Latter-day South African Spatial Planning And Problem Solving Initiatives Against A Globalisation Backdrop, And The Redrawing Of Boundaries

Introduction

Arguably, South Africa (SA) was most notorious for its system of apartheid and most famous for its transition from apartheid and the enigma that is Nelson Mandela. This has meant that a country sitting on the southern tip of Africa, far removed from the hegemonic bustle of Europe and America, has enjoyed quite some attention on the world stage. This was not always the case, and SA was once quite economically, and politically dislocated from the world stage, ensconced in its “laager” in the face of economic sanctions, and academic, cultural and sporting boycotts.

The notion of the laager runs deep through SA’s veins – the original pioneers, or “Voortrekkers”, would draw their oxwagons into a circular formation, or laager, so as to protect themselves and their livestock from attack. During the apartheid era and with SA’s pariah status, successive nationalist politicians aimed at self-sufficiency for SA, in order to beat sanctions and fight apartheid opponents. Accordingly, SA established MOSSGAS and SASOL to try and attain energy independence, and ARMSCOR, for weapons self reliance, which included a nuclear capability (McGowan 1993). It was hoped that whites and blacks could then get on with their “separate” lives, where “separate” of course had a spatial dimension as well – a plethora of legislation and polices dictated that these two group should live apart, hence – “apartheid.”

But no country is “hermetically sealed” from the rest of the world, and SA was important to at least the US, as a strategic ally in the cold war (McGrew 1992), and also because of its vast stocks of strategically important and other minerals. (In 1982, SA accounted for fully 64.6 percent of Western world gold production, although this had declined to 33.7 percent by 1992 (McGowan 1993: 56)).

With the advent of a post-apartheid SA in 1994, the situation has changed dramatically. Gone are the mostly inward looking policies; the country has political legitimacy and is now firmly part of the global economy – consider some anecdotal and harder evidence for this: where once South African politicians were essentially boooed off the world stage, Nelson Mandela’s 2003 85th birthday celebration was attended by a phalanx of local and overseas luminaries (including Queen Beatrix, the Clintons, Oprah, and Robert de Niro). More “globally telling”, was the fact that the glittering event was sponsored by the Coca Cola corporation, whose CEO also delivered a lengthy speech in a banqueting hall emblazoned with Coca Cola livery (albeit in desaturated colours!).

But global influences are not only to be found in the cultural sphere: The Johannesburg (Jhb.) Securities Exchange (JSE) is heavily weighted in terms of resource stocks such as the giant Anglo American corporation, international paper giant SAPPi, energy giant SASOL and some of the biggest platinum mines in the world, namely Anglo Platinum and Impala Platinum. The market capitalisations of these stocks and correspondingly the JSE, can experience rather wild volatilities in accordance with the changing fortunes of the South African currency, the Rand (R).

The upshot is that SA is highly linked to the global economy and currency speculators can cause havoc – indeed the Rand reached an all time low of over R13 to the Dollar in recent
years. The Rand is currently fluctuating around the R7.40 mark and many economists expect it to trade in a band between R7 – R8 in the near future. With many companies having overseas listings and the overall index of the JSE heavily biased toward so-called “rand hedge” stocks (essentially their costs are in Rands, but revenues are in overseas currencies, primarily US dollars, pounds sterling and German marks), company fortunes can change overnight.

Overseas companies also have a presence in SA: the Ford Motor Company is set to invest about R1 billion (South African Rand; approximately US$ 137m), in car production (Fraser 2003). In so doing, it joins other global brands with a South African presence such as Toyota, BMW, Volkswagen, Daimler Chrysler and General Motors, (the latter owns 49 percent of the local Delta Motor Corporation). Similarly, with increasingly global trade and the port of Durban anticipated to be moving as much as 2.2 million twenty foot equivalent units (containers) by 2010, the concession from the Durban terminal could be worth as much as R2 billion. (Durban is one of the top 30 ports globally in terms of throughput). One of the main bidders for the concession is the global firm of CSX world terminals, something that is opposed by the Transport and Allied Workers Union, which fears job losses (Enslin 2003).

While Durban is a globally ranked port, SA’s primary city, Johannesburg has been accorded secondary global city status (although of course not everybody regards this as a status issue and/or a desirable mantle). Johannesburg has undergone significant institutional and other transformation in the last decade and has spent some time constructing a far-reaching vision statement for the city. The vision is that by 2030, Johannesburg will be

a world-class city with service deliverables and efficiencies, which meet world best practice. It’s (sic) economy and labour force will specialise in the service sector and will be strongly outward oriented such that the city economy operates on a global scale. The strong economic growth resultant from this competitive economic behaviour will drive up city tax revenues, private sector profits and individual disposable income levels such that the standard of living and quality of life of all the city’s inhabitants will increase in a sustainable manner (Johannesburg 2002).

One could go on – globalisation and its effects is a vast topic and one could provide many examples of its effects in SA. It is clear though, that SA is no longer in a laager and indeed its borders are somewhat porous - it is engaged in all manner of political, cultural, economic, sporting and other exchanges. (Unfortunately this includes porosity to international crime and/or drug syndicates, but this major problem will not be addressed here).

Rather, I will examine this issue of the development of SA’s space economy against a globalisation backdrop and show how the country attempts to address Spatial/Development problems in this light. Hence, I start with a very brief discussion on globalisation and then move on to a truncated history of the SA space economy and discussion of spatial frameworks and latter-day initiatives such as IDPs, and SDIs, with a brief case study of the Maputo SDI.

A golden thread in this discussion thought is the overarching state approaches to development, namely the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), and the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) approach. These approaches, and the influence of globalisation results in a porosity and blurring of boundaries between ideologies, the state and the private sector and the space economy itself. But now, what of globalisation?
Globalisation

This is of course a vast topic and can be only briefly dealt with here. A useful definition is provided by McGrew (1992: 12): Globalisation is

the forging of a multiplicity of linkages and interconnections between the states and societies which make up the modern world system. The processes by which events, decisions, and activities in one part of the world can come to have significant consequences for individuals and communities in quite distant parts of the world.

As McGrew (1992) notes, globalisation does not necessarily mean that the world is becoming more politically united or culturally homogeneous, nor can it “simply be equated with the global sing tendencies of modern capitalism… it has significant military, political, legal and cultural dimension and has been associated with the spread of concepts such as liberal democracy, technical efficiency and it has also even affected southern African music!

Globalisation took its place amongst other dominant characteristics of the global system in the 1990s, such as a “superpower decline, complexity and diversity, the possible decline of the nation state and processes of international governance. This is all in the context of “the awesome complexity of the contemporary global system where issues such as arms control, ozone depletion, debt, drugs, terrorism, currency crises, space exploitation, human rights, hunger and HIV/AIDS “crowd the political agenda” (McGrew 1992: 12,13).

After World War II, the dominant global imperative was the cold war. Up until the early 1990s, the “central axis of world politics was East- West competition, the ‘Great Contest’ between capitalism and communism” (McGrew 1992: 12). The so called “Third World” (TW) mattered only in that it became part of the agenda of superpower rivalries, but eventually managed to shift the debate from that solely of West vs. East, to North vs. South. However, for a variety of reasons, including the fragmentation of TW political cohesion, first world antagonism and aggressive monetary and market oriented policies, 1980s economic recession and global industrial restructuring, and the end of the cold war and fundamental changes in the world order (McGrew 1992: 11-12).

Especially after the oil crisis, technological innovation and the saturation of mass markets, there were a number of economic transformations: the collapse of a system of mass production as firms moved into highly differentiated mass markets, a new wave of innovation centred around information and telecommunication technologies, the increasing importance of the service sector in relation to other tertiary activities such as tourism, the informalisation of economic activity, changes in the organisation of production with increasing emphasis on flexible labour practices, the liberalisation of financial markets, the increasing power of transnational corporations, and the relocation of industry from the industrial heartlands in North America to Europe to the low wage periphery (Harrison 1998: 14).

Also, the “global city” (GC) is often a much sought after mantle, one that will supposedly place a city or country on the world stage. Similarly, “glossy globalisation” presents globalisation as a favourable process which promotes technological progress, stimulates capital investment, increased the productivity of labour and results in more goods and services for the world’s people… however, globalisation has less desirable attributes at some times and places: increased unemployment, lower wages and labour standards, homogenization of cultures, environmental degradation, social polarization, racial animosities, the ‘new urban poverty’” (Marcuse 2003).
Thus, the discourse of global and global cities has been viewed by some as, inter alia, increasingly neo–imperialist and econocentric (Robinson 2003). Johannesburg’s future, for example, is “entwined into of the most powerful discourse and set of practices shaping cities. The idea of being a global city and the urgent requirement to improve living conditions for the poor are respectively parameters of the world city hypothesis and developmentalist understandings” (Robinson 2003: 259).

Clearly then, globalisation has numerous effects many protagonists and antagonists. What of globalisation, development and the SA space economy? A suitable backdrop is a discussion of the government’s approaches to the development challenge, viz. the RDP and GEAR.

South Africa: RDP and GEAR

The RDP

As Craythorne (1997: 454) states, “from 1990 onwards the ANC began a policy of grassroots consultation and academic investigation with a view to formulating policy for the future” and this culminated in the document entitled the “RDP.” It was published in 1994 as a policy framework and act. This act did not define the RDP, but established a fund, which was to be used to finance RDP projects and programmes. In paraphrasing the RDP document’s 147 pages, there are some salient feature for the present discussion: The RDP was seen as an “integrated, sustainable process, with one of its key programmes “meeting the basic needs [in urban, peri-urban and rural areas] in respect of jobs, land, housing, water, electricity, telecommunications, transport, a clean and healthy environment, nutrition, health care, and social welfare” (ibid). The RDP also turned attention towards, inter alia, promotion of SA culture, sports and recreation, collective bargaining, affirmative action measures, “strong” metropolitan government, elected local government with a “developmental culture,” and the promotion of small business including the promotion of more favourable procurement policies.

GEAR

The RDP Ministry office was closed in 1996. (Its head later became a prominent businessman in SA). In its place came a market–based approach to urban development within an increasingly conservative national economic framework. Soon afterwards, the government had adopted a new policy framework – Growth, Employment, and Redistribution, at the centre of which were polices such as privatisation. Thus the local government of Jhb embarked on a privatisation of municipal services that set it on a collision course with trades unions, for example, the SA Allied Municipal Workers Union.

The upshot is that although GEAR has been in the ascendancy, there are still vestiges of the RDP in SA -- the borders are blurred and we shall see how this plays out in SA spatial planning and problems solving initiatives… To begin with though, one needs to understand the legacy of apartheid.

A truncated history of the development of the SA Space economy

Borders and boundaries have always played an important role in SA’s development and the nature of its space economy. The policy of apartheid imposed boundaries in a quite literal sense, by seeking to have blacks located in their own “homelands and only seen as temporary sojourners in white South African cities, to a satisfy the demand for labour, especially on the
mines. Legislation saw to it that blacks owned only 13 percent of the land and were not permitted to live in white areas (via the group areas act) and as part of influx control measures, they were required to carry a pass in order to "legitimately " be in “white areas” (Boshoff 1989).

In the 1920s and 1930s there were few attempts at industrial dispersal; rather the emphasis was on industrial growth per se. When the infamous National Party came to power in 1948 it envisaged territorial segregation on an ethnic basis: blacks were to live in reserves/bantustans/homelands and what the government would later attempt to legitimise as “national “ and :“independent states.” Urbanized Africans were given only temporary residence rights in “white area” with a legal status of “politically rightness temporary visitors.” There was not an immediate political approach to industrial dispersal, but the government concentrated on tightening up direct influx control to hold labour down in the white farming areas, and less urgently in the reserves. In the late 1950s, white investment was permitted only on the borders of the homelands as it was felt that white capital and a white presence inside homeland borders would challenger at least dilute segregationist policy (Boshoff 1989).

Following Verwoerd’s (the prime architect of apartheid) public pronouncement on industrial dispersal in 1960, a range of incentives was offered in order to entice industrialists to invest in growth points, which bordered the homelands. These incentives included subsidies to social overhead capital, tax concessions, financial assistance, labour concessions, transport subsidies and tariff protection, the aim of all these measures was clear: to halt, or even reverse the flow of Africans to the “white areas.”

In the 1970s, white capital was allowed across “borders” into the homelands, and the 1975 National Physical Development Plan appeared – the fist time a regional plan was concerned with the rest of the SA space economy and the first stirrings of notions of corridor development with the demarcation of a number of growth axes and later guide plans (Harrison and Todes 1996). Although homelands remained separate and distinct entities, now there were also thirty-eight planning regions, nodal cores and a system of urban centres. In keeping with the modernization paradigm of development, there was still an emphasis on (urban) industrialization, although there were some recommendations to include agriculture and the informal sector (Boshoff 1989).

During the term of the comparatively reformist, but militaristic PW Botha, the boundaries between government and other actors softened: government met with big business and the space economy changed again. This time, the “Good Hope” plan of 1992 divided the country into eight, then nine development regions, which actually cut across homeland boundaries. Borrowing strongly from growth pole theory, (but ignoring many of its theoretical requirements such as the need to having a limited number of designated growth poles, with propulsive industries with strong backward and forward linkages), the apartheid government fragmented the space economy and identified four metropolitan areas, ten “deconcentration points”, almost 50 “industrial development points,” and “other industrial points” and “ad hoc” cases. The industrial decentralization (ID) strategy did create some jobs in peripheral locations, but ID is generally regarded as a failure, with the apartheid government’s political/ideological agenda flying in the face of economic forces and exhibiting a great opportunity cost in terms of funds spent and jobs created. Few of the growth poles attained any notion of sustainability (Boshoff 1989).

In 1991, “a revised regional industrial development programme replace the system of selected growth poles with an almost spatially uniform application in which all new or expanding industries outside the then PWV region and Durban/Pinetown could apply for incentives,
substantially downgrade the level of incentives available to industrialists, and replaced the old input-related incentives with a market-related, output-based profit-oriented incentive. In 1993, support was extended to small firms. There was also an emphasis on export oriented industry, with Regional Industrial Development Programme (RIDP) subsidies applied together with the subsidies payable in them of the General Export incentive scheme” (Harrison 1998: 65). The 1991 RIDP was associated with the creation of about 15 000 jobs, but this was limited compared with the loss of almost 58000 jobs in the manufacturing sector, largely due to pressures of globalisation. At best, the RIDP provided “limited compensation for job losses as a consequence of lowered tariffs, illegal imports, and increased capital intensity merely reinforced existing patterns of development” (Harrison 1998: 72).

Post-apartheid policy represents shift from import substitution to export oriented industrialisation and supply side support measures are seen as the most appropriate means to secure the necessary global competitiveness. The Dept. of Trade and Industry is an important driver of latter-day regional policy due to the strong link to industrial policy (Harrison 1998: 74). The major elements of the DTI programme are industrial cluster initiatives, investment support via a tax holiday programmes and the small and medium manufacturing programme, support for small, medium and micro enterprise (SMME) and spatial development initiatives (SDIs) which we now turn attention to, after a brief discussion of spatial frameworks and Integrated development plans (IDPs).

Spatial frameworks (SF) and IDPs

(SF) have been used in many countries to inter alia, guide public sector investment and infrastructure and services, provide indicative guidance for private sector investment and as the basis for public/private collaboration and In SA, planners need to co-ordinate and integrate development. This is a difficult enough task, and is bedevilled by the need to overcome the spatial and other impacts arising from the legacy of apartheid. Furthermore, there is the “weak position of integrative spatial planning in relation to sectoral planning and interest, the lack of an effective institutional framework for inter sectoral co-ordination, the role of power and factional politics in shaping the rationality of planning frameworks, the way in which spatial frameworks often expose the varying objectives, interests and sometimes contradictory policy aims of government, and the difficulties in producing meaningful spatial frameworks where spheres of government are overlapping, and roles and responsibilities are subject to contestation.” (Harrison and Todes 2001:66).

At the provincial level, some attempts have been made at producing non-statutory provincial growth and development strategies, but with limited success (Harrison and Todes 2001). Far more attention has been paid to IDPs: according to the official Department of Local Government Guide Pack (n.d.) , “the IDP is a principal strategic planning instrument which guides and informs all planning, budgeting, management and decision -making in a municipality. It has the following core components: an assessment of the existing level of development, (which includes identification of communities with no access to basic services), development strategies (including a municipality’s vision, and a council’s development priorities objectives and strategies), projects, and integration, which includes a spatial development framework, a disaster management plan and integrated financial plan, (both capital and operational budget), other integrated programmes and key performance indicators and performance targets, and approval.”

IDPs are deemed necessary, due to the need to make effective use of scarce resources, to speed up delivery, help attract additional funds, strengthen democracy and hence institutional
transformation, co-ordinate sectoral plans, overcome the legacy of apartheid, promote intergovernmental coordination (IDP guide pack n.d.).

As Harrison (2001) has shown, IDPs have a rich genealogy and they reflect or draw on for example, new public management practices, historical and contemporary ideas about integration within the planning process and concepts of development and development planning. Theoretical antecedents of integrated planning include regionalism/holism, procedural rationalism, and systems theory, radical planning theory, and collaborative planning. IDPs have been influenced by international agents, such as the GTZ, the World Bank, and the ODA.

But, “some tensions accompany this coalescence, for example, the IDPs emerged just as government was shifting ideological gears from the RDP to the GEAR strategy. This meant that concerns with institutional and other transformation and equity and participatory governance, were sitting alongside the drive to efficiency and fiscal responsibility, priorities expenditure, and budgets being linked to strategic objectives. The state would provide a framework for development, with the private sector being responsible for delivery” (Harrison 2001).

Furthermore, in 1996, “the ANC government confronted its first economic crisis since taking office: a rapid outflow of foreign capital and a sudden fall in the value of the Rand. The pressures to abandon ‘leftist’ rhetoric and pacify global capital were great. Clearly, any notion of central planning—even of the type espoused by the RDP office—was not easily reconciled with an economic orthodoxy” (Harrison 2001: 186). Again we see the influence of globalisation in the SA space economy and development effort. In the face of many of the development difficulties in SA, especially those of integration, IDPs proceed apace, with some success, but I now examine Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs).

Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs).
(This section draws heavily on Rogerson (2001-various).

SDIs are also supposed to impact on and redress the SA space economy, but in terms of corridor development rather than nodal development. As Peberdy and Crush (2001: 115) state, the SDI programme involves identification of key geographical zones (often along pre-existing transportation arteries) with demonstrated economic potential for investment.” (Often though, infrastructure has to be significantly upgraded). The programme in South Africa was conceived in 1995 and is supposed to promote higher rates of both economic growth and job creation and intensive intervention in an identified area to fast-track private sector investment, to stimulate the growth of small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) and to enhance the empowerment of local communities. In so doing it supports the GEAR programme, such that SA might attain a competitive export-oriented economy with private investment from domestic and international sources.

This is not lightweight initiative -- in one speech President Mandela described South Africa’s SDI programme as “akin to an industrial revolution” and viewed the planned SDIs as “important stations for boarding the development train” (South African High Commission, London, 1998:4, cited in Rogerson 2001a: 249). The architects of the SDI programme argue that a “paradigm shift” has occurred in economic policy from the formerly “protected and isolated approach to economic development, towards one in which international competitiveness, regional cooperation, and a more diversified ownership base is paramount” (Jourdan et al., 1996: 2, cited in Rogerson 2001a: 253).
After Rogerson (2001a: 254), the major strategies for the SDI programme stress four core themes: the “crowding-in” and co-ordination of public and private sector investment in areas of proven, albeit often underutilised, potential for economic development; ensuring political support, commitment and buy-in for the SDI process from the highest levels of government in order to facilitate a fast and focused planning approach; the use of well-planned and publicised opportunities for the private sector to obtain detailed information about the SDIs and how they might invest in them. Another planned output is the clustering of key industries around strategic anchor projects in order to harmonise productive activities and maximize their local linkages or multipliers.

Another form of SDI is the industrial development zone (IDZ), created in response to globalisation pressures. This is not the same as an export-processing zone, such as is found in many developing countries, but is seen as a specialised industrial area within an SDI to promote exports. Attention turns now to the Maputo Development Corridor

The Maputo SDI or Maputo Development Corridor (MDC)

The MDC crosses the Mpumalanga province in South Africa and parts of the Gaza and Maputo provinces in southern Mozambique and will eventually link up with a corridor to Walvis Bay in Namibia, through Botswana. It is the “most advanced development corridor in Africa” (Mitchell 1998:1) and its methodology has as been “exported” to other African countries.

Central to the MDC, is the “creation of an environment that will facilitate public private sector partnerships. A linked mechanism for crowding in local and international investments is a set of strategic interventions to provide the infrastructure required to unleash new economic potential in mining, state -of-the-art manufacturing, tourism, gaming and agriculture. “ (Rogerson 2001a:260).

The MDC project aims to regain the formerly important role of Maputo in the Southern African regional economy and to be a major potential player in world markets, via clusters of production activities, including the stainless steel, chemicals and agro-food sectors spin-offs from these activities, such as tourism, cultural villages, and casinos (Rogerson 2001a). The MDC has also generated a brisk trade from informal cross border traders and yet again the issue of shifting borders crops up. In fact, the border post between Mozambique an SA is being upgraded, and “borders should shift from their traditional role as barriers and points of control to become bridges which facilitate the movement of good and people.” (Peberdy and Crush 2001: 115).

In evaluating the MDC in particular, Mitchell (1998: 768) concludes that the MDC has managed to enhance institutional capacity and mobilize over $200m to rehabilitate infrastructure, but with more investor interests being expressed in Mozambique than SA, and a tendency to generate more capital intensive than labour intensive growth, often to the detriment of environmental concerns. In the end then, as Harrison (1998: 74) citing Murphy, notes, the SDI programme provides the spatial dimension to the government’s broader policy approach which attempts to marry the principles of and objectives of the RDP (equity, redistribution and basic needs), with those of GEAR (efficiency, growth and international competitiveness). However, Harrison (1998: 75) also maintains that there is “some element of smoke and mirrors in the presentation of SDIS. To some extent a SDI represents a ‘packaging’ of project already planned by the private sector and a spatial focusing of investment capital that may have gone elsewhere in the country.
However, state support for SDI projects has reduced investment risk, and may well have led to investments that would otherwise not have occurred.

Conclusions

The SA space economy and the striving for development has come a long way, but still faces great challenges. One of those challenges is to deal with globalisation -- a highly contested influence that has been shown by many authors to have myriad positive and negative effects and impacts. This paper has shown that globalisation has also influenced SA spatial frameworks and policies, in the context of competing, but related demands, as evidenced in GEAR and the RDP. I argue that there is a great danger of being simplistic and blinded by globalisation as a meta narrative and one should closely examine developmental goals and objectives, especially as they occur in a variety of contexts. For example, "just as Jhb’s citizens and managers must grapple with that city’s complexity, and devise creative ways of thinking about its future, and negotiating present dilemmas, so urban theorists need to move beyond globalisation and developmentalism, and embrace the ordinary, but dynamic complexity of urban life" (Robinson 2003: 278).

Also, as (Harrison 1998: 15) puts it: "although the southern African region is indeed linked to the global economy and global forces, it is not simply a “helpless pawn shaped entirely by forces outside the control of regional and local actors. It is possible to improve the position of a region within the world economy by enhancing the positive attributes of the region.” One hopes that the initiatives discussed in this paper are up to the task.

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