspectives in order to raise critical consciousness about the complexities of creating failed governance

leading to creation of poverty-stricken cities like Maseru. Tracing the evolution, status and functions of local authorities from the colonial era, helps in comprehending manifestations of urban poverty, serving the purpose of this study.

### **Development of Colonial Local Governance**

The British colonial regime (1871 to 1884) introduced direct rule, which consequently dismantled the existing indigenous institutions of Moshoeshe's reign. The colonial administration divided Lesotho into four districts: Leribe, Berea, Thaba-Bosiu and Cornerspruit (Hailey, 1953:47-48). A Resident or Assistant Resident Magistrate became the head of administration in each of the districts, responsible to the Governor of the Cape Colony for the maintenance of law and order, civil and criminal jurisdiction, administration of land as well for the collection of taxes. The Colonial administration preserved the customary system of local government, which at the time enhanced local government administration, *khotla*, but these enjoyed only limited powers with specific functions. When Lesotho became a High Commission Territory in 1884, some changes in the system of local government administration were introduced (Hailey, 1953:61-62).

The most significant change was the introduction of indirect rule as the system of administration. The colonial administration's functions were limited to the maintenance of law and order and collection of tax. The colonial administration revived the system of the indigenous local government administration where *lipitso* became frequent. However, the placing system (discussed in chapter 3) increasingly centralized authority within the traditional structure. This in turn weakened the responsiveness of chieftainship and reduced the importance of the *pitso*. With the declining importance of the National *Pitso*, recognition for the need of some alternative form of local participation resulted in the establishment of the first National Council in 1903 (Wallis and van der Geer, 1982:12-13).

The Council became a statutory body in 1910 intended to discuss the domestic affairs of Basutoland. The 1930s saw the development of a new framework for local government administration (Wallis and van der Geer, 1982:14-15). It began with Sir Alan Pim's 1935 Commission of Enquiry into the existing administrative structure of local government set up in Lesotho, eventually leading to the passing of the Proclamations of 1938. The proclamations aimed at the provision of "an integral place in the machinery of administration for indigenous institutions, which had previously derived their authority from custom and tradition" (Hailey, 1953:83). Consequently, chiefs received recognition through official

gazetting from the colonial administration and received statutory powers and functions concerning law and order and general welfare. The 1938 reforms drastically changed the power of the chieftainship. It no longer derived its legitimacy from the traditional political structure but was now a statutory institution requiring gazetting. However, gazetted chiefs continued to perform their original traditional functions and the 1938 Proclamations had only gradual effects. Nevertheless, it was evident that the powers of chiefs diminished. The 1938 reforms had given the chiefs statutory powers on judicial and administrative matters only. The establishment of the Treasury in 1944 to collect funds in the form of taxes, fees and fines further reduced chiefs' powers. Henceforth they could no longer keep fines and fees from court proceedings, but all such income would go to the Treasury. These financial reforms meant a further reduction of gazetted chiefs, as gazetting was only for the task-justified payments. However, Pim's 1938 reforms and establishment of the Basutoland Council did little for increased participation in government. The reforms rather entrenched a "state of chiefs' administration" (Hailey, 1953:95). Seemingly, the Basutoland Council was an unrepresentative institution, since its membership was largely from chieftainship. The situation intensified the commoners' struggle for increased participation in government (Weisfelder, 1974) that led to the establishment of the District Councils in 1943, constituted of chiefs as ex-officio members plus other nominees from the public gathering, *Pitso* (Hailey, 1953:96-97).

The councils served as advisory institutions, often preparing motions, and served as electoral forums for the Basutoland National Council. However, it was not long before people lost interest in these councils. The public accused them of being unrepresentative and this provoked uprisings from nationalist movements who directed their anger towards them. Hence, in 1959, passing of Proclamation No.52 took place, reforming the District Councils and making them representative bodies with elected members responsible for a limited range of functions. The reconstitution of the Councils, however, did not stop people from demanding increased participation in government (Wallis and van der Geer, 1982:17)

At independence in 1966, two categories of local authorities existed in Basutoland - the reconstituted Councils per the Local Government Proclamation, No. 52 of 1959 and the Basutoland National Council, which replaced the Basutoland Council in 1960, which later became the Lesotho Parliament. There was no difference in the functions performed by these local authorities. The councils were formally representative of the local people but without power conferred upon them to perform governmental functions on their own accord. Thus,

the policy of the colonial government was merely to contain the demands for greater participation in government (Wallis and van der Geer, 1982:17). This was the type of local administration in Lesotho until independence in 1966, which excluded the needs of the local people. Maseru was not an exception from this development (as discussed later in the chapter). Lesotho saw further changes in the local administration after independence that affected the delivery of services, and specifically in the three areas under consideration.

### **Development of Post-colonial Local Governance**

Many African countries dismantled the local government created during colonial times soon after attainment of independence. Many governments resorted to control of local government institutions for example, chieftainship, from the centre by placing them under the central government, while some faced abolition. In most of the African countries, with the exception of Botswana and Gambia, the central government controlled local institutions (Gordon, 2007 and Mutahaba, 1983). Lesotho followed the dominant example by increasing central control of local government. In 1968, two years after independence, the Basotho National Party (BNP) government abolished District Councils through the Local Government Repeal Act. These Councils were established in 1943 by the colonial administration as statutory bodies to manage local public affairs and resources (Hailey, 1953:96-97). They complicated lines of communication between the central government and the districts. According to Kotze, the Councils were seen to be “disrupt [ing] a well-established de-concentration system of administration to which most people were comfortably accustomed ... the strong district councils had become centres for political dissention and opposition” (Kotze 1972:57). The more important reason for their abolition was political, as they appeared as objects of opposition from the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) who largely dominated the Councils. As such, they became an apparent alternative source of political loyalty and therefore a threat to the government of the BNP. Additionally, the existence of the Councils deprived the central government of local sources of revenue, besides the fact that they lacked sufficient competence in financial management. Thus, the abolition of District councils by the Jonathan regime saw an end to these formal participatory institutions<sup>13</sup> at the local level resulting in increasing centralized administrative and planning machinery. Some limited degree of deconcentration, however, remained where there was some delegation of administrative powers to officers representing their line ministries in the field and traditional institutions,

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<sup>13</sup>These were made up of members locally elected by the public to facilitate local affairs. They used public meetings to gather public demands and were expected to liaise with the central government to table such demands to be addressed (Van de Geer & Wallis, 1982:38).


including chieftainship, but still with direct technical responsibilities to the headquarters (Hirschman, 1984:1).

In the absence of District Councils, development initiatives at the local level became a failure, as there was no link between the local level and the central level. There was no delivery of services critically needed by the people at the grassroots level, hence, poverty increased. The BNP government saw the need for other local structures to encourage local participation. Consequently, the country passed the Local Government Act of 1969. The Act provided a framework for the execution of functions formerly performed by the District Councils. As a result, the District Development Committees (DDCs) and Village Development Committees (VDCs)<sup>14</sup> were established. Along with the Chieftainship, the Committees became the most important local structures. The Committees served as forums for local participation, execution of bottom-up planning and co-ordination of development activities (van de Geer and Wallis, 1982, Kimane, 1982 and Thoahlane, 1984). Other Committees, which formed part of local structures, included the Ward Development Committees and Constituency committees. The former, in some cases, worked jointly with the Constituency committees as aggregate representation of the village in a specific area and were under the command of the Ward and/or Principal Chief (Mapetla and Rembe, 1989:31) (See figure 5.1 below). However, these authorities were not effective.

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<sup>14</sup>. VDCs and Ward Development Committees [not mentioned in text] were grassroots local structures meant to facilitate development initiatives both through planning with the people, submitting such to higher authorities (DDCs who then submitted to Central Government for approval) and implementation of such initiatives in their respective communities indicating some degree of social inclusion by the state, as the literature suggests (Prates and Diniz, 1997 and Stren and Cameron, 2005).

**Figure 5.1: Local government structure (1969- 1982)**



Source: van de Geer and Wallis, 1982 and Mapetla and Rembe, 1989.

According to Mapetla and Rembe, these bodies were incapable of being effective local planning institutions for services delivery (Ibid), due to a number of factors. First, their structures lacked the technical and managerial capacity necessary for effective co-ordination, and the government did little to strengthen their status in relation to the centre. Additionally, formulation of plans remained centralized at the Central Planning and Development Office (CPDO) and ministerial headquarters. In fact, there was practically no involvement or communication between the local institutions and the centre. Second, they lacked the financial muscle to sponsor their local development programmes, as they were dependent on central government funding to finance their activities. Their reliance on government funding was a disincentive to initiating, supporting and carrying out some of the development programmes. Moreover, the government's perceived need to maintain central and political control impeded their business. Third, there was an absence of official guidelines by way of set rules and regulations governing the composition, mode of elections and functions of these institutions. Further, although they were supposed to be grassroots representative institutions for expression of local demands as well as channels for mobilization, the Committees could not perform as expected as they faced problems of unrepresentative membership. Besides being dormant and ineffective, these committees lacked authority, hence they mainly operated as propaganda institutions for mobilizing political support of the BNP government, and fuelled political tension in the villages (van de Geer and Wallis, 1982 and Thoahlane, 1984). This undermined their capacity to become important tools for services delivery and

development. In addition, frequent central government intervention, lack of support staff and lack of sound education undermined their ability to facilitate development projects. The 1970 Public Service Order, which centralized the system of personnel administration, with most authority remaining in Maseru, undermined the Committees' capacity to be agents of development. The Order denied them technical support, as some of their programmes were considerably 'a risk to security' to the Jonathan regime (van de Geer and Wallis, 1982:129-130).

As such, the Committees were not representative bodies on two accounts. This was not only due to the dominant civil service membership, assumed to have no representational linkages with the people in the district, but other non-civil servant members as well. Chiefs who were non-civil servants derived their positions through custom and not through processes normally accepted as being representative. Those from the civil service, on the other hand, represented only the ruling BNP party. In some districts, this meant that they did not represent the party of majority support. Thus, whilst the Committees could sometimes provide useful insights into local conditions, they could not reflect the opinion of the people of their districts (Van de Geer & Wallis, 1982:38). Maseru at the time suffered the same consequences as other districts. The BNP government abolished the city's local council and replaced it with dysfunctional development committees, which failed to deliver services to the people.


### **A renewed emphasis on local governance**

In the early 1980s, a shift in organisation of local government occurred, at the behest of donor organizations which strongly emphasized participation of local organizational forms for development. With much enthusiasm, the BNP government agreed that institutions at the local level needed strengthening and reorganization to make them responsive to the needs of the people (van der Geer and Wallis, 1982). With this renewed emphasis on decentralization, the BNP government introduced the Urban Government Act of 1983. It aimed at making provisions for establishment and regulation of urban local authorities and providing for matters connected to their functions (Mapetla and Rembe, 1989:27). Additionally, the Act empowered the Minister of Interior to declare any area to be a municipality, to assign a name to and alter the name of a municipality, to define the boundaries and declare that any area shall cease to be a municipality, and how the composition of a municipal or urban council should be. In implementation of the Act, Maseru was supposed to serve as a model for urban decentralization. The BNP government also made changes to district governance.



The District Coordination Office replaced the District Administration Office and it was placed within the Prime Minister’s Office. The move was intended to enhance the status and authority of the office of District Coordinator. It was an attempt to show government commitment to the decentralization project, and to strengthen local administration with senior positions gaining more power and authority. In line with the government’s objectives in the Third Five Year Development Plan of 1980/81-1984/85, the District Coordinators were to be officers of high calibre and with sound administrative and coordination experience (Schemes of Service, 1982). Van der Geer and Wallis (1982:35) confirm that District Coordinators were of high calibre and well qualified given the situation at the time. Figure 5.2 below depicts the comprehensive structure of this arrangement including the district administration and the municipal alongside chieftainship.

**Figure 5.2: Local government structure (1983-1985)**



Source: Van der Geer and Wallis (1982) and Mofuoa (2005)

<sup>15</sup>. The King is regarded as Head of Government only commanding authority within the traditional system of governance and remains a ceremonial monarch without any executive powers in the government (modern democratic system of governance)

<sup>16</sup>. The DC was Head of Government at the District level and coordinator of district development activities (Van der Geer and Wallis, 1982:39)

<sup>17</sup>. The Mayor was the Head of Municipal Council in Maseru and Town Clerk was the chief executive of the Municipal Council and secretary to the Municipal council (Mofuoa, 2005:9-10).

However, implementation of the Urban Government Act of 1983 did not take place and the newly envisaged municipal authorities or Urban Councils did not take off. The delay in the implementation of the Act was attributable to a number of reasons on the part of the state. First, it was difficult for the government to secure qualified and experienced personnel to run the envisaged municipal authorities. Second, the streamlining of responsibilities to rid the Councils of bureaucratic interference between the District Coordinator and Town Clerk proved difficult. Third, indecision about the staff composition of the urban government also delayed the implementation of the Act leaving the District Coordinator responsible. Like their predecessors, the District Coordinators did not perform as expected and political motives gained prominence over their overall governance. With the absence of operating guidelines, they lacked executive powers and authority over their business. They also had no autonomy over personnel and financial matters. This made it difficult for them to practically and effectively undertake their responsibilities. Other problems, including little or no commitment by those involved in development activities and the general red tape of the central government bureaucracy hindered their effectiveness. The Vesting Powers Act of 1984 that stipulated their functions not only amplified ineffectiveness but also increased confusion and hostility among various players in the administration of the district affairs (van der Geer and Wallis, 1982 and Mofuoa, 2005). In the process, the powers of the chieftainship diminished.

Traditionally, this institution played a vital role in policy and decision-making. At the local level, it enabled participation through *Lipitso*. Such involvement had become weak consequent to the BNP's government policies. In subsequent years, the Chiefs lost some of their legal and traditional powers, and therefore their participation in political structures diminished. With the decentralized administration of development, the Chiefs further lost their leadership powers to the modern local institutions. This situation led to the existence of conflict and power struggles between the Committees and the Chiefs based on party politics and differences over the affairs of local administration. Despite League Jonathan's policy change announcements concerning administration following the elections of 1985, the Chiefs' predicament *vis-à-vis* the modern institutions in local administration in the Mountain Kingdom did not change (Mofuoa, 2005:8).

Accordingly, the decentralized administration development alluded to above shows that lack of explicit policy guidelines on decentralization and its implementation and total inertia on the part of the decision makers, compounded by uncoordinated policy, rendered development difficult. Nevertheless, in promoting local participation, a decentralized administration was a

good strategy for people to manage their own local affairs with less political and bureaucratic interference.

### **Local administration during military rule**

The overthrow of Jonathan's government by the military in 1986 saw fundamental changes to the local administration system. The new government repealed the Parliament Act of 1983, and replaced it with the Lesotho Government Order No.3 of 1986. The Order vested legislative and executive powers in the King. The Order also established a Military Council to advise the King in performing his functions, whilst also creating a Council of Ministers to assist in the general administration of the country (Lesotho Government Gazette Extra Ordinary No. 3 of 1986). In addition, the military government issued Order No.4 of 1986 banning political parties and their activities in the country. The Order thus hindered local participation in development activity, since *Lipitso* appeared to be 'destabilising mechanisms' to the military government. Amongst other orders, the military instituted the local administration Order No. 9 of 1986 concerning district administration, local institutions and chiefs. In the district administration, the Order repealed the District Coordinators (Vesting Powers) Act of 1984. Consequently, the District Development Councils Secretariat (DDCS) replaced the office of District Coordination. The government established a new office of District Secretary to perform the same functions as its defunct predecessors. Moreover, introduction of the post of Military Officer was intended to ensure law and order at the district level. With regard to local institutions, Article 2 (1) of the 1986 Order established Village Development Committees (VDCs) to perform the following functions:

Consult with government for planning, formulation, implementation and maintenance of development activities and social services in the village.


To represent and lead the community in its efforts to identify village development needs including basic services infrastructure, raise funds for its local development purposes, stimulate local participation in development activities and make government aware of local development priorities through the District Development Council Secretariat (DDCS)

(Order No. 9, Article 2 (1), 1986).

Similarly, Article 8 of the Order established Ward Development Committees. The Committees were responsible for scrutinizing and putting together development proposals from VDCs for submission to the DDCs, and monitoring the implementation of development projects at the village level. Additionally, Article 12 of the Order established the District Development Committees (DDCs) to perform the following duties: promote socio-economic development at the district level, formulate and implement development projects in the district, ensure that projects in the district are in line with the national plan, monitor the implementation of national projects and raise funds for implementation of national projects.

There were also further changes to the local institutions through Order No.15 of 1986 effected by the military government. The Order replaced the word “Committee” with the word “Council”. Thus, Village Development Councils replaced Village Development Committees, and so on throughout the hierarchy (See Figure 5.3 below). This however symbolized a significant change on the part of the military as it demonstrated the military government’s commitment to disassociate itself from Jonathan’s legacy, not to mention its commitment to the depoliticization of local administration affairs. With regard to local institutions, the military government through the Orders changed titles without any significant structural changes to the local institutions. The military government also introduced the idea of elections but the elections were indirect since political activities and freedoms were suspended. Furthermore, the tasks and responsibilities of the local institutions lacked technical expertise, and resource availability (financial, personnel, infrastructure, transport, training etc) continued to suffer constraints. Like their predecessors, therefore, they could not perform as expected and hence they endured public ridicule and hostility. With regard to the chiefs, the Order, through a series of articles, made the chiefs ex-officio members and chairpersons of the committees. This was the case both at village and ward levels. At the district level, the Order made the Principal Chief the official representative of the District. Thus, the Order increased the powers of the chieftainship in the governance of local affairs. Perhaps this replicated what was happening at the central level where the King’s powers were substantially increased. Probably, the military government wanted to score political points for its legitimacy and gain support from the chiefs who had experienced a very difficult time under Jonathan’s regime (Mofuoa, 2005:9). With regard to municipal or urban governance, the military government implemented the provisions of the Urban Government Act of 1983.

**Figure 5.3: Local government structure (1986-1997)**



Source: Lesotho Government Gazette Extra Ordinary No. 3 of 1986.

In 1989, the military rule established the Maseru Municipal Council, which they saw as a way of giving people an opportunity to organize their own affairs. To create a conducive environment for the Municipal government, Order No. 11 of 1990 amended the 1983 Act, which paved the way for the first municipal council elections held through nominated representatives mandated to campaign along nonpartisan lines in 1991. Thus, from the military government perspective, all these changes were done primarily to increase participation in local administration, but in practice this was not the case. The central administration of the military government caused local institutions, through several mechanisms, as shown below, to be dysfunctional, inhibiting service delivery in Maseru’s poor urban areas.

In the same way, as indicated with the local institutions at village and district levels, Maseru Municipal Council could not perform as expected. First, the Municipality’s relations with the military government brewed perennial conflict. The Councillors saw themselves at par with the Ministers, and passed a resolution to bear the title of 'Honourable Councillors' and to enjoy fringe benefits, as Ministers did. They also resolved to work for the termination of the Town Clerk position since they perceived it as an inhibiting factor to the municipal

operations. This conduct entrenched the conflict between the Council and the military government, and seriously damaged the operations of the municipality. Second, the political affiliation of the Council clouded the smooth operations of the municipality. The majority of the Councillors were BCP members, whereas the Town Clerk was a BNP member. Consequently, party politics rocked the operations of the municipality. Both parties used the Council as a forum for pushing their respective political agendas, thus the BNP - BCP tension was vigorously on display during the Council meetings. This hindered the municipality from making a meaningful impact in its attempt to deliver services to the populace. Third, ignorance of the Councillors regarding their operations and sphere of jurisdiction in relation to the central government impaired the Council's operations. This demonstrated lack of training prior to the establishment of the Council. Consequently, lack of training and clarity over roles regarding the Councillors inhibited the effective performance of the Council. The bureaucrats, particularly the Town Clerk, viewed the Councillors as 'illiterates' and subjected them to public ridicule. This led to the Councillors' declaration of war against the Town Clerk and the bureaucrats, and stood as an obstacle to Council operations. In return, the Council received a hostile welcome from the public. Politicians labelled it a 'dummy council' used as a rubber stamp for the military government decisions. In desperation to save its damaged reputation, the Council ended up violating the Standing Orders that established it, culminating in its suspension by the Military government (Mofuoa, 2005:10), with serious impact on service delivery in Maseru.

One can therefore argue that the BNP and the military organizational arrangements were major problems. First, the political affiliation of local authorities was a problem in development at the local level. Historically, party politics adversely affected the functioning of the Councils, resulting in their failure to make an impact in the development of local areas. Political parties used Councils systematically as a forum for pushing their own political agendas. This political factor always landed the Councils in deep conflict with the ruling government, culminating in their suspension and/or abolition. Second, central government ignored training relating to the operations of local government, prior to the establishment of the local authorities. Lack of training had in the past made it difficult for the Councillors to have the necessary clarity on their responsibilities in relation to the central government and resulted in entrenched conflict between the Councils and the central government over jurisdiction and range of functions. Third, local authorities lacked the expertise and competence necessary for running the local government business. Evidence has shown that in

the past, the calibre of the Councillors was not up to the desirable standard needed for meaningful participation in the policy and decision-making processes. The Councillors were not skilled and knowledgeable in the skills of public administration and management, leading to a situation where Councillors found themselves at the mercy of technocrats, whose policy and decision agendas dominated the public agenda in the management of local affairs. Fourth, lack of finance and poor financial management was the common feature of local authorities as in the past. The Councils were incapable of either raising funds or managing the funds allocated to them by the central government resulting in Councillors not being paid their allowances. Thus, Council was simply insolvent mainly due to inadequate generation of revenue, poor resource base or simply inefficient management of revenue. Additionally, resource base imbalances among the local authorities led to their trifling performance in the generation of revenue resulting in varying degrees of development among them, sometimes fuelled by deliberate lack of central government support. Fifth, undue political interference in local affairs in the past denied local authorities an opportunity to create order in their own affairs. They lacked the necessary autonomy and independence to manage their affairs, culminating in their inability to deliver services to the public. As literature indicates (Halfani, 1997, Olowu and Akinola, 1995, Bello-Imam, 1995 and Yankson, 1995), it was a shared experience across Africa. The factor earned Councils the ridicule and hostility of the public. People labelled them 'rubber stamps' to the decisions made by the ruling government. Additionally, Councils' lack of autonomy and independence resulted in political motives gaining prominence over merit as a criterion for management of personnel retarding the operations of the local authorities as in the past (Mofuoa, 2005: 12-13).

The poor cooperation and coordination among the various technical agencies on the one hand and the Councils on the other tended to frustrate development initiatives at the local level. Ridicule surrounded Councils, in that technical agencies viewed Councillors as 'illiterates' who could not translate the government documents into action. Consequently, technical agencies felt that it was a waste of energy to spend considerable time trying to translate government documents to the Councils. This attitude stood as an obstacle to the development of local areas particularly in services delivery (Mofuoa, 2005:12-13).

Despite the above, the record of the military government proved to have certainly gone some way towards putting decentralization and creation of local institutions on a sound legal basis. The restoration of civil rule in 1993 was followed three years later in 1996 by the repeal of

the following Acts: Local Administration Act 1969, Urban Government Act 1983, Development Councils Order 1991, Development Councils (Amendment) Order 1992 and Development Councils (Amendment) Act 1994 and replaced these Acts with the Local Government Act 1997. Hence, the military government's efforts towards the restoration of civil rule made an impression on the Basotho and the international community.

### **Local governance from 1997**

Prior to the above and in accordance with section 106 of the Constitution, the Ministry of Local Government was established in 1994. Consequently, the Ministry was responsible for overseeing the implementation of the 1997 Act. However, there was delay in establishing Local Authorities for reasons not publicly disclosed by the LCD government. Nevertheless, there is an assumption that the political legitimacy crisis that rocked the ruling LCD government after 1998, coupled with the magnitude of budgetary implications of the local authorities' project, forestalled progress. However, there have been notable initiatives undertaken by the ruling LCD government to fast track the implementation of the 1997 Local Government Act. In 1997, the Parliament of Lesotho enacted the Local Government Act as a legal framework meant to guide the implementation of local government in the country. Act No. 5 of 2004 amended the Act. The enactment of the Local Government Elections Act No.9 of 1998 followed providing procedures pertaining to how elections are to be conducted. Act No.6 of 2004 also amended it. The main aim of this decentralisation of Lesotho's local government system is:


To provide for good governance, ownership and accountability in matters of public policy, to facilitate democratic control over the development planning process, to move decision-making, resource allocation and local level development planning into the hands of the people. Furthermore, it is to provide for equitable distribution of human, institutional, infrastructural and financial resources across the country. To enhance the effectiveness of developmental activities by creating opportunities for elimination or reduction of duplication in development efforts, to facilitate sustainability through matching development decision with local conditions, to facilitate greater speed and flexibility of decision-making as a result of reduced central direction, and control and to facilitate mobilisation and maximisation of local resources, technologies and skill. Thus decentralization would promote the socio-economic welfare of all citizens, targeting service delivery and good governance, that



is, the improvement of services delivery and promotion of local participation (Ministry of Local Government 2003:2).

Local Government elections were held in April 2005 in terms of the 1997 Local Government Act and its subsidiary legislation, which reorganized the previously centralized system. At the local level, the structure remains the same as it was under the previous system except that chiefs are now part of the election system. Chiefs nominate their peers in the Council of Chiefs chaired by the Principal Chief to be representatives in the Community Council. At the district level, however, the District Council and the District Administration have powers, authority and responsibilities similar to their respective predecessors. A major difference from the past system is that in the existing system all development activity is part of the management of the District Council supported by the District Planning Unit. Additionally, the Districts also have direct management over their human resources supported by the Local Government Service Commission and Local Government Service Tribunal. Furthermore, local authority elections are the business of the Independent Electoral Commission, and certain Local Authorities' constituencies have been reserved for women. Non-developmental departments as well as the law and order arm of government are the only representative of the central government at the district level (Mofuoa, 2005:11). Figure 5.4 below depicts the structure of local government in Lesotho from 1997.

**Figure 5.4: Local government structure (1997- to date).**



Source: Local Government (Amendment) Act No. 5 of 2004.

As the main purpose of decentralisation is to enhance development and good governance, it follows, therefore, that the major responsibility of local authorities is to address the

developmental needs of their communities. The local authorities were created primarily to provide services within defined geographical areas as a means to close the gap caused by the government's inability to attend to all issues of government. The Local Government Act 1997 outlined the functions of local authorities as the municipal, community or district councils. These functions include but are not limited to the following:

Control of natural resources and environmental protection, basic services delivery like public health, land/site allocation, grazing control, allocation of burial grounds, control of building permits, local administration of central regulations and licences, care of mothers, young children, the aged and integration of people with disabilities, mortuaries, burial of bodies of destitute persons and unclaimed bodies and forestry preservation and improvement of designated forests in local authority areas (Shale, 2004:10).

These functions are limited so that there is still a need for the central government to continue performing other functions not performed by these councils due to their lack of capacity. The law does not clearly show the implications of the decentralised functions in terms of how the local authorities will relate to the central government in their execution of these functions. For instance, it only stipulates that local authorities will control natural resources and environmental protection, without differentiating the different types of natural resources and stating which ones whose control will remain with the central government. There are ambiguities in the law in that it does not spell out how its various sectors at the central level will be involved at the local level in order to minimise confusion and duplication of efforts, hence conflict is a characteristic of the present situation. When the question of central-local relations is not well defined, it can be a source of conflict (Shale, 2004:6).

The new Councils have more top-heavy bureaucracies than their predecessors, which tends to add to the operating costs of the Councils. The top-heaviness of the bureaucracies manifests in the bureaucrats' dominance in the decision-making system at the local level and has led to the near disappearance of citizen participation. Additionally, the red tape associated with bureaucracies manifests itself in the administration of the Councils, culminating in their inefficiency in managing local affairs. Finally, reinstating participatory devolutionary decision-making under the existing financial arrangements has led to the emergence of acute geographical disparities and inequalities, since areas with rich resource endowments, as in the past, are able to raise revenue through tax and use it for development, whereas the poorly

endowed areas cannot afford to do so. This kind of situation has resulted in conflicts between the centre and the local areas. This is because responsibilities did not devolve to local areas based on varying local capabilities to manage such responsibilities. The above does not represent details of the issues that needed close attention by the ruling LCD government to enhance decentralization and development initiatives at the local level. Nonetheless, the account demonstrates how decentralization in Lesotho, including in Maseru, characterizes a continual conflict between chieftainship and local authorities, rendering it ineffective. The prevalence of conflictual central-local relations in both the pre-local government elections phase and the post-elections phase has become a serious threat to effective delivery of basic services. Most of the functions of the local authorities mentioned earlier are causes of conflict because some of them have traditionally been the domain of chiefs. The transfer of some of these functions to councils was difficult for some of chiefs to accept.

In terms of the Development Councils Order, chiefs were ex-officio members of councils. Development Councils changed this in 1994 through the Amendment Act (Development Councils Amendment Act, 1994:3). Chiefs were no longer chairpersons but remained only members of the councils. This change affected the status of the chiefs and so they became an opposition force to the councils, despite the fact that they were still members of those particular councils. For example, many chiefs, although prohibited by law, still allocated land without consulting councils. This also triggered tension between the Ministry of Local Government and the communities, due to the Ministry's tough measures against offences related to land. Chiefs and people found to have violated the law on land allocation faced prosecution.

Each of the two tiers of the system of government (Chieftainship and Local government Councils) has its own identity. The advocates of the chieftainship institution see it as representing the identity of the people of Lesotho, including the politicians. They regard modern politics and the politicians as an imported system that is alien to the people. The politicians are nonetheless strongly averse to this perception. There is therefore a conflict of identity, which is one of the deep-rooted kinds of conflict that are often difficult to deal with. It is against this background of overwhelming difference in opinion about each other that the conflict between chiefs and politicians escalates. Those who favour chieftaincy are afraid that their chiefs, from the Principal Chiefs down to a Customary Chief, might be subjected to the administration of "commoners" under decentralisation and that would be demeaning to them. The fissures between local authorities and chiefs have led to arrested development in some

council areas as chiefs mobilise support from their supporters using their residual power to oppose the transfer, which they believe threatens their status (as also indicated in chapter 3). The situation is aggravated by the non-intervention of the central government, which according to Shale (2004:4) appears to have no appropriate mechanisms to respond to any kind of conflict within and between councils.

The absence of government intervention is also slowly paralysing the district administration where there is also another tug-of-war between Principal Chiefs and District Secretaries. In some cases, the conflict is between the District Secretaries and heads of departments, where the latter refuse to recognise the authority of the former and prefer to report directly to the mother ministries. The duties of the District Secretary currently constitute a compromise to some extent because the District Secretary has to accommodate the Principal Chief's interests. The Principal Chiefs still enjoy support from the people who see them as their idols. The administration becomes difficult under this bi-polarity due to lack of a clear mode of operation.

Also related to this problem is the nature of chieftainship boundaries, which are not contiguous with district boundaries. One of the districts shares borders with nine chieftainship wards which also overlap into other districts, thus presenting a coordination problem for the concerned District Secretary. This is yet another challenge that faces the local authorities at the district level (District Council) and sub-district level (Community Council) affecting the powers, roles and functions of the local authorities and the chieftainship, escalating tension in the current situation and thus frustrating many, if not all, of the development efforts.

The process leading to the establishment of local authorities has already demonstrated the intricacies of conflict and their potential to affect service delivery. This presents a challenge to local authorities in carrying out their developmental responsibility while at the same time are in conflicts that emanate from the roles and functions conflated between administrative and developmental roles. Maseru, the capital of Lesotho, faces these problems of local administration development with serious repercussions on service delivery inflating poverty.

## **Local governance in Maseru**

Local governance<sup>18</sup> in Maseru developed in the same way as the rest of the country from the colonial epoch. The only exception was with the introduction of the Municipality in 1983 by the BNP government as the Maseru local administration. However, such change further affected local governance performance in the delivery of basic services and deepened poverty.

From independence to the 1980s the government operated through Village Development Committees (VDCs) whose membership was predominantly the ruling Basutoland National Party (BNP), and which were under the control of the District Administrator (Van de Geer and Wallis, 1982:47). Maseru was a town surrounded by villages with these structures. Establishment of these advisory bodies was to pursue the main objective of obtaining representative expression of public opinion and consultation between central government and local people. The second objective was to encourage public interest in the management of public affairs through the creation of opportunities to elect representatives and to express public opinion in local public meetings. Decentralization therefore became the main emphasis and the government set up several committees to enhance local participation and local governance. This suggests a local political process separate from the nation-wide process because the issues around which it revolved had local characteristics. In other contexts, Stren and Cameron (2005) have argued this kind of decentralization of power is a good entry point for addressing a wide range of social issues including poverty. But Lesotho's decentralization structures did not enhance participation of local people. While decentralization became a key development policy in Lesotho throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the exclusion of citizens was evidence of the lack of representation in development. The development of Maseru in the 1970s and 1980s included erecting new government office complexes and constructing tarmac roads linking the city to the north and south districts. There was not much development in terms of basic services infrastructure in the urban areas, despite Maseru receiving more people from the rural areas (Van de Geer and Wallis, 1982). The Urban Government Act of 1983 aimed at making provisions for establishing and regulating urban local authorities. The municipality in Lesotho is under the Local Government Ministry (as structurally indicated in figure 5.2) financed and controlled by the central government. This

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<sup>18</sup>. "Local Governance is generally used to refer to a decentralized, representative institution with general and specific powers, devolved upon it and delegated to it by central or regional governance in respect to a restricted geographical area within a nation or state, and in the exercise of which it is locally responsible and may to a certain degree act autonomously" (Vosloo et al, 1974:10).

bureaucracy has made the municipal authority a dormant institution that relies entirely on the central government for finances in order to implement its development initiatives including basic services delivery. Since the municipality was established, it has failed to respond to the needs of the urban people in providing necessary basic services infrastructure within its jurisdiction, thus allowing poverty to deepen. Despite new reforms set in motion in the later years to make local government work and address the needs of the people, all these efforts have been unsuccessful in bringing about development and eradication of poverty in Maseru.

The new government elected in 1993 established a more democratic local administration, which involved participation of local communities in decision-making structures of governance and instituted local councils. The management of urban development is now vested in the local urban authorities (local councils: District and Community and the municipality) as mandated by the Lesotho Local Government Act 1997. However, the implementation of urban development plans is still constrained by the central Ministry of Local Government control of the budget, and so local authorities are failing to deliver basic services particularly to poor areas. This is visible in the areas of the Maseru municipal occupied by low-income households such as Sekamaneng, which does not have basic services including water supply and sanitation. In contrast, areas like White City where urban elites are residing get good services with necessary infrastructure including high mast streetlights, implying that even in the post-independence era Maseru is still underdeveloped with only a few people having access to basic services. Nevertheless, I want to emphasize here that the structure of local governance has a greater bearing on underdevelopment of Maseru.

Maseru has three forms of local administration running concurrently (See figure 5.3). Chiefs are responsible for local administration by executing government development policy in their respective areas. The District Local Government deals with comprehensive development of the district and works in collaboration with the chieftainship at all its levels (area and ward) which also form area or community local government under the district council and the municipality responsible for city development. The district local governance comprises representatives from various community councils, elected from their local government constituencies including chiefs. According to section 4 of the Local Government Act of 1997, as amended in 2004, gazetted chiefs shall be members of local authorities, making chieftainship part of the local government system (Local Government, 2005). It should be noted that Maseru is a district, and at the same time a city that has encroached into villages

formerly and still under the chiefs' administration, which is a long-standing traditional structure of Lesotho governance since pre-colonial epoch. The municipality runs Maseru as a city, under a Mayor elected from the forum of all local councillors from all constituencies that form the 'Maseru urban reserve'. The municipal council comprises the Mayor and representatives from chieftainship in the urban reserve. The system is such that we have traditional system representatives, chiefs, and political appointees elected through the political process (councillors). These two systems have not had harmonious relationships in executing development policies of government. Because chiefs have more influence among the Basotho than political appointees, if they do not support those policies, people also tend not to support them. This is because Basotho are more inclined towards traditional rule in their respective villages as they believe chiefs are more responsive to their needs than the politicians. For example, as the municipality has extended into areas that were formally agricultural settlements under the jurisdiction of traditional authorities (chiefs), it has become difficult for the municipal authorities to enforce laws and standards that regulate urban development such as regulating urban settlements on areas declared as development areas. Chiefs in areas which were initially peripheral to the city centre, feeling deprived because the municipal authority has reduced their power by declaring their land for urban development, continue allowing individuals who want to sell land to do so, regardless of the declarations made by the municipality, by endorsing such sales. They uphold this on the basis of the Land Act of 1979 that gave them power to allocate land. In the event, agricultural land is now sold, resulting in unplanned settlements that are consequently neglected by the municipality in terms of services delivery and infrastructure provision (see chapter 4) thus impoverishing many households, which were dependent on this land as well as new settlers. Hence, Maseru faces a perilous state of increasing poverty.

Chiefs are members in the local government councils and councillors are the pillars which support the functionality of local government. People are supposed to be able to raise their concerns and views during their meetings ("*Lipitso*" which refers to public gatherings) with the councillors held before the council meeting. These *Lipitso* are rarely called and when the councillors call them the attendance is usually poorer than if the chief calls a *pitso*, showing how Basotho are more inclined towards their traditional authority. The councillor takes up the concerns of the community during council meetings and then reports back to the community on decisions taken by the council. Rugege (1993:31) however, argues that 'the strategy of *Lipitso* as purported to promote democracy does not guarantee that all the concerns will be

taken care of by those in power'. This is representative participation<sup>19</sup> as councillors represent people in the decision-making body and practically people remain outside decision-making domain. It is important, however, to further point out that representative participation does not necessarily mean that the concerns of the most vulnerable in the community receive consideration in decision-making. This is evident in the sharing of the resources among the areas in Maseru. For example, Thibella and Motimposo are both areas under the municipal authority with the poorest people who have to stand in long queues at public taps to buy water for domestic use, indicating exclusion. Poverty in the city manifests itself invariably in lack of basic services delivery. Housing, water, sanitation and electricity are a few examples provided here, illustrating the failure of local governance in the delivery of basic services to the communities of Thibella, Motimposo and Sekamaneng in Maseru, and its consequences on poverty levels.

### **Community basic service delivery in Maseru**

#### **Housing**

Provision of housing in Maseru has been a challenge since the colonial era. The problem continued even after independence mostly due to poor governance consequently escalating poverty. It is estimated that the government intended to build 9 000 new urban housing units during the five-year plan period (1975-80) of which 6 000 were for the low income households with family income of about R100 to R120 in Maseru. Building or contracting costs were too high for these income levels leaving many poor people without access to housing. The poor in Sekamaneng, Thibella and Motimposo lived in very bad housing as an alternative (Table 5.1).

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<sup>19</sup>. Representative Participation refers to the decision-making process where democratically elected persons represent a larger part of the population. (Gaventa and Valderrama, 1999:19).



**Table 5.1: Housing problems in Thibella, Sekamaneng and Motimposo**

Housing problems	Frequency (%)		
	Sekamaneng	Motimposo	Thibella
low quality type	7.5	20	17.5
Overcrowding		25	22.5
Insecurity	2.5	7.5	
Lack of security of tenure		27.5	80

Source: Field Survey, 2009.

At the time of this study, the problems of housing were characterized by *low quality type* meaning poor housing including shacks. About 7.5 percent of houses were dilapidated in Sekamaneng, 20 percent in Motimposo and 17.5 percent in Thibella. Some lived in shacks: in Motimposo 5 percent of households lived in single-roomed shacks, 30 percent of households did so in Thibella while Sekamaneng had no people living in a shack. The reason for this is that in former rural areas such as this, owning a house is a priority and a valuable asset hence many people own houses. *Overcrowding* is another feature: in Motimposo 25 percent of households had two or more people living in a single room and 22.5 percent had small living space in Thibella 42.5 percent of households had small space for usage while Sekamaneng had no such case because there were enough rooms for household members. *Insecurity* is another problem. In Sekamaneng 2.5 percent of households lived in a house where windows were old iron sheets locked with nails, and 7.5 percent in Motimposo, while in Thibella there was no such case as the area is in the interior of the city and at least landlords provided housing with windows. *Lack of security of tenure* was also a problem. Some 80 percent of households were tenants in Thibella, and 27.5 percent in Motimposo did not have security of tenure, as they did not own those houses and shacks, and owners could evict them any time. Sekamaneng was an exception where there was security of tenure. This is a settlement still in the stage of transition to becoming fully densified and ‘urban’. People who settled in the area had land used for housing. The condition of housing as portrayed by these data is a result of land and housing market prices that are too high and thus unaffordable. There is also lack of space for settlements since landowners have sold their land, including agricultural land, due to population growth in their areas (for further details see chapter 7). The other problem is that there is lack of commitment on the part of government to have a pro-poor policy on land

and housing (Field Survey, 2009).

In Lesotho today there is no free land as used to be the case in the past. People who do not own land have to buy from different markets available in the country. These markets include the Lesotho Housing Corporation (LHC), Pulamaliboho Housing Scheme and individuals who have more land and are willing to sell part of it. The LHC is a private entity that buys the land from the state, and then sells plots to individuals. The size and location of the plot determines the amount to be paid. This organization also builds different types of houses for sale or rent around the city but in designated areas. Also the prices differ depending on the type, size and location of the house. The prices of land and housing in LHC specifically are exorbitantly high. In an interview with the officer in charge, the researcher established that there were no sites that could be affordable for the poor purely because the institution is profit-oriented operating as a business, therefore one has to buy at the given price (Field Survey, 2009). It is important to state that, given the severity of poverty among the poor in Maseru as already explained, none of them could raise enough money to buy either land or housing from this entity.

On the other hand, there is a government run project on housing called Pulamaliboho housing scheme. It targets low-income earners who are employed or have a steady means of income every month to facilitate deductions for the gradual payment for the house. According to evidence, the type of people this research has centred on did not fall under this specified category because the majority depended on piecework and were unable to fulfil the requirements of the scheme. Again, this project has chosen specific areas to build these houses, and none of the three communities under this research study was included. Even the number of these houses is quite small compared to the rate of urbanization. It is evident that the relationship between demand and supply in urban housing is not improving at all. This trend started long after independence. Scholars like Metcalf (1981:24) also argued that there is poor servicing of the Maseru housing market by the economics of demand and supply, and further that the shortage of decent, safe and sanitary shelter for low and middle-income families remains unaddressed.

Besides the two markets described above, there is also a private market where individuals who have extra land normally sell to people in need of land. The price here is subject to negotiations where the seller sets the price and the buyer bargains depending on the willingness to buy. The land sold includes agricultural land and part of the already occupied

land, mostly in Sekamaneng and Motimposo. During the study, immigrants bought the whole of the land used for agriculture by original inhabitants in the Sekamaneng area. Some of the inhabitants claimed that they had disposed off their land because they heard that the government was going to repossess it as part of the encroachment of the city. This land had previously formed the basis for livelihood in many households and consequently these households could not sustain their lives as they previously relied on agriculture. Habofoane from Sekamaneng had sold out his land in fear that it would be taken by government in 1985. He stated: “we relied mostly agriculture for our survival. However, I sold my agricultural land in 1985 as I heard government will take it without compensation.” (Interview, Habofoane Khoele, January 2009).

The apportionment of the already occupied plots has led to overcrowding, most particularly in the Motimposo area. Some houses cannot be easily accessed by road as there is not enough space left between the houses and there is little space for infrastructural development. In Thibella, also the apportionment of land was such that the original owners had divided it into pieces for renting. There was no sale of land but it was only leased out temporarily to the occupants who had to pay the ground rent for putting up their own shelter. Thabo confirmed this:

I stay in these 2 shacks for which I pay a ground rent of M100.00 a month. There is a toilet in this place but the owner refuses us with it, we use the gully. We get water from the public tap at 50 cents for 20 litres but when I have no water and there is no money we get water from the passing gully and cook it for drinking (Interview, Thabo Letsie, March 2009).

Mathabang who originally came from Mafeteng district seeking for employment in Maseru also reported: “I have rented the space for putting up this iron sheet room at M50.00 a month and we all sleep in it, me, my husband, my daughter and my son” (interview, Mathabang Mokhoalinyane, March 2009). The household faced the same problems as those of Thabo and other tenants regarding basic services. This has resulted in an appalling state of shelter where more than ten shacks are crowded on a small piece of land and there is little space in between those shacks. This demonstrates that land ownership directly relates to housing ownership in Lesotho. If one owns land, one can easily put up a shelter, but if one does not have land it is not possible to build himself a shelter and one would have to rent it. As it is now, there are no

pro-poor land and housing markets in Lesotho. The scenario above supports Masika et al's (1997) attestation that the price and availability of land and housing remain an important influence on housing prices and conditions, leading to the development of illegal or informal land markets where the poor have limited capacity to pay. This is found to have increased the number of people living in shantytowns, slums, overcrowded or unsanitary housing or simply on the streets in many poor countries' cities as housing lags ever further behind (UNCHS, 1995), which is the experience in Maseru today. On the other hand, the financial institutions are not willing to give credit to the poor because they are classified as non-credit-worthy citizens who fail to meet the credit requirements. All these circumstances have pushed the poor into unfavourable living conditions such as squatter areas and renting of substandard housing, such as seen in Motimposo and Thibella (Field Survey, 2009).

The argument this section is making is that land ownership is fundamental to housing ownership. Moser (1998) points out that housing is also an important productive asset since access to credit to secure livelihood may depend on property ownership. However, where land and housing ownership is not possible, as is the case with the poor in Maseru, it makes life extremely difficult. Many factors regarding the land system in Lesotho and lack of pro-poor housing policy have had much influence on the levels of poverty. The urban poor have no choice but to rely on informal land and housing markets for access to land and shelter (UNCHS, 2003). This situation is mostly a result of bad governance, lack of political will, failed policies and corruption, the same way as attested by Cities Alliance (2007). UNCHS (1995) also observes that inadequate incomes go together with very poor and overcrowded housing and living conditions and often insecure tenure (as indicated earlier in this chapter and in chapter 4). Lack of housing in the urban areas is the most central feature of urban poverty (UNCHS, 1995). The provision of other services (water and electricity) exists mostly in middle-income areas and these services remain inaccessible to poor areas, further worsening their poverty situation.

### **Water**

Another major challenge faced by poor communities in Maseru is lack of adequate water supply. The distress caused by this problem is extremely serious because it forces the poor to rely on contaminated sources of water for survival, increasing health risks. This research has revealed that the inadequate water supply infrastructure in the three low-income urban communities of Sekamaneng, Motimposo and Thibella in Maseru is a key symptom of poverty and underdevelopment. Table 5.2 below indicates sources of water supply).

**Table 5.2: Sources of water supply in Thibella, Sekamaneng and Motimposo**

Water supply source	Frequency (%)		
	Sekamaneng	Motimposo	Thibella
Own yard		17.5	17.5
Open spring	97.5	7.5	
Gully	10		
Nearby village taps	5		
Neighbours taps free		10	
Neighbours taps with monthly payment		55	
Neighbours tanks	10		
Public taps		10	82.5

Source: Field Survey, 2009.

From the three communities studied, in the Sekamaneng area, 97.5 percent of households collected water from open springs, 10 percent of households fetched water from a gully which is simultaneously used as a toilet by those households that did not have proper toilets. Some 5 percent of households claimed to fetch water from the nearby village, mostly during drought spells as was the case at the time I conducted this research. Around 10 percent of households bought water from people who had tanks and collected rainwater or bought water from the Water and Sewerage Corporation (WASCO). The argument is that these poor people did not have established permanent means of income-generation but only casual jobs, as discussed in earlier sections of this report, and they had to buy water from vendors at R1.50 per 20 litres. The important question is ‘how did these people manage to survive under these conditions?’ Many of them had resorted to using unprotected and untreated water sources as a solution because they did not have money. Indiscriminate excreta disposal and contamination by animals polluted these water sources. The situation was worse for households affected by HIV/AIDS where the people did not have the necessary physical strength or human resources to collect water. In most of these cases, they used water collected from the gully. ‘Mapoloko, one respondent from Sekamaneng, and an HIV/AIDS patient, confirmed this by pitifully stating that her household used the water fetched from the gully, the same gully they used as the toilet, because for her it did not matter as she claimed that she had to boil it before use.

The scenario is that lack of water supply infrastructure in the area has forced people to get water from these polluted sources, which bear a high risk to their health.

Furthermore, in the Motimposo community, out of 40 households only 7 (17.5 percent) had water in their yards, 3 (7.5 percent) households fetched water from an open spring, 22 (55 percent) households fetched water from neighbours' taps where they had to pay monthly rent ranging from R20 to R25 a month. About 4 (10 percent) households claimed that they got water from their neighbours for free because they could not afford to pay as they had no means to generate income while 4 (10 percent) used public taps where they had to pay R1.00 per 20 litres. There were individuals who bought monthly coupons at R75.00. They used these coupons to generate money for themselves, that is, since the coupon was used as a key to the public tap for one to get water, those who had coupons were able to open for everyone who did not have means to buy this coupon and in return, the person paid R1.00 for every 20 litres. Most people who were trapped in this type of arrangement were the poor because they did not have money to pay for the coupon, neither did they have access to the public taps in their area. This seemed to enrich some individuals more while the poor were impoverished more. This was also the case in Thibella community.

In Thibella generally the poor used the public taps provided by the Municipality, while others were provided by WASCO. About 33 (82.5 percent) fetched water from public taps and only 7 (17.5) had water taps in their yards. For those that were run by the Municipality, money was collected by the Municipal officials while those run by WASCO were under the same coupon system as in Motimposo, where vendors themselves were collecting money as the poor came and bought water from the taps. The situation here was devastating for the poor who had to part with cash every time they needed to drink or eat. The money went into the hands of government and individuals who wanted to enrich themselves. The worst situation was that the poor were paying for water from vendors at 92 cents extra since if they were to get water from WASCO directly they would pay only 8 cents. This scenario presents the reverse of the government policy on water that has stipulated that 'every Mosotho is entitled to getting free 30 litres of water a day'. Instead of the poor getting the 30 litres free they paid more to vendors and Municipal authorities. The situation, however, substantiates the argument already put forth by other scholars that urban services today are accompanied by cost recovery, that is, those who benefit from the public services are required to pay a fee which contributes to the cost of providing the services (Beall in Thomas 2000). Stephens (1996) further shows that the urban poor often have least access to piped water and are forced

to pay more than wealthy people do for poor quality and limited quantities of water which they sometimes buy from vendors. He argues that this is double regressive taxation in which one group is doubly disbenefited (in health and economic terms) while another doubly gains. The situation is more worrying when one hears people like ‘Mamoeketsi bitterly claiming

If I do not have money, I beg from people around here but they can only give you water to drink not more than that. There are times when we go without water for a day (Interview, Mamoeketsi Thabaneng, March 2009).

The study’s interview with a WASCO official revealed that even though WASCO has a mandate from the government of Lesotho to provide water for the nation mostly in towns, the government has not given this department any money as a subsidy for the people to access 30 litres of water free. The official stated that WASCO is a profit-oriented organization and therefore everybody has to pay for water including the poor. He stated: ‘it is clear therefore that even those that sell water from the public taps run by WASCO do not commit any crime because they paid for water well in advance’ (Field Survey, March 2009). The Municipality was also responsible for further impoverishment of the poor by making them pay for water. This suggests that the Municipality as the institution of urban governance does not value the poor as it values the rich in Maseru. There is provision of needed service infrastructure for the rich, they have water taps in their home yards because they can afford the cost of needed infrastructure while the poor cannot. The poor suffer social exclusion and marginalization, as they lack essential services which are basic to human life, thus affecting their livelihood. Lack of services delivery to poor areas and lack of access to such services where infrastructure exists are factors that have further widened the gap between the rich and the poor in urban Maseru and have led to increasing levels of poverty among the already poor urban inhabitants. This research study has further revealed that water provision was not the only problem around services delivery and urban governance, which escalated poverty among the urban poor. Lack of/ poor sanitary facilities have also worsened the levels of poverty in the areas studied.

### **Sanitation**

Improved sanitation is as important as water in the well-being of individuals as well as households (Ellis, 1998). It goes beyond the issue of improving the physical infrastructure of toilets as it also includes the disposal of domestic wastewater. However, in the areas studied the focus was on toilets which if available were not in good condition or were not available at

all to serve as a hygienic measure, and so pose a serious threat to human life. Table 5.3 shows the type of sanitation available to the poor in the three areas of study – Sekamaneng, Motimposo and Thibella. I found that in the Sekamaneng community, 60 percent of households used pit latrines. These pit latrines were not in good condition, some had no doors and only tattered pieces of cloth hung instead to secure privacy. Some were in a state of collapse because the rusty iron sheets they were made up of were beginning to fall down, while some pits were poorly constructed and poorly covered so that the excreta was exposed. This made these toilets to become not only dangerous for human use but also a risk to the health of the households. 5 percent of households used neighbours' toilets and 5 percent used relatives' toilets and all of these were pit latrines. Only 5 percent of households had proper VIP toilets. Some 7.5 percent of households were using the nearby gully because they had no toilets and 2.5 percent of households used an open pit dug at the edge of the yard as an alternative for a toilet. An interviewee claimed that they used this pit only during the night to secure privacy. This situation has a far reaching impact in terms of health, not only for the household but for the community as a whole as it puts it at serious risk of diseases like typhoid particularly in dry and windy seasons. The situation also has an environmental impact in that it leads to increase in pollution of water sources, resulting in water-faecal disease cycle to communities with untreated water supplies. The situation was rather bad because people claimed to have no means to change their circumstances, as they had no income. It illustrates the depth of poverty in this area (Field Survey, 2009). Beall (2000) affirms that lack of access to services such as water and sanitation are both a cause and symptom of poverty in low-income settlements.

This was similar in the Motimposo community, where 67.5 percent of households were using pit latrines that were also in a poor condition. Some 2.5 percent used a gully as a substitute for toilet, 15 percent of households depended on their neighbours' toilets, 2.5 percent depended on relatives' toilets and 7.5 percent had VIP toilets but could not use them because they were full so they used their neighbour's toilets. The observation was that a major proportion of the population used poorly constructed pit latrines. However, the situation looked very different in the Thibella community, where only 5 percent used pit latrines. 72.5 percent used public water system toilets provided by the Municipality. These households were mostly of tenants, who because of the problem they had with their VIP toilets, alternatively used the Municipal toilets where they had to pay 50 cents for each visit. The observation the researcher made was that the toilets available in the places they had rented



were full beyond their capacity and left open because the doors were broken. As a researcher, I found it unbelievable that such chaotic conditions were still prevailing in Maseru particularly in its inner part where Thibella is situated. At least 72.5 percent of households claimed that they sometimes used a nearby gully as an alternative when they did not have money to pay for the service (Field Survey, 2009). ‘Mats’epo, who had moved to Thibella after the death of her husband to find means of survival, claimed: ‘There is a toilet but it is like it is not there, it is full. Instead we use the public toilet where we pay 50 cents each time one has to go or use a gully if there is no money’ (Interview, ‘Mats’epo Makheng, March 2009). Nonetheless, the Municipal officials chased these people for using the nearby gully: this is what ‘Mathabang who was also a tenant stated:

We use the municipal toilets a distance from here, we pay 50 cents each time we go for the toilet. Imagine when one has a running stomach how many 50 cents she/he will pay! Since one is not working sometimes we have to resort to use open space down in the trees, but there one is chased by men who use the place for smoking dagga or by the Municipal officials who claim that we pollute the environment (Interview, ‘Mathabang Lebuso, March 2009).

**Table 5.3: Type of sanitation in Thibella, Sekamaneng and Motimposo**

Type of sanitation	Frequency (%)		
	Sekamaneng	Motimposo	Thibella
Pit latrine	60	67.5	5
Use of Neighbours’ toilet	5	15	
Use of relatives’ toilet	5	2.5	
VIP toilet	5	7.5	
Nearby gully	7.5	2.5	72.5
Open pit in the yard	2.5		
Public toilet			

Source: Field Survey, 2009.

These poor conditions not only put the health of these people at risk, but, most importantly, it

affects their survival in that their efficiency both at work and in their families is jeopardized, as Beall (2000) has also attested. The reason for toilets being full is that owners did not want to pay for tapping, which is done by WASCO. They claimed that it was expensive and they could not afford to maintain them because these toilets become full over a short period of time (Field Survey, 2009). This supports the argument that there are no universally free services as no local authorities in the developing countries could deliver these successfully in any case (Stephens, 1996). However, this argument does not apply to Lesotho where the population is very low and is further decreasing due to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Moreover, corruption and embezzlement of government revenue is high and does not allow the government to develop the local authorities to the capacity that they can deliver these services free. Yet this could be possible. Already there is a water policy which, though not implemented, has already stipulated that the poor should get 30 litres free a day. It also looks possible that local authorities could provide sanitation services free to the poor. Lack of access to these services has affected many poor people and their potential to earn a living thus affecting the household livelihood and its general well-being. The situation as it is now refutes Ellis's (1998) contention that a person's livelihood includes access to, and benefits derived from social and public services provided by the state including water supply and sanitation. It means therefore that the urban poor live in poverty, demonstrated by these devastating living conditions resulting from lack of basic services.

It is imperative to show that this empirical survey does not differ from other studies done before (Satterthwaite, 1995b, Masika et al, 1997, UNEP, 1997 and UNCHS 2003) that form the theoretical framework for this research. The arguments from these studies is that there is a decline in urban living standards due to a decline in investment in urban infrastructure, specifically sanitation and water provision, and that Municipalities have not been able to keep pace with the demands of the increasing population due to urbanization, such as basic services. Evidence from the three communities, Thibella, Motimposo and Sekamaneng, has shown that a larger proportion of the poor are living under miserable conditions. These conditions are worsened by the fact that these people lack other opportunities like employment, as they also possess low levels of education, which put together, have reduced their ability to improve their condition, thus worsening their poverty situation (Field Survey, 2009 and Chapter 5). This substantiates the argument of this research that urbanization has posed a number of problems where urban governance in Maseru has failed to respond to the ever-soaring population by providing adequate basic services to allow the urban poor to have

at least the minimum standard of living. The urban poor population is marginalized and largely used to enrich the already well off individuals, thus widening the gap and heightening the poverty situation in the country.

### **Conclusion**

The political history combined with historical background on governance in Lesotho, as discussed earlier in this chapter, shows that urban poverty is largely a result of lack of political will. The historical and political conditions resulted in poor participation of the urban poor in Lesotho's local administration and thus their failure to contribute to changes that affect their lives. Planning systems and resource allocation have remained centrally driven and controlled with very limited consultation with ordinary Basotho. Development plans have remained purely on paper, and for a long time without much serious engagement with primary stakeholders. Representative participation that for a long time has been the practice does not necessarily mean that the most vulnerable in the community are taken into consideration in decision-making. Poor people living in these areas face social and economic exclusion, with limited access to basic social infrastructure and services. The failure of the Lesotho government to address these problems is largely due to a number of challenges: lack of resources, designs of infrastructure and services set at levels unaffordable to the urban poor, rapid urbanization exceeding capacities to implement city development plans, measures that often did not reach the urban poor, non-involvement of beneficiaries/communities in planning and implementing urban development and absence of policies and flexible by-laws to deal with problems of urbanization such as squatter and informal settlements. Too often, the response of urban governance has been to try to eradicate the informal sector by means of slum clearance, further deepening the vulnerability of the already marginalized many.

The way forward seems to start with the involvement of all stakeholders in the decision-making process. Participation that goes beyond only the consultation process but includes full civil engagement and equality of access is key to the development of well-governed cities.

## CHAPTER 6

### URBAN HOUSEHOLDS' VULNERABILITY AND POVERTY

#### Introduction

This chapter discusses how changes to poor urban households, under certain circumstances, increase their vulnerability, which in turn leads to deepening poverty. It proceeds from the premise that households are not a static phenomenon. Indeed, it is widely accepted that households are fluid and experience change on a continuous basis, exposing them to vulnerability and poverty (see Hummel, 1984; Netting et al, 1984; Sharma, 1986; Smith and Wallerstein, 1992; Kabeer, 1994; Moser, 1996 and Moser, 2009). Moser (1996) argues that any transformation within the household can make such a household vulnerable to increased poverty. However, the restructuring can decrease or increase vulnerability depending on other factors including the capability of any additional member to make an additional input to the household's resources (Moser et al, 1997).

This chapter mainly examines how changes to the form and composition of poor households in the three chosen areas of Maseru have contributed to making them more vulnerable to poverty. It also contends that the structural problems of economic decline and a concomitant increase in poverty levels in Lesotho, which have become especially concentrated in Maseru, coupled with rapid urbanization since the mid-1980s, have caused general instability in poor urban households. Thus it argues that poverty can destabilise households, which, in turn, increases the vulnerability of these households. Consequently, poverty deepens.

Given the wider context of Lesotho's history, with political, economic and social developments showing a declining trajectory from the colonial era, which also affected Maseru, significant household restructuring is taking place among poor urban households, reducing their ability to cope with poverty. The continual decline in agriculture and mining remittances, combined with rapid urbanization and inadequate social services delivery, have influenced household restructuring in the country as a whole, but with particular forms in the urban areas in Maseru in the post-colonial period. The previously existing household structure in Lesotho, the extended household, has collapsed. These factors have moulded the household structure and increased vulnerability in already poor households, resulting in various forms of poor households. It was observed that, in the areas of Thibella, Sekamaneng

and Motimposo, household restructuring was significant, as about 97.5 percent of poor households experienced changes in structure and composition due to adverse effects of poverty and also to trying to respond to these. There is, therefore, an incidence of increased vulnerability, higher than if these households were in their former state, confirming Moser's (1996, 1998) view that any form of change in the household can increase vulnerability. The chapter further argues that internal and external factors have influenced the change in the structure of these poor urban households, further increasing their vulnerability, thus deepening poverty. This analysis starts with the evolution and development of the urban household within the historical context of Lesotho, aiming at understanding the nature of the urban household in Maseru and particular changes and processes that led to restructuring, what forms of poor urban households emerged and how vulnerability increased in such households. The argument here is that restructuring of poor households in Maseru is observable along with the rapid growth of Maseru, particularly from the 1980s, with many poor households becoming more vulnerable and unable to cope with poverty. Furthermore, the chapter examines the character of the poor urban household to confirm that poor households in Maseru have continually restructured, and hence are vulnerable. Household restructuring has not only happened in Maseru but also in the world at large. The study also draws from experiences around the world for comparative purposes to illustrate how restructuring leads to increased vulnerability and poverty.

### **Household restructuring in Maseru and vulnerability**

In order to discuss properly the form and structure of urban households in contemporary Maseru, it is important to understand the development of an urban household in the pre-colonial era, colonial and post-colonial eras, focusing mostly on the post-colonial period when Maseru experienced remarkable growth. In the pre-colonial era, there were two dominant forms of households in Lesotho, both existing in traditional rural society. Central to any understanding is to state that they were strongly rooted in patriarchal relations. First was the nuclear family with the man being the head of the household with the wife and children. Murray (1981) explains this as the basic form of domestic association. The second type was the extended family - a wider family where households comprised resident members who occupy a homestead in a village and one or more absent members who may have contributed to its income. Continuing responsibility to contribute towards the household's maintenance influenced membership of such a household (Murray, 1981:47-48). The Sesotho term *lelapa* (family/household) refers to both types of households. In rural society, the extended

household was predominant. Arguably, the main feature of these households was its patriarchal organization: men commanded authority and women, who were regarded as minors, did not have the right to take part in decision-making even though in some cases women contributed much to the sustenance and reproduction of the homestead (Guy, 1987 and Gill, 1993). Casalis (1861, cited in Thabane (2002:179)) also observed the strong male-ordered structure of families in Lesotho. The household revolved around strong intertwined economic and personal intra-household relationships that shaped day-to-day life. Though the members lived together and considered themselves as one unit, plans and decisions about daily life were men's role. As Murray (1981:102) argues, the household revolved on co-residence, co-operative labour, consumption, reproduction and distribution and sharing of earnings mainly from the subsistence economy. Each member from the household was able to claim support from other members within the household, thus reducing vulnerability. There was a clear gender division of labour. Based on patriarchy, men were the heads and responsible for generating livelihoods. Women provided support to men in terms of labour. This was the predominant state of rural households in pre-colonial times.

Given the prevalence of the traditional household especially in the pre-colonial times, the traditional Basotho household revolved around strong relations with sharing of available resources with men controlling such resources (Gill, 1993; Guy, 1987 and Mothibe, 2002). Nevertheless, the traditional household evolved over time from the 19<sup>th</sup> century and over the past 25 years of rapid urbanization, with remarkable change to the household structure and composition affecting manifestations of poverty. However, as an earlier chapter explained, this was slow initially and grew rapidly from the 1960s and 1980s.

Following changes in the political economy of the country, Basotho have been leaving their original settlements and re-establishing in Maseru urban area, the place that has been economically active since the 1870s when compared with many parts of the country. Among these changes, colonialism greatly influenced the change in the household structure in the 19<sup>th</sup> century by introducing the western-oriented cash economy that compelled Basotho males to migrate from their rural settlements, especially to work in the mines. Men dominated internal and cross border migration, leaving women, children and the aged behind to sustain the subsistence economy (Thabane, 2002 and Crush, Williams and Peberdy, 2005). This movement changed the structure of the traditional Basotho household and the economy. This is to argue that the migrant labour system disrupted traditional households. Consequently, there was formation of *de facto* households (households with absent male heads/spouse as

migrants). Women served as temporary heads in the absence of their migrant spouses. Murray (1981:102) attests to this pointing out that the nuclear family and the extended family structure changed due to husbands and wives being forced to live apart. In addition, there were *de jure* households (with single, widowed or separated female heads). The boundaries of the *de jure* household coincided with those of the nuclear family. These new forms of households differed in size and several distinct modes of survival. The argument here is that colonialism and migrant labour system influenced the change in the household structure and composition. Some factors which contributed to this change were that women bore children as single parents but remained in their families. Widows headed households and grandparents in multi-generation households brought up many children because their parents were absent migrants (Murray, 1981:102), indicating the development of extended households both in Lesotho generally and specifically in Maseru.

Rapid urbanization influenced the rate and scale of change in households becoming urban in Lesotho in the 1960s and 1980s. As Maseru continues to serve as a business centre and the main border linking Lesotho with South Africa, the city continually receives rural-urban migrants from different villages who form new poor households in Maseru. City encroachment has further influenced the growth of these households and that has allowed an increase in the number of new poor households within the city boundaries with various forms and composition. The areas of Thibella, Motimposo and Sekamaneng, which used to have traditional extended and nuclear households, now have experienced urbanization resulting in new forms of households. Evidence from this study has revealed that 80 percent of the sample studied in Thibella was immigrants from other areas of Lesotho. Only 20 percent were people who had settled in the area as original residents. In the Motimposo community, 67.5 percent of households were original residents in the area and 32.5 percent were immigrant households. While in Sekamaneng, 37.5 percent of the households were of original residents and 62.5 percent were immigrants (Field Survey, 2009). From the evidence of the study, migrant households were dominant in Thibella and Sekamaneng while Motimposo had a larger number of households of original residents. This is because the former areas experienced rapid urbanization in the last three decades. Besides rapid urbanization, other processes including the change in the political economy of the country triggered some of these changes. New forms of households have developed from different processes, which are distinct from each other. Some men are unmarried and live alone as heads in their households (single person). Children have become heads because both parents

have passed away (child headed). Widows head (female headed) households and grandparents raise many children whose parents have passed away. This has also been the experience in other cities (See Moser, 2009; Moser et al, 1997 and Wallman, 1984) This indicates that urban households are no more in their former state due to restructuring in Sekamaneng, Thibella and Motimposo. These distinctions will illustrate whether households in Maseru still maintain their traditional structure as nuclear or extended households or whether they are reshaped by socio-economic as well as political developments in the country and Maseru make them more susceptible to vulnerability. The examples below are different forms of households existing in Motimposo, Sekamaneng and Thibella with different causes of their restructuring and structure. These characteristics are important as they explain how different households changed and why they are vulnerable.

### **Changes in Maseru households**

Several case studies show that different factors have contributed to the restructuring of poor households in Thibella, Motimposo and Sekamaneng, resulting in increased vulnerability. Both internal and external factors influenced changes in the structure of the households and led to vulnerability but the internal factors had greater influence. In order to explain this, I use Moser's (1996) framework of analysis on household restructuring and provide evidence from the three communities showing how vulnerability increased and culminated in increased poverty in poor households. The study assesses first the relationship between household restructuring and its vulnerability in the rapidly urbanizing city, Maseru and then proceeds to other factors that influenced households' vulnerability. The discussion here considers different categories of households: the original resident, the immigrant, the single person and child-headed discussing gender in relation to each of the categories to illustrate how restructuring has contributed to their vulnerability.

With increasing urbanization in Maseru, household restructuring is a continuous process exposing poor households to more vulnerability. Different households restructure differently resulting in new forms of households with different composition. The study evidence indicated that some households restructured when households' members separated and this led to the formation of new urban nuclear households living far apart from previous extended households. The newly restructured households have lesser dependency on the parental support of the former households but the parents in the former households still depend on the new nuclear households for survival (Field Survey, 2009). Tapole who lived in Sekamaneng reported:



I have one child who stays somewhere with his family and I am living with my wife only. I never went to school, and my wife did Std 4. Though I have a piece of agricultural land, it does not produce anything to sustain the family rather I spent on it for no return. My son comes home rarely. He sometimes gives us money to get maize meal if he comes home (Interview, Tapole Litabe, January, 2009).

Tapole had previously been living in Sekamaneng in a traditional extended household where he lived with his wife, his children and the grandparents. The household first experienced restructuring when the grandparents died. It became a nuclear household. Later it restructured again when his son felt no need to be living with them after getting married. That means the initial household composition of five members, went down to three and eventually to two. Tapole's household became more vulnerable when his son who is economically active with employment separated to form his own household. This has affected the resource base of Tapole's household on which it could draw during times of economic crisis, thus increasing its vulnerability. In the past, patriarchy and gender division of labour characterized the primary form of a household. The study has indicated that household members used to live together with division of roles and sharing available resources. However, in the new forms of households in Maseru, these elements are no more visible within the increasing urbanization. There is no more division of labour in Tapole's household, as head of the household and his wife now have to engage in the same activities, especially piece-jobs, to sustain their living.

Another case is that of Lira Lelaka's household. This had been a nuclear household but had changed to a traditional extended form (man as head, the wife and children and grandchildren) indicating an expansion of the nuclear household. The increased burden from the grandchildren, who are orphans, has put serious pressure on the household. Their own children, who are working, spent their money on themselves without contributing to the household's welfare. Lelaka had no employment to derive a livelihood and he does not have land to cultivate crops. Lelaka and his wife had to seek for piece-jobs to generate income for the household's survival, meaning that there was no more gender division of roles. These examples serve to illustrate that nuclear households have restructured leading to modified composition of such households turning them into new forms of extended households, which are more vulnerable in the rapidly growing Maseru.

Another category was of households of immigrants from other parts of the country who have settled in the areas of Motimposo, Sekamaneng and Thibella. 'Immigrant', in this study,

refers to a person who has moved from his place of origin to settle in another area. Their establishment was mainly due to rural-urban migration. Later they were able to settle and became permanent immigrant households. The study's results have shown that immigrant households were the most predominant particularly in Thibella and, to a lesser extent, Sekamaneng (about 80 percent and 37.5 respectively). Motimposo had 32.5 percent of immigrant households. With the increasing urbanization in Maseru, these households were more vulnerable than they were before. For example, 'Mabatho's household moved from its traditional rural extended form. It moved to the urban setting as a nuclear household with husband as head and 'Mabatho as a wife and two children. Initially this was a tenant household and later became a resident household in Motimposo. The transition of this household from an extended rural form with shared resources to a single female-headed household, with the unemployed 'Mabatho as head, points to its increasing vulnerability in the rapidly growing Maseru.

This same analysis is applicable to households which also had migrated to the city but stayed as tenants. 'Tenant' in this research refers to a person who is renting accommodation on at least a monthly basis the year round. 'Manthabiseng's household was an immigrant household of male and female friends. This is one of the households established due to mineworkers choosing to stay with their female friends and eventually abandoning their homes in the countryside and establishing homes in the urban areas ('living together' immigrant-tenant households). 'Manthabiseng, who lived in Motimposo, indicated:

I live with my partner ('living together'), my spouse died long ago. My children, a boy and a girl are staying with my mother at home in Mochale's hoek. I came to Maseru in 1970 to work as a domestic worker in one home in town but finally, I ended up in Motimposo brewing and selling locally made beer (Interview, 'Manthabiseng Mohale, January 2009).

This case indicates restructuring of the household of 'Manthabiseng which used to exist in the rural area where she used to live with her husband and their children. The household structure and its composition had completely changed due to urbanization. It was observably vulnerable at the time of the research even without children. Observable indicators of its vulnerability included the type of occupation they both engaged in, as well as other things like the housing they occupied.

This was not different from some households that relocated from the countryside to Maseru abandoning the rural livelihood and adapting to the urban environment as tenants (immigrant households). Cecilia, living in Motimposo, stated:

I stay with my 3 sons and my daughter in law. They are all not working anywhere. I did Std 3 at school. I was married but my husband died in 1970. In 1979, I moved to Maseru to seek for a job and rented here in Motimposo. I got a job where I worked as a domestic worker. However, it has been difficult to live in an area where there is no one you know because at times if you need assistance you hardly find someone willing to help. I find life better here than home (Interview, Cecilia Ramoabi, January 2009).

The common feature of these households is that they were all new forms of households reshaped by the historical, socio-economic and political developments in the country, particularly urbanization. Wallman (1984) clearly indicates that historical, personal and situational reasons influence change in household structure. These processes explain how various external factors influence household restructuring and its vulnerability. Nonetheless, internal factors also had a significant impact. This research also explicates the most influential internal factors that led to household restructuring in Maseru.

According to evidence from the three communities in Maseru, many households restructured due to death of spouses. Widows who were mostly 60 years old and above were heads in about 20 percent of the sample households in Sekamaneng, 35 percent in Motimposo and 42.5 percent in Thibella, with limited resources for survival (Field Survey, 2009). This incidence coincides with statistical data from other regions of the developing world particularly Africa, Latin America, Asia and Oceania where widows are more numerous than widowers (Table 6.1). The household resources diminish because a member who may have been contributing significantly to the household income and resources would not be doing so anymore, resulting in declining welfare of such a household and exposing it to increased vulnerability. Often when a member who is the breadwinner to the household dies, such a household becomes incapable of mobilizing needed resources for survival (Moser, 1996 and Sharma, 1986).

**Table 6.1: Widowhood among women and men (Percentage 60+ who are widowed)**

<b><u>Africa</u></b>	Women	Men
North Africa	59	8
Southern Africa	44	7
<b><u>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</u></b>		
Caribbean	34	12
Central America	36	1
South America	37	13
<b><u>Asia</u></b>		
Eastern Asia	49	14
South-Eastern Asia	49	14
Southern Asia	51	11
Central Asia	58	13
Western Asia	48	8
<b><u>Oceania</u></b>	44	15

Source: United Nations Statistics Division, 1997.

Widowhood had a profound impact on household vulnerability in Maseru. When a household loses its head from death, responsibility shifts. It is common mostly in the patriarchal societies such as Maseru that women upon the death of their husbands assume the household headship. Evidence from Thibella, Motimposo and Sekamaneng indicated that these households were under-resourced and daily needs not all met. These widows claimed that they were worse off with the death of their husbands who were the breadwinners in the households. For example, ‘Mamoeketsi’s family in Thibella used to depend on the husband/father as the breadwinner but the death of the husband left ‘Mamoeketsi as a widowed household head and breadwinner. She is uneducated and earns income from piece-job of M/R30.00 for washing people’s clothes per day but this depended on availability of such piece-job. The use of this income is to pay rent of M45.00 monthly, to buy water for household consumption, to pay for toilet use and to buy food daily. ‘Mamoeketsi claimed to be living a very distressing life struggling to live each day with her son.

In addition, ‘Mapoloko who lives in Sekamaneng and has lost her husband indicated that the poor are forced to be on their own. It has become difficult for her to cope with life. The contributions other members of a household make through their labour and financial capital reduce the household vulnerability. It increases the ability of the household to respond to external shocks (Moser et al, 1997:53). Nevertheless, where such do not exist, as was the case

with 'Mamoeketsi and 'Mapoloko, the household is more vulnerable to poverty, affirming Moser's (1996) contention that household restructuring can cause households to fall into poverty. The analysis also concurs with Sharma's (1986) attestation that a household functions better as a resource system where members support each other and they can make a better living but if this is not the case, like it is with 'Mamoeketsi's household (Field Survey, 2009) such a household is more vulnerable to poverty (Sharma, 1986 and Moser, 1996).

In addition, death of parents increased the vulnerability of households resulting in child-headed households. The changes in the boundaries of the capital (encroachment), which incorporate the rural households that depended mostly on subsistence farming, the urban cash-oriented economy has increased poor households' vulnerability. It has pressurized household members to go out seeking for employment, thus separating from their former households as migrant members while those that left behind are more vulnerable. The household of Letlama demonstrates restructuring of a traditional type of nuclear household which formerly had both parents with a male being head. But circumstances had forced it repeatedly to restructure and eventually become a child-headed household, making it more vulnerable (Field Survey, 2009). Letlama affirmed:

I live in a family of three, I currently live with my younger sister. The other sister is in Johannesburg. I have to seek for a job to assist my sisters. I am in charge of the family because our parents died. Since their death, I find life very difficult because I have to see to it that my younger sister gets everything including food, books, uniform. I only rely on piece-jobs to get income. Sometimes my sister also does piece-jobs in Johannesburg and sends some money for us (Interview, Letlama Mphahane, November 2008).

Moreover, Keneuoe's household of three members supports the argument that restructuring increases household vulnerability in child-headed households. Keneuoe (unmarried but with a child) and her brother were more vulnerable than they were before when they were supported by their parents, who had passed away. No one could claim headship. Both Keneuoe and the brother were surviving on their own, indicating that the household had transformed from its former state of a nuclear household to its present situation with limited resources. Other members (parents) who used to contribute to its resources were no more available to do that.

The cases show that many of these child-headed households have become more vulnerable in the rapidly urbanizing city

Marriage was another factor that led to household restructuring, where new members joined the household (2.5 percent in Sekamaneng and 2.5 percent in Thibella). Although this number may seem to be insignificant, the consequences can be substantial depending on whether a new member is able to contribute towards the welfare of the household or not. From the study results, 'Makhahliso Leche (66) of Sekamaneng lived with her married son, Thabang, and his wife who were without formal jobs. 'Mapalesa Lesia (48) lived in Thibella with 6 children including the daughter-in-law, a wife to one of her sons. She lived in a shack for which she paid ground rent monthly and rented extra rooms on monthly basis. The two cases displayed what Moser et al (1997) refers to as extension of extended household. They indicate that we have poor households within poor extended households. It is evident that these people without jobs and without any means to generate income had added more strain on the household's available resources in both cases by increasing the dependency ratios in such households, thus exposing them to more vulnerability (Field Survey, 2009). This conforms to Moser et al's (1997) contention that an increase in vulnerability depends on whether an additional member is able to make financial and labour contributions to the household.

Furthermore, household restructuring also leads to more vulnerability in the case where single men and women take up household headship. These include unmarried females and males and those that have become single after marital relationships have broken down. Often unmarried women who are mothers suffer most and are more vulnerable to poverty than their male counterparts. This is because they have to take the responsibility of raising their children while men often have to look after themselves only (Moser, 1996). Evidence from the three communities indicates that 7.5 percent were single male-headed households in Sekamaneng, 10 percent in Motimposo, while Thibella had no single male-headed households. There were also 5 percent of single female-headed households in Motimposo, 5 percent in Thibella while Sekamaneng had 2.5 percent households. In all these communities, what differed was the level of vulnerability between single male-headed households and single female-headed households, but they were all poor. Households with children suffered more because of the burden of raising children (Field Survey, 2009). Mpati, a 62 years old single unmarried woman living in Thibella, gave her testimony:

I am not married but I have children, my home is in Mafeteng district and I

moved to Thibella in 1976, there were no means to support my children at home and I came to seek for means of survival, I resorted to brewing and selling beer as my main source of income, but now since I am tired to brew beer I have resorted to collecting boxes in the shops and streets and sell them to generate money. It was better in the past, brewing and selling beer generated a lot of money and at the time things were not expensive like today. Now I live a very difficult life because if I do not go out to collect the boxes, I will have nothing to feed the family with (Interview, Mpati Mathetsa, March 2009).

In the same vein, Teboho residing in Motimposo, who is a 49 years old single male, explained his status,

I live alone, I am not married. I have been seeking for a permanent job but I cannot find one. It is difficult to cope with life when one has no job. Piece-jobs just provide for a meal at times when one has to eat 3 times a day. That means to cater for other meals I have to borrow money. We get indebted trying to survive yet we have no money to pay back. This type of work does not allow one to save money. It is insufficient to cater for my needs, I live a hand-to-mouth type of life, at times I sleep without food (Interview, Teboho Marabe, January 2009).

Teboho's household is less vulnerable compared to 'Mpati's household with children as dependants.

Furthermore, lack of income had much impact on household restructuring as it forced people to migrate from their homes. People migrate within Maseru and to South Africa. This study found that there was high unemployment in the communities visited where 90 percent of the households in Sekamaneng, 82.5 percent in Motimposo and 80 percent in Thibella had unemployed members with no income. They generated sporadic cash from other informal activities. When a household lives without income, it means it is incapable of meeting basic needs, meaning that these households lived in great despair (Field Survey, 2009).

In addition, inadequate employment forced people to move from one place to another in search of job opportunities and sometimes they spent most of their time in places of employment living independently from their former households. This re-establishment, either as permanent settlers or as tenants, sometimes made these people not to remit any money

home, eroding the former household potential to mobilize enough resources for survival and leading to increased vulnerability of the former households. These people engaged mostly in jobs like domestic, factory and contract work either within the country or in South Africa. For example, in the Sekamaneng community, 5 percent of households had at least one member engaged in domestic work, 2.5 percent in factory work and 2.5 percent in contract work. In Motimposo, 15 percent of the households had a member engaged in domestic work and 2.5 percent in factory work. All these jobs were low paying jobs (Field Survey, 2009). The figures may seem insignificant compared with the total sample households in these areas, but if someone is from a poor household, and goes out to work as a domestic worker who gets a low income of about M150.00 per month, it is possible for the person not to send money back for the family survival. These households claimed that they rarely have enough food for a day. Food here refers to maize porridge as a staple food basic for all Basotho and vegetables. Observably, they were poor households.

Several households have restructured due to internal and external factors as demonstrated and have moved from their original state creating different structures and categories of households in these areas today which are: Female-headed households, male-headed households, extended (female or male headed), child-headed and single male and single female-headed households. The 'extended household' here refers to a new form of household after restructuring where, for instance, a household that used to be nuclear now gets joined by other members related to the household- this could be grandchildren. There is an overlap of the structures of households - the nuclear and extended households due to several reasons such as childcare and marriage. There are different structures of households existing here today whether of immigrant, tenant or resident. Table 6.2 below illustrates different household structures existing in the three areas of Thibella, Sekamaneng and Motimposo in Maseru.



**Table 6.2: Structure of urban households**

Structure of household	% of all households		
	Thibella	Sekamaneng	Motimposo
Single person	-	5	7.5
Couples	10	10	17.5
Nuclear	5	7.5	5
Single parents with children under 18	15	10	-
Extended households including children under 18 (female and male headed)	35	60	70
Other extended households (with married couples living with parents)	10	-	-

Source: Field Survey, 2009.

Common features of the households in the three areas are: there is a large number of extended households compared with nuclear or single person households. about 35 percent in Thibella, 60 in Sekamaneng and 70 in Motimposo constituted extended households (Table 6.2). Nonetheless, the increase in vulnerability often associates with the nature of that household owing to several processes that caused restructuring.

### **Character of household**

Several characteristics depict vulnerability within poor urban households. The socio-economic and political experiences in Lesotho from the 19<sup>th</sup> century exposed many households to increased vulnerability. Colonialism, decline in agricultural productivity, decline in remittances from migrant labour, post-colonial government policies which exposed the country to aid dependency as a result of poverty (as illustrated in chapters 3) eroded the potential of many households to mobilize enough resources to sustain them thus increasing vulnerability. Lack of employment due to lack of/ inadequate education and skills needed in order to be employable, and high dependency of relatives including children were the most influential factors leading to vulnerability in Sekamaneng, Motimposo and Thibella in Maseru.

Several features characterize Maseru urban poor households. Lack of employment characterized most of the urban households in Thibella, Sekamaneng and Motimposo. Given that unemployment is high in the country as a whole, at 22.5 percent (Bureau of Statistics, 2009), due to retrenchments, decline in employment in some sectors of the economy and poor economic performance, there are other additional reasons that explain why many people were unable to get formal employment. The main reason is that the poor belong to the masses with low or no education. There is evidence that 32.5 percent of households in Sekamaneng had female heads who had primary education, 5 percent of female heads with secondary education while 12.5 percent had male heads with secondary education and 20 percent who never went to school. In Motimposo 25 percent of female heads had primary education, only 10 percent had secondary education and 10 percent never went to school, while 5 percent of male heads acquired secondary education and 35 percent had primary education. In Thibella, 47.5 percent of households with female heads had primary education and 15 percent secondary education, while 2.5 percent of male heads acquired secondary education and 2.5 percent never went to school (Field Survey, 2009). This phenomenon of low levels of education exists because in the past the education system in Lesotho focused on primary school education, aiming at only producing ‘helpers’, who were half teachers and half evangelists. The development of lifelong skills of an individual was not the primary objective (Government of Lesotho Report, 1982). Most of the people included in the data above had their education during the colonial era. This is when post primary schooling curricula were modelled along the colonial needs of the Cape Province and South Africa to advance white supremacy and to serve the interests of a white minority to the detriment of the development of Basotho. The purpose was to cater for formal employment credentials needed in the colonial civil service and the teaching force (Clark Commission, 1946 in Muzvidziwa and Seotsanyana, 2002:3). Hence, few, only 42.5 percent had secondary school education. This being the case, the poor unemployable households had to engage in informal work to generate income for their survival (see details in the next chapter of the study).

Another feature of poor households was high dependency, created mainly by caring for orphans. This was due to death of some members of the household. Out of the total sample of 40 households in Sekamaneng, 20 percent were widow-headed and 10 percent of them included orphans. Out of 40 households in Motimposo, 35 percent of households were widow-headed and 10 percent of them were caring for orphans. Thibella remains an exception with no orphans in any household visited. This is because households visited were

mostly tenants who had come to find means of survival in the city and were not taking care of any orphan children of relatives. This points to change in the household structure of widows. Caring for orphans had profound impact on already poor households in these areas as the burden worsened their poverty status. A number of widows were aged 60 years and above and depended on the old age pension from the government, yet they had the extra burden of raising orphans left behind by their sons and daughters infected and killed by HIV/AIDS. Table 3.13 (in chapter 3, p.117) of this study illustrates the death toll and the level of orphanage in the country (UNAIDS, 2012 and UNICEF, 2009). ‘Mamatong, a widow who was 85 years old, renting in Motimposo for the last 30 years, further explained her situation indicating the severity of poverty in widow-headed households with orphans:

I stay with 1 grandchild and 2 grand-grandchildren who are orphans, their mothers and fathers who were my children died, I have not attended school myself. I was married but my husband died long ago. I have been living here for more than 30 years renting. My life today is a struggle because I am old I do not work anymore, I depend entirely on the old-age pension to pay the rent and what is left, I buy maize meal, nothing more. We sometimes sleep without food, sometimes people of goodwill help us when we run short of food (Interview, ‘Mamatong Matong, January 2009).

‘Mamatong was already poor but the loss of her children who left orphans behind has worsened her situation. Keeping children in the city where the economy has an unpredictable cost of living- due to increasing food prices, inflation, and national and international competition - is burdensome. This is why ‘Mamatong is unable to sustain her household and has to live on handouts. Another case was of Lira Lelaka’s household in Sekamaneng that raised orphans (discussed earlier in the chapter) and was unable to cope. Chapter 7 illustrates the type of livelihood in such households. Orphanage has further inflated the level of poverty in Maseru as well as in Lesotho as a whole, with other factors facing households such as agricultural decline, loss of income from the mines, poor health and increased deaths due to HIV/AIDS pandemic (Field Survey, 2009; UNAIDS, 2012 and UNICEF, 2009). The argument here is that household restructuring increased the urban poor households’ vulnerability and deepened poverty. Despite these, there is also a need to examine other factors that influence poor households and further increase their vulnerability.

### **Gender and household structure and vulnerability**

While restructuring has a significant influence on urban poverty, gender is yet another dimension to look at in understanding urban household vulnerability to poverty. However, focusing on the households is critical: while the structure of the household is not reducible to heads, heads often are directly involved with resource mobilisation within the household and hence of value in this study context. This study considered households headed by different groups comprising the urban poor in examining the relationship of gender, vulnerability and poverty in Maseru. These groups included widows, widowers, and single-adult parents both male and female. The study argues that poverty was prevalent in all these groups. The argument here is that poverty does not depend on gender but on resources the household is able to mobilize and possess. This follows on Glewwe and Hall's (1995) contention that households headed by women are not necessarily poorer than households headed by men.

In the Sekamaneng community, out of 40 sample households, 35 percent were female-headed, while 65 percent were male-headed, in Motimposo, 60 percent were female-headed, while 35 were male-headed and in Thibella, 70 percent were female-headed and 30 percent were male-headed. In Sekamaneng, males headed about 30 percent of households which was not the case with the other two communities. This is because Sekamaneng is a semi-rural area where many households still value marital and traditional societal norms and that has kept them intact. The results show that in Motimposo and Thibella female-headed households were the majority because these communities were hosts of single-women immigrants who had relocated from other parts of Lesotho to seek means of survival and had established new homes where they automatically became heads (Field Survey, 2009).

Examples below illustrate three different household types: one headed by a male living with his wife and children, a single male-headed household and finally a single female-headed household. Moqebi, 69 years old and living with his family in Sekamaneng, described their situation: "We are continually faced with everyday problems of getting food for survival, we are sick and we cannot recover because we are starving (Interview, Moqebi Lelaka, December 2008)".

Ts'eliso, 42 years old from a single male-headed household in Motimposo, also claimed:

I do not see the prospects of living in the city, all I see is poverty. Even people who came here hoping to get a better life, we all live a helpless life,

we have no jobs, we are poor, we get poorer every day. I was better when my parents were still alive, they were supporting us but since they died I am a poor helpless man (Interview, Ts'eliso Toli, January 2009).

‘Mamoleboheng, 58 years old, the female head and a migrant in Thibella, indicated:

In the past this business of brewing and selling beer was good, I was living perfectly well because I was able to buy what I needed. Today things have changed, selling beer is no more sustaining me because I get little money, like today I have been here since morning but I have sold nothing, it often happens that a day passes without selling, this means that I have to suffer to get what we need, mostly food and I have to borrow from people (Interview, ‘Mamoleboheng Mots’oloane, March 2009).

These examples indicate that, irrespective of gender of the household head, vulnerability has increased in each of these households, hence they experience poverty. Indeed, it appears that the male-headed households are worse off than female-headed households. Female-headed households are able to engage in income-generating activities like brewing and selling beer to minimize their vulnerability. This supports the views that poverty incidence among female-headed households is lower compared to male-headed households (IFAD, 1999 and Mtshali, 2002), also affirming Glewwe and Hall’s (1995) observation that households headed by women are not necessarily poorer than households headed by men.

However, poverty in urban households is not just about incomes: there are other factors as well that influence the level of poverty. Fukuda-Parr (1999) suggests that measures of poverty should also include other dimensions of human capital development like education. According to Fukuda-Parr (1999), focus on income may lead to different conclusions about poverty than a focus on the concept of ‘human poverty’, which looks into a person’s human capabilities, which means choices and opportunities most basic to human life – and is thus distinct from income poverty. Evidence from the three areas (Sekamaneng, Motimposo and Thibella) shows that most women who were household heads in the three communities were more educated than men. Tapole Litabe who lived in Sekamaneng had never gone to school, Nkoale Kou who lived in Thibella had gone as far as preschool entry level (*Paliso*) and Teboho Marabeof Motimposo had done Standard or grade 1. All these were males. While ‘Makamohelo Mokhalinyane of Sekamaneng had Form C or grade 9, ‘Mapalesa

Matsepe of Motimposo had Form C or grade 9 and ‘Mamatseliso Morekeof Thibella had done standard 5, all females. However, though Form C is far higher than preschool entry or no attendance at all in these few cases given, it may be misleading to argue that women were empowered through education to have better job opportunities than their male counterparts. This is because many of these women went only as far as primary school level, which could hardly attract formal employment at least in the context of Lesotho. Consequently, women and men did not differ in terms of capabilities, as their chances for getting employment in the formal sector were limited (Field Survey, 2009). In this regard, the argument that female-headed households are not necessarily poorer than male-headed households (Glewwe and Hall, 1995) still stands in the three communities, rejecting the notion of feminization of poverty. Feminization of poverty refers to concentration of poverty among women at a disproportionate rate compared to men, with women experiencing a higher rate (Pearce, 1978 and Fukuda-Parr, 1999). Nonetheless, Kennedy and Haddad (1994) indicate that within the household framework of analysis, female-headed households also differ and this should be borne in mind when comparing them to male-headed households. They clearly mark the difference between the *de jure* (households headed by single, widowed, or separated women) and the *de facto* (households headed by women whose male spouses are living elsewhere) female-headed households in terms of vulnerability and poverty. This study followed this mode of analysis.

The findings of this research show that *de jure* female-headed households were poorer than *de facto* female-headed households. The *de facto* households had support from spouses working in South Africa. For example, ‘Malebohang Selomane who lived in Thibella relied on her husband working in South African mines. On the other hand, *de jure* households depended entirely on the means available to them or from the extended family members. For instance, ‘Maseipati Leraka of Sekamaneng was without employment and relied on the mother-in-law for both child care and survival. Her household fetched maize grain from the mother-in-law (Field Survey, 2009). This implies that vulnerability and poverty were higher in the *de jure* households than was the case with the *de facto* households.

However, the findings further show that *de jure* female-headed households were not essentially poorer than the male-headed households, particularly single male-headed households. In the case of the three communities, single male-headed households (e.g., Ts’eliso’s case of a single male head described earlier) were poorer than even the *de jure*

female-headed households (e.g. ‘Mamoleboheng’s case also described above), further indicating that there is no overall feminization of poverty in Maseru (Field Survey, 2009).

Additionally, there are other circumstances which made female-headed households to be better off in comparison to male-headed households. The study considered how women survived and were able to avoid poverty in their households. Since evidence has shown in the case of the three communities in Maseru that female-headed households are not significantly different from the male-headed households in their poverty status, it appears that women were able survive through income generated from small informal businesses such as brewing and selling beer. This helps us understand poverty among female-headed and male-headed households where women can manage to evade poverty in their households. According to Chant (2004), the important thing is to look at how women manage to evade the status of the “poorest of the poor”.

## **Conclusion**

The chapter observed that a typical extended household in Maseru revolved around strong intertwined economic and personal intra-household relationships that shaped day-to-day life. Members lived together and considered themselves as one unit sharing the available resources (Gill, 1993; Guy, 1987 and Mothibe, 2002). However, this traditional household evolved from the 19<sup>th</sup> century and over the past 25 years of rapid urbanization changed to new urban household and lost elements of co-residence, co-operative labour, joint consumption, reproduction and distribution of earnings that characterized such a household. This means that the structure of the traditional Basotho household has changed, with new types of households in the urban areas of Maseru today. The existing households are fluid, as their boundaries and composition continue changing due to the current global influences including urbanization. The changes in urban household structure in the three areas, Thibella, Motimposo and Sekamaneng, have made households vulnerable to increased poverty. The changes in the political economy of Lesotho and different forms of urbanization in Maseru, together with other factors, have influenced household restructuring and created different types of households resulting in increased urban household poverty. The urban household took three main forms, the immigrant household that resulted from rural-urban migration, the tenant household also due to migration and the household of an original inhabitant who had experienced urban encroachment. However, these took several forms. For example, some were extended households, some nuclear, others with single parents (Table 6.1). Despite the differences between these areas, where Thibella is close to the city centre, Motimposo is on

the periphery but close to the city and Sekamaneng is a peri-urban community in Maseru, and differences in the household headship with male and female heads, all the sampled households were poorer than they were before. Several internal and external factors contributed to changes in the household structure leading to vulnerability and poverty. Many of these households lacked capabilities, hence were unable to function to engage in any meaningful livelihood strategy and survive on their own. Rather, they had to rely on social networks, which in many cases were not sustainable, and meagre social welfare benefits provided by the state without any significant impact on poverty (see details in chapter 7).

There are no significant distinctions between the households in the three areas in their poverty as they are all experiencing these structural reformations influenced by both the internal and external factors, including migrant labour system and the decline in agriculture, which increased rural-urban migration. People continuously move because they are poor, bringing instability to their former households and resulting in new forms of households. Consequently, Thibella, Sekamaneng and Motimposo areas and Maseru today do not have a typical extended household, which used to exist before the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Nonetheless, how did these households in the three urban communities survive under these conditions of abject poverty? The next chapter discusses livelihood strategies of these poor households.



## **CHAPTER 7**

### **URBAN LIVELIHOODS AS COPING STRATEGIES AGAINST VULNERABILITY AND POVERTY**

#### **Introduction**

In the previous chapter it was argued that several factors such as rapid urbanization since the mid-1980s, economic decline and social distress contributed to the destabilisation of households in Maseru. Following Moser (1996), it was shown how households were thus rendered more vulnerable to poverty. Several internal and external factors impacted on the household structure, which also influenced the change in livelihoods of these households. This chapter proceeds from this basis to analyze whether and how these households were able to mobilize livelihoods or survival strategies to cope with these conditions of vulnerability and poverty.

The particular forms of urbanization in Maseru have generated different kinds of vulnerabilities in poor households by unsettling and modifying their livelihoods. These vulnerabilities are manifested in the features of these households. The chapter mainly argues that these processes made some of the livelihoods unavailable and others unsustainable, leaving them in a vicious poverty cycle. The main trends of the country's employment have had an influence on household employment and poverty in Maseru. The continually declining levels of employment in the country due to retrenchment from the mines and the manufacturing industries have contributed significantly to household vulnerability. The formal employment option for the poor is to engage in contractual low wage paying jobs without job security and terminal benefits, making them more vulnerable. The income is too low to enable savings to allow asset accumulation. Assets are important in reducing vulnerability and poverty among poor households (Moser, 1996 and Moser et al, 1997) and the chapter further shows that poor households in Thibella, Sekamaneng and Motimposo are more vulnerable without assets from which to derive livelihood. With increasing urbanization, they have lost their land which had historically formed a very crucial component to their livelihood: they used it for food production. Moreover, housing, from

which livelihood was derived through rent and other productive activities, was insecure due to unpredictable evictions, leaving the poor vulnerable.

The chapter discusses how poor households have coped with poverty. For instance, the informal sector served as an improvising survival mechanism for some poor households to suppress “economic and social distress”, allowing them to meet basic needs and thus avoid destitution. Some relied on social security. However, in developing countries, social transfers have rarely been adequate to meet the basic needs of the poor mostly the aged (Sharma, 1986 and ILO, 1984).

The research draws on several studies on livelihoods (Ellis, 2000; Bebbington, 1999; Chambers and Conway, 1992; Rakodi, 1999, 2000 and Murray, 2001). A widespread acknowledgement of these studies is that at the most elementary level livelihood is about the ways and means of making a living. Chambers and Conway (1992, in Carney, 1998:4) argue that a livelihood encompasses the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. Livelihood deals with people, their resources and what they do with these resources. Livelihoods revolve around resources (such as land, crops, seeds, labour, knowledge, cattle, money, social relationships), which all give meaning to the person’s world, but these resources cannot be disconnected from the issues and problems of access and changing political, economic and socio-cultural circumstances (Murray, 2001 and Bebbington, 1999). Ellis and Rakodi both support this, arguing that livelihoods are about assets that can be utilized directly or indirectly, to generate the means of survival of households or to sustain their material well-being at different levels above survival. Assets are not simply resources that people use in building livelihoods but they are also assets that give them the capability to act (Rakodi 1999 and Ellis, 2000).

Two studies conducted in Lesotho, *Poverty mapping exercise in Lesotho* by Sechaba Consultants (1999-2000) and *The national survey of poverty and Livelihoods in Lesotho* by CARE Lesotho (2001), which identified what constitutes a livelihood and the major factors influencing livelihoods in Lesotho, formed the framework of analysis of livelihoods in Maseru. The Poverty mapping exercise in Lesotho study was part of a larger process of grasping the dynamics of poverty and understanding how Basotho combine new variations of livelihood portfolios in a rapidly changing environment. There was a need to link up with other studies such as the on-going Care International poverty and livelihoods study. Sechaba Consultants adapted the Care International model on sustainable livelihoods to the conditions

of Lesotho. These studies both used the Sustainable Livelihood Framework but Sechaba Consultants made modifications and used a quantitative measure. The Sustainable Livelihood Framework recognizes the necessity to investigate the relationships between different activities that constitute household livelihoods which implies the capabilities, assets (material and social) and activities which are available to poor men and women which together make a living (Sen, 1992; Chambers, 1995; UNDP, 1999 and Murray, 2001). The Care model begins with assets in a household and quantifies these in terms of four variables, first the household worth, that is, the monetary value that can be assigned to physical items in the household which include trees, fields, utilities, domestic assets, annual income and savings. The second variable consists of capabilities in the household for moving forward, including wage earners, education of children, ownership of formal business, active and healthy household members, and the ability to hire workers. Third is the accessibility of the household members, including physical infrastructure, communications and personal contacts with the outside world. Fourth is the list of assets in the environment which include water. The Care model also looks at shocks and stresses, which Sechaba Consultants was not able to measure but only included several elements to the category including loss of income and harvest, deaths, denial of loans, permanent departure of members and various types of violence against household members. The adaptation reflects not only the situation on the ground in the country but also the availability of data from a 1999 household survey used to create quantitative variables. In addition, Sechaba developed a quantitative measure for activities which the household engages in, referred to as choices: use of clinics, attendances at school, seeking work, moving temporarily out of the household, seeking loans, actively planting crops or caring for livestock and spending money on household goods and productive activities. All these categories were assigned values. The survey further evaluated the strategies which people used to establish the extent to which the strategies were put in practice by people.

The two studies identified livelihoods as assets in the form of human capital, social capital and economic capital (land, income, skills, capabilities and education, assets, food security and health). They argue that all these form a critical part of human survival in Lesotho. The Care International study further found migration, retrenchments, large families to feed, long-term illness and deaths in the household, scarcity of piece jobs and desertion by breadwinner/spouse as potential threats to these livelihoods (Turner, 2001). Furthermore, they also revealed situations that make livelihoods unsustainable. Among these are political contexts that are largely unfavourable, economic contexts that have been problematic over

the years, socio-cultural contexts where certain strengths on which livelihoods draw are now fragmenting and access to infrastructure being enjoyed by non-indigent populations (Gay, et al, 1999-2000 and Turner, 2001). Lesotho's historical economic weakness and political problems are arguably the overarching causes of unsustainable livelihoods. It is on this framework that the analysis on livelihoods in Maseru is based. I wanted to use some of their model on livelihoods but to apply them to the specific urban environment of this study. This comparative study on Maseru specifically assesses how rapid growth of the city affected livelihoods of poor households in these three urban communities and how this led to households' vulnerability, adopting some of the measures of livelihoods (land and assets) from these two studies. Moreover, this thesis provides an update of these reports, with particular reference to poor households and Maseru as the capital city. The study adopted new additional measures of livelihoods drawn from the Asset Vulnerability Framework by Moser (1996). These include employment, housing, social networks, inter-household and community relationships, rural-urban links, social transfers and the informal sector. The subsequent sections discuss, first, employment, second, assets (land and housing), third, social networks, fourth, rural-urban linkages, welfare benefits and last informal sector employment as livelihood and survival means for poor urban households in the Thibella, Motimposo and Sekamaneng communities in Maseru.

### **Employment as a livelihood for the poor**

From the literature, employment/labour is an asset which contributes to household survival and asset accumulation (Moser 1996 and Moser et al, 1997). It is therefore of prime importance in that if accessible it minimizes vulnerability in poor households. As chapter 6 has indicated, one common feature of poor households in Maseru is lack of employment. Households that are affected by unemployment experience limited income options and are consequently exposed to high levels of poverty. In order to show how formal jobs served as a livelihood to the poor urban households in these areas, background to formal employment in African cities and Lesotho is discussed. I do this particularly to show how the main trends of the country's employment situation had an influence on household employment and poverty in Maseru. This is done in order to comprehend the importance of formal employment as a livelihood in an urban household particularly in Thibella, Sekamaneng and Motimposo in Maseru.

Formal employment as the main source of sustainable household income has been in decline in African countries since independence. The early 1970s experienced a decline in economic performance as a result of the first OPEC oil crisis in 1973. The slowdown in economic growth led to a decline in income in various sectors of the economy including the public sector. As a result, the share of government spending as a percentage of GDP declined slightly during this period. To continue the trend of government expansion, oil-importing countries embarked on heavy borrowing. A similar oil crisis in 1978 and declining world prices for primary commodity exports of Africa along with domestic policy deficiencies led to further economic decline in the period 1980s and 1990s (De Lancey, 2007:121).

As the economic crisis of the late 1970s reached ‘almost cataclysmic proportions’ in the 1980s, most African states were forced into structural adjustment loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The conditions of such loans required countries to reorder society by adjusting the structure of economic relationships (Gordon, 2007:87). While the stabilization programmes of earlier post- independence years achieved successful monetary, fiscal, and trade policies without economic restructuring, structural adjustment programs in the developing world during the 1980s and early 1990s were associated with the adoption of free-market policies as a condition for international assistance. For example, the 1980s is regarded internationally as the decade of privatization. From the middle of the 1970s, worldwide sales of state enterprises reached a record total of over \$185 billion by the end of the 1980s. Although the public enterprise sector expanded in most countries during much of the post-World War II period, this sector contracted or remained the same in most countries during the 1980s, principally due to privatization policies. Since 1980, worldwide sales of Public Sector Enterprises (PSEs) have risen faster. In 1990, governments worldwide sold off \$25 billion in PSEs. Total sales increased to \$69 billion in 1992 and exceeded \$175 billion over the period 1990 to 1993. Assets of privatized entities were projected to exceed \$600 billion by the year 2000 (Guseh, 2001:1).

At the outset, structural adjustment policies had major impacts on urban areas which rulers often pacified by subsidizing foodstuffs. Deregulating agricultural prices caused food costs to rise dramatically. In the major cities where little food is grown for personal use, price increases for such staples as rice, flour and meal were often devastating. While the vast urban population made up largely of nonsalaried, underemployed or unemployed poor felt the full effect of structural adjustment austerity; lower-and middle-range government employees

were also affected substantially. Across the continent opposition to food prices was especially bitter and led to demonstrations and riots in many countries (Gordon, 2007 and De Lancey, 2007).

Furthermore, due to the structural adjustment, which created shortages of imported materials, reduced investment and led to declining effective demand, the urban-based manufacturing suffered badly. Although large-scale manufacturing enterprises have created an impressive volume of jobs in the newly industrialized countries of Asia and Latin America, they have generated only a relatively small number of employment opportunities in urban Africa. While the size of the public sector has been growing, the rate of economic growth has been slow. A broad overview of the economy of Africa shows that the average annual rate of economic growth was over 10 percent in the 1960s and declined to below 2 percent in the 1970s and 1980s. During the 1980s, most of the national economies were in a state of near or partial collapse. Over the period 1990 to 1998, annual rate of economic growth averaged slightly over 2 percent. In 1990-93 the average annual growth rate per capita was negative (-0.4 percent). The growth rates in the 1980s and 1990s were below the average annual rates of population growth of 5 percent and 3 percent, respectively. As a result of the declining rate of economic growth African countries are increasingly reducing the size of the public sector and are turning to market-oriented reforms (Rondinelli and Kasarda, 1993; Gilbert, 1994; Guseh, 2001 and De Lancey, 2007). The downturn in large-scale manufacturing has affected even the most dynamic industrial agglomeration in Africa, Gauteng, South Africa's economic heartland. Underpinning this downturn has been a combination of factors including a decline in mining, cut-backs in military production and the consequences of excessive decentralization programmes that encouraged the outflow of labour-intensive production activities such as the clothing and textiles manufacture (Rogerson and Rogerson, 1994 and Rogerson, 1995a), rather than structural adjustment. More recently, a few regions have registered impressive growth, but unemployment remains stubbornly high.

The public sector has not been an important source of formal employment since the mid-1960s especially in cities. Under adjustment programmes, civil service reform has meant an end to expansion of public sector employment, which could have served as a form of welfare system during periods of economic downturn. Instead, public sector reform in several African countries has precipitated substantial layoffs in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly in the lower echelons, effecting a downturn in urban jobs. Alongside this general decline in the public

sector across Africa, there has been a sharp fall in modern sector wages in urban areas (ILO, 1992; Hodd, 1993; Barwa, 1995 and ILO, 2000). The impact of these trends in employment is noted in Maputo, Abidjan, Nairobi, Abuja and Lagos (Assuncuo, 1993 and Rogerson, 1995a). Even South African cities are part of this continental trend owing to restructuring. During the period 1996-2004, each of the nine cities demonstrated some level of employment growth. However, these rates of growth have been deemed to be well below what is required, considering the high levels of unemployment that characterize South Africa as a whole (ILO, 2012:13) . According to Quantec data cited by the South African Cities Network (SACN) (2006), unemployment rates in the nine cities declined from 28.2 percent in 2001 to 26.7 percent in 2004. In 2005, it was estimated that 44.5 percent of national unemployment was concentrated in the country's nine largest cities (SACN, 2006:3-17).

ILO records indicate increasing unemployment in African urban areas. They note that unemployment is creeping up the education ladder, with even university graduates now being affected. The worst levels of unemployment however are among the urban youth, who are said to constitute 60-75 percent of the unemployed though they account for only one-third of the labour force. The consequences of globalization on the formal economies of Africa's cities have therefore been devastating. Adjustment and economic restructuring have produced major changes in urban economies and the urban labour market since 1980. The security of regular wage employment has declined and as a result the distinctions between employment conditions in the formal and informal economies of cities have become progressively blurred. With the erosion or slow growth of the formal economy, large numbers of people have moved into either self-employment or casual wage employment or have to supplement formal sector wages with income generated from informal sector activity. This has produced the widely noted phenomenon of the informalization of the urban economy in Africa (ILO, 1994a; ILO, 2000 and ILO, 2012). Lesotho as part of sub-Saharan Africa is not excluded from these experiences.

Several factors have impeded growth of formal employment including weak economic performance in Lesotho as noted in Chapters 3. The decline in remittances from the mining employment in South Africa on which many households depended since the colonial period and the decline in agricultural production over the years affected income levels of many households in Lesotho especially those in rural areas. Consequently there was increasing rural-urban migration (Thabane, 2002 and Crush et al, 2005).

Within the country, migrants worked in urban centres in construction, domestic service and in the textile industry getting minimal wages which have not been able to sustain them adequately. Table 7.1 indicates the participation rates of female and males in the formal sector from 1996 to 2001. The employment rates for males were higher than those of their female counterparts. However, the data displayed in the table suggests that over the years the employment rate seems to be decreasing. There was an observed drastic decline in participation of females from 1999 to 2001 (Bureau of Statistics of Lesotho Labour Survey Report, 2008) when the manufacturing sector employment declined, mostly due to the 1998 political turmoil that caused industrialists/employers to flee the country.

The garment industry has been one of the main sources of economic growth in Lesotho since the 1990s (Table 7.1) and created a large number of jobs predominantly for female labour force. In 2003, 43 firms with 43 000 employees (90 percent being women) were reported to operate in the industry. The industry employed an estimate of 54 000 workers in 2004 but in 2005 the figure declined to about 40 000 workers (Bennet, 2006). This indicates a significant fall in employment in the Lesotho's garment and textile industry further indicating likelihood of an increase in poverty in households which depended on income derived from this sector. Moreover, the industry pays low wages of M/R660.00 per month, only higher than the wage of the domestic servant, which is M/R210. Other sectors pay above M/R660, like a watchman getting M/R863 per month (GOL Economic Review Report, 2005).

**Table 7.1: Performance in Manufacturing, 1997-2003**

Industry	Employment	Wages and Salaries
Manufacturing of food/beverages	5%	16%
Manufacturing of textiles and clothing	79%	66%
Manufacturing of leather and footwear	11%	11%
All other manufacturing	5%	7%
Total	100%	100%


Source: Bureau of Statistics, Lesotho Report No 21:2003 February 2004



The downsizing of the public sector as part of implementation of SAPs caused many households to lose income. The layoffs and the reduction of salaries and wages further affected the economy. It led to the reduction of household income pulling many households below the poverty line. There was and still is continuing massive migration of professionals to other countries and this drains the country's human capital. The labour force keeps on increasing with the graduates not absorbed by the labour market, further showing the adverse position of the economy. This has resulted in increased poverty in Lesotho (GOL Economic Review Report, 2005).

Subsistence farming remains the mainstay of Lesotho, where 40.6 percent of the self-employed population aged 15 years and above are engaged. The private sector is the second highest employer constituting 30.0 percent, while private households (domestic work) are the third highest with a representation of 22.2 percent. The government with 5.5 percent and the parastatals with an estimated representation of 1.6 percent absorb very low proportions of the population. Figure 7.1 indicates the current employment in the sectors of the economy. The unemployment rate rose from 15.0 percent in 2001 to 22.5 percent in 2009 (Bureau of Statistics of Lesotho Labour Survey Report, 2009).

**Figure 7.1: Employment by Sectors of the Economy in 2009**



Source: Bureau of Statistics of Lesotho Labour Survey Report, 2009.

One of the primary causes of the increase in unemployment was the retrenchment from the mines. The number of migrant mineworkers declined from 2.8 percent to 2.3 percent of the total employment in 2009. The mining sector in South Africa, the largest employer of male Basotho labour force, has been under considerable pressure since the last quarter of 2008. Although the prices of gold and platinum have remained relatively strong in the study's review period, the long-term trend of mineworkers' employment has been downward. In Rand terms, the price of gold declined in the third quarter of 2008, squeezing the companies' profits and revenue and continuing the stress of the labour market (Central Bank of Lesotho Quarterly Report, 2009). Most mining companies continue to shed jobs, thus presenting a challenge to the employment picture of the Lesotho labour market due to its close labour market linkages with South Africa.

It appeared from the survey that households used to earn income from employment in the mines in South Africa - 20 percent of households from Sekamaneng, 7.5 percent from Motimposo and 7.5 percent from Thibella - but were retrenched (Field Survey, 2009). Pascalis Sello, Mokete Maritints'i, Tapole Litaba, Lefela Sepinare, Moqebi Lelaka are some of the former mine workers in the Sekamaneng area who were at home during this survey. Lelaka stated, "I was employed in South African mines and I sent money home for family survival. However, in 1983 I was retrenched from the mines" (Interview, Moqebi Lelaka, January, 2009). This is not surprising, in that the labour in the mines which formed the largest part of Lesotho's economy is continually being retrenched (Cobbe, 2004, Global Policy Network, 2004 and Central Bank, 2005 and Bureau of Statistics, 2007) affecting the country negatively and leading to the current state of serious poverty. While the Government of Lesotho (2004) estimated that about half of the income of poor households came from family members working in the mines and other employment in South Africa, this income has been declining over the years from retrenchment.

Employment levels in the country have also been declining over the years. In the period 1996 to 1999, 73.7 percent of males and 26.4 percent of females were in employment compared to only 49.4 percent of males and 23.9 percent females in 1999 to 2001 (Bureau of Statistics of Lesotho Labour Survey Report, 2008). This sharp decline in employment was due to the economic crisis that affected the country from 1998 when the economy registered a negative four percent growth. The following year there was an improvement but even then the economy stagnated. Consequently, there were even fewer work opportunities than before. The reflection of the employment situation beyond 2001 is not possible due to unavailability

of published data. The employment in the manufacturing sector as well has been declining as indicated in chapter 3.

Lesotho has experienced declining levels of employment for a protracted period. This is evident from the three urban communities of Thibella, Motimposo and Sekamaneng. The main sectors of formal employment for the poor households in these areas included domestic work, factory work and contract work, cleaning work and catering. In Sekamaneng, 5 percent of all households were employed in domestic work, 15 percent in Motimposo and 5 percent in Thibella. About 2.5 percent of all households in each of Sekamaneng and Motimposo worked in the factories and 10 percent from Thibella. 2.5 percent of all households from Sekamaneng worked on contracts in South Africa and 5 percent from Thibella. Only 2.5 percent of all households from Thibella worked as night watchmen. The category only occurs in one location. Again only 2.5 percent of households from Thibella worked in a catering company from Thibella. There was a similar trend in the three communities where 5 percent of households in each community had members who worked as cleaners in the Municipality. From these figures, it appears that less than 30 percent of adults were employed. This is indicative of increased unemployment among the poor (Field Survey, 2009). The nature of work in these sectors is such that people are often employed on a casual basis and paid at an hourly rate especially in factories and in contract work. The wages they are getting are too low to sustain the household as they are overburdened by living costs making the households to live in a severe poverty cycle. Employers only stick to the minimum wages without any increment, as this cheap labour is one of the incentives given to them to invest in the country. As examples of the inadequacy of these wages, for a factory worker living in Motimposo, earning M/R 660.00 per month, her average expenditure is a monthly rent at M/R 150.00 for a single room in *malaene* – a terrain of single line rooms for renting, transport at M/R 120.00 per month, domestic worker at M/R 150.00 per month for those who have small children and the rest on food which is also costly. Often times these workers are seen walking long distances to and from the industrial area daily to save the transport money for other household necessities. This tradeoff between walking and saving means a considerable hardship where one does not have an alternative even during harsh weather conditions like winter. Moreover, inflation is high at 8.5 percent (International Monetary Fund 2009 Economic Outlook), worsening poverty among these poor households. High levels of unemployment make it impossible for the poor to accumulate sustainable means of livelihoods, particularly assets.

### **Assets as means of livelihood for the poor**

Assets form an important component of livelihood. According to Rakodi and Lloyd-Jones (2002:6), livelihoods involve multiple activities in which households engage to ensure their survival and improve their well-being. Poor urban families respond to poverty through several strategies. Faced with stress or risks, households devise coping strategies. Assets remain important in reducing vulnerability and poverty among poor households. They are not just a means through which a person makes a living but also give a meaning to the person's world. These are not simply resources that people use in building livelihoods but more importantly, they give them the capability to act (Bebbington, 1999:20-22). Ellis (2000:13) identifies assets as natural capital (land), physical capital (buildings), human capital (labour, skills, education and health), financial capital (stock of money, access to credits) and social capital (community and wider social networks). People's ability to alleviate poverty and fulfil their various needs depends on their access to assets. In this study, land and housing were chosen to assess the livelihoods of poor households in Thibella, Motimposo and Sekamaneng communities. This was mainly because traditionally land has been the most crucial asset from which livelihoods were generated. Housing was chosen based on the argument that it provides households with an alternative range of strategies to reduce poverty where it is accessible and there is security of tenure (Moser et al, 1997). In exposing the level of poverty among these households and how land served as their livelihood, the discussion starts with a broad description of land ownership in Africa and Lesotho in order to understand the significance of land as an asset and a means of livelihood.

### **Land as an asset and livelihood**

Land is an important asset that can cushion the poor against poverty. It serves to generate livelihood in terms of agricultural productivity and sometimes through income generation from leasing it out for other productive activities. But where there is insecurity of tenure along with lack of ownership, this increases the vulnerability of poor households. The land administration determines the security of tenure in many African countries.

In most of sub-Saharan Africa, despite considerable variations, pre-colonial land tenure was based on the concept that ownership of land belonged to a community (clan, lineage, family), the head of which held it in trust and administered it on behalf of the group's ancestors, its currently living members and members yet to be born. All adult members of the community had rights to use the land, although these user rights varied with status, gender and other community values. The head of the group had the right and responsibility to allocate unused

land and arbitrate in disputes, and the usufruct rights were inheritable. Variations in the system arose from factors such as political structures, types of agriculture and rules of succession (Rakodi, 1997). Lesotho followed a similar land ownership system.

An important feature of the customary land tenure system in Lesotho was the “right of avail” that was automatically shared by all people, rich and poor, who accepted the authority of a chief. This right did not depend on the discretion of the chief or the wealth of the applicant. He was required to provide residential, arable and grazing land for all his subjects. A tribesman was entitled to land without giving anything for it, but he had a duty to protect and conserve it. Although the concept of individual ownership was unknown, the rights to residential land were exclusive and permanent. The holder could protect his rights by civil action against any person, even the chief. These customary rights are reflected in the system of land allocation provided for under the Land Act of 1979 which has been mediated by local committees such as Village Development Councils (VDCs) and Community Councils, with the assistance of chiefs. In urban areas, the long-standing government policy position has been that, under the Land Act 1979, all land is to be converted to leasehold at the point of transfer or other transaction. Land administration in Maseru is not distinct from the rest of the country. The Land Act 1979 is the principal law governing tenure relations and the administration of land held under Customary Law. Most people occupy and use land in accordance with the principles and practices of customary tenure. Traditionally, chiefs on behalf of the King administered the law (Laws of Lerotholi, 1959 and Land Act 1979). However, as from the 1980s the system was modified, with institutions of local land administration together with more central guidance and supervision (Local Government Act 1997 and 2004). However, these attempts were not without problems. Overall, the land reform process has been slow and difficult. This has led to current land tenure practices where chiefs still use their traditional powers in allocating land, when such role is now entrusted to the new local governance councils. These practices are unfavourable to the achievement of food security in the country as chiefs continue to endorse transfers of land including agricultural land between individuals who use such land for settlements. In urban and peri-urban areas, the poor administration of land in these areas is hindering smooth implementation of initiatives for proper land use planning affecting livelihoods and improvement of food security (Leduka, 2004 and Mokitimi, 2006). With regard to women, land-related laws discriminating against women have been repealed. Women are now entitled to own land and to register it in their own names just like men. Those married are

given access to land and all resources as married women's own rights (Equal Married Persons Act, 2000). This has improved the conditions of women by allowing them access to land from which they are able to generate various kinds of livelihoods. For example, 'Mapalesa Lesia who lived in Thibella as a tenant had land in Lithoteng area on which she built her house with the income she saved from selling beer. She had rented out the house to earn extra money (Field Survey, 2009). It is important to mention that the sale of communal land in Maseru is increasing with urbanization leading to loss of land used for livelihood generation. Consequently, the poor are exposed to the risk of increased poverty.

With the rapid growth of population in Maseru, the traditional tenure is impracticable, as is evidenced by the growth of informal settlements. Individuals sell land with chiefs endorsing such transfers. Thus, Maseru has had very poor land-use planning measures, like the rest of the country, characterized by unplanned human settlements as is the case with Ha Leqele and Lower Thamae (see Chapter 4, p.139 and 141). Many settlements in these areas are on the 9 percent arable land of the country, further decreasing its potential for agricultural production. For example, most of the land at Ha Leqele that was used for agricultural productivity in the past, has now been converted into settlements. These areas are overcrowded making it difficult for the municipality to provide basic infrastructure like roads. The overcrowding makes them vulnerable to high-risk environmental and health problems.

According to the results of this study, 82 percent of households in Sekamaneng and 67.5 percent of households in Motimposo still own land, while in Thibella only 15 percent of households own land. Most of this land has been used for settlement. Most of the agricultural land was sold. Less than 1 percent of households still used land for agricultural purpose in Sekamaneng. Tapole, a resident of Sekamaneng, retained a piece of agricultural land which, however, produced little to sustain the family (Field Survey, 2009). The study findings indicate that 82 percent of households in Sekamaneng and 67.7 percent in Motimposo lost land initially used for subsistence farming due to several reasons: they sold it to immigrants, or government repossessed it. Those who sold land used the money for household consumption needs only, no investment was made for the future and thus they were unable to meet their basic food requirements as well as other necessities. From the study results, it was established that 'Malosia Litaba, aged 69 years from Sekamaneng, sold her land that she used to cultivate in the past. She sold the land because there was no income in the family to spend on basic needs, particularly when her husband died leaving her behind with children to look

after, but she had spent all the money (Field Survey, 2009). Fifty one year old ‘Mampolokeng Khoele who lived in Sekamaneng explains how her family sold their land:

Since 1980, the landscape in Sekamaneng started to change. Many fields were sold to new settlers who have built big mansions now. My husband got retrenched from the mines, we had to sell our agricultural land too. But we used all the money. Today we solely rely on our children to give us money every month which is not sufficient to cater for our everyday needs

(Interview, ‘Mampolokeng Khoele, January, 2009).

The two mentioned cases are representative of the poor households, indicating the sale of land initially used as a livelihood to generate income to meet other basic needs. However, the income was not sustainable, as income was not saved for investment to enable further development of more sustainable livelihoods. These poor households thus became more vulnerable.

According to the traditional land tenure system in Lesotho, every citizen is entitled to free land holding. This explains why in the two communities, peripheral to the city centre, we have a large number of people owning land for settlement, people born in the areas as well as immigrants who bought the land. ‘Mats’epo Sebotsa from Sekamaneng had settled on agricultural land that used to provide livelihood for some people, but had been disposed of for settlement. She stated, “In the past, there were fields all over, now even this house is built on the agricultural land, my son bought it and he was a new settler in this area” (Interview, ‘Mats’epo Sebotsa, January 2009).

The sale of agricultural land also affected community members who relied on agriculture for their livelihood. Land provided livelihood for both households which owned land and those who did not have any land. During farming seasons, people who had no land worked for money and food grain for those who owned the land. Mokete Maritints’i from Sekamaneng community used to farm with people who had land (sharecropping) but he had stopped after the owners of land sold it to people who built their homes (Field Survey, 2009). ‘Mapoloko Lefaphana (56) who also lived in Sekamaneng stated:

Before 1980 we used to work in the nearby fields and could feed our families. The production was sufficient to sustain the family. Even us

who had no fields could survive well because we used to work in the fields of those who had them and got cash in kind (harvest) for payment (Interview, 'Mapoloko Lefaphana, January 2009).

'Mazulu (66) living in the same area of Sekamaneng also pointed out, "In the past we engaged in agriculture. Those who had no fields like me, we engaged in sharecropping (*Lihalefote*). Urbanization has impoverished us. The land we used to work on is sold out to new settlers" (Interview, 'Mazulu Zulu, January 2009). In addition, 'Matsietsi (birth date unknown) from Motimposo, also confirmed that they depended on land for their livelihood:

In past there was vast agricultural land in Motimposo, we used to work in those fields weeding for cash or food from the owners. However, in the 1980s land started disappearing because of migrants occupying the land. Today Motimposo is an area with no land left idling, there are houses everywhere mostly houses for tenants (*Malaene*) build purely for commercial purposes by the owners of that land. That loss of agricultural land has made us to rely on cash economy where even it is not easy to generate cash to buy commodities. For instance, since I am not working I have to fetch wild vegetables from people's gardens and sell them in order to get some money to survive. A few people sometimes assist me by giving little money and maize flour for us to eat at times of hardships (Interview, 'Matsietsi Khatebe, February 2009).

Some respondents also indicated that they sold their land when they heard that the government was going to take it once their area becomes part of the city. 'Mampolokeng, a resident in Sekamaneng, pointed out that she disposed of her land used for agricultural production because she heard that the government intended to take the land for development purposes (Interview, 'Mampolokeng Khoele, January, 2009).

In cases where landowners did not sell their land, the government repossessed the land during expansion of city boundaries without any compensation. The poor lost their livelihood on which they depended exposing them to vulnerability and poverty. Moqebi Lelaka (69) living in Sekamaneng asserted that his agricultural land was repossessed by government and converted into a burial place without any compensation. He lost a 6 hectare plot on which he used to cultivate food for his household (Field Survey, 2009). He stated that he could not feed his household sufficiently as he only relied on food he purchased from stores and this was dependent on whether he had money.



The examples given here serve to expose how disposing of land that provided livelihood for many people in Sekamaneng and Motimposo has left the poor desperate as they do not have enough to eat with their families. As the examples show, they were all poor, whether an immigrant such as 'Mats'epo or a resident such as Mokete. This means that with urbanization, the vulnerability of already poor households increased due to loss of physical capital (land), hence poverty increased among this group. The main argument here is that the disposal of land that served as an asset and a livelihood for the poor in Sekamaneng and Motimposo through sales has not only eroded the poor's assets but also their capability to act towards fulfilling other basic needs, increasing their vulnerability. Livelihood is about using assets as a means for a living (Chambers and Conway, 1992). But urbanization has completely changed the land use in these communities where land that provided livelihood through agriculture is used for settlements. The situation does not differ from other experiences in urban Africa where traditionally owned land that provided livelihoods was disposed of through sale (see O'Connor, 1983; Frishman, 1988; Mabogunje, 1993; Bruce, 1988, 2000; Lund, 2000; Platteau, 2000; Alden, 2003 and Cotula et al., 2004). Not only land was a crucial livelihood, but housing also formed an important form of livelihood for the poor in Maseru.

### **Housing as an asset and livelihood**

Housing can be an important asset that cushions households against severe poverty. Housing insecurity, along with a lack of employment opportunities, human capital endowments, and other assets, increases the vulnerability of the poor. Housing not only provides shelter, but is also a productive asset. It is a resource during times of economic adversity, when other sources of income are reduced. Homeowners often use their housing and land productively through home-based enterprises, raising income by renting part or all of their house, subdividing their plot, or, as a last resort, selling off their property (Moser, 1996 and Moser et al, 1997). In Maseru, there were different types of housing for different groups of people used differently by owners.

In this study, certain criteria were used to identify different types of housing factors, such as ownership and value. There are four types of housing: first, built by individuals who can afford the cost and mostly owned by high-income earners. Second, housing that is built out of less costly material but also owner financed and usually owned by middle to low-income households dependent on the ability to raise money for construction of such housing. The

third comprises housing made up of corrugated iron sheets known as 'shacks', usually owner constructed. It is owned by poor people who are in the low-income strata, some of whom want to escape rental accommodation while others have no option but have to pay ground rent to landlords to put up such housing. The last category is of rental units in longer terraces/lines, (*malaene*). Some of the housing is on land subdivisions acquired from chiefs or from individual sellers, Land for most of the high and some of the middle-income earners housing is acquired from land markets (e.g. Lesotho Housing Corporation (LHC)). Housing in Maseru has been shown to provide shelter and in some cases served to generate income (Field survey, 2009 and PRS, 2003). These categories are adopted to demonstrate that poor people in Maseru live in poor housing which cannot generate sustainable livelihood. Evidence indicates that the housing they occupied was used mainly for shelter and small productive activities generating little income for survival and not providing a livelihood. For example, those living in shacks used their housing for producing and selling home-brewed beer. This was the case with 'Mapalesa Lesia (48) who lived in a rented shack in Thibella. She claimed to have lived in Thibella for many years brewing and selling beer to generate money only sufficient to buy everyday necessities (Field Survey, 2009). This is contrary to the view that housing can be an asset for a livelihood on which one can claim support and sustenance during economic crisis (Moser, 1996 and Moser, et al, 1997) which cannot be the case with the poor in Maseru.

Housing and land in Maseru were mostly used by individual landowners and companies to generate income, a case which does not differ from experiences across the continent. Rakodi (1997) has observed that in Africa the increasingly commercialized process by which land previously held under indigenous tenure is disposed of, the markets that are developing in such land, and the processes of house production with which they are associated indicate that the traditional responsibilities of community leaders are gradually giving way to profit-making land practices. Opportunities are available for brokers with purely commercial aims and the process of illegal subdivision and house production on this land increasingly resembles that of land held under forms of individual tenure.

Housing provides households with an alternative range of strategies to reduce poverty. It can be used to protect against inflation, to transfer assets inter-generationally, and as a productive asset. Housing as an asset can be used as rental property, to produce food or raise livestock on the plot, or to run a commercial or small-scale manufacturing operation - in other words, a home-based enterprise. Poverty influences households' capacity to use housing productively,

with the better off having greatest potential to benefit from it (Moser et al, 1997). Evidence from the present study revealed that some people derived their livelihood from their housing in the three communities. 'Mamats'eliso who lived in Thibella confirmed: "I have these 7 shacks which I rent at M40.00 a month each, which I also survive on. I have also rented one room out of the two rooms of my house" (Interview, 'Mamats'eliso Moreke, March 2009). 'Mamohobelo Thoabela living in Motimposo also concurred, "I have these 5 rooms, 3 of them are rented out for M100.00 each" (Interview, 'Mamohobelo Thoabela, February 2009). Though these people were able to use their housing productively, thus generating income, the income was too little to cover all basic needs. For example, 'Mamats'eliso Moreke received monthly rent from tenants which she spent on health care for her household members. However, she indicated that the money was insufficient to cater for other basic needs including food. She further engaged in brewing and selling traditional beer to add to the income from rent (Field survey, 2009). Even with these extra activities to generate livelihood, the poor clearly remained poor.

Furthermore, some 27.5 percent of the poor households from Motimposo and 80 percent from Thibella did not possess any assets such as housing or land, as they were tenants. Thibella is different from the other two areas, with a large number of tenants living in rented accommodation. The poor who were renting used the rooms for both shelter and home-based production such as brewing and selling of beer (Field Survey, 2009). 'Manthabiseng who rented in Motimposo indicated, "I have rented this single room at M35.00 per month. I am not employed, I rely on brewing and selling beer, I find it still better than home because I have means to survive as I prepare and sell beer everyday here" (Interview, Manthabiseng Mohale, February 2009).

Home-based enterprises play an extremely important role in contributing to household income (Moser et al, 1997). 'Mats'epo from Motimposo also survived on income from sale of home-made beer. She indicated, "I have rented this single room at M60.00 a month, I live solely on selling of beer. The money I get helps me pay my debts, rent and buy food and other small items. I brew every time, it does not get finished I manage to make a living out of it" (Interview, 'Mats'epo Nkhema, February 2009). Nkoale Kou and 'Mamothepane Morie from Thibella also lived in a rented accommodation which they use for production of beer for survival (Field Survey, 2009). These case studies show that poor households also survived by using their rented housing productively as a coping strategy not as a livelihood. The strategy was volatile in that it depended on several factors, such as the availability of money to continue the stay, and to continue with the beer brewing activity. This as short-term coping strategy exposed these

poor households to vulnerability and therefore they were poor. The important point shown by the above examples is that rented accommodation, although unstable without security of tenure and subject to spontaneous evictions, still generated coping means through brewing by poor households.

In the same manner, housing tenure security remains important for people to maintain a stable sustainable livelihood (Moser, 1996 and Moser et al, 1997). However, these poor people did not have security of tenure, and were subject to eviction by their landlords at anytime they failed to pay rent. At the time of the survey in Thibella, Thabo Letsie was busy constructing a shack on another place after eviction by ‘Mamats’eliso Moreke from her land after failing to pay ground rent. Similarly, those in shacks were also subject to eviction by local authorities. Shacks in Maseru are often removed because they are considered to promote crime. However, it is important to note that a larger percentage of female-headed households rented out rooms (about 78 percent) than male headed households (about 2 percent), suggesting that room rental is an important survival mechanism for these families (Field Survey, 2009).

Access to land and the ability to build their own house remain important for households to be able to maintain a sustainable livelihood. The household can make investment or lease out such a property or engage in any productive activity. However, the poor cannot easily access land and housing through formal land markets. Prices in the land and housing markets are exorbitantly high in the case of Lesotho making it impossible for the poor to acquire either. For example, the Lesotho Housing Corporation (LHC) provides housing from a price of R400 000.00. LHC is the only company that sells housing in Maseru. It operates on a profit-making basis, hence it charges high prices for housing. It does not provide low-income housing. It sells plots from the cost of M/R15 000.00 in Maseru (Lesotho Housing Corporation, 2009). LHC operates as a profit-making organization, which does not target poor people. Consequently, these poor people have no option but to live in poor quality housing in order to pay less rent. Yet housing is a productive asset that can cushion households against severe poverty (Moser, 1996:44).

From the analysis made there were several factors responsible for lack of access to land and housing. Land that served as an asset and livelihood in the past in the three communities no longer served such a purpose. With the increasing pressure from urbanization, owners disposed of the land and lost their livelihood. On the other hand, insecurity of tenure of both land and housing has increased vulnerability among the poor. They have been unable to

access land and housing from the formal markets which offered these at a high cost. Most of the poor households lived in rented accommodation where they were unable to generate sustainable livelihoods. They were often subject to evictions from time to time from their accommodation. Even those who had access to housing resources could not have their livelihoods met as only little income was received, with little effect on their level of vulnerability. With this kind of life, the poor households relied on survival strategies. These are multiple strategies to survive and to reduce risk. Being unemployed or underemployed in government or the manufacturing sector, the poor are compelled to create some jobs for themselves. In Latin American and African cities they engage in income generation activities such as informal micro businesses, petty trading and domestic services (IFAD, 2010 and Nazeer, 2002). Some of them are forced to maintain social networks in the form of inter-household and community relations (Moser, 1996 and Moser et al, 1997) or their links to their kin residing in rural areas (Potts, 1997) in order to survive. They also rely on state welfare transfers, where these are available to reduce the risk (Sharma, 1986 and Kanji, 1993).

### **Inter-household and community relations as survival strategies**

Households can act as important safety nets during times of economic adversity. This role is reinforced by the strength of family and kinship ties in the community. Households are part of social institutions of families and their capacity to respond to changes in their changing environment depends on this social network (Moser, 1996 and Moser et al, 1997). Social networks refer to relationships people manage to establish and maintain as coping strategies. They may be with extended family, with other personal connections (friends, neighbours) who are in employment, with state, civil society and aid organizations. Often the poor have more restricted relations with only a small set of institutions and individuals (Paulo et al, 2007). Ellis (2000) further argues that wider social networks generate the means of survival of households and enable them to sustain their well-being at different levels of survival. The community can be an important asset to reduce vulnerability or to increase opportunities. However, the extent to which it actually is an asset depends on its "stock" of social capital, identified as the networks, norms, and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit (Putnam 1993a, 1993b). Studies show that inter-household and community level reciprocal relationships and social networks have been important means of survival. These include networks between rural and urban family members, kin and place of origin networks, and more recently formed networks in the urban community itself. Short-term

reciprocities, mainly of money, relating to crises such as death or illness, as well as longer-term reciprocity around childcare, food, water, and space have contributed to building trust and cooperation. In the same way that social capital has been identified as a precondition for economic development, so the stock of social capital may influence the capacity of communities to reduce vulnerability. Households link into communities in a virtuous-vicious circle, based on inter-household reciprocities. When households are coping, they support others, but when they themselves are depleted, they cease to support communities. Changes in trust, in notions and patterns of reciprocity, contribute to the changing stock of social capital (Moser 1996; Moser et al 1997 and Moser, 1998).

With the increasing urbanization in Maseru, households without social networks cannot easily survive, given that they are incapable of being self-sufficient as they are unable to work as resource systems. Despite differences among the three communities, this study's results show that social networks in the form of kin, neighbours and other contacts were survival means for the poor. A significant proportion of households in all three areas indicated some level of dependence on social networks. About 37.5 in Thibella, 25 in Sekamaneng and 35 percent in Motimposo depended on social networks (Field Survey, 2009). For example, 23 year old Rethabile, born and living in Sekamaneng, indicated, "We rely on neighbours for both social and economic support in times of difficulties mostly when we do not have food" (Interview, Rethabile Ts'osane, November 2008). This was also the case with Keneuoe Thoahlane's household, which was dependent on neighbours for assistance during difficult times (Field Survey, 2009). These examples indicate that social networks were a very important means of survival for poor households in Maseru. These social networks enabled the household members to acquire social and material resources in order to survive (Field Survey, 2009). Those in Motimposo and Thibella depended more on social networks with kin.

In Motimposo, an area on the periphery of the city, social networks with neighbours were non-existent for poor households. Findings of this research revealed that about 27.5 percent tenant immigrant households and 67.5 percent of households did not have social networks either as original residents or as tenant immigrants, even among members in their own group. They depended on their family from other areas. In the same way, about 80 percent of the tenant immigrant households in Thibella survived on rural-urban linkages/ social networks, as discussed in the latter section of this study, with kin residing in the countryside. In the Sekamaneng area there were also some households that did not have any social network. This

raises the question of what are the implications of lack of social networks on livelihood. The household of Mokete in the Sekamaneng community was an example of such households faced with hardships of coping with life it had no social networks, a situation which impacted on survival. Mokete, a 55 year old man, had worked in the mines in the past but was retrenched. His family depended on the availability of piece-jobs as their means of survival. He stated:

I have also lost my job. All the people in the house are not working. We depend on piece-jobs if they are available. We sometimes spend weeks without food in the house. The most unfortunate part is that people who live here do not know how to help each other. There is no employment, life is getting difficult each day, and I am getting poorer each day (Interview, Mokete Maritints'i, November 2008).

Findings of this research also show that with the increasing urbanization there is social fragmentation in the three communities, meaning that the interconnectedness, interhousehold and community relationships that existed before have disappeared (Field Survey, 2009). 'Mapoloko clearly indicates that community and interhousehold trust and collaboration that existed in the past have disappeared. She stated:

Before 1980 we used to work in the nearby fields and could feed our families. The production was sufficient to sustain the family. Even us who had no fields could survive well because we used to work in the fields of those who had them and got cash in kind for payment. Since 1980 we struggle for a living. We even cannot get support from neighbours around as used to be the case in the past, social networks we used to have are no more existing, people are now self-centred, every man for himself (Interview, 'Mapoloko Lefaphana, November 2009).

This indicates that the relationships between households and the community may be unfavourable and unsupportive for some households so that they may find their poverty worsened, as they have no supporting networks from the community or other individuals. They also do not have an ability to mobilize sufficient resources that can assist them even in times of hardships (Field Survey, 2009). In the absence of supporting networks, poor

households in Sekamaneng, Thibella and Motimposo depended on rural-urban linkages for survival.

### **Household and rural-urban linkages**

Rural-urban linkages are important survival strategies of the urban poor households. According to Potts (1997), African urban residents have long maintained strong social and economic links with their rural home areas, although the nature of those links has varied over time due to changing economic and political circumstances. The recent era of severe economic decline and structural adjustment has made such linkages significant. The trend prevailing in urban areas in Africa is that urban incomes are persistently declining, devastating household welfare. The income levels have become too low to allow households to even feed themselves, let alone cover other necessary costs, such as housing and transport to work, or vital welfare expenditure on health, education, or clothing (Potts and Mutambirwa, 1990; Mabin, 1990; Andreasen, 1990 and Jamal and Weeks, 1993).

With rapid urbanization, however, rural-urban links have become significant through exchange of goods, services and people for the development of both rural and urban areas alike. The economic aspects are associated with livelihoods and production, and encompass various kinds of resource flow – principally labour, natural resources, commodities, and financial flows (Baker and Pedersen, 1992). There is an exchange of raw materials and finished or semi-finished goods, whose sources are found in rural areas and urban areas respectively. At the level of the household, evidence suggests that most rural dwellers maintain close links with their urban relatives and *vice versa* in exchange of goods and services, money, food stuff and other material needed for survival. It applies to most income groups, although the intensity of interaction is probably greater among the poor (Tacoli, 1998; de Haan, 1999; Jerve, 2001). Furthermore, this involves children who stay with relatives where food is more easily accessible and life more tranquil. Undoubtedly, this is particularly reinforced by urban households' desperate need for food: people at home can grow food, some of which can supplement urban sources, as noted for Uganda by Jamal and Weeks (1993) and for Zambia by Mulenga (1991).

Many households pursue a circular migration strategy or are semi-permanently split into a rural and an urban part by means of 'straddling' – i.e. not relinquishing their roots on either side of the rural-urban divide (Murray, 1981; Tostensen, 1991; Bank, 1998; de Haan, 1999 and Tostensen, 2004). Transfers of goods and cash between urban and rural households have



always been a vital part of African migration processes (O'Connor, 1983), but the dominant flow has tended to be of cash remittances to rural dependants. In many societies these have been fundamental to the survival of rural households, particularly in Southern Africa, where unequal land division between black and white together with influx controls rendered many rural households virtually destitute. However, there is evidence of significant shifts in the nature of such transfers (Potts, 1997).

It appears that far more food is now being brought in from rural areas, which of course greatly enhances urban residents' vested interests in maintaining their social and economic rural links. These transfers can rely on surpluses generated by existing rural kin or on urban residents returning in the rainy season to cultivate, which they would probably not choose to do if they could afford urban food prices or could gain access to sufficient land in town to grow food. On the other hand, there is evidence that remittances to rural areas are declining as urban households find it harder to spare any money. This was true of urban households in Harare (Kanji, 1993) and in Lilongwe and Blantyre (Chilowa and Roe, 1990). In the latter cities in 1988/89 only 17 per cent of households remitted to rural areas during a three-month period. Like elsewhere in Africa, the experience in Maseru is similar regarding rural-urban linkages.

Rural-urban linkages have remained an important means of survival during the increasing urbanization in Maseru, especially for recent immigrants from the countryside. Poor households use these connections as they continually experience hardships. Lack of income to support the household was the main factor that pushed poor households in Sekamaneng, Motimposo and Thibella to send some of their members to their kin in the rural areas, thus influencing the migrant household composition as it became smaller in terms of members to support. But that did not improve the household well-being. 'Maseipati, a 26 year old, lived in Sekamaneng with her husband. They had sent their three children to stay with their grandmother in a rural village in the Thaba-Tseka district while also they depended on food from their rural home. She stated:

I live with my husband who is self-employed, our two children are staying  
with my mother-in-law. Since I have been here I find life rather difficult  
in that we had no permanent jobs. Food that we eat in this house mostly

the maize meal is from home. We fetch the maize grain from our home that makes us survive here (Interview, 'Maseipati Leraka, January 2009).

This case supports the argument that urban households usually need food from rural areas: people at home can grow food, some of which can supplement urban sources (Jamal and Weeks, 1993 and Mulenga, 1991). Furthermore, some poor urban households made cash transfers to support children left behind in the rural areas. 'Manthabiseng from Motimposo, who was 38 years old, maintained: "my children, a boy and a girl are staying in Mhales'hoek with my mother. I send them money which I generate from selling beer" (Interview, 'Manthabiseng Mohale, February 2009)"

On the other hand, the declining agricultural productivity and mining employment faced by Lesotho affect rural areas by pushing people to urban areas, particularly women. They spend more time in town in order to save on transport costs, although still remaining attached to their rural homestead. 'Makhotso (1966), an immigrant in Thibella, was supporting her family at home in the countryside. She stated:

I live with my sister in law, we share this room. I have three children who are staying home in the rural area. My husband is also at home to look after the children when I am here for work. I had to leave home to seek for a job in 2008 so that I can support the family because my husband is not working currently, he was working in the mines in South Africa but he got retrenched in 2004 (Interview, 'Makhotso Makhablesela, March 2009).

Many women who are tenants in Thibella and Motimposo came from the rural areas in search of means for survival. They maintained links with their villages and mostly to their maiden homes in order to survive in town. The cases cited indicate that different categories of urban households maintained connections with the rural areas. They make transfers of goods and cash between urban and rural households but the dominant flow has been of cash remittances to rural dependants particularly children. Urban households also brought in basic needs like food from rural areas for survival. The study results show that 15 percent of poor households

in Sekamaneng, 17 percent from Motimposo and 8 percent in Thibella were dependent on rural-urban linkages with their kin for food and financial assistance in order to survive. For example, as previously indicated, 'Maseipati Leraka's household in Sekamaneng depended on food from her home in Thaba-Tseka district (Field Survey, 2009). 'Makhotso (1966) also confirmed this, "I sometimes get food grains like beans at home to save money. But it is not all the time they are available because we cultivate crops once a year" (Interview, 'Makhotso Makhablesela, March 2009). This support enhances urban residents' vested interests in maintaining their social and economic rural links. This indicates that rapid and expanding urbanization has not resulted in the complete rupture of traditional links and structures in Maseru. Muzvidziwa (1997) refers to this situation as 'double-rootedness', where an urban household has one foot in town and the other in the rural village. The nature of the urban household is such that it survives through rural links as the cases cited above indicate. These links remain strong for several reasons. Lack of income and food for survival in the city and childcare are the main factors. Besides rural-urban links, poor households survived on public transfers as a coping strategy.

### **Dependence on public welfare transfers**

Public transfers where available act as a safety net for the poor (Sharma, 1986 and Kanji, 1993). However, in Lesotho, public welfare provision is very limited in terms of enabling households to survive. The old-age pension is the most prominent provision, but is focused on a small population of people who are 70 years of age and above which constitutes 3.9 per cent of the country's population (Table 7.2). Some proportion, about 0.2 percent of the population, gets other state grants e.g. disability grant for those disabled and Child Cash Grant for orphans and vulnerable children (Table 7.3). It must be noted here that the Child Cash Grant is just a pilot project funded mostly by the European Union covering only 3 constituencies out of 80 constituencies of the entire country (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 2009). This area does not constitute even a quarter of Lesotho. This implies only a few have safety nets, meaning that the majority are exposed to vulnerability. This affirms Sharma's (1986) attestation that there are few safety nets in developing countries and this has worsened poverty levels among the poor.

Because of inability to mobilize resources and absence of access to assets, lack of employment and income, lack of capabilities and lack of support networks, poor households depend on public welfare benefits from the government of Lesotho, particularly the elderly. Public welfare benefits lessen the severity of poverty among this elderly group (Sharma,

1986). One feature of the poor urban households, particularly those headed by senior widowed female citizens, was their dependence on the state old age pension as a survival means (Field Survey, 2009). It means that without livelihood, only a few have safety nets as survival means while the majority of the needy population does not, meaning that they are trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty.

**Table 7.2: Old Age Pension Recipients in Maseru**

District	Total population per district	GOLFIS: Old age recipients	Percentage of total district population
Maseru	436,399	13,845	3.2
<b>Lesotho</b>	<b>1, 872,721</b>	<b>72,863</b>	<b>3.9</b>

Source: Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (Government of Lesotho Financial Information System- GOLFIS, June 2009).

**Table 7.3: Public Assistance beneficiaries in Lesotho**

District Name	Total population per district	Number of Beneficiaries in 2009 by district	Percentage of total population
Maseru	436,399	1,258	0.3
Lesotho	1, 872,721	3,851	0.2

Source: Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (Pensions Division, June 2009).

This, however, does not mean that, for those who get public welfare assistance, such assistance is adequate as a means of survival. They are also unable to survive on their own and have to rely mostly on their kin and neighbours. ‘Mats’epo, a 74 years old widow, explained that:

The income we have is just from the old age pension of M200.00 (1 Loti is equivalent to 1 Rand) which I get every month. Besides, my sons give us money but not that much, at most they give M100.00. We solely rely on them for survival because as you see there are no animals or anything else to rely on. I am not working, I am old. If only I can raise my grandson that is enough (Interview, Mats’epo Makhema, January 2009).

The cost of living is high in Maseru where the required minimum spending for a household is M/R4800.00 per month (GOL Economic Review, 2009). The cost of food is M/R1, 500.00 per month, of transport is M/R600.00, and of rent is M/R2000.00. But poor households with lack of capabilities, lack of formal employment for sustainable income and lack of any productive assets to generate income are unable to meet this minimum requirement, except to live on the meagre state welfare grant where it is available to them. The social grant provided by the government in the form of old-age pension was not just a coping mechanism. Out of the total sample population, 30 percent of households in Motimposo, 5 percent in Thibella and 5 percent in Sekamaneng depended on old-age pension. The majority of these were female-headed households of widows and single mothers. Particularly in Motimposo community there was a larger number of old-age pensioners and a larger number of widows (35 percent of all households headed by widows). These households found it difficult to survive, as 'Matlakeli, a widow aged 80 from Motimposo, described:

I stay with two grandchildren whose parents have died. I did only STD 4 at school. I have lived here in Motimposo for a long time now. Today my life is so difficult. I have to support the two orphans from the old-age pension I get from the government. This money is not enough, food prices are high. We sometimes go without food. There is no one to assist me, except people around here sometimes when they afford. These children also have to go out and find means of survival, they do not attend school  
(Interview, 'Matlakeli Pali, January 2009).

'Mamatong aged 85 also from Motimposo had a similar experience:

I moved to Motimposo from Thaba-Bosiu because I came to seek for a job in those olden days. My life today has become a struggle because I am old, I do not work anymore, I depend entirely on the old-age pension to pay the rent and what is left, I buy maize meal and nothing more. We sometimes sleep without food or some people of goodwill help us at times if we run short of food. I now live on handouts from people (Interview, 'Mamatong Matong, January 2009).

Moreover, people are unable to cope with inflation of 4.7 percent per annum (African Economic Outlook, 2011) and they sometimes go without food or have to depend on the

goodwill of the people around them. Sharma (1986) indicates that because the public welfare benefits provided by governments in the developing countries, like pensions, are so low, they are severely overburdened and if households do not have kinship support networks, poverty can easily escalate. Nonetheless, ILO (1984:3) in Kaseke (1993) states that social security, like old age pension, only serves as a “protection against economic and social distress” allowing beneficiaries to meet their basic needs and thus avoid destitution. But in developing countries, social transfers have rarely been adequate to meet the basic needs of the poor, mostly the aged (Sharma, 1986) as the cases above show. At the time of the study, the aged were getting R200.00 and yet they had to support others within their household including HIV/AIDS orphans.

Governments in both the developed and the developing world provide public welfare benefits on the premise that individuals’ exposure to a variety of contingencies permanently or temporarily impairs their capacity to earn income. The belief is that individuals exposed to such contingencies are unable to mobilize the resources required to contain the contingencies on their own (Kaseke, 1993). However, in the context of the developing countries, it makes little sense to regard social security as offering protection against contingencies, when the poor are struggling to meet their daily needs. The poor are not only worried about what happens tomorrow, they are more worried about what happens today as well. Sen (1987) has observed that all around the world, people’s living standards are constantly under attack from uncertainty and changes in their environment. The common impact of these threats ranges from loss of resources to consequent reduction in living standard. As such, social transfers need to be a means to restore the standard of living to at least an acceptable level. However, from the cases cited above it can be seen that destitution had set in even with the existence of the social grant. But it could be argued that if these poor households were not given government assistance, their poverty would have been even worse than it is today. In this case, the social grant acted as a mitigating agent. What these cases however confirm is that social welfare benefits in Lesotho provide inadequate means of survival for poor urban households without any form of capability (education or skills), with widows as heads, with high dependency of members, with lack of sustainable income making them more vulnerable to poverty.

### **Informal sector as an alternative strategy**

The informal economy in the Third World, including in African cities, has been an alternative survival strategy for the poor. Much of the literature indicates how informal sector

employment developed over time as a livelihood strategy (see Sethuraman, 1998; Allen et al, 2000; ILO, 2000; Chen, 2000 and Chen, Jahabvala and Lund, 2002). Sethuraman (1998) has noted that in developing countries informal sector employment is concentrated in the urban areas. In many developing countries, planned economic development has not created sufficient jobs to reduce unemployment or erode the informal sector (Chen, Jhabvala and Lund, 2002:3). The informal sector suffers problems where policy makers and governments ignore its activities. It is frequently unregulated, rarely supported and sometimes discouraged (Charmes, 1998a). Informal sector employment is regularly without secure contracts, workers' benefits, or social protection (Lund, 1998 and Chen, 2003). Despite all these problems, the informal sector has continued to witness a tremendous growth and it serves as a response to economic crisis. Retrenched workers usually move into it and households often need to use it to supplement incomes earned in the formal sector (ILO, 2000). The growth of this sector is evident with the increasing unemployment rates faced by Lesotho, particularly Maseru. The proliferation of the informal economy since the 1980s is directly related to the increase in unemployment.

In Lesotho, out of the total of 20 000 job-seekers that enter the labour market annually from different institutions, including tertiary, the formal sector absorbs only 10 000. The remainder is either unemployed or self-employed in the ever-growing informal sector. About 9 percent of the total labour force is employed in the formal sector, 20 percent is employed in the informal sector, and 15 percent is employed in the South African mines. The unemployment rate is averaged at 22.5 percent and is found to be more severe among youth who form the largest proportion of the population (Demographic, Labour and Social Statistics Division (DLSSD), 2002 and Youth Global Network, 2010). Currently, Lesotho has graduates queuing to find jobs in the industries while others claim to be working as domestic workers in South Africa. This trend of increasing unemployment has been observed across Africa where the worst levels of unemployment are among the urban youth, who are said to constitute 60-75 percent of the unemployed, though they account for only one-third of the labour force (ILO-JASPA, 1992:16).

According to Alejandro et al (1989:11), much of the earlier literature on the informal sector used the dual economy approach that maintained that formal and informal sectors are autonomous entities, operating within different labour markets, with little or no relationship between them. The two sectors are treated as autonomous entities because major

improvements are seen and directed to the public formal sector and the informal sector, which performs a major role in absorbing the growing labour force, is not recognized. For instance, in Lesotho the government regards the relatively small tourism industry as a major service, while failing to recognize the service sector that dominates the informal sector (Economic Options for Lesotho, 2011).

Currently, the informal sector represents a central economic activity in the country due to the structural reformation of the country's economy caused by the following factors: decline in agricultural output, retrenchment of migrant labour from mines in South Africa, decentralization, urbanization, job insecurity in the formal sector and new entrants into the labour market (Ministry of Planning in Economic Options for Lesotho, 1997 and Global Policy Network, 2004). Equally, the 1998 political instability in the country resulted in massive destruction of property, a drastic fall in the overall economy and loss of income among the business community. All these contributed to economic recession and loss of jobs by many Basotho (SADC Trade, Industry and Investment Review, 2003:64). The informal sector will thus continue to grow as many people are losing jobs with the closure of some textile industries in the country (Bennet, 2006).

The informal sector, according to Gill (1994), is a very important source of income and employment for women in Lesotho. ILO (1994b:33) has also observed that in urban areas of Lesotho women cluster in businesses that are “an extension of domestic chores (like selling food items) and a spatial and temporal extension of traditional activities (like beer brewing)”. From all the three areas Thibella, Motimposo and Sekamaneng, the focus of this research, 18 percent of women were engaged in beer brewing and 8 percent in selling food. These types of informal income generating activities are not different from those undertaken in other southern African countries where women concentrate more on petty trade (see Peters-Berries, 1993a; Rogerson, 1994c and Rogerson, 1996). According to Roever (2007), street vending is one of the most visible segments of the urban economy of the Third World countries. In Maseru, the informal economy comprises informal traders who sell goods and services outside business premises. While some work in large concentrations in open markets, others work in smaller concentrations or alone on street corners and sidewalks. Street vendors choose the location of their workplaces based on maximizing their client base and are often congregated in strategic commercial areas of the city, such as outside bus terminal and shopping centres. Lack of a defined legal framework that establishes when and where



vendors may occupy public space and protects vendors against risks like expulsions from their workplaces has allowed local authorities to spontaneously evict vendors particularly when the public comes to view them as a nuisance. Local authorities often confiscate vendors' merchandise, exacerbating economic hardships for those who have little to fall back on. Street vendors in Maseru are faced with the same experiences over the years.

Declining agricultural productivity and high unemployment have drawn many people to the urban areas to engage in the informal sector as an alternative to avert poverty. There are no current statistics on the number of existing informal businesses in Lesotho except data from the 2000 survey by Sechaba Consultants on the 831 informal businesses drawn from six out of ten districts in the country. But from observation, this sector has expanded dramatically, most particularly in urban areas. The main business categories are informal production, services and trade. For example, selling in the streets was more common where 17.5 percent of households in Thibella, 2.5 percent in Sekamaneng and 2.5 percent in Motimposo were engaged in this business. 'Masello who was 67 years old residing in Thibella stated:

I now live on the money I get from selling apples in the streets. I started selling in the streets in 2002 but these days my items do not sell well because we are many people who sell the same item. These days I target places of events like stadium when there are activities held there so that I can sell, even there we are many but at least one is able to get something to buy something to eat, look here are the apples left a few days ago, I am tired to go round in the bus stop so that I can sell them, I now have to eat them before they get spoiled (Interview, 'Masello Pitso, March 2009).

Similarly, 'Maseabata Mothetsi (39) living in Thibella revealed her situation:

I live with 5 children, 2 daughters, 3 sons, 3 of these children 2 daughters and 1 son are at school, only one son is selling in the streets. I have rented this single room at M100.00 a month, I can now afford to pay the rent every

month from the money I generate from selling in the street. My family depends on the money I generate from the sale of food in the street, the money is not sufficient to cater for our needs but we manage to buy food and pay rent which are our most critical needs. I living a poor life because I have to sell whether it is raining or not, whether it is winter or not, I am seeking for jobs but I cannot find any. This is a struggle, how long will I endure to sell, I wonder (Interview, 'Maseabata Mothetsi, March 2009).

In the case of Maseru urban communities, informal self-employment included sewing, selling garden vegetables, wild vegetables, clothes as hawkers, small items like sweets in their home yards, snuff, handicrafts, discarded plastics from shops, boxes and bottles, seedlings, fresh fish, rearing and selling pigs and their meat and brewing and selling beer. From the sample of the study of 120 respondents, 50.8 percent is involved in the informal economy where 45 percent of those involved in the informal economy were women. The numbers of households participating in each category in all three communities were relatively insignificant looking at the sample of 40 households in each community. However, Thibella had a recognized number of households engaged in selling small items around the area and in the bus stop (15 percent of households), those selling discarded plastics from shops, boxes and bottles (10 percent of households), those selling cooked food in the streets (17.5 percent of households) and those brewing and selling beer (22.5 percent of households). This means that the informal businesses are more common in poor households in Thibella than is the case with Sekamaneng compared with Motimposo with households selling small items around the area and in the bus stop (5 percent of households), those selling discarded plastics from shops, boxes and bottles (0 percent of households), those selling cooked food in the streets (0 percent of households) and those brewing and selling beer (15 percent of households). Sekamaneng also differed with Thibella with selling small items around the area and in the bus stop (5 percent of households), those selling discarded plastics from shops, boxes and bottles (0 percent of households), those selling cooked food in the streets (2.5 percent of households) and those brewing and selling beer (7.5 percent of households). This is influenced by urbanization as Thibella attracts more immigrants who mobilize income through informal trade (Field Survey, 2009).

From the data, brewing and selling beer is also the most dominant among all income-generating activities especially in Thibella. This is an activity most commonly undertaken by women in Lesotho, as ILO (1994b:33) observed that in the urban areas of Lesotho, women cluster in businesses that are “an extension of domestic chores (like selling food items) and a spatial and temporal extension of traditional activities (like beer brewing).” It was discovered during this research that some men also engaged in brewing and selling beer to generate cash for survival. Nkoale, a 63 year old man stated, “I have someone whom I have hired to brew and sell for me, I pay her by giving her time to brew and sell for herself at least once in a month (Interview, Nkoale Kou, March 2009)”. I observed that there were 3 big containers of 200 litres each, that stood by the side of the door way and Nkoale claimed that he uses them for brewing beer (Field Survey, 2009), meaning that in the urban areas of Lesotho there were no marked gender divisions of labour within the urban small-scale economy. This further invalidates the notion of ‘Feminization of poverty’ as men also suffer the same consequences of poverty as women and engage in the same activities to generate income for survival, which were predominately used by women in the past. The same thing applies to selling of small items and selling of discarded plastics from shops, boxes and bottles, as both men and women were doing these jobs in urban Maseru. But it is true that the majority of those who are engaged in these activities, as already indicated, are women (Gill, 1994; ILO, 1994b and Gay et al, 2000).

However, across the developing world, there are difficulties regarding the operations of the informal sector. Often these involve harassment in the form of arrests, evictions and confiscation of merchandise of those engaged in this type of business by local authorities claiming to be working in the public interest to safeguard the cleanliness of cities (Roever,2007). In the same manner, the municipal authorities in Maseru through their special police force keep on harassing residents and sellers engaged in informal trade by frequent arrests, evictions and confiscation of items for sale. This has increased the incidence of poverty, as residents are not able to get money out of what the municipal regards as ‘illegal’ business.

Although the informal sector workers (street vendors) have organized themselves into civic associations and have secured licenses to operate within the city (StreetNet, 2009),the urban governance however continues to pose problems that involve confrontation between the city council and the legal as well as the ‘illegal’ vendors in and around the city centre. The Urban

Council dominates the decision-making but the civic organizations also exert a substantial pressure through protests and use of the media in determining direction of informal business.

For those who were selling cooked food in the streets, as was the case with 2.5 percent of households in Sekamaneng and 17.5 percent of households in Thibella, who happened to be all women, they were also subjected to many hazards (Field Survey, 2009 ) normally faced by street vendors across the developing world as Roever (2007) and WIEGO (2005a) indicate. They often want to maximize their client base and frequently congregate in strategic commercial areas and, since local authorities do not allow them to occupy that public space, they are subject to confiscation of their merchandise and other harassments by the authorities (Ibid). This is very disturbing for someone whose survival depends on this activity because it further exacerbates her economic hardships. The informal sector serves as a response to economic crisis in the developing world and many households engage in informal work to supplement incomes, as ILO (2000) has shown. Some respondents in this study felt that the informal sector has had an impact on household poverty reduction, though it has been limited because the income is little. ‘Maseabata, 36 years old woman living in Thibella, concurred:

My family depends on the money I generate from the sale of food in the Street, the money is not sufficient to cater for our needs but we manage to buy food and pay rent which are our most critical needs. I am living a poor life because I have to sell whether it is raining or not, whether it is winter or not, I am seeking for jobs but I cannot find any. This is a struggle, how long will I endure to sell, I wonder (Interview, ‘Maseabata Mothetsi, March 2009).

This case shows that urbanization, the informal sector and urban poverty are linked. ‘Maseabata is an immigrant who sought for survival in the informal sector in Maseru but is still living in poverty even after migrating to the city because she could not get any formal employment. The informal sector became a ‘safe haven’ for her. It is evident that failure of both the public and the private sectors in keeping pace with urbanization has resulted in the increasing number of the labour force turning to the informal sector in the developing world (Sethuraman, 1998) which the UNDP Human Development Report (1993) refers to as ‘jobless growth’. However, the informal sector provides income below a living wage and usually serves as a hand-to-mouth activity in poor households in Maseru. Low income forces people to concentrate on consumption expenditure, that is, food and other necessities and not

on investment, perpetuating the lack of household income (Duke et al, 1990:15). It is clear that the informal sector is an important survival strategy in Maseru which minimizes poverty.

The informal work engaged in also comprised occasional jobs (They are referred to as *piece-jobs* in Maseru) as an income-generating strategy for the urban poor in Maseru. These involved working in gardens, working as labourers on building sites, washing people's clothes, baby-sitting, fitting satellite dishes and car sound systems, loading and unloading stock at shops, working as motor mechanics, weeding in people's fields, building and maintaining people's houses, carrying/conveying people's items with wheelbarrows, plaiting people's hair, car washing and working in community development projects (*fato-fato*). The study results indicate that out of the total sample, 72.5 percent participated in occasional jobs. These were short-term activities and depended much on availability as the cases below indicate (Field Survey, 2009).

Tapole 65 years old and 'Matau 59, a couple living in Sekamaneng, find it difficult to survive because they lost income from the mines. They are not educated either, Tapole never went to school while 'Matau did only Standard 4 at primary school level. The occasional jobs they were doing to get income were not sustainable. This is their story:

I am living with my wife only, I never went to school, and my wife did STD 4. I worked in the mines in the past and I was able to feed my family and sent my child to school. Money was enough to cater for family needs. I got retrenched from the mines in 1981 because of age. I have ever liked to get a job but was never successful, except if I get a piece-job from some neighbours that pay little money, if it gets finished I stay at home. Since I lost my job I have never worked anywhere, I just stay at home as you find me here. Since I lost my job from the mines, my life is rather difficult even the house can tell that all what I have was acquired during the time when I was working way back, nothing is new. Each day it is difficult to get food. Social relations are not so good around here, no assistance I get from anyone except for piece-jobs. My son stays in Naleli and comes home rarely. He sometimes gives us money to get maize meal if he comes home. My wife is just a housewife. She used to baby-sit for someone who works in the industries. But lately the mother does not bring the baby any more. She was paying M100.00

per month. We have no other sources of income (Interview, Tapole Litabe, November 2009).

Life was not better even for young people. Ts'eliso, a 43 years old man living in Motimposo, also struggled to survive. He had done only STD 7 in primary school and was not married. He lived alone because both parents had died. This is how he survived:

Since I have no family, no job, I live a hand-to-mouth type of life every day. I do piece-jobs in order to survive such as gardening or working with motor mechanics. But the money I get is very little to survive on and at times those jobs are not there. I do not cook because I have no stove; I eat at the shops where I buy bread and milk. But there are days when I sleep without food. For instance, I have these peaches now to take as breakfast because I have no food to eat this morning (Interview: Ts'elisoToli, January 2009).

Rets'elisoetsoe, a 53 years old man who lived in Thibella, also struggled for a living though he had secondary education. He indicated,

I live with my wife and 3 children who are all at school. My wife is a housewife, I am doing piece-jobs in contracts when they are available and also I sell small items here in the house like paraffin, eggs and matches. I have done Form E, I was born here in Thibella. Now I live in my parents' home though I have my house in Lithoteng (one area in Maseru), I moved here because I can do business without paying transport costs for my items, I just use a wheelbarrow to get them from the nearby shops. In the past I lived a very good life because my parents had money and I worked in the mines where I got retrenched in 1994 and also in government for a very short time where also the work was terminated in 2000. Since then I am struggling. Our life is getting worse every day. We have sewage line passing through here but I am unable to even connect because I am a poor man who has no job so that I can have money to pay for all that we need. I am just living like a rural man but there in the villages, there is no difference in terms of the type of life we are living, they may be better than us I think (Interview, Rets'elisoetsoe Khoabane, March 2009).

What these case studies confirm is that even when people have lost formal jobs or have never had formal jobs, the informal work only serves as a temporary means of survival. They are further constrained by the level of education they have acquired from getting permanent jobs that can sustain them. They are trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty. This is irrespective of whether they live closer to the city centre or at a considerable distance, or even whether one is an immigrant or someone born in Maseru.

Nevertheless, the informal business sector continues to serve as a cushion for many households in the country to fall back on since the country's formal economy fails to cater for them. Gay et al (2000) consider the informal sector as one form of livelihood strategy for many Basotho and argues that a quarter of all households are engaged in some type of informal business. As the informal sector only remains a hand to mouth activity, the high poverty levels remain. Many urban poor residents have now resorted to small income generating activities mostly operated from home as they cannot be either actively engaged in the formal employment sector or have capital to engage in informal business.

### **Conclusion**

The general observation from chapter 7 is urbanization processes have unsettled and modified livelihoods on which these households depended, exposing them to vulnerability and poverty. It was observed that a number of important factors, income, housing, education, capabilities, employment and land, influenced livelihoods across the sample of different categories of households in Thibella, Sekamaneng and Motimposo, Maseru (Table 7.4). These were some of the different categories found in these three areas during the study: immigrant tenant nuclear household, immigrant tenant household, original inhabitant nuclear household, immigrant single parent household, original inhabitant single parent household, original inhabitant extended household and original inhabitant male (child) headed household.

**Table 7.4: Sample summary on different categories of households and important factors influencing livelihoods**

Case	Factors influencing livelihoods					
	Income	Housing	Education/Capabilities	Employment	Land	Survival means
Case 1: Original inhabitant extended male headed household of Lelaka	No income	Own house	Never attended school	Not employed	Land for settlement only	Old age pension
Case 2: Original inhabitant nuclear male-headed household of Tapole	No income	Living in own house	Never attended school	Not employed	Piece of land owned for cultivation	Piecework and support from son
Case 3: male-headed migrant-tenant household of 'Mamatong	No income	Living in rented accommodation	Never attended school	Not employed	No land owned	Old age pension and community
Case 4: male- headed Single Immigrant tenant household of Nkoale	No income	Living in a rented accommodation	Pre-school entry class ( <i>Paliso</i> )	Not employed	No land	Brewing and selling beer
Case 5: female headed immigrant household of Masepati	No income	Living in own house	Standard 7	Not employed	owning land for settlement only	Rural-urban linkages
Case 6: male (child) headed original inhabitant household of Rethabile	No income	Own house	Standard 5 at primary school level	Not employed	Only land for settlement	Piecework and community social networks

Source: Field Survey, 2009.

In the increasing urbanization in Maseru, most of the households in all the three communities, Thibella, Motimposo and Sekamaneng, did not have assets as livelihoods to cushion them in times of economic hardships. Most of the sample had no access to land and housing with only a few having access to these assets. They had no capabilities including adequate level of education and skills rendering them incapable of generating capital to enable them to invest in income generating activities yet these are critical elements to well-being (Moser, 1996; Bebbington, 1999 and Ellis, 2000). They were dependent on rural-urban linkages with their



extended families in the countryside, most particularly women, for reasons like childcare to enable them to engage in income-generating activities in the city and in turn remit money home for their survival. However, the formal and informal sectors absorbed very few poor people. They had to engage in home-based activities to generate a little cash for survival like selling beer. A few depended on old age pension. Therefore, the poor households in the three communities live in poverty given the constraints they face in acquiring livelihoods to meet the minimum standard of living (Field Survey, 2009).

## CHAPTER 8

### CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Introduction

This thesis explained how the particular forms of urbanization in Maseru have affected the manifestations of poverty and shaped livelihoods in Lesotho's most important urban settlement. What is clear from the research is that the problem of poverty in Maseru is intrinsically linked to the broader socio-economic and political difficulties experienced by Maseru over many decades. The roots of the country's underdevelopment are located in its colonial experience, as well as post-colonial dilemmas. Nonetheless, the thesis argues that since independence, and especially from the 1980s, Maseru underwent unprecedented and rapid growth, which affected poor households in profound ways.

The main reason for undertaking this research was that there were no such studies in Lesotho yet poverty is observably increasing in the city, thus making this study an important contribution to the literature. Studies done elsewhere in developing countries and specifically in Africa show that urbanization causes poverty (see Devas and Rakodi 1993, UNEP 1997 and 2000, UNCHS 2003, Cohen 2004 and Shi 2007). However, such studies have concentrated on metropolitan cities with the assumption that they are representative of smaller cities, hence neglecting such cities and any problems they are facing, making this study significant in terms of its contribution to the literature on small cities. It is also timely as Maseru is facing negative effects of rapid urbanization.

The research took two dimensions as dictated by the two key questions. First, the study sought to answer the question on how different forms and patterns of urbanization have affected the manifestations of poverty in the three selected urban communities, Thibella, Sekamaneng and Motimposo, trying to establish the impact of urbanization on poverty levels in poor households. Second, the study proceeded from the first question with the hypothesis that the increasing urbanization has unsettled conventional livelihood strategies, compelling residents to employ different livelihood strategies to survive and as such finding out 'what livelihood strategies have been adopted by these poor people' and compare such strategies. The assumption was that since the three areas experienced different forms and patterns of

urbanization (see Table 8.1), people living in each area have different ways of coping with poverty. The study paid special attention to the experiences of women, who were assumed to be the most poverty stricken section of the urban population compared to men and considered to be key agents in the development of livelihood strategies (see chapters 3, 4, 7 and 8). While this was not mainly a gender based study, aspects of gender were included only to indicate the depth of poverty among these groups by comparing one group to the other, the results of which may inform policy decisions for future action. The study further examined how the urban governance systems and these poor people within them are coping with the pressure from urbanization. This is due to the fact that those government entities responsible for urban development are faced with serious challenges in dealing with urban poverty, as literature suggests (see United Nations, 1980; UNCH, 1996; Halfani, 1997; UNEP, 1997 and 2000; Satterthwaite, 1999 and UNCHS, 2003), and which was also the case in Maseru. Nonetheless, this research study came up with a number of findings demonstrating that poverty increased in Maseru but not only as a result of urbanization.

### **Challenges of underdevelopment of Lesotho on Maseru**

The historic nature of socio-economic as well as political developments in Lesotho, which led to general underdevelopment, has had a significant bearing on poverty in Maseru, as the city shares similar experiences with the rest of the country. The study discovered that, socially, Basotho society was characterized by class and gender divisions since its founding with great inequalities in the sharing of resources. The society had a hierarchical ordered structure, where chiefs commanded authority that allowed them access to more wealth and used such wealth to manipulate their control over their subjects. This exploitative communal labour further exposed them to greater vulnerability as they continually depended on chiefs for their sustenance. Marginalization and exclusion of ordinary Basotho continued into the colonial era because the resources including land remained with the chiefs. The colonial administration used chiefs to implement its policies. They were used to exploit the commoners through taxation and labour recruitment for the South African mines and in return paid a little money that enriched them. Tax revenue was used to develop the mother Cape Colony in South Africa rather than Lesotho, where only a few schools were set up with curricula based on the colonial interest of producing assistants to the colonial administration, indicating little concern for social development. Maseru, established as a colonial administrative centre, also experienced segregated development dominated mostly by the whites and the black elite working for the colonial government. The majority of the black

population was segregated and marginalized from enjoying citizenship rights. Their areas were not developed with even basic services, exposing them to intense poverty. While these conditions prevailed, the centre continually absorbed more immigrants escaping poverty in the countryside, adding more distress to the city population. Two factors, agricultural decline and labour migrancy, contributed significantly to this growth.

Continuous agricultural decline in the rural areas of Lesotho forced men to migrate to the city to find jobs. Agriculture, that had been the mainstay of the population in Lesotho particularly the rural areas where 80 percent of the population resided, faced severe shock from both environmental and natural disasters. The proposed environmental policies of the colonial administration were boycotted by Basotho, who continued their practices which were not environmentally friendly, eventually leading to serious land degradation. Natural disasters including severe drought affected crops and natural vegetation on which the population and livestock depended, resulting in starvation. Agriculture has shown no signs of improvement into the post-colonial epoch and this has led to continuous rural-urban migration and population growth in Maseru. Agricultural projects set up in the 1970s and 1980s which were mostly donor-funded became politicised, with derived benefits diverted to those in power, resulting in increased marginalization of the majority population. The country developed a dependency syndrome both for financial and food aid, which is still the case today, as the country's position has worsened. Efforts to improve the situation by various governments have been negated by lack of commitment to implement various policies to this effect, resulting in economic decline.

The country is faced with serious land degradation and soil erosion from overuse of land without revitalizing it and this is compounded by long spells of drought, pushing more population out of the agricultural sector. Maseru continually absorbs more of this poor population from the countryside. This has been a trend in Southern Africa, where breakdown of indigenous farming systems, overgrazing and soil degradation have all been manifestations of population pressure on resources in rural areas, resulting in rural-urban migration and poverty in cities as the population growth has exceeded the ability to create jobs and raise standards of living for urban residents (UNEP, 1997 and 2000).

A large and growing number of Basotho men, who could not secure employment in the city during the colonial period, were recruited for mining jobs in South Africa. Labour recruited was sent off to build infrastructure and work in the mines. They earned low wages without

any effect on the lives of Basotho and their families and even the country, exposing the economy to greater dependence on the South Africa economy. Migrancy deprived the country of its manpower which was fundamental to prosperity in the years before colonialism. Lesotho turned from being a granary into a labour reserve for RSA. Basotho men migrated in large numbers, leaving women and children behind, who continued with the agricultural production but only at subsistence level and producing insufficient to sustain the families beyond the harvest period, indicating a serious decline of Lesotho's economy. This increased dependency on RSA not only for income but also for food imports. Lesotho was and still is a labour reserve for RSA. Today women have also become active in the labour market of RSA.

Within the country there were shifts of population during the colonial era towards economically better areas. Maseru was the only place that showed signs of modern infrastructure including business complexes. The city began attracting poor Basotho who hoped to improve their lives by getting jobs. This means poverty moved to the city. Thibella and Motimposo received most migrants at the time. But the underdeveloped city could not offer sufficient jobs most particularly for these Basotho who were uneducated. Those absorbed worked as domestic workers of the colonial administration, while the rest had to join the informal sector by setting up shebeens around the city centre, attracting even more population from the countryside. Sheebens are still an urban characteristic and a sign of poverty in Maseru. Lesotho further showed little signs of development after independence.

The post-colonial state developments were heavily characterized by marginalization and exclusion of citizens, resulting in increased disparity among the nation. The state resources were allocated on the basis of nepotism to the detriment of development. The little progress achieved in the early years of independence was from British aid. The assistance subjected the economy to external control where the country was required to pay back the aid with generated revenue, meaning that aid given had no multiplier effect on the economy. Most of the development plans remained partially and/or completely unimplemented thus failing to effect change in the lives of Basotho, making them remain poor. Amongst unimplemented plans is the Poverty Reduction Strategy that ended up only at the feasibility study level.

Furthermore, the country's efforts to industrialize failed to enhance the economic growth. Foreign owned industries promoted capital flight as profits were invested outside the country. This left the economy in a precarious state with rising budget and current account deficits,

which led to an increase in public debt especially in the 1980s, pushing the country to seek for aid from the international financial institutions. The assistance, however, did not improve the conditions faced by the country.

The ensuing Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) worsened the economic situation. For example, downsizing of the public sector resulted in many citizens losing jobs, and hence increased destitution. Another effect of SAPs was that many professionals left the country for jobs elsewhere as SAPs increased unemployment in the country. The market liberalization policies led to poor crop production causing food insecurity and the privatization policy pumped the scarce resources into inefficient enterprises, impairing economic progress. The declining employment rate in the formal sector has led to high unemployment and the growth of the informal sector. However, the informal sector only serves as a hand to mouth activity, still leaving many people destitute. For example, the poor live on the little income generated by selling plastic bags collected from dustbins in the shopping complexes to the recycling firms. Social services have also not improved.

The underdeveloped social services infrastructure has impeded Lesotho's development. All basic services vital for human survival and well-being, including housing, water, sanitation and electricity are undersupplied, and very costly. Many people are now living below the poverty line in terms of consumption while only a few are above the poverty line. Even with the mitigation of government social welfare policies, notably the Old Age Pension Scheme whose recipients are poor old aged people with a high dependency ratio from orphans of HIV/AIDs, poverty continues to escalate. These schemes provide very small amounts, failing to effect a positive change in people's lives. Lesotho is currently in a serious position in terms of numbers of orphans from HIV/AIDS. Poor households in Thibella, Motimposo and Sekamaneng had orphans to take care of, but households headed by widows were in the most distressing situation.

### **Repercussions of urbanization and poverty in Maseru**

Often development processes take place in the urban sectors of the economy, bringing about job creation. The few available job opportunities tend to attract people from the countryside into the urban sector. Besides the population from the countryside, these cities have the original residents who continually reproduce, thereby adding more to the jobless population. Some cities expand into the peri-urban areas incorporating poor people with rural livelihoods. Often this transition (urbanization) does not only affect employment in the urban sector, but

also destroys the livelihood of the people and forces them to devise new ways of survival. Meanwhile, the government fails to cater for this population in terms of job creation and services needed, making cities plagued with increasing poverty. It is observed as well that in many cities of Africa the existing jobs are often inadequate to absorb everyone, leading to 'jobless growth' (UNCH, 2003). Urbanization in this context, therefore, does not only involve population increase but also economic, social and political demands. Accordingly, this development process is accompanied by increasing urban poverty (de Haan, 1997; Gilbert and Gugler 1992; UNCHS, 1996 and Beall, 2000). Maseru increasingly faces this predicament.

The burgeoning population currently poses serious problems for Maseru. The city's population grew by 11 percent from 137 837 in 1996 to 197 907 in 2006 (Bureau of Statistics Population Report, 2006), the last census in the country. This figure is not static, due to rural-urban migration, because the country faces declining levels of employment, agricultural productivity, deteriorating or absent social services delivery and economic setbacks from the declining economic sector. This does not automatically imply that the city is always ready to absorb these new entrants in terms of the social and economic services they need. It means then that while the already existing inhabitants suffer from not having adequate services, they are also overwhelmed by this population growth and hence there is increased poverty.

Migration to the city continues as people, particularly women, regard the city as the best place to offer them means of livelihood, adding more to urban poverty. Women, who initially took care of their households when men were in the mines, are now migrating in greater numbers to look for work. The available formal jobs are mostly in the factories, offering very low wages. This has increased their dependency on home linkages, which provide extra needed support while in the city. Meanwhile, the city keeps on receiving more people from the countryside including youth who hope to find job opportunities believed to exist more in the city than other areas within the country. However, this often exacerbates unemployment as jobs are not readily available. This scenario is not different from the observed shifting patterns of population in developing countries and Africa towards cities, which have led to poverty (UNCHS, 2003 and ADB, 1992). The argument here is that Lesotho's underdevelopment has contributed to poverty in Maseru. In addition to rural-urban migration, other forms of urbanization, particularly city encroachment, have worsened the situation.

Maseru has had considerable urbanization-encroachment into poor peri-urban areas, affecting manifestations of poverty within poor households. Poor households, which initially depended on agriculture, were no longer cultivating their land, particularly in the Sekamaneng community. The area continually absorbs immigrants who buy and settle on land formerly used for agriculture, exacerbating hunger.

Additionally, for these areas becoming part of the city did not mean any development was undertaken to enable them to absorb this increasing population by providing needed infrastructure. The process turned out to be anti-developmental by escalating poverty levels. From these different forms of urbanization in Thibella, Motimposo and Sekamaneng, poverty manifested itself mainly in employment, housing, water, sanitation and electricity.

**Table 8.1: Differentiated forms of urbanization of 3 communities in Maseru**

<b>Thibella</b>	<b>Motimposo</b>	<b>Sekamaneng</b>
Migration	Migration	Migration
Natural population growth	Natural population growth	Natural population growth
-	-	Encroachment

Source: Compiled by Author

As a result of the development processes in the country: as already shown, these basic socio-economic necessities were not sufficiently developed. Little progress was, however, achieved in terms of employment where the economy through the garment sector has generated insufficient jobs to absorb the burgeoning urban population. Just like in other African countries, this kind of investment has failed to stimulate local demand as profits generated fail to increase the level of employment. The garment sector in Lesotho shows more reliance on foreign direct investment than internally generated employment. This type of employment to a great extent is not guaranteed as employers are at liberty to decide how many people to employ as was the case when they retrenched 14 000 workers in 2005, leaving them in poverty. Those who are employed earn little income which is unable to sustain them, meaning that they are trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty. With these little and diminishing employment opportunities in the formal sector, many people are surviving from income earned in the informal sector.

The informal sector has been expanding from what it used to be in 2000 when it comprised 831 businesses. Observably the informal sector is expanding enormously in Maseru like in



other African cities. This is the sector where most families derive subsistence income, particularly women with their diversified activities. The diversity of informal economic life across the continent is evident, as the literature indicates. The sector faces several challenges, among which is that vendors occupying public space in Maseru face spontaneous evictions and confiscation of their merchandise, exposing these poor people to further economic hardships and thus increased poverty. This is similar to Roever's (2007) findings on problems faced by the informal sector in the developing countries' cities, of which Maseru forms part. Despite these problems, the informal sector is an important component of the Lesotho economy as it continues to grow. Many people who are losing jobs in the formal sector, including mineworkers initially employed in South Africa, are participating in the sector. Therefore it would be appropriate for the government to consider integrating this sector into the economic system by legally recognizing its operations. This would enhance the employment level in the country and improve livelihood for poor households and reduce poverty.

Housing is one of the manifestations of poverty in Maseru. The urban poor in Thibella, Motimposo and Sekamaneng live in very bad housing conditions without basic services, putting many at health risk. This type of housing is self-financed using locally acquired materials to provide only shelter and does not promote the hygiene required by health standards. It lacks enough space as households are large, comprising an average of 4 to 5 members sharing the space. In addition, the poor are unable to get decent housing due to stringent land and housing market conditions existing within the urban area resulting in occupation of land without security of tenure. This is an indicator of underdevelopment and poverty. Decent housing for the poor provided with basic services is not foreseeable in the near future as current housing arrangements are not inclusive of the poor. Meanwhile these people are at risk of infectious diseases including TB. They live in a very distressing environment. Generally, the country faces serious challenges of spread of infectious diseases including TB and other illnesses such as bronchitis and water-borne diseases (GOL Report, 1999) that also reflect poor conditions. Observably, this situation is pervasive particularly in Maseru as many people are dying from these diseases. Nevertheless, housing problems can be addressed through provision of low cost housing, particularly for the poor, as was done in the late 1970s in Maseru. Again, the problem can be dealt with by providing land at low cost to allow those who cannot afford the available housing a chance to get land to construct their own housing. That would require the government to subsidize the cost of land sold by private

companies in order to reduce the cost to the prices affordable by the poor. Other basic services - water, sanitation and electricity - are under provided and even where they are provided, the cost hinders poor families from accessing them.

Though the country has abundant water, the available alternatives to piped water for poor households are unprotected sources. Water, Lesotho's most abundant resource, is being exploited through the 30-year, multi-billion dollar Lesotho Highlands Water project (LHWP) and transferred from the Orange River System and sent to South Africa's Free State and greater Johannesburg area, being a large concentration of South African industry, population and agriculture. Lesotho does not make use of this water to supply the nation's water needs, but rather to derive huge sums of money as revenue (see GOL Report, 2000). Nonetheless, efforts are underway to supply all parts of Maseru without water by 2015. Meanwhile the poor continue to suffer most, since for them to obtain clean drinking water, which is one of the necessities of life, they have to pay a cost daily or alternatively use contaminated sources such as streams. There is an official water policy, which applies to all nationals, whereby the government is supposed to subsidize water for the poor at M/R30.00 per head daily. However, the government does not pay the cost to the Water and Sewerage Corporation (WASCO). Consequently, the corporation provides water through a Coupon System which uses the prepaid metres installed at the public standpipes. The system's rates are rather high for poor people. Vendors have now emerged selling water in small portions through the coupon system (where someone buys prepaid water coupons that serve as a key in accessing water from the public standpipes) after buying it from WASCO. Therefore the government has to provide the poor free access to water in the city as used to be the case in the past before the coupon system was put in place to minimize their health risks

Water supply is not the only problem, proper sanitation as well does not exist. The poor use the nearby gullies/streams, exposing the people to health risks as the excreta is left in the open where the wind and rain sweep it into water sources making life very difficult. This is evident from the poor household of 'Mapoloko from Sekamaneng area. She indicated that she has to use these unprotected polluted sources. 'Mazulu confirmed this situation by indicating that she uses the nearby gully as a toilet as she has no alternative, the same gully where they also wash clothes (Interviews, November 2009), a clear indicator of poverty. The existing situation suggests a need for the urban government to come up with an immediate plan of action to provide these basic needed services for the poor.

Moreover, only a few people have electricity connections. Most of the nation, including the urban poor living in Maseru, fail to connect to mains electricity because the cost of installing electricity in Lesotho is far too expensive for ordinary citizens (at M/R2000.00 for domestic use), so only the rich can afford it. Moreover, the rich live in the areas provided with streetlights while the poor live in dark areas, indicating inequality and underdevelopment of poor areas including Thibella, Motimposo and Sekamaneng in Maseru (Field Survey, 2009). If the city cannot provide a better life for people, some of whom had hoped to better their lives when they migrated to the city, this means instead of poverty levels declining they have escalated. Though from observation it looks unlikely that in the near future Lesotho will resolve this problem of improving the standard of living of the poor living in the city, however, it could be a solution to provide electricity connection to these people at a subsidized cost, like other governments have done, for example, South Africa, so that even the poor can access it.

Other factors have also fuelled poverty in poor urban households. Generally, in Lesotho it is estimated that 60 per cent of the population is below the poverty line of R149 (UNAIDS, 2012:1) while the death toll from HIV/AIDS has risen drastically to 17 000 in 2009, reducing household income for much of the population and worsening poverty in the country. Already poor households, including those in the urban areas, many of whom do not have employment as their source of income, divert their scarce resources away from basic needs for the expenditure on medical care and funerals, indicating clearly the causal linkages between unemployment, poverty and HIV/AIDS. Consequently, poverty levels have risen as many of these households are pushed further below the poverty line, thus widening the existing inequality in the country (UNICEF, 2009:1). These problems faced by the poor in Maseru are not exclusively responsible for increased poverty, as there are other serious challenges faced by urban governance towards reduction of the prevailing poverty in Maseru.

### **Local governance and development of Maseru**

The effects of urbanization including population growth and the rising poverty levels are major challenges facing urban authorities in Maseru. The city is currently characterized by lack of services delivery to poor urban areas and lack of access to such services where infrastructure exists. These are some of the factors explaining why poverty levels are increasing among the poor in Maseru. In all areas surveyed, the existing local governance had not been able to meet these needs owing to the prevailing conflict between various structures responsible for urban development.

Maseru has a very complex system of local governance controlled from the centre for its budgetary requirements. The prevalence of conflictual central-local relations dominated by red tape has become a serious threat to effective delivery of services. Moreover, most of the functions of the local authorities mentioned earlier are causes of conflict because some of them have traditionally been the domain of chiefs. Chiefs, though are now part of local authorities, feeling stripped of the powers which they traditionally enjoyed in their respective areas by this modern institution, show resistance expressed by their actions which contradict laws regulating urban development, particularly land allocation, by allowing land sales. Initially, this role was transferred to local councils. This increased illegal settlements without basic services as these are not recognized as part of the urban reserve. This does not differ from Rakodi's (1997) exposition that in African cities, the increasingly commercialized process by which land held under indigenous tenure is disposed of, the markets that are developing in such land, and the processes of house production with which they are associated mean that the traditional responsibilities of community leaders are giving way to profit-making. Rakodi further argues that opportunities are being provided for brokers with purely commercial aims, and the process of illegal subdivision and house production on this land is increasingly emerging on land held under forms of individual tenure. The commercialization of land in Maseru has not only increased poverty mostly in areas which initially relied on agriculture like Sekamaneng and Motimposo where people have become poorer, as migrants from the countryside infested their land, but has also hampered infrastructural development as these areas are not easily accessible to avail needed services.

Nonetheless, amongst all the three areas surveyed during this research study, Thibella was the most deprived area with poor households without basic amenities. Most occupants were shack owners who had secured space for occupation from property owners. This is a common practice in RSA where proprietors lease out space for backyard dwellers who buy material for construction of shelter/shacks. In Thibella, the municipality provides basic amenities, water and sanitation only at a cost, further promoting the horrific situation whereby dwellers, instead of paying for sanitary facilities, use available open space to relieve themselves, avoiding the cost yet continually being chased by officials for contaminating the environment. The best alternative would be for the authorities to demolish the shacks and put up subsidized housing with amenities, to enable even the shack dwellers to afford the cost, so that the money they currently pay to the proprietors as ground rent could go into the payment for decent housing. This would not only reduce poverty among this group but would also

promote the town's outlook, as Thibella is an area in the interior of the city. In addition to these aspects of poverty in Maseru, the poor were also confronted by unsustainable livelihoods, further increasing their destitution.

### **Unsustainable Livelihoods**

The increasing urbanization has also unsettled conventional livelihood strategies, compelling residents to employ multiple unsustainable livelihood strategies to cope with poverty. These livelihoods were in the form of employment, assets: land and housing, social capital, rural-urban links, and the informal sector. It was noted, however, that such livelihoods only enable the poor to survive but not to improve their welfare.

The poor households dependent on rented accommodation to generate livelihood. They used their housing to generate income through beer brewing, particularly in Thibella. Only a few land owners collected rent as a means of their survival from tenants (Field Survey, 2009), confirming Moser's (1996 and 1998) attestation that housing is an important productive asset for the urban poor as it generates income when other sources of income are reduced. However, because such housing was often not secure and subject to spontaneous evictions, it was an unsustainable livelihood, as tenants moved from one place to another without generating a sustainable income. Livelihoods were not only physical assets that people used in building their survival means in Maseru. Other resources that would protect them against severe poverty were no longer available, worsening the situation.

In addition, community and interhousehold trust and collaboration that served as a survival strategy for the poor in Thibella, Motimposo and Sekamaneng in the past had disappeared, leaving the poor increasingly vulnerable. Yet Moser suggests that social cohesion embedded in household and interhousehold level relationships remains the most significant factor in reducing vulnerability (Moser, 1998). Continuous household restructuring has further worsened the situation. The poor are surviving on their own, making it difficult to cope with life. Other coping mechanisms including social networks are diminishing among the poor in the three communities, making them more vulnerable. However, some of them, mostly tenants, survive on social support networks/rural-urban links in order to cope with the demands of urban life.

Most of the poor in the areas of Thibella, Motimposo and Sekamaneng were tenants from the rural areas and had come to search for means of survival in Maseru. Among them were women who maintained links with their villages and mostly their maiden homes in order to

survive in town. The most notable example involved the flow of services regarding childcare between the village and the urban household. However, strategies such as this are often insufficient to make someone survive in town. Hence, these poor people were living in great despair. In order to keep the poor surviving in Maseru, they need to be assisted by government with skills to enable them generate sustainable means of livelihood. This will in the end, relieve the stress on the government on how to manage the escalating poverty levels in the city.

### **Gender and household poverty**

Among the various poor households headed by widows, widowers, and single-adult parents, both male and female, in Thibella, Motimposo and Sekamaneng, what differed was the level of poverty, which was dependent on resources the household was able to mobilize and possess. Women and men did not differ in terms of capabilities. Their chances for getting formal employment were both limited. However, male-headed households were poorer than female-headed households. What made them worse off is that they could not engage in some activities to evade poverty like women did. Women often manage to evade the status of the “poorest of the poor” (Chant, 2004). Despite this, widow-headed households were poorer than male-headed households, particularly those with orphans. The increased dependency on already poor households worsened poverty, confirming what other studies have found that many households around the world headed by women, particularly widows, are poor (Moser, 1996 and UN, 1997).

In these concluding reflections, poverty is not a new phenomenon in Maseru as exposed by the historical developments of both the city and the country. Increased urbanization had an additional impact on urban poverty. Several manifestations of poverty, including housing, water, sanitation, electricity and income, explain this relationship. In addition, poverty is reflected in the livelihoods of the poor. The urbanization process has unsettled and shaped the livelihoods of the poor, compelling them to adopt unsustainable means of survival.

This suggests that the government of Lesotho should engage with much more eagerness than before in dealing with poverty by implementing the Poverty Reduction Strategy/PRS and other related plans. It should be fully committed to channelling enough funds and resources towards structures that are designed to deliver basic services to the people. This will offset the implications of lack of these services, which have put many lives in a precarious condition. Furthermore, the government should engage in a comprehensive programme of

empowerment whereby these poor people could learn and acquire skills, which would enable them to establish self-initiated projects to improve livelihoods. Although these projects would initially require some backing from government lifelong skills such as these work better in poor communities. This will minimize dependency on the government.

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## LIST OF APPENDICES

### **Appendix I: Life History Interview Guide** **An Interview Guide for Poor Households who live in urban Maseru (Thibella, Motimposo and Sekamaneng)**

Name of interviewer \_\_\_\_\_ Number \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

#### **Section A**

#### **Biographical Information**

Family background:

Education:

Marital status:

District of origin:

#### **Urban Life**

Where do you live?

When did you first move to Maseru?

Why did you move?

If Maseru is your place of origin, can you tell me about your life in Maseru before 1980?

What are your life experiences since 1980?

If Maseru is not your place of origin, why did you leave your place of origin?

Can you tell me about your first (social and economic) experiences of living in the city?

Is this house you are living in now yours or are you renting the house?

How long have you lived in this area/house

How many people live with you?

What do they do?

Does the household have a flushing toilet?

Is it located inside or outside the house?

Does the household have access to supply of water and electricity?

#### **Livelihoods**

What is your main source of income?

What type of work do you do?

Can you tell me about your employment history?

Do you think the income you are getting is sufficient for your family needs?

Do you have other sources of income?

What type of assets does your household have? (e.g. investment, animals)

How do these assets contribute to the welfare of the household?

**Section B: For only those who participate in Street Vending**

**[This interview questions will be asked concurrently with questions in section A for those households that would have members participating in the informal sector]**

What was your major reason for joining street vending?

What type of business do you have?

How long have you been engaged in this activity?

What was your main work before joining street vending?

Which is your relatively permanent business location?

How did you acquire this space?

Who provided the shelter?

Do you pay monthly taxes or trading license fee for street selling?

Who owns this enterprise (business)?

What is the source of capital for this business?

What was the initial capital?

Do you sometimes sell on credit?

Where do you buy your stock?

How regular do you buy stock?

Is your activity seasonal? If it is seasonal, what do you do during off-season?

What is the approximate average daily income from this activity?

What can be your monthly profit from this activity?

Do you think this amount is enough?

How many days do you work per week?

How many hours do you work a day?

What are your total daily expenses for your household?

### **Life situation after joining street vending**

Do you think that street vending has helped improve your life/household life?

To what extent have you attained your expectations after joining street vending?

How would you compare your current life to your life before joining street vending?

### **Understanding effect of street vending on poverty alleviation**

Did you consider yourself poor before joining street vending?

Which top basic needs you/household had before joining street vending?

Which other means apart from street vending do you think can best alleviate poverty?

If any other means, why did you not engage in the above mentioned means?

Are there any problems and risks associated with street vending?

How do you address the encountered problem(s) indicated above?

What immediate risk do you face?

What future risks do you think you would face as a street vendor?

In addition to money you pay to buy goods that you sell, on what else do you spend money for this business?

### **Household needs and resources**

How has your life been affected by your street vending?

What improvements have you achieved by joining street vending?

What improvements have you made in relation to housing, water supply and sanitation?

What assets did you own in your household before you engaged in street vending?

How have these assets changed having engaged in street vending?

Have you acquired any new items /assets worth mentioning?

How do you save profits that accrue from your business?

## Appendix II: Respondents from Three Communities in Maseru

Motimposo Community		Thibella Community		Sekamaneng Community	
Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
T. Toli	M. Leooke	T. Letsie	M Moreke	R. Ts'osane	M. Sebotsa
S. Pulumo	M. Khatebe	R. Khoabane	K. Makhoalinyane	P. Sello	M. Letooane
M. Ngakane	M. Matong	M. Mofoka	M. Thabaneng	M. Maritints'i	K. Thoahlane
T. Masupha	M. Motokoa	T. Molati	M. Morie	T. Litaba	M. Litaba
T. Masupha	M. Pali	N. Kou	.M. Kume	L. Mphahane	M. Class
T. Tabane	M. Khaebane	T. Tente	M. Makheng	L. Sepinare	M. Kojane
T. Marabe	M Macheli	F. Mohale	M. Lebuso	M. Sepinare	M. Lelaka
M. Machecheroane	M. Fabia		M. Mofoka	L. Lelaka	M. Lefaphana
A. Machecheroane	M. Mating		M. Mofoka	T. Leche	M. Zulu
K. Pule	M. Ramorakane		M. Mpo	M. Lelaka	M. Litaba
	M. Lebitsa		M. Selomane	S. Sebotsa	M. Leche
	M. Ts'otetsi		M. Lelahla	H. Khoele	M. Leche
	M. Khakale		M. Mosehle	P. Mohale	M. Khoele
	L. Matsoso		M. Ts'ilo	M.	M. Thejane
	M. Thoabela		M. Lekarapa	MoMofuoanyane	M. Khatebe
	M. Mohale		M. Makhabesela	T. Ts'ilo	M. Lelaka
	M. Monts'o		L. Mots'oane		M. Mohapi
	M. Makhema		M. Nthunya		M. Lefaphana
	M. Lekhetlanyane		M. Pitso		M. Khoele
	M. Ntsunye		M. Serobanyane		M. Khoele
	M. Ntsunye		M. Lesia		M. Mphosi
	M. Machecheroane		M. Akhosi		M. MoMofuoanyane
	M. Phats'oana		M. Lerumo		M. Leraka
	M. Phakisi		M. Tikiso		M. Mokhethi
	M. Taleng		M. Putsoa		M. Ts'ilo
	C. Ramoabi		M. Mots'oloane		
	M. Motanyane		M. Mothetsi		
	M. Matsepe		M. Meraba		
	M. Phelebane		M. Mathetsa		
	M. Mabaso		M. Mohale		
	M. Ranthako		M. Pakela		
			M. Makoaela		
			M. Rakoti		

Source: Field Survey, 2009.

**Appendix III (a): Total Urban Population by Major Area, Selected Periods, 1950-2050**

Population (millions)	Average annual rate of change (percentage)								
	1950	1975	2007	2025	2050	1950-1975	1975-2007	2007-2025	2025-2050
<b>Major area</b>									
Africa	224	416	965	1394	1998	2.48	2.63	2.04	1.44
Asia	1411	2394	4030	4779	5266	2.12	1.63	0.95	0.39
Europe	548	676	731	751	664	0.84	0.24	-0.12	-0.30
Latin America and the Caribbean	168	325	572	688	769	2.65	1.77	1.02	0.45
Northern America	172	243	339	393	445	1.40	1.03	0.82	0.50
Oceania	13	21	34	41	49	2.03	1.49	1.05	0.65
<b>Urban Population</b>									
Africa	33	107	373	658	1234	4.76	3.90	3.15	2.52
Asia	237	574	1645	2440	3486	3.54	4.29	2.19	1.43
Europe	281	444	528	545	557	1.84	0.54	0.18	0.08
Latin America and the Caribbean	69	198	448	575	683	4.21	2.55	1.38	0.69
Northern America	110	180	275	337	401	1.98	1.33	1.11	0.70
Oceania	8	15	24	30	37	2.60	1.44	1.17	0.8

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division: World Population Prospects DEMOBASE extracts 2007, 2008, 2009.

**Appendix III (b): Percentage Urban by Major Area, Selected Periods, 1950-2050**

Percentage urban	Rate of urbanization (percentage)								
	1950	1975	2007	2025	2050	1950-1975	1975-2007	2007-2025	2025-2050
<b>Major area</b>									
Africa	14.5	25.7	38.7	47.2	61.8	2.28	1.28	1.10	1.08
Asia	16.8	24.0	40.8	51.1	66.2	1.42	1.66	1.24	1.04
Europe	51.2	65.7	72.2	76.2	83.8	1.00	0.29	0.30	0.38
Latin America and the Caribbean	41.4	61.1	78.3	83.5	88.7	1.56	0.78	0.36	0.24
Northern America	63.9	73.8	81.3	85.7	90.2	0.58	0.03	0.29	0.20
Oceania	62.0	71.5	70.5	71.9	76.4	0.57	-0.05	0.11	0.24

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division: World Population Prospects DEMOBASE extracts 2007, 2008, 2009.

### Appendix III (c): Nairobi Metropolitan Projected Population Up to 2030

Year	1999	2007	2012	2017	2022	2027	2030
Total National Population	28.7	36.3	41.5	47.2	52.9	58.7	62.1
Total Urban Population	5.4	9.0	12.3	16.9	23.1	31.7	38.2
Metropolitan Population	4.8	6.3	7.6	9.0	10.8	12.8	14.3
Urban % of National Population	18.8	24.8	29.6	35.8	43.7	54.0	61.5
NRM % of National Population	16.7	17.4	18.3	19.1	20.2	21.7	22.8
NRM % of urban Population	88.8	70.3	61.7	53.3	46.3	40.2	37.0

Source: Adopted, Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development, 2008, p.21.

### Appendix IV(a): Rapid and Differentiated Forms of urbanization in Thibella, Motimposo and Sekamaneng, Maseru

Form of urbanization	Thibella	Motimposo	Sekamaneng
National Population Growth (NPG)	NPG	NPG	NPG
Rural-Urban Migration (RUM)	RUM	RUM	RUM
Encroachment (E)	-	-	E

Source: Compiled by the Author. 2009.

**Appendix IV(b): Impact of Urbanization on Manifestations of poverty in Thibella,  
Motimposo and Sekamaneng, Maseru**

Sekamaneng - Motimposo –Thibella						
Manifestations of poverty	Before urbanization (1980)	After urbanization (from 1980)	Before urbanization (1980)	After urbanization (from 1980)	Before urbanization (1980)	After urbanization (from 1980)
<b>Water</b>	Used open spring	Get water from open spring  Get water from nearby gully  Collected water from roofing of their houses  Get water from nearby places  Buy water from neighbours who have water tank refilled by water and Sewerage Authority (WASCO)  –  –  –  –	Used public taps and own taps	Get water from open spring  –  –  –  Get water from neighbours with water taps  Pay for water from neighbours with taps  Buy water from public stand pipes (those using Coupon System)  Have water taps in their yards	Used public taps and own taps	–  –  –  –  –  –  Buy water from public stand pipes (those using Coupon System)  Have water taps in their yards



**Sekamaneng - Motimposo –Thibella**

<b>Manifestations of poverty</b>	<b>Before urbanization (1980)</b>	<b>After urbanization (from 1980)</b>	<b>Before urbanization (1980)</b>	<b>After urbanization (from 1980)</b>	<b>Before urbanization (1980)</b>	<b>After urbanization (from 1980)</b>
<b>Sanitation</b>	Used pit latrines  Used gullies	Use pit latrines  Use the nearby gully for toilet  Use neighbours' toilets  Use relative's toilets  Use Improved Ventilated Pit Latrine (VIP)  Use dug holes at the corner of their yards for toilet  –  Customers where local brewed beer is sold urinate in open space	Used pit latrines  Used gullies	Use pit latrines  Use the nearby gully for toilet  Use neighbours' toilets  Use relative's toilets  Use Improved Ventilated Pit Latrine (VIP)  –  –  Customers where local brewed beer is sold urinate in open space	Used pit latrines  Used gullies	Use pit latrines  Use the nearby gully for toilet  –  –  Use Improved Ventilated Pit Latrine (VIP)  –  Use public toilets provided by the Municipal but have to pay each time  Customers where local brewed beer is sold urinate in open space
<b>Electricity</b>	No electricity supply	Most households have no connection to electricity supply (cannot afford connection fee)  Those connected because one member had a formal job e.g working in factory	No electricity supply in poor households	Most households have no connection to electricity supply (cannot afford connection fee)  Those connected because one member had a formal job e.g working in factory	No electricity to poor households	No electricity to all visited households (of landlords and tenants)  –

Source: Compiled by Author, 2009.

**Appendix IV(c): Livelihood Strategies in Thibella, Motimposo and Sekamaneng,  
Maseru before and after urbanization**

Livelihood Strategies	Sekamaneng		Motimposo		Thibella	
	Before urbanization (1980)	After Urbanization (from 1980)	Before Urbanization (1980)	After Urbanization (from 1980)	Before Urbanization (1980)	After Urbanization (from 1980)
<b>Formal Employment</b>	Mining  Government employment	Cleaning Offices  Working in contracts in RSA  Domestic work	Mining  Government employment	Domestic work  Factory work  Cleaning offices	Mining	Domestic work  Factory work  Working in contracts in RSA  Working in catering company  Working as a night watchman  Cleaning Municipal offices
<b>Informal Work</b>		Sewing people's clothes  Selling garden vegetables  Selling clothes as a hawker  Selling pigs/ and their meat  Selling small items like sweets at home  Selling cooked food in the city streets  Selling locally brewed beer  Selling fresh fish from the lake		Sewing people's clothes  Selling garden and wild vegetables  Selling pigs and their meat  Selling small items like sweets in home yards  Selling snuff  Selling handicrafts  Selling local brewed beer  Selling fresh fish from the lake		Sewing people's clothes  Selling clothes as a hawker  Selling small items such as sweets, fruits in the bus stop  Selling boxes and plastics in the industries  Selling cooked food in the city streets  Selling locally brewed beer  Selling fresh fish from the lake

	Sekamaneng		Motimposo		Thibella	
Livelihood Strategies	Before urbanization (1980)	After Urbanization (from 1980)	Before Urbanization (1980)	After Urbanization (from 1980)	Before Urbanization (1980)	After Urbanization (from 1980)
<b>Occasional piece-work</b>		<p>Working in gardens</p> <p>Working in contracts</p> <p>Washing people's clothes</p> <p>Baby sitting</p> <p>Fitting satellite dishes and car sound systems for people</p> <p>Weeding in people's fields</p> <p>Building and maintaining people's houses</p> <p>Pleading people's hair</p>		<p>Working in gardens</p> <p>Working in contracts</p> <p>Washing people's clothes</p> <p>Baby-sitting</p> <p>Unloading and loading stock at shops</p> <p>Motor mechanics</p> <p>Building and maintaining people's houses</p> <p>Pleading people's hair</p> <p>Car wash</p>		<p>Washing people's clothes</p> <p>Baby-sitting</p> <p>Loading and unloading stock at shops</p> <p>Carrying people's goods with wheelbarrows</p> <p>Working in community development project (Fato-fato)</p>
<b>Social Grant</b>		<p>Old Age Pension</p> <p>Pension from government (retirement benefit)</p>		<p>Old Age Pension</p>		<p>Old Age Pension</p>
<b>Rent</b>		–	–	Rent (from built 'lines'/rooms in one straight line (malaise)		Rent (ground rent from backyard built shacks and built 'lines'/rooms)
<b>Asset Ownership Land</b>	<p>-land for settlement</p> <p>For subsistence agriculture</p>	<p>Still own land for settlement</p> <p>A few have land for agriculture</p>	<p>Land for settlement</p> <p>Land for subsistence agriculture</p>	<p>Still own land for settlement</p> <p>No more land for agriculture exists (sold out to immigrants, some turned into rented accommodation)</p>	<p>people owned land for settlement</p> <p>No land for agriculture existed</p>	<p>A few people still own land for settlement (as homes), most is converted to rented accommodation</p>

	Sekamaneng		Motimposo		Thibella	
Livelihood Strategies	Before urbanization (1980)	After Urbanization (from 1980)	Before Urbanization (1980)	After Urbanization (from 1980)	Before Urbanization (1980)	After Urbanization (from 1980)
<b>Housing</b>	–	–	–	Landlords are renting out some housing units to get cash income	–	Are renting out some housing units to get cash income
<b>Social Networks</b>	–	Get food and financial assistance from neighbours and community	–		–	Get food and financial assistance from neighbours and community
<b>Rural-urban linkages</b>	–	Assisted with childcare by parents and relatives at home  Remit cash to assist those at home and receive cash as assistance from home  Get food and financial assistance from parents, siblings, children and relatives	–	Assisted with childcare by parents and relatives at home  Remit cash to assist those at home and receive cash as assistance from home  Get food and financial assistance from parents, siblings, children and relatives	–	Assisted with childcare by parents and relatives at home  Remit cash to assist those at home and receive cash as assistance from home  Get food and financial assistance from parents, siblings, children and relatives

Source: Compiled by the Author, 2009.

## Appendix V: Imports of Lesotho from 1919 to 1933

Year	Merchandise	Livestock						Grain						Other Produce	Total
		Horses, mules, etc		Cattle		Sheep and goats		Wheat and wheat meal		Maize and Maize meal		Kaffir-corn			
		Quantity	Value	Quantity	Value	Quantity	Value	Quantity	Value	Quantity	Value	Quantity	Value		
£	No	£	No	£	No	£	Bag	£	Bag	£	Bag	£	£	£	
1919	1,069,393	637	6,025	2,032	12,045	1,096	1,039	2,013	4,351	25,424	26,004	11,282	11,635	6,545	1,137,037
1920	1,091,840	476	3,608	447	2,429	190	174	1,624	4,996	41,526	54,445	15,339	23,089	406	1,180,987
1921	468,148	66	488	66	222	230	202	1,284	2,932	51,949	36,104	12,509	10,360	494	518,950
1922	623,755	50	235	432	1,032	453	309	1,485	2,644	36,584	25,176	13,126	10,677	597	664,425
1923	767,198	157	669	5580	13,097	401	350	2,132	3,762	10,024	8,242	2,899	2,552	622	796,492
1924	788,005	692	2,124	4,891	11,548	468	216	4,666	7,582	82,291	69,928	32,871	28,963	604	908,970
1925	733,173	425	1,021	1,682	5,008	338	364	3,343	6,458	39,432	32,785	34,939	27,475	6,263	812,547
1926	593,919	70	239	768	2,147	264	400	4,741	8,395	55,892	39,607	25,256	19,766	501	665,014
1927	780,470	127	490	2,747	6,947	598	1,059	5,925	9,506	46,602	34,155	8,452	9,631	635	842,893
1928	881,767	1,350	1,855	4,772	11,239	716	1,541	6,920	1,0460	15,289	10,925	3,399	3,124	663	921,574
1929	669,008	251	501	2,428	6,351	149	207	5,415	8,837	25,049	17,398	4,315	3,030	1,084	706,416
1930	431,534	12	34	645	1,526	312	163	5,179	6,760	61,416	30,318	10,828	7,090	524	477,949
1931	389,237	12	70	436	996	344	144	4,917	7,529	13,9901	63,302	1,374	1,015	440	462,733
1932	404,041	16	67	349	793	838	275	3,894	6,386	95,718	41,880	1,983	1,291	378	455,111
1933	362,986	40	93	1,264	1,691	783	210	8,675	10,381	356158	21,7007	25,018	17,028	1,709	611,110

Source: Pim's 1935 Basutoland Economic Situation Report