CHAPTER 1

The past ten years of South Africa’s political landscape been imbued with a young man who has forcefully occupied the minds of South Africans across race, class and gender. The South African political arena was marked by a controversial figure named Julius Malema. Malema took advantage of the political stage to rupture what he understood to be the silences on the perennial disadvantaging of ‘black’ people in South Africa. He was in the forefront of an emerging populism. He achieved this through championing the articulation of the economic grievances and injustices that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission had not addressed. He played a role in destabilizing the concept of an unified rainbow nation by triggering the suppressed resentments of some black people. This gained him popularity and support particularly among the youth. Moreover, Malema’s presence and performances within the public space has various implications, among them one that concerns this study: the articulation of black identity, particularly masculine identity, in the post-apartheid period.

The reason for this is premised upon the issues of unemployment some young black men face. This unemployed cohort with hopes of a better future is prone to support a man who narrates a story of an enviable black man whose success did not require sleepless nights in front of academic books. For instance, it is highly unlikely that the men and women who supported the ANCYL’s march to the Union Buildings in Pretoria on the 27th of October 2011 had employment.

In this chapter, I outline a brief profile of Julius Malema, offering a glimpse into his life. Malema has a particular understanding of the struggle, he adopts Mandela’s ‘the struggle is my life’ dictum within a post-colonial and post-apartheid phase. This subsequently calls for the employment of a historical and contextual approach to understanding Malema’s actions, especially the remarks he made pertaining the Jacob Zuma rape trial in 2006.

1.1 A BIOGRAPHY WITH MEANING

Julius Sello Malema was born in 1981 to a single and fierce woman named Florah Malema who was a domestic worker. He grew up during a phase of political turbulence marred by violence in a poverty stricken township called Seshego, in what is now the Limpopo province. As Gary Kynoch (2005) shows, the level of criminal violence that erupted in some highly concentrated South African townships escalated after the outbreak of the heightened challenge against the
apartheid state. He averred that the 1980s political conflict facilitated a great influx of weapons into violence-stricken areas. Sekhonyane and Louw’s (2002) report showed that Seshgo, located in Limpopo, was not exempt from vigilante attacks and violent activities of the time. This bloody atmosphere offers insight into the rationale behind Malema’s access to a gun at a young age (Forde, 2011).

Malema was a member of the Masupatsela pioneer movement of the ANC. The main task of that movement at the time was the illegal removal of National Party posters placed outside police stations. Malema was a child soldier who graduated into a politician (Forde, 2011). At age nine, already a member of the pioneer movement, Malema helped to marshal crowds at the Seshgo stadium, a rally organized to welcome Elias Motsoaledi, one of the ANC leaders who had been imprisoned. Forde (2009) comments that he wore a *hand-me down uniform*, he was callous about. The second-hand uniform may have been received from former pioneers of Masupatsela. The significance of the experience was his becoming a comrade, “a big man in the making” (Forde, 2009: unknown).

Moreover, Malema was elected as the chairman of the Youth league branch and regional chairman in 1995. The Congress of South African students (Cosas) of the Limpopo constituency elected him as chairman in 1997. He became the national president of the same organization in 2001. In 2002, he led a chaotic Cosas march by school learners. Years later, a fairly divided and discordant electorate made Julius Malema the president of the ANC youth league, succeeding Fikile Mbalula. It can be argued that Malema’s rise to power parallels his rise in wealth. Forde (2011) mentioned Malema’s luxurious collection of watches which he declared must be coupled with matching shoes. Malema offered fashion advice to Fiona Forde stating that “the leather in your shoes is supposed to match the brown leather in your belt and watch…” (Forde: 2011: 9).

The interest in fashion as well as careful consideration of how one appears is often described as metrosexuality. Hellen Shugart (2008) distinguishes between metrosexuality and traditional masculinity. “Metrosexuality served a crucial rhetorical function for the reconciliation of commercial masculinity with normative masculinity” (Shugart, 2008: 37). On the subject of masculinity, Forde (2011) reported that Malema became a father in 2006 with a woman who later ended their domestic partnership because he spent too much time with his other family, the ANC. Nonetheless, Forde (2011) stated that Malema centralizes his son, implying that fatherhood is important to him.
An argument made by Ritcher and Morrell (2006) is that fatherhood is associated with manhood. “Fatherhood is a role that is understood and exercised in different ways. One does not have to be a biological father to accept the fatherhood role...” (Morrell, 2006: 14). Malema did not have a biological father but the ANC functioned as his family and the older generation within the ANC played the role of patriarchs (Forde, 2011). Malema’s navigation between his biological family and the ANC family is interesting. In his private space he was a father and in the ANC space he became the child. Based on the reports on Malema’s behaviour towards members of the ANC mother body, for instance his comment about the then minister of Education, Naledi Pandor’s accent, labelling it as fake, Malema symbolizes a disrespectful child that has challenged and ridiculed its elders. Malema’s comments were slammed by the ANC’s leadership who said they suggested a “lack of respect and dignity for the individual concerned” (Mail&Guardian, 2009: para. 8). It is common knowledge that Malema’s term as president of the ANCYL has been characterized by controversy and criticism. Although there are multiple issues that Malema has been criticized and reprimanded for, this research report focuses only on one: Malema’s comments relating to Jacob Zuma’s rape trial. Malema’s enactment based on and around this event must be rooted from somewhere and the following paragraphs provide an argument on the basis of his performances.

Du Preez and Rossouw (2009) stated that Malema was groomed within the ANC. He spent time reading political books as well as all biographies of ANC politicians. Forde (2011) substantiated this by stating that Malema was well versed in the history of the party as well as the diverse leadership of the party. Forde (2011) added that Malema knew that despite the political inexperience of the ANCYL’s founding members (including Ashbey Mda, Anton Lembede, Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela); the young leaders managed to hijack the ANC mother body to direct its course. He knew that they managed to “take hold of the reins of the mother body and dictate the course of the ANC during the early years of apartheid...and firmly kept their hands on the leadership throughout the struggle” (Forde: 2011: 80). Nelson Mandela was a highly militant young man in his youth league days. He and other members of the liberation movement founded the ‘Mkhondo we Sizwe’, a military wing of the ANC. Mandela became Commander-in-Chief of the MK in the early 1960s. Mandela and his colleagues were responsible for the ANC’s resort to violent resistance as a response to the violence of apartheid.

The culture of violence and defiance was appropriated as the life-force of the ANC and most of its masculinities (Suttner, 2007). This was not only applicable to the ANC, it applied to the great
part of the broader resistance movement. This lifeline infested the thinking and actions of various ANC cadres; one of those whom the virus of violence infected was Malema’s political hero, Peter Mokaba. Malema’s appropriation of ‘violence’ was expressed by his assertion that he belongs “to a militant and very radical organization and if you are not militant, you run the risk of being irrelevant” (Fiona, 2011: 13). Malema also referenced Mandela in his argument for Nationalization and somewhat glorified militancy by asserting that “we [the youth league] stand opposed to any peace-time heroes who want to oppose nationalization as not being a policy of the ANC... [Mandela] himself is better placed to give a proper interpretation of the freedom charter…” (SAPA, 2010a: para. 3-4). This statement was made in reference to the ANC’s defiance campaign in the 1950s.

Moreover, Forde (2011) highlighted Malema’s admiration for the late controversial Peter Mokaba and that he wanted to be like Peter Mokaba. The late Peter Mokaba was an ANCYL president in the 1990s and he was also from Polokwane. A short biography of Peter Mokaba published by the local government of Polokwane (2010) stated that Mokaba was an activist with enactments of the militancy of the 1976 defiant generation. In his teenage years, Mokaba was already a delinquent refugee pursued by the state police for public violence. His unruliness at school consequently had him expelled; however he continued studying on his own and later became a teacher. The short biography reported that in 1982 he was arrested again for ANC membership (which was banned at the time). The biography stated that he was also charged for possession of weapons and for undergoing military training in Angola and Mozambique. Upon his release years later, he rallied the youth for resistance against apartheid. In 1988 he was arrested again on charges of commanding MK organizations.

Peter Mokaba was the champion of the “kill the boer, kill the farmer” chant. The ‘dubul’ibunu’ song, Malema was tried for, has resonance in Peter Mokaba’s “kill the boer” chant. Peter Mokaba, as is Malema, was an embodiment of rebellion fearlessness and militancy just like Nelson Mandela. There are many incidences that rendered the currently peace-loving Mandela a violent rebel in his youth. The kind of rebelliousness Julius Malema performs today has roots in the older generation’s defiance. One could even go as far as to argue that Malema’s performances are an emulation, even more of an upgrade, of ANCYL presidency. For instance, Forde (2011) highlighted the incident whereby Mandela challenged the white judiciary during the Rivonia Trial. Mandela’s act of rebellion elevated him (along with the others) to martyrdom (Fiona, 2011). Malema is aware of the ‘benefits’ of rebellion, controversies and populist politics.
After he was suspended by the ANC, he said “I have made my contribution in this country. My name will be recorded in the history books of this country unless you want to teach people a distorted history” (Bardo, 2011). Malema’s recent hate speech trial also awarded him popularity among the masses, so Malema, who declared the leaders of the ANC his fathers, is a chip of the old bloc. Now that the paper has fore-grounded Malema’s performances, the objectives of this study shall be discussed in the following sub-section.

1.2 THE AIM AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The objective of this project was to investigate contemporary masculinity in the political sphere. The project addresses multiple and related layers of contemporary masculinity. It studies black masculinity, particularly Malema’s gendered performances. Gender is a “stylized repetition of acts…which are internally discontinuous…so that the appearance of substance is precisely that, a constructed identity, a performative accomplishment which the mundane social audience, including the actors themselves, come to believe” Judith Butler (1990). Moreover masculinity performance is shaped by context. Context historicizes gender performances, meaning a plethora of performances emerge. This paper is characterized by constant highlighting of the impact of context in shaping contemporary masculinities. This will be done through a critique of dominant discourses on black masculinity, urging for counter-epistemologies. This has direct impact on the manner in which Malema’s gender enactment concerning the Jacob Zuma rape trial is understood and articulated as struggle masculinity and rebel masculinity.

The main purpose of this project is to show that Malema performs struggle masculinity. The basis of focusing on Malema was his constant in the media. Cinman (2010) rendered Julius Malema a brand due to the media’s obsession with him. According to his evaluation using the industry standard measure called AVE (Advertising Value Equivalent), ‘Julius Malema’, the brand, could generate R287878 with around 450 mentions within a period of two days. Cinman (2010) reported that ‘Julius Malema’ is not only a local affair but an international brand. He stated that “only 49% of these mentions are local. Even taking into account the recent BBC incident, which would have had unexpected reaction in the UK, the volume of mentions from the US is surprising” (Cinman, 2010: no page).

Moreover, there is a relative scarcity of discursive engagement on contemporary models of ANC masculinities, particularly within the youth league. This research project aims to add onto Erlank, Unterhalter, Suttner and recently Forde’s work. Fiona Forde has offered a rich biography of
Malema. However her book falls short of explaining the deeper meanings behind Malema’s presentations. However, on a constructive note, Fiona’s book can serve as a source of data to be analysed in other research endeavours centred on Malema. Suttner has also done some work on contemporary ANC masculinities. He also wrote about the Jacob Zuma trial and its relationship to patriarchy.

1.3.1 HOW TO VIEW MALEMA

The choice to focus on Julius Malema in examining contemporary masculinity consequently steers this paper into referencing ANC masculinities because for one to understand Malema’s performance of masculinity, one must not isolate his presentation from ANC influence. Moreover, Malema’s performances are rooted in ANC masculinities, he tends to reference past heroes. For instance, when he was making a general comment about being challenged on his ideas, he reminded his audience that “when Nelson Mandela fought for land, they took him to prison just like us. This means that there is no freedom in this country.” (SAPA, 2011b: para. 2). Authors such as Suttner (2007), Erlank (2003) and Unterhalter (2000) have helped shed light on the gendered narratives of the struggle and liberation movement within the ANC during apartheid and colonialism. These scholars discussed some of the distinct models of ANC masculinities which were of marginalized men, for instance gay men, non-violent men and possibly working class black men who opted to be passive and not get involved in politics during the liberation struggle. Oxlund (2008) identified the gendered discourses within post-apartheid student politics. He discussed the importance of considering a multiplicity of discourses in the construction of gendered roles in student politics. He showed how African traditional views intertwined with the history of the struggle in carving some masculine identities. However, his work lacked an analysis of ANC masculinity within a broader political space. Student politics and mainstream politics differ even though, with regards to ANCYL masculinities, they can be suitable samples for researching some aspects of ANC and ANCYL masculinities. Moreover, it is acknowledged that the post-liberation ANC differs from the ANC of the liberation struggle, thus the masculinities of each era are typified with nuances. On the other hand masculine identities of the past tend to be appropriated and applied in different contexts by those who stand to gain from doing such as in the case of Oxlund’s (2008) study.

Malema’s location of himself within the struggle does not mean that his enactment of struggle masculinity is exactly similar to that of Thokozani Xaba’s description, for instance overt
violence which involved murder committed by former liberation struggle comrades in some instances. Nonetheless, the project strived to show parallels between Xaba’s concept of Struggle Masculinity and Malema’s performances. “Struggle masculinity refers to the type of masculinity which became dominant among young, urban Africans during the days of the struggle against apartheid (in the 1980s)” (Xaba, 2001: 108). An illuminating discussion on struggle masculinity will follow shortly, for now a brief focus on the concept of the struggle begins. The struggle was a phenomenon characterizing the opposition to apartheid. The lamentation that the ‘struggle continues’, suggests the overlap of dynamics of apartheid into the post apartheid space. In highlighting the perennial socio-economic marginalization of certain groups, especially African natives classified as black, he said “one hundred years of the ANC must mean a roof over your head, bread on the table…(because these things are still an issue for the majority)...the struggle continues” (Laing, 2012: para. 46. Italics added).

Blacks (a historical group) continue to feel the brunt of apartheid’s legacy because the end of legal apartheid did not herald the depreciation of black economic subordination. Xoliswa Mtose comments that the “…experiences of everyday racism remains a historical and current reality for black South Africans. This suggests that the legacy of apartheid racism continues to have a significant impact on black people in South Africa” (Mtose, 2011: 325). In terms of economic marginality, the post-apartheid imagination heralded a proliferation of what is called black elitism (see Eskew, 1992). Julius Malema can be classified as a member of the small black elite. But nonetheless Malema averred that “People think that because they are now in positions, they are eating dinners with the Oppenheimers. They think we have all arrived. Our struggle was never about (this)…neither was our struggle about blue lights” (Malema, 2012: IOL). This means that although black elitism has historicized blackness, the struggle still continues the theoretical reasons for such shall be highlighted below.

1.3.2 LOCATING MALEMA IN A LARGER CONTEXT

The prevalence of unequal conditions in post-colonial societies has been explained by some post-colonial scholars. Shohat (1992) expressed her awareness of the pivotal links and continuities between the colonial and post-colonial. She remarked that the term ‘post-colonial’ functions as a contradiction to neo-colonialist critique. The term post-colonial, associated with anticolonial projects, allows us to dream and fantasise about the day colonialism, clothed or naked, ends. Moreover in the case of the South African context, Pumla Gqola urged that we ought to perceive
apartheid and post-apartheid as “simultaneously connected and oppositional” (2010: 2). Post-colonial and post-apartheid South Africa continues to be bound by the material effects of race. Race is an illusion, it is unreal yet it has material effects. Race is a social construct which continues to have a defining role for many black South Africans. This constitutes one of the reasons Biko (1978) warned against the premature undertaking of a non-racial project.

Non-racialism denies the impact of race on the material realities of people. It is a project which entails racial integration which Biko (1978) criticized as he believed it thwarts the opportunity for a marginalized group to develop economically as a result of what he called black solidarity in order to reach a synthesis. The synthesis can be simply defined as a state of equilibrium in which groups can dialectically influence and shape each other with regards to issues such as culture and identity. At the moment in South Africa, the concept of non-racialism is a façade. Gqola (2001) also highlighted this issue through her critique of what she called rainbowism. She argued that “Rainbowism became an authorising narrative which assisted in the denial of difference” (Gqola, 2001; 98). It is more of a label which has no concrete meaning.

In fact the concept of a rainbow nation exposes the illusion of non-racialism. Gqola (2001) argued that the “metaphor of the rainbow people is hailed as a celebration of unity and the successes of a post-apartheid dispensation. Yet its benefits continue to elude, slip and mock” (2001: 100). Moreover, Gilliespie (2010) argued that non-racialism is a variation on white privilege and considering that “systematic racism encompasses a broad-range of white-racist dimensions: racist ideology, attitudes, emotions, habits, actions and institutions in white society…” and for such a system to change, it requires an equal but opposite force, which can be said to be Steve Biko’s antithesis.

The argument that the end of apartheid did not herald the end inequality, informed by the marriage between class and race, partly substantiates Malema’s location of himself within the struggle. However, Mngxitama’s (2011) analysis of Malema as a comprador challenges this position. Mngxitama (2011) quoted Frantz Fanon’s argument that post-colonial Africa is characterized by leaders who have taken over the colonialist’s project. He stated that such leaders are become black colonialists that take over power for self enrichment. Mngxitama (2011) argued that for Fanon, compradors tend to engage in conspicuous consumption while the rest of the population suffers. If Malema is a comprador and yet claims to live in the struggle, what implication does that have on the concept of the ‘struggle’?
1.4.1 DECIPHERING THE CONCEPTS

The concept of the ‘struggle’ may be theorised as a means of defining authentic black identity within an oppressive environment. For men, one could go as far as to argue that it is a means of identifying and consolidating black masculine identity in terms of the role of opposition and symbolic heroism assumed. The struggle is an act of resistance. It refers to a process taking place in time, an unwanted condition that is challenged. Therefore it denotes an action, a process that is indicative of a period. In the South African case, it is a process of opposing the disenfranchisement and socio-economic marginalization of a group whose condition is a product of structural violence. Moreover, it is an anticolonial and post-colonial phenomenon which, from a Fanonian perspective, is blind to class difference.

It is faulty to discard the relativity of colonial subjectivity. For instance age, gender, colony, ethnicity, geographic location and sexuality interact differently to construct identity. Moving back to the concept of struggle in the South African context, the concept of ‘the struggle’ has assumed an associational relationship with the apartheid era which was characterized by the intersection of racism and capitalism, a marriage that subordinated ‘black’ South Africans. There are some scholars such as Jeremy Seekings (2008) who imply that the end of apartheid meant the end of the struggle, rendering South Africa’s inequality a class issue.

For instance, Mtebule (2001) claimed that there is a gradual erosion of race, culture, gender, political orientation including spatial location (the marginalised spaces populated by black people as a result of apartheid’s racialist project) as uniting factors in the definition of identity. He argued that these are being replaced by class and economic power. This assertion is correct to an extent because it does explain the relationship Malema maintains with the black poor. On the other hand, the concept of unity may be contested. Moreover, Mtebule’s suggestion that race no longer matters echoes Seekings’ (2008) assertion that race is no longer significant in articulating post-apartheid South Africa’s disintegrated society. This position exposes a lack of an understanding of the concept of structural racism which implies that 1994 could not have eroded structural racism which was characterized by the social, economic, educational and political exclusion of black people (Biko, 1978). This argument will be further discussed in the third chapter. For now, the paper moves onto a discussion of the main concept of this project, struggle masculinity.
1.4.2 DISCUSSING STRUGGLE MASCULINITY

Struggle masculinity is a model of masculinity that was socially constructed as a response to the apartheid system, which was characterized by Bantu Education, exploitation of workers and communities, high rents and rates, and suppression of protest as well as political militancy. Moreover, Xaba (2001) stated that the struggle for many young men in urban areas had influence on their sense of identity, meaning that the ‘struggle’ was intertwined with identity. Julius Malema, labelled a firebrand, had a militant streak to him. While addressing a small crowd in Kliptown, Soweto, he vowed that “we as soldiers must die with our boots on. We must never give up- we must never surrender” (Bauer, 2012). This war rhetoric substantiates that claim that Malema enacts struggle masculinity. Xaba (2001) stated that struggle masculinity is inherently violent; it is birthed in militarism. Cock (1991) discussed the role the masculinity rhetoric plays in the process of turning men into soldiers. She stated that the sphere of conflict can be viewed as a space for cultivating masculinity. In Malema’s case, the sphere of conflict is ideological. During apartheid, black men were fighting the castration of their manhood by the state. One of the means of emasculating black men was marginalization, creating marginalized masculinities. It is worth noting that the ANCYL’s militancy has been dismissed by the ruling party as ill-discipline (Bauer, 2012).

The “comrades were impatient with elders who either seemed to be tolerating or accommodative of apartheid and this created tensions between the young and the old” (Xaba, 2001: 109). There is a known tension between the ANCYL and the ANC due to disagreements on certain policy issues, for instance the ANCYL calls for the nationalization of mines and the radical appropriation of land without compensation while the mother body refuses such. Malema also asserted that “… members of the ANC and South Africans must appreciate…that all issues on economic freedom in our lifetime are elementary to the success of the revolution…” (Roberts, 2012: para. 13). This statement is indicative of the differences in ideology between Malema, the dissident in a post-apartheid neo-liberal era, and ANC members and the general population which is on the anti-nationalization camp. Moreover Xaba (2001) continued to state that struggle masculinity deems the ‘elders’ as too complicit with the current ‘unacceptable’ state of affairs which is the reason Malema urged the youth to take over. He averred that “our generation will have to take full responsibility…” (Roberts, 2012: para.15).
During and after the fall out with the ANC, Malema accused the ANC of being complacent with the status quo and denying change. Malema stated that “they actually suppress new ideas. I do not know, maybe they serve as a threat to the current leadership of the ANC” (De Wet, 2012: para. 3). Malema further expressed his discontent by arguing that “if the leaders of this revolution are not prepared to fight for this land, the economic freedom fighters will” (Bauer, 2012: para. 14). These so called economic freedom fighters are illegitimate within a ‘post-struggle’ dispensation. In fact these post-struggle fighters are labelled as “…hooligans and thugs… beyond redemption…and should be expelled from the movement…” (Sapa, 2012a: line 12).

Xaba (2001) argued that apartheid’s struggle masculinities became marginalized under the new dispensation. The reason for this was premised upon lack of education ‘skills’ that could afford them opportunities to make a living legitimately. Xaba’s work alluded to the disgruntled state of former comrades who have been sidelined. It is as if they had been used for the liberation movement’s goals and when the struggle ended they became dispensable. This also echoes Malema’s assertion that the ANC “used [us] like condoms” (Sapa, 2012b: para. 4). According to Xaba (2001) the failure of assimilation birthed subaltern masculinities in which criminality was part of its characteristics. Malema’s ANC youth league faction endorse political ideas that have proven to be marginal with regards to the liberal tendencies of the ANC. Roberts (2012: para. 2) reported Malema’s accusation of the ANC leadership for “going round the world ensuring investors that nationalization was not on the agenda of the ANC”. Moreover, violence against women also shaped struggle masculinities. “Struggle masculinity considered women to be fair game” (Xaba, 2001: 116). This is an indication of sexist attitudes towards women. Black men’s marginalization exacerbated the unfavourable positions of black women.

“Sexism is the subordination of one sex, usually female, based on the assumed superiority of the other” (Kendall, 2008: 352). The idea of subordinates assuming dominance over other subordinates is a phenomenon that radical feminists have highlighted. What is more interesting is the shifting power dynamics, for instance the relationship between black men who are no longer economically marginalized in post-apartheid South Africa and women. Women’s changing economic positions have an impact, within Connell’s hegemonic framework, on the fluid location of black men within the hierarchy of gender. Women’s economic ‘empowerment’ initiatives, within a patriarchal order, are deemed to marginalize men however this can be countered through perpetrating violence. This is an argument based on a specific women’s
reality. The current patriarchal system often renders women at the economic margin. Women’s economic marginalization subjects then to further abuse and for some material possessions have become means of subordinating black women and homosexuals.

In Malema’s case access to influence through his position as the ANC youth league’s president, seemed to be an opportunity to attack white people. “[W]e have no respect for Helen Zille…Helen Zille is a representative of apartheid…” (SAPA, 2010e: para3). This quote also emphasizes the continuity of the struggle. Moreover, on the issue of strategies of accessing power, one must note that these remarks were made at a political rally leading to the elections. Although Malema’s attack on Helen Zille is an inappropriate tradition and a political boxing game, the attack is probably indicative of a deep desire to occupy hegemonic masculinity through partaking in the subordination of white women which is predominantly an exclusive terrain of white men. This assertion reflects the position taken on black men and masculinity; this point will be discussed further in the third chapter. While we are on the subject of Malema’s “desire” to inhabit the throne of whiteness, one may add to the argument made that Malema’s sexist perception is echoed by his ‘vision’ of white domestic workers. This ‘vision’ not only reflects Malema’s racialist politics, it undresses his gender beliefs. Instead of envisioning the erosion of gendered divisions of labour, he calls for white women to partake in the subjectivities of some black women.

Moreover on struggle masculinity, Xaba (2001) stated that the importance and urgency of education by comrades was relegated to the margin. Malema’s early political career had placed his schooling career at the backseat because he only graduated from Mohlakeng Secondary School in Seshego at the age of 21 with most of his subjects failed. (Forde, 2011). Moreover, struggle masculine identity was characterised by valuing the community, this was expressed through the formulation of “‘defence committees’ whose responsibilities included protecting communities from the state and the ‘third force’ (clandestine forces either armed or controlled by the state or operating with its tacit consent), as well as weeding out state informants.” (Xaba, 2001: 109). Malema’s enactment of this ideal to defend the ‘community’ Malema promised five thousand residents of Diepsloot that “we are here for you. We will not rest until you stop worrying about where your next meal will come from” (Mabona, 2011: para. 9).

Struggle masculinity is rebellious against authority; this is an exact reflection of current ANCYL and ANC relations. For instance Julius Malema along with the ANCYL defied the ANC’s
suspension of ANCYL leaders, including the denial to have Julius Malema step down as the youth league’s president. Moreover, Julius Malema called Jacob Zuma a dictator by stating that “it is under President Zuma that we have seen a critical voice of the voiceless being suppressed…we have seen under President Zuma democracy being replaced with dictatorship.” (De Wet, 2012: para. 3). Moreover, Xaba (2001) showed how struggle masculinity enacted in a certain moment can become dangerous in another. This implies that Xaba’s struggle masculinity, as a ‘positive’ configuration, met its demise in 1994. He showed how men who embodied this type of masculinity were relegated to the margin as they had no place in the contemporary/post-apartheid era. Xaba (2001) reported the death of one of his research participants named Fernando. “Fernando was killed by the police who had been looking for him for some time” (Xaba, 2001: 106). Malema seems to be facing a “political death” by the ANC through expulsion from his position. In this case however, Malema was, on many occasions, given platform to reform, however rebellion overwhelmed his militant decisions.

According to an online article on The Post Online (2010, para. 2) website, Malema received some form of military training by the age of fourteen. In 2010 there were also reports of Malema leading a military sting In light of this knowledge and the illegitimization of certain gender identities in a different context (the post-apartheid era), a question arises; has Malema become a danger to society as well? Perhaps not a danger in the same sense of Xaba’s conception, regardless of this Malema has been described as a danger to South Africa’s unity. Others may even criticize the idea of unity because reconciliation is a fallacy, South Africa remains divided. This division may be accounted for by the failure to honour the Hegelian Dialectic as Steve Biko (1978) advised. The Hegelian dialectic is a three step strategy of bringing about change, namely through the thesis which is a problem that should be countered by an opposing force to the problem, namely the antithesis in order to birth the synthesis, which can be simply explained as the state of balance. In ‘I write what I like’, Biko borrowed Hegel’s tool of analysis to articulate the South African condition. This tool is comprised of stages that are meant to function as a route to a neutral state. One of the stages Hegel conceptualized was the thesis. Biko marked the apartheid project as the thesis, arguing that black solidarity was the antithesis which would usher in the antithesis, (a true non-racial society). The problem with Biko’s contribution is that it does not provide specific details of this “antithesis”. For instance it does not specify the position of apartheid beneficiaries during this antithesis phase. However, the helpful contribution by Biko is exposing the structural mechanics of apartheid.
1.5 MINDING MALEMA’S VERSION OF THE STRUGGLE

The continuation of apartheid factors into the post-apartheid era explains Malema’s constant location of himself within the struggle in a democratic South Africa. Malema’s comments on apartheid ‘forces’ lingering into contemporary South Africa during his hate speech trial with Afriforum provided one with an understanding of Malema’s perception of post-apartheid South Africa’s judicial system. He stated that there are dark evil forces that lurk in the corridors of our courts at night (YouTube, 2011) meaning that apartheid forces continue to characterize the judicial system as a way of casting judgement on Afriforum’s intensions with the case against him. Moreover, during an interview with Deborah Patta on a television show called ‘3rd degree’, Malema was asked about his luxurious lifestyle, he argued that the things he possess are not owned by him but by the bank therefore that does not make him rich because he owns nothing. Discussions on the factors that define richness are beyond the scope of this project. However, it remains important to explain how Malema understands of the struggle because his remarks have an impact on the construction of his identity as well as that of his public audience be it through rejection, assimilation or merely filtering what they deem acceptable.

1.6 DISCUSSING THE TOPIC: THE PUBLIC

Newman and Clarke (2009) discussed the contending definitions of the term public. They noted Charles Taylor’s argument that the term, public, is a central organizing concept of the ‘modern social imaginaries’. The spheres, areas and aspects of social life are mapped by the term. Newman and Clarke (2009) stated that the term does not refer to the private, the market, the family, the personal or the individual. Instead the term is “a ‘complexly structured’ concept that contains descriptive, ideological and normative associations’ (Newman and Clarke, 2009: 11). Although the public is not an individual, it can be influenced by individuals. This is the reason Warner (quoted by Newman and Clarke) warned against treating the public as an abstract category stating that publics are rooted in the perceptions of their participants. The participants are the people/actors “who shape –and sustain- spaces and sites of publicness and public action” (Newman and Clarke, 2009: 12). Newman and Clarke (2009) argued at publics have cultural significance and that they help constitute identity and social action.
Newman and Clarke (2009) also argued that the public domain has a variety of meanings; it may refer to a set of times, places and/or spaces. It is a type or series of institutional development, social interchanges or activities or a more personal sensibility, such as outer-directedness or self-presentation or social discourse. One may even say that the public is an arena of contestation over various issues. Those contestations and the characteristics of the public have influence on the identities of those indirectly involved in the public. I say indirectly involved because the non-public figures are not mere receptors of what is concocted as identifying features of a nation (or identity), there is always negotiation. In terms of masculine identity, public figures are in positions of modelling translations of produced or dominating models of masculinity. Their public status, meaning visibility to a vast audience, contribute to marketing their forms of masculinity as well as assigning themselves hegemonic statuses. Before one moves any further, a framework in which men are analysed shall follow.

1.7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Good, Borst and Wallace (1994) argued that previously, a number of social science research has been based on men but rarely analyzed men as gendered beings. Scholars such as Hearn (1997), Morrell (2001), Connell (1995) and Brod (1987) along with many others fueled the journey to historicizing men as a category. Hearn (1997) argued for the naming of men as men. The deconstruction of men, the transformation of the relationship of men’s subjectivity and objectivity in effort to understand and dismantle gendered hierarchies. Brod (1987) contended that men’s studies perspectives are pivotal to women’s projects which mostly began two decades ago. Brod (1987) argued that men’s studies is mistakenly perceived as a problem, however it dismantles patriarchy in a sense that it deals with the normalization of men as non-gendered beings whereas women’s studies’ main objective is to correct women’s exclusions.

Considering Malema’s occupation of the public space, he models masculinity for other men to reject, accept or ignore. Although Malema models certain forms of masculinity, for instance struggle masculinity as well as rebel masculinity as the study shall show, it does not mean that his model is fixed. One must note that Malema’s model of masculinity is racialist and it is influenced by populist ideas. It may seem exclusive to black men however it is opened to appropriation by any one. Embracing contradictory multiple identities and weaving them into new types of personal histories represents an opportunity to move away from fixed-identity politics. It is useful to acknowledge that the politics, discourses and context in which the fusing
of multiple identities is facilitated determines the outcome of those identities. This means that such process of ‘fusion’ cannot be dislocated and analysed outside cultural, economical and socio-political context.

Moreover, Malema’s enactment of masculinity must not be understood outside political context. For instance Morrell (2001) argued that 1994 led to the reconfiguration of gender identity, a plethora of gender identities emerged while others shifted in meanings. For instance the heroes of the marginalized that embodied struggle masculinities during apartheid became thorns to the marginalized. The main idea here is that there is a plethora of masculinities and the change in political context has had impact on gender identity. I am in agreement that there has been a change in gender identities; however the nature of this has been underplayed in certain instances. Despite any changes, this paper aims to show that black masculinities remain marginal. For instance, struggle masculinity and black elitist masculinities are understood to be subaltern.

Connell (1995) argued that marginalized masculinities are shaped by hegemonic masculinities. This relationship is not merely top-down influence; there is a dialectical relationship between these fluid identities. This theory is highly relevant and shapes this study; however there is one objection, especially in black masculine relations. The argument that is made in the paper is that black men cannot be hegemonic in the same sense as white hegemons. Black hegemonies are a contradiction because blackness in essence is designed to be marginal. Blackness is an economic construct which is influenced by politics. Borrowing from Marxist lenses, economics determine the basis of politics, for instance even the dismissal of the idea of nationalization has been highly premised on the idea that nationalizing mines in South Africa would be expensive. This simply means that political power is determined by economic power which is a character of whiteness, thus black masculinities, despite political dominance cannot be hegemonic instead black masculinities compete for power in the margin. This however does not mean that they have no impact on central power. For instance with regards to Connell’s (1995) four interlinked categories of masculinity, marginalized masculinities, as in working class men, have some influence on the hegemons. Power is dialectical but unequal; the effectiveness of whatever amount of force in which the marginal exert on the hegemons is often dependant on those who reside with power. For instance consider the outcome of the CODESA negotiations, black people ended up with some dwarf political power deprived of an economical muscle. The liberation struggle was inspired by the state of marginalization a certain group classified as black contended against. Struggle masculinity is a category of masculinity which was/is marginalized.
Meaning struggle masculinity was constructed in response to apartheid’s impact on black identities; however within the context of the marginalized spaces, struggle masculinity was dominant when considering Xaba’s (2001) work. Struggle, rebel, heroic, black elitist masculinities are all, in the category of black masculinity, internally competing masculinities within a margin.

1.8.1 RESEARCH APPROACH

This project employed a qualitative approach. The chosen method considers the interpretative epistemological orientation which helps to highlight the complex factors that influence identity performance and contours the meanings employed in the construction of masculinities. Moreover interpretive social science allows one to show that social reality is fluid and definitions are created out of social interaction which is guided by dominant ideologies and norms. The process of interpretation which yields definitions of identities is influenced by the researcher’s analytical approaches which cannot be read outside politics. Zhang and Wildemuth (2008) argued that a qualitative approach usually constructs descriptions or typologies, along with expressions from subjects reflecting how they view the social world. Moreover, Zhang and Wildemuth (2008) also argued that the goal of qualitative research is to explore people’s experiences, practices, values and attitudes in depth and to establish their meaning for those concerned.

In simpler terms, the qualitative school of thought is concerned with developing explanations of social phenomena, “it seeks answers to questions by examining various social settings and the individuals who inhabit these settings.” (Berg, 1995: 7). Berg argued that qualitative research is concerned with the quality of things. It refers to the what, how, when, why and where of a thing. It also refers to the meanings, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols and description of things. Keith Punch (2005) discussed critical issues of social research, one of them being the distinction between explanatory and descriptive knowledge. Description is more concerned with ‘drawing a picture’ of what is happening whereas explanation provides the reason for the existence of such a ‘picture’. Without the description it is difficult to understand the ‘why’ which is the outcome of interpretation. This study was simultaneously a descriptive and explanatory project. The explanations are an outcome of interpretation which is a characterization of interpretive epistemology. Epistemology can be simply defined as the study of the ‘how we know’. Scholars such as Berg (1995) claimed that interpretive social science allows one to show that social reality is fluid and that definitions are created within social
context. This means that identities are fluid because contexts change. If identities change, what then is the purpose of categorizing them? The purpose is to capture the meanings provided in a certain context. It forces one to study the context in which identities are configured. The importance of context as well as understanding that context is not fixed and isolated.

Context, with regards to black masculinities, is important in order to understand certain relations between men and women. For instance, during apartheid some, if not most, black men were politically, socially and economically marginalized. However this still did not hinder them from partaking in the subordination of black women. The post-apartheid era ushered freedom for women in South Africa, at least in theory because after 1994 there was an increase in cases of violence against women (Shefer, Ratele, Strebel, Shabalala, and Buikem, 2007). Morrell (2001) argued that the changes in the political and economical spheres had influence on gender relations in South Africa. He argued that the change has also had significant implications on masculine identities that are dependent on women’s subordination.

1.8.2 DATA COLLECTION METHOD

The project was centered on analyzing an event captured in documents, namely online news reports. The concept of struggle masculinity was read in a way that could inform the type of data accumulated, namely sexism. The choice to focus on Malema’s link to Jacob Zuma’s rape trial guided the selection of articles. Thus the purposive selection of text reflected the sampling method. Specific texts concerning articles related to the hate speech trial were collected from various newspaper articles such as the City Press, IOL and Sowetan newspaper archives, the Daily Maverick website and so forth. Other sources were not ignored, but the news reports were more favored because of their access to the public. This means that the public had access to the data analyzed and probably had its own interpretation of the event. This makes it more pivotal to briefly include an analysis of the impact of populism on Julius Malema’s masculinity. This shall be done as the paper progresses. The manner in which the performances of Malema around the rape trial are interpreted by the public is not engaged in this project because the project is not about media content analysis although it uses media sources.

Max Weber (quoted by Macnarama, 2006) viewed media content as a means of monitoring the cultural temperature of society. According to research, the media is considered very important in most people’s lives next to sleep and work. The media is a space in which social agents are able to articulate their views. Moreover, the media also has massive influence in terms of shaping
identity. The advantage of using media reports as source of data is the knowledge that the model of masculinity performed by Malema is filtered to the public, subsequently influencing the masculinity ideas of the public. The downfall of the project however is rooted in Harry Brod’s criticism. Brod (1987) argued that historically studies on men have relegated men’s private lives to the status of insignificance. This project is guilty of this by virtue of analysing Malema from a public-space point of view at the exclusion of the private. To counter this, the project included a brief biography which touched on Malema’s personal identity and his political career.

The exclusive reliance on newspaper articles forms one of the shortfalls of this project. In this case, the newspaper articles serve as secondary sources of data instead of the first. This is so because the project is not about analysing the representation of Malema by the Media, but rather the manner in which Malema presents himself to the public. The media only serves as a medium between the audience and Malema. Investigating the impact of Malema’s performances on the public and the representation of Malema by the public constitute two distinct topics, incorporating such magnitude of research in this current project would have been an injustice for such requires time. There were a number of articles that were retrieved, because of the lack of media based research resources; the collection of data was done manually, which took time considering my internet-utility dyslexia. I had to spend countless, tiring hours in search of relevant articles for the project. Accessing articles from previous years also proved to be daunting and when finally finding the articles that reported on Malema’s links to the Jacob Zuma trial, I had to go through a process of selection and discarding. Selecting articles that focused on the topic and discarding those that somewhat repeated the same information in other articles. But then again after noticing some errors in some of the newspaper articles, I had reverted back and re-searched other articles and sources that could validate the reliability of some newspaper reports. The problems encountered stem from my nonexistent exposure to media based research training is there is such. Moreover, if there is such, media analysis is often centred on the media whereas my project was centred on a subject, namely Julius Malema.

I tried accessing Malema through appointments as well as personal favours for the purposes of triangulation. However the issues he was facing at the time (the Hate Speech trial followed by the disciplinary hearings) made it impossible to gain access to him. Initially I contacted Floyd Shivamvu who took me back to square one by instructing me to contact Julius Malema’s secretary. I then pursued that only to find a record machine that did not allow me to leave messages. After that I tried contacting Floyd Shivamvu again without any success until I gave up
on the matter especially considering the escalating problems Malema found himself facing. The unfruitful endeavours did not help much; I was still faced with documents whose validity of the accounts of the situations was questionable. I was stuck with documents whose probability of bias was alarming, therefore as a way of countering such; the paper focused more on the direct quotes from the subject (Julius Malema). I compared them with similar quotes from multiple newspaper sources. This had implications for the analysis approach. This means that this project could not apply content-analysis as an approach even though the source of data was documents. I only analysed portions of written texts.

1.8.3 RESEARCH ANALYSIS

It is pivotal to mention that this paper did not only analyze texts written concerning Malema on the Jacob Zuma trial, non-verbal communication such as actions were also subjected to analysis. Thus a motion for action to be viewed as text is adopted. Action is an observable representation of thought/cognition. It represents the psyche just as language does (Sarup, 1993). Text is reflective of the psyche. However, the text focused on here represents not only the actor reported, but the interpretations of the reporter too. Hekman (1984) discussed Gradamer’s argument that understanding a text involves fusing the conceptual schemes of the author and the interpreter. This assertion challenges Zhang and Wildemuth’s (2008) assertion that the documents are non-reactive meaning the researcher does not influence the context or the content of the documents. However one must acknowledge that the authors of those documents could have been influenced by context. The analysis process was quite challenging at the same time it provided space for the construction of tools to analyze data.

1.8.4 QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS

A predominant definition of content analysis has quantitative research attributes. This technique is deemed objective, systematic as well as a quantitative description of manifest content communication. Quantitative content analysis is mostly used in mass communication as a way of counting apparent textual elements. Zhang and Wildermuth (2008) stated that qualitative content analysis is mainly inductive” however, this project involved the formulation of concepts that supplemented the shortfalls of Xaba’s concept. This means the project simultaneously employed deductive and inductive approaches. This was inspired by the multiplicity of analytical approaches that the researcher applied namely analytical induction, event analysis and content
analysis approach. A discussion of these shall follow after the concluding remarks of this chapter.

As part of the process of achieving the objective of the project, a position was assumed. It was hypothesized that Malema’s model of masculinity is a performance of Thokozani Xaba’s ‘struggle masculinity’. The main basis of this assertion is Malema’s location of himself within the struggle as well as the analysis of contemporary South Africa’s economic and political situation. This chapter offered a lens to view contemporary as a phase which continues to be characterized by apartheid issues. The reason for doing such was to draw a context in which Malema, including black masculinities as well as other masculinities should be understood. This mission subsequently led to linking the issues of the importance of context as well as a framework of analysing black masculinity to the broader discourse on masculinity. The argument to be laid out in the following chapters is that black men continue to be at the margin, thus the idea of black men assuming hegemonic power is problematic. It has been he highlighting of black men enacting sexism against women was done in a way which positioned black men within the category of the subordinated group. A group which cannot self-determine no matter how much it aims for the centre (hegemonic masculinity) the basis of this controversial position is discussed in the following chapter on epistemology. This means that black masculinity and its “malcontents” are shaped by marginality.

The first chapter of this project entailed an overview of the entire research report. The purpose and objectives of the study were discussed. The chapter also entailed a discussion of concepts that are central to the project. The second chapter entails a discussion of the framework which characterizes the study. The chapter also serves as a platform for a critical discussion of social science epistemologies. The chapter set the tone for understanding the basis of the criticisms of the dominant analysis of black masculinity. The subsequent chapter is a continuation of a review of literature on masculinity, however chapter four focuses on South African black masculinity. The chapter that follows analyses empirical data collected from newspaper articles. This chapter presents a description as well as an explanation of Malema’s model of masculinity. The manner in which this was done is outlined in that chapter. The last chapter entails conclusive remarks based on the study. It entails a summary of the overall findings as well as some recommendations for future research. It is worth noting that some recommendations are found throughout the study.
CHAPTER 2

This chapter entails a discussion of already existing literature on masculinity. It serves as a framework in which black masculinity should be understood. In doing so, it outlines the discourses of masculinity by firstly offering the history of the concept. The chapter then proceeds with constructivist arguments about gender identity. A discussion on the intersectionality of identity offers a base for the call to analyse black masculinity differently as well as highlighting the multiplicity of black masculinity, thus the correct term is masculinities. After this the paper moves onto a discussion of the concept of hegemonic masculinity which has had great influence in masculinity studies. The paper also offers criticisms of the concept arguing that it is problematic to claim that black men can be hegemons. A clarification of the definition of hegemony is provided in order to anchor the assertion made. In the same mode of criticism, the concept of patriarchy is discussed as it is important in the analysis of the subject of this paper. Before moving any further the chapter shall commence with an introduction of literature on studies on men.

2.1 MEN AS A HISTORICAL CATEGORY

The abandoning of the monolithic view on ‘men’ became a wave characterising scholarship on gender thus the reiteration of the notion of masculinities by authors such as Jeff Hearn, Harry Brod and Robert Morrell amongst many others. Brod (1987) defined men’s studies as the study of masculinities and male experiences as specific and varying social-historical-cultural formations. Such studies view masculinity as a historical entity. Franklin (1984) stated that in the past, the concept of masculinity was lacking attention in terms of definition. Hearn (1997) also argued that the social sciences have been extremely neglectful in explicitly studying men. Scholarship on men is fairly recent. Various arguments posed on the notion of masculinity allude to the idea that the concept of masculinity has changed over time. Hearn (1997) even argued that men as men are historically produced and reproduced through particular structures and practice.
2.2 MASCULINITY DISCOURSE

Connell (1995), Cornwall and Lindisfarne (1994) argued that masculinities vary through context and culture. The position was that every society has its definition or idea of what it means to be a ‘man’. Connell (1995) thus argued that all societies have culturally based meanings of gender but not all of them have the concept of masculinity –

Masculinity is the gender orientation attributed to many but not all men, and it is assessed with self concept ratings. Men who possess particular personality attributes and behavioural tendencies are referred to as masculine (Levant and Pollack, 1995: 131).

An instance of this view can be seen from the context of a traditional man with specifically culture-defined characteristics. He is viewed as possessing masculinity in comparison to a non-traditional man revealing other traits – such a man is considered to be missing ‘something’. This implies that the heart of masculinity is constructively located in men but it is not biological. However, the body is the “major bearer of masculine value and symbolism” (Morrell, 2001: 8).

Moreover, one could argue that masculinity serves as a model aimed to guide and even guard social behaviour. It is a guide in a sense that it functions as an ‘object’ that men can “look up to” (or even ignore) when engaging in negotiated social practices and also consolidating inclusive and exclusive categories. It serves as a guardian of what is deemed to be appropriate practices that men ‘should’ engage in. Morrell (2001) would support the argument that masculinity is an entity to be used or deployed. Moreover, Giddens (1989) argued that manliness was not solely a cultural representation of masculinity; it is also a description of men’s actual lives; and life is a performance. This alludes to the notion that “ideology does not consist merely of ideas or representations; it also involves a series of material practices…” (Poulantzas, 1978: 28). In other similar words, ideology is not merely a set of thoughts possessed but actual social practices which are framed by those ideas.

2.3 GENDER AND MASCULINITY

Masculinity is not simply biological or subjective. It must be grasped through men’s involvement in social relations that constitute the gender order. Gender order is a systematic hierarchy whereby male and female roles are ‘normalized’ within institutions (Giddens, 1989). Gender system is the patterning of social relations connected with reproduction and gendered divisions.
that are found within societies (Connell, 1995: 71). Connell (1995) that the body has been subjected to historicity. This stance is echoed by Butler’s (1990) strong assertion that even sex, an entity popularly seen through the lenses of biology, is a social construct, this came after the separation of sex and gender.

Butler (1990) argued that a truly radical separation between sex and gender would imply that “man and masculine” can easily apply to a female body and vice versa. If man can easily apply to a female body and man is not a term exclusively connoting a male (a biological designation that is also selective. For instance it is not biologically impossible for men to cry however doing such is deemed unmanly in many cultures). Moreover, man, just as masculinity, is a social construct. Man is as much defined by the norms and expectations of what should and should not be done. It is an entity which can be embodied and performed by any human (male or female).

Butler (1990) argued that nature is also a man-made concept. Brod and Kaufman (1994) concurred with Judith Butler’s argument that the body has no intrinsic meaning outside cultural interpretation(s). Butler argued that sex is a result of inscription of arbitrary cultural meanings on the body. The meanings that prevail are subject to power. Those in dominant positions assign the meanings which become naturalized through an endless process of repetition or “sedimentation” of discursively constituted actions. “Our sexed bodies, gendered identities and inner sense of self are all material effects of repeated actions within the power/knowledge nexus of discourse” (Butler, quoted by Brod and Kaufman, 1994).

Judith Butler’s contribution to the gender and sex question is signified by her fusion of sex and gender as constructs. Butler (1993) argued that sex and gender can be performatively reinscribed in ways that heighten its factitiousness rather than its facticity. This means that gender and sex are constructs and not a fact of nature. Within this performance of a construction, the actors are afforded agency in regards to the normalized performances. One must note that the performances are regulated and the standard in which is set out is borne out of the repetitiveness of particular acts. For instance Malema’s rebellion, as will be shown in the fifth chapter, is a form of masculinity which has been performed by previous leaders. But now that type of performance is in contention with the redesigned gender norms suitable for a new political dispensation guided by constitutional democracy. Thus Malema’s decision not to completely adhere to the prescribed post-apartheid identity is a subversion of the reconstructed norm and he does this for a political end. To put this bluntly, Malema endorses the idea that the struggle has not ended thus
embodying struggle masculinity as a part of his identity. The reason for doing such, for instance consistently lamenting that the struggle has not ended hence the performance of struggle identities, is ultimately economic power.

As stated before, Butler argued that sex a performance, and the “performative nature of gender and sexuality can be demonstrated through an analysis of gender parody” (Brod and Kaufman, 1994: 31). However, Brod and Kaufman (1994) argued that Butler’s assertion on discourse lacks historical/cultural context. For instance, Brod and Kaufman (1994) quoted Jean Grimshaw who argued that “obsessive and compulsive housecleaning is a parody of housewifery, but a destructive one in which the sufferer’s oppression is increased rather than reduced” (Brod and Kaufman, 1994: 32). This notion of gender parody makes one wonder which performances are not emulated and whose performance is original and authentic and if we were to ‘reference the source of the first performer of gender’, who would one refer to? Moreover, Jean Grimshaw must not fail to acknowledge the level of agency the so called “oppressed sufferer” has, this critique leads one to think of subjectivity.

Giddens (1989) explained masculinity as a set of cultural attributes/social identity, stating that it is also a social status demonstrated in specific contexts. He stated that public affirmation is central to masculine status as a performative act. Public affirmation would be premised upon already established and structured gender identities and practices. Based on the above, one may argue that Malema’s rebellion is affirmed through by the support he had been given by the ANC prior to the saga that led to the disciplinary hearings.

2.4 GENDER IDENTITY AND MASCULINITY

Morrell (2001) stated that masculinity is also a term that makes reference to a specific gender identity. Theoretical approaches to gender identity have traditionally wrestled with physical embodiment, discussing the body and the role of reproductive biology in constructing gender. The second dimension zoomed into institutions and the gendered social processes that encompass the family, the economy and the state. Finally, the discursive dimension was also added to the mix, including the analysis of the gendered construction of language and its constitutive role in the gender order. Butler (1990: 140) argued that gender is not “a stable identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through a stylized repetition of acts”. She also added that gender identities are neither true expressions of some ontological prior self nor the distorted results of repressed and moulded ‘sex drive’. Moreover, Morrell
(2001) also argued that there is no set or prescribed procedure of being a man however the
determination to become one, on its own, is a powerful feature of masculinity.

Brod and Kaufman (1994) offered a conceptual analysis of the self as a product of social
interaction (characterised by observation and dialogue) within political and cultural frameworks.
This means that gender identity formation is a process of simultaneous interaction of nature,
nurture and discursive dimensions. This reiterates the assertion regarding factors (such as the
ANC masculine culture) that shape Malema’s model of masculinity. Brod and Kaufman (1994)
purported that each dimension is influenced by the power of others, thus a degree of
indeterminacy in relations. In particular historical periods, in different cultures and under varying
circumstances, the configuration of power relations between bodies, institutions and discourses
vary. To briefly touch on the issue of bodies, there is a certain popular post-apartheid
iconographical performance of a middle class black man namely Black Economic Empowerment
(BEE) men.

There is a heteronormative idea of what BEE men look like, how they dress and behave, for
instance a certain ‘Nandos’ television commercial aired a few years after the year 2000, captured
some performatve elements of ‘BEE masculinity’. The advert had two characters, a male and a
female who seemed to be having an extramarital affair. The obese looking man, whose age may
range between the late thirties or early forties, was the central character in the advert. Obesity is
often symbolic of upper class status, plus the man was wearing a business suit, holding an
expensive looking cellular phone and he drove a an expensive German car which had the young
woman sitting inside with one of her legs protruding towards the ground. The young woman,
probably, in her mid twenties, was wearing a short dress and when the main character quoted his
line saying “he is a thighs man”, camera shifted to capture the young woman’s thighs.

Kennedy Owino (2010) briefly mentioned how the advert depicted a certain culture of South
African men having more than one wife but can still afford a ‘Nandos’ meal. It is worth
correcting Owino (2010) that the character, as depicted in the advert, was not a polygamist he
was merely having an extra-marital affair because the advert ended with him receiving a
telephone call from his wife and he seemed to display guilt. One could write a lengthy analysis
and critique of the advert however that is not the purpose of this paper; therefore a suggestion is
made for future research to look into the idea of ‘BEE masculinities’. BEE men seem
materialistic perhaps out of a symbolic display of their financial endowments. They have a
certain sense of fashion and particular upper class tastes. BEE men are normally business men as the concept is premised upon the Black Economic Empowerment policy. At the moment it is only worth noting that BEE masculinity is also a variation of masculinities however it is neither hegemonic in the qualitative sense, nor protest, complicit or marginal. There reason for this argument shall unfold later when discussion black men and the concept of hegemonic masculinity.

2.5 GENDER AS A PRODUCT OF INTERSECTIONALITY

Connell (1995) claimed that gender is an internally complex structure, where a number of logics are superimposed. This view implies that masculinity, as is femininity, is subject to internal contradictions and historical disruptions; thus there are many masculinities. Connell (1995) argued that any masculinity is simultaneously positioned in a number of structures of relationships. He argued that there are different ways of being a man. The image of a single standard of masculinity is apolitical and ignores the pervasive imbalance of power among different men. Connell (1995) examined the relations between various masculine identities. He provided four mechanisms of masculinity that accompany the masculine gender role namely “hegemony, subordination, complicity and protest as relations internal to the masculine gender order” (Connell, 1995: 80). Struggle and rebel masculinity are framed as part of mechanisms of Connell’s hierarchical gender order. Xaba (2001) emphasized Connell’s assertion that the relations between the mechanisms of masculinity must be studied. Struggle masculinity in indeed a reaction to the hegemons who had set a standard of what masculinity, particularly black masculinity constitutes.

Moreover masculinities are fluid and should not be deemed as belonging, in a fixed manner, to any one group of men. Morrell (2001) also stated that Connell’s categories of masculinity compete however it is vital to comprehend that these identity configurations are fluid thus ‘membership’ can be difficult to capture. Morrell (2001) also emphasised that masculinity is not inherited nor acquired in a uni-directional manner. “men’s experiences depend on class, race, ethnicity, age, region of the country and location in the global economy” (Morrell and Swart, 2005: 338). The intersections of gender, class, race and sexuality have become preoccupations of both feminism and cultural studies. The intervention of lesbian, non-white and non-Western voices into feminist debate has highlighted the heterosexual and racist bias of much earlier feminist writing and has led to debates about double and triple oppressions. Traditionally, issues
of race, class position and homophobia were treated as personal burdens of some people but now, these categories have proven to intersect in a manner that impact on gender identity constructions.

As stated before, gender identities are constructed through nature, nurture and discursive domains using a perspective that merged the Foucaultian concept of productive power operating in a diffuse manner throughout society, with a postmodern understanding of the fluidity and multiplicity of identities. There is, however, a problem with Foucault’s notion of productive power regardless of its usefulness in helping one understand how gender identities are produced. Foucault’s conception of power is blind to gendered power inequalities. As a way of dealing with the shortcoming of Foucault’s conception of productive power, the concept of hegemony shall improvise. The following discussion on hegemony serves the purpose of critiquing the contradictory idea of black hegemonic masculinity.

2.6.1 HEGEMONY CONCEPTUALIZED

Connell adopted the concept of hegemony from Antonio Gramsci’s analysis of class relations. Hearn (2004) argued that Gramsci’s theory of hegemony explains how a dominant (economic) class controls society, emphasizing its ideas of the situation. This process, he argued, involved the active consent of the dominated groups although backed by occasional force. This idea of hegemony comes forth from Marx’s second theory of ideology. Connell (1995) summed up Gramsci’s analysis of hegemony as “the cultural dynamic by which a group claims and sustains a leading position in social life” (Connell, 1995: 77).

In addition, Adrian (2009: no page number) stated that

Hegemony addresses the relations of power and ideology, including the domination of what is ‘taken-for-granted’, and ‘commonsense’ definitions of the situation. It particularly highlights the importance of consent, even if that is provisional and contingent, and even if that consent is backed by force. In this sense, hegemony speaks more to complicity than to brutal enforcement. It refers to and reinforces what has been called the “fundamental outlook of society” (Bocock, 1986). In this sense, it is performative, but not simply a matter of performance. Hegemony encompasses the formation of social
groupings, not just their operation and collective action. It is a structural concept, or at least invokes assumptions of structure, but is not structuralist.

Hegemony can be grasped in term of different theories of ideology within the Marxian analysis. Adrian (2009) argued that Marx offered distinct theories of ideology, the first giving strength to social agents in determining their consciousness. The second theory is economically deterministic. Marx and Engels, in the German ideology, render economic structure the base. Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist rejected the economic determinism pose, arguing that the cultural and the intellectual are important and they have greater political impact than economics. “Hegemony encompassed the range of social arenas – material, economic, political, cultural, discursive – rather than prioritising the economic or the cultural.” (Adrian, 2009: no page number).

Hegemony is about the manner in which the ruling class produces and reproduces its dominance through imposing the classification of social-economical-political-cultural affairs, by setting and dictating the terms in which events are viewed, analysed and comprehended. It even determines or rather has enormous influence on the issues discussed, the ideals formulated and the definition of morality as part of the process. Hegemony is about the persuasion of the major part of society through the media and the organization of social institutions in ways that appear as the norm, the ordinary and natural, offering a model in which the population is to conform (Adrian, 2009).

2.6.2 HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY AND OTHER MASCULINITIES

“Hegemonic masculinity can be defined as the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (if is it taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women” (Connell, 1995: 77). Connell (1995) highlighted that the custodians of hegemonic masculinity are powerful people. This means that there has to be some correspondence between cultural ideal and institutional power, collective if not individual. Hegemonic masculinity embodies dominant and widespread beliefs and accepted strategies. This means that those with power maintain it through some level of consent possessed by those without the kind of power characterising the hegemonic group.

Moreover Judith Butler argued that the concept of hegemony emphasizes the ways in which power operates to form our daily understanding of social relations and it works to show the ways
in which the subjects consent to and reproduce those relations of power. “Hegemony involves both the consent of some men, and, in a different way, the consent of some women to maintain patriarchal relations of power” (Hearn, 2004: 52). In this case, the definition of power is borrowed from Michel Foucault’s conception of modern power. Hooper (2001) stated that power, as opposed to force, is primarily productive and relational rather than oppressive or repressive. Power operates through the construction of particular knowledge, or discourses and humans are produced as subjects through the power of discourse. The process of exclusion and inclusion forms categories and the norm is established through what is called the Other.

In addition, Hearn (2004) stated that all identities are relational. They are premised upon difference, I am black because you are white, but now the trick comes in when one defines themselves as black in the post-apartheid South Africa whereby Indians and ‘coloureds’ (who tend to have the same pigment shade with various African natives) and the Chinese, whose shade renders them non black according to essentialist discourse). In this case, identity is defined according to the material effects of the past impacting the present. This shared politically defined identity among Indians and native Africans does not stop the members of each group from viewing themselves as different. On black and white dichotomous constructs, whiteness is deemed ahistorical and native Africans, coloureds and Indians are globally ahistoricized but locally, especially under the apartheid regime, they were historical and hierarchical. Hooper (2001) argued that some identities become marginalized and denied subject status due to this process of categorization.

Gender relations within a hegemonic framework are characterised by dominance and subordination between groups of men. Homosexual men tend to be subordinated in comparison to heterosexual masculinities in a society upholding normative ideas. Moreover, not many men meet the normative standard; men who practice all the prescriptions of hegemonic masculinity in its entirety are a few minority. Masculinity paradigms have concerned themselves with qualitative issues and not numbers; however, Connell (1995) stressed that in considering the dynamics of society in its entirety, numbers matter. Meaning if there are a majority of men who are linked to the hegemonic project but do not totally embody hegemonic masculinity, their specific situation needs to be theorised. The question which springs up is whether this majority of men are hegemonic or not.
Beasely (2008) provided an insight with regards to the above questions by arguing that men with power may not conform to cultural ideals concerning masculinity even when they are associated with power. For instance, accountants are rarely thought of as the mobilising model of manliness, even for those with much authority. Many men with significant social power do not embody hegemonic masculinity; in fact, working class manhood is viewed as a highly significant mobilising cultural ideal of hegemonic masculinity. Beasely (2008) argued that working class men may not wield power but they can provide the means to legitimate it. Beasely makes it clear that the working class men embody that which is already set up by the ‘hegemons’ who have the capacity to use propaganda or consensual dictatorship which Adrian (2009) modestly calls persuasion.

Black men, generally, do not possess this capacity within a western civilization and postcolonial context to prescribe and determine hegemonic ideals, whatever ‘power’ they possess, it is that of a subject. The concept of hegemonic black men is contradictory. Ellapen (2006) argued that the end of apartheid ignited the task of incorporating black masculinity within the images and representations of hegemonic masculinity. Prior to this, black men were represented and portrayed through racist colonial discourse. Blackness, by white design, is inferior; it is not a product of self determination. Blackness represents the marginal while hegemony means the centre, the creator, the domineering especially of women and other masculinities. Such is not the case with some black men; black men create within a framework designed for them. Their failures and victories are determined by their assimilation into an already established boundary. More significantly, they are inferior to white women. To counter argue this, Connell would reiterate that there is not clear cut and singular category of belonging; the boundaries between the different categories are fluid. However, the flow in and through those categories is not the same as people experience masculinity differently. Moreover, the mere act of incorporation implies that the membership of black men into the hegemonic group is by invitation.

2.6.3 CRITICISMS OF CONNELL’S HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY

On the general critique of hegemonic masculinity, Beasely (2008) made an accusation that Connell’s concept as slippery. Michael Flood, quoted by Beasely (2008), argued that the term runs through multiple meanings, it can be read as a political mechanism referring to cultural leadership to attain mass consent to certain forms of rule. The concept also shifts to its descriptive state which refers to dominant, meaning most powerful versions of manhood.
Moreover, the meaning of the concept implies that it translates as an empirical reference to actual groups of men. This is the reason Beasely (2008) argued for the distinguishing of hegemonic masculinity from dominant masculinity simply because dominant men may not represent hegemony.

Moreover on the weaknesses of the concept, hegemonic masculinity, Beasely (2008) labelled the concept as politically deterministic and defeatist for assuming that the most dominant ideals/forms of masculinity are necessarily the same as those that work to maintain men’s authority over women. Beasely (2008) argued that dominant forms of masculinity do not always legitimate men’s power and those forms that do, may not always be socially celebrated or common. Moreover, the hegemonic ideals which are the deceptive norm, the ordinary and the engineered state of the ‘natural’ function similarly to the concept of the all-knowing and all-determining metaphysical and mighty god of religion. It is a custodian of social action; just like the concept of god, it is a model in which ‘believers’ are expected to emulate. It functions as the supreme guide of the masculine performance. This is the type of substance that induces schizophrenia and anxiety to the extent that man seeks to behave like god, with occasional failure or success. Man as god, is the ideal man-made man yet the sinful nature man was born with (emotions, the ability to cry and so forth) splits him between obeying the master model of manhood and biological processes that are often denied depending on the respective societal norms and expectations.

Connell’s historical narrative is also pronounced guilty of downplaying the pragmatic value of non-hegemonic masculinities by subordinating and marginalizing them as if they have no significant role in the construction of hegemony. Demetriou (2001) identifies this as an inconsistency with Connell’s theoretical understanding of the concept of hegemony. For instance, Gramsci’s account of hegemony is labelled as “dialectical pragmatism” whereby the marginalised are appropriated as part of the project of domination.

“The fundamental class is in constant, mutual dialectical interaction with the allied groups and appropriates what appears pragmatically useful and constructive for the project of domination at a particular historical moment. Pragmatically useless or harmful elements, on the other hand, are subordinated and eliminated because they have no historical value. The outcome of this process is an amalgam of elements, an
"equilibrium" that embodies the best possible strategy for external hegemony.” (Demetriou, 2001: 345-6).

The history of class and race in South Africa rendered black men at the margin and their appropriation into the patriarchal project served as part of the project of patriarchal dominance. Moreover, Connell’s concept of hegemonic masculinity was also challenged for appearing as an essentially white, Western, rational, calculative, individualist, violent and heterosexual configuration of practice that is never influenced by ‘non-hegemonic’ elements. The use of the term non-hegemonic implies that other forms of masculinities are an aberration to a norm, assuming hegemonic masculinity to be the blue print of all masculinities. It is essentialist in a sense that it suggests that all men have potential hegemonic characteristics that they deviate from, thus rendering them ‘untrue’ to themselves instead of hegemonic masculinity being an imposition or potential imposition.

2.7.1 PATRIARCHY AND BLACK MEN

Pleck (2008) argued that men and women’s relations have been structured under the governance of sexual politics that exist outside the individual needs of men and women. There are some unequal relations amongst men. This formed part of a wager for criticizing the concept of patriarchy, which is simply defined as the rule of the father. Pleck (2008) insisted that under patriarchy, men’s relationships with other men are also shaped and patterned by patriarchal norms; they locate themselves within categories of masculinity and create hierarchies and rankings among themselves according to masculinity. It means that these men allocate themselves within predetermined contours of that which defines masculinity.

Pleck (2008) also argued that patriarchy allows men differential payoffs and that various societies stratify men according to age, physical strength, and recently with the ability to make money thus ‘accessing’ women. This assertion ignores the role race plays in stratifying inter and intra-sex groups. For instance, Pleck (2008) argued that men’s social identity are shaped by the power they posses over women and the power they wield from competing with each other. Moreover, within this patriarchal fraternity of ruling fathers, black men are infantilized. In addition, structural racism as well as black men’s inferiority to white women inundates a query over black men’s social identity. Pleck (2008) argued that men’s social identity is shaped by their domination of women, the question should be asked, which women?. The notion of dominance over women ahistorises the concept, it does not differentiate nor specify the category of women,
thus one could claim that black men’s social identity is shaped by their domination of Other women.

On the contrary, Carbado (1999) argued that black men cannot be pronounced as possessing any power over any category of women. The only thing they are guilty of is attributed to a racist analysis of overt sexuality, thus posing as sexual predators of white women, their object of desire representing power of the white domineering man. Hooks (2004) claimed that patriarchy was an imposition into black men’s lives. Within the context of plantations during slavery, Hooks (2004: 3) asserted that black men “had to learn… to equate their status as men with the right to dominate women, they had to be taught patriarchal masculinity.” Staples (2009) also argued that black men cannot be sexist; they did not have power to be patriarchal due to the system of gendered racial oppression and patriarchal capitalism. Carbado (1999) had also made this claim. He argued that black men cannot be declared beneficiaries of any (patriarchal) dividends. He remarked that black men, especially in America, are economically marginalised to a point that it is extremely difficult for them to possess power. This argument wrongfully discards the theorization of power as a dialectical affair. Even the economically marginalised, somehow partake/partook in reproducing the culture of the dominant force, be it diluted or the exact replica of that which is produced.

Moreover, Carbado’s (1999) argument challenges the earlier assertion that some black men envy whiteness, thus they emulate it consequently reproducing a patriarchal order. They do so because as much as they may try to achieve the level of whiteness, they will not succeed. This assertion is derived from Fanon’s (1967) argument that the black man’s destiny is to be white. He averted that “... [b]lack men want to prove to white men, at all costs, the richness of their thought, the equal value of their intellect” (1967: 10). Fanon suggested that this pursuit is in vain. However, the endeavour as well as the project of colonialism breeds a hybrid identity. Bhabha (1994) added to the debate that postcolonial theory is developed from anti-colonial philosophy, which in itself is a hybrid construct. Hybridity is a mere product of ‘disruptions and dislocation’ of any system. Postcolonial culture is “inevitably a hybridised” phenomenon that entails a dialectal relationship of the “designed” Western cultural systems and a native ontology, which (re)creates a new local identity (Rukundwa, 2007).

The mixture of the past and the present has formed a base for the configuration of socio-political identities. The concept of hybrid identities needs further critical questioning, among many other
questions to be asked, some of them with regards to a hybrid identity are, which aspects of nativity are kept, to what degree is the hybrid lingering towards a foreign identity? The answer to this question evokes the fact that context and circumstances determine the ‘degrees of hybridity’. For instance an African born and raised in America may differ from an African who migrated to America and began consuming and performing American culture. Another interesting question comes up, had Africa been allowed to modernize on it own, would we have reasons dichotomize identities as done now?

2.7.2 THE INTERSECTIONALITY OF PATRIARCHY AND CAPITALISM

Another interesting contribution to the discourse of patriarchy is by Claudia Van Werlhof. Werlhof (2007) lamented that scientific scholarship has neglected a proper analysis of patriarchy; the consequence of such is the limited understanding of capitalism. She argued that patriarchy and capitalism are deeply related in a way that many, including feminists, have not comprehended. Werlhof (2007) added that patriarchy invented an economy that is premised on looting other people’s property under the guise of private property as well as systematic exploitation of the conquered especially women (because politically it invented a state in which the conquered are hierarchically dominated and policed by armed men). Werlhof (2007) quoted Vaughan’s argument that patriarchy depends on the annihilation of matriarchy “because women in matriarchal society had control over the means of production, women were the producers and distributors, the providers of concrete wealth—life, food, and security—and were responsible for the integration of everyone into the community” (2007: 2).

Moreover Werlhof (2007) argued from “the point of view of patriarchy, capitalism is the epoch in which women, nature, and life in general are finally successfully replaced by the artificial products of industry: gifts by exchange; subsistence goods by commodities; local markets by a global markets…” (Werlhof, 2007: 7). Structural racism, slavery, neo-colonialism and so forth are the obstacles to black men’s involvement in ‘major’ monopoly capital. However this does not mean they are not making attempts to actively participate within the system. On the issue of differential power, it is truthful that “…black men did not partake of the dominant power of white men…. On the institutional level, most black men do not have the power to force women into subordinate roles” (Staples, 1979: 124, italics added). However, this does not dismiss any participation black men may have in the unequal gender relations.
Franklin (1987) also argued that patriarchy did not serve black men; in fact the pursuit of patriarchal power by black men is defeatist because in that pursuit they reproduce and strengthen an order which marginalizes them, of course this is with the exception of a few. Rose Brewer (2003) added that the global economy has marginalized many black men as well as women. Brewer (2003) added that the class: race analysis misses the gendered feature of the global working class. She remarked:

“The racialist capitalist order is indeed heavily gendered. Bell hooks names this systemic dynamic “racist, patriarchal capitalism.” Black women’s inequality is at the center of this system… the deindustrialization of much of the Black urban core has marginalized a generation of young Black men and some women from work. Some Black women and a few Black men, on the other hand, do the work of the new global economy, low paid service work. It keeps them in poverty. The structure of the economy is gendered, raced, and classed.”

McClintock (1992: 5) had also argued that “race, class and gender are not distinct realms of experience existing in splendid isolation from each other. Instead, they come into existence in and through relations to each other.” Considering this relationship between race, class and gender as well as Werlhof’s marriage of patriarchy and capitalism, the marginalization of black men and women within the global economy seems to be a problem that will stay with us for a long while.

Moreover, Werlhof (2007) argued that there could never be a post-patriarchy, post-modern, post-anything without the complete overhaul of capitalist resources, technologies, institutions and ideological apparatuses. Werlhof suggested that there is an illusion of a ‘post-era’ simply because the cultural, economic, social and political spheres are mainly moulded and determined by the dominant class, the same class which pushes a capitalistic patriarchal agenda (Hooper, 2001). Werlhof’s sentiments are not that different from other authors such as McClintock (1992) and Shohat (1992). Shohat objected to the concept of ‘post’ because it denies the ineluctable, sequential and it assumes a unilinear march of human progress. For instance, the concept of post-apartheid suggests a rupture with apartheid and that is misleading because racism was systemic.

Feagin (2006) made an important point. He argued that the dominant group, namely white supremacists, worked hard to keep the system from changing in fundamental and foundational ways over several centuries. He averred:
When the system of race does finally change significantly, the law of social inertia typically operates to keep that system more like it was in the past than like the ideal new society (Feagin, 2006: 34).

The same can be said about the system of patriarchy, those oiling it and its automation (the science of production and reproduction) will ensure that it remains the same. Briefly on the concept of white supremacy, Gerald Horne (2003) stated that the concept should not be read on the basis of ‘melanin’ or the hue of the skin, instead it should be grasped as a mark of global hegemony of the people of European descent, particularly Euro-American elite whom white supremacy affords them economic hegemony, private property as well as power and privilege. Horne (2003: no page.) added that “white supremacy has served in the first place the interests of the Euro-American elite and has been perceived by many non-elite Euro-Americans to serve their interests too.” Horne’s paper was on the topic of the “Crisis of white supremacy”. He remarked that the “general crisis of white supremacy is at once a crisis of imperialism and a crisis of what might be called the white U.S and perhaps even more, a crisis of masculinity, particularly what has been called white masculinity.” (Horne, 2003: no page).

Rogers and Bowman (2008) argued that race is a political construction created for the purpose of bestowing power to ‘white’ people and to legitimise the dominance of white people over ‘non-whites’. This was the case during apartheid, what of post-apartheid South Africa and the idea of a social inertia? This question directs one to Gerhard Maré’s article on ‘Race counts in contemporary South Africa: an illusion of ordinariness’. Maré (2001) argued that races still exist. He argued that in the South African post-apartheid context, the social constructivist and biocultural notions continue to be simultaneously employed when dealing with race.

This implies that race is a product of social discourse, but somehow exists in a sense of anatomical classifications (hair texture, nose structure etc) noting that those classifications have also been endowed with meanings that are subject to evolutionary changes. This means there is a measure of fixity and fluidity when it comes to race, particularly for blackness. The ‘fixity’ or ‘materiality’ of race is a social construct because the linguistic, legal, anatomical classes are interpreted. Maré (2001) premised his stance on the material effects of race in post-apartheid South African ‘form-filling’ system. This brings up the question; is there a difference between racial classifications or rather the idea of race during apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa? The simple answer would be, during apartheid, racial classification served to socio-economically
marginalize certain groups of people while others benefited from that classification. In post-apartheid South Africa, racial classification serves the purpose of retributive justice even though the majority of the previously marginalised continue to suffer socio-economically.

2.8.1 CONTEMPORARY THOUGHTS ON RACE

Guillaumin (1995: 105) made an argument pertaining to the contemporary position of ‘race’ stating that ‘race’ “is about the least conceptional, cold and abstract of notions, so it appeals from the start to the unconscious side of the mechanisms we have for acquiring knowledge and relating to other human beings”. This anchors the argument that race or rather racist ideologies continue to roam post-apartheid South African imagination. Moreover on the composition of apartheid, Biko (1978:104) argued that “blacks had to be denied any chance of accidentally proving their equality with white men.” The maintenance of racial and economical inequalities were reproduced in various ways such as low quality education given to black children while white children, especially those with privileged family backgrounds, were afforded a better education awarding them class advantage hence explicit discrimination within the labour market became unnecessary. This preludes the following discussion on structural racism and black men’s position.

Economically, white men came first, and then white women; black men and women followed respectively. Thus black men living within an imposed binary constructivist order which ‘superiorized’ men over women were relegated below an already subordinated category as highlighted earlier. This means that the subordinates illusively dominate another subordinated group, kind of like a hierarchy of subordinates. For instance in the American context, Whitehead and Barret (2001) argued that most black men in America have accepted the standards and norms of dominant definitions of manhood (being a bread winner, strength and dominating women). However systematic racism has prevented black men from attaining many aspects of that masculinity through the restriction of access to good education, jobs and institutional power, this may be labelled as the crisis of black masculinity.

American scholarship on black masculinity tends to be dichotomized with white masculinity. Highlighting the issue of intersectionality again, Carby (1998) argued that the ideologies of masculinity always exist in dialectical relations to other ideologies such as race, class, age, sexuality, nationality, ethnicity and disability. Unterhalter (2000) the social construction of masculinity in South Africa cannot be understood outside the complex interactions of race, class
and the formations of the state in different periods. Unterhalter (2000) remarked on the importance of theorizing difference when seeking to comprehend masculinity, particularly black masculinity in South Africa. Before doing so, let us look into black identities of apartheid to device a lens for understanding contemporary black masculinities.

2.8.2 BLACK MASCULINITY IN APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA

Black masculinities in apartheid South Africa were systematically marginalized. Within the South African colonial and apartheid contexts, black men were deemed lazy, ill educated and politically incompetent, harbouring illicit sexual desires for white women (this painted them as sexual threats) and they were referred to as boys regardless of their age. This highlights the contradictions in these emasculating tactics, black men were infantilized as well as hyper-sexualized. The infantilization of Africans signified the justification of the political domination by viewing them as a race of children (Suttner, 2007). The family iconography stemmed from the “metaphorical depiction of the social hierarchy as natural and familial, thus it depended on a prior naturalization of the social subordination of women and children” (McClintock, 1992: 45). African men’s assertion of their manhood was not only a response to being designated childlike status; it also signified a wider symbolic gesture of rejecting over lordship. Suttner (2007) argued that apartheid oppression did not treat Africans as boys in all instances, the traditional rites of passage into manhood were not tempered with and the only difference is that they were not recognized. This introduces another dimension of analysis that interacts with other ideologies that construct a belittled/subordinated race of men.

Moreover, Ellapen stated that Afrikaner nationalists, emulating global patterns, constructed black identity as the other. Black masculinity constituted alternative and marginalized masculinity and white masculinity exerted hegemony. Ellapen (2006) stated that ‘hegemonic masculinity’ is pivotal in the process of locating diverse performances of masculinities in South Africa. Within this framework black masculinity was constructed as ‘deviant’ through the dominance of white masculinity. “White masculinity enjoyed the privileges of being hegemonic and dominated the landscape of South African society until democracy in 1994.” (Ellapen, 2006: 58).

It is pivotal to highlight that black men in South Africa are also not an ahistorical group; meaning that a shared history of oppression and its legacies inspires the assertion that not all black men fall within the same category of masculinity. For instance, Morrell’s (2001) collection of articles in ‘Changing men in Southern Africa’ supports this stance. Post-apartheid South
African black men’s gender identities are influenced by differentially intersecting categories such as race, class, location (rural, urban, township and suburb), ethnicity, sexuality, age and various other facets. Kopano Ratele rightfully questioned, in his ‘Between ‘Ouens’: Everyday Makings of Black Masculinity” article, which black men are referred to by one of his respondents when describing a notion of black masculinity. Even at the times of violent resistance to apartheid era, not all black masculinities were signified by violence, meaning black masculinity during apartheid was also not ahistorical. Moreover, Ulterhalter (2000) added that hegemonic masculinity in South Africa was carved by the politics of racialization. Racism and capitalism simultaneously operated to construct hegemonic masculinities as well as their subordinates.

2.8.3 FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING SOUTH AFRICAN BLACK MASCULINITY

Suttner (2007) argued that some literary writers have failed to comprehend the dynamics of black masculinity. He argued that Connell (1995); Lindsay and Miescher’s (2003) works often relate claims of denial of masculinity or crisis masculinity on the part of men who feel that gender assaults their sense of manhood. Suttner (2007) argued that most of the major textbooks on masculinity do not cater for the discussion of masculinity or masculinities in the context of South Africa whereby men had been denied manhood and were emasculated. Suttner (2007) lamented that when authors refer to ‘hegemonic masculinity’ and ‘gender order’ they do not cover layers that provide meaning to the attempts to reclaim manhood in the context of apartheid and colonialism. This is the reason behind the masculinist rhetoric that was embedded within struggle discourse. “The irony of course is that patriarchal and sexist assumptions underpinned both the laws of apartheid and the struggles against those laws” (Ratele, 2003: none).

Moving forward, Suttner (2007) stated that joining the national liberation movement served as a process of transition to manhood. Zapiro’s depiction of Malema as a baby wearing a nappy was antagonistic to the idea of transition. One could even argue that it served as a challenging tool which dismantles the type of manhood bestowed by comradeship. The image had resonance in the infantilization of black masculinity in apartheid. This was a case of the emasculation of Malema, an incident which justifies the author’s location of himself back into ANC masculinities that Suttner (2007) discussed. Malema’s constant highlighting of the idea of the struggle that has not ended has significant implications for his manhood. However, this does not imply that South
African struggle was exclusively masculine even though it was mostly marred by masculine rhetoric.

The above directs one back to Suttner’s (2007) view that joining the struggle was a sign of reclaiming and regaining manhood. Moreover, Unterhalter (2000) argued that during the anti-apartheid struggle, masculinity was linked to politics and this was connected to some sense of personal heroism. Malema also portrays himself as the champion of the poor as well as a hero. The ambiguity of the situation with Malema is the class difference and lifestyle between the people he claims to represent as opposed to some anti-apartheid men who were equally socio-economically marginalised by the regime of the time. Nonetheless, heroism is not limited by class differences.

2.9.1 BLACKNESS IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA

In post-apartheid South Africa Chipkin (2002) argued that Blackness is increasingly referenced to Nation building. This takes place as a consequence of “blackness being increasingly detached from its historical referents (notions of oppression, alienation and exploitation) to refer to a sublime object that has the form of the Sadeian victim: a corpse that endures all torments and survives with its beauty immaculate” Chipkin (2002: 569). Although, in comparison to connotations of blackness in pre-Democratic South Africa, blackness in the new South Africa still endures some characteristics designed under apartheid. Chipkin (2002) argued that blackness currently has three paradoxical sociological referents, namely the working class and the poor, those evidencing a certain psychological condition (hail black consciousness) and patriots of the South African state. Chipkin (2002) authored these referents as a response to his probe in the deification of the heads of state under the ANC government. Criticisms of these elevated beings equates/d blasphemy simply because members of the ANC represent authentic representatives of the project of national sovereignty.

Chipkin (2002) argued that it is believed, in a national consolidation project, a nation composed of blacks should have a state controlled by blacks, blacks being deemed the authentic representatives of the nation. Chipkin’s definition of authentic representatives of the nation is unclear as to whether it is solely based on qualitative or quantitative measures, but one will assume that it is based on both when considering that the struggle against apartheid was propagated by black people (a popular belief deprived of complete ‘‘truth’’). It was a struggle for black people’s material and psychological health even though it was waged in the name of non-
racialism. Non-racialism was the synthesis of apartheid and strong black solidarity, perhaps this is the reason Malema demeaned Mazibuko (the DA’s national spokesperson) as the tea lady. His statement has reference to apartheid South Africa’s socio-economic fabric which relegated black people as servants of ‘white’ people. The rhetoric of non-racialism is a used to perpetuate the shallow understanding of race relations in South Africa; it is not hard to identity the salience of racism in post-apartheid South Africa.

“…[I]t is not a question of luck or coincidence that white South Africans own most land, receive most capital income, are more likely to own their home outright, live in safe and quiet neighbourhood with well maintained public amenities, go to the country’s top schools and best universities, get the best and most paid jobs and have medical aid and a longer life expectancy, this is due to structural racism” (Rupert Taylor, 2012: )

According to Biko’s Black Consciousness (BC) ideology, being a servant did not only reflect material subordination but it was coupled with inferiority, affecting how one view(ed) themselves psychologically. Black people saw themselves as inferior due to inferior material reality. In extending Chipkin’s (2002) arguments, Blacks within the ANC reflect a sense of ‘black consciousness’ because they portray themselves as masters in their own country, not under white power (whatever that is) and supervision, especially that of a white woman (Hellen Zille), thus the emasculation of Khume Rhamulifo, one of the DA leaders, rendering a garden boy. This concept of a ‘garden boy’ denotes apartheid’s configuration of the South Africa socio-economic fabric. Under apartheid, as well as the colonial era, black men, in Steve Biko’s words, lost their manhood, a phenomenon also highlighted by Suttner. Moreover Ratele (2003) highlighted Biko’s masculinised race discourse by citing a specific case whereby Biko said “[b]lack people under the Smuts government were oppressed but they were still men.” Through Suttner’s eyes, Ratele (2003) mistakenly interpreted the exclusion of women in struggle discourse as sexist and patriarchal.

2.9.2 BLACK MEN AND PATRIRACHAL SEXISM

However, Suttner (2007) failed to take into cognisance the role modernization in most of those claimed-to-be-non-sexist traditional black men’s adoption and performance of the British inspired model of masculinity. Coupled with Christian indoctrination, Western gender binaries determined those urban men’s outlook. On gendered relations, the notion of black manhood had
a patriarchal character but the emphasis on the discourse of restoration of manhood reveals a broader significance on gendered relations. For instance the domination of the masculine rhetoric within the liberation struggle and the peripherization of women’s roles in the master narrative of South African black resistance exclusively legitimated men’s domination in post-apartheid government seats. The subordinate roles of women were described by Suttner (2007) as the desire of African women for their men folk to recover their dignity. As much as this may have some truth, according to Suttner’s (2007) discussion of Women in the ANC-led underground movement, it does not warrant a legitimate justification of relegating women to post-apartheid South Africa’s political margin because in the underground movement, women played roles in the MK as soldiers.

The reluctance of men to include women in politics was not totally based on private patriarchal relations transferring to the public. Suttner (2007) argued that black men could not be deemed patriarchal for they had no material power to do so. However that did not stop them from pursuing traditional conceptions of manhood that were characterized by the right and duty to protect. As much as black men wanted to be characterized by these traditional conceptions of manhood, most of them could not do so for family life was disrupted when others went to exile. Moreover, those who were not comrades but workers, migrant labour deprived them the opportunity to enact the traditional roles of manhood such as protecting their families. Even for those who were not separated from their families, the private spaces were not immune to the pervasive violence of the apartheid state and such had consequences on their manhood.

2.9.3 SYMPATHIZING WITH BLACK MEN’S CHAUVINISM

Suttner (2007) stated that the deliberate hindrance to perform such a task was humiliating thus the need to protect during colonialism and apartheid superseded its attribution to patriarchy. The inability to protect one’s child and wife meant from falling prey to the state police, a reason many joined the liberation movement. Joining the struggle was a sign of reclaiming and regaining manhood (Suttner, 2007). Joining the struggle often translated into joining Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the military wing of the ANC. The MK allowed men who could not protect their families an opportunity to fight and at least protect the masses. It is pivotal to note that joining the struggle should not be automated with assuming violence in resistance. The ANC’s initial formation was premised on a peaceful challenge of colonial and subsequently apartheid rule. However, in the 1960 the organization changed routes; Mandela (1990) remarked that
violence was resorted to as a way of fighting the violence of apartheid against black people. As stated before, Suttner (2007) began beautifully by criticizing the failure of masculinity scholars to analyse black men as men who have been denied manhood, however he fell short on clarifying the issue of violence and black masculinity, particularly violence against women.

2.12 POST-APARTHEID DISCOURSE ON BLACK MASCULINITY

“After South Africa attained democracy in 1994 [the] reconfiguration of the hierarchical structure of patriarchy in South African society became inevitable. The ‘other’ had to be redefined and the operation of power had to be re-constructed…the crisis in South Africa was how to incorporate black masculinity as the hegemonic masculinity and more importantly what was to become of white masculinity” (Ellapen, 2006: 62). Black masculinity has been incorporated into hegemonic masculinity; however it is incorporated in a way that does not shed its otherness. For instance despite assuming powerful positions, Zapiro’s depiction of Malema in nappies resembled the infantilization of black men phenomenon. Jacob Zuma’s rape trial, the infidelities, the illegitimate children and so forth gave way for the media to portray him as a hypersexual man as per the recent painting of him by Brad Murray.

Kopano Ratele (2001) argued for an era of analysing black men as men without relating them to whiteness. This is in contrast to his earlier position that blackness is a colonial construct, thus black men’s identities are dichotomized with whiteness as relational. I assume that the call made to study black men without relating to whiteness does not deny the perennial impact of whiteness on the post-apartheid’s constructions and performances of black identity. “South African society… is one in which racial group differences with regard to wealth, income, education, class position, and residential location, do not exist as separate or divisible factors; they are all systemically interlinked through structural racism.” (Taylor, 2012: 47). Moreover, a seemingly appropriate analysis of the category in which black masculinity belonged during apartheid is Connell’s subordinated or marginalized masculinity. The fluidity of masculine identity and the competitive tendency of Connell’s mechanisms, boxing black men as exclusively marginalised is a mistake. Thus the meaning of black masculinity is characterised by the flowing through various categories of masculinity.

The above implies that one can fall within a certain category at the time, meaning that occupying two or more (if not all) categories of masculinity simultaneously takes place. For instance struggle masculinity was simultaneously characterised by protection and violation. The
subordinate’s endeavours to resist a political establishment were rooted in constructed normative ideas of masculine duties to protect. On the other hand, it is worth highlighting that the intermigration through the different levels of Connell’s (1995) hierarchical masculinities by black men, or any other man for that matter, is monitored and mostly determined by the hegemons. For instance, struggle masculine men manoeuvred between being protectors, as prescribed by heteronormative standard of manhood, and being violators within the same context of oppression, deprivation of manhood and emasculation. Apartheid shaped the nature of their protection, for instance migration labour affected many men’s ‘duty’ to protect their families. Apartheid also had an impact on violent tendencies of some black men as violence was rooted in structural violence instigated by apartheid.

2.13 BLACK MEN AND COMRADES AS ANGELS AND DEMONS

For instance, some ANC and MK veterans were committed to protecting the masses and yet violated their women. The same applies to struggle masculine comrades. The common target of violence was predominantly women. Since the political climate changed in 1994, women’s issues have been given attention along with measures to change their marginal statuses. Feminist scholarship has demonstrated the importance of locating acts of violence against women within the broader atmosphere.

Boonzaier (2005) discussed the material basis of women’s subordination in other countries such as China and the Arab countries. She stated that men with material power reproduce and enforce ways of systematically oppressing women, yet in South Africa the context is different. The “South African context [which is] characterized by poverty, unemployment, crime and deprivation influence how women and men understand the violence in their relationships and the kinds of identities they construct?” (Boonzaier, 2005: 99). Boonzaier blamed the changing economic climate characterized by the feminization of labour for violence against women. She explained how men feel powerless and emasculated for struggling within a society which stratifies men as financial providers. The inability to do so results in alternative ways of reaffirming their masculine identities. On the other hand, there are ‘the Malemas’ and ‘the Zumas’, who are not frustrated by the emasculating force of unemployment and poverty and yet violence is romanticized and enforced. This too must be located in context when analysed, for instance, the apartheid resistance culture of violence is the culprit.
2.14 BLACK MEN AND VIOLENCE

The justification of the establishment of the Mkhonto we Sizwe (MK) was attributed to the unfruitfulness of peaceful resistance. Malema, during his testimony at the AfriForum hate speech trial, remarked that black people’s resistance to oppressive apartheid was initially peaceful. Malema stated that the reason for the youth (the ANCYL) to pursue other means of overthrowing the oppressive regime stemmed from observing the complacency of the elders. Thus Mandela and his peers decided to change their course and began pursuing the use of violence as means of resistance to apartheid. The decision to be violent was not rooted in the dependency on violence to construct masculine identity however that choice had consequences for identity configuration. The decision to fight violently was articulated by Mandela in a leaflet issued by the MK on 16 December 1961. He wrote:

[There] comes a time in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices: submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means within our power and defence of our people. (Mandela, 1990: 122).

The resort to violence was a reaction to apartheid violence. This means that the enactments of violence exposed black men’s marginal location. They did not independently choose to be violent; they were forced to be violent. This continues to wipe out the idea of blacks determining the first principle; meaning that blacks cannot create themselves. A black man is a mere reactionary because his ‘life’ is a reaction, either to oppose or appropriate an imposed civilizational order (see Scheurich, 1997). There seems to be an entity outside of him that creates his world and he is a mere reproducer of that which he has been moulded to be. The argument here is that the culture of violence was reproduced inherited by subsequent generations of the ANC movement. To some extent, the culture of resistance exposes the powerlessness and marginality of the ‘black’ subject thus exposing the structured nature of black agency.

This chapter has discussed the context in which black masculinities are cultivated. It has highlighted the importance of locating definitions of black masculinity within an understanding of the continuity as well as discontinuity of identity. The fluidity of identity does not mean that history is completely wiped out especially when material reality remains somewhat constant. Moreover, the shifting meanings of black identity as a result of context are highlighted as crucial to the understanding of contemporary black masculinities. This was achieved through a
discussion of scholarship on ANC masculinities in apartheid and post-apartheid eras. The researcher also took the liberty of critiquing the concept of Hegemony, pleading for a clarification of the concept and its applicability to black men. The paper then ended with a brief discussion of the theories of violence against women. The stressed argument that black men’s subjection to violence is the reason for their behaviour does not disregard the roles that they play in reproducing patriarchal ideas and practices. The arguments should not be misinterpreted as an endorsement of the ‘victim of racism’ rhetoric because that was not the intension. Instead the paper suggests that the examination of violence and black men must not be dislocated from history. This proposal is employed in the following chapter which offers an analysis of Julius Malema’s actions around the event of the Jacob Zuma rape trial.
CHAPTER 3

This section of the paper offers an analysis of events around the equality court case as means of paralleling Malema’s performance with Xaba’s concept of Struggle Masculinity. This trial was premised upon Malema’s remarks about Jacob Zuma’s rape accuser, Khwezi (an alias) which shall be quoted shortly. Malema’s responses to the entire situation had gendered implications. His behaviour was indicative of a model constituted by a fusion of various identities. In order to reach the objective of testing the hypothesis made about Malema’s performance of struggle masculinity, the chapter entails a detailed narration of the events that took place. It includes documented events that transpired in the court room as well as Malema’s presentations outside the court room. The chapter also deals with subsequent events that took place after the judgment passed on the 12th of March 2009. In the process, Malema’s enactments shall be categorised in light of a brief discussion of issues surrounding forms of violence against women. Moreover, in terms of understanding Malema’s performances, I propose that Malema’s response to the Jacob Zuma rape trial and his enactments pertaining to the equality court case instigated by Sonke Gender Justice Network (Sonke) should be located within the complex political context of the ANC. Malema’s actions and remarks should be simultaneously viewed as a production and product of identity.

3.1 THE COURT CASE AND ITS OUTCOMES

One of the moments in contemporary history which resulted in the impact on Malema’s construction of masculinity was when Malema was brought before the Equality Court by Sonke on the 29th of January 2009. This case was opened as a response to the words uttered by Julius Malema on the 22nd of January 2009 at the Cape Peninsula Technikon in Cape Town. While addressing the crowd as part of his rallying for the support of Jacob Zuma during the election campaign season, Malema made a comment in effort to excuse the rape charges that were brought against Jacob Zuma. Malema uttered that;

“When a woman didn't enjoy it, she leaves early in the morning. Those who had a nice time will wait until the sun comes out, request breakfast and taxi money. In the morning that lady requested breakfast and taxi money. You don't ask for taxi money from somebody who raped you.” (Lewis and Makinana, 2009: para. 2-3).
This statement reached the ‘ears’ of many South Africans as it was captured by the media. The lawsuit brought against Malema for uttering the above quoted words was meant to “appropriate declaratory relief, an unconditional apology for the statements and an order for compensation of the kind contemplated in section 21(2)(c) of the Equality Act.” (Muller, 2010: 2).

On the 15th of March 2009, the Equality Court declared Malema’s comments hate speech as per the Equality Act (Act 4 of 2000) defined within the framework of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA). Mbuyiseni Botha, a member, of Sonke made a complaint that Malema’s comment amounted to hate speech and alternatively harassment. It was demanded by Sonke that Malema retract his statement, make a public apology for uttering such words as well as pay a fine of R50000 to any organization dedicated to women’s empowerment (Mammburu, 2011). This act had the purpose of the law suit served as an unequivocal statement to the general public on the extent to which women’s statuses ought to be revered especially in a country where violence against women has been normalized. Gqola (2007) stated that “gender based violence is very ordinary, it is everywhere, commonplace, made to seem normal”.

3.2 THE MOTIVES BEHIND THE EQUALITY COURT CASE

Pertaining to the purpose of the case, Botha said “It was about creating a condition in South Africa that will make women continue to feel respected and dignified” (Mammburu, 2011: para. 11). This case was also used as example to society regarding the supposed relationship between social agents, particularly the ‘powerful’ and vulnerable people. Botha quoted by Mammburu (2011: para. 8) said “...we feel that it is an important milestone dealing with issues of gender, issues of violence against women, more importantly about the principles in law that all of us are not above the law.” Malema on the other hand, interpreted this as a political war against the leadership of Jacob Zuma, a war against struggle comrades seeking economic emancipation. Malema accused Sonke of being an organization sponsored to impede upon African leadership. He said the case is brought forth by “whites who are opposed to African leadership…” he emphasized that “we are in court because of the whites who are sponsoring this organisation; they want to make sure they embarrass the leadership of this movement.” (Sapa, 2010: para. 7-8). The thought about a conspiracy against African leadership resonates with the antagonistic relationship struggle comrades had with whiteness during apartheid forces.
3.3 THE MEANING OF THE TRIAL

Moreover, the statement Malema made while addressing a crowd outside the Equality courtroom affirms Suttner’s argument that the Jacob “Zuma rape trial must be at once understood as a trial for sexual assault of a woman and also part of a context of political turmoil” (2007: 1). This warning brings us to the next section on the application of the concept of struggle masculinity on Malema’s attitude to women. Xaba (2001) highlighted that struggle masculine men’s relationships to women are characterized by a patriarchal muscle which has little regard for women. Suttner argued that restricting the focus to the court room would rob the meanings of the trial, causing it to lose texture. The same is argued for Malema’s enactments with regard to the ‘sexist’ remarks he made about Jacob Zuma’s rape accuser.

According to Lewis and Makinana’s (2009) report, Malema made the sexist remarks during a campaign for the national and provincial elections held in April of the same year. This context must not be overlooked; the controversial remarks may be interpreted as a campaigning strategy for the 2009 elections. Malema campaigned for the succession of Zuma as the ANC leader as well as the country’s president and said “if you [the authorities] arrest him [Zuma], he will lead us from prison” (Mail&Guardian, 2008: para. 21). He was very adamant that Zuma replaces Thabo Mbeki. Du Preez and Rossouw (2009) did state that Malema enthusiastically campaigned for Zuma in the 2009 elections. Du Preez and Rossouw (2009) mentioned that no other Youth League president can claim to have played as much of a major role Julius Malema played in the 2009 election campaign.

3.4 MALEMA THE POPULIST REBEL

Malema’s succession of Fikile Mbalula as ANCYL president was pivotal to the agenda of promulgating and supporting the succession of the then seemingly leftist Jacob Zuma into the presidency. Malema attributed the increase in ANC’s youth vote during the 2009 elections to his ‘coolness’. In Malema’s case, coolness equates controversy, defiance and luxury. Du Preez stated that “among the black youth, Malema has become a much-admired hero and his arrogance, crude defiance a representation of their fears, resentments and aspirations” (Du Preez and Rossouw, 2009: 6) meaning that Malema has become an influential populist. The point here is, Malema’s controversial and populist statements managed to garner votes for the ANC during the elections. “The most important rhetorical device employed in a politics of populism is the appeal
to the ‘people’ as a legitimizing authority for a particular set of ideas or political support in this case” (Vincent, 2011: 3, italics added).

The above was true for Malema in his strategies of yielding support as a leading rebel and struggle masculinity performer, for instance during the March to the union buildings he said to the army of the poor and unemployed youth “when they ask you [the marchers] why you are marching you must say you are marching because you want to live like whites. Everything that whites have, we want it also” (Mngxitama, 2011, para. 7). Prior to the march, during his mobilization campaign to the Union buildings, his racialist rhetoric resurfaced again to indicate the extent of his rebellion. The march to the Union buildings was essentially a protest against the mother body’s economic policy that the ANCYL seeks to influence. This can also be paralleled with the rebellious youngsters Xaba (2001) mentioned when discussing the 1980s youth that embodied struggle masculinity.

On the issue of economic freedom, Malema argued that “because we say we will take from the white minority and give to you, the black majority. They are scared.” (Ndlangisa and Rampedi, 2011: para. 7). On the other hand, he clarified to an audience of poor whites that they “…must never buy the story that we are anti-white and we want whites to be driven into the sea. This is your home, your country and it belongs to all of us…I would die in defence of the white minority…” (IOL, 2012: para. 2). These statements are an unsuccessful attempt to blur the argument that Malema is a racialist populist. Malema tends to articulate the grievances of the poor black majority, particularly the youth, because they represent potential voters of the ANC.

While we are on the subject of white people and Malema, he has promulgated his demand for “expropriation of land without compensation” (IOL, 2012: para. 1). This call resonates with Xaba’s report of the characterizing actions of men who perform struggle masculinity in the new political order. Xaba (2001) stated that former comrades engage in robberies for a living, he termed this the confiscation of property and it happens violently. This confiscation is considered to be justified because of their systematic exclusion in the consumption of the post-apartheid pie.

3.5 THE REBELLION AND THE REASONS BEHIND IT

Moreover the rhetoric which asserts that “they (whites) stole our land” (IOL, 2012: para. 7) is another tune which Malema also sings. ‘Economic freedom in our lifetime’ was the locomotive ideas behind Malema’s support for Zuma, as stated before he interpreted the legal charges brought against Zuma as a ploy to stop him from assuming the role of the presidency which was
planned to be a strategic move towards adopting nationalization as an ANC policy. The same belief in the conspiracy against Zuma’s leadership informed Malema’s thinking of the Equality Court case brought against him. He interpreted the Sonke lawsuit as a plot against the leftist ideas he endorses, ideas which historically have been opposed by apartheid’s white supremacists. This is explained by his refusal to adhere to the demands of Sonke and the justice system. He argued that "...there are other agendas which are trying to undermine this [pro-Zuma/pro-leftist] leadership." (News24, 2009: para. 22). Moreover, during a cross-examination, he was asked about the comments he made, he replied that he “was explaining why the ANC still had Zuma as a candidate... I was not trying to be an expert on the conduct of women after sex...” (News24, 2009: para. 17). He also said that “[w]e have concluded this issue is not a criminal case, it is a political case.” (Mail&Guardian, 2008: para. 7). This adds onto the substantiation of the argument that Malema’s remark about the rape victim should be placed within the context of a political campaign and his perception of the rape accusation against Zuma as a ploy to derail the economic freedom vision.

On the same day, when the case was postponed to the 31st August, he addressed his supporters outside the Equality Court enforcing his rebellion by stating "we will never apologise to some Mickey Mouses (Sonke) who want to put pressure on us…” (Sapa, 2010b: para. 4). This sentiment may partly explain the reason behind his absence from the court case on the 1st of April whereby his legal counsel. More so, the content of his address was an indication of rebellion, to refuse to submit to authority just as struggle masculinity enactments. Moreover, according to a chronological report found on the Sonke Gender Justice Network website, Malema’s legal team argued on behalf of Malema that the comments made were a fair comment. This response suggests a certain normalization of the subordination of women as well as the myth upheld regarding the constitution of rape. Before engaging the argument endorsed by Malema’s legal team, the paper will mention one of the myths believed to characterize Malema’s interpretation of the rape issue.

3.6 THE IMPACT OF A “FAIR COMMENT” ON GENDER RELATIONS

Lisa Vetten, an expert witness for the complainants at the court case, compiled an extensive report which highlighted the widespread myths about rape. She reported during the court proceedings that rape myths include scepticism regarding the credibility on the victim’s claims. She stated that it is believed that women tend to “falsely accuse men of rape, blame- victims
provoke rape through their dress, responsibility - men are not responsible for sexual violence; deservingness - women ‘ask for it’ and trivialization – rape is not particularly serious or harmful” (Vetten, 2009: 10). Moreover, by fair comment they meant that Malema was merely regurgitating judge Willem van der Merwe who was presiding over Jacob Zuma’s rape trial. This was criticized for inaccuracy during the court case by Sonke’s legal team and Vetten. Malema’s comment on Zuma’s rape victim was a misinterpretation of what had been said during the case proceedings. The case proceeding’s transcript indicates that Malema’s “revision of the facts suggest that some sort of normal morning after behaviour had taken place between the victim and the accused...” (Muller, 2010: 13). However, when Malema was asked about his comment, considering its impact on gender equality, he argued that he “was not trying to be an expert on the conduct of women after sex...” (SAPA, 2009d: para. 17).

Moreover, when criticized for presenting an opinion as factual and criticizing his mis-translation of the statements made during the Zuma rape trial, Malema used his level of education as an excuse. He said "You [the lawyer of the complainant/Sonke] must know that you are talking to a layman whose highest qualification is matric, who is trying to remember a judgment which was passed three years back..." (SAPA, 2009e: para. 7). Had Malema not rebelled against the idea of apologizing for his statements, one would sympathize with the above quoted argument. Instead what springs up is the justification of criminality and violence by former comrades who have found themselves materially and ‘ideologically’ excluded from the new South African imagination (see Xaba, 2001). Malema is however not materially excluded even though he is endorsing populist ideas that the current ANC seems to marginalize.

3.7 VIOLENCE AND FAIRNESS

Moreover the argument that the statement was “fair comment” indicates Malema’s failure to see the inappropriate nature of his remark regardless of whether it was directed to one woman. What is of the matter here is the failure to contextualize the comments on a larger societal level considering the alarming prevalence of violence against women in South Africa. Shefer, Ratele, Strebel, Shabalala and Buikema (2007: 1) added that in “the last few years, figures of reported rape have remained above 50000 per annum, and alarmingly appear to be increasing- in 2004/2005 2391 more victims reported rape than in 2003/2004.” Helen Moffett (2006: 1) also highlighted that one in three women in South Africa will be raped in their lifetime.
Rape constitutes a form of violence against women, and some men too. There are various forms of violence such as domestic abuse and sexism. Violence ranges from physical abuse to emotional abuse. Malema’s remarks were publicly declared sexist, the right or wrongfulness of this is of no concern for now, what is argued however is that Malema’s remarks were an act of violence. This stance is derived from O’Conner’s (1995) citation of ways of linking language and violence. One must note that violence is also a contested concept. In an article titled ‘Discourse of Violence’ O’Conner (1995) discussed different forms of language and their relations to violence. He stated that there is a type of language that accompanies acts of violence; there is also language that reports or claims act of violence. He added that there is a form of language that leads to gauge that reports violence or reclaim acts of violence.

There is also a kind of language that leads to violation or violence and lastly language that in is itself a violation. Amongst these ways of viewing violence, Malema’s remarks that the rape victim had a ‘nice time’ meaning she enjoyed herself were judged by the Equality court as tantamount to harassment. The outcome of the judgement of the case in 2010 declared Malema’s initial remark about the rape victim as violence. It was argued that the words “could be reasonably construed as hurtful, harmful and demeaning to women” (Muller, 2010: 14). The comments were an indication of the underlying perceptions that shape men and women’s relations in South Africa. The remark exposed the perception of the status of women from and within a political atmosphere. The confidence (be it rebellion or whatever) that Malema had to make such a demeaning statement reveals the discrepancy between the clauses in the constitution and the empirical status of women in South Africa and the traditional ideas on women’s sexuality (Hassim, 2009). However, as argued at the beginning of the chapter, the statements cannot be analyzed solely in this gendered manner. There are other cultural factors that shape relationships between comrades that must be considered. There are factors such as loyalty, which in the Malema and Zuma case was determined by shared ideas.

3.8 ANC POLITICS AND MASCULINITY

In 2007 Jacob Zuma became the president of the ANC. Malema in steering and rallying support for the Zuma era within the ANC, he uttered a lot of controversial things such as ‘taking up arms and killing for Zuma” (IOL: 2010: no page). This statement not only reveals Malema’s militant pose, it also reveals the dogma characterizing ANC leadership. Ivory Chipkin’s article titled ‘The Sublime object of Blackness’ entailed an argument that explained the disdaining of any attack on
the leadership of the ANC, particularly the president, who was Thabo Mbeki at the time. The reason for this is that the members of the ANC are considered to be the authentic representatives of the national sovereignty project (Chipkin, 2010) thus the deification of ANC presidents. One could argue that any criticism of these elevated beings equated blasphemy.

Xaba (2001) stated that loyalty and a sense of non-blood familial ties characterises post-struggle masculinity. The argument already made in the paper is that Malema’s performance falls under the category of struggle masculinity however this does not mean that his performance is exclusive to one model. There are various masculine identities that Malema appropriates, for instance, as Vincent (2011) discussed, Malema uses populism in his politic making his masculine identity partly populist. Masculinity is fluid and one can occupy multiple spaces of gendered identity meaning that Malema may also represent black elitist masculinity and post-struggle masculinity which falls within the category of sub-alternate masculinities. Although the category of masculinity in which Malema is locatable is not completely the same as that of post-struggle masculinities of survival. The concept of ‘family-hood’ rooted in political, social and economic relations of in exile and the relationship between comrades discussed by Xaba (2001) can be used to analyze Malema’s loyalty to Zuma. One could even argue that then Malema and the anti-Mbeki camp stood together out of ‘feeling’ sidelined by Thabo Mbeki. Malema accused Mbeki saying “he thinks he's too clever for all of us and won't engage with us” (News24, 2010: para. 1).

In all of this, the comradeship demanded that Malema and the youth league stand by comrade Zuma no matter what. However this loyalty was a façade. The loyalty was as deep as the extent to which the young radicals were guaranteed endorsement with regards to their ideas. At the turn of events when Jacob Zuma disappointed his left-wing supporters by saying “[o]ur economic policies will remain stable, progressive and unchanged, as decided upon in previous ANC national conferences” (Berger, 2008: para. 4) as well as failing to support the leftist Youth leaders., Malema ended up calling Zuma a toothless leader and at the beginning of 2012, Malema was quoted as saying that “it is part of our [the ANCYL] agenda to replace Zuma” (Hammer, 2012, no page).

3.9 THE ANC, MALEMA AND ZUMA’S RAPE TRIAL

At the time when the relationship between Malema and Zuma seemed mutually beneficial, the accusations of rape against Zuma were rendered ‘blasphemous’, deserving vicious punishment. Sonke complained about the ANC’s failure to respond to Malema’s remarks. Instead Gwede
Mantashe’s intervention, reported by Maughan (2009), was intended to save Malema from the court case. The silence can be explained by Gqola’s (2007: 118) argument that “gender based violence is very ordinary: it is everywhere, commonplace, made to seem normal”. Therefore reacting to Malema’s comments was unlikely for an organization that has feminist voices outnumbered by patriarchs (Gqola, 2007a). Suttner (2007) stated that during the liberation movement, women were raped and beaten but no measures were taken to deal with it. This offers an explanation of the ‘naturalness’ of violence against women. It also offers another dimension in the analysis of Malema’s subjection of Khwezi, the ANCWL’s silence as well as the judgement of Khwezi by women who supported Zuma during the trial. What then explains Zuma’s response to his audience’s harassment of the rape accuser?

Although the latter question is not central to this paper, a brief discussion shall be offered because it provides an insight into the post-apartheid culture of the currently dominating ANC masculinity as well as Jacob Zuma’s choice of the song he sang during the rape trial. In a 2010 interview for the Polity website, Raymond Suttner argued that the Jacob Zuma rape trial ushered in the glorification of the gun, stating that apart from the phallic imagery of the gun in his “bring me my gun” rendition, the song characterized the romanticization of militarism. Moreover, in light of the conspiracy to keep him from power using rape and corruption charges, the request for his gun was indicative of his demand for his diminishing control over himself as an agent and a potential successor of Thabo Mbeki. Moreover, it may also have been a symbolic warming of the willingness to fight considering the conspiracy to kill him as way of stopping his succession into power. Zuma “revealed that there was a plot to have him assassinated when he was deputy president.” (IOL, 2011: para.1). Moving away from conspiracy theories, Suttner (2010b) made an argument that “one of the things about the Zuma project is that it is a very patriarchal project and there is violence against women, but it is committed primarily by men” (Suttner, 2010b: no page). However, the Zuma era did not pioneer the violent characteristics of the contemporary ANC. Suttner stated that the glorification of violence within the ANC is not the ‘Zuma era’ project. He added that the exultation of violence was evident in the party’s decision to pursue an armed struggle

However, this is not the only explanation. Moffett (2006) argued that the discourses of apartheid are another factor configuring black masculinity
“For over 50 years, South African society operated on the explicit principle that the Other [the subclass] was unstable, potentially extremely powerful and therefore dangerous and needed to be kept in its place by regular and excessive shows of force. Women—the current subclass—are also seen as having significant agency and therefore they pose a potential threat to the uncertain status quo” (Moffett, 2006: 10).

Moffett (2006: 1) highlighted that contemporary sexual violence is anchored by “justificatory narratives rooted in apartheid practices that legitimated violence against the disempowered”. She argued that violence tends to be blamed at racialized systematic and physical violence. Mbeki’s public attack of an anti-rape activist (Charlene Smith) for her method of educating South African about rape as racist resonates with this ‘racist-victim’ defence (Moffet, 2006). Moreover, Thabo Mbeki’s elevation of women and suggestions of the succession of a female president may be viewed as different from Zuma’s patriarchal project however; Suttner (2010b) argued that patriarchy is the muscle of the ANC.

3.10 THE ANC FAMILY AFFAIR

Suttner (2010b) highlighted that patriarchy is reflected in the ANC’s structure of the patriarchal family. This family iconography is reflected by the division of the ANC organization into the male dominated ‘mother body’, the youth league (are the children) and the ANC Women’s League (ANCWL). The concept of iconography was borrowed from Anne McClintock who wrote on gender and nationalism arguing that “women serve as boundary markers visibly upholding fetish signs of national difference and visibly embodying the iconography of race and gender purity” (1997: 104). The domination of male figures within the so called ‘mother body’ reflects the nature/nurture, woman/man dichotomy that validates the patriarchal project of ‘dominating over women’. Moving back to the family iconography the ANC family is a peculiar family because the children have a tendency of dictating the father.

The youth league’s insistence on nationalization, despite the mother body’s dismissal, is similar to the behaviors of children who rebel against the authority of their father. It reflects generational conflict within the ANC as well as the norm of the ANCYL’s disobedience towards the elders. Malema’s rebellion against the elders reoccurs many times. For instance the comment he made in September 2008 pointed at the ousted Thabo Mbeki, “we are leaving this dead snake, but we must bury it dead now” (IOL: 2011: para. 23) resembled the behaviours of the anti-apartheid
struggle youth as well as the ANCYL of Mandela, Tambo and Lembede’s times. Thokozani Xaba would label this a performance of ‘struggle masculinity’, a concept based on the analysis of the eighties generation.

3.11 YOUNG AND RADICAL

Achille Mbembe’s foreword in Fiona Forde’s ‘An Inconvenient Youth’ reported that rebellion against elders is not exclusive to ANCYL culture and it was not exclusive to the eighties. Mbembe (2011) stated that the 20th century period was characterized by three episodes of the youth challenging older generations. The first episode happened in the early 1950s. The youth league at the time exerted the kind of pressure to the ANC to adopt radical stances that ultimately led to the armed struggle. The second episode was in 1976 when the youth decided to take action against the oppressive government’s education policy. The 1980s phenomenon was another episode whereby the youth facilitated the replacement of state power with civic power on the ‘streets’. This phenomenon has now recycled again through a certain camp of the ANCYL. Recently Malema’s supporters sang "showara wa re sokodisa" (SAPA, 2011c: para. 3) meaning the shower man is giving us a hard time. This is another indication of Malema’s enactment of rebellion because when Zapiro first drew Jacob Zuma with a showerhead in 2006, Malema was at the forefront of condemning the image. This indicates the different contexts that characterized the Malema and Zuma relationship.

In 2011, Malema was reported as singing along on stage holding his hand over his head to symbolize a shower head to mock the current president. According to a BBC report, the fall out between Malema and Jacob Zuma is the latter figure’s failure to relieve poverty, if that is the reason, why then commence to endorse Thabo Mbeki who was initially conceived to be the cause of the failures to alleviate poverty in the first place? This only adds weight to the assumption that he is “an opportunist within the [ANC] regime”. However, a Sowetan online article in 2010 entailed a Wikileaks report that allegedly quoted Malema as saying “Zuma would likely not have been picked up by the ANCYL ‘if Mbeki hadn’t gone after him…” (The Guardian: 2010). This quote assists one in comprehending the reason for the initial rebellion against Mbeki. It also add insight into the easily changed attitudes towards Zuma. For the purposes of clarity, using the family iconography analysis, Khwezi’s blasphemous ways warranted violence (that led to her excommunication from the patriarchal level, family) was not only because she was a woman, she was also not a member of the family.
3.12 WHEN THINGS FALL APART

However, the excommunication of Malema from the patriarchal family (at the organizational level) was not solely based on blasphemy; Malema was an embodiment of the threat to Zuma’s patriarchal project. Forde (2011) noted Barney Mthombeni’s editorial piece in the Financial Mail newspaper which scornfully argued that the ANC’s failure to confront Malema is sheer cowardice. Such were comments characterizing public discourse. In essence, such comments were questioning the authority of the ANC patriarchs, especially Zuma. Prior to this, Forde (2011) highlighted that the ANC had mutated into a piece of unstable, divided and alternating networks of interests less united by a common principle or ideology. Mbembe (2011) argued that Julius Malema embodied both passions and contradictions of post-struggle politics and the dark and troubling undercurrents of long South African tradition of lumpen radicalism. “Lampen radicalism is a political tradition of unruliness and at times resistance-in which fantasies of male power, control and desire have always been deeply entangled with ‘war envy’ and an almost invisible appetite for money, luxuries and women” (Mbembe, 2011; vi). According to the Merriam Webster dictionary, the term ‘lumpen’ refers or relates to dispossessed and uprooted individuals who are cut off from the economic and social class with which they might normally be identified. This term is problematic in various ways when applied to Malema.

3.13 THE COMPLEXITY OF MALEMA’S MASCULINE IDENTITY

First of all, Malema, as were the 1980s youths, is uneducated. Secondly, different from struggle masculine youths of the 1980s, Malema is not live in penury; his life is characterized by luxury. One characteristic of lumpen radicals that warrants a gender analysis is the appetite for women. Forde (2011) suggested that Malema also had a number of women he had sexual relations with despite having a girlfriend whom he referred to as a steady girlfriend. Forde (2011) described Malema as wild in his early days as a young adult. It is safe to say that this was code for promiscuity. Sexual potency as a signifier of masculinity repeatedly surfaces in many cultural definitions of manhood. From this view women’s bodies are important in the making of masculinity.

Moreover, on women’s bodies as sites of masculinity configuration (Gqola, 2007), endorsing the eating of sushi on women’s half naked bodies offered a glimpse into the unequal power relations between men and women. This inequality is often informed by the economic marginality of women. Moreover, the metaphor of appetite reminds one of township discourse on sex, for
instance the ‘eating of pussy’ rhetoric that is predominant in some ‘masculinity conversations’. Women are portrayed as objects to be ‘eaten’; this entails referring to women as mere genitals. For instance, slurs such as ‘ass’ and ‘booty’ are used by some people when referring to women. Talking about ‘ass’ and ‘booty’, during the rape trial, Khwezi’s sexual history was judged in and outside the court as promiscuity, suggesting she was loose piece of ‘ass’, thus deserving of sexual violation (Muller, 2010).

3.14.1 POLICING BLACK SEXED/SEXABLE BODIES

Hassim (2009) reported that Khwezi was wearing a ‘kanga’ when she was conversing with Jacob Zuma and the manner in which she was sitting was interpreted by Zuma as an invitation for sex. Skeen (2007) stated that the rape accuser was reported as sitting with her legs open, a posture culturally reserved for men. This politics of sitting sparks a notion of sexpectations (sex expectations) on women’s bodies. Although gender has nothing to do with biology, there are cultural meanings that mark the body, for instance DeFranscisco (2007: 81) wrote that “U.S. women usually do not think about whether or not to cross their legs, but they are more likely to think about the feminine taboo of sitting with their legs apart (especially in a skirt).” Khwezi’s choice of dress and opening her legs was interpreted as her availability for sex, an object that Zuma was entitled to by virtue of his masculinity. In order to understand the entire treatment and experience of Khwezi, one must emphasize that she is a woman who is black and at times lesbian.

The identities produced and defined by the intersection of these dimensions (sexuality, gender and race) are shaped by the structural, political and representational aspects of her violation. Kimberley Crenshaw (1991) argued that white women and black women do not experience rape in the same manner. Crenshaw (1991) argued that the factors that determine what rape is and what it is not are predominantly shaped by the intersection of race and gender. Malema’s remarks about what a rape survivor should do or not do also perpetuate rape myths. Such remarks are reflective of the patriarchal ideas on the constitution of rape, especially for black women. This is rooted in the discourses on black women and the black female body. Crenshaw (1991) stated that the representations of black women in the media were informed by racist discourses. For instance, Halle Berry, the first black actress to receive an Oscar, was woman whose chastity was highly questionable. This shows that even the “post-racism”/post-slavery era is still influenced by racist discourses on the black body.
Khwezi’s chastity was considered to be devalued, which is one of the reasons the patriarchal court bought the argument that she and Zuma had consensual sex. Patriarchal views and judgements of rape, account for Malema’s remark about Khwezi having ‘a nice time’ and later on claiming his comments were fair. It is worth noting that Malema’s judgement of Khwezi was not simply patriarchal. Malema’s visit to the American Embassy in Pretoria also entailed an engagement on a discussion about Zuma and the rape trial. Wikileaks (quoted by The Guardian, 2010) reported that Malema mentioned that Fikile Mbalula “did not want to support Zuma during the rape trial but that the regional leadership insisted, arguing that the YL (youth league) defended Zuma on corruption charges, they could defend him on rape charges since both acts are immoral”. This statement supports the call to locate Malema’s sexist remarks within a political context because Malema did acknowledge the moral discrepancies in Zuma’s behavior despite his support of him.

It is, however, unclear whether the ‘secret’ condemnation of Zuma’s sexual relation with Kwezi by Malema made at the American embassy was in reference to the age gap between Zuma and Khwezi or he was commenting based on the incest argument raised by feminists and the media. Nonetheless, Malema, during his height of support for Zuma, he publicly made remarks that should be understood as him adhering to the principle of offering unconditional support to the ANC family, similarly to the support that post-struggle masculine comrades offered to the members of the family they constructed (Xaba, 2001).

3.14.2 WOMEN AND MEN’S POLITICAL “WARS”

Malema’s reactions throughout the entire event, from his militant support for Zuma to be elected as president to appealing the judgement made on the 15th of March declaring his comments harassment revealed gender relations within the contemporary ANC. Malema’s enactments were not merely patriarchal chauvinism of struggle masculinity or simply rebellion, he was also informed by the idea that Khwezi may have been a sex missionary thus his statement that when a woman didn’t enjoy sex she does not ask for breakfast and taxi money, “…[y]ou don’t ask for taxi money from somebody who raped you” (Lewis and Makinana, 2009: para. 3). Despite the fact that Malema’s remark attempts to construct ideas of normal after-rape behavior, the fact that Khwezi filed for rape charges against Zuma even though she allegedly “enjoyed it”, his comment suggests that she was an agent. “Malema argued factually that Zuma was ‘a victim of a conspiracy…” (The Guardian, 2011: no page).
The idea of a conspiracy implies that women can be used as pawns in a malestream political game. This argument is based on the argument that Malema’s remark may have been a political strategy. The remark as well as the conspiracy claim led to the subjection of a woman to crossfire between men fighting for power. During this ‘war’, Malema made a vow to eliminate any enemy opposing Zuma becoming the president. He said “we are on a mission here. We will crush you. It doesn’t matter who you are, even if you are in the ANC” (Mail&Guardian, 2008), although the above statement was not directed at Khwezi, it is surely an indication of the militancy employed in the mission to have Zuma succeed as president.

The mere belief that she may have been an agent resonates with the idea of women’s bodies as the battlefield for power (see Gqola, 2007). Based on the conspiracy, Khwezi was a sex missionary deployed to target Zuma and strip him of power just like the biblical Delilah conspired against Samson. The perception and probability of a woman being employed as a sex missionary is rooted in the marginalized positions of women in general. In most cases, women who are marginalized are prone to abuse. Their economic marginality subjects them to use their bodies for sex transactions. Even if Khwezi was a hired agent, her agreement would have revealed the patriarchal violence against women; it exposes the levels in which women are disempowered.

3.15 SEXISM OUTSIDE THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Another incident which may prove the patriarchal nature of the South African society and the limitations of the justice system in protecting women is the lamentation about Malema’s misjudgment. According Pierre de Vos, a Constitutional Law expert suggested that Malema was unfairly judged. He claimed that Malema’s remark was not intended to incite hurt on rape victims or women victims. Pierre de Vos stated that “many people fail to understand that hate speech as defined in Pepuda (Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act) requires more than making hurtful or harmful statements about someone” (De Vos, 2010: no page ). Whether this case was unfairly declared hate speech is not of importance. Malema did make a comment about a woman who voiced a complaint about rape. Moreover, an apology cannot take away the fact that no legislation or legal punishment can singularly deal with the deep rooted problem of South Africa’s patriarchal society. Malema may have not intended to be sexist or hateful in his statement but his choice to subject Khwezi reveals the patriarchal muscle that remains the locomotive of political thought.
In March of 2010 Malema was ordered to make a public apology, donate R50 000 to People Opposed to Women Abuse (POWA) and pay for the legal fees of the Sonke Gender Justice Network. The apology and the R50 000 fines were a suggestion made by the Sonke Gender Justice Network. Although the legal punishment was somewhat in line with the offence Malema was judged guilty for, the monetary compensation for violence against women should not be deemed unproblematic. The idea and act of compensation has resonance with the commoditisation of women. It also echoes the reason and mind over emotion and the body dichotomy of a rationalist outlook. This rationalist and masculinist outlook quantifies violence. It suggests that gendered abuse can be valued by money, thus easily dealt with by money which is dominantly possessed by men. Although there may have not been other means, the payment suggests that elites can pay to their way to ‘freedom’. This is another indication that there is a serious need for the material translation of the status of women in South Africa as enshrined in the constitution. Regarding the court’s order of Malema to apologise and donate R50 000 to POWA, Malema failed to comply immediately which reflected his regard of the judicial system and matters of gender equality.

3.16 REBELLION, AUTHORITY AND SUBMISSION

Malema’s failure to comply meant that he was in contempt of court and such an act is punishable by law. However, the justice system failed to make him account. On top of Malema’s disregard for the law in this case, the City Press newspaper reported that in October 2010, Malema’s lawyer applied for condonation which means the court forgives a transgression. It was denied. The following year it was also reported that Malema’s legal team applied for an appeal reinstatement. This suggests that Malema failed to comprehend the problem with his remarks. A Sowetan (2011) online article reported that he withdrew that appeal in June 2011 and eventually apologized.

The apology was made fifteen months after the court ruling. This belatedness brings up the rebellion against authority trait of struggle masculinity as well as rebellious ANC masculinities. The reoccurrence of the act of rebellion by Malema and the discussed former ANCYL presidents warrants the conception of ‘rebel masculinity’. Rebel masculinity can be defined as the performance of rebellion as indicative of manliness. This type of masculinity is oppositional and characterized by disobedience and defiance towards authority, just like Xaba’s (2001) struggle
masculinity. The difference between rebel masculinity and struggle masculinity is sex based violence, but it does not mean rebel masculinity is not aggressive.

Upon apologising, Malema said “I am sorry, sorry and very sorry about that. And commit not to repeat the similar mistake again…Issues of women are sensitive and once a person says ‘I’m offended’, it doesn’t matter whether you are right or not, you must have the capacity to say sorry… I want to say sorry to say sorry to the lady and Sonke Gender, and I commit to pay them that R50 000 and pay legal fees for that case”” (SAPA, 2011a: no page). The content of Malema’s apology also reflects patriarchal arrogance which is characteristic of rebellious masculinity. The apology was not admittance to the error, him saying “it doesn’t matter whether you are right or not, you must have the capacity to say sorry” (SAPA, 2011a: no page). This, as stated before, reveals the depth of the sexist mentality. The rebel masculinity performance also surfaced in his delayed compliance with the payment.

According to Seraro (2011), Malema took his own time to comply with the court order but eventually paid the money in cash fifteen months later. Apart from the enactment of rebel masculinity as well as struggle masculinity, the belatedness is characteristic of the patriarchal norm of resistance to transformation that is supposed to lead to women’s empowerment. What is meant by resistance to change is the failure to pay the money. Moreover, the non-compliance is characteristic of the resistance to transferring ‘property’ to women rooted in the prohibition of property ownership by women. “In many cultures, women at all levels of society are not allowed to own property” (Buckley and Casale, 2006: 425). One more issue regarding the issue of payment is that compensation for gendered violence may be rooted in binary conceptions of women’s bodies as equivalent to conquered land and commoditised or privately owned.

The chapter entailed a critical discussion the remark made by Malema. It offered a political framework for the understanding of Malema’s masculinity enactments. The paper entailed paralleled Malema’s performances with struggle masculinity. It also proved a concept of rebel masculinity. The basis for birthing the concept of ‘rebel masculinity’ was premised on the limitations in Xaba’s concept of ‘struggle masculinity’. Rebel masculinity forms part of the multiple yet interlinking identities that characterize Malema’s masculine identity. Moreover, the chapter indirectly showed the role of context in the appropriation of certain identities, for instance populist masculinity constructed through populist politic. It was also evident in the paper that Malema’s performances throughout the event were rooted in the ANC patriarchal
culture and also not forgetting the impact of historical events which shaped liberation struggle masculinities and contemporary black masculinity. As a concluding remark, Malema’s comments and responses around the events which took place before, during and after the Equality Court case by Sonke provided a better understanding of Malema’s model of manhood as characterized by struggle masculinity and rebel masculinity.
CHAPTER 4

4.1 RECALLING THE STUDY AND ITS PURPOSE

The purpose of this study was to describe as well as explain the enactments of masculinity within the political sphere. At the moment, the dominating masculinities within the political arena are that of ANC members. One member of the ANC who has been dominating the public space is Julius Malema, therefore it proved to be a good idea to focus on Malema’s model of manhood as a ‘lens’ into understanding the definitions of masculinity within the political space. There are a multitude of incidents which can be interpreted through a gendered framework. However the paper selected one event as a focus, namely the Jacob Zuma rape trial. As a way of guiding the scope of the study, the paper began with a hypothesis which stipulated that Malema’s performances reflected ‘struggle masculinity’. The reason for examining Malema’s enactments of masculinity through applying Thokozani Xaba’s concept was heavily premised on Malema’s location of himself within the struggle. The concept of the struggle in post-apartheid era from Malema’s perspective was interrogated.

4.2 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS AND RESULTS

As mentioned above, the paper began with a broad topic, which was about masculinity within the political sphere. The choice to read Malema’s enactment of masculinity consequently led one to focus not only on black masculinity on a larger scale but ANC masculinities as well or rather one some models of ANC masculinity. A discussion on black masculinity as well as ANC masculinity helped in providing accounts for Malema’s performances. The project yielded a number of accounts for Malema’s enactments around the event of the Jacob Zuma trial. First of all, it was argued that Malema’s performances must be read within a historical context. The political tension induced by the struggle for power and the support of Zuma for the nationalization end. It was argued that Malema’s performances symbolize the traditions of the ANC. The paper linked certain events concerning Malema to the events and practices of former ANCYL presidents, namely Nelson Mandela and Peter Mokaba (Malema’s hero). After the analysis, it was evident that Malema’s performances resembled struggle masculinity, however the concept had limitations therefore provisions were made to deal with such. The provision yielded a concept of ‘rebel masculinity’. The birth of the concept was based on the analysis of Malema’s actions as well as some analysis of the previous ANCYL presidents are discussed in the study.
The researcher then inferred that rebellion forms one of the defining features of ANCYL masculinities. Moreover, Xaba’s ‘struggle masculinity’ proved helpful in highlighting the nature of comrade’s relations with women. Xaba reported that comradeship awarded young men access to women and the same applied to Malema. Malema’s enactments exposed the relegation of women to subordination by struggle masculinities. This point was achieved through discussion Malema’s treatment of Khwezi. However, his behaviour has to be understood within a larger context, this means that Malema is not only a product of the ANC, he is a product of a larger patriarchal project that is beyond the ANC.

The above assertion was anchored by a discussion of the position of women within society. This was done through highlighting the general marginalization of most women, especially in terms of finances. The sexist remarks uttered by Malema were not solely based on financial marginality of women. The remarks were interpreted in multiple ways however, most of the interpretations echoed patriarchy. In order to arrive to such an argument, Malema’s actions were categorized as violence. Theories of violence against women were reviewed however they mainly about sexual violence or domestic violence. None of the theories explained Malema’s behaviour. In this regard, the paper fell short of providing a solution to this dilemma. However, this weakness serves as a call for a further engagement on the discourses of violence, particularly sexism and language as violence. The engagement should be guided by a quest to formulate measuring tools.