RACE, GENDER, CLASS AND LAND REFORM: A CASE STUDY APPROACH ON THE LAND REFORM FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT (LRAD) SUB-PROGRAMME

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RACE, GENDER, CLASS AND LAND REFORM: A CASE STUDY APPROACH ON THE
LAND REFORM FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT (LRAD) SUB-PROGRAMME

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ABSTRACT

The racial discrimination under colonialism and apartheid culminated to the dispossession of black people from their land, and to unequal land distribution between black and white people. Territorial segregation during this period was not only about the displacement of black people from their land and their deprivation to equal access to land compared to their white counterparts, it was also about economic deprivation, eradication of subsistence agriculture and the transformation of blacks into wage labourers (Hall, 2004; Walker, 2008). The post-apartheid land reform process was initiated to redress the injustices and inequalities of the past. It took a market-driven approach to blend the objectives of land reform with those of national reconciliation and maintenance of food security (DLA, 1997).

The land reform process took a form of restoring land to its original owners who were forcefully removed from it after June 1913 or compensation if land could not be restored. It was also aimed at securing tenure rights for farm workers, labour tenants, farm dwellers and people residing in communal areas. The aims of the third part of the land reform programme was to redistribute 30% of commercial farms in white hands to black people with the view of redressing racial disparities in landholding. As early as in the initial stages of the development of South Africa’s land policy in the early 1990s, scholars and civil society groups warned about the ineffectiveness of the market to deliver on land reform objectives.

This paper adopts a case study approach to study the South African land reform process in relation to the notion of empowerment. It focuses on the Land Reform for Agricultural Development (LRAD) sub-programme by looking at the intersection between race, gender and class. Bambanani Fruits (Pty) Ltd, an LRAD project based in the Gauteng province is used as a case study. This is an LRAD Equity Scheme project, meaning that its beneficiaries (who are former workers on the farm) acquired an LRAD grant to purchase equity shares to be co-owners of the project. Bambanani Fruits is a successful project considering its productivity and access to the market. This paper investigates how much LRAD beneficiaries are part of this success i.e. whether they have agency, whether they feel a sense of ownership and control of the project, and the extent at which they take part in decision making in the project. This task is carried out through the application of Kabeer’s (1999) instrumentalist model of measuring empowerment. Kabeer states that empowerment is measured by looking at three aspects, namely; resources, agency and achievement. Kabeer’s model is applied to the data which was collected through various means including in depth interviews with Bambanani LRAD beneficiaries and land officials from the province, document analysis and review of existing scholarly work on land reform.

It is well documented that South Africa’s land reform process has been very slow in delivering to its objectives, and departmental reports used in this paper also confirm this assertion. The research results reveal that even though more land was transferred under LRAD, the sub-programme also encountered some of the challenges and hindrances faced by its predecessor Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG). It faced budgetary constraints, complexities of the land market such as price restrictions and resistance by land owners to cede land, and so on. Generally, it was found that LRAD tended to entrench race, gender and class disparities in landholding.

At Bambanani, I discovered that LRAD has affected beneficiaries differently. The sub-programme has stratified these beneficiaries into competing class factions. Divergent interests have emerged to distort the actual meaning of empowerment. I have labelled this tension a ‘dichotomous factionalism’. The struggle and conflict is caught up between beneficiaries themselves, and their disunity has left the hegemony of the farm’s management unchallenged. I argue that, their empowerment is firstly condemned from within and this internal condemnation limits their negotiating power with the
management. Secondly, their empowerment is curtailed by the farm’s management in such a way that it sometimes uses its majority shares to justify unilateral decision making. According to Kabeer, empowerment ought to encompass egalitarian decision making. Respondents have reported this is not always being the case at Bambanani.

One group of participants complained about how things have remained the same on the farm despite the acquisition of LRAD shares to co-own the farm. Another group which is mostly comprised by trust members argued that things have changed for the better compared to the period prior to the attainment of these equity shares. In doing so, this group blames the discontent group for the lack of commitment to the project and for being after money over the interest of the project. The discontent group has also complained that the trust is not representing their interests to the management, and whenever they lay complaints there are often threats of expulsion.

Apart from the above mentioned conflict of interests amongst Bambanani beneficiaries, positive elements were also discovered where beneficiaries agreed on some areas of dissatisfaction. I have labelled this a Collective Discontent Spectacle. The plight of beneficiaries is caused by the lack of adequate exposure to the business side of the farm’s operation and the lack of delivery on houses which were promised to them by the management as part of the shareholding package. Having considered the Bambanani case and other literature on LRAD, I concluded that LRAD has failed to fulfil empowerment requirements as per Kabeer’s model.

Keywords:
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this research report is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the Degree of Master of Arts at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university or institution.

__________________________________
Philani Madleyana
November 2011
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<td>AGRIBEE</td>
<td>Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Framework for Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGRISA</td>
<td>Agri South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>BEE</td>
<td>Black Economic Empowerment</td>
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<td>BBBEE</td>
<td>Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLaRA</td>
<td>Communal Land Rights Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>CODESA</td>
<td>Convention for a Democratic South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONTRALESA</td>
<td>Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRDP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Rural Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>DLA</td>
<td>Department of Land Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoA</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRDLR</td>
<td>Department of Rural Development and Land Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESTA</td>
<td>Extension of Security of Tenure Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Employment and Redistribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDARD</td>
<td>Gauteng Department of Agriculture and Rural Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDC</td>
<td>Industrial Development Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCI</td>
<td>Johannesburg Consolidated Investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAPC</td>
<td>Land and Agricultural Policy Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRAD</td>
<td>Land Reform for Agricultural Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTA</td>
<td>Labour Tenants Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFU</td>
<td>National African Farmers' Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAIL</td>
<td>New Africa Investments Limited</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan-Africanist Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDI’s</td>
<td>Previously Disadvantaged Individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLAS</td>
<td>Pro-active Land Acquisition Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLAAS</td>
<td>Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTO</td>
<td>Permission to Occupy</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Pty) Ltd</td>
<td>Proprietary Limited</td>
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<td>RAIL</td>
<td>Real African Investment Limited</td>
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<td>RDP</td>
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<td>Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAIRR</td>
<td>South African Institute of Race Relations</td>
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<td>TRAC-MP</td>
<td>Transvaal Rural Action Committee - Mpumalanga</td>
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CHAPTER ONE
The interlinked nature of race, gender and class as manifestation of the land question in South Africa

1.1 Introduction
Through the use of Bambanani Fruits BEE (Pty) Ltd as a case study, I investigate how the Land Reform for Agricultural Development (LRAD) sub-programme has performed its envisaged role of empowering historically disadvantaged people\(^1\). This will be carried out by looking at the intersection of race, gender and class with a view to capture how they collectively shape the experiences of land beneficiaries with regard to the notion of empowerment.

For this purpose, I apply intersectionality theory for its ability to bring together critical thinking around race, gender and class, respectively, into a single context of questioning and challenging social inequalities and injustices. The paper measures the extent of (dis)empowerment of land beneficiaries in the case study through Kabeer’s (2007) three-prolonged instrumentalist model which looks at resources, agency and achievement.

The paper is configured into six chapters which are explained in more detail in the chapter outline section. These include an introductory chapter, overview of the South African land reform (generally) and LRAD (specifically), theoretical framework and literature review, methodology and research design, data presentation and analysis of findings, and a conclusion.

1.2 Problem statement
Debates on South Africa’s post-apartheid land reform allude to the political nature of the land question in the country, and how various mechanisms inaugurated by the government over the years to redress the racially skewed distribution of land embodies political contestation. The powerful lobby made up of few white commercial farmers represented by their respective unions still controls large hectares of arable land while the powerless lobby composed by the

\(^1\) Historically disadvantaged people in South Africa’s land reform perspective constitute blacks (i.e. Africans, Indians and Coloureds).
majority of the landless blacks is still awaiting land through government processes. This confirms Kariuki’s (2004:5) argument that,

“Landowners have always ensured that the political system comes under their control or influence. And that land owning interests, especially if they are privileged and entrenched, will not give up their privileges or power unless they are forced to do so through one form of negotiation or coercion”.

In South Africa today, the land question remains an unresolved and least attended legacy of the past with the potential to lead to political and economic instability. Some have begun to predict that South Africa is likely to culminate into a similar land expropriation and forced land occupations path as transpired in the neighbouring Zimbabwe (See De Villiers, 2003; and Kariuki, 2004). The argument is that, South Africa’s land reform process has retained structural inequalities of the past in land ownership and control patterns, and has resulted in ‘new inequalities’ amongst the programme’s targeted group along gender and class lines. These are some of the issues which have attracted extensive scholarly attention to question and critique the seemingly top down process driven by the government, white land owning class and the market.

The problem identified is that South Africa’s land reform process has so far not transformed ownership and control patterns of land and the agricultural sector at large. This skewed structural composition of agrarian ownership and control does not escape race, gender and class bias; and government’s policy approach since 1994 has reflected a struggle in balancing these conflicting interests. With regard to the notion of empowerment, land reform is not only about giving land to the people; it is also about what the acquired land does to improve the living conditions and social status of the poor. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to probe how government programmes address this complex nature of the land question.

1.3 Aims and objectives

The purpose of this study is to probe the extent to which LRAD has addressed the issue of racial, gender and class disparities in ownership and control of agrarian land. The aim is to identify how LRAD defined its empowerment goals, and whether this catered for the interlinked nature of race, gender and class. Furthermore, this research aims to uncover
whether LRAD has met its objectives; if so, to what extent? And if not, what were the challenges?

1.4 Focal research question

To what extent has LRAD tackled racial, gender and class disparities in ownership and control of agrarian land and how is this impacting on the empowerment of beneficiaries?

- Sub-questions

  i. What evidence is available which indicates the intersection of race, gender and class as having influence on how individual beneficiaries of the chosen case study have been empowered or disempowered by LRAD?

  ii. In what ways has LRAD, if at all, improved the social status and bargaining power of beneficiaries of the chosen case study?

  iii. What resources have LRAD offered or not offered to its beneficiaries?

  iv. What were the trends in the implementation process of LRAD, and how did they impact on its empowerment role?

1.5 Hypothesis

The study begins with the hypothesis that the LRAD sub-programme affects the empowerment of land reform beneficiaries along race, gender and class.

1.6 Rationale

Focusing on LRAD in relation to race, gender and class is important in widening the scope of empowerment debate with regard to South Africa’s land reform process. For example, when gender is discussed independent of race and class, it curtails an understanding of inequalities in ownership and control of agrarian land within the context of patriarchy. In South Africa, the land question is not merely a product of gender disparities; it is also a product of the history of racial discrimination and dispossession.
Gender difference is also not a homogenous concept as it is often treated in these debates. Within the category men or women there is generational difference (i.e. young versus old) and class difference which may act as condition for inequality in the redistribution and acquisition of resources. According to Holvino (2010:257), using the intersectionality perspective shows that gender is a historically determined difference that cannot be studied in isolation from other social processes such as race, ethnicity and class.

I hope that by emphasising on the intersection of these categories of difference, this paper will make a significant contribution to the South African literature on land reform. This literature tends to study race and gender separately, with class often mentioned in passing. Throughout the African continent, however, there is a growing literature on elite capture of land. That literature will benefit this study in terms of engaging with class dynamics concerning land reform.

1.7 Definition of key concepts

1.7.1 What is LRAD?

LRAD is a sub-programme of the land redistribution component of the South African land reform programme which was introduced in 2001 by the then Department of Land Affairs (now the Department of Rural Development and Land reform (DRDLR)) in conjunction with the Department of Agriculture (DoA) to provide grants to individuals who want to purchase land for agricultural purposes. The LRAD grant supports various projects such as food safety-nets, equity schemes, production for markets, and agriculture in communal areas (DLA and DoA, 2000). The qualifying criteria for an LRAD grant was that applicants had to be black South African citizens, be 18 years or older and intending to use the land for agricultural activities (ibid.).

Prior to the inception of LRAD, land was acquired through a Settlement Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) programme based on the household regime; described as targeting the poorest of the poor (See Lahiff, 2007). A grant of R16 000 was given to qualifying households with an income of less than R1500 per month (ibid.). This grant mechanism attracted criticism from different directions for its approach to land redistribution which seemed to be entrenching the old order than redressing it. It has been criticised by women rights activists as
under privileging women in favour of men since more men headed households compared to women (See Walker). Another criticism came from land activists that SLAG propagated overcrowding witnessed during apartheid by ‘dumping’ large groups of poor people on commercial farms previously white-owned without necessary skills and resources to enable them to utilise the land productively (ibid.).

As set out in its policy document (2000), the objective of LRAD was to;

- contribute to the redistribution of 30% of agricultural land from White hands to Black landless people by 2014,
- contribute to relieving the congestion in over-crowded former homeland areas,
- overcome the legacy of past racial and gender discrimination in ownership of farmland,
- empower beneficiaries to improve their economic and social wellbeing, and to
- improve nutrition and income status of the rural poor who want to farm on any scale.

At its initial stage, the LRAD funding structure was as follows;

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Own contribution R</th>
<th>Matching grant R</th>
<th>Proportion of total cost %</th>
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<tr>
<td>Own contribution</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 000</td>
<td>40 871</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>145 000</td>
<td>68 888</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400 000</td>
<td>100 000</td>
<td>80</td>
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Extracted from the LRAD Final Document, DLA and DOA (2000:6)
In August 2008, the LRAD grant structure was increased after a thorough review. The minimum grant was increased from an amount of R20 000 to R111 152, while the maximum grant increased from R100 000 to R430 857 (DRDLR, 2009). Applicants’ own contribution amount was also increased from R5000 to R20 000 for a minimum grant, and from R400 000 to R500 000 for a maximum grant amount because of the excessive increase in land prices (ibid.). According to the DRDLR report (2009), since the increase in the grant allocation, 186 995.57 hectares of land has been redistributed to 1001 households, covering a total of 2934 individual beneficiaries.

1.7.2 The notion of empowerment

As much as it is difficult to completely define empowerment, there is a general agreement amongst scholars that it entails the attainment of power to determine own destiny by those who were previously deprived of such freedom (Collins, 1994; Rowlands, 1997; Kabeer, 1999). It is argued that “People are empowered when they are able to participate in and take greater control over decision-making process – and when they have greater control over assets, policies, organisations and institutions and processes that affect their lives” (TRAC-MP, 2004:27). The first thing to note is that access is a starting point to this, but the concern extends further to whether such access yields to change in power relations. According to Rowlands (1997:14), “Empowerment must involve undoing negative social constructions, so that people come to see themselves as having the capacity and the right to act and influence decisions”. This bring to the fore an argument that empowerment initiatives can sometimes entrench powerlessness of the subordinates (See Collins, 1994).

The concept of empowerment does not apply to everyone but to previously disempowered group(s) in a society (Kabeer, 1999). This implies that the system of social interaction or institutional domains in a society ought to be liberal so as to permit individual autonomy of all persons who make up a targeted group of the empowerment project. This will then enable them to participate and to have a sense of ownership and control in the new order. When subordinate group(s) have been granted unlimited right to make choices, empowerment can be said to have taken place. As argued by Kabeer (1999), “…the notion of empowerment is that it is inescapably bound up with the condition of disempowerment and refers to the process by which those who have been denied the ability to make choices acquire such ability”.

6
Moreover, empowerment does not occur through dependency, but is emancipation from dependency (Rowlands, 1997; Kabeer, 1999; Songelwa, 2009). Within the land reform context this may imply an achievement of individual’s direct access to land and attainment of an ability to participate in all spheres of social engagement such as those concerning decision-making. However, access alone does not symbolise empowerment, but is part or rather a starting point of the process towards empowerment. Therefore, empowerment programmes ought to go beyond granting previously disadvantaged people access to resources which they were deprived of in the past, but should also create an environment that is conducive to effect change in the lives and social statuses of such people.

1.7.3 Intersectionality theory

Intersectionality is defined as a theory which seeks to examine the ways in which various socially and culturally constructed categories are intertwined and interact on multiple levels to manifest themselves as inequality in society (Knudsen, 2006:61). The argument is that, “Intersectionality holds that the classical models of oppression within society, such as those based on race/ethnicity, gender, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, class, or disability do not act independently of one another; instead, these forms of oppression interrelate creating a system of oppression that reflects the "intersection" of multiple forms of discrimination” (Lanehart, 2009:2).

According to the literature, intersectionality was first coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989, and gained prominence in the 1990s through various studies of Black feminism (Phoenix and Pattynama, 2006; Davis, 2008; Kitch, 2009; Lanehart, 2009). This was propelled by American scholars within black feminism ranks who criticised gender-based research for producing diversity in gender but homogenising race (Knudsen, 2006). It is argued that, Crenshaw coined this concept with an intention to address a scholarly gap caused by an absence of a dedicated theoretical explanation about the experiences and struggles of women of colour (Davis, 2008). The experiences and struggles of women of colour, according to Crenshaw, fell between the cracks of both feminist and anti-racist discourse (Davids, 2008).

Crenshaw argued that, “…theorists need to take both gender and race on board and show how they interact to shape the multiple dimensions of black women’s experiences” (Davis, 2008:68). Some branches of the feminist discourse such as socialist feminism and
poststructuralist feminism studies the intersectionality of gender, race and class as the manifestation of social inequalities. However, they restrict their parameters of how these categories of difference produce multiple inequalities which simultaneously shape the experiences of black women as subordinates in the society.

It is said that while the theory began as an exploration of the oppression of women, today sociologists strive to apply it not only to woman but to discussions of all peoples, and this paper has applied this theory to both women and men in the chosen case study to discover how their race, gender and class played a combining influence in their experience with land reform.

1.8 Background information on Bambanani

Bambanani Fruits BEE (Pty) Ltd is an LRAD Equity Scheme project located at about 60 kilometres West of Johannesburg in the Gauteng Province. It is a Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) formation of City Square trading 665 (Pty) Ltd. This is a 500 hectare farm with fruit trees only taking up 100 hectares while the remaining 400 hectares is partly occupied by buildings. The farm land was historically owned by the Johannesburg Consolidated Investment (JCI) Mining, and was known as Tavlands. It was part of the mine’s corporate social investment project, and was used to farm variety of agricultural products such as fruits, maize and beans.

In 2005, the JCI sold the farm to Johan Swanepoel and Roger Horak who are now its directors. The farm was then registered under the name City Square trading 665 and was transformed into an orchard. They farm stoned fruits such as peach, apple and plum.

In 2006, Swanepoel and Horak sold 25% equity share of the farm to 55 farm workers, resulting to the birth of Bambanani Fruits BEE (Pty) Limited. Swanepoel and Horak now own 75% share of the farm which is unequally distributed amongst them. According to the leaders of Bambanani Trust, the 55 farm workers obtained an LRAD grant of R3.1 million to buy the shares. The cost price of these shares was R4 million, and the money to cover the balance was received through a Standard Bank loan (Ibid.).

The opportunity to acquire these shares was not opened to everyone, but to those referred to as ‘loyal workers’. On my first visit to the farm on 5 July 2010, I got to speak to Mr.

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2 For a definition and detailed discussion on BEE see chapter 2.
Screeninger Solomon who is one of the leaders of Bambanani Trust. Unfortunately, I did not get a chance to speak to other beneficiaries on that day because they were busy on duty, and Mr. Solomon was the only person available.

The major concern though was whether the process of selecting ‘loyal workers’ for LRAD equity scheme was empowering to everyone or was empowering at all. One would perhaps view the process as having had disempowered those workers who were not selected as a result of this qualifying criteria which I found to be subjective. As a result, I asked Mr. Solomon to unpack the concept of ‘loyal workers’. According to Solomon (2010, Interview), ‘loyal workers’ were selected based on the number of years they have worked on the farm, their skills, potential, passion and determination for farming.

After asking him for how long did he work on the farm before becoming a shareholder, it emerged that he had only started working on the farm in 2003, which is three years before he acquired LRAD equity shares. This on its own raises questions regarding the extent to which Mr. Solomon met the criteria of being regarded as a ‘loyal worker’, considering the conception and clarification he had given earlier on. This may point to possible unequal power relations amongst farm workers during the beneficiaries’ identification process. It may be possible that some people were able to influence and negotiate their way into the beneficiary list more than others.

At Bambanani, shareholding comes with terms and conditions and is governed by two documents, namely; Trust Deed of the Bambanani workers black employee share trust and Rules: Bambanani workers share incentive scheme. One of such terms and conditions concern the disposal of shares by beneficiaries and is dictated by what is called a ‘ten year clause’. This ‘ten year clause’ prevents beneficiaries from selling their shares before the end of a ten year probation period from acquisition.

It is stated in the shareholding policy document that if a person decides to sell his or her shares after the probation period, Bambanani will get a first preference in the transaction, and if Bambanani is not interested in buying the shares, offers from outside buyers can be considered. The idea behind this is to hold the shares within Bambanani Fruits in order to preserve legacy for their children and to prevent selling the land to someone who might not be interested in farming. They fear that outsiders may want to alter the purpose of the project and want to use the land for something else other than farming (2010, Interview).
1.8.1 Access to the market

Pick and Pay store provides the biggest market for Bambanani Fruits. Having access to the market is the most important factor for a successful agricultural adventure. Mr. Solomon explained how crucial it is to create the market for your products. He informed that, this is mainly achieved through networking and making lasting relationship with other farmers who might be of help in times of needs (Ibid.). Bambanani Fruits also use these networks to source agricultural products they do not produce, and sell them to their customers. For example, Bambanani Fruits supplies;

- Hostels in surrounding mines with fruits and deprocessed vegetables. As already mentioned, Bambanani only produces certain types of fruits but they supply vegetables and a variety of fruits to their customers. They get vegetables and other fruits from other local farmers with whom they have created networks and from the import market.
- Pick and Pay stores, with whom they are a national supplier. They supply them with local and imported stoned fruits.
- South African market agents in Gauteng e.g. municipal markets.

In addition to this, Bambanani Fruits has recently been awarded an opportunity to deliver a fair share of the no-name brand vegetables to Pick and Pay stores countrywide.

i. Local Market:

Bambanani Fruits supplies the local market with stone fruit, kiwi, citrus, grapes and vegetables.

ii. Export:

During their harvest season they supply the export market with stone fruit (peaches, apples and plums).

iii. Imports:

Mr. Solomon explained that they have to keep their business operating throughout the year to meet a growing demand from their customers. The argument was that, fruits are seasonal products and the harvesting season only last for few months. As a result, they have to import fruits from countries that are within the harvesting season so that they can supply their
customers throughout the year. Their imports include stone fruit, kiwi, citrus, grapes and strawberries.

1.8.2 Access to labour

The farm has access to adequate labour which is provided by all LRAD beneficiaries, which are considered permanent workers. As per LRAD requirements, beneficiaries are required to live and work on the acquired land (DLA and DoA, 2000). Moreover, they have employed 80 contract workers, and during peak seasons the number of contract workers is increased to 400 to cope with high burden of work load that comes with harvesting.

1.9 Profile of LRAD beneficiaries of Bambanani

Table 2

- Active members
- Not active, but still a shareholder
- Deceased members
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name(s) of beneficiary</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age in 2010</th>
<th>Position/role</th>
<th>Level of education Reading</th>
<th>Level of education Writing</th>
<th>Year started working on the farm</th>
<th>No. of dependents</th>
<th>Property type</th>
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1.10 Outline of chapters

Chapter One introduces the study on land reform and empowerment with emphasis on the intersection between race, gender and class. It then proceeds by outlining the aims and objectives of this study, the research questions it seeks to investigate, and motivate the importance of looking at these categories of difference in the study of the South African land question. Lastly, it provides background information on Bambanani Fruits.

Chapter Two provides background information on South Africa’s land question within its historical context, and the land reform process since its inception in 1994. This gives an idea of various dynamics underlying this process, and its role in empowering the previously disadvantaged black majority. The land question in South Africa like in many parts of the world does not only concern race, but also gender disparities. Class becomes the most crucial factor as we now talk redistribution, especially in the market-led land reform process.

Chapter Three introduces the methodology and methods used to carry out this study. A qualitative position has been adopted, using a case study approach as a methodology. The basis for this decision was driven by an interest to gain in depth understanding of the impacts of the LRAD sub-programme on the empowerment of its beneficiaries in a particular context. The primary methods of data collection are LRAD land redistribution records, government newsletters and structured interviews with LRAD beneficiaries and land administration officers. Lastly, secondary sources in a form of existing academic research, Internet and newspaper articles on land reform were utilised.

Chapter Four conducts a review of scholarly work on South Africa’s post-apartheid land reform process within a particular theoretical context(s). Although this literature is dispersed and drawn from different theoretical traditions, this study attempts to interconnect it by locating South Africa’s land reform knowledge enquiry exercise within an intersectionality perspective. For instance, the literature on gender and land reform is based on feminist theory, and the literature of race and land reform draws theoretical inspiration from anti-racist discourse while the one on class subscribes to theories of social stratification. The chapter concludes by demonstrating the significance of integrating race, gender and class in the study of land reform in South Africa.
Chapter Five records the experiences of fieldwork through the presentation of data collected and analysis of research findings. This is a chapter enabled the researcher of this paper to have informed knowledge about the implementation patterns of LRAD in the Gauteng Province and to respond to the research questions concerning LRAD’s role in redressing the past injustices in ownership and control of agrarian land in South Africa. Kabeer’s model is applied to measure the empowerment levels of Bambanani beneficiaries as a result of LRAD.

Chapter Six concludes by summarising key findings and arguments made in the study. This later evolves to a discussion of what these findings mean to the struggle to redress the injustices and inequalities of the past in land ownership and control patterns in South Africa. The final part of this chapter makes suggestions and recommendations for further research in this area.

1.11 Conclusion

The land question is a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon, thus studies about the land reform process ought to reflect and accommodate this complexity. This chapter has unpacked the aims and objectives of this research project and outlined the questions it seeks to address. It has also provided justification on why the emphasis on the intersection between race, gender and class is significant to knowledge in the area of land reform in South Africa. A comprehensive background information on Bambanani Fruits and profiling of its LRAD beneficiaries shed light on the nature of the case study used in this paper.

The position taken by this paper enabled the formulation of the argument that the empowerment debate surrounding the land reform process needs to be expanded to accommodate the complex nature of how race, gender and class collectively influences how individuals are empowered or disempowered by the programme. This chapter has further demonstrated how the intersectionality approach marks the point of departure from the homogenisation trap noticeable in gender-based research and in anti-racial discourse. It is argued that feminism tends to treat women as homogenous group of equally marginalised, failing to acknowledge inequalities and differences that exist amongst them either in terms of race, gender or class.

The notion of women as ‘raced’ is the issue that the emergence of Black Feminism between 1960s and 1970s in America set to address (Lanehart, 2009). The idea was that, conventional feminist
thought does not explain and accommodate the unique social experiences of women of colour. Similarly, study on race and land reform seems to follow a reductionist tendency whereby the impact of other social factors such as gender and class get distorted in the treatment of race as an umbrella struggle point for resource distribution. Again, intellectual work on class also does not accommodate these concerns. Therefore, intersectionality theory draws attention to the interrelated nature of such factors, and the Bambanani case study provides a platform for the exploration of this.
CHAPTER TWO
South Africa’s land question and the logic underlying the post-apartheid land policy

2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides background information on South Africa’s land question and the subsequent land reform process in order to set out a broader map of the field that the current study is exploring. This will also be to demonstrate how race, gender and class are intertwined in manifesting the land question, and the significance of focusing on the intersection of these social dimensions in studying the distributive nature of the land reform process. The chapter begins by rendering a historical account on South Africa’s land question and then proceeds with an engagement of South Africa’s land reform process by looking at its logic and its objectives. Lastly, a conclusion summarises the fundamental points and arguments raised.

2.2 Dispossession, resettlement, deprivation and racially unequal land distribution
As argued by Hendricks (2001:294), South Africa’s land policy does not emerge out of a vacuum, but is rooted in a political and historical context. The land question in South Africa is a legacy of the racial past and its patriarchal nature. The Native Land Act of 1913 is noted as the piece of legislation which entrenched racial discrimination in land allocation by setting a platform for the establishment of native reserves where black people were resettled separately and far away from whites (de Wet, 1997; Ntsebeza, 1999; Cliffe, 2000; Lahiff, 2007). This legislation is argued to have been aimed at “destroying independent African existence in the interest of White settlers by creating a number of reserves for the settlement of black people, which would serve as pools of migrant labour for White-owned farms and urban based industry”.

The history of dispossession of black people from their land predates 1913, and many scholars have traced it back to 1652 with the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck in the Cape under

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the command of the Dutch East India Company (See Wegerif, Russell and Grunding, 2005). Wegerif et. al. (2005) informs on how the Khoi-khio people were dispossessed from their land in the Cape Peninsula and turned into labourers for white settlers and the Dutch East India Company. According to Wegerif et. al. (2005), being a labourer was the only way of obtaining a right to continue living or using the land which was originally theirs.

However, 1913 was a defining era in the history of dispossession in South Africa in a sense that it introduced a legislation which was deemed racially explicit (ibid.). In addition to this, scholars such as Ruth Hall and Samuel Kariuki, respectively, view the 1913 cut-off date as part of the political compromise made by the African National Congress (ANC) at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in the early 1990s.

The 1913 Land Act allocated only 7 per cent of the country’s land to black people (who were the majority), while over 80 per cent of the land was reserved for white people who made up only 20 per cent of the population (Murray and William, 1994). To further strip Africans off their economic independence and their right to use land, the 1913 Act prohibited sharecropping contracts between white land owners and black peasant farmers (ibid.). According to Murray and Williams (1994), this was followed by the planning and designation of ‘schedule’ areas where Africans could not buy or rent land. It is estimated that about 1.5 million hectares of land rented to whites by blacks was lost. Platzky and Walker (1985:30) estimate that about 1.1 million blacks were removed from white-owned farms as a result of the criminalisation of labour tenancy. This makes up a largest category of removals in South Africa during that period (Ibid.).

In 1936, the native reserves were increased to 13 % of the country’s land area through the Native Trust and Land Act (Murray and Williams, 1994). The 1936 Act formalised and extended native reserves as per Beaumont Commission’s recommendation (Ibid.). The Beaumont Commission discovered that the 7% which was allocated to the people in the reserves by the Native Land Act in 1913 could only accommodate and sustain half of the population in the reserves (ibid.). Building on the 1913 legislation, the Native Trust and Land Act took territorial segregation further, making it even more difficult for black people to have secured tenure (Ibid.). According to Murray and Williams (1994), the 1936 Act authorised the eviction of unregistered blacks living on white-owned land such as cash paying tenants.
A notable difference from the 1913 legislation is that the 1936 Act established a Development Trust to oversee land administration in the reserves. These developments attracted extensive resistance from Africans as they were viewed authoritarian (Ibid.).

The literature reveals that the 13 per cent capacity of the reserves could no longer stand the strain of over population, hence ecological problems erupted (Letsoalo and Rogerson, 1982; McAllister, 1989; Murray and Williams, 1994). In response, the government introduced betterment and rehabilitation programmes which included culling of stock, cutting of arable land, force removals and concentration of settlements (Ibid.). This was followed by the imposition of Native Authorities through which the state sought to enforce its policies (Ibid.). It is argued that, the betterment schemes “...were designed to improve production and conserve the soil in the African ‘reserves’ without altering the distribution of land” (Murray and Williams, 1994:316). It is estimated that about 1.3 to 2.5 million people were affected by betterment planning (Platzky and Walker, 1985).

The 1936 Act also culminated to forced removal of people from ‘black spots’\(^5\). The argument is that the majority of people who lost their land as a result of ‘black spots’ removals were not reasonably compensated (ibid). One example of such incidents is the 1955 forced removals of people from Sophiatown. Urban relocations are said to have affected about 700 000 people while ‘black spot’ removals affected approximately 600 000 people (ibid.).

According to Ntsebeza (1999), the 1936 Act restricted the occupation of land in the reserves to what was known as the system of ‘permission to occupy’ (PTO). The PTO system gave the government unlimited powers to forcibly remove people without consultation whenever the need arose (Ibid.). People’s houses were demolished without compensation and recourse to law whenever the government wanted to implement developmental projects such as irrigation schemes, nature reserves, industrial developments, etc. (ibid.). All this points out to the problem of unsecured land rights of people in the former homelands or Bantustans that the post-1994 land reform process seeks to address.

More repressive land laws such as the Group Areas Act of 1950 and the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 were enacted by the apartheid regime to further intensify racial discrimination in

\(^5\) ‘Blacks spots’ were classified as areas inhabited by black people within ‘white South Africa on freehold basis or on the basis of other rights to the land.
land rights (de Wet, 1997; Ntsebeza, 1999, Cliffe, 2000). The Group Areas Act ordered that people of different race in any given town or city had to reside in separate areas (Ibid.). This resulted to the displacement of the vast majority of black people (ibid.).

As a result of the Group Areas Act, the best and most developed areas were reserved for white people, while Africans, Indians, and Coloureds were settled in rural outskirts of the major metropoles. The South End Museum newsletter (2010) reveals that, out of the 3.5 million people who were removed from their homes as a result of the Group Areas Act, only 2 per cent of them were white and these whites were moved to better areas compared to where they lived before.

The developments around the Group Areas Act attracted massive resistance from black liberation movements, leading to the adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1955 (See Wegerif et. al. 2005). The Freedom Charter was signed by more than 3000 people of all races from around the country (Ibid.). The Freedom Charter clearly articulated people’s aspirations and grievances around the issue of land. It called for ‘agrarian utopia’, and it upheld a principle that; “The land shall be shared among those who work it!” According to this principle;

- Restrictions of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended, and all the land re-divided amongst those who work it to banish famine and land hunger;

- The state shall help the peasants with implements, seed, tractors and dams to save the soil and assist the tillers;

- Freedom of movement shall be guaranteed to all who work on the land;

- All shall have the right to occupy land wherever they choose;
- People shall not be robbed of their cattle, and forced labour and farm prisons shall be abolished.

The corollary of the Group Areas Act included congestion, diseases and food shortages in the homelands where the majority of black people were settled, while the minority white population enjoyed access to large hectares of land (See Lahiff, 2007; South End Museum, 6 South End Museum, 2010. ‘Group Areas Act’, http://www.southendmuseum.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3&Itemid=4.
It is argued that, at the end of apartheid, approximately 82 million hectares of land was in white hands while the black majority was confined to 13% of land in the homelands where rights to land were unclear (ibid.). Even in terms of food production there were systematic inequalities where one quarter of commercial farmers produced 80 per cent of food for the market, while less than one quarter of ‘micro farmers’ in the homelands generated food for their own food requirements (ibid).

This is a legacy of a ‘bifurcated’ agricultural system or ‘agrarian dualism’ engineered by colonialism and apartheid (Hendricks, 2001; Hall, 2004). On one hand, the ‘bifurcated’ agricultural system comprised of large-scale white commercial farmers who were privileged in terms of exclusive access to advanced infrastructure, cheap credit through the Land Bank, government subsidies, guaranteed markets and price controls, and readily available cheap labour (Desmond, 1970; Murray and Williams, 1994; Hendricks, 2001). On the other hand, this system comprised of disadvantaged small-scale subsistence black farmers in the homelands (ibid.).

Although heavily subsidised, many white farmers did not use this advantage effectively (Hendricks, 2001:293). A vast majority of them became dependent on government assistance for their survival, instead of being highly productive (Hendricks, 2001:293). Arguably, these government subsidies operated as an overt act of patronage, considering government’s continued assistance to underperforming farmers. Citing the South African Race Relations (SAIRR) Survey of 1992/93, Hendricks (1994) informs that, approximately two third of white farmers during that period could be regarded as farming viable units, and that forty per cent of them would have been forced into liquidation if state assistance was suddenly withdrawn.

The problem of racially determined land rights was also accompanied by a challenge of gender disparities and class bias in land ownership and control. The predominant role entrusted to and executed by traditional leaders in allocating land, especially after the promulgation of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, had both gender and class implications, all closely linked to the dominant race discourse often referred to as ‘white supremacy’. The Tribal Authorities headed by these traditional leaders are viewed as undemocratic and highly patriarchal in nature, with no representation of women in decision-making circles (Ntsebeza, 1999). The gendered structure of Tribal Authorities is therefore problematised for marginalising women in decision-making platforms and in the ‘public sphere’, for a lack of
gender and class sensitivity in land distribution and for a lack of transparency in governance and in a manner in which land is administered. It is against this background that the first democratically elected South African government led by the African National Congress (ANC) initiated a land reform programme so as to redress racial inequalities and injustices orchestrated by an oppressive past.

### 2.3 The political dispensation and its land policy stance: linkages between land ownership transformation, and reconciliation ideals

The promulgation of the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act of 1991 marked the end of racially determined land access in South Africa and paved way for a new land regime founded on the principle of “restorative justice” and various redress mechanisms (Hendricks, 2001). Following this was a highly contested political space at CODESA through which the post-apartheid land policy emerged (See Hall, 2004). The South Africa’s post-apartheid land policy spells out a “three-prolonged” land reform programme which comprises restitution, tenure reform and redistribution programme (DLA, 1997). The programme is targeted at black South African citizens (Africans, Indians and Coloureds) who are 18 years and older (DLA, 1997).

Land restitution is government’s highest priority (DLA, 1997). Yet, it has been proven to be one of the worst performing programmes. It is aimed at restoring land to its original owners who lost it after June 1913 as a result of racially motivated legislations (Wegerif et. al., 2005). In cases where the original land cannot be restored, alternative land or financial compensation is given to claimants (DLA, 1997).

Tenure reform was designed to formalise or legally acknowledge tenure rights of people who have been occupying a particular land for years but do not have legally secured tenure (DLA, 1997). This group include people living in communal land, farm workers, labour tenants and women and children who are dependants of male farm workers (ibid.).

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7 Land administration by Tribal Authorities during apartheid is criticized for creating and exacerbating inequalities between men and women, and between different social classes.

8 Ntsebeza (2009) alludes to corrupt practices by traditional leaders in former homelands, Transkei and Ciskei in particular.
The redistribution programme was designed to cater for those who were not covered by restitution and tenure reform (Ibid.). Its main objective was to deracialise land ownership and the agricultural sector in the country. It intended to achieve this by transferring 30 percent of the land owned by white commercial farmers to landless black people by the year 2014.⁹

The necessity for land reform is enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa under section 25 of the Bill of Rights. Section 25(5) of the Bill of Rights states that, “The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis”. Section 25(6) states that the intentions of the land reform programme must be to provide a legally secured tenure status to those occupying land without tenure security as a result of past racial discrimination.

As pointed out by Greengberg (2004), farm dwellers and labour tenants face evictions as a result of insecure tenure status. The belief is that, these evictions can be prevented by formalising or legally recognising people’s tenure. Section 25(7) further identifies people and communities dispossessed from their land after 19 June 1913 through racially discriminatory laws as a targeted beneficiary group of the land reform programme.

The process of public consultation on land policy issues in South Africa began when the Department of Land Affairs published a Framework Document on Land Policy in 1995 (DLA, 1997). Over 50 organisations including farmers' associations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), government departments and concerned individuals, responded to this Framework Document (ibid.). Task teams of experts with knowledge in various areas of land policy contributed in redefining and developing different version of the document (Ibid.). Their work together with public comments was incorporated into a Draft Statement of Land Policy and Principles which was discussed at the National Land Policy Conference held on 31 August and 1 September 1995 (ibid.). Diverse views from delegates who attended this conference were taken into account in formulating the Green Paper on Land Policy which was released in February 1996. This was followed by the publication of a White Paper in March in 1997.

⁹Research shows that the deadline for delivering this target has been consistently moved further and the process is accompanied by a series of failure.
South Africa’s land reform programme was modelled in accordance with the national reconciliation project and growth and development goals (DLA, 1997). The aim was to implement land reform in a manner that does not culminate to instability. As a result, the market-led land reform in a form of the ‘willing-buyer, willing-seller’ approach was adopted. Contrary to this, Mngxitama (2006:43-44) argues that “The resolution of the land question is not just significant for nation building, but also, and perhaps most importantly, for the re-articulation of a different ‘civil society’”. According to Mngxitama (2006), the re-articulation of a different society can be achieved by enabling what he call ‘effective citizenship’ through the extension of property rights to the historically dispossessed.

The South African Constitution under the Bill of Rights also sets out a framework on how this harmonious land reform mission ought to be executed, hence averting forced occupations and unlawful expropriation of land. However, there is also a provision in the Constitution which states that if expropriation is deemed necessary for public interest purposes, it ought to be guided by constitutional principles, implying that fair compensation has to be granted to land owners.10

In terms of preventing forced land occupations, the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA) of 1997 was enacted. ESTA starts by acknowledging that the majority of black people in South Africa, especially farm workers and labour tenants do not have tenure security on the land they have been occupying for many years. ESTA forbids illegal land occupations by advocating for the establishment of consent of residence and use of land between the owner of the land and person(s) concerned while simultaneously avoiding unfair evictions. This legislation asserts that;

- It is desirable that the law should promote the achievement of long-term security of tenure for occupiers of land, where possible through the joint efforts of occupiers, landowners and government bodies;
- the law should extend the rights of occupiers while giving due recognition to the rights duties and legitimate interests of owners;
- the law should regulate the eviction of vulnerable occupiers from land in a fair manner, while recognizing the right of land owners to apply to court for an eviction order in appropriate circumstances.

10 See Section 25(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
Taking into account the above three principles, one can argue that ESTA does not go far in terms of resolving unsecured tenure status of farm dwellers. However, ESTA merely sets out legal ground for the extension of occupation of land by farm dwellers and provides guidelines to prevent “unfair evictions”. Because of lack of tenure security farm dwellers, farm workers and labour tenants on white-owned commercial farm land are vulnerable to evictions and harassment. Therefore, formalising their tenure through tenure reform or other processes of land reform is crucial in addressing these problems and restoring their dignity.

One example of a recent illegal eviction story was published by the City Press newspaper and involved the Systerfontein family from a farm in Randfontein in Johannesburg. According to this article, Moses Systerfontein (61) had lived and worked on this farm for eight years and his employer sold the land without informing him. It is reported that, one night the new landlord broke into the room that Moses Systerfontein share with his wife and daughter. It is alleged that the new landlord threatened them with a gun and forced them to vacate the farm. Similar cases have become common in South Africa despite the formal legal basis to prevent them from taking place. According to Dlamini (2010), farm evictions totalled to 143 in 2006, 122 in 2007, 59 in 2008, and 55 in 2009.

In an attempt to address the weaknesses of the Labour Tenants Act (LTA) 3 of 1996 and ESTA in providing security of tenure to people residing and working on farms, the DRDLR published the Land Tenure Security Bill on 24 December 2010. This Bill was drafted as a response to public outcry, petitions by farm dwellers and civil society, as well as media reports about perpetual human rights abuses by some farmers; something which clearly proved the weaknesses of ESTA and LTA (Ledwaba, 2010). According to Ledwaba (2010), the Bill has three long term goals i.e. to achieve the separation of farm workers’ labour related rights / obligations from those relating to residence on farm land, to create harmonious relations on farms, and to establish Agri-villages to deal with tenure security within the context of sustainable human settlement and food production.

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11 Lucas Ledwaba “He was angry. He bought the land and did not want us there”: Man tells of illegal eviction trauma, while law to protect farm workers is tabled”, in City Press, 16 January 2010, pp.14.
2.4 The post-apartheid land policy lobby: The World Bank, local conservatives and moderates within the ANC leadership ranks

The World Bank has played a decisive role in influencing the post-apartheid land policy. The much criticised market-led agrarian reform approach in a form of ‘willing-buyer, willing-seller’ was advocated by the World Bank amongst other stakeholders. Between 1992 and 1993, the World Bank embarked on a series of dialogues with policy-makers on transformation strategy for the new South Africa (Murray and Williams, 1994). The World Bank’s Land and Agricultural Policy Centre (LAPC) funded a number of reports, mainly by South Africans (ibid.). According to Murray and Williams (1994), the findings of these reports were selectively incorporated into the World Bank’s ‘Options for Land Reform and Rural Restructuring’ document which was heavily criticised by the National Land Committee for its potential to curtail the scope for South Africans to define their own policy agendas.

The argument contained in the ‘Options’ document was that 6% of land exchange hands in South Africa every year, therefore, it will be possible to achieve a 30% redistribution target within five years (Murray and Williams, 1994). As outlined in ‘Options’, the market-led land approach was not only crucial in terms of achieving national reconciliation and maintaining food security, but was also going to be inexpensive to implement. The World Bank estimated that the cost of settling more than 600,000 smallholdings on 24 million hectares of agrarian land in four fertile regions would be at around R17.5 billion (ibid).

This market-assisted agrarian reform strategy was embraced by international liberal forces, conservatives within the country and moderates within the ruling African National Congress (ANC) which was committed in maintaining the structure of large-scale, capital-intensive farming (Lahiff, 2007). The World Bank’s lobby may be viewed as being a struggle to position the post-apartheid land policy within a global liberal fashion of transformation and redistribution. Arguably, the World Bank was in a better position to influence the country to adopt global capitalist ideals of transformation as the country was in a process of reintegrating to the international community. Equally as there were global pressures, there were also domestic pressures from different ideological directions.

According to Lahiff (2007), the adoption of a market-based land reform process was not dictated by the South African Constitution because the Constitution makes explicit provision for land expropriation, subject to compensation at below market price. Lahiff is correct, the 1996 Constitution does make provisions for expropriation in the interest of land reform, as I
have also noted in previous paragraphs of this chapter. However, there is also a need to acknowledge the complex nature of this provision. As per section 25(2) of the Constitution;

*Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application:*

1. *for a public purpose or in the public interest; and*
2. *subject to compensation, the amount of which the time and manner of payment have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court.*

This provision does not take us far in terms of the expropriation path. In fact, it brings us back to the very same market determinism fiasco of negotiated settlement whereby the amount of compensation has to be reached through a consensus between the owner of the land and the government, or through the court of law if a consensus cannot be reached between the two parties (ibid.). Compensation disputes will be most likely to end up in court and there is no guarantee that the courts will always rule in favour of the state for compensation below market value. The courts will have to consider various factors including the market value of the property, history of acquisition and the use of the property, as well as capital investment made to develop the land in question (South Africa 1996, Section 25 (3)).

Lahiff (2007) argues that, the “willing-buyer, willing-seller” approach was rather a policy choice in line with the neoliberal macroeconomic strategy adopted by the ANC in 1996 through Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy. However, Lahiff acknowledges the pressures through which this choice emanated from. According to Lahiff (2007:1577-1578), the adoption of the market-led land reform was also influenced by domestic factors such as extreme inequalities in landholding along racial line, the highly commercialised nature of South African agriculture, a well developed land market, the commitment of the ANC to neoliberal policies and national reconciliation ideals. Lahiff does not, however, dismiss the influence of global pressures on the ANC.

Arguably, there is a balance on the extent to which the move towards neoliberalism can be regarded as a choice or as a result of global and domestic pressures. Walker (2008) informs that at the Land Policy Workshop held in Lusaka in 1990, land nationalisation was still dominant on the agenda of the ANC, but there were emerging contrary ideas by the then senior ANC policy-makers who began to embrace market-friendly solutions. The argument is that, “The collapse of the Soviet Union, which had been a major source of support for the
ANC, the problems key ANC analysts in exile had observed with state farms in Mozambique and other socialist countries, the strength of both the international and South Africa business lobbies pushing for market-led reform, as well as fears about the devastating potential of capital flight from the country – all these factors contributed to a rapid scaling back of demands about the future agrarian order” (Walker, 2008:52). As a result, social alternatives to agrarian question lost favour on the political agenda of the ANC at top leadership level (ibid.).

2.5 The role of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) in land reform and post-apartheid agricultural sector transformation project

For the sake of maintaining the focus and scope of this research project, the aim is not to go into detail with the discussion of BEE in generic economic sense, but to discuss how BEE has been implemented in the agricultural sector and within the land reform process. However, a brief background is necessary in providing a general and broader understanding of BEE to be able to establish a basis for discussing how it is working within the agricultural sector and the area of land reform as these are both intrinsic to the topic of this study.

BEE is generally defined as an economic transformation policy intervention by the post-apartheid government under the leadership of the ANC to deracialise the country’s economic sector by obliging companies to increase the number of black people in management positions, by promoting the development of black owned-companies and promoting black ownership of shares in major corporations (Ponte et. al., 2007; Tangri and Southall, 2008). Tangri and Southall (2008:699) assert that, BEE was identified by the ANC ‘...as one of the key instruments to break through the wall of whiteness around South Africa’s economy”.

The above literature seems to proclaim BEE as originally an ANC’s brainchild, but Moeletsi Mbeki amongst others holds contrary views. Mbeki (2009) argues that, BEE was invented by South Africa’s ‘economic oligarchs’ (made up of white business class) who controlled enormous portion of the country’s economy in various sectors such as mining, chemical and engineering industries, finance, etc. Mbeki substantiates his argument by interrogating the timing and modus operandi of BEE.

With regard to timing, Mbeki stipulates that BEE was established in 1992 by ‘economic oligarchs’. This was two years prior to a democratic dispensation and ANC obtaining political power to lead the new democratic government. This was through the establishment
of the New Africa Investments Limited (NAIL) by the second largest South African insurance company Sanlam (Mbeki, 2009). According to Mbeki, this was followed shortly by the formation of Real African Investment Limited (RAIL) by a mining giant Anglo American. These projects were both funded by the National Party government-controlled Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), an industrial investment bank formed in 1940 (Mbeki, 2009). Mbeki’s central argument is that the ‘economic oligarchs’ invented BEE to soften the economic transformation hand of the liberation movements, especially the ANC, as there were fears that they might adopt a nationalisation route after obtaining political power (Ibid.).

Mbeki (2009:68) further argues that, BEE was intended in order to:

- wean the ANC from radical economic ambitions, such as nationalising the major elements of the South African economy, by putting cash in the politician’s private pockets, packaged to look like atonement for the sins of apartheid, that is, reparations to black people in general,
- provide the oligarchs with prominent and influential seats at the high table of the ANC government’s economic policy formulation system,
- allow those oligarchs who wanted to shift their company’s primary listings and headquarters from Johannesburg to London to do so,
- give the oligarchs and their companies the first bite at government contracts that interested them, and
- protect the oligarchs from foreign competition while opening up the rest of the economy, especially consumer goods and manufacturing sector, to the chill winds of international competition.

Mbeki (2009) argues that, major shares in the newly formed companies went to several ANC and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) affiliated leaders, many who turned overnight multi-millionaires without having to carry financial burden as financial matters were overseen by the ‘economic oligarchs’ concerned (Mbeki, 2009). The general idea that Mbeki attempts to articulate is that, one cannot detach BEE from other compromises and gains made by the liberation movements at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA).

Between 1992 and 1994, BEE focused on creating a black bourgeoisie class through initiating enterprise ownership and shareholding in large corporations. However, post-1994,
the ANC pursued a more intensive BEE project which included the promotion of blacks into top management positions in companies and other areas of employment through Affirmative Action and Employment Equity policies.

It is generally agreed amongst scholars and commentators that BEE has benefited a few politically connected black elites (Tangri and Southall, 2008; Mbeki, 2009; Masondo, 2010). In his opinion piece published in the City Press newspaper (2010), David Masondo affirms that, “The BEE model is structured favourably for politically connected politicians and their proxies to enter into business through the state”.

Examples of notable BEE linked initiatives concerning land and agrarian reform include AgriBEE and LRAD Equity Scheme. As stated by the South African Department of Agriculture (DoA) in its July 2004 policy document, AgriBEE “is a sectoral Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment framework intended at a deliberate and systematic support of black South Africans to actively participate fully in the agricultural sector as owners, managers, professionals, skilled employees and consumers”. AgriBEE also aims at enabling black farmers to fully participate in the entire agri-business value chain (ibid.). Its approach to transformation is to get well established white commercial-farmers to mentor emerging black farmers so that they can acquire necessary skills and knowledge to be productive and successful farmers. In return, these commercial farmers (depending on their BBBEE compliance score card) would be eligible to qualify for government procurement deals (DoA, 2004).

On the other hand, LRAD Equity Scheme is explained as an initiative aimed at enabling previously disadvantaged individuals to purchase equity shares in an agricultural enterprise tantamount to the value of the grant plus the own contribution (DLA and DoA, 2000). The Bambanani case study reveals how LRAD Equity Scheme operates as a BEE tool. At Bambanani, farm workers were assisted by government through its LRAD grant mechanism to purchase equity to be co-owners of the project.

LRAD Equity Scheme is different from AgriBEE in a sense that it requires beneficiaries to make own contribution in order to qualify for a certain grant amount. In contrast, AgriBEE can be viewed as ‘empowerment through accommodation’. Under AgriBEE, an attempt is made to accommodate black people in top management positions and other strategic spheres of established white-owned agri-businesses (Ibid.). This is government’s transformation
framework which is geared towards balancing the ownership and control equation of the agrarian sector in order to eliminate racial disparities entrenched by the past.

The Bambanani case study confirms Mbeki’s (2009) arguments by demonstrating how BEE and other related initiatives have become predictable in their transformation agenda. It confirms Mbeki’s arguments by displaying how BEE has perpetually removed transformation efforts outside the parameters of traditional capitalist establishments through a process of creating ‘detached’ ventures to take care of black empowerment demands.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter provided a historical background on how the colonial conquest and later the state-sanctioned racism under the white minority rule orchestrated the South African land question. The previous regimes divided the oppressed into various classes of privileged and disadvantaged. Looking at the history of land dispossession in South Africa, signs of connection between race, gender and class in manifesting the land question are evident. This serves as a basis for further justification of the significance of scholarly focus on the intersection between these social dimensions in the study of South African land reform process. This chapter has also discussed the linkages between reconciliatory and redistributive ideals of the South African land reform as enshrined in the country’s Constitution. It also looked at the implications of the country’s land policy to the objective of redressing past injustices.

In South Africa we have not yet seen a radical economic sector transformation but rather a shallow transformation project that is conducive to market and globalisation. The argument captured from scholarly work discussed in this chapter is that, in the economic sector in general, BEE has perpetuated inequalities amongst black people by only benefiting a minority class of politically connected black elites to the detriment of an inclusive economic transformation agenda. This chapter has demonstrated how the land reform process and agricultural transformation project has also been trapped within the same ineffective market-driven redistribution framework.
CHAPTER THREE
Methodology and Research Design

3.1 Introduction

A research methodology can be viewed as a manner in which a researcher approaches a research problem. In support of this statement Kothari (2004:8) argues that, research methodology “…may be understood as a science of studying how research is done scientifically”. On the other hand, research methods are the tools that a researcher uses to conduct a research (Kothari 2004). These tools assist a researcher in gathering the required data for the research project and to analyse such data in order for conclusions to be drawn.

This chapter outlines the research methodology and research methods used to carry out this study. It further justifies why such methodology and methods have been chosen. The chapter also look at the value that these tools added to achieve the objectives of this research. In terms of a methodology, the paper adopted a qualitative case study approach. The tools used to collect data include interviews, official documents and secondary sources.

3.2 Research Methodology

There are two types of research methodologies used to conduct empirical studies, namely; qualitative and quantitative paradigms. Each methodology has its unique approach to research, and its application is dependent on what the researcher aims to achieve. For instance, a qualitative methodology takes an interpretative approach to research, resulting to depth, openness and detailed findings (Newman and Benz, 1998; Patton, 2002). Quantitative methodology focuses on counting events and on scientific experiments which are based on standardised measures (Ibid.). This approach is suitable for achieving generalizable set of findings (Ibid.).

According to Newman and Benz (1998:2), these research paradigms vary in a sense that qualitative methodology have philosophical roots in the naturalistic school of thought, and qualitative researchers regardless of their theoretical differences they follow an individual phenomenological perspective. On the other hand, quantitative research is based on the
positivistic philosophy with its researchers emphasising on the view that there is a common reality on which people can agree (ibid.).

Although the number of blacks who own and control land is important to interrogate, this paper takes a position that the issue of land reform and empowerment ought to be explored in its depth. Therefore, research should not be constrained by merely quantifying the land question but should aim at obtaining a comprehensive understanding of underlying aspects pertaining to the role of land reform in empowerment. Because of its ability to explore matters in depth and for its principle to value personal experiences of subjects, a qualitative approach provides a basis for studying how the LRAD programme has empowered or disempowered land reform beneficiaries in the chosen case study.

Patton (2002) states that, a qualitative approach enables issues to be studied in depth by supplying detailed information about a smaller number of people and cases at a researcher’s disposal; hence increasing the depth of understanding of cases and situations studied. Patton (2002) further argues that, qualitative methods are good in evaluation studies of programmes because they tell the program’s story by capturing and communicating the participants’ stories. In this way, it broadens understanding about the process and outcomes of the programme to those who must make decisions about it.

This study has employed a case study approach as a methodology. This study is trying to understand a certain phenomena in a particular context, and a case study approach is viewed as an appropriate tool to achieve this. According to Stake (1995), “Case study is the study of the particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within important circumstances”. The case study approach has enabled this paper to explore the implementation and performance of LRAD in depth within a specific context.

Simons (2009:23) outlines the following strengths of a case study research approach:

- Case study using qualitative methods in particular enables the experience and complexity of programmes and policies to be studied in depth and interpreted in the precise socio-political contexts in which programmes and policies are enacted.
- Case study can document multiple perspectives, explore contested viewpoints, and demonstrate the influence of key actors and interactions between them in telling a story of the programme or policy in action.
• Case study is useful for exploring and understanding the process and dynamics of change. Through closely describing, documenting and interpreting events as they unfold in 'real life' setting, it can determine the factors that were critical in the implementation of a programme or policy and analyse patterns and links between them.

• Case study is flexible, that is, neither time-dependent nor constrained by method. It can be conducted in a few days, months or over several years and be written up in different forms and lengths appropriate to the timescale. It is responsive to shifts in focus and the unanticipated consequences of programmes in action. It can include a range of methods, whatever is most appropriate in understanding the case.

• Case studies are written in accessible language, including vignettes and cameos of people in the case, direct observation of events, incidents and settings, allowing audiences of case study reports to vicariously experience what was observed, and utilise their tacit knowledge in understanding its significance.

• Case study has the potential to engage participants in the research process. This is both a political and epistemological point. It signals a potential shift in the power-base of who controls knowledge and recognises the importance of co-constructing perceived reality through the relationships and joint understandings we create in the field. It also provides an opportunity for researchers to take a self-reflexive approach to understanding the case and themselves.

3.3 Data collection instruments and sampling

Bambanani has been chosen as a case study primarily for its close proximity, something which allowed for regular visits to the site. Secondly, this project was chosen because of the researcher’s access to language of communication used by most beneficiaries of this project. This enabled easy access to information and has contributed immensely to the depth of the study. Thirdly, Bambanani is one of the most sophisticated and successful LRAD projects in Gauteng, a success story which can be used as a good example in implementing future projects and reviving those many projects which are considered failed projects as a result of being unproductive.

The farm’s documents also inform that, in 2008, Bambanani was acknowledged as the best BEE Company in the Gauteng. However, this paper is interested in investigating how much
LRAD beneficiaries form part of this success i.e. whether they have agency, whether they feel ownership and control of the project, and the extent at which they take part in decision-making processes in the project.

- **Analysis of official documents**

Land reform records obtained from the Department of Rural development and Land Reform (provincial) were analysed. This data assisted the researcher in identifying and discussing common trends in land acquisition in order to point out their implications to empowerment. This data became relevant because it was representative of the context in which the case study used in this paper is situated. Various government newsletters were consulted to get updated information on the progress of the land reform process. Furthermore, three official documents of Bambanani Fruits namely; *Trust Deed of the Bambanani Workers Black Employee Share Trust, Rules: Bambanani Workers Share Incentive Scheme*, and *beneficiary shareholding certificates* were scrutinised to see how they endorse or limit the powers of LRAD beneficiaries.

- **In depth Interviews**

Semi-structured interviews were a major data collection instrument for this study. Interviews allow people to convey to others a situation from their own perspective and in their own words. As explained by Kvale (1996), “With qualitative research interviews you try to understand something from the subject’s point of view and to uncover the meaning of their experiences”.

LRAD beneficiaries of Bambanani were approached to inform about their perspectives and experiences of LRAD and how land ownership has impacted on their lives and their social position. These beneficiaries were asked questions concerning their possession of resources, their level of agency and achievement as set out by Kabeer’s model.

Secondly, I approached land officials from the Gauteng Provincial Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, and officials from the Gauteng Department of Agriculture and Rural Development. Through interviewing these people, I got to know about their experiences and strategies in implementing LRAD. The DLA document of 2004 states that, projects are reviewed and approved at provincial level. Therefore, land officials were in a
position to provide useful information for this study as they were directly involved in the transfer of LRAD projects in the province.

During these interviews, a simultaneous tape recording of responses and the writing of interview notes were applied. The aim was to capture every response; for example, when writing down interview notes only, one could not pick up every single word from the participants’ responses. Some participants spoke very fast and gave lengthy explanations, making it difficult to capture everything in writing, hence recording was essential. During interviews with Bambanani beneficiaries, there were instances where a tape recorder was not used. The reason for this was that some beneficiaries were uncomfortable to speak knowing that they are being recorded, and in such instances only interview notes were taken.

- **Secondary sources**

This category of data constituted existing empirical research on land reform both locally and abroad. These included books, journals and Internet sources. This helped in facilitating a knowledge context whereby discoveries from other studies and arguments raised in other scholarly text were used to augment the claims and analytical stance of this paper.

### 3.4 Data analysis tool

After the completion of the data collection process and transcription of interviews, a qualitative content analysis was used to analyse research findings. Patton (2002) defines content analysis as a method of analysing text such as interview transcript, diaries, or documents. Patton adds that, this can also take form of searching for recurring words or themes. Here, I have searched for common themes in people’s response to interview questions. This facilitated an identification of experiences and perspectives commonly shared by beneficiaries about LRAD. This analysis tool was also applied to data acquired through land redistribution records.

### 3.5 Empowerment measurement tool

In measuring or determining whether Bambanani beneficiaries have been empowered by LRAD, the paper has utilised Kabeer’s (1999) approach as discussed in her work on the measurement of women’s empowerment. Kabeer (1999) outlines three dimensions which have been used by many researchers to measure women empowerment. These are; resources,
agency and achievement. However, Kabeer suggests that there must be triangulation of these three dimensions in order to quantifying women empowerment. In this study, Kabeer’s model has been used to also measure the empowerment of men. During interviews with Bambanani beneficiaries, I have searched for indicators that represent each of the three dimensions of empowerment.

**Resources** imply that there should be preconditions in place to enable empowerment of previously disempowered groups (Kabeer 1999). The resource dimension of empowerment is about institutional reform and enabling equal access to material resources. Kabeer (1999:437) argues that,

> Resources include not only material resources in the more conventional economic senses, but also various human and social resources which serve to enhance the ability to exercise choice. Resources in this broader sense of the word are acquired through a multiplicity of social relationships conducted in the various institutional domains which make up a society (such as family, market, community).

**Agency** involves participation. This can be viewed as a practical exercise of power by beneficiaries of the empowerment project in deciding on matters affecting their lives (Kabeer, 1999). **Achievement** on the other hand, involves the outcomes of the process of empowerment. As cited in Kabeer (1999), Kishor speaks about direct evidence of empowerment, which includes what she call ‘egalitarian gender roles’ and ‘egalitarian decision-making’. In this study, I have looked at ‘egalitarian roles’ and ‘egalitarian decision-making’ between LRAD beneficiaries themselves, and between LRAD beneficiaries and the farm’s management. These dimensions enable previously disempowered people to make choices, something which they were unable to do before as because of their social position. This power to choose puts them in a position to partake in decision-making processes. According to Rowlands (1997:13), “…empowerment is bringing people who are outside the decision-making process into it”. Similar to Kabeer (1999), Rowlands have come up with three dimensions displaying how empowerment is experienced and demonstrated. These are shown in *Figure 1* below:
As per Rowlands (1997), the personal dimension of empowerment has to do with “developing a sense of self and individual confidence and capacity, and undoing the effects of internalised oppression”. Similar to Kabeer’s notion of agency as an empowerment indicator, close relationships as outlined by Rowlands implies the development of an ability to negotiate and influence the nature of a relationship as well as decisions made within it. Rowlands (1997:14) defines the notion of collective as an instance “where individuals work together to achieve a more extensive impact than each could have done alone”. This can be closely linked to the notion of ‘egalitarian gender roles’ and ‘egalitarian decision-making’ which symbolises achievement dimension of empowerment discussed above.

3.6 Limitations of this research

As research is supposed to be a focused piece of work, focusing on a specific issue(s) within a broader field of knowledge enquiry; this on its own sets out boundaries that limit research on particular issue(s), leaving out others. This research is constrained by its scope, but I hope these limitations will inspire future research in the area of land reform in South Africa.

Although this research is focusing on the intersection between race, gender and class, it is limited to the land redistribution programme. I hope that future research of this nature will go beyond to include or specifically focus on the other land reform components that this research
does not cover. Also, this research focuses on one aspect of LRAD i.e. Equity Scheme; leaving the other three project types outside as the case study chosen falls within this specific aspect.¹³

Conceptual constraints and those which were beyond methodological reach were also encountered. For example, interview questions were initially conceptualised in English but most Bambanani LRAD beneficiaries do not understand the language and many cannot express themselves well in English. As a result, interviews were conducted in IsiZulu.¹⁴

3.7 Conclusion

The methodological parameters also prevented this study from yielding results that can be generalised across, but has facilitated the acquisition of an abundant information and knowledge on the matter under study, hence contributing to its depth. A qualitative approach was deemed crucial for the study as the nature of research questions required objective measures. This qualitative methodological route has enabled an in depth exploration of the LRAD sub-programme in relation to empowerment, and the employment of a case study approach has maintained the focus of this study as the responses from Bambanani beneficiaries and analysis of company’s official documents has led to a number of discoveries that are suitable to answer the research questions set out at the beginning of this paper.

The application of a multifaceted data collection method such as document analysis, in depth interviews and participants observation gave substance to the outcome of this study. Kabeer’s three prolonged approach to empowerment conceptualised the research findings into its three dimensions of empowerment i.e. resources, agency and achievement. This enabled the measuring of the extent at which Bambanani beneficiaries have been empowered or disempowered by the programme.

¹³ According to the LRAD policy document of 2000, the LRAD grant caters for the creation of Food safety-net projects, Equity Schemes, production for the markets and agriculture in communal areas, and any project which is agricultural-based.

¹⁴ IsiZulu was the most understood language amongst Bambanani beneficiaries and was one of African languages that the researcher of this paper is fluent in, hence it was deemed convenient to conduct interviews in this language. This however, posed various conceptual consequences as most of the questions could not preserve their theoretical essence during the process of translation.
4.1 Scope of the land reform literature

A considerable literature has been written on South Africa’s post-apartheid land reform process. However, this literature engages on issues of race, gender and class, separately. For instance, one category of literature focuses on gender and land reform with specific emphasis on how the land reform process impacts on women. This literature speaks to the issue of women’s land rights and a need for equal access to land ownership and control in order to provide them with tenure security and economic independence from men.

The limitations of this literature, however, are in its assumption that black men or perhaps all black men are empowered and privileged by the land reform process. Therefore, the empowerment of women (black) in land ownership and control should be measured against these men. Although this literature focuses on black women, it speaks in generic terms without clearly acknowledging divisions amongst these women. This homogenisation of black women also needs to be problematised. In this way, the literature fails to accommodate the role played by the intersection of race, gender and class in the manifestation of inequalities in land ownership and control.

On the other hand, the literature that approach land reform on race perspective focuses on the failures of the market-led approach to bridge inequality gap in ownership and control of agricultural land between blacks and whites. Researchers at the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) based at the University of Western Cape have written widely on this topic. One of the arguments made by this literature is that the market-led land reform approach under the ‘willing-buyer’, ‘willing-seller’ principle gives more power to white farmers in a sense that they determine which land to cede for redistribution, and at what price (See Hall, 2004; Lahiff, 2007).
The logic underlying this argument is that, this process entrenches racial inequalities in landholding since black people end up acquiring land of poor quality and smaller hectares of land in large groups as they are unable to mobilise adequate funds to purchase large hectares of land because of exorbitant prices of land on the market. The constraints of this category of literature are in its failure to do justice to the divisions that exist amongst the targeted group(s) of the land reform process such as gender and class, which may have enormous influence on how land is redistributed.

This chapter theoretically unpacks the South African land reform literature, and reference is also made to international literature. Within South African land reform literature, the influence of two theoretical perspectives can be identified. There is a literature which focuses on land reform and gender, with its theoretical inspiration drawn from feminism. Another body of literature draws from revisionist ideas in its criticism of the role of the market in addressing racial inequalities in landholding.

This section of the paper engages with scholarly text concerning land reform and gender, issues of race and transformation underlying land reform, and the class dimension surrounding the programme. The view is to establish evidence that the South African literature has not dealt with the intersection of race, gender and class in its conceptualisation of the land and agrarian reform process, thus there exist a scholarly magnitude to pursue the study of this nature.

4.2 Theorising land reform

Global land reform trends reveal elements of neo-liberalism and state-interventionist approaches. However, history has shown the dominance of neo-liberal model known as the ‘willing-buyer, willing-seller’, while only few instances of state-led land reform processes has been evident. The debate around South Africa’s land policy is divided amongst those who support market-led approach and those who support state-led approach. Radical perspectives such as those articulated by Kepe and Cousins (2002), Lahiff (2007), and others asserts that, a meaningful land reform process and sustainable rural development in South Africa requires a radical abolishment of structural underpinnings of poverty and inequality inherited from three centuries of oppression and exploitation. These scholars subscribe to the school of thought which Beinstern (2001) refer to as a populist agrarian lobby which strongly advocate for a
state-led land reform process. This school of thought argues for a state-led land and agrarian reform with specific emphasis on the development of small-scale family farms (See Beinstern).

Notably, the two phases of South Africa’s post-1994 land reform i.e. 1994-1999 and 2000-2009 focused on large-scale farming. This displays elements of a ‘classical agrarian question’ supported by the neo-liberal confidence on the market to resolve the land question. It is only now that the government is pushing for the establishment of small-scale farms through its Comprehensive Rural Development Programme (CRDP). One can situate the recent move to CRDP as a sign of a slight shift towards a ‘hybrid’ land and agrarian reform approach proposed by Ciamarra (2003) amongst other scholars.

Ciamarra conducted a study which investigated the factors which led to the successful implementation of Philippines’ Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of 1988. The success of CARP led Ciamarra to argue that the divergence between state-led and market-led land reform is ill-conceived since the two approaches can complement each other. According to Ciamarra (2003:34), “The Philippines experience indicates that possibilities exist for the process of land acquisition and distribution to be successfully carried out under a joint state-led/market-assisted approach, challenging the disagreement between state-led and market-assisted land reform proponents”. The idea is to combine the strength of both approaches to achieve better outcomes.

4.3 Gender discourse and land reform

Gender inequality in landholding is a universal phenomenon (Agarwal, 2002; Walker, 1997; Ikrdahl et. al., 2005). Even though there might be few cases where certain adjustments have been made in a form of gender equity policies to empower women, gender disparities seem to have followed common trends in many parts of the world where gender imbalances in land ownership have persisted under the land reform process despite policy arrangements (Jacobs, 2002; Walker, 2005). In many countries, this has continued as there were no gender equity policies put in place to ensure gender balance. However, in countries such as South Africa, gender inequalities on land reform have continued despite the enactment of gender equity policies (See Agarwal, 2002; Walker, 2005). Deere and León’s (2001) work on land and property rights of women in Latin America, discovered that “…gender inequality in land
ownership is due to male preference in inheritance, male privilege in marriage, male bias in state programs of land distribution, and gender inequality in the land market, where women are less likely to be buyers than men”. Like in many parts of the world, South Africa’s land reform process has entrenched gender inequalities (Walker, 2005).

The feminist theory attributes gender inequality and the subordinate position of women in the society to patriarchy (Beasley, 1999; Tong, 2009). They view the system of male domination as entrenching unequal power relations by putting women in an inferior position (Alston, 1995). Feminists advocates for gender equality in all facets of life and maintains a position that, people’s access to resources and privilege should not be determined by their biological orientation of being men or women but should be determined equally by citizenship (ibid.).

Land redistribution is faced by a reality whereby women continue to be minority owners of land (See Walker, 2003; Walker, 2005). The literature informs that in many parts of the world where land reform has taken place women have remained marginalised by such processes and have remained unable to attain independent land ownership rights. Women need independent land rights for their economic and social well-being (ibid.). Independent ownership and control of land by women guarantees them tenure security and improve their level of agency in social relations of power and decision-making circles. A question ought to be probed why women have remained marginalised in terms of land ownership? Therefore, a gender discourse brings relevance in explaining factors underlying such inequalities.

Within the South African context, the gender discourse on land reform grew out of a persistent marginal position occupied by women with regard to access and ownership of land even in the presence of gender-sensitive policies which are geared towards achieving gender equality in the redistribution processes of such resources. Scholars such as Rangan and Gilmartin (2002), and Walker (2003) have argued that gender policy on land reform has been conceptualised by the DLA in an abstract manner and that its implementation has proven lack of commitment on the DLA’s side. In her research on the outcomes of the pilot programme in KwaZulu Natal province, Walker (2003:135) discovered that “…very little attention was paid to gender equity and women’s empowerment. Officials worked with already constituted...

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groups and existing power relations between men and women”. These scholars also acknowledge that this problem emanates from poor capacity-building mechanism to execute gender policy in a manner that ensures women’s equal access to land.

Walker (2005) also problematises what appears to be a policy contradiction by the South African government in terms of prioritising or balancing between gender equity ideals and the interests of the traditionalist lobby represented by the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA). On one hand, the post-apartheid government strives for gender equity on land reform by putting in place necessary gender policies and other relevant measures to ensure that women are equitably empowered by the land reform process, while on the other hand, it endorses powers of traditional leaders or tribal councils in the allocation and administration of land in rural communities (Walker, 1998; Walker, 2005).

This situation was aggravated by the launch of the Communal Land Rights Act (CLaRA) in 2004. CLaRA triggered heated public and parliamentary debate, with critics such as the Commission for Gender Equity and other land-sector non-governmental organisations (NGOs) arguing that “…the legislation would entrench the powers of undemocratic, patriarchal traditional leaders over communal land, fail to secure the tenure rights for women living on this land, and ultimately undermine the significant role that common property resources play in the livelihood strategies of the rural poor” (Walker, 2005:298).

Land allocation by traditional leaders or tribal council is viewed by feminists as a threat to women’s access to land and unable to transform patriarchal patterns in ownership and control of land. Rangan and Gilmartin (2002:641) also substantiate this position by arguing that “Traditional authorities not only derive their power from controlling access to land occupation, but also from using African customary law to maintain social order through gendered privileges, marital status, and age-based hierarchies”.

An example of Buffelspruit in the Mpumalanga province used by Rangan and Gilmartin (2002) demonstrate how land allocation under patriarchal channels of tribal councils subject women to suppression. This was an instance where patriarchal interests in land use had undermined the principle of justice and basis for gender equity. A group of women who had
been allocated communal land by the induna\textsuperscript{17} of the area to grow crops on subsistence basis faced brutality from local men who at a later stage wanted to use the land for grazing.\textsuperscript{18}

Rangan and Gilmartin’s (2002) article points out how women continue to experience discrimination and unfair treatment despite the presence of gender equity policies on land access and ownership. This is blamed on unreformed institutional structures which have remained intrinsically gendered. This gives evidence to what they refer to as the politics of accommodation. The argument here is that “gender equity is inevitably regarded as a political exercise in accommodating the ‘principles’ of gender equality within the existing practices of institutions, rather than as a process of gender of institutionalised relationships, conventions, and customary practices (ibid.). This argument emphasises that, accommodating women into such institutions does not necessarily redress the gender question in land access but subject women to a marginal bargaining position compared to their male counterparts.

The literature on land reform and gender is imperative in a sense that it questions and critiques the gendered nature of the post-apartheid land reform process due to poor approach of gender policy. However, this feminist outlook has its limitations as noted earlier; hence it should expand its horizons beyond gender parameters. The feminist outlook on land reform is limited in its conceptualisation of women as homogenous and because of curtailing empowerment debate in land reform by merely comparing women’s land access with that of their male counterparts. This approach fails to take into account a broader historical and present nature informing South Africa’s land question. Responding to the problem of feminism’s treatment of women as equally deprived, Walker (1998:4) argues that even though this might be the case, “…the overwhelming number of rural women fall into the category of poor or very poor”.

With regard to LRAD, Walker (2005) argues that this programme is putting women at a disadvantaged position compared to men by requiring them to make own contribution in order to qualify for a land grant. LRAD requires a person to make own contribution of R5000 to qualify for a grant of R20 000 (DLA, 2000). This contribution can also be in form of kind (contribution of tractors, cattle, etc.) and labour (DLA, 2000). Walker argues that, considering the historically subordinate social position held by women, they cannot afford to raise the required R5000. As a result, they will have to rely on their husband to make this

\textsuperscript{17} Induna is a Zulu word for a headman.

\textsuperscript{18} To read the entire story see Rangan and Gilmartin (2002: 648-652).
contribution for them. She further argues that history has deprived women from owning assets and has also restricted them from performing certain roles in the society and in the work place.

Nomvuselelo Songelwa (2009) wrote a PhD thesis focusing of how the LRAD sub-programme impact on women. Songelwa analyses LRAD from its early stages. She used one of the first LRAD projects in Mpumalanga Province as a case study to examine how the programme has transformed women’s access to land. She discovered that despite the launch of LRAD, access to land by women was still difficult. According to Songelwa (2009) in order for women to acquire land they had to be knowledgeable and persistent. Although the findings and arguments made by Songelwa are valid, she also falls in the same trap as the above discussed literature which attributes women’s landlessness solely to patriarchy.

### 4.4 Land reform, race and transformation

The core argument here is that racial disparities in landholding still persist (Lahiff, 2007; Hall, 2004; Cousins, 2006). From the early stages of South Africa’s land reform, proponents of state-led agrarian reform in academia and civil society formations have expressed their scepticism about the ability of the market to transform racially-skewed landholding patterns (Wegerif, 2004; Lahiff, 2007). They argued that, reforming land through the market will only entrench existing inequalities and possibly cement the land advantage of white commercial farmers (ibid.). Contemporary arguments still maintain that white commercial farmers continue to enjoy substantial advantage compared to the majority of landless blacks as a result of current reform regime which gives land owners superior negotiating powers on land transactions (ibid.). As per Lahiff (2007), the old agrarian order which is defined by racial inequalities is still eminent, symbolising the failure of the market-assisted land reform.

This market-pessimist thesis is in line with global scepticism about the ability of the market to deliver to land reform objectives. According to Wegerif (2004), international experiences with market-led land reform have shown disappointing results whereby the programme has failed to bring about substantial “de-concentration” of landholding. South Africa’s pro-market advocates such as Hans Bingswanger and Klaus Deininger seem to have overestimated the ability of the market to control land prices and to keep them at a relatively low margin (See Borras Jr, 2003). The opposite have occurred, instead. Some land owners
have inflated prices while others have resisted ceding land, making ‘deracialisation’ of landholding impossible to achieve within the time frame (ibid.).

Another area which is viewed as a constraint to successful land reform is the ‘property clause’ which is entrenched in the Constitution (See Hendricks and Ntsebeza, 2000; Hall, 2004; Lahiff, 2007; Ntsebeza, 2007). In light of this, Hendricks and Ntsebeza (2000) have begun to question whether the constitutional protection of private property rights symbolises a justification of colonial land theft.

Hall (2004:214) argues that, “White farmers and industrialists successfully lobbied to ensure that commitments to transformation in the 1993 interim Constitution and the final 1996 Constitution were tempered by a ‘property clause’ that recognised and protected existing property rights”. This set basis for constrained land reform process as the ownership of the land in question was now formally endorsed and entrenched in the new Constitution (ibid.). As a result, the land reform process seems to advance limited deracialisation of commercial farming rather than a process of complete agrarian restructuring (2004:213). This literature proposes for a state intervention which includes land expropriations where necessary (See Lahiff, 2007).

Lahiff (2007) criticises the state for showing reluctance to use the powers granted by the constitution to expropriate land for the interest of land reform (ibid.). Arguably, land expropriation does not seem to be possible yet in South Africa considering the catastrophic experience of a ‘fast-track’ land reform in neighbouring Zimbabwe.

4.5 Class dynamics and the politics of access to land

The literature’s engagement on the class dimension of the land reform process regards power and economic privilege as determining factors to people’s access to resources. Class can be viewed as a structural composition that stratifies society members according to clusters of privilege and disadvantage. Karl Marx and Max Weber are notable theorists of social stratification. They explain how people’s access to social benefits is determined by their position in the social stratification hierarchy. In Marx’s work, two primary classes are identified, namely; the capitalist class – those who own the means of production, and the

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proletariat – those who sell their labour in exchange for wages (Ibid.). Marx’s analysis of social stratification is confined to economic determinants, but Max Weber advanced the social stratification analysis through his multidimensional approach that include class (the economic dimension), status (the cultural and social dimension), and party/power (the political dimension).20

According to Max Weber, class has to do with how much access to the material goods of society (such as income, property, and other financial assets) a group or individual has, and how this serves as a basis for one’s life chances (Ibid.). This analysis goes further to say status concerns social judgement and recognition that a person gets from society as a result of economic status and the respect earned (ibid.).

International experience shows a growing tendency of elite capture of land reform in situations where power relations and redistribution of political and economic power remain unchanged and favours the elite class (cousins, 2007:234). South Africa’s land question is defined by two classes, namely; the land owning class (mainly large-scale white commercial farmers) and the landless (mainly black). Within the landless there are various classes, with the poor of the poorest being at the bottom of the hierarchy. This paper has adopted Weberian class analysis as it incorporates all various aspects regarding the aims and objectives of this study.

The threat of elite capture of land reform in South Africa is evident when looking at criticism of CLaRA and those of market-led land reform approach. CLaRa’s entrenchment of the powers of traditional leaders in land administration in communal areas was seen by many critics as having potential to limit people’s rights and access to land in those areas.

Levin and Weiner (1996:94) have predicted that land reform in South Africa would likely be constrained by various political and economic obstacles. This speculation was informed by their observation of what they labelled elite-pacted democracy21, brought to being by the negotiated settlement of the early 1990s. The argument articulated by Levin and Weiner (1996:96) is that,

20 Ibid, p186.
21 Levin and Weiner (1996:95) defined elite-pacted democracy as a scenario where power lies in the hands of politicians and bureaucrats, and the masses are marginalized in various channels of political life. They argue that, in such instances moderates and reformers form an alliance in policy-making resulting to a form of democracy that mostly preserves the existing status quo through social and economic conservatism.
“If transition in South Africa is limited by an elite-pacted democracy, prospects for significant land and agrarian reform are remote. One reason is that entrenched power holders will maintain the capacity to shape the content and institutional form of land and agrarian reform”.

Cousins and Hall (2010:23) gives an example of how “PLAS programme appears to lend itself to capture by a narrow elite as officials allocate farms to those judged to already have the skills and capital to keep existing farming operations going – but this comes at the cost of poverty reduction and equity”. From 1994 to 1999, South Africa’s land reform has been dominated by what Zimmerman labelled ‘demand-led rationing’ (See Lahiff, 2007:1588). Zimmerman argued that the process of self-selection permitted by ‘demand-rationing’ will be most likely to exclude poorer groups because of lack of clarity on the policy regarding intended beneficiaries (Ibid.). There is a possibility that a demand-led programme would be driven largely by considerations of racial equity that assume a homogenous black population (Ibid.).

When speaking about land reform and class, the politics of land markets are crucial to scrutinise as their outcome determine the number of hectares available for redistribution to the poor. Borras Jr (2003) speaks about a prevalent incident of a visible, yet a passive market in land dealings in the countryside in many developing countries. Land prices in these areas are determined by class and political power, not by the market as commonly understood by market-led land reform proponents (ibid.). According to Borras Jr, the powerful have been successful in manipulating land prices regardless of its economic value, whereas the landless poor remained at a disadvantaged position as they are unable to manipulate land prices downward. The political economy of land in South Africa defined by vested interests of the land owning class and various black elites (See Lahiff, 2007).
4.6 Post-LRAD land policy outlook: a brief overview of the CRDP paradigm

On 12 August 2009 the Cabinet approved the CRDP, a symbol of government’s commitment to rural development. Rural development is regarded as one of the key priorities of President Jacob Zuma’s government which assumed power in 2009, and is aimed at creating sustainable rural communities (ibid.). The CRDP is a development strategy based on the merger of rural development with land and agrarian reform as a way of responding to poverty and food insecurity in rural areas through the use and management of natural resources (DRDLR, 2009).

The first two pilot projects were launched in Riemvasmaak in the Northern Cape and at Muyexe village in Giyani, Limpopo Province (DRDLR, 2009). The CRDP is a ‘three-legged’ approach which includes agrarian transformation, rural development and land reform. According to Kariuki (2010:349-350), a significant feature of the CRDP is its embracement of the participation and empowerment of communities where government is viewed as an ‘enabler’ to help rural communities to meet their aspirations as articulated through a community-led participatory process.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter has conducted a review of the available literature on South Africa’s post-apartheid land reform process within the context of theoretical frameworks informing this literature such as those founded in gender, anti-racial, and class discourses, respectively. Global land reform experiences and literature concerned has been utilised as a reference in augmenting the arguments which emanated from this review. The central argument which emerged out of this exercise was that the South African literature has not focused on the intersection of race, gender and class in its conceptualisation of the land reform process. Therefore, the current study provides a platform for the exploration of this multi-dimensional outlook to the South African land question.

CHAPTER FIVE

Land reform delivery outcomes and the empowerment question: LRAD

5.1 Introduction

The findings of this research shed light to the successes, failures, and problems which can be attributed to LRAD’s mode of delivery. These findings also pointed out to the impact that LRAD’s mode of delivery had on the empowerment of previously disadvantaged individuals. This paper has consistently maintained a position that race, gender and class are not autonomous from each other but are intertwined social dimensions in their determination of one’s privilege or disadvantage in the process of resource access and acquisition, thus an emphasis on the intersection of these categories of difference broadens the horizon of the empowerment debate regarding agrarian reform. The South African land reform process bears witness to this argument.

This chapter demonstrate this through data collected using various methods ranging from document analysis, scholarly literature and in depth interviews. Interviews were conducted with Bambanani LRAD beneficiaries and land officials from two government departments in Gauteng, namely; the Gauteng Department of Rural Development and Land Reform and the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development.

5.2 Findings and analysis

5.2.1 Broad themes

The Bambanani case study presented mixed findings; something which confirms that land beneficiaries are not homogeneous but are diverse in their needs and expectations when it comes to the issue of land. This proves the relevance of a multi-dimensional approach enabled by the intersectionality of race, gender and class. This heterogeneity is not harmonious; it consists of competing ideologies and interest, leading to unity amongst those beneficiaries who feel that they are equally marginalised.

At Bambanani, one observed that beneficiaries have united based on a common interest, something which seemed to be motivated by a sense of feeling equally marginalised or bettered off by the equity share scheme process. This resulted to what I term dichotomous
factionalism\textsuperscript{23}. The first faction is composed by Trust members while the second faction is made up of ordinary members.

The Trust has a duty to represent the interests of the collective in the bargaining council with white management. Instead, this structure has been accused by some beneficiaries of failing to represent their interests and for creating a class vacuum amongst Bambanani beneficiaries. On the other hand, Trust members have accused ordinary beneficiaries of being after money at the expense of the wellbeing of the project. They argued that this behaviour symbolises ordinary members’ lack of patience and commitment.

It is argued a major challenge emanating from group projects is infighting and misunderstanding amongst beneficiaries (Interview, 2010).\textsuperscript{24} Keaditse (2010) attributes this to the consequence of what he calls ‘forced marriage’\textsuperscript{25} between beneficiaries with divergent needs and interests. The argument is that, such people are unlikely to reach common ground and their differences “might lead to temptations to subdivide the land into several uneconomical farm units.

Arguably, land partitioning at Bambanani and other similar projects, might not be possible as beneficiaries are not sole owners of land, but are recipients of the equity shares in a well established agricultural venture. What has happened at Bambanani is a dichotomous factionalism scenario whereby those who share similar interests, ideology, perceptions and attitude towards the ongoing outcomes of shareholding have shown some sense of unity. In extreme cases some beneficiaries have left Bambanani to look for greener pastures as indicated in table 2 in Chapter 1 (i.e. 10 inactive members).

As in most provinces in the country, group projects are a dominant form of land acquisition in Gauteng. This shows how LRAD has replicated group project regime witnessed under SLAG, but in a different form and scale. An argument that LRAD groups are much smaller than those processed under SLAG can be safely made. For instance, even in cases where

\textsuperscript{23} This terminology is used in this paper to explain the division of Bambanani beneficiaries into two camps along varying interests, ideology and power ambitions. In doing so, this terminology furthers Kariuki’s (2004:5) argument that in societies in transition land owning interests always ensures that they maintain their privileges or power. This argument is valid and it enlightens on how this practice hampers the pace and depth of the transformation project. In addition to this, the Bambanani case demonstrate how conflicting interests amongst the previously disadvantaged brings confusion to the outcomes and direction of the empowerment initiative.

\textsuperscript{24} The interview was conducted at Gauteng DRDRL offices with Mr. Danny Keaditse, a project officer.

\textsuperscript{25} According to Keaditse, the concept of ‘force marriage’ explains a situation whereby historically dispossessed people are forced by economic impediments attached to the land reform process to group in order to get maximum grant to purchase land.
SLAG groups seemed to be small, the number of beneficiaries in the government’s records represented only the number of households, leaving out the dependents under those households. Individual grants have been identified as the contributing factor to this slight reduction in the size of these groups (Interview, 2010). In this way, LRAD can be viewed as having added an individual element compared to the past land acquisition regime.

According to the Gauteng’s land reform database, a total of 135 LRAD projects were approved in this province between 2000 and 2010, and only fifteen of these were individual projects. Out of these fifteen individual projects only four were owned by women; two from urban areas and another two from peri-urban areas. Interestingly, the nine men who acquired land on individual basis were from rural areas and the remaining two were from urban areas (Ibid.). In light of these findings, three crucial points need to be emphasized;

- Income inequalities and skewed ownership and control of assets between men and women are evident. Therefore, gender equity on land reform is impossible to achieve by simply granting women a right to apply for land as individuals. Arguably, LRAD seem to have underestimated the impact of the marginal economic status of women on their chances to acquire land as individuals.
- Although women are the most marginalized group in patriarchal societies, they are to a greater extent not homogenous or equally deprived. Their respective background either socially, economically, politically or culturally distinguishes them and dictates their chances to access resources.
- Economic factors underlying LRAD and their impact on the poor be taken into consideration when developing land policies in the future.

Bambanani Fruits is one the group projects initiated by the provincial government through an LRAD grant mechanism. On this regard, it was discovered that the information on Gauteng’s land reform record database which was obtained from the provincial Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) does not correspond with that in the official documents of the farm. For example, the size of the land transferred to Bambanani beneficiaries is expressed as 8000 hectares on the provincial land reform records while it is expressed in share percentages in the farm’s official documents. My argument is that, it is impossible for this information to be regarded as valid if the farm in question is only 500

26 This information was sourced from the Gauteng Department of Rural Development and Land Reform project database which was obtained on 31 May 2010.
hectares as stated in chapter 1 of this paper. This experience shows how LRAD has been vulnerable to manipulation, and the repercussions of this to the overall empowerment of previously disadvantaged people.

Apart from this, provincial land reform records and responses from project officers interviewed have demonstrated that more land was transferred to beneficiaries through LRAD compared to other programmes. The ability to empower more previously disadvantaged people through accessing land as individuals is one of the successes of LRAD. This implies that even though land was acquired in large groups, individuals still have secured rights and claim to the land, especially vulnerable members such as women and youth. Furthermore, LRAD has succeeded in empowering previously disadvantaged individuals through increased and flexible funding mechanism.

As one project officer puts it, LRAD increased the funding that beneficiaries could qualify for (Interview, 2010). Prior to this increase, the grant amount used to be R16000 per household, an amount which was too little for beneficiaries to purchase large hectares of land considering the exorbitant land prices on the market. Keaditse argued that, through LRAD, it meant that more land could be acquired as individuals within a single household could qualify for a R20000 minimum grant each. He further argued that after an increase of the minimum grant amount to R40000 per individual, it meant that even more land could be bought.

Even though more land could be bought as a result of combined individual grants and an increased minimum grant amount, empowerment should be measured in terms of both the quality and quantity of the acquired land or equity shares, in the case of Bambanani. Through a review of shareholding certificates of Bambanani beneficiaries and a review of the farm’s document entitled “Trust Deed of the Bambanani Workers Black Employee Share Trust”, it was discovered that each beneficiary owns sixteen shares at One Rand (R1.00) each. These shares are 880 in total and add up to R880.00 considering the price of R1.00 per share.

This amount points out to a discrepancy that exist when it is compared with the grant amount of R3.1 million together with a Standard Bank loan of R900 000 that the leaders of the Trust revealed as the amount used to purchase the shares. This is one of the major complexities around Bambanani shareholding that LRAD beneficiaries do not display knowledge of. The majority of respondents revealed awareness about a Standard Bank loan which was incurred
to add up to the grant amount, but they also expressed their lack of knowledge about the exact amount already been repaid as well as the amount still outstanding.

These shareholders have nonetheless admitted that the management sometimes relay financial information to them. However, what confuses them the most is the sophistication of the financial jargon underlying this process. It then came out that there is a need for demystification of financial information to an easily apprehensive manner so that shareholders can participate meaningfully in financial matters on the farm. This exposes the explicit signs of monopoly over knowledge regarding LRAD equity scheme, and the exclusive mastery of financial knowledge by the management. This paper has found this to be disempowering to Bambanani LRAD beneficiaries.

The above information shows how LRAD equity scheme at Bambanani has failed in its equity role and how it has created a mammoth racial gap in power relations on the farm\(^\text{27}\), subjecting beneficiaries to compromised levels in all three measures of empowerment set out by Kabeer (1999). At provincial and national level, LRAD has been found to have fallen short in its role of redressing past inequalities. Supporting evidence to this argument include the slow pace in delivering land to the people, the continued dominance of group projects and a tendency of settling large groups of people in small hectares of land. The following table demonstrates the performance of South Africa’s land reform programme during 2009/2010 financial year.

\[^{27}\text{There is a disproportionate knowledge distribution patterns at Bambanani, and this is skewed along racial lines. This Knowledge gap limits the level of agency of black partners. Even amongst the LRAD beneficiaries knowledge sharing seems to be ineffective, and Trust members seem more informed about the activities on the farm than the rest of beneficiaries.}\]
Table 3

Performance summary of the land reform process
1 April 2009 – 31 March 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>LRAD.COM/SLAG-SPLAG</th>
<th>PLAS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>LRAD.COM/SLAG-SPLAG</th>
<th>PLAS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>INDIVIDUALS</th>
<th>FEMALES</th>
<th>FARM WORKERS</th>
<th>HOUSEHOLD</th>
<th>YOUTH</th>
<th>DISABLED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>15,144.1338</td>
<td>24,533.8293</td>
<td>39,677.9631</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FS</td>
<td>17,821.2578</td>
<td>12,390.3208</td>
<td>30,211.5786</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP</td>
<td>378.1468</td>
<td>1,366.8641</td>
<td>1,745.0109</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KZN</td>
<td>41,742.8082</td>
<td>1,679.5779</td>
<td>43,422.3861</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>4,158</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1,690</td>
<td>1,990</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>8,960.5685</td>
<td>5,743.4159</td>
<td>14,703.9844</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>11,657.4360</td>
<td>17,423.8675</td>
<td>29,081.3035</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC</td>
<td>29,441.1814</td>
<td>27,386.1602</td>
<td>56,827.3416</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>NW</td>
<td>7,857.9938</td>
<td>5,183.2199</td>
<td>13,041.2137</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3,117</td>
<td>1,872</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WC</td>
<td>7,553.9534</td>
<td>3,725.8010</td>
<td>11,279.7544</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1,073</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>140,557.4797</strong></td>
<td><strong>99,433.0566</strong></td>
<td><strong>239,990.5363</strong></td>
<td><strong>276</strong></td>
<td><strong>98</strong></td>
<td><strong>374</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,162</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,795</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,212</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,944</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,138</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extracted from the Annual Report of the National Department of Rural Development and land reform, 1 April 2009–31 March 2010

Table 3 portrays challenge faced by the South African government in meeting its land reform targets. According to Makgalemele (2010:6), between the year 2009 and 2010 the national government delivered 239,990.5363 hectares of land, falling short of the original target. She attributed this failure to budgetary constraints and exorbitant land prices. Gwanya (2009:5) informs that during the financial year 2008/2009, the Department of Land Affairs spent almost 100% of its allocated budget but only managed to transfer 443,600.00 hectares instead of 608,060.00 hectares. The 608,060.00 hectare mark was a new target after a reduction from the initial target of 1,500,000.00 hectares. Gwanya (2009) link the root cause

28 Dr. Nozizwe Makgalemele is an Acting-Director General at the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform and was cited from the department’s Annual report of 1 April 2009-31 March 2010.
29 Mr. T. T. Gwanya was a Director-General of the Department of Land Affairs (now Department of Rural Development and Land Reform) until 2009.
of this failure to the escalating land prices. He argued that these high land prices eroded the buying power of the budget, making it impossible for the government to meet its targets.

A positive feature is that since the inception of LRAD there has been a slight increase in the percentage of land transferred to beneficiaries even though this does not come near to the initial delivery target of 30%. However, there is a need to acknowledge that the South African land question presents complex institutional impediments which went beyond LRAD’s capacity. According to Cousins (2006:224), a capital budget of at least 1 billion per annum is required to meet the redistribution target of 30 per cent by 2014.

A visible evidence of LRAD’s success at Bambanani is the high level of gender balance between men and women as illustrated in Table 2 in Chapter 1 and in Figure 2 below. When LRAD equity shares were transferred at Bambanani, there were 55 beneficiaries; 27 women and 28 men. Fourteen shareholders from the initial 55 beneficiaries are no longer participants on the farm. According to the Trust, 10 members (4 women and 6 men) withdrew their services on the farm but are still shareholders while the other 4 members (1 woman and 3 men) passed away. Now there are 41 (22 women and 19 men) active members working on the farm.
The above results display positive progress towards women empowerment in ownership and control of agrarian land, but they do not qualify for generalization to be made. For instance, Gauteng’s land reform records shows that in many LRAD projects men still dominate while women remain a minority. This point is also evident in Table 3 under this chapter. According to the South African literature, gender imbalance in land reform is a countrywide problem. As displayed by these records, the common trend in land acquisition under LRAD is through family trusts. Feminists problematise the family structure as a means of resource distribution because of its patriarchal nature. Contrary to the SLAG household regime, LRAD beneficiaries chooses to form family trusts, probably a best option for those beneficiaries who wanted to partner with people they know and people they trust. As Keaditse’s argument above suggests, common interest alone is not sufficient, it has to be supplemented by trust and understanding amongst beneficiaries so as to minimize conflicts which are pandemic in group projects.
As much as there were notable successes, LRAD also failed to fulfil some of its objectives as a result of weaknesses in its implementation strategy. According to Keaditse (Interview, 2010), one of the challenges during the implementation of LRAD was the lack of involvement by the local government. This was also the case during the initiation of Bambanani. Bambanani falls under the Westonaria Local Municipality. During my visit at Westonaria Local Municipality I discovered that there was no person dealing specifically with land reform. Local municipalities are required to include land reform as part of their Integrated Development Plan (IDP).

The only people who are involved in land issues at Westonaria Local Municipality are Town Planners. The Westonaria Local Municipality informed that their office only get involved in land transfer transactions if the land concerned belongs to the municipality, but does not get involved if the land is privately owned. This contravenes the principles of LRAD which requires the involvement of local officials to assist applicants in the initial stages of land application.

In the case of Bambanani, there was no involvement by the local municipality since the land was privately owned. As a result, I was referred to the West Rand District Municipality, a district council under which the Westonaria Local Municipality is located. The District Municipality office informed that they do not deal with land reform matters, and that I should approach the regional office of the Department of Agriculture and Environmental Conservation.

The absence of independent dispatching of information about LRAD and shareholding at Bambanani was also discovered. The entire process of facilitation and education was entirely performed by the farm’s management. One respondent argued that, “Whites have given us a chance, now it’s up to us to uplift ourselves” (Interview, 2010). This has cultivated a general perception amongst Bambanani Trust members that the transfer of LRAD shares to black workers was an act of generosity by the white management. Arguably, this nature of thinking puts them in a vulnerable and weaker power relations position with the farm’s management.

Relying on responses from in depth interviews with Bambanani LRAD shareholders, I have classified these beneficiaries into three categories, namely; a gratified group, a disgruntled group and an accommodative group. A gratified group constitute the minority members who have been given positions which give them access to frequent interaction with the farm’s white management. This group is drawn from Trust members; they are more informed about
the operations and business issues on the farm compared to other beneficiaries, and some of them hold supervisors’ positions.

I also observed a tendency of denialism amongst some of Trust members regarding their lack of extensive knowledge about shareholding. During the interviews they were defensive and diplomatic in their responses. In contrast, the Director of Trustees admitted that she is not absolutely clear about the process of shareholding. It was therefore, surprising for some of the Trust members to claim knowledge about the process.

A disgruntled group comprises of the majority of ordinary members of the project. These members are unhappy and dissatisfied with how things turned out with equity share scheme. Their discontent is caused by the failure of the equity scheme arrangement to meet their empowerment expectations. The following statement confirms this;

“When you work, you must be happy. Here, we work because we don’t have money and we don’t have anywhere to go. They say we have shares but we don’t get anything. They promised us houses before 2010 but we are still living in shacks” (Interview, 2010).

Lastly, an accommodative group is made up of few people from ordinary members. This group argued that the nature of shareholding as it stands is better than having nothing. One beneficiary mentioned that “before I did not own any assets and I did not have any skills. At least now I have acquired a variety of skills”.

5.2.2 Application of Kabeer’s model

- Resources

Resources should not be looked at only in material terms, but should also be viewed in terms of human and social resources (Kabeer, 1999). According to Kabeer, a combination of these three resources enables access to institutions of power in a society. The notable resources received by Bambanani beneficiaries through LRAD are equity shares, training and permanent employment (Interviews, 2010). The government offered them an LRAD grant of
R200, 000.00 to buy equity shares, and a planning grant of R31, 702.00 (GDRDLR). The grant information is displayed in the Gauteng land reform database as follows:

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bambanani Fruits project funding and project initiation costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government Assistance</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRAD grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above data was drawn from Gauteng Department of Rural Development and Land Reform records database, except the loan amount which was worked out by adding government assistance total with own contribution and then subtracting new total from the initial costs total as the amount was not displayed on the department’s records.

Equity shares can be viewed in terms of what Kabeer (1999) refer to as material resources, while various training courses which Bambanani beneficiaries reported to have received as part of LRAD package constitute human resource. Bambanani beneficiaries informed that this training has enhanced their level of skills and competency, enabling them to be productive and employable if ever they decide to seek employment elsewhere in the future. Although these new skills can enable them to seek employment anywhere, which is a good thing in terms of empowerment, these skills do not equip them to run or manage the farm. I argue that this is detrimental in terms of the empowerment of beneficiaries going forward, especially in facilitating an effective “exit-strategy”30.

30 An exit strategy is explained in the farm’s Constitution as a programme to be initiated to prepare beneficiaries to take over the operation of Bambanani from the current management after a specific period of time. According to the beneficiaries I have spoken to, after this period they will be entitled to 100 per cent ownership of the farm, but this need to be validated as I did not find any evidence of it during my research.
Nonetheless, I have discovered the lack of social resource amongst Bambanani beneficiaries. This refers to the *modus operandi* of institutional formations set to transform but instead perpetuate the status quo of unequal power relations. Power relations at Bambanani have remained unequal. There has been a failure to transform from a worker-employer relationship to co-owner relationship.

Many respondents were happy about the acquisition of LRAD equity shares, but at the same time they expressed disappointment about the outcomes of the programme so far. They complained that equity shares have not met their expectations in terms of transforming their living conditions and power relations on the farm. One respondent said, “I feel happy about the shares; government did the right thing by helping us otherwise we would have not managed to purchase the shares on our own. This respondent further asserted that, “My life has changed in term of employment security, but in terms of financial situation nothing has changed”.

Bambanani company documents (such as beneficiary list and the policy document) and in depth interviews conducted with its LRAD beneficiaries reveal high levels of gender equality between men and women in terms of opportunities on the farm. This displays adherence to gender equity, which is a positive picture to LRAD performance in delivering to its gender commitments. However, these results cannot be generalised across as Hall (2004:216) indicates that the majority of applicants who managed to make LRAD’s own contribution in cash or kind were mostly men. What these results does, they confirm Walker’s argument regarding commitment to gender policy and political will as integral towards achieving gender equity in land reform.

In the farm’s official document entitled *Rules: Bambanani Workers Share Incentive Scheme*, shares are defined as “...ordinary shares of R1, 00 [ONE RAND] each in the issued share capital of the Company”. The Trust members representing LRAD beneficiaries at Bambanani could not produce a document linking them to the ownership of land. What they had in their possession were duplicates of shareholding certificates which were kept in the office of the Director of Trustees. One of the Trust members informed that the bank decided to keep the original copies as surety until the loan payment is settled.
In terms of being able to participate in decision making processes three different responses from interviewees, and these are group as follows; I participate, I am not given space to participate, and I participate to a limited extent. Below is a graphical presentation of these responses:

**Figure 3**

![Decision-making graph](image)

Those who claimed not to be given a space to participate in decision-making pointed out to a lack of transparency in how the farm is managed, and to elements of favouritism by the farm’s management. The argument was that, “Some people do participate, for example beneficiary X. Beneficiary X is always with them – they do not ask us anything, I feel bad because we are all shareholders and we suppose to play an equal role” (Interview). Another respondent divulged that, “We don’t participate; they do things without informing us”.

In contrast, one of the respondents who confirmed to be participating in decision-making on the farm said, “We get to participate through the Trust Committee. During shareholders meetings we tell them what we want and they speak to the management on our behalf”. This seemed to be a common response by everyone who confirmed to be participating in decision-making. Lack of time was generally cited as being the reason why some decisions are taken without prior consultation. However, one of the Trust members I interviewed informed that, “They take some decision without our knowledge, and they use their 75% majority share to justify unilateral decision-making”.

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31 The name of the beneficiary was mentioned during an interview, but was deliberately removed and replaced by X to protect identities so as to avoid creating tensions between shareholders.

32 This interview was conducted at Bambanani Fruits from 14-18 October 2010.
Meetings are probably a suitable channel through which agency can be exercised because that is where issues are discussed and decisions are taken. The majority of the beneficiaries I interviewed informed that they did not remember the last time they had a shareholders’ meeting. They further stated that they hold meetings once in a while and they are report based, with little focus on discussing burning issues. The common response from interviews was that these meetings are mostly about business updates and financial reports.

With regard to agency especially the decision-making part where the farm’s management sometimes make unilateral decisions, the responses demonstrated common grief amongst beneficiaries regardless of which ‘faction’ they belong to. This is something which epitomize what I label ‘collective discontent spectacle’.

Based on these responses, my observation of people’s attitude during the interviews and the content of the farms legal documents, I conclude that the level of agency of Bambanani Fruits LRAD beneficiaries should be understood in two ways; between LRAD beneficiaries and the farm’s management, and between LRAD beneficiaries themselves. According to Kabeer (1999:438), agency encompasses both positive and negative meanings in relation to the exercise of power. A positive meaning of agency concerns the notion of the ‘power to’, a concept referring to people’s capacity to define their own life choices and pursue their own goals regardless of opposition from others. On the other hand, agency can be exercised in a negative manner; reflecting elements of the notion of ‘power over’, a scenario in which an actor or a group of actors overrides the agency of others through the use of violence, coercion, and threat amongst other techniques (Ibid.).

Although many beneficiaries of Bambanani had many complaints, they expressed fear to directly challenge and question some of the processes taking place on the farm because they might lose their jobs. Considering the lack of participation and restrictions in decision-making as displayed by the above responses, one can argue that Bambanani beneficiaries have not acquired the ‘power to’ aspect of agency that Kabeer (1999) talks about. Even those who claimed to be participating in decision-making processes did not display evidence of freely making their own choices but seemed to succumb to the pressures by the farm’s management. This is something which ordinary beneficiaries attribute to the weakness of the Trust in challenging unequal power relations on the farm. Power is still unevenly distributed.

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33 This implies that the responses of LRAD beneficiaries commonly displayed dissatisfaction about the outcomes of the sub-programme. On the other hand, the application of intersectionality approach of race, gender and class has alluded to different levels of privileges and disadvantage.
on the farm, with management having unlimited power to even take unilateral decisions without any significant opposition from beneficiaries.

- **Achievements**

According to Kabeer (1999), achievement is about the outcomes which reflect change in the social status of beneficiaries of the empowerment project. An area of achievement which was evident amongst Bambanani LRAD beneficiaries as indicated by interview responses is job security. The acquisition of LRAD equity shares has enabled these beneficiaries to secure permanent employment on the farm. As one respondent puts it “shares helped us in terms of jobs – now there is a change because we are in permanent employment”.

As suggested by Kabeer (1999), empowerment ought to display evidence of ‘egalitarian gender roles’ and this has proven to be the case at Bambanani. All women respondents informed that they are treated equally as their male counter parts and that people’s roles on the farm are not determined by gender. They argued that any person regardless of their gender is allowed to perform any task. However, one has discovered that there are jobs which are still dominated by men such as driving, technical roles and heavy duties such as the offloading of heavy boxes. I discovered that women at Bambanani choose not to perform these duties out of their free will because they believe such roles are suitable for men. One female respondent argued that, “men perform all difficult duties; they carry heavy stuff and women do the packing. Everyone does the kind of work that is suitable for him or her” (Interview, 2010).

To a greater extent, the overall achievement indicator on Bambanani beneficiaries has been disappointing. This has been accompanied by a series of broken promises of empowerment. For example, it was revealed during the interviews that on acquisition of equity shares, beneficiaries were promised houses by the farm’s management as part of the shareholding package. The management promised to deliver these houses before 2010 but this has not materialised. As Table 2 in the first chapter indicates, an overwhelming majority of the beneficiaries interviewed are living in shacks, some in RDP houses, and only a few reported owning decent houses. The management’s failure to deliver houses and the lack of
improvement in the standard of living is another area which displayed a high level of a ‘collective discontent spectacle’ amongst Bambanani LRAD beneficiaries.

Moreover, dissatisfaction was also rife around the issue of dividends. Beneficiaries have not received any financial rewards except their wages, something considered frustrating by many. One responded said, “We are working for whites; we don’t see any money”. On the other hand, Trust members remained optimistic that the current financial stress will get better. According to respondents, they were told that they will receive dividends after a ten year period which ends in 2016. Therefore, one can safely state that the social statuses of Bambanani LRAD beneficiaries may remain unchanged until such time dividends are issued out, depending on their quantity.

The issue of recognition has been highlighted as a problem by one of Bambanani beneficiaries who said he has been given a position of an assistant farm manager. This position involves interacting with various suppliers and other stakeholders within the agricultural fraternity. He informed that about the difficulty to get recognition amongst fellow white peers in the agricultural sector. He further stated that;

“As a black assistant manager it’s still difficult because you don’t get recognition, people out there still believe that management position are for whites. You only get treated better by people in the agri-business when you are with a white person; it’s difficult to engage them alone as a black person”.

Although the Bambanani case study has displayed many pressing challenges with regard to the empowerment of individual beneficiaries, this project is by far one of the land reform success stories in Gauteng because of its high level of productivity and successful agribusiness venture. Throughout South Africa, a common challenge facing newly transferred projects has been unproductiveness and lack or low market penetration by those projects that are able to produce. Acknowledging poor post-settlement support as one of the determining factors, Pasha also cited lack of enthusiasm by beneficiaries as one of major causes for unproductive projects (Interview, 2010). Pasha (2010) stated that, “We buy land for them and they sit down and relax”.

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34 Mr. Paul Pasha is a project coordinator working with LRAD at the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, Gauteng Province.
5.3 Conclusion

The above findings confirm that LRAD had its limitations in its role to redress the past injustices and inequalities in ownership and control of agrarian land in South Africa. Although there has been an increase in the amount of land transferred under LRAD compared to SLAG, the sub-programme has retained some of delivery patterns seen under SLAG. These include transferring of large group projects. Even though this might be the case, it is imperative to acknowledge that LRAD operated within a constraining environment set up by the market. Land prices remained determined by the market, and the government did not allocate required funds to purchase enough land for the people.

Similar to the SLAG programme which was criticised for gender bias, LRAD did not manage to achieve gender balance in the transfer of land. However, at Bambanani gender did not seem to be an issue but race and class was. Despite the acquisition of equity shares by Bambanani beneficiaries, power relations have not change on the farm. The elements of worker-employee relationship are still more evident.

The market fundamentalist stance on agrarian reform has been successful in terms of preserving large-scale commercial farming, and food security in the country. Nonetheless, it has failed to redistribute according to official targets. Arguably, this may be attributed amongst other reasons to government’s inability or failure to find a way of balancing between the interests of the landless and those of large-scale commercial farmers. A lobby by land owners remain strong and their interests are still protected as they have found favour from a politically connected black neo-liberal force which stands to benefit from the current setup through BEE arrangements (Ibid.).

In the current context, the radical redress of racial disparities in ownership and control of agrarian land has a potential to culminate to the disruption of the established large-scale commercial farming in the country. However, large-scale commercial farming as it stands is problematic because of its racial composition. A depressing reality is that seventeen years into democracy, the ownership and control patterns of land is still defined by race as it was in the past.

Very few hectares of land were redistributed under SLAG. Although land officials tend to praise LRAD for managing to redistribute more land than SLAG, available statistics shows
that LRAD is far from redressing racial disparities in land ownership and control considering the number of hectares redistributed and the failure to create large number of individual projects.

In the case of Bambanani, an indication of a good pre-settlement support in a form of LRAD funding for the acquisition of shares is evident. However, Kabeer argues that resources as an empowerment indicator should transcend material boundaries to incorporate human and social resources. Human resources should entail training and skills development programmes to enable beneficiaries to utilize their material resource (land or shares) effectively. At Bambanani, I discovered that although there has been training and skills development programmes for LRAD beneficiaries, such training was limited to technical skills such as driving of Forklift, pruning of fruit trees, first aid, fire fighting and supervision. This does not involve training in finance, economics and management of agriculture.
6.1 Introduction

The LRAD sub-programme like any other programme before it has reached its life span, and this study came at the right time to evaluate its progress. This chapter lays out concluding remarks of this research project and summarises the core arguments raised. Based on the findings presented in chapter 5, this chapter answers the research questions raised in chapter 1 and validates the hypothesis.

6.2 Discussions

Empowerment encompasses multifaceted aspects as suggested by Kabeer’s model. Physical transfer of land and other reform initiatives such as equity share scheme projects alone bare no adequate evidence or substance to empowerment. The lessons from the Bambanani case study demonstrate the significance of the need for beneficiaries to be fully acquainted with the empowerment project in order for them to be able to exercise their rights with regard to decision-making and other aspects regarding agency. The majority of the beneficiaries interviewed revealed that the only information concerning how LRAD equity shares work was given by the farm’s management. This might have been dangerous in terms of empowerment as it would have exposed them to vulnerability for manipulation. According to LRAD guidelines, local officials should assist potential beneficiaries during the land application stage through information workshops, project planning, etc. However, this was not the case at Bambanani.

Taking into account the discussions and arguments raised in this paper, it is apparent that one of the reasons behind the introduction of LRAD was to ensure that transferred land is used productively, hence resolving the problem of unproductive projects witnessed under SLAG. The aim was to give land to qualified individuals or groups who would be able to work the land.

The land reform literature upholds an idea that ownership of land by PDI’s would facilitate their economic independence, tenure security, and improve their social status. This has been entirely true in other parts of the world where land reform has taken place. This paper has
shown that in the South African context this theory is valid to a certain extent as the country’s experiences with land reform has over the years proven that the transfer of land alone is not adequate to fulfilling the above objectives. Indications have pointed out to a need for a comprehensive post-settlement support strategy in a form of financial resources and other relevant support systems. These challenges have been viewed as a consequence of the ‘willing-buyer, willing-seller’ land reform approach and the neo-liberal fashioned redistributive measures informing the South African agrarian reform process.

The shift from household to individual redistribution approach has afforded women and youth (and some men who might have been marginalised under SLAG as a result of an ambiguous gender policy approach) independent access to land, a change which applauded by many land movements. A further observation was that, LRAD is also inclusive of all previously disadvantage individuals (PDI’s) in a sense that it also covers those who were excluded by SLAG since they fell outside the monthly income range of below R1500.

However, critics have also lambasted the shift from a pro-poor grant mechanism witnessed under SLAG to a more economic driven funding approach which required applicants to contribute R5000 to access a minimum grant of R20 000. This paper argues that, although there has been an increase in LRAD’s minimum grant amount to R40 000, the terms to access the grant remained demanding and unaffordable to poor applicants. This yields to the eruption of class conflict and create a scenario where the poor and the rich compete for limited resources (Hall, 2004:217).

The intersectionality approach has enabled this paper to capture the essence of the interlinked nature of inequalities which cut across race, gender and class. The theory gives a broader spectacle of inequalities in resource distribution in transforming societies. The application of intersectionality approach has displayed how race, gender and class amongst other social dimensions are inherently intact, and how the connection between them determines one’s level of empowerment.

The Bambanani case study demonstrates that South Africa’s land reform process is far from redressing racial disparities in land ownership and control. Instead, the programme propagates past inequalities. It also promotes the eruption of ‘new inequalities’ amongst land beneficiaries.
The paper also discussed the role of BEE in South Africa’s land reform process by making reference to AgriBEE and LRAD Equity Scheme. These two initiatives are argued in this paper as displaying some of the failures and empowerment limitations of BEE as witnessed in other sectors.

A proactive land reform process in South Africa is hindered by various institutional impediments and the redistribution order which seems to follow similar patterns despite changes in delivery modes or mechanisms. LRAD presented a more neoliberal policy outlook to agrarian reform, marking a radical shift from what was then viewed as a pro-poor funding model under SLAG. I argued that, even though LRAD has set new principles and targets, the rules of the reform process have remained the same. For instance, the ‘willing-buyer, willing-seller’ approach, budgetary constraints, the dominant role of land owners in land negotiation processes, and the exorbitant prices of land still hinders progress in land reform. LRAD faced the very same challenges as SLAG, but provided no guidelines to overcome them.

6.3 Responses to the research questions

6.3.1 Focal research question

In terms of agrarian land ownership, racial inequalities between blacks and whites are still evident. Large hectares of arable land remain under white minority control, with many landless blacks still awaiting land through government processes. Many land reform beneficiaries are crowded in smaller pieces of land which is sometime of poor quality. The majority of these beneficiaries are unable to use the land productively because of lack or poor post-settlement assistance. Racial inequality is evident in power relations between those white farmers and land beneficiaries who have partnered in equity scheme projects. According to Keaditse, a project officer at Gauteng’s provincial Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR), equity scheme beneficiaries have remained merely employees despite government’s efforts to make them co-owners of these projects (Interview, 2010).

Although the Bambanani case study did not show instances of gender disparities, other studies and official records indicates that there are few women who own land compared to men. This has been a major concern of those advocating for women’s land rights in South Africa and elsewhere (See Walker, 2003; 2005). Class inequalities in land ownership and control are also still evident to some extent. The landless is poor and LRAD redistribution records prove that these people are unable to exploit the opportunity to access land
individually because of their economic background. As a result, they are forced to engage in group projects hence their level of exercising choice is curtailed. Kabeer (1999:437) asserts that, “…choice necessarily implies the possibility of alternatives, the ability to have chosen otherwise”.

6.3.2 Sub-questions

i. At Bambanani, the paper identified a stronger intersection between race and class, while a gender connection was found to be weaker. This paper argues that power relations at Bambanani are still unevenly distributed along racial and class lines. For example, whites are still dominating the share value and decision-making processes. Inequalities in power relations were also identified between ordinary beneficiaries and Trust members.

Land redistribution records display a strong evidence of intersection of race, gender and class in ownership and control of land. The argument raised is that, LRAD did not transform property relations; instead, it has perpetuated the very same problem of unequal land ownership patterns.

ii. Although there might be a lack of a significant change in the social status and bargaining power of Bambanani beneficiaries as this paper argues, there is also a need to acknowledge the few changes which came as a result of acquiring equity shares.

iii. As noted in Chapter 5, the resources offered by LRAD to its beneficiaries at Bambanani include a grant to purchase equity share, skills training and job security. The major issue that Bambanani beneficiaries complained about was the lack of post-transfer support from government.

iv. There are two trends in the implementation process of LRAD identified in this paper i.e. the continuation of group projects and the establishment of Family Trusts. Both these trends were prevalent under SLAG and were viewed as problematic by many critics. However, group projects under LRAD are of a different nature. For example, group projects under LRAD are much smaller than those seen under SLAG. They are smaller in a sense that they have been individualized. Under SLAG a household with
numerous dependents would only qualify for a grant of R16000 and were forced to combine their grant with other households to make up the land purchasing price. Contrary to this, individuals under LRAD choose to combine their grants with any individual(s). In this way there is a space for applicants to exercise individual choice under LRAD compared to SLAG.

As emphasized by Kabeer (1999), an ability to choose freely is a crucial element of empowerment. Arguably, under SLAG choice was limited. Households were under financial strain as the grants were far lesser to cover the high land prices; hence they were forced to group with other households. Furthermore, there was also monopoly over this limited choice as those who headed households are said to have been primary and sometimes sole decision makers within their respective households. Therefore, the exercise of choice by household members was marginal.

**6.4 Testing the hypothesis**

The provincial and national evidence proves the hypothesis made at the beginning of this paper valid. The land redistribution records show a linkage between race, gender and class. Some people are still unable to access land on individual basis as a result of financial constraints. This undermines LRAD’s principle of individual empowerment and creates inequalities between beneficiaries.

**6.5 Recommendations for future studies**

A nationwide study of this nature is essential to produce findings that are more representative of the country’s agrarian reform experiences. This will enable a comparative study of various cases to be made. Furthermore, the application of the intersectionality approach would be necessary in looking at the impact of land repossessions on livelihoods of different social groups.

**6.6 Conclusion**

South Africa’s land question remains unanswered because various government interventions have failed to speak to the fundamental policy and structural issues concerning the
transformation of past inequalities in the agrarian sector. The major factor which has received extensive criticism is the market-led land reform process under the ‘willing-buyer, willing-seller’ approach. According to Hall (2004:222), the “willing-buyer, willing-seller” approach is a product of the balance of forces aimed at favouring a gradual deracialisation of the agrarian sector without necessarily restructuring unequal property relations. LRAD also failed to provide tools to deal with impediments that are hampering significant progress in the land reform process.

This paper concludes that, LRAD has done little to tackle racial, gender and class disparities in ownership and control of agrarian land in the post-apartheid South African society. The above findings demonstrate how extensive is the enduring prevalence of racial inequalities, marginal position of women, and the class effect in ownership and control of agrarian land in the country. As a result, the empowerment of beneficiaries has been compromised as these impediments tempers with the very nature of individual choice making process. Keaditse (2010, unpublished paper), spoke about the notion of ‘forced marriage’ between beneficiaries. This on its own explains that even though LRAD has embraced the significance of individual choice by allowing individual applicants to decide on the nature of their projects and members to partner with; this choice is constrained by stringent economic barriers. Having looked at the case of Bambanani, Gauteng provincial land reform records, government reports and existing literature on land reform in general, and LRAD in particular, I argue that LRAD has failed to fulfil the empowerment requirements outlined by Kabeer’s model.
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Pasha, Paul. (Project coordinator specializing on LRAD), Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, Gauteng Province.

(Conducted on 14 October 2010 at Bambanani Fruits premises with LRAD beneficiaries)

Khubeka Jane
Mokoena Evelyn Nthabiseng
Phari Martha

(Conducted on 18 October 2010 at Bambanani Fruits premises with LRAD beneficiaries)

Biditsi Lydia
Boditsi Shadrack
Hewu Nophilayini Victoria
Mahlomane Maria Dora
Mazenze Buyiswa Betty
Mazenze Meshack
Mokalanyane Elsie
Mphoiphoi Ditaba Koos
Nketsi Pulane Angelina
Phadi Rebecca
Rammile Pappie Gregory
Ranja Mirriam
Rathabe Morris Serame
Serite Johanna
Suping Annah
Tsoeleamakoa Alpheus Tshepo

(Conducted on 19 October 2010 at Bambanani Fruits premises with LRAD beneficiaries)
Phadi Onica
Phadi Sinah Morake
Sapho Promise
Sauli Maphoka
Solomon Screeninger Badanile
APPENDICES

Figure 1: ‘Empowerment illustration diagram’, in Rowlands (1997)

Table 1: ‘Land grants and own contribution’, in DLA and DoA (2000)

Table 2: ‘Profile of LRAD beneficiaries of Bambanani’, in Bambanani Fruits beneficiaries list