PLANNING FOR EX-COMBATANTS’ REINTEGRATION IN A POST-CONFLICT SOCIETY: LESSONS LEARNT FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES FOR KIVU IN THE DEMOCRATIQUE REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Charles GIMBA MAGHA-A-NGIMBA

A research report submitted to the Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment, The University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Development Planning.

Johannesburg, 2010
DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Master of Science in Development Planning at the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.

(Signature of candidate)

November 4\textsuperscript{th}, 2010
ABSTRACT

This study seeks to critically assess an alternative approach to reintegrating ex-combatants into the Local Economic Development (LED) process, using the experiences of other African countries. It also offers practitioners guidance on how planners might successfully address the challenges of reintegration within the context of a Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes. The study unpacks the role of Public Works Projects in a post-war torn society for this purpose. The strength of Public Works Projects in a post-conflict society lies on the fact that these projects aim to provide rapid and visible relief for the reintegration of ex-combatants and/or other socially marginalised people into civil society. Public Works Projects build the capacity of communities for development, keeping the marginalised members productive and self-reliant in the new society in which they find themselves.

Using the case study of Kivu in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), this study is premised on the assumption that the planning of the reintegration of Kivu’s ex-combatants needs to focus on the an overall systems framework, whereby all the segments play a crucial and equal role and where all the issues of LED through Public Works Projects are regarded as dynamic and treated as interconnected. Experience from Sub-Saharan African countries show that the reintegration of ex-combatants is a means towards sustainable peace and LED enhancement in a post-conflict society since it allows external and national partners to invest, through Public Works Projects, in rebuilding developmental infrastructure in a post-conflict society. Planning for the reintegration of ex-combatants in a society, therefore, assumed a multifaceted approach. Within the context of this research, this new form of planning for the economic reintegration of ex-combatants has the potential of lasting longer and requiring more funding than the ex-combatants’ reintegration programme as it exists currently in Kivu. It urgently needs more dedicated resources in the form of Public Works Projects to prevent a relapse of conflict. The reintegration of ex-combatants in Kivu (DRC) confirms the fragile and complex nature of the DDR programme and speaks of the need to reassess the role of Public Works Projects in post-conflict reconstruction.
Field visits, extensive readings on Kivu and interviews with conflict analysts and residents of the DRC’s conflict-tensed regions have revealed that Kivu will not improve without a holistic approach to LED planning through Public Works Projects and systemic thinking. Planning for the reintegration of ex-combatants in Kivu’s post-war torn society will, therefore, have some priorities, that is: a reintegration program drawn from the experiences of other post-conflict countries as well as a good understanding of local and international policies and the involvement of Public Works Projects. These priorities will re-orientate the existing theoretical and methodological processes of planning for the reintegration of ex-combatants in a post-conflict-society. Based on the analysis of Kivu’s recent reintegration programme, and following the readings of the shortcomings of United Nations Organization in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), soon to be United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) as of 1st July 2010, and the National Commission for Disarmament and Reintegration (CONADER), in this study a good understanding of local and international policies and the involvement of Public Works Projects will serve as recommendations for prospective African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations.

Charles GIMBA MAGHA-A-NGIMBA

gimbamagha@yahoo.fr
AKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Aly Karam for his guidance throughout this year and also aiding me to learn from myself.

I would like to thank Professor Robert McCutcheon for sponsoring this research and Dr. Anne Fitchett for her continuous support and encouragement.

I am grateful to all the Sisters of Charity of Jesus and Mary, without their additional assistance, much of this study would not have been possible.

Most of all, I am extremely thankful to my family, who have provided much of the emotional and financial resources that have enabled me to complete this study.

I have also valued the advice and support of my friends during this year.

I am indebted to all of these people for empowering me to pursue my dreams.

Charles GIMBA- A- NGIMBA
## Contents

*DECLARATION* ....................................................................................................................................... *i*

*ABSTRACT* .............................................................................................................................................. *ii*

*AKNOWLEDGMENTS* ................................................................................................................................. *iv*

*ACRONYMS* ........................................................................................................................................... *xi*

*CHAPTER 1: POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND EX-COMBATANTS’ REINTEGRATION* .............. *1*

1.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. *1*

1.2. Context of the Study: Kivu, DRC ............................................................................................................... *2*

1.3. Problem Statement .................................................................................................................................. *3*

1.4. Research Question ................................................................................................................................... *5*

1.5. Research Method ...................................................................................................................................... *6*

1.6. Rationale of the Study .............................................................................................................................. *7*

1.7. Research Framework .............................................................................................................................. *9*

1.8. The Structure of the Research ................................................................................................................ *10*

*CHAPTER 2: POST-CONFLICT SOCIETY’S REVIEW* ............................................................................. *11*

2.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. *11*

2.2. The Understanding of the Meaning of an Ex-combatant ........................................................................ *12*

2.2.1. The Demilitarization of Ex-combatants ................................................................................................. *13*

2.2.2. Challenges Faced by Ex-combatants in a Post-war Society ................................................................. *13*

2.2.3. Lack of Skills .......................................................................................................................................... *14*

2.2.4. Unemployment ...................................................................................................................................... *14*

2.2.5. The Reintegration of Ex-combatants .................................................................................................... *15*

2.2.6. Different Types of Reintegration ........................................................................................................ *17*

2.3. Skills Development in a Post-conflict Society ....................................................................................... *18*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.4. Reintegration through Employment Generation</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5. Public Works and Local Economic Development Projects</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5. 1. Public Works Projects as a Local Economic Development Engine</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6. Conclusion</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3:</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A POST-CONFLICT SOCIETY</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1. Introduction</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2. Local Economic Development</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1. Local Economic Development Framework</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.2. Various LED Approaches</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.3. Principles Associated with Local Economic Development</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.4. Successful Local Economic Development Strategies</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.5. Planning of Local Economic Development in Post-conflict Society and the Need for a Decentralisation System</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.6. Towards Local Economic Development in a Post-conflict Society</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3. Public and Private Partnership in Mega-projects</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4. Assessment of Post-conflict Review</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4. Conclusion</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4:</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EX-COMBATANTS’ ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1. Introduction</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2. Analysis of Ex-combatants’ Economic Reintegration</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.1. Training and Skills Development</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.2. Private Sector and Business Development Services</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.3. Employment in Existing Businesses</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.4. Micro-enterprise and Small Business Start-ups</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# 5.7. Conclusion

CHAPTER 6: ................................................................. 77

**A WAY INTO THE FUTURE** ......................................................... 77

6.1. Introduction....................................................................... 77

6.2. Ex-combatants’ Reintegration: A Planning Issue ..................... 77

6.3. Decentralisation: A Path towards Kivu’s Sustainable Local Economic Development .......... 78


6.5. Reintegration: A Local and National Issue .................................. 80

6.6. Kivu’s Reintegration: A Learning Experience ................................ 81


**BIBLIOGRAPHY** ........................................................................... 85
FIGURES

FIGURE 1: THE DRC MAP ................................. 2
FIGURE 2: ILLUSTRATIVE COMPONENTS OF LOCAL ECONOMIC STRATEGY .................. 29
FIGURE 3: MODEL OF DECENTRALISATION FOR A SUCCESSFUL LED ...................... 31
FIGURE 4: ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION OPTION FOR EX-COMBATANTS .................. 50
FIGURE 5: THE KIVU MAP, SHOWING NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AND PROVINCES ........ 59
TABLES

TABLE 1: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PRACTICAL AND MORE THEORETICAL DEFINITION OF REINTEGRATION .............................................................. 16
TABLE 2: DIFFERENT TYPES OF REINTEGRATION ......................................................... 18
# ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFDL</td>
<td>Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEAU</td>
<td>Department for Planning and Urbanism (Bureau d’Etude et d’Amenagement Urbain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDS</td>
<td>Business Development Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPGL</td>
<td>Great Lakes Economic Community (Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGAP</td>
<td>Consultative Group for Assistance to the Poorest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDP</td>
<td>National Congress for the Defence of the People (Congrès National pour la Défence du Peuple)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONADER</td>
<td>National Commission for Disarmament and Reintegration (Commission Nationale pour le Désarmement et la Réintegração)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Agriculture Organization Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Society for Technical Cooperation (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit German)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INICA</td>
<td>Initiative pour l’Afrique Centrale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute of Security Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LARES</td>
<td>Laboratoire d'Analyse Régionale et d'Expertise Sociale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LED</td>
<td>Local Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDTF</td>
<td>Multi Donor Trust Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCDDR</td>
<td>National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non Government Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGOs</td>
<td>International non Government Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCNA</td>
<td>Post-conflict Needs Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public and Private Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>Congolese Rally for Democracy (Rassamblment Congolais pour la Démocratie)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMEs</td>
<td>Small and Medium Enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security sector reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCDF</td>
<td>United Nations Capital Developments Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDESA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Development and Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PLANNING FOR EX-COMBATANTS’ REINTEGRATION IN A POST-CONFLICT SOCIETY: LESSONS LEARNT FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES FOR KIVU IN THE DEMOCRATIQUE REPUBLIC OF CONGO

UNDP
United Nations Development Fund

UNHCR
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF
United Nations Children’s Fund

USAID
United States Agency for International Development
CHAPTER 1:
POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND EX-COMBATANTS’ REINTEGRATION

1.1. Introduction

Several Sub-Saharan African countries have made major strides in institutionalising the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants. This remarkable turnaround has provided a glimmer of hope and created opportunities for not only sustainable peace, but also the enhancement of the Local Economic Development. However, the management of the DDR of ex-combatants remains a very complex process due to the lack of a standardized DDR method to be applied to all countries (Kingma, 1997). To address this challenge, post-conflict countries have used Public Works Projects as a post-conflict developmental framework which enables a rapid and balanced reconstruction of a post-conflict economy (Colletta et al, 1996). This research flashes light to the challenges surrounding the reintegration programme as it occurred in the Kivu. Acknowledging the difference and variation in the shaping of the reintegration framework, as each case of DDR involves a distinct political, social and economic context, both post-conflict states and international agencies agree upon the fact that the success of the reintegration programmes relies on the framing of a strategic planning for the post-conflict local economic development through Public Works Projects (GTZ. 2005).
1.2. Context of the Study: Kivu, DRC

Figure 1: The DRC map

Source: www.flickr.com/photos/pietclement/

This study looks at Kivu province in the Eastern quadrant of the DRC. The Great Kivu Region is divided into three provinces namely: North-Kivu, South-Kivu and Maniema which are the power houses for agriculture and mineral resources (Stewart and Fitzgerald, 2001). Many devastating conflicts, having been launched from neighboring countries, have persisted for over 15 years. It is important to note that the outbreak of conflicts in Kivu has led to the disruption and destruction of much of the physical infrastructure in the province as well as
the decline of social and human capital in a way that is too complex to quantify (Colletta, 1997). Armed conflict in Kivu is the root of recurrent presence of ex-combatants into the province, and is unquestionably seen as one of the main causes, among several, of why millions of people in the DRC are living in poverty (Stewart and Fitzgerald, 2001; Speaker, 2008). The region holds the record for the most conflicts and has incurred the most casualties of all the post-cold war conflicts in the DRC with an estimated 150,000 ex-combatants, of whom 33,000 were estimated to be under 18 years old of age (Speaker, 2008). In the 2003, a peace agreement in which all warring parties took part aimed at achieving national unity and the reintegration of ex-combatants. Since, the country has embarked on a post-conflict reconstruction programme based on key priorities namely: infrastructure, economy recovery, ex-combatants’ reintegration and community reconciliation.

1.3. Problem Statement

Despite the existence of an internationally agreed upon legal framework towards DDR programmes, there are formidable challenges in designing and implementing DDR processes that successfully address the specific needs of ex-combatants in post-conflict peace-building situations. There has been significant progress in the second half of the twentieth century in stabiling norms and standards for DDR as part of peace building. Yet, despite of the significant progress made in establishing the norms and standards, there remain shortcomings in the actual practice of implementing DDR of ex-combatants so that there is a positive impact on the ground for achieving sustainable development (Colletta et al., 1996; Anderlini and Pampell Conaway, 2004). For instance, despite the appeals found in the UN report, the reality is that the needs of ex-combatants are often not addressed in the initial DDR process (Boutros-Ghali, 1994; 1995). The reality is that the needs of ex-combatants are often not addressed in the initial DDR process, leaving them vulnerable. It is argued that ex-combatants often find the return to civilian life difficult. As Anderlini and Pampell Conaway (2004) remark economic reintegration blind or insensitive exacerbates the difficulties encountered by ex-combatants in this transition. There is also justified concern that even when ex-combatants participate or are included in formal reintegration planning, their role can be limited to a formal presence without having the capacity, or mandate to contribute to setting or shaping the agenda of such planning. Hence, there is still much work to do to make
ex-combatants’ economic reintegration a reality. To leave ex-combatants out of reintegration programmes is not only a violation of their right to participate but also undermines the objectives of the DDR programme. The reintegration of ex-combatants is critical towards achieving their human development security and a steady job recovery process as part of post-conflict local economic development (Colletta et al., 1996).

The most important functions of DDR is arguably the provision of training and support for ex-combatants to help them understand the way their society has changed as a result of conflict and how they might reintegrate into post-conflict social, economic and political structures (Ibid). In contemporary DDR, it is important to emphasise on ex-combatants as war affected persons, social agents of change, and beneficiaries of assistance. In Kivu, ex-combatants were active agents in armed conflict either as combatants or as service providers (Anderlini and Pampell Conaway 2004). The efforts to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate ex-combatants in Kivu have not succeeded. The reintegration programme in the DRC highlighted that although the DDR programme took place in Kivu, some 10,000 ex-combatants are still waiting to be reintegrated and their rights are overlooked, despite their involvement in armed groups and ostensible consideration in the text of the Lusaka and Pretoria Accords. Kivu’s reintegration programme was poorly planned and framed due to a continuous flow of cheap small arms into the region. As Takhur (2008) explains, the most significant challenges of a weak and non strategic reintegration programmes in Kivu lie in ex-combatants frequently posing a danger to post-war security; the atrocities committed by ex-combatants lead to severe tensions with civilians who have suffered at their hands. Furthermore certain groups of weak and marginalized ex-combatants need special assistance for humanitarian reasons -This was evident in Kivu where DDR programmes traditionally operated with the narrow objective to disarm ex-combatants with guns. It generally failed to account for the fact that reintegration is a long-term economic recovery process, therefore a way towards a sustainable local economic development (Oxfam, 2008).

In its initial phases, the Kivu’s DDR programmes had a one-combatant, one-gun and $ US 100 eligibility policy; every ex-combatant with a weapon was invited to turn it in, in order to participate in the process and earn $ US 100. Hence, the UN’s definition of combatant excluded those who did not have weapons to turn in such as: the ex-combatants who had
served in the armed factions as nurses, cooks and sex workers or slaves. Thus, Kivu’s DDR programme has failed to incorporate an economic perspective based on the post-conflict’s economy recovery as the programmes relied on one-combatant, one-gun theories and conceptualizations of the war-to-peace transition (Takhur, 2008). This has had significant implications on ex-combatants’ lives in post-conflict societies in general. Considering the position of ex-combatants in the post-conflict, Chigunta (2006) asserts:

Given that ex-combatants face challenges such as social exclusion, lack of skills, unemployment, diseases, amputation, etc which particularly victimised them during the post-conflict reconstruction, special attention shall be accorded to their needs and potential in formulating and implementing national rehabilitation, reconstruction and development programmes, to enable them to play a central role in the moral, social and physical reconstruction of the local economy recovery. Accordingly, the problem is that despite the good intention of MONUSCO/MONUC and CONADER to implement DDR programmes in Kivu, the planning of DDR programmes aimed at ex-combatants was weak, not strategic and ended up overlooking ex-combatants’ economic recovery. Hence this research can argue that one reason for this was that the aim of DDR was to achieve political stability and security (Takhur, 2008) and this is why there was a gap. In Kivu, it was found that the exclusion of economic perspective from the DDR programmes was due to the implementation and development of weak reintegration planning, which was not strategic which failed to include local developmental projects as a way towards a sustainable local economic development (ISS, 2007).

1.4. Research Question

From the previous discussion, one can see that the main problem is that the Kivu’s reintegration programmes formulated were weak, not very strategic and failed to include the economic perspective of the post-conflict society. The main question that is asked in this research therefore is:

What other courses of action can be taken to have a strong and reliable reintegration programme for Kivu province?
To engage fully with the task at hand, some subsidiary questions will be posed and there are formulated as follows:

- How can re-skilling/training be used through Public Works Programmes to integrate ex-combatants and boost LED in the Kivu?
- How can the reintegration programme be strengthened and made more strategic for the purpose of LED?
- How can micro-enterprises be used towards ex-combatants’ economic reintegration?
- What is the successful vehicle for carrying out what is needed?

1.5. Research Method

This research is a case study based on empirical method. The empirical method gauges selected lessons learned from the review of relevant publications and articles on reintegration programmes. This analysis is based on a literature review of secondary sources covering the subject areas of reintegration programmes. In addition, internet research was used to gather specific information on AU, UN, INGO, NGOs initiatives and working papers, evaluations and policy documents. The study utilized the qualitative case study method. Comprehensive desk secondary data research on the reintegrat ion of ex-combatants in the Kivu was carried out.

Given the breadth of the literature, the study focuses on that which is most relevant to the current discussion. The diversity of sources enables a more comprehensive grasp of the link between reintegration programmes, Public Works Projects and LED. Much of this literature is qualitatively focused, although there is some information about the numbers of ex-combatants who have participated in the reintegration programme. This literature was helpful to determine the history and evolution of ex-combatants’ reintegration. Evidence about the number of ex-combatants in Kivu was sought from the qualitative information. This is important because of the literary wealth of information that already exists about DDR as well as a lack of access to primary materials in the researcher’s present location as regards DDR will provide sufficiently for this aim.
1.6. Rationale of the Study

This study offers practitioners guidance on how planners might successfully address the challenges of reintegration within the context of a DDR programme. Looking at state owned CONADER and external partners MONUC/MONUSCO, NGOs and INGOs to address the re-integration process for the purpose of LED will shed light on how government and external sector partnership in Public Works Projects can play a role in the DDR process. This piece of work also intends to explore the reintegration process as a socio-economic problem involving the participation of the whole community in the Kivu. In addition, it strives to report on how CONADER, MONUC/MONUSCO, NGOs and INGOs may effectively address the reintegration process which aims to afford Kivu’s ex-combatants skills and marketable opportunities for the reconstruction of their households, livelihoods and also assist local economic development (Watson, 2009).

Reintegration is both a social and economic process with an open time frame (Hillier and Healey, 2008). The main components of reintegration programmes often include: the formulation of national policy; support to regional implementation agencies; local level emergency aid; socio-economic profiling; transport to selected resettlement regions; discharge payments; reinsertion packages, reconstruction projects, vocational training and employment promotion (Kotzé and Hussein, 2008). The extent of local private sector involvement in each of these components can vary considerably according to local post-conflict capacities. Nonetheless, reconstruction projects, employment promotion, vocational training and poverty alleviation are the areas which usually witness the greatest level of private sector participation.

The dominant approach to reintegration is that of a ‘continuum’ of interventions, moving from emergency relief activities to reconstruction and ultimately to development (Kotzé and Hussein, 2008). Reintegration programmes are often implemented through large-scale cooperation among donor agencies, national and international non-government organisations and host governments (Colletta et al., 1996). Colletta (1996) points out that cooperation may be organised through Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals by the United Nations and/or through initiatives under the Post-Conflict Fund of the World Bank. For her, resources from a
wide array of donors may be pooled and the specific technical expertise of organisations such as UNHCR, ILO and GTZ may be co-ordinated under the umbrella of national programmes (Ibid). Experience in several settings has led to the emergence of best practices for conflict-sensitive approaches to reintegration. These include: Tailoring interventions in response to the detailed socio-economic needs assessments of ex-combatants and receiving communities; Building upon the existing self-help livelihood strategies of local communities; Building participation, transparency and accountability in the design, implementation and evaluation of programmes; Building capacity of government to assume long-term responsibility of LED processes (Kotzé and Hussein, 2008).

Economic reintegration comes jointly with LED strategy’s which emphasises links between community needs for infrastructure rehabilitation and employment promotion for ex-combatants, referral services for employment opportunities, access to micro-enterprise support schemes, building a consensus around development issues, restoring basic services in areas such as health, education and housing, and reactivating the local economy (Hillier and Healey, 2008). The provision for the basic needs of ex-combatants is vital in terms of poverty alleviation and LED. If the basic needs of ex-combatants are provided for, they will be more productive and economic growth will be stimulated. Economic reintegration is a strategy to fight for the plight of ex-combatants and reduce unemployment directly but it also has other indirect benefits for human development on a local level (Kotzé and Hussein, 2008). Reintegration programmes include the creation of jobs by attracting new business; achieve local economic stability and a diverse economy.

At this stage, the relationship between reintegration and planning is identified. The reintegration approach aims at employment creation and income generation through an optimal use of human (ex-combatants) and other resources in a determined geographical economic area. Ex-combatants traditionally excluded from economic development processes are given the opportunity to participate in the planning and the design of interventions through economic reintegration. This involved the establishment of LED Agencies as bottom-up participatory instruments to build consensus, tackle threats and exploit economic opportunities. Particular emphasis is placed on strengthening the capacity of local stakeholders to articulate their interests, plan and organize initiatives, and to link the local
economy with national and global economies (Hillier and Healey, 2008). The overall approach placed equal weighting on the process and output. In other words, broad participation is considered as essential for sustainable LED. However, the crucial point to be borne in mind when planning for ex-combatants’ reintegration is not to know in order to decide, but to decide in order to be able to know (Archibugi, 2003). This traditional idea needs positive analysis to be able to make a decision which brings an explicit normative orientation that makes positive analysis possible and meaningful (ibid).

1.7. Research Framework

This report probes into Kivu’s ex-combatants reintegration. It provides understanding of ex-combatants’ reintegration, first by examining the economic role of reintegration in post-conflict situations, then by analysing the applicability of ex-combatants and other developmental contexts. Looking at the experiences of other African post-conflict societies, the literature shows that most of Sub-Saharan African reintegration programmes were carried through Public Works Projects to retrain and re-skill ex-combatants. These programmes were drawn on the country’s capacity to raise national scarce resources and ability to utilize them sparingly. The Ethiopian reintegration programme, for example, was based on vocational training, formal education and life skills education to re-skill ex-combatants. This programme has assisted returnees to be marketable and competitive on the job market. Through Public Works Projects, Ethiopian veterans have been able to find decent jobs tailored to their skills that contribute to the development of their local economy (Muggah, 2008). In Angola, however, the national government has set a special ex-combatants department which works inextricably with the department of the Public Works. These two departments aim at providing skills, training and empowering former fighters in initiating development projects in which ex-combatants utilize their new skills to become economically self-reliant (Mashike, 2000). In South Africa the Expanded Public Works Projects implemented through a reintegrated plan have been effective in training and empowering marginalized people in search of marketable and employable skills (Colletta et al. 1996; Anderlini and Pampell Conaway, 2004). Therefore, this research will draw upon the African reintegration frameworks as they occurred in Sub-Saharan African post-conflict countries.
1.8. The Structure of the Research

The first chapter introduces the research and discusses the aim, research question and the method to be used. The second chapter focuses on the post-conflict’s review, arguing for a contextualized approach which takes cognizance of the reintegration of ex-combatants and how the process interacts with LED through Public Works Projects. The third chapter introduces LED in a post-conflict society. It emphasizes the need for decentralization and public and private partnership in mega-projects. The chapter provides an assessment of post-conflict review as a cross-referencing to guide forward the debates surrounding Sub-Saharan African reintegration programmes. The fourth chapter examines ex-combatants’ economic reintegration. It portrays different scenarios for economic reintegration of ex-combatants through Public Works Projects. The fifth chapter engages a discussion between the international review and the reintegration programme as it occurred in Kivu. Finally, the sixth chapter looks at the way into the future, suggesting a planning response for ex-combatants’ reintegration as a way forward for Kivu.
CHAPTER 2:
POST-CONFLICT SOCIETY’S REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

Although Angola and Namibia have experienced civil war before 1990s, over the past nineteen years, since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War, the Sub-Saharan African region has become a region of unrest. Civil wars inherited from failed or collapsed states left behind a heavy social bill that continues to have a negative impact to African post-conflict countries (Hassan, 2001). African civil wars have involved several nations. There have been a number of complex reasons, including conflicts over basic resources such as water, access and control over rich minerals and other resources and various political agendas (Colletta et al., 1996). This has been fueled and supported by various national and international corporations and other regimes which have interests in the outcome of the conflicts. At the end of a conflict, there are distinctive challenges among which is the spread of ex-combatants into civilian society, economic disruption, economic recovery and reduction of the risk of recurring conflict which emerge as social challenges to overcome.

Too often the need for the reintegration of ex-combatants, skills development and job creation projects after a serious conflict go unrecognized and unmet. This chapter will look at the understanding of the concept of ex-combatants and defines some concepts which relate to the demilitarization of ex-combatants and their transition to civilian life, namely: disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration, followed by the understanding of the post-conflict challenges. The chapter will then link both the reintegration of ex-combatants and the uplifting of local economic development through Public Works Projects in a post-conflict situation. A key focus is the array of issues and challenges that must be worked out in order to permit a smooth rebuilding of a post-conflict society and its resultant lack of job opportunities to a situation of stable, long-term employment capable of supporting a decent livelihood.
2.2. The Understanding of the Meaning of an Ex-combatant

The United Nations defines an ex-combatant as a former soldier who has been registered and disarmed from a military service (UN, 1999). However, this definition does not clearly explain who should be recognized as a fighter or combatant. Lindsey (2005) attempts to draw up a useful list of factors that contribute to the understanding of the concept by proposing that an ex-combatant is a member of national armed force, where there exists an identifiable organization, a clear command structure and an internal disciplinary system.

In an armed conflict wherein different states are engaged, as was the case in the DRC, Lindsey’s (2005) definition is not applicable due to the fact that many rebel groups and paramilitary forces lack both a clear command structure and organization (Lindsey, 2005). Hence, Stedman (2002) suggests broadening the meaning of ex-combatant in the international conventional discourse as the demilitarization of individuals who have served a warring party (Stedman, 2002). An ex-combatant is then an individual who has taken direct part in the hostilities on behalf of one of the warring parties and has been registered and disarmed (Stedman, 2002; Nilsson, 2005).

This definition is based on combatants who are identified from the official DDR processes. It ignores many other fighters who have participated fully in the conflict but have not been identified and demobilized by the official structures (Coulter, 2004). Hence, from these definitions, an ex-combatant is any person who has been part of an armed group in a support capacity and may therefore include messengers, porters, cooks, spies, cleaners, bodyguards, sex slaves etc. This latter definition incorporates ex-militias, ex-fighters, former soldiers and ex-guerrillas. For the purpose of this research these terms are used interchangeably, denoting anybody who legally or illegally took part in an armed group.

Having understood the different meanings of ex-combatants, it is important to understand how they get demilitarized and involved with civilian life. This issue will be discussed in the next section which relates to disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration.
2.2.1. The Demilitarization of Ex-combatants

Demilitarization is a process through which an ex-combatant is disarmed, demobilized, reinserted and reintegrated. Reintegration as a final stage of former soldiers’ demilitarization is tied greatly to national economic reconstruction. Disarmament is a post-conflict process the purpose of which is to collect arms and military objects used during the conflict period (UN, 1999). Disarmament mainly encompasses the development of responsible arms management programs (Coulter, 2004). Demobilization is the formal and controlled process through which ex-combatants are taken away from their arm groups to a temporary cantonment centers (UN, 2006). This transitional, or short-term, period covers the support packages provided to the disarmed and demobilized people, a process known as reinsertion (Nilsson, 2005). Reinsertion, as a form of transitional assistance offered to ex-combatants, consists of the gathering of ex-combatants into a cantonment camp and occurs prior to the longer-term reintegration (UN, 1999). This process is short-term and involves the provision of material and /or financial assistance which serves to meet immediate needs and can last for one year (Nilsson, 2005). Reintegration, however, is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and obtain sustainable employment and income (Coulter, 2004). It is essentially a socio-economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. Reintegration is seen as a part of the general development of a post-conflict country, and a way towards boosting the local economic development, and is a national responsibility that often necessitates long-term external assistance (Nilsson, 2005; UN, 2006). Researches from either African or Asian post-conflict countries depict that reintegration is a path to rebuilding and enhancing a post-conflict economy and its success relies on its implementation and monitoring through sustainable public works projects (Chigunta, 2006).

2.2.2. Challenges Faced by Ex-combatants in a Post-war Society

In studying the processes of different impacts of conflicts and some challenges related to ex-combatants it is apparent that former soldiers face many challenges such as social exclusion, lack of skills, unemployment, diseases, amputation, etc. These challenges may compromise social peace if they are not efficiently and effectively addressed. This section will only focus
on the lack of skills and unemployment as the main post-conflict challenge that ex-combatants face. The interest in these two challenges is on account of their direct link with economic reintegration which is one of the local economic development components in the reconstruction of the economy of a post-war society.

2.2.3. Lack of Skills

In post-conflict situations many ex-combatants who joined Guerrilla groups at a young age return to society much older than they were when they left with few skills and education. The conflict period prevents them from accessing the educational and labour markets. This stops ex-combatants getting a hold of socially useful skills (Chigunta, 2006). Quite often, they end up being unemployed for long time periods of time. This situation generally culminates in a vast majority of ex-fighters being dependant on their families (Mashike, 2000). However, this situation differs from one country to another. In South Africa, for example, the end of apartheid split the former combatants into winners and losers. South African ex-combatants who found jobs tailored to their skills are better-off and are still able to earn a living, whereas those who did not find jobs are still worse-off and dependant on their families (Mashike, 2000). In Sierra Leone, however, the study shows that “…there is recognition among ex-combatants that skills training [is] important… most ex-combatants needed skills training in order to have a good life… with some saying that they would want to complete their education” (Mashike, 2000: 12). Lack of skills hinders ex-combatants from being competitive and marketable in post-conflict economy recovery.

2.2.4. Unemployment

There is a close relationship between lack of skills and the unemployment of ex-combatants in countries like Sierra Leone, Liberia, Rwanda, Congo and the DRC (Mashike, 2000: 12). Unemployment in a post-war situation exposes everyone to social insecurity. Former soldiers might jeopardize social peace because of idleness. Employment in a post-conflict society must not only be seen as an economic concern for ex-fighters, but also as a great opportunity for social reconciliation. A post-conflict society has to find means and ways to create jobs that will occupy the unemployed people (Bennett, 2002; Harsch, 2005). The concept of ‘unemployed people’ underpins not only ex-combatants but also jobless civilians living in the
same location. Addressing the ex-combatants challenges in post-war society is not an easy task to undertake since it involves complex issues ranging from lack of skills to unemployment. The successful handling of the unemployment of ex-combatants requires a good understanding of the various issues surrounding the life of ex-combatants in a post-conflict community.

Job creation in a post conflict society constitutes a boost to local economic development as it gives the opportunity to train unskilled employees according to the concept of ‘learning by doing’. This will enhance the post-war economy (Mashike, 2000). Moreover, the post-conflict employment must be tailored gradually according to the skills currently in demand on the market. This means that jobs must take into account different social skills, including those of the returnees without any discrimination (Bennett, 2002). Skills are key to productivity, employment and, increasingly, to local economic development. Business competitiveness in a post-war context depends on the skilled labour force. Investment in local skills and education is one of the key factors to attract and retain businesses. And lack of skills can be a key barrier to employment of disadvantaged groups. For this reason, the reintegration program is to draw away from disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion to focusing on long-term economic development in a post-conflict society. This point leads the debate to the next section concerning understanding reintegration.

2.2.5. The Reintegration of Ex-combatants

Generally, the reintegration of ex-combatants is a technical process which mainly refers to the economic assimilation of demilitarized combatants, particularly, through training and job creation schemes. The process aims at curbing the disgruntlement of ex-combatants which could undermine the consolidation of the peace (Lundin, 1998; Nilsson, 2005). The socio-economic aspects with regards to the reintegration of ex-combatants occupy the main focus. This is the heart of the program since it makes ex-combatants part of their local civilian society. The socio-economic reintegration facilitates community reconciliation. It is a way by which ex-combatants and other community’s members should be used as workforce of their own society (Nilsson, 2005). Hence, the program requires particular attention to avoid tension between ex-combatants and other unemployed groups in society. Nilsson (2005)
moreover, implies that the success of reintegration processes lie on theoretical and practical levels. By practical definition the author understands reintegration as used by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), national and international organizations. This being skills development and job creation which deter ex-combatants from reutilizing their military skills. Theoretical definitions consist of different meanings of reintegration which lead to the lack of international standardized theory for the reintegration of ex-combatants (Nilsson, 2005). Nilsson further suggests that when dealing with reintegration of ex-combatants the following questions have to be kept in mind so as to distinguish between the two categories of definitions. These questions are: who is included in the target group; what is the aim of the reintegration; and what methods are prescribed?

Table 1: Differences between Practical and More Theoretical Definition of Reintegration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Practical definition</th>
<th>Theoretical definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target group</td>
<td>Ex-combatants, their families and other war-affected groups</td>
<td>Ex-combatants and their families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aim</td>
<td>Economic and social assimilation</td>
<td>Economic and social assimilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method</td>
<td>Programs and projects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Two main observations are being considered from the above chart. Firstly, practical definitions quite often include all war-affected groups and their dependents. Secondly, practical definitions strive to specifically mention programs and projects whereas theoretical definitions leave the question of method open. Both categories of definitions are parallel in their goal of the reintegration process as the economic and social incorporation of marginalized groups into the civilian community (Nilsson, 2005). Each different group of war-affected individuals has its own needs and the problems linked to these needs are varied.
This confirms numerous target groups in the same definition of reintegration, which may confuse the most vital element that should be used when working with each category (Coulter, 2004). This might cause the ineffectiveness of the reintegration, as was the case in Sierra Leone (Nilsson, 2005). The definition of the reintegration of ex-combatants neglects the political aspect of the conflict and its importance in the ex-combatants assimilation. Thus, it diminishes the role of reintegration. The theoretical and practical definitions of reintegration are more technical while the political aspect seems to be more traditional. Reintegration processes are, by definition, technical matters for they are most often equated with reintegration programs (Stedman, 2002).

In light of these debates and for the purpose of this research an alternative reintegration definition encompassing all ex-combatants aspects is necessary. This definition is tailored to the total ex-combatant and comprises of the following aspects: target groups of ex-combatants and their families, the ex-combatants’ economic assimilation through public works projects with reintegration as a major aim; and the method to be used, being much broader in order to incorporate all the efforts and projects related to the reintegration (Nilsson, 2005). Above all and on the grounds of the aforementioned background the reintegration is a societal process aimed at the economic, political, and social assimilation of ex-combatants and their families into civilian society. Reintegration being an economic long-term recovery of ex-combatants takes place in an existing human community whose members have been affected by the war. Therefore, the success of reintegration program has to go along with reconciliation and cohabitation between the members of the community and the returnees. Thus the reintegration program, further, requires a social aspect to be looked at.

2.2.6. Different Types of Reintegration

Being the economic assimilation of an ex-combatant the effectiveness of reintegration depends upon the economic elements led in a social environment wherein a community’s members and ex-combatants accept to cohabit (Brown, 2005). After the short-term assimilation (reinsertion) reintegration becomes a much longer process. The aim of reintegration at this stage shifts to the socio-economic incorporation of ex-combatants through productive activities (Brown, 2005).
Table 2: Different Types of Reintegration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Performance indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Reintegration</td>
<td>Ex-combatants and their dependents are accepted into welcoming communities;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ex-combatants cohabit and interact with other community members within their new community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic reintegration</td>
<td>Assessment of the basic needs of the ex-combatants;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appraisal of ex-combatants households against that of the community average.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Brown, 2005. Reintegration of Ex-combatants through Micro-enterprise

In most cases of post-conflict societies in developing countries there is a severe shortage of skills as alluded to earlier. The question then arises of how employers can demand skills and maintain the delicate balance of wanted skills with the reintegration imperative of employment? The next section attempts to approach the main justification of skills development as the best means of maintaining the balance between reintegration imperatives and market demand.

2.3. Skills Development in a Post-conflict Society

The disruption of skills acquisition and basic education is a severe cost of armed conflicts and require an essential post-conflict commitment to rebuilding schools and training facilities. These two requisites will ensure that the balance spoken of earlier is maintained. In addition to these, a post-conflict society needs quality assurances involving labour market opportunities and the establishment of quality assurances and credentialed trainers. Training on technical level as well as the development of core skills should be basic requirements to be
established and should focus on non-vocational skills such as social and communication skills (Chigunta, 2006). Moreover, ex-combatants also need to be taught life skills, self-confidence, practical skills, civic and moral learning, group formation, crisis prevention, reconciliation and alternative dispute resolution to violence that are very important for their social reintegration (Bennett, 2002; Harsch, 2005). The efficiency and strength of training resides in a systematic assessment and a post-training support intervention at a local level.

During the period of post-conflict reconstruction, employment opportunities and local economic development are expected to be boosted. Lessons from post-conflict rebuilding reveal that local and international non-governmental organizations provide the most jobs for post-conflict societies (Curtain, 2000). This is a real opportunity for ex-combatants who have limited skills to become a central workforce. The presence of different NGO’s and government sponsored programs in a war-torn community allows ex-combatants to learn some other professional, practical and technical skills (Bennett, 2002; Harsch, 2005). Broadening the training of ex-combatants allows for the national economic operators to utilize the new skills of the returnees according to their abilities. This contributes to the generation of employment opportunities to enhance the broader post-conflict local economic development (Curtain, 2000; Chigunta, et al., 2005).

Most of the post-conflict societies such as Angola, DRC, Sudan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone provide the opportunity to develop skills in mining. However, lessons from conflict analysts depict that countries rich in minerals such as diamond, cobalt, coltan, cassiterite, copper, and gold are often marred by corruption, authoritarian repression, militarization, and civil war. Rebel groups, governments and mining companies exploit mineral resources, fueling civil and interstate conflict as players vie for control over riches (Global Witness, 2009:1). Angola, DRC, Liberia, Sierra-Leone and Sudan are prominent examples to name a few. The period of war in Angola, Liberia and Sierra-Leone shows that these countries have fallen victim to rebels who use revenue from minerals such as diamond and gold to purchase arms and fuel for the conflict (Global Witness, 2009:1). Researches from the UN Group of Experts (2008) describe close links between individual traders and specific armed groups. It may thus be assumed that armed groups derive their strength from these links and that ending the trade or bringing it under government control will deprive armed groups of their livelihoods and thus
contribute to ending conflict (UN, 2008). Therefore, providing ex-combatants with practical skills in mining seems very risky for post-conflict societies and can constitute another root of future conflict.

2.4. Reintegration through Employment Generation

The lack of availability of jobs renders ex-combatants dependent on their families (Curtain 2000). Economic reintegration ties much closer to local economic development not only for the returnees but also for the whole community. Economic reintegration tackles unemployment and skills shortages, which are major obstacles to the successful reintegration of ex-combatants into society. Castelo-Branco (1999) links the veterans’ lack of economic reintegration and marketable skills to social stigmatization, exclusion and marginalization. Although some progress has been made to re-skill veterans, these initiatives have been scarce (Chigunta, et al., 2005). One of the main constraints for re-integration programs is the economic context into which ex-combatants are incorporated. Employment and livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants are crucial to sustainable integration in post-conflict states, often characterized by shattered economies and inaccessible tight labour markets (Chigunta, et al., 2005). However, the United Nations (2008) suggests a path of solution to the post-conflict job creation. For the UN, ex-combatants employment programs in post-conflict situations should be based on stabilization, reintegration and long-term employment creation.

The stabilization of employment deals with sustainable income generation and emergency employment (UN, 2008). According to this theory, the economic reintegration is carried through Public Works Projects and has to start with a social and economic recovery. This helps to restore the livelihoods of ex-combatants that experience a great danger to their lives. Berg (2006) draws on this stance and suggests that the stabilization of employment is about emergency temporary jobs as well as basic livelihood and start-up grants for ex-combatants. The reintegration deals with local economic improvement of employment. This program suggests that the promoting employment opportunities takes place at a local level, wherein the reintegration ultimately takes place. Therefore, attention has to be given to rebuilding communities in order to address the root causes of unrest and ease longer term reconciliation (UN, 2008). The reintegration program emphasizes the capacity of local government to invest
in local socio-economic infrastructure, the reinstatement of a natural resource base and local government capacity building (UNCDF and UNDESA, 2006). At this stage, the focus has switched from employment creation and income generation to incorporate participation of economic actors and include capacity and institution building. This shift in focus leads to a peace consolidation process and strong economic reintegration (CGAP, 2004). The long-term employment creation probes conditions in which sustainable employment and decent work might be created. This program proposes a strong support to policies, institutional capacity building at a national level and the creation of a framework related to the community participation to define, by consensus building, the rule of the game (UN, 2008).

The rationale behind this process aims at promoting sustainable long-term development that maintains productive and decent employment. Moreover, this program advises that employment found must balance the need for quick action with the importance of a sustainable impact (UN/World Bank PCNA, 2007). The link between employment creation, income generation and reintegration in a post-conflict setting is shown in fig. 4.

Figure 2: Curves Measure the Intensity of the Programme (The three tracks of post-conflict employment programming)

Skills development and employment generation programs in a post-conflict society are aimed at setting up short-term economic relief. As a post-conflict society starts recovering its stability, it has to consider its sustainable development. This highlights a clear link between Public Works Projects, local economic development, skills development and job creation plans for post-conflict reconstruction.

2.5. Public Works and Local Economic Development Projects

Public Works Projects have been a popular programme for poverty alleviation in developing countries. The net income gains to participating workers will depend in particular on how time allocation across countries and persons respond to the new employment opportunities (McCord, 2002; 2003). Public Works Projects and economic development investments help support the construction or rehabilitation of essential public infrastructure and facilities necessary to generate or retain private sector jobs and investments (McCord, 2003). They attract private sector capital and promote regional competitiveness, including investments that expand and upgrade infrastructure to attract new industry, support technology-led development, redevelop Brownfield sites and provide eco-industrial development (McCutcheon, 2001; McCord, 2002).

2.5. 1. Public Works Projects as a Local Economic Development Engine

Public Works projects assist to sustain the building or refurbishment of indispensable public infrastructure and amenities necessary to produce or hold private sector jobs and investments. The argument for Public Works Projects, being a local economic development engine is centered on a sustainable work. The public works projects play a different role in low-income developing countries. This role is that of a safety, conferring transfer and/or stabilization benefits to the poor, while at the same time using the poor’s labor to build infrastructure for development (McCutcheon, 2001; McCord, 2002). The effectiveness of the program depends on the benefits, costs, and the way resources are raised to finance the program (McCutcheon, 2001). Public Works Projects also attract private sector capital, uphold local competitiveness, support technology-led development, redevelop Brownfield sites and provide eco-industrial development (McCord, 2003). The development of an expended Public Works Projects is a
path of solution to employment generation and skills development opportunities for the unemployed and marginalized people (McCutcheon, 2001; McCord, 2002).

Public Works Projects, being a local economic development engine come out as a cross-cutting programme that has to be implemented by all spheres of government in post-conflict country “owned enterprises”. The strengths of Public Works Projects in a post-conflict society lies on the fact that these projects intend to provide rapid and visible relief for the reintegration of ex-combatants and/or other social marginalized people into civilian society. Public Works Projects build the capacity of communities for development, keeping them productive and self-reliant in the new society in which they are marginalized (McCutcheon, 2001).

At this stage, Public Works Projects need to be allocated a budget in order to create job opportunities for the ex-combatants allowing them not only to integrate peacefully into civilian society, but also to contribute somehow to the individual and collective developmental assets. Public Works Projects are a way of a re-orientating of mainstream public expenditure on infrastructure towards labour-intensive techniques for ex combatants to become civilians and in need of employment to survive (McCord, 2002). Thus, they help define a nation-wide program which draws significant numbers of the ex-combatants into productive work, so that workers gain skills while they work, and increase their capacity to earn an income.

The objective of the Public Works Projects through the local economic development is, not only to utilize public sector budgets to alleviate ex-combatants unemployment (by creating temporary productive employment opportunities coupled with training) (McCord, 2003), but also to avoid the raising of another spiral of violence in society between ex-combatants and civilian citizens who hold them responsible of economic breakdown, crimes and other social nightmares. Public Works Projects which are intended to broaden employment creation and skills development in this stage may offer insight into an approach to re-integration through projects that develop marketable skills in the fields of infrastructure, housing, tourism, agriculture and other disciplines (McCord, 2002; 2003).
2.6. Conclusion

In light of the above discussion, a post-conflict society, in most developing countries is characterized not only by the ex-combatants phenomenon, but also by a severe shortage of skills and economic disruption. The reintegration of ex-combatants seems to be a form of post-war relief as it emerges within war-torn societal planning and is much closer to the idea of sustainable development through Public Works Projects. Reintegration programmes are drawn on social, political and economic assimilations by which ex-combatants recover their civilian status. Several jobs being created by the private sector in most post-conflict situations, the involvement of Public Works projects in reintegrating ex-combatants in a post-war society calls for a sustainable LED further culminates in employment generation, wherein ex-combatants and community’s members are beneficiary. However, LED’s aspect, being at the heart of the post-conflict reconstruction has to draw more attention to the reintegration programme. This aspect leads us to the next chapter with respect to LED in a post-conflict society.
CHAPTER 3:
LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A POST-CONFLICT SOCIETY

3.1. Introduction

Government, business and civil society are increasingly in search of the means to raise and pursue economic development strategies and sort out socio-economic problems jointly. Each with a specific function, these new paradigms complement each other in order to promote endogenous development using every opportunity to apply local assets, skills and knowledge in order to uphold competitiveness. Local Economic Development (LED), skills development and job creation in a post-conflict situation are very important. They work alongside to rebuild and enhance the post-conflict local economy by using rationally local, scarce resources and making local communities responsible for their own development (World Bank Group, 2009). This chapter addresses the concerns with regard to how should LED happen and what are the processes related to a post-conflict LED consolidation. It also probes into the need of public and private partnership in post-conflict mega-projects, and assesses the post-conflict review pertinent to DDR programmes and LED as a means of rebuilding a post-conflict society.

3.2. Local Economic Development

Local economic development is a way by which a local community in collaboration with other external stakeholders assesses and manages local scarce resources in order to raise external investments for the enhancement of local development. It is a collective effort in which local people from all communities work together to boost their local productivity. This participatory process results in a planned and sustainable economy. It is a local strategy that helps create decent employment and improves the quality of life for community members, including those who are underprivileged and marginalized. Local economic development comes up with partnerships between public and private sectors and civil society. It is a means by which local communities find common solutions to the economic problems affecting their society (Rogerson, 2005; World Bank Group, 2009). The United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) puts forward that the LED process brings together resources from outside and within the society in order to address challenges and promote the economic growth (World Bank Group, 2009). For LED to take shape it needs a development framework which fits into the local realities.

3.2.1. Local Economic Development Framework

The LED process aims at empowering local communities to successfully make use of all local economic potential in order to establish priorities (for example: to promote high quality jobs, reduce poverty and generate municipal taxes). LED practitioners have many actions available to them (World Bank Group, 2009). For LED to be successful, participants and practitioners should have knowledge of these actions and be committed to a process that enables them to achieve sustainable results. An LED framework requires strategic planning in order to realize a successful and predetermined outcome (Nel, 2005; Rogerson, 2005).

The useful LED framework as utilized in most developing countries is that from USAID (World Bank Group, 2009). This paradigm shift points to the LED framework as a set of oriented policies and non-prescriptive endeavors which incorporate (Nel and Rogerson, 2005):

- **LOCAL** values: a mechanism to assess the local potential that makes rational use of the already existing local capacities.
- **ECONOMIC** drivers: the capacity of identifying asset opportunities, sustaining commercial activities and facilitating the access to (new) markets.
- **DEVELOPMENT**: the promoting of social wellbeing by creating decent jobs and regenerating income for the community.

Although the USAID’s LED design is a unique and useful framework pertaining to an LED, its approaches, however, are variable and depend on different actors involved in the LED process. This leads the debate to the next section with regard to various LED approaches.
3.2.2. Various LED Approaches

The current and useful LED approaches are from USAID. Nel and Rogerson (2005) draw on USAID’s approaches and propose the essentials of an LED. These include:

- Public and private partnership approach: to assess or seize the comparative economic advantage.
- Small business approach: for innovation, private investment and job creation.
- Regional approach: leveraging the resources of surrounding areas.
- Sector-cluster approach: supporting the most promising sectors by bringing together business, educational institutions, NGOs and government.

These LED approaches form the core of the principles associated with LED.

3.2.3. Principles Associated with Local Economic Development

When leading an LED certain requirements are to be taken into account (World Bank Group, 2009). These are:

- Private/public partnership: LED is a local way of maximizing local potential in attracting external investments. It requires an efficient partnership between private, public and non-profit actors allowing the junction in the program of investment between the different stakeholders. All principles associated to the LED set up a partnership between the private and public sectors. This bilateral cooperation requires a clear coordination from different developmental activities.

- Making people participate in local decisions: a current dialogue promotes and encourages the creation of social networking which leads to social development. Local stakeholders play an important role in the development of their community. Local communities and their leaders should continuously engage in dialogue. Dialogue between different stakeholders in local economic development is a way forward to the success of the LED. As it allows all actors to collectively discuss development issues.
3.2.4. Successful Local Economic Development Strategies

A local economy has to respond to the aspirations of local inhabitants. Community participation at a local level is the backbone in planning a local development strategy. However, a successful LED in a post-conflict area, based on a trustful partnership between all local stakeholders, has to be at the center of addressing national economic growth. LED strategy in a post-conflict area should reflect a broader planning process for a rural area. This entails that issues related to poverty are addressed and scarce resources are well targeted and managed. The LED strategic planning should fit into other local planning processes (Nel and Rogerson, 2005; World Bank Group, 2009). Lessons from LED project management tell that an LED has to be a guided strategy. The World Bank Group (2009) implies four stages for an LED strategic planning process: effort organization, the assessments of local economic potentialities, the establishment of an approach to be adopted (vision, goals, objectives, and programs, projects and action plans), implementation and evaluation.

The mechanism to reach this strategy goes through the creation of a local development council taking the lead of the local development projects and a community organization represented by the local civil society. The development council should encompass donors, national government members and local community represented by civil society (Kenneth, 2006). LED increasingly appears as a strong tool in supporting greater democracy and transparency at the local level (World Bank Group, 2009). The success of LED lies upon the understanding of different local resource opportunities. Local Communities are strongly advised to draft the program model that is going to be a part of their strategy (World Bank Group, 2009). Below are different components of local economic strategy (Fig. 5).
3.2.5. Planning of Local Economic Development in Post-conflict Society and the Need for a Decentralisation System

Countries emerging from a severe socio-economic disruption are expected to develop micro, small and medium-sized enterprises to revive their post-conflict economy (Brown, 2005). Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises offer new opportunities to local employment, wealth and tax generation in a post-war torn society. Visible results can help maintain momentum in the short term, and simply initiating a single project focusing on one critical issue might pave the way for long-term success (World Bank Group, 2009). Ultimately, LED is about sustainable long term development, for it takes time to change local conditions and mind sets (Brown, 2005). Moreover, LED is about building capacity, it also organizes participatory processes and empowers stakeholders, especially the poor (Nel and Rogerson, 2005). Overall, a post-war LED needs strategic-planning to meet the long term social expectations (World Bank Group, 2009).

Planning for LED in a post-conflict society also calls upon the principle of decentralisation (Blackely and Bradshaw, 2002). According to this principle, decentralisation, in a post-conflict situation, increases economic efficiency because local governments are better
positioned than the national government to deliver public services as a result of information advantage. Population mobility and competition among local governments for delivery of public services will ensure the matching of performances of local communities and local governments (Romeo, 2002). Decentralisation considerations in this case suggest that policies aimed at the provision of public services such as infrastructure and education (that are sensitive to regional and local conditions) is likely to be more effective in encouraging growth than centrally-determined policies that ignore these geographical differences (Ibid). The rationale behind decentralisation of systems in local economic development is about creating an enabling economic environment, balancing social and economic policy, and creating an environment for trade, investment and hiring (Kotzé and Hussein, 2008).

Consequently, with other things being equal, a decentralised local economic development system where local governments play a more important role than the central government in public service provision leads to more rapid economic growth (Kenneth, 2006). Decentralisation will increase public sector efficiency therefore improving service delivery and regulation. This will create a more conducive business environment and greater incentives for investors. Local officials will have better local knowledge and business contacts making them more able to make locally relevant, appropriate decisions. Decentralisation is a good way towards LED in a post-conflict society for it reduces the opportunities for corruption, particularly large scale corruption. This has a beneficial effect on national economic growth. However, decentralisation without competent state administration is likely to aggravate social fracturing and to foster inequalities while, at the same time, failing to assist in public service delivery and local economic development.

To remedy this situation, Blackely and Bradshaw (2002) suggest a particular attention being paid on both strengths and weaknesses of public officers, particularly their ability to manage and account. Such assessments being very important, give donors the opportunity of appraising the level of oversight and technical assistance that public officers (local actors) need. Hence, it will assist in planning for pre-project and in-service capacity building as required (Bambang Bintoro Soedjito, 2004).
A successful post-conflict LED model of decentralisation based on different partnership capacities is presented in fig. 6.

Figure 3: Model of decentralisation for a successful LED

Source: UN Capital Development Fund and the UNDP, 2002

Economic development outside of agriculture and indigenous small and micro enterprise sectors are largely a matter of central government, parastatal enterprises and mostly foreign investors or transnational corporations. These enterprises were generally large and vertically
integrated (UNDP, 2002). That is to say that they internalize the production of inputs and of allied services and thereby minimized their demand for inputs and services from other local producers. However the decentralization model as set above (Fig. 10) shows that localities are increasingly thrown onto themselves to create ‘place prosperity’, to establish the right conditions for the economic advancement of its population (Ibid).

3.2.6. Towards Local Economic Development in a Post-conflict Society

Local economic development (LED) is an approach towards economic development which allows and encourages local people to work together to achieve sustainable economic growth and development. LED brings economic benefits and improves the quality of life for all residents in a local municipal area by developing business opportunities. This spells that the LED appraisal has to shape a contextual framework which provides preliminary details of the probable activities, intended specific end results, likely project duration and needed input of human and financial resources to attain the expected end results. However, the critical elements of start/know the start decision in a post-war situation should include the following considerations (World Bank Group, 2009):

- The feasibility of the local economic development and the possibility that it will lead to a carefully planned private-public growth strategy in one or more local communities;
- An appraisal of the importance that local and national government and business leaders attach to a LED initiative;
- LED capacity to produce tangible results connected to private investment, jobs created, jobs retained and increased incomes;
- LED likelihood to bring strengthened institutions within different communities;
- The ability and assurance of LED community leaders;
- The capability of LED team (technical staff or board);
- The trust between different stakeholders’ offices involved in a LED initiative.

Local economic development in a post-war situation is critical to the economic reintegration of ex-combatants. Reintegration programs provide for employment and skills useful for the building of a post-conflict LED. For this to happen, cooperation between different
stakeholders is required. The following section tries to unpack different partnerships and stakeholders that make LED happen within the context of a post-conflict situation.

3.3. Public and Private Partnership in Mega-projects

A public sector is a part of the economy concerned with providing basic government services. The composition of the public sector varies by country, but in most countries the public sector includes such services as the police, military, Public Works and healthcare for the poor (World Bank Group, 2009). The public sector might provide services that a non-payer cannot be excluded from (such as street lighting), services which benefit all of society rather than just the individual who uses the service (such as public education) and services that encourage equal opportunity. The private sector, however, is a part of the economy that is owned and controlled by private individuals and business organizations such as private and public limited companies (Ibid). In a free enterprise economy, the private sector is responsible for allocating most of the resources within the economy. This contrasts with the public sector, where economic resources are owned and controlled by the state (World Bank Group, 2009).

Public and private partnership in mega-projects means that the private sector comes to work alongside public sector in bringing its management expertise and/or monetary contributions to the government projects with the aim of achieving public benefit. In this case, a public and private partnership (PPP) becomes a contract between a public sector institution/municipality and a private party, in which the private party assumes substantial financial, technical and operational risk in the design, financing, building and operation of a project. And the public sector provides them with the developmental framework and necessary infrastructures (World Bank Group, 2009).

Private enterprises have played, in most post-conflict societies, a central role in rebuilding the economic infrastructure. Nowadays the private enterprises are generators of future economic growth and permanent job creation. By private sector, one can understand international enterprises that can invest on their own account or partner with local firms. The latter is generally unmatched in its ability to assemble people, capital and innovation to create meaningful jobs and to profitably produce goods and services that meet the needs and
requirements of people (World Bank Group, 2009). Projects from private sectors generally
target a given local community in need of assistance. Every opportunity to jumpstart the local
private sector must be exploited, beginning with establishing of local priorities for
community-level projects that can use local private initiative and talent (ibid). This complex
task requires the participation of the local community.

Post-conflict reintegration and reconstruction should be combined whenever possible, even if
longer time frames are necessary. When serious reconstruction projects are underway,
incentives should be provided to international contractors to subcontract with domestic and
local companies that employ local labour (World Bank Group, 2009). Local government as
one of the stakeholders in the local development has to create public development projects
that enable the local economic development environment in a post-conflict area to develop.
These governments may find it efficient to contract with small local entrepreneurs to provide
many of the services that are often provided by local or regional governments. The projects
might be Mega or Micro-Public Works Projects that engineer LED. The funding thereof,
should also be provided for the recovery of local small and medium enterprises (SMEs),
which will probably be the principal local sources of long-term employment in most post-
conflict communities (World Bank Group, 2009).

Viable state structure is the vehicle of post-conflict reconstruction and local economy
development, for it provides a post-conflict development framework that includes security
issues, rule of law, economic development, and political stability. State-building in countries
emerging from conflicts is a daunting task (World Bank Group, 2009). A recent experience,
particularly in Angola, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia and other Sub-Saharan
Africa post-conflict countries suggests that although private sector participation is required,
outsiders cannot simply impose governance or public sector structures (Chigunta, et al.,
2005). Local groups must be involved in the process to ensure legitimacy and sustainability.
This is the reason why public and private sectors are bound to work together to promote the
reconstruction of post-conflict society. The public sector provides for the fundamental state
infrastructure and developmental framework, while the private sector comes up with its
management expertise and monetary contribution to cement the post-conflict reconstruction
(Muggah, 2008).
Armed conflicts disrupt not only a country’s socio-political fabric, but also the basic ability of an economy to function. Conflicts create incalculable losses, not only in a real physical sense but also in terms of lost economic growth and development. The key objective of post-conflict reconstruction efforts should be restoration of the domestic capacity for a productive and dynamic market economy, thereby establishing the basis for a prosperous society (Colletta, et al., 1996; Anderlini and Pampell Conaway, 2004). Thus, the private sector plays a crucial role in the restoration of a post-conflict domestic capacity for a reproductive and dynamic market economy. The private sector’s business agendas can offer reformers a list of what needs to be addressed on the day-to-day policymaking level to spur economic growth and, therefore, provide economic and job opportunities for ex-combatants and regular citizens.

Experiences from Angola and Ethiopia show how the business community can co-operate and speak with a unified voice on the crucial issues pertaining to post-conflict rebuilding and development. Angolan and Ethiopian private entrepreneurs spent a whole year working together with national authorities and local communities to create an economic plan for the country. The aims and objectives of these stakeholders were: identification of constraints to doing business, prioritization of problems, and determination of opportunities for reform, recommendation of specific solutions, and building trust (Chigunta, et al., 2005). This bottom-up effort clearly demonstrates that the private sector is more likely to commit to reforms if local entrepreneurs themselves are the ones participating in drafting their own development framework than if they are just handed a list written up by someone else. Likewise, governments (public sector) are more likely to listen to the voices of their own constituents rather than those of outsiders (Colletta, et al., 1996; Anderlini and Pampell Conaway, 2004).

The importance of the local buy-in achieved in this manner cannot be overestimated. Significantly, a business agenda is not only a litany of problems but is also a compilation of actionable solutions that can be actively promoted and presented before the local government. By virtue of generating this public-private dialogue on key reconstruction and development issues, the business agenda committed by all stakeholders enhances democratic process, giving the business community a platform for providing input into policymaking in an open,
transparent and accountable manner. The point to be made here is that, public and private sectors in Mega Projects are a *sine qua non* of post-conflict reconstruction with the government taking the lead. This partnership must be predicated to identifying and recognizing the developmental challenges of the post-conflict situation, sorting out comparative advantages and synergizing, staking out mutual responsibilities and accountabilities, and geared exclusively to complementing government effort (Castelo-Branco, 1999). Greater attention needs to be given, especially, to the complementary role of civil society, whose grassroots processes can be harnessed for effective reconstruction efforts. For example, in Somalia, administration by elders' councils had transformed the city of Baidoa (Curtain, 2000). This means that success in reconstruction is aided by the direct participation in, and ownership of, the reconstruction effort by the country's communities at all levels and also by the broad and coordinated participation of key NGOs (Castelo-Branco, 1999).

Community participation brings to local citizens the experience in running their own organizations and practicing democracy at a local level. Democratic experience helps create confidence and belief in self rule. Community participation, therefore, leads people towards a long-term local project ownership. Thus, national, provincial and local governments, through their Public Works Department, should initiate developmental projects compelling community participation. This implies the need for a broad partnership between all stakeholders in the post-conflict reconstruction process. In sight of what has been said above the general argument of this research will look at the usefulness of Public Works Projects for local economic development to see whether Kivu has what it takes and actually benefits from the Public Works Projects.

**3.4. Assessment of Post-conflict Review**

By contextualizing a review of the literature on DDR programmes, most scholars dealing with this matter seem to agree that the demilitarization of combatants (known as demobilization and reintegration) is a volatile issue (Lamb, 1997). This is due to the fact that the mismanagement of this process might create a new opportunity for ex-combatants to
disrupt the entire peace process. However, if the DDR process is well handled, it can create opportunities for sustainable peace and human development (Chigunta, 2006).

Many reintegration exercises have taken place since the late 1980s in several Sub-Saharan African countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Rwanda. Similarly, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Liberia and Sierra Leone have had to deal with the enormous problems of reintegrating large numbers of children and young people who were either abducted by rebel or government forces or who joined the local militias (Mkandawire, 1996). The aim of reintegration, which is the stabilization and establishment of the long-term economic development of ex-combatants (Sesay, 2002; Specker, 2006), starts with the allocating of reinsertion benefits to ex-combatants (Speacker, 2006). These reintegration benefits are based on an approach that draws a line between an individual’s status as an ex-combatant and as a civilian (Zerdem and Alpaslan, 2002).

The UN definition of reintegration (that is based on assistance to be provided to all war affected people) implies that when dealing with the reintegration process, the support given to former combatants and their dependants to enable them to reintegrate into civilian life should also be extended to other war affected populations who did not take up arms during the period of strife (Geneva Convention of 1949; Optional Protocol 2001). The servicing of all post-conflict groups without privileging anyone allows for the implementation of reconstruction programmes that will lead to recovery and economic development programmes (National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, 2001; Doyle, 2002; Green, 2002; Collier and Sabanis, 2005).

Zerdem and Alpaslan (2002) probe into the reintegration issue in the context of security. For them, once ex-combatants are released or set free from armies much should be done to ensure that their civilian life should not become a threat to social peace. Doyle (2002) supports this stance in saying that ex-combatants should be retrained in civilian education (informing them about rights and duties, opportunities and constraints) before being released into society. When looking at these different views relating to the reintegration of ex-combatants all authors propose a new orientation of ex-combatants into society. Innes and Booher (2003) concur with Doyle’s stance. For them, this re-orientation includes not only social support and
economic opportunities, but also needs to be given to the communities where ex-combatants are due to settle. Castells (1996) and Colletta (1996) link reintegration programmes to the economy aspect. They understand reintegration as the return of ex-combatants to their former home or to a new location. For them, ex-combatants have to be economically supported by being provided with reinsertion benefits at this stage. Following from the literature above, it can be argued that the objective of reintegration is the economic incorporation of ex-combatants and their dependants into civilian society, with the direct result being economic self-reliance and productivity (Mausse, 1999).

Writing on different inter-related aspects of reintegration, namely, political, social and economic, Colletta (1997) and Doyle (2002) suggest that the social and economic aspects of reintegration should proceed in parallel in order for reintegration to be effective. Broadly, Colletta and Doyle try to depict the political, social and economic context in which demobilization and reintegration should occur. For these scholars, this context invariably influences the outcomes of the reintegration programme (Colletta, 1997; Doyle, 2002). The success of the economic reintegration of ex-combatants should be a post-conflict-society milestone since it allows for social stability. Mashike (2000) while studying reintegration processes, such as the one led in Ethiopia brings up the programme characteristics that support Colletta’s argument. The success of the reintegration of ex-combatants in Ethiopia is attributed to the economic aspect of the reintegration programme and the following-up of ex-combatants development projects through the use of Public Works Projects across the country (Mashike, 2000). The Ethiopian reintegration process epitomizes successful reintegration in Africa. Quoting Muggah in his research in respect of Ethiopian reintegration, the author says:

“The scale and scope of the Ethiopian demobilization and reintegration programme was breathtaking. Between 2000 and 2003, more than 148 000 veterans (including more than 17 000 disabled soldiers) were disarmed and demobilized by the Ministry of Defense and provided with cash and non-monetary reinsertion and reintegration assistance via the Ministry of Labour and Social Services. The Ethiopian process was
carried out efficiently and according to declared principles of transparency and equity, making successful the reintegration programme” (Muggah, 2008: 1).

The Ethiopian reintegration has been one of the most successful reintegration programmes across the continent that has used Public Works as a locomotive to empower and market ex-combatants. The reintegration of ex-combatants in Ethiopia was based on re-skilling and retraining returnees through different Public Works Projects. The training and skill development issues were addressed by offering ex-combatants appropriate skills, correctly tailored to the socio-economic environment realities, allowing them to be competitive on the job market (Muggah, 2008).

Some other examples of successful reintegration in Africa occurred over the past few years. Stewart and Fitzgerald (2001) depict the Rwandese reintegration as a successful process amongst others. Between 1997 and 2001 the Rwandese government with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) had reintegrated more than 18 000 ex-combatants. The World Bank revamped and expanded the reintegration programme in June 2001 with the result being an additional reintegration of 36 000 ex-combatants from the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and armed groups. The World Bank supported the Rwandese reintegration programme which was aimed at providing assistance to veterans of war to reinstate them into civilian life and to re-orientate the government expenditure from military activities to social and economic sectors (International Development Association, 2007).

The 1990s Namibian reintegration occurred in a fragile situation wherein the transition from war to peace was wielded by two opposing forces under the United Nations supervision (Anderlini and Pampell Conaway, 2004). There was no reintegration plan for Namibian ex-combatants. Neither the United Nations nor the new government conceived a reintegration programme for ex-combatants. The assistance brought to ex-combatants was simply ad hoc activities hastily made by the government to keep veterans from any protestation (Colletta, et al., 1996; Anderlini and Pampell Conaway, 2004). Having been a patchwork of well-intended responses, Namibian reintegration programme lacked strategic government policy and a planned programme (Anderlini and Pampell Conaway, 2004), which resulted in the
dissatisfaction of ex-combatants due to the government’s discrepancies in its promises and the reality of an opportunity-constrained environment (Colletta, et al., 1996).

In approaching the post-apartheid society in South Africa, Harrison (2006) argues that the integrated development planning process produces more integrated participatory ways of working and a more united government. Furthermore that this integration (if it has occurred) has led to more effective service delivery and to more effective responses to problems such as poverty, HIV/AIDS, crime and spatial fragmentation.

In Liberia, however, 1500 ex-combatants have been trained in agriculture and are still involved in illegal sectors. Writing on Liberian ex-combatants reintegration, Harsch (2005) reveals that those who were keen on completing their study were sent to schools and have currently graduated and resettled in their home communities, where they are being allocated land to raise crops and animals for cash. Pre-vocational numeracy and literacy is given to those who do not know how to read and write, and counsellors are on hand to help with problems related to war trauma (Harsch, 2005). Liberian economic reintegration is one of the more successful African ex-combatants’ reintegration models. Due to its particularity drawn from an innovative reintegration programme, it manages to bring together intensive agricultural skills training, conflict resolution skills and experience, literacy and numeracy training, assistance returning to home communities, and help starting a small agricultural enterprise.

However, analyzing what has been called reintegration programme in Sierra Leone, findings of some authors portray that ex-combatants have been reinserted instead of being reintegrated. Harsch (2005: 1) gives one way forward when he says:

“The National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) was faced with the problems of limited funds and facilities available for the reintegration of the large number of ex-combatants who had completed the disarmament and demobilization phase, due to the lack of consistent funding through the Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) and the capacity of implementing partners. This resulted in the delivery of only short-term training opportunities, without many apprenticeships or on-the-job training in existing workshops or businesses”.

40
The NCDDR’s vocational training in Sierra Leone offered to ex-combatants focused on - among other things - carpentry, masonry, hairdressing, tailoring and metal works. However, there are limited employment opportunities for such trades (Harsch, 2005). Again in the case of Sierra Leone, apprenticeships or in-service training has fit as an excellent model of economic reintegration (Chigunta, 2006). This should have resulted in more sustainable employment and reintegration, but Harsch (2005: 2) as well as other analysts of Sierra Leone’s post-conflict society note that “the lack of education and training coordination capacity, official accreditation of the certificates and qualifications attained the shortage of well-experienced trainers and trainers who used rigid, instructor-oriented methodologies, turned the training into quick-fix endeavours with little impact”.

Ethiopia and Eritrea have done a reintegration relatively straightforward. The conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia involved only regular armies, which facilitated the reintegration programmes of different army fractions. The Eritrea and Ethiopia ex-combatants’ economic reintegration went fairly smoothly, for ex-combatants had been welcomed into their society as heroes, and the reintegration programme focused on development projects which provided ex-combatants with jobs opportunities (Green, 2002; Gera, 2003; Harsch, 2005).

However, in countries where opposing armed forces are in conflict with each other, the dynamics are different. Here, ex-combatants have fought for a power deal and expect to wield power after the conflict. This situation occurred in Mozambique wherein government and the rebel Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) signed a peace accord in 1992. After Renamo ex-combatants’ reintegration, they subsequently took part in national elections (Harsch, 2005). Angola, however, experienced a decade and half of civil war during which several ex-combatants were released into society (Mungoi, 1999). The Angolan reintegration programmes as conceived by the government trained approximately 10 500 ex-combatants, resulting in most of them choosing farming and agriculture, micro-enterprises and existing businesses. Those returnees who have not been able to undertake their own businesses are assisted, working for different development projects contracted by the government.

From the aforementioned review, it follows that planning for ex-combatants’ reintegration consists of building local authorities’ capacity to plan and manage the delivery of immediate
assistance and sustainable public services both in the emergency and the longer term recovery phases of LED (Romeo, 2002). This approach requires a systemic planning that recognizes three critical levels (Ibid):

- The local authorities themselves, where capacity must be built to plan, programme, budget, implement, monitor and evaluate local emergency, recovery and development activities.
- The decentralised State administration, (at provincial/regional level) where capacity must be built to provide the financial and technical support that local authorities will require and exercise the necessary legality controls and performance monitoring.
- The communities of both returnees, demobilized and other residents, whose settlement-level and special interests organizations must be promoted and strengthened to actively participate in local government processes of allocation of resources and programmes/projects implementation.

Hence, planning for ex-combatants’ reintegration is not just synonymous with training of individuals, but requires changes in the institutions. Those individuals have to operate in the legal framework of those institutions (Romeo, 2002). In addition to being systemic, the consequence is that capacity building effort of post-conflict’s LED must be “experimental”. Accordingly, it must be carried out through the practical experimentation of decentralization policies and improved local institutions (Ibid). This point is critical as it implies both the possibility and the necessity of starting the local capacity building process of LED as early as possible in the post-conflict period. This might need to happen in seemingly unfavorable policy environments. For systemic planning to happen, post-conflict countries have to use practical experimentation to build local government capacity (Romeo, 2002). This was based on (Ibid):

- Local Government financing. This means that in the long term, comprehensive fiscal decentralization measures, including substantial devolution of fiscal powers, should be considered. However in most post-conflict environments the first step is the set up of a mechanism for fiscal transfer providing local authorities with a minimum of
regular and locally programmable resources for both recovery and development spending.

- Local Government planning and budgeting. As a minimum of programmable resources is made available to local authorities, a simple, participatory procedure for strategic planning, investment programming and annual budgeting, should also be extended. Local level planning would be made meaningful by the existence of the above minimum of locally programmable resources and could be institutionalized as a truly local government planning process rather than be just a requirement to access externally financed programmes, as is currently the case with most programmes promoting “participatory planning”.

- Local Government implementation. In most post-conflict environments and particularly in resource-poor countries, much of the resources available for local level infrastructure and services delivery will continue to flow through national/sector channels or will be managed by central agencies (including specialized ones like the World Bank-supported Social Funds). While these resources, which are purpose-specific and aid-financed, are not an alternative to fiscal transfers, and have not the same wide impact on local capacity building, they may offer to local actors an opportunity for implementing centrally financed projects and activities. This in turn requires that the capacity of both local administrations and community organizations for implementation (procurement, contracts administration, etc.) be strengthened.

In the immediate period after the end of war, the creation of jobs through Public Works Projects and the stimulation of micro and small enterprises are crucial. To overcome this challenge, new macro-economic policies and institutions, as well as capacity-building for people working in governmental institutions, are required to encourage the development of market mechanisms that can efficiently and effectively allocate scarce economic resources. In post-conflict countries such as Angola, Ethiopia, Liberia, South Africa and Rwanda, to name a few, international actors encouraged post-conflict’s governments to promote private sector development, creation of economic opportunities for business operation and development as well as entrepreneurship training and policy frameworks for small and medium enterprise
development. They have also assisted governments to establish sustainable partnerships with the private sector, where the latter exists (public private partnerships), and carefully balance its interactions in this area in order to prevent polarization of interests that might undermine the benefits of the general population, hence generating renewed or even new conflict.

In light of what has been analysed above, it follows that economic reintegration includes the change of institutions, the policy and framework of these institutions, and provisions for absorbing ex-combatants into restructured lucrative conditions. Ex-combatants with limited education and few skills other than fighting are the most attractive incentives for taking part in the reintegration (Chigunta, 2006), as they have to switch from being combatant to civilian life (Harsch, 2005).

### 3.4. Conclusion

Following from the literature above, it can be concluded that early support of local civil society groups interested in local economic development and livelihoods may reduce future external aid needs as communities’ capacity and initiative grow. Post-conflict’s LED entails available technical help and funding for long-term job promotion activities, including counseling, training, finding and providing information about jobs, and job placement. Systemic planning based on decentralization is essential for long-term LED and permanent job creation. This suggests that donors should work with host country stakeholders in building local capacity to promote economic growth. Careful assessment and monitoring are essential. In this regard, local authorities should be encouraged to organize partnerships among local government institutions, private businesses, and community groups to pursue LED goals. Responsive government institutions and an honest, transparent regulatory framework are vital if the private sector is to rise to the challenges of reconstruction and be an engine of LED and new employment. Particularly important are viable legal institutions that guarantee property rights and the sanctity of contracts, along with properly functioning financial markets and supporting institutions. However, how can Public Works Projects fit in LED through reintegrating ex-combatants? This issue leads the discussion to the next chapter pertaining to ex-combatants’ economic reintegration.
CHAPTER 4: EX-COMBATANTS’ ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION

4.1. Introduction

Many African countries are emerging from large-scale armed conflicts that have left a legacy of chaotic economies, depleted productive capacities and sources of revenue. The peace dividend needs to be understood in social and economic terms, as well as financial terms. It is useful to link a country’s overall macroeconomic reform program to the planned economic reintegration program. Jump-starting the economy by rehabilitating critical infrastructure also can be linked to reintegration programs that involve training and employment schemes for both reconstructing material assets and building human and social capital. The realization of this objective hinges on the reintegration of ex-combatants into productive civilian roles.

This chapter discusses the economic reintegration of ex-combatants in a post-conflict society such as designed by Suzan Brown (2005). The analysis is focused on the economic opportunities and the viability options that ex-combatants are given during their transition to civilian life. The chapter will also look at some cases of ex-combatants’ economic reintegration as they have occurred in certain African post-conflict societies.

4.2. Analysis of Ex-combatants’ Economic Reintegration

As soon as a conflict ends, assessing job opportunities and services that might fit to ex-combatants’ skills profile is vital in the designing and planning of an economic reintegration program (UN, 2006). The analysis of labour market should be recurrent and must encompass the implementation of the reintegration program. The labour market should not be a foreign process to the reintegration; rather, “it has to include analysis of culturally appropriate professions for men and women of varying age groups, recognizing how conflict may have changed cultural norms about gender-appropriate work” (Chigunta, 2006: 67). Therefore, national and local governments through Public Works projects, in a post-conflict situation, bear the total responsibility of leading a market analysis (ibid). This task is devoted to the
ministry of labour and that of public works. Local experts and national authorities should have sufficient resources to conduct ex-combatant training activities and have to be equipped enough to do so. Ideally, a partnership between UN agencies, national officials, local and international non-governmental organizations should be an option to be prioritized (Chigunta, 2005; UN, 2006). National and local authorities should promote developmental Public Works Projects that are aimed at hiring marginalized people (Bennett, 2002).

Kapitsa (2002) advises that a post-conflict reconstruction framework should draw its foundation from labour-based Public Works Projects and public sector job creation in a broader vision of integrated post-conflict development programme based on a temporary measure. The understanding of temporary situation of labour-based public programmes and public sector job creation should reflect every national expenditure as it is set down through the national budget (Okojie, 2003). In this fact, the failure of reintegration programs to provide sustainable job opportunities for ex-combatants might be handled by hiring them into Public Works. This makes the reintegration programs draw on the overall sustainable economic development strategies (UN, 2006).

The following are different Public Works Projects’ options that a reintegration programme might draw on to economically assimilate ex-combatants.

4.2.1. Training and Skills Development

The lack of fundamental and advanced education for ex-combatants has prevented ex-combatants opportunities to be competitive on the job market. Providing ex-combatants with a tailored informal education or vocational training according to their different age groups increases the ex-combatants’ chances of being marketable (UN, 2006; www.undrdr.org/iddrs/og).

Training is not a reintegration process. Rather, a tool that reintegration program should utilize to reach its goal of reintegration. Reintegration managers should conceive a training program that tackles the basic problems of ex-combatants. Planning an ex-combatant training model means the teaching should address the imperatives of the informal sector in which ex-combatants are expected to start up the livelihoods. This means during the training period, ex-
combatants should have a mental map of their near future in terms of their socio-economic profile (UN, 2006; www.unddr.org/iddrs/og). Well trained ex-combatants are marketable, particularly in the private sectors and business development.

4.2.2. Private Sector and Business Development Services

A post-conflict society should have a post-conflict development framework in which policies and programs with regard to business creation and support for employment creation are provided. A post-conflict development framework defines not only basic sector to be developed but also has to present solutions to challenges that ex-combatants face after the socio-economic reinstatement (Brown, 2005). It is advised that appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks connected to post-conflict business development frameworks should be encouraged. This will attract private sector initiatives and then growth in the local economy (Okorie, 2003).

The private sector has to be given the role of monitoring and coordinating developmental projects, because in lots of post-conflict societies, private sectors bring the expertise, while government agencies suffer from a severe lack of capacity to support and deliver services to micro and small enterprises (White and Kenyon, 2000). Other post-conflict investors like businesses, local NGOs having experience in economic development projects and community groups should be welcomed to deliver business development services (BDS) (Brown, 2005). The private sectors and business development services should not overlook the existence of some rare local employment opportunities, rather they need to work together so as to enhance employment opportunities in a post-conflict situation.

4.2.3. Employment in Existing Businesses

It is a well known fact that the private sector has reservations about hiring ex-combatants who have limited skills (Bennett, 2002). The main task of reintegration programs is of re-skilling unskilled people into a post-war torn community, wherein employment opportunities are scarce. It is up to the reintegration programs to identify some existing jobs and place for trained ex-combatants. Relocation of skilled war veterans in existing employment minimizes the risk of new micro-enterprise failure because of a lack in skills on the part of ex-fighters (www.unddr.org/iddrs/og; Chigunta and Mkandawire, 2002; Chigunta, 2005). This entails
that reintegration programs have the duty of raising the employment hope for ex-combatants, by schooling and giving them salary.

Reintegration programs should, therefore, help raise available opportunities to ex-combatants by offering salary, schooling and equipment subsidies. For UN (2006), these subsidies however, should have the following conditions:

- A limited salary given during a limited period;
- Ex-combatants are not to be privileged than previous employed;
- The ex-combatants salary should be used to increase their businesses, that is to say ex-combatants must have a permanent job;
- Ex-combatants and other demobilized people or other vulnerable groups should be protected by labour rights making them out of abusive labour from the private sector.

4.2.4. Micro-enterprise and Small Business Start-ups

The development of businesses in a post-conflict society is just a theory but the reality on the ground remains something else. Foreign investors prefer to invest where there are both security guaranties and countries wherein economic policies favour to expansion of their workforce. It is, therefore, strongly advised that the development of private business which might have capacities to hire ex-combatants should be attracted. In case of existing businesses are worn out by the conflict, it is imperative to encourage and help ex-combatants to build their own micro-enterprise and start-up business plans and projects (UN, 2006; www.unddr.org/iddrs/og). This might not be an easy task for the reintegration programs, since managing a multiple member project is a difficult task. To overcome this latter impediment, reintegration programs should assure that all kinds of micro-enterprises are started and the distortion in the balance of supply and demand in local markets is avoided (Chigunta, 2006; UN, 2006; www.unddr.org/iddrs/og).
4.2.5. The Provision of Micro-grants

Micro-enterprises need to be funded in a post-conflict situation. Arguing about how a micro-enterprise should be financed, Chigunta (2006) states:

“Financial support to create micro-enterprises should be micro-grants, which should be offered to the ex-combatants only after they have mapped a clear business planning, and should be allocated in instalments” (Harsch quoted by Chigunta, 2006: 2).

Ex-combatants should be given allowances. These would include equipment, supplies and training on an incremental basis. This has proven to be the best way of assisting returnees rather than the cash instalments. Gradually instalments are more preferable in that they are easier to monitor and supervise than cash allowances. Cash payments generally end up being misused due to ex-combatants inexperience in new business set up (Chigunta, 2005; UN, 2006; www.unddr.org/iddrs/og). The advantage of the Brown’s model is that it gives us different economic reintegration options that are appropriate to a post-conflict society. These boost job creation and skills development for ex-combatants (Brown, 2005). However, it fails to tell us the best viable option that corresponds to economic reintegration in response to the area’s realities. The next section unpacks viable economic reintegration options as applied to a few African post-conflict societies.

4.3. Economic Reintegration Option for Ex-combatants

The ex-combatants economic reintegration option depends on the capacities of local government to develop a clear national LED. The Public Works Projects as the engine of LED need to play the central role of coming up with an understanding economic reintegration plan drawn on the national resource capacities. Brown defines these capacities as being “the state of the economy in terms of demand for labour, business opportunities, and the availability of land and credit; and characteristics of the target population of ex-combatants in terms of education, skill levels, age, gender, entrepreneurial ability, and aspirations” (2005: 4). The following Browns’ paradigm (Fig. 7) describes more than a few economic reintegration options that an ex-combatant might embark on once reintegrated into a civilian society. According to this framework, the main economic reintegration options are either to
undergo skills training after which one can find employment or to be self-employed. For Brown, self-employment involves agricultural work (farming) or operating a small (micro) business (Brown, 2005). Self-employment, in the form of farming and micro-businesses should be encouraged by aid organizations or host governments, as means to opening the way to the vital assimilation option that will be chosen by the returnee himself. Ex-combatants’ reintegration in micro-economic enterprises means that skills level, entrepreneurial ability, age, needs and aspirations should be assessed at the outset of the process, and must determine the available information on training and employment opportunities. This spells that the level of income that each employment option is perceived to generate is not to be overlooked (Brown, 2005).

Figure 4: Economic reintegration option for ex-combatants


Although the above chart portrays different economic opportunities for an ex-combatant (Fig. 7), the ex-combatant’s capacity to exploit these opportunities still remains questionable. On the one hand, ex-combatant’s reintegration depends on the country’s capacity to plan a local economic development capable of responding to post-conflict challenges. On the other hand,
however, cultural and environmental disparities from each country require that the reintegration program be differently adapted to each countries’ beliefs and realities (Chigunta and Mkandawire, 2002; Chigunta, 2005). Hence, deciding on ex-combatant’s economic reintegration option requires a strong analysis of labour market opportunity. These issues are addressed in the subsequent section.

4.4. Viable Options

From the Brown’s paradigm, it follows that several valuable lessons have to be taken into account when talking about the viability of economic reintegration through Public Works Projects. These lessons include: situation, needs and capabilities that ex-combatants need to embrace as they seek assimilation into civilian life. These viable options are described in the paragraphs below.

4.4.1. Micro-Enterprise

The feasibility of micro-enterprise as an economic reintegration for an ex-combatant is that micro-enterprise generates income both for those who cannot find wage-employment (which would provide a livelihood and are thus forced into self-employment) and also for those with genuine entrepreneurial aspirations to run their own businesses (Brown, 2005). It also generates additional job opportunities for other unemployed people in the community, by multiplying the benefits of the initial donor investment. Micro-enterprise gives rise to private sector development in a post-conflict national economy (Brown, 2005). Micro-enterprise offers a livelihood option in an environment where there are no opportunities for wage employment. Microenterprises can also reinforce other development programs, and vice versa. At the same time, microenterprise programs are likely to be more effective in raising ex-combatants’ incomes where rapid growth in the economy and in agricultural output, and better infrastructure, create a demand for the products and services provided by micro entrepreneurs. The following paragraphs try to draw a micro-enterprise program model for the economic reintegration of ex-combatants and a program design considerations specific to ex-combatants according to Brown framework (2005).
A Micro-Enterprise Programme Model for the Economic reintegration of ex-combatants

- Assessment of conditions in country and selected area, needs profile of target group
  Survey of potential business opportunities and referral alternatives in the area (Brown, 2005)
- Selection of local NGO or government partners (to provide local knowledge, background check on applicants for loan/grant approval, and monitoring assistance)
  Program design and approval, public announcement of programme
- Initial screening of applications, background checks with partner NGOs and cross checking with the military, to identify fraudulent applicants (care should be taken to eliminate personal bias in this screening process)
- Interview of screened candidates, preliminary evaluation together with local community advisors, to check for reliability and to produce a first applicant profile
- Conduct of aptitude tests, assessment of results: business skills, attitude to risk, and business experience. If insufficient score, refer applicant to skills training, temporary public works projects, local employment offices or local NGOs, using the inventory of referral alternatives developed above
- Development of small business training curriculum (e.g. entrepreneurship, functions of management, types of businesses, accounting and taxation, marketing and business planning); training of a pool of small business advisors/trainers
- Business planning for screened applicants:
  - Information sessions on local business opportunities
  - Business idea generation workshops, market research by applicants
  - Business training sessions
  - Preparation of business plans by applicants, assisted by business advisors
- Assessment and Approval of Business Plan by a Selection Committee comprised of the Executing Agency, a Microfinance Institution or bank (if one is involved), the local NGO partner, and a representative of the community business advisory panel.
Selection criteria will include business viability, number of jobs created, guarantees available (if loan) and applicant’s reliability

- Business Start-up and Operation
  - Monitoring and on-going business counselling/technical assistance
  - Loan repayment (if applicable)
  - A Micro-enterprise program design considerations specific to ex-combatants
  - They are an economically vulnerable group, usually lacking education, marketable skills, material assets, and social networks
  - They are usually not in need of long term support, as they make good use of their discharge payments and settling-in packages
  - Support should thus be targeted to disadvantaged regions and groups first, e.g. females, child soldiers, and the disabled, as they have limited access to benefits and employment.
  - Female and disabled ex-combatants should have preferential access to skills training and capital
  - Child soldiers do not have the life-experience needed for microenterprise, but should have preferential access to vocational training and job placements
  - Some ex-combatants may have an entitlement mentality, based on the normative values adopted during combat. This could make them poor credit risks, although those held to the same standards as any other borrower group were observed to react well.
  - Lack of social acceptance of the individual by the receiving community may hinder his/her business prospects.

4.4.2. Agriculture

The viability of agriculture as an economic reintegration for returnees is that it may offer a means of securing a living even in the absence of a developed labour market (Chigunta, 2005). However, the reintegration schemes in many countries failed to encourage viable agricultural reintegration, partly due to a reliance on choices made by ex-combatants (Harsch
quoted by Chigunta, 2006). The situation is further complicated by the issue of land ownership and inadequate access to land by ex-combatants.

Agriculture is an appropriate programme for ex-combatants' reintegration (Chigunta, 2005). Ex-combatants who have developed their business in agriculture are better off than those who are involving themselves in other sectors. This is due to the fact that agriculture ensures continued existence in situation where there is a shortage or lack of labour-market in a post-conflict society (Harsch, 2005). Though ex-combatants trained in agriculture and farming perform well and fend for their livelihoods, agricultural programs are less attractive to ex-combatants. In Sierra Leone for example, only 15 per cent of former soldiers chose the agricultural program and took up farming, while the rest of ex-combatants were disinterested in agriculture and the rural life (Harsch, 2005).

4.4.3. Vocational Training

Skills shortage generally impedes ex-combatant marketability and competitiveness on the labour market in a post-conflict period. To address this situation, reintegration programs provide ex-combatants with vocational education or training to allow them to make a living in the civilian economy (UN, 2006). For the UN, training erases ex-combatants’ combatant attitudes and behaviour, and builds up values and norms based on peace and democracy (UN, 2006). Vocational training for an ex-combatant fits much better than formal education because it directly addresses ex-combatants’ basic concerns and is closely linked to the local labour-market which targets local economic potential and its business opportunities (UN, 2006).

Leading a research on vocational training and economic potential of a post-conflict society, Gera (2002) and Kapitsa (2002) provide that when dealing with labour market assessment in a post-conflict society the existing economic cultures ought to place meticulous attention on the issues of gender with particular attention on the existing economic culture, and ways in which the program can give the same chance to women and men to have equal access to all types of work by addressing gender inequality. Vocational training comes to revamp the opportunity of discovering ex-combatants latent practical skills that they might have never utilized in their life (UN, 2006).
4.4.4. Education and Scholarships

Education and training for young ex-combatants in a post-conflict society should have a particular attention. Young people who are still under 15 have to be eligible for the formal education, and schooling. Bennett (2002) and Chigunta (2006) provided progressive ideas when they proposed extra support for teachers and trainers to manage the special needs of such learners. For them, teenager ex-combatants are to be allocated in the public schooling institutions, while those older than 20 years of age have to be beneficiaries of state assistance. The state assistance might be in the form of financial support in order that they finish their studies. This entails that when dealing with education of ex-combatants, the youth should be prioritized, and the attention should be placed on girls in particular (UN, 2006).

United Nations’ stance on ex-combatants training and education in a post-conflict situation eloquently argues that the transformation of post-conflict agenda depends on the reconstruction of youth ex-combatants. Collectively the United Nations and other authors like Gera (2002) and Kapitsa (2002) provide deep insights into the problem of training and education of ex-combatants. School allowances budget should cover the total period of ex-combatants ‘education. This period could be longer than the reintegration program, therefore, the financial planning of ex-combatants’ education should effectively target scarce resources and their availability, and identify potential support to the process in case the budget runs short (Kapitsa, 2002; UN, 2006).

4.4.5. Apprenticeships and In-service Training

The purpose of vocational training is to empower ex-combatants with new skills usable through apprenticeships or in-service training in existing businesses that might become more sustainable employment. In a post-conflict situation wherein a training program is expected to be undertaken, the opportunities for learning and training of former soldiers should be subsidized by paying the trainee an allowance. The local belief or tradition is a crucial asset to the success of apprenticeship and in-service training, for it ensures the programme sustainability (UN, 2006). The apprenticeship improves levels of general education which contributes substantially to the effectiveness of employer and private training and to project-related training. It has also been shown to complement traditional apprenticeship in the
informal sector (Harsch, 2005). Apprenticeship has proven to be an excellent way of social reintegration and reconciliation, as it brings together returnees with other community’s members (Bennett, 2002; Harsch, 2005; UN, 2006).

4.4.6. Life Skills

The life skills can be related to the capabilities approach. The term “life skills” emerged about a decade ago in relation with the need to address what could help learners to cope with risks, decision making, emergency situations and survival strategies. Specific education modules were designed to train them in the ways to react when faced by such situations that they may encounter in their lives (UN, 2005). In this context, the “life skills” also addressed the request to foster the learners' personal development, to help them unfold their potential and enjoy an accomplished private, professional and social life. Finally, the concept of “life skills” was progressively associated with an education aiming at the acquisition of specific essential behaviours (UN, 2006).

At the World Conference on Education for All, in Jomtien in 1990, the importance of teaching skills that are particularly relevant to current life was raised (UN, 2005). Ten years later, in Dakar, a framework for action was adopted defining the four key pillars that are required to ensure a quality education in the long-term, namely: learning knowledge, learning to do, learning to be, and learning to live together (Ibid). The two last dimensions, learning to be and learning to live together, are the so-called “life-skills” since they deal with those important psycho-social capabilities that people need in order to live in harmony with others and to be able to master correctly their own lives.

Within this framework, one can consider life skills as particular capabilities that should be reinforced, through the implementation of a suitable education policy, in the context of human development. They can be used to avoid the upsurge of serious conflicts, by improving attention to others and overcoming mental traumas due to social tensions and frustration. The provision of life skills is a necessary asset to ex-combatants and not a luxury. According to UN (2006), life skills training should not only include anger management classes, tutoring on appropriate civilian social behaviours and career planning, but should also extend towards other types of behaviour, like professional, social, political behaviour.
Life skills being a way of dealing with social behaviour and population participation in the social structure should complement other social training with regard to social rights and responsibilities. Ex-combatants, therefore, should be encouraged to participate to democratic structures in their new society (UN, 2006).

4.5. Conclusion

Labour-based Public Works Projects and public sector job creation play a crucial role in successful reintegration, by increasing ex-combatants’ chances to effectively participate in the labour market. The provision of business development services can address the non-financial constraints faced by ex-combatants, such as lack of education, inadequate technical skills, poor access to markets, lack of information and unreliable infrastructure. Reintegration programmes can help to increase the opportunities available to ex-combatants by offering wage, training and equipment subsidies. The development of micro-enterprise start-up business plans should be undertaken by ex-combatants with the guidance and support of the DDR programme team. The main tool for funding the creation of micro-enterprises should be micro grants which, as recent experience indicates, should be disbursed to the ex-combatants only on the basis of a clearly established start-up business plan, and should be paid in installments. Successful economic reintegration is equivalent to the ex-combatants’ productive activities that render them responsible to hold their own livelihoods. That is to say returnees newly skilled are socio-economically self-reliant and contribute to the improvement of the post-conflict LED (Bennett, 2006).

However, it is important to note that economic development and permanent job creation occur together. Measures to encourage LED should begin as soon as there are viable prospects for peace. Private sector initiatives should be actively promoted and assistance to micro and small enterprise development, small holder agriculture, cooperatives for farmers and other producers, and public-private partnerships is appropriate at all stages of post conflict recovery. Thus, the question arises of how can LED in Kivu happen along with permanent job creation in order to avoid the recurring weaknesses of the programme? This issue is addressed in the next chapter of the report which relates to planning prospective for the reintegration of ex-combatants in Kivu.
CHAPTER 5:

PLANNING PROSPECTIVE FOR KIVU’S EX-COMBATANTS REINTEGRATION:
TOWARDS A LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ENHANCEMENT

5.1. Introduction

Ex-combatants and victims alike often welcome the end of hostilities and are willing to “give peace a chance.” Peace negotiations and the post-peace agreement phase can be opportunities to implement political and labour market reforms that improve the status of previously disenfranchised groups. A more secure and equitable work environment can encourage public and private investment necessary for inclusive and risk reducing growth (Musila, 2009). Kivu having major natural resources required for a sustainable LED in a post-conflict context, Public Works Projects can particularly be important in leading the reintegration of ex-combatants programs aimed at achieving local economic enhancement (UN system wide-Policy, 2008). This chapter discusses a possibility of local economic development as a planning prospective for the reintegration of ex-combatants in Kivu. In the first part, the discussion is based on the physical context of Kivu and how its geostrategic situation can influence the development of the region. In the second part, the chapter attempts to unpack the reintegration program as it takes place in Kivu, in comparison to other post-conflict societies and the last part of the chapter looks at how agriculture, small businesses and infrastructure renovation can be a successful model for the reintegration of ex-combatants and a way toward LED enhancement for the region.

5.2. Context of the Study

Kivu (230,510 sq km) is located in the Eastern part of Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It is one of the richest mineral and agricultural regions. The Region shares its borders with Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi on the East of the DRC and with Province Orientale, Kasai oriental and Katanga inside the country. Kivu region provides the country with coffee, cotton, rice and palm oil. Tin, gold are also produced in area. The diversity of Kivu mineral and agricultural resources generally is beset in the hands of various rebellions and guerrillas
launched from neighboring countries such as Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda (The Columbia Encyclopedia, 2004). Although the intervention of international organizations and Congolese government in demobilizing, disarming and reintegrating process in the DRC, the reintegration programme is far from finishing and did not reach the target (ISS, 2007; Takhur, 2008).

Figure 5: The Kivu map, showing neighboring countries and provinces

![Kivu Map](image)


5.2.1. Administrative Context

Up until 1986, Kivu was one single province. The region was then split to three different administrative entities or provinces, namely: Nord-Kivu, Sud-Kivu, and Maniema. Ostensibly Kivu’s subdivision was the first test towards decentralization system (Musila, 2009). In reality, the decentralization system as tested in Kivu, aimed to contain political tensions
between the leaders of different ethnic groups. However, despite this political subdivision, Kivu still remains a land of rivalries (Ndaywel, 1998; Musila, 2006). In general, the land’s rivalries in the Earstern part of the DRC and particularly in Kivu are one of the origin of internal conflicts (Baba Kaké and M'Bokolo, 1977). The endless politic and economic tensions between Nande and Banyarwanda ethnic groups in North Kivu, and in Sud-Kivu, between the Bashi and the Barega confirm the competitive environment between different ethnicities over the land mangement (Ndaywel, 1998). The Kivu’s economic anthropology revolves around land’s rivalries between these four main ethnic groups and their support networks (Baba Kaké and M'Bokolo, 1977).

5.2.2. Physical Location

Kivu belongs to the Great Lakes region. The region is well located, being at the intersection of trade routes that connect the Indian Ocean to South Sudan (Pourtier, 2003). This region has served as a meeting point between merchants from different cultural background (Renault, 1987). According to Roland Pourtier (2003), this region is well located where Francophone Central Africa meets East Africa, an Anglophone and Swahiliphone region looking out onto the Indian Ocean and the Arab world. Kivu lays in the drainage basin of two great rivers – the Congo and the Nile – the former flows towards the Atlantic, while the latter towards the Indian Ocean (Cros and Misser, 2006). Having a meeting point at Kisangani, Congo and Nile rivers fill the falls of lakes Albert, Edward, Kivu and Tanganyka which all run from North to South and serve as a natural border for the DRC with its Eastern neighbours, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania -all members of the East African Community- (EAC) along with Kenya (ibid).

Initiative pour l’Afrique Centrale (INICA) and Laboratoire d’Analyse Régionale et d’Expertise Sociale (LARES’) Survey on the Great Lakes Region depicts that the Kivu’s ecology is made up of high lands. These high lands have advantages of having both tropical mountains and low temperatures. Tropical mountains and low temperatures contribute to a healthier environment that attracts tourism businesses, agricultural and farming activities (INICA and LARES, 2006). Kivu does not have tuberculosis and trypanosomiasis, known as tropical severe diseases (Musila, 2009). Additionally, the region has fertile volcanic soil
which offers to the region attractive arable lands (Cros and Misser, 2006). These privileges expose the region to better conditions for raising cattle, making the region’s high lands over time coveted by both farmers and cattle herders (ibid). This situation has given rise to areas of high demographic concentration, where the population density exceeds 330 inhabitants per square kilometer (hbts/km²) (Musila, 2009).

5.2.3. Demographic Factors

Since the 1990s, Kivu has faced bloodshed civil wars with result being a very heterogeneous population and recurring migration, as well as to omnipresent internal tensions between cattle herders and farmers (Mathieu and Mafikiri, 1998; Musila 2009). This situation has further been spoiled by the unique and transformative nature of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Kivu still hosts more than million Rwandan refugees and fugitives in its edging districts, whose presence gets worse its existing ethnic and land tensions (Musila, 2009). In 1990s, the junction of pastures, arable land and high population in a restricted space created strong tensions linked to land ownership (Mathieu and Mafikiri, 1998). As this has been showed earlier, the land ownership issue is an ever-present conflict which lies at the heart of Kivu’s different communities. The land ownerships’ issue has also involved that of the natural resources (wood and minerals). Since 1990s, Kivu’s natural resources are linked to the international market, with result being the complexity conflict to the existing intercommunity tensions (Baba Kaké and M'Bokolo, 1977). Kivu’s conflicts arise over the control of coveted lands among a diverse population that has been unbalanced by massive migratory movements (Initiative pour l’Afrique centrale-INICA-and Laboratoire d’Analyse Régionale et d’Expertise Sociale-LARES, 2006).

5.2.4. Rivalries over Land

The land’s rivalries in Kivu are not only fuelled by the issue of land ownership, but also by the confusion caused by the coexistence of two methods of land management (Baba Kaké and M'Bokolo, 1977). The Congolese regulation pertaining to the land management links the ownership of the land to the state (land belongs to the state), which grants exploitation licenses. Traditional customs, however, entitle traditional chiefs to protect the land and bestow the land rights to the community or clan that cultivates it (Musila, 2009). Under this
clash, the state always wins any land disputes. With result being, peasants are expropriated from their land rights, which entails their uncertainty and instability (ibid). Additionally, Kivu has two cultural conceptions of land totally divergent. The first cultural conception is that some ethnies define land as a tie between an ethnic group, a Mwami (the traditional authority) and a given area. According to this conception, access to land is directly linked to membership of a network of social relations which involve a duty of loyalty (tributes and tithes) and the provision of services. The second group, however, defines land as a value and can belong to individuals, free of personal ties or obligations. The second conception makes land, the farming and cattle herding rights which come with it, the object of personal desire (Mathieu and Mafikiri, 1998; Musila, 2009). Conflicts over land rights and the extension of territory have become fundamental components guaranteeing political and social emancipation (Musila, 2009).

5.2.5. Kivu’s Economy

The fundamental issue of Kivu’s economy is linked both to the market structure (Musila, 2006; 2009) and the system of the communication networks between producers and consumers -between the countryside and the country’s cities- (Department for Planning and Urbanism, 2004). Basic infrastructure disruption and enormous security challenges caused by idle ex-combatants and armed groups are some post-conflicts’ legacy that Kivu is still facing. Kivu’s economic infrastructure has completely broken down, or works poorly (ibid). In 2004, the DRC’s Research Department for Planning and Urbanism (BEAU) described the DRC as being “torn” into three main “socio-economic and cultural zones” (BEAU, 2004):

- A Western zone facing towards the Atlantic whose transport networks converge on Kinshasa and the port of Matadi;
- An Eastern zone with no dominant city, but centered on the highlands, having almost no links to the capital Kinshasa and oriented towards the Indian Ocean;
- A Southern zone focused on the DRC’s copper basin and its hinterland, oriented towards Southern Africa.
Kivu’s economy is disintegrated. The whole region’s economy is badly connected to the region’s cities and the rest of the DRC’s economy. This has been the result of the lack of reliable economic infrastructure. However, Kivu links to the national economy, in terms of goods imported and exported to and from the region (Musila, 2006). Kivu’s economy is divided into four geographical categories (Musila, 2009):

- **South West to North Route:** This main route is totally busy with heavy air traffic carrying minerals or palm oil between the main cities of the Eastern provinces. This is the heart of Kivu’s economy. This route links Goma’s international airport to Oriental Province and, is complemented by roads leading to Rwanda, Uganda and Southern Sudan, and is connected to Lubumbashi by rails.

- **Nord-Kivu – Sud-Kivu – Oriental Province –Kinshasa:** This route has been the exclusively air-based route between Kivu and Kinshasa. The over 2000 km airline route was busy with supplying the capital with vegetables and meat from the large farms owned by airline companies. The years of war ( 1990s), followed by the collapse of the farms reduced the flow of goods. Since the official end of the war in 2003, some airlines have restarted using this route to transport people as well as goods. To date, level of activities are nonetheless less than those of the pre-war years.

- **The North-Kivu – South-Kivu Route:** This economic route is dominated by water-based traffic. It links Goma to Bukavu, respectively the capital of Noth Kivu and South Kivu. The goods are transported by boats and motorized canoes range from agricultural produce (beans from Rutshuru and Masisi) to imported manufactured goods, foods, pharmaceuticals and electronics. The road between the two cities is still in a good state, but its different segments are controlled by armed groups.

- **South-Kivu – Maniema Ties:** This route is broken up into numerous segments and is being currently under refurbishment. From time to time it has been saved as a route of goods and minerals transportation.
As said earlier, Kivu is located in a middle of two rivers’ basin (Congo and Nile) and is in the heart of the Great Lakes Region. This geostrategic location makes the region well integrated with the East African economy and Swahili cultural zone (Cros and Misser, 2006). This economic and ecologic geostrategic position clearly exposes Kivu to a cross-border geopolitical situation (Ibid). Kivu is only connected to the West by air, while to the East, it has several possible connections at its disposal: air, water-based routes across the lakes, roads, and rail (Musila, 2009). The region has two international railway lines (the “Northern corridor” via Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya, and the “Central corridor” via Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania) these airrail lines link Kivu to the ports of Mombasa in Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania (Ibid). INICA and LARES (2006) state that the daily traffic at border crossings allows trade density to be measured. Such crossings have been simplified by a series of trade accords signed by Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda within the framework of the Great Lakes Economic Community (CEPGL) (Musila, 2009).

Theoretically, Kivu has the economic potential that the region needs to be a post-conflict economic central hub of the DRC, however, the major handicap seems to be its geographic isolation caused by the lack of conducive infrastructure and the insecurity of political instabilities and conflict (Musila, 2009). To date, while the decentralization issue is one stride towards the local economic development, policy favouring decentralization coupled with the reconstruction of the economy infrastructure can be able to solve these issues. Although Kivu theoretically have resources that can enhance its LED, however, the last three civil strifes that have blown up in the region (1996: the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo [AFDL], 1998: the Congolese Rally for Democracy [RCD] and 2007: The National Congress for the Defence of the People [CNDP]) have shed light on the workings of this Eastern part of the DRC, in particular its local economic development and ex-combatants’ reintegration programme. Taking advantage of the fact that the DRC’s DDR programmes did not work properly, these conflicts have resulted in Kivu being an unrest region, disabled socio-economically, wherein local economic development and the ex-combatants’ reintegration program are still not working out properly. The following section tries to analyse the reintegration programme as applied in Kivu.
5.3. Kivu’s Reintegration

In Kivu, UNICEF (2002) worked hand in hand with local authorities to structure and to develop programmes towards reintegrating ex-combatants back into civil society. UNICEF worked in conjunction with provincial authorities and local NGOs and implemented reintegration programmes in Goma (North Kivu), and Bukavu (South Kivu). The reintegration programmes, as undertaken by UNICEF, encompassed three phases. The first three-month phase involved ex-combatants’ psychological counseling and their participation in community building activities. The second six-month phase was designed to reintegrate ex-combatants into their families. At this stage, the programme set to put ex-combatants with other care-givers as well as give them literacy and vocational training. Phase three, however, comprised close monitoring of the reintegration process, the continuation of counseling, and the provision of additional capacity-building training (UNICEF, 2002).

Kivu’s reintegration programme aims at expanding access to education materials, training of teachers, rehabilitation of schools, increased participation of parents in school management, access to school meals, and enhanced opportunities for youth for vocational training and participation in community life (Boshoff, 2007; Takhur, 2008). The programme also promotes social and economic empowerment through increased access to skills and vocational training. Its particular focus is on women, youth and other vulnerable groups with expectancy being individual, household. Community incomes increase as a result of livelihoods and income-generating opportunities. This includes rapid-employment and micro-enterprise activities and cash voucher / food for assets and training activities, on the one hand; and on the other hand, agricultural productivity and long-term food security promoted through support for food processing, alternative fuel and cooking methods, seed distribution, strengthening of agricultural production capacities, market rehabilitation and cash voucher / food for work schemes (Takhur, 2008). Moreover, increased local production and increased employment through the “Purchase for Progress” initiative to encourage improved agricultural practices, improved transport infrastructure and better access to markets (Boshoff, 2007; Takhur, 2008). With result being some child soldiers in Kivu and province oriental went through agricultural training as one of the reintegration components. Ex-combatants from remote villages bordering the Bunia region have been trained in farming
techniques and received assistance instalments (a wheelbarrow and a watering can) to start up their own business (GTZ, 2005; ISS, 2007).

On the ground, however, things do not look like they should be. Kivu still has a huge number of ex-combatants (ISS, 2007). CONADER established that 10,000 fighters still need to be demobilized in the Eastern of the DRC (Takhur, 2008). In Kivu, CONADER is working in partnership with some implementation stakeholders who sub-contract the work to a number of NGOs (Takhur, 2008). The continuing presence of armed groups shows that the disarmament and demobilization programme has been unsuccessful, and the reintegration of ex-combatants has not fully implemented (ibid). Research from Takhur devoted to Kivu’s reintegration depicts a lack of coordination and management on behalf of both national and international communities. Takhur (2008) states that the problems that beset the DDR programme stem, on the one hand; from poor planning of reintegration programmes leading to poor technical, logistical and financial coordination and implementation and, on the other, from poor understanding and conceptualization of Kivu’s realities and, ex-combatants dynamics behaviour, not only by CONADER, but also by the reintegration programmes sponsors, including UNDP and World Bank. Kivu’s reintegration programme stakeholders pledged US$200 million towards the civilian component of the national DDR programme. This joint contribution from World Bank and donor community has never been totally released (Boshoff, 2007).

Kivu’s reintegration budget being exhausted and international donors having not fully delivered their financial and material supports as pledged, many demobilized ex-combatants are still waiting to be reintegrated in Kivu (Takhur, 2008). The weakness and lack of strategy in the Kivu’s reintegration programme are also the fact that the reintegration programme drew away from the African experiences in the reintegration of ex-combatants. The programme seems not to focus on the economic aspect of the ex-combatants and neither does it pave the way for the ex-combatants’ economy recovery. Critics such as GTZ (2005); Boshoff (2007) and Takhur (2008) among others have acknowledged that the reintegration programmes took place within conflict areas where ex-combatants were exposed to being re-recruited by their former military groups and it was solely approached from a short-term security perspective by placing the focus solely on containing violence. Takhur (2008),
however, emphasises that the Kivu’s DDR has been a complex process because it attempts to integrate security sector reform (SSR) with DDR, while the Kivu is still plagued by endemic violence, on the one hand, and on the other hand, reintegration has been an afterthought, with no focus on economic aspect based on Public Works Projects.

In a discussion on planning for the reintegration of ex-combatants in a post-conflict situation, Kingma (1997) points out that the planning of the reintegration programme needs to involve all levels of government, especially the municipal and provincial levels. The highest levels of government have the most resources (financial and otherwise) but the least knowledge of the situation on the ground, while the lowest levels have the opposite strengths and weaknesses. Vertically integrating planning will allow constituencies at all levels of society to have ample opportunity to contribute to the reintegration process (Ibid). Although Kivu province and its municipalities were struggling to meet their reintegration mandate, the provincial level seems to be the weak link in the reintegration programmes (Boshoff, 2007).

Despite DDR programme was put in place, planning for the reintegration of ex-combatants at the provincial sphere did not work out and most of the reintegration planning formulated were weak and not very strategic because local authorities were not given sufficient resource to deal with the reintegration issue, and the ex-combatants’ stance was overlooked in the reintegration planning (Craner, 2002; Anderlini, 2004). In addition, contrary to other war-torn countries’ experiences having dealt with the ex-combatants’ reintegration programmes, the Kivu experience further shows that there was still mistrust between ex-combatants and the local communities. Ex-combatants were afraid of leaving their armed groups, and the communities that would receive them were normally afraid to do so as well (UNICEF, 2002). Ex-combatants’ immediate families were often disadvantaged and thus, ill-prepared to receive and reintegrate ex-fighters. Moreover, the wider socio-economic support structures needed to reintegrate former soldiers back into civilian life were also largely non-existent (Ibid).
5.4. Learning from African Best Practices

The diversity of reintegration experiences among countries is so great that drawing general lessons is hazardous. However, with the appropriate care, and always putting reintegration within the broader economic issues, one might draw some general lessons from the available research and other information on reintegration, particularly in Africa (Kingma, 97).

When planning and implementing a reintegration programme, attention should be drawn on the transition of ex-combatants’ behaviour and the state of the post-conflict economy. Both elements are very crucial since they influence the transition from military to civilian life and the success or failure of ex-combatants’ economic reintegration. From different scenarios of Sub-Saharan African reintegration programmes as discussed above, it is evident that economic reintegration is closely linked to long-term post-war economic and social development plans (Harsch, 2005). However, it should not blind us of the potential failures of reintegration programmes, as this occurred in certain other countries.

The well-orchestrated reintegration programmes in Angola, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Liberia and Rwanda is an example worth emulating. The Angola, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Liberia and Rwanda reintegration enabled the reconstruction of the local development in making ex-combatants proactive human resources. Again, the programmes emphasised on decentralized administrative structure which empowered different level of government to have exclusive functions. Given some weak institutional structures and other challenges that characterise the reintegration programmes, countries such as Mozambique and Namibia missed to strategise their reintegration planning. In Mozambique, ex-combatants did not have a reintegration programme. However, owing to an intellectual advantage, some ex-combatants have reintegrated themselves quite easily. This is the case of Mr. António Gaspar, ex-combatant from the Mozambican government army in the early 1990s. Having a higher education, he was easily able to find a teaching position at the country’s Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Harsch, 2005). In Namibia, as discussed earlier, the reintegration planning was a patchwork of well-intended responses.

Alien to Mozambican situation, in Angola, however, the Government reintegration programmes created an ex-combatants department which supported ex-combatants beyond
the term set with international graners. As stated earlier, more than 10,500 have been
trained and assigned to the job (Mungoi, 1999). Ex-combatants found themselves hired in
public sector under Public Works Projects initiated by the national government. The
experience in both Liberia and Sierra Leone gave a picture of hope for sustainable ex-
combatants’ economic reintegration. This programme got a large number of ex-combatants
having acquired livelihood. On the one hand, those who have been trained in farming and
agriculture are still economically performing. On the other hand, it shows that without any
significant access to micro-credit schemes and few job opportunities, the skills development
training has lost its potential value to ex-combatants (Harsch, 2005; Chigunta, 2006), which
made Liberian ex-combatants use their reintegration reimbursement to develop their own
skills fit to the socio-economic realities. Harsch (2005: 3), for the purpose, provides that
“many ex-combatants used their reintegration benefits to buy basic diamond, mining
equipment, and prefer to settle in the mining district areas for diamonds. Others bought
motorbikes and are running them on a commercial basis. Those who squandered all they were
given are now in a deplorable and frustrating situation, with little or no hope. They believe
that they did not achieve anything from the reintegration”.

The Liberian reintegration programmes also revealed that about 40 per cent of ex-combatants
desired to acquire skills by returning to school, whilst preferred a vocational training with
auto mechanics being the most popular choice among men and tailoring among women
(Harsch, 2005); while in Sierra Leone Harsch sees a hopeful note. He concurs with Green
(2000) and Gera (2000) that tens of thousands of ex-combatants are already working as
carpenters, cocoa farmers, small-scale traders and electricians. Though there are some notes
of significant progress in Liberian and Sierra Leonean reintegration, in both countries,
however, ex-combatants skilled in agriculture and farming have been overlooked during the
distribution of lands (Harsch, 2005). In South Africa, the Expended Public Works
Programmes succeeded to reintegrate freedom fighters. Ex-combatants got chance to achieve
their studies, however, a gap between those who efficiently used their skills and those who
failed to do so still exist (Mashike, 2002). Lesson from South African reintegration depict
that the concept of ideology, when designing a reintegration plan, should be well handled.
Most rebellions used Marxist-Leninist ideology, in order to instil in the mind of fighters the
concept of social equality. Currently, global neo-liberalism is the master word on the market; as such reintegration risks a failure because ideological discrepancies that exists between Neo-liberalism and Marxism. As stated by Mungoi (1999) when looking at the South African post-conflict society, He argues that the implementation of reintegration under neo-liberal hegemony is not adequate. South Africa led an urban reintegration not properly planned and implemented, leaving behind complaints among former freedom fighters.

In sight of the broad-based lessons from the above review, one can say that a reintegration plan should extend over a realistic period of time for reconstruction. It will then, be the principal strategic planning instrument which guides and informs all planning, budgeting, management and decision-making processes. In short, reintegration programme consists in alleviating ex-combatants’ poverty and is a window towards the improvement of the post-conflict LED.

5.5. Discussion and Critical Assessment

As a poverty alleviation process and an economic recovery, the reintegration programme is a joint effort by governments and international agencies. The international review shows that the success of the reintegration programmes depends on the decentralization degree and the efficient use of the public means through Public Works Projects (and/or development and socio-economic projects) which provide former combatants with the means to more desirable productive work in line with what is realistic given market conditions and manage their expectations of what is realistically available in the market. Put simply, from the African experiences, economic reintegration means:

- Tailoring interventions in response to the detailed socio-economic needs assessments of ex-combatants and receiving communities;
- Building upon the existing self-help livelihood strategies of local communities;
- Building participation, transparency and accountability in the design, implementation and evaluation of programmes;
Building capacity of government to assume long-term responsibility of local development processes.

Against to the international review, Kivu’s reintegration describes that there are still many holes in the understanding of economic reintegration. Although reintegration programme has emerged in Kivu in recent years, the prevalence of unresolved questions about key aspects of economic reintegration suggests that current DDR practices have significant room for improvement (Takhur, 2008). Kivu’s unresolved issues of key aspects of economic reintegration are:

- Lack of employment actually leads to the resumption of war
- Uncertain right balance of skills training and capital infusions for getting former combatants back to work
- Community-driven recovery programmes actually do not lead to improved economic or social outcomes for former combatants
- Lack of the criteria by which to determine the most appropriate balance between individual and community based targeting for economic reintegration
- Unintended effects of DDR programmes on the broader economy
- Programmes are not coordinated with longer term development planning.

Experiences from African post-conflict countries show that the micro-enterprises approach is deployed usefully to support the economic reintegration of ex-combatants in a post-conflict situation. Having a significant success in contributing to economic growth, social stability and equity, the sector is one of the most important vehicles through which low-income people can escape poverty (Brown, 2005; Nilsson, 2005). With limited skills and education to compete for formal sector jobs, ex-combatants find economic opportunities in micro-enterprise as business owners and employees (Brown, 2005). As it is mentioned earlier, the success of reintegration programme in Sub-Saharan African post-conflict societies draws on provisions for absorbing ex-combatants into restructured lucrative conditions. In countries like Angola, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, to name a few, ex-
combatants’ economic reintegration was led through either Public Works Projects or socio-economic (developmental) projects, which assisted ex-combatants with limited education and few skills to be employed through different developmental projects like agriculture, farming, carpeting, sewing, masonry (Chigunta, 2006).

The reintegration as a socio-economic process through which an ex-combatant switches to civilian life (Harsch, 2005), its full success is equivalent to the ex-combatants’ productive activities that render them responsible of their livelihoods (Bennett, 2006). As seen in other post-conflict societies, the success of ex-combatants reintegration relies on intensive agricultural skills training, conflict resolution skills and experience, literacy and numeracy training. Economic reintegration, as happened in some Sub-Saharan African countries has provided ex-combatants with financial autonomy through employment (Ibid). Different initiatives have catered to the special needs of disabled veterans who cannot reintegrate into the labor force, for rural settlers, and for urban settlers (Harsch, 2005). Common economic reintegration programmes include education and professional training, public employment, encouragement of private initiative through skills development and microcredit support, and access to land have been done (Bennett, 2006; Chigunta, 2006). As Harsch (2005) would point out, for the reintegration to be more functional and productive within a given area, Public Works Projects need to plan and set a training programme based on agricultural and small enterprises reintegration for ex-combatants and community members. For him, training being a reintegration tool is generally provided to ex-combatants and community’s members as a means towards LED (Harsch, 2005).

From the above consideration, it follows that Kivu's formal economy is dominated by the agriculture, small businesses, livestock, fisheries and mining sectors. Agriculture is basically practiced in the villages, and for subsistence. It provides with major sources of income (65%), small businesses (20%), Livestock (10%) and fisheries (5%) (Alin, 2002). The major crops are cassava, rice and sweet potatoes and the main cash crops include coffee, palm oil, rubber, cotton, sugar, tea, and cocoa. Food crops include cassava, plantains, maize, groundnuts, and rice (Ibid). Though agriculture is the mainstay of the region, commercial agricultural production, however, remains limited, with many producers engaged in subsistence food production. Mineral sector, however, accounts for the vast majority of
Kivu’s exports and represent the single largest source of foreign direct investment (Alin, 2002).

Planning for a Kivu’s ex-combatants reintegration as a path towards the local economic development means that appropriate economy recovery plan and poverty alleviation framework for Kivu’s ex-combatants should simultaneously address central problems facing ex-combatants and local communities in the post-conflict society, namely growing unemployment (Gera, 2000). This means that Kivu’s DDR planning through development projects under Public Works Projects should draw on a new local developmental framework based on local capacities (Takhur, 2008). Under this framework, Public Works Projects have to go a long way towards ensuring direct and sustainable poverty alleviation and strengthening capacities for ex-combatants self-reliance. For this to be effective, this research proposes a reintegration programme through Public Works Projects with some viable options like agriculture, small businesses and infrastructure as sectors to be taken into account.

5.6. Viable Options for Kivu’s Ex-combatants Reintegration

Brown’s paradigm as set earlier offers a reintegration framework that Kivu’s programme can draw on. According to the paradigm, the Kivu’s reintegration programmes through Public Works Projects need to make use of local opportunities such as agriculture, small business and infrastructure.

5.6.1. Agriculture

Agriculture provides Kivu with 65% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Alin, 2002). This means that the region’s main economic activity is the agricultural production. Thus, Kivu’s reintegration could be based on the agricultural aspect. Based on the prior discussion on availability of land capacity in Kivu, ex-combatants’ reintegration through agriculture is feasible and could be planned under agricultural pilot training centres. Reintegration through agriculture under agricultural pilot training centres implies all ex-combatants and the demobilized soldiers drifted toward the cities altogether to be reintegrated into the socio-economic mainstream. This means that by setting up the agricultural pilot training centres, Public Works Projects will reintegrate ex-combatants through agricultural activities, with aim
being expended skills development and job creation, and the boost of local economic development for the whole community. Under this frame work, ex-combatants are no longer fighters or destructors but the Builders of the Nation in being economically productive. This means that ex-combatants who were initially receiving installment will no longer get any payment, but have to live off their own agricultural, farming or livestock produce. The agricultural pilot training centres will be a skilling centre where 2,000 ex-combatants are supposed to be trained in agriculture, farming and livestock.

As stated earlier, 10,000 ex-fighters are still waiting for their reintegration in Kivu (Takhur, 2008). Ex-combatants’ reintegration through agriculture, planned under agricultural pilot training centers gives the opportunity of absorbing more than 10,000 ex-combatants with only five pilot training centers settled in the region. Furthermore, agricultural pilot training centres will create more jobs for the whole community, increasing crops’ production and local income. They will, therefore, pave the way for the enhancement of LED. The agricultural pilot training centres are one of the powerful structure under which Public Works Projects should plan the reintegration of Kivu’s ex-combatants in the context of LED.

5.6.2. Small Businesses

In the DRC, opportunities for wage employment in the formal sector of the economy are extremely limited, and the vast majority of poor people rely on self-employment for their livelihood. Kivu being manly an agricultural province, microenterprises can play an important role in poverty reduction and in economic and social development more generally. Microenterprises can therefore contribute significantly to increasing the productivity of self-employment in the informal sector of the local economy in Kivu. It may also enable ex-combatants skilled in agriculture and other small businesses, and marginal farmers to purchase the inputs they need to increase their productivity. Small businesses as well as finance a range of activities adding value to agricultural output. In an environment, like Kivu region, where economic growth is occurring, microenterprises also have the capacity to transmit the benefits of growth and/or external injections more rapidly and more equitably throughout the community.
Small enterprises provide 20% of Kivu’s GDP (Alin, 2002). This means that the reintegra-
tion of Kivu’s ex-combatants through small enterprises will provide basis to start local small
business as well as to expand existing Kivu’s businesses, either owned by the ex-combatants
or in partnership with other small entrepreneurs. Reintegrating Kivu’s ex-combatants through
small businesses implies training courses, implemented with the support of small
entrepreneurs willing to hire and train the ex-combatants. Training will skill ex-combatants in
garment-making (tailoring), carpentry, mechanics, masonry, small-scale trade, electricity etc.
Ex-combatants skilled in small enterprises will contribute in providing market tools and
power necessary for local job creation and boost Kivu’s LED. It follows that after a few
months of activities, ex-combatants will be able to hold their own small shops, taverns, shoe
repairing, design studios. Reintegrating ex-combatants through small enterprises brings to
Kivu the vision of the Regional Programme for Economic Development and Regional
Integration in transforming the region into a space of shared growth and development, a
space of cooperation based on strategies and policies of convergence.

5.6.3. Infrastructure

Only half of the roads from Bukavu to Kindu are currently being renovated by the Chinese.
The underlining problem of Kivu’s economy is also linked to its failed infrastructure (Musila,
2009). Kivu’s infrastructure has completely broken down. This is the most handicaps of
Kivu’s economic roads in terms of connections and trade (Ibid). To date, the lack of roads
means that traffic between Kivu’s cities (all dotted along the frontier) and their hinterlands is
negligible. To reach Bukavu from Uvira (in South-Kivu), transporters prefer to cross the
Congo-Rwanda border twice, as the roads are of a better quality on the Rwanda side (Musila,
2009).

As for the exportation of agricultural produce, it is not guaranteed in such conditions.
Sometimes it even becomes impossible when security conditions worsen. Reintegration
programme through infrastructure renovation means Public Works Projects should plan
infrastructure innovation’s works in Kivu which should absorb ex-combatants as workforce.
This will create suitable jobs for ex-combatants who would like to involve in infrastructure
refurbishment rather than in agriculture or small-businesses. Furthermore, reintegrating ex-
combatants through infrastructure innovation will cost much cheaper in using a local workforce. Kivu is also a mining region. This implies that Public Works Projects can plan an ex-combatants’ reintegration programme based on mining skills. However, as seen in previous discussion, reintegrating ex-combatants through mining does not work well (Global Witness, 2009).

5.7. Conclusion

Over the last two decades, rebuilding war-torn societies has been in the centre of post-conflict society planning. The link between local economic development and economic reintegration in a post-conflict reconstruction raises the concern of planning a sustainable post-conflict development that alleviates the risk of a renewed outbreak of conflict and unrest. This chapter was aimed at tying economic reintegration to local economic development in Kivu post-conflict society. Discussion surrounding Kivu’s prospective planning for ex-combatants reintegration has depicted that the successful reintegration of ex-combatants in Kivu relies on agricultural, small-enterprises and infrastructure reconstruction through Public Works Projects. This is the approach that the local, provincial and national governments should have grasped in reframing a new, strong and sustainable ex-combatant reintegration framework, grounded in trustful coordination between different stakeholders. Therefore, the reintegration through agricultural projects based on the settlements of agricultural training pilot centres, infrastructure renovation and micro-enterprise models strongly appear to be a sustainable economic reintegration approaches for the reintegration of ex-combatants. Furthermore the consolidation of LED planning for Kivu, by taking into account all physical and geographical opportunities that the post-conflict society is offering. Kivu’s infrastructure being currently in refurbishment state, this had to be supportive for ex-combatants, however, the sector is using the Chinese as workforce. Moreover, the period of war in Kivu shows that the DRC has fallen victim to rebels who use revenue from minerals such as coltan and cassiterite to purchase arms and fuel for the conflict (Global Witness, 2009:1). Mineral resources being at the heart of the Kivu’s conflicts, therefore, reintegrating ex-combatants through mining seem very hazardous for the post-conflict community.
CHAPTER 6:
A WAY INTO THE FUTURE

6.1. Introduction

After studying the conditions in Kivu and the different ways that can be part of the reintegration options, with LED and Public Works Projects making up some of these strategies, the research attempted to answer the question: What other courses of action can be taken to have a strong and reliable reintegration programme for Kivu province?

Planning has a history of common debates about thoughts and practices. These common debates have entrenched a critical concern for the development of human and environmental well-being, mainly as pursued through interventions which seek to shape environmental conditions and place qualities (Morino, 2005).

6.2. Ex-combatants’ Reintegration: A Planning Issue

Analysis of planning for the reintegration of ex-combatants leads to the issue about planning models and planners’ roles in a post-conflict society. This concern, in turn raises issues of ethics and values, issues that cannot be divorced from socio-economic context in which ex-combatants’ reintegration planning takes place. “Planning as a method of making rational decision, a method that is, to some extent, common to many areas in this perspective, is essentially oriented toward optimization that achieves the best possible result within given constraints, with regard to the objectives undertaken” (Archibugi, 2003: 156).

Having conducted this research, the analysis takes as its starting point the validity of selective African post-war societies, which was the foundation for the Kivu’s case study. As the emerging literature regarding the post-conflict societies and reconstruction suggests, when ex-combatants are demobilized and therefore, released into civilian society, the community is faced with socio-economic challenges that relate to post-war rebuilding, namely economic disruption, ex-combatants phenomenon and disintegrated society (Colletta, et al., 1996; 1997; Bennett, 2002; Harsch, 2005; Chigunta, 2005). To deal with these challenges, donors have
developed the reintegration programmes as a planning theory aiming at the economic, political and social assimilation of ex-combatants and their families into civilian society (Lundin, 1998; Brown, 2005; Nilsson, 2005).

Countries like the DRC, the reintegration programme can only be successful if the role and purpose of the programme is clearly articulated. As this research has indicated, planning for Kivu’s reintegration programme will depend on the way different stakeholders interact with provincial authorities within a cooperative structure. As in the case of Sub-Saharan African countries, the Kivu’s reintegration programme is in dire of coordination and harmonisation between and within all stakeholders. The reintegration of ex-combatants in Kivu has to draw on experiences from other war-affected countries. Dialogue between different social groups involved in LED will contribute to the socio-economic cohesion.

6.3. Decentralisation: A Path towards Kivu’s Sustainable Local Economic Development

The purpose of consultations between different social groups is to come to a common and shared vision on the economic development of the territory that is based on the territorial diagnosis, sensitizing, creating a forum, designing a Local Economic Development strategy and establishing coordination/implementation structures (Bennett, 2002; Harsch, 2005; UN, 2006). For this to happen, a decentralisation which offers to local officials the power to be more active than the central government authorities is necessary. Decentralised administrative system will empower local officials to be more dedicated and successful promoters of economic reintegration and LED than central government authorities. Decentralisation will generally be considered desirable in itself as a democracy-enhancing undertaking (Kenneth, 2006; Blackely and Bradshaw, 2002). In this regard, the implementation of the Kivu’s reintegration programme will be piloted by a strategic and systemic approach which encompasses a provincial or national structure such as Public Works Projects for its execution. It should aim at countrywide coverage within a definite time horizon and according to a strategic expansion plan.
6.4. Public Works Projects: An Engine for Kivu’s Ex-combatants’ Reintegration and Local Economic Development

As this has been tested in other post-conflict societies, Public Works Projects have been supportive of ex-combatants’ poverty alleviation initiatives and can play the same role in Kivu’s situation. The rationale behind Public Works Projects in re-integrating ex-combatants through agriculture is that Public Works Projects can work together with other sectors to produce faster growth, reduce poverty, and sustain the environment. As an economic activity, economic re-integration through agriculture, small-businesses and infrastructure refurbishment under Public Works Projects is a source of growth for the local and national economy, and provides the post-conflict society with the private investment opportunities. This sounds very important for Kivu for agricultural production constitutes food security because it is a source of income for the ex-combatants.

Agricultural pilot training centres as discussed earlier can draw on the National Service framework as settled in Kaniami Kasese (Katanga province) in 1998. However, care should be taken to direct the projects away from military skills as ex-combatants’ attitudes have to be shifted from war to the application of developmental skills. Small enterprises in the Kivu’s informal economic sector will benefit ex-combatants. In running commercial and other trading activities, ex-combatants will partake actively in the circular movement of the informal sector activities. Entrepreneurial conditions should be promoted among the ex-combatants so that they can feel and have a sense of belonging into the society that they can fully be functional. Micro-enterprises creation can be supported by set-up grants or loans, skills training and business coaching (Yusuf and Schindehutte, 2000).

Micro-enterprises bring to ex-combatants access to savings facilities that also plays a key part in enabling them to smooth their consumption expenditures, and in financing investments which improve productivity in agriculture and other economic activities. To safe guard against misuse ex-combatants are encouraged to design their own business plan. Grants become a more suitable way of providing start-up assets when ex-combatants are themselves genitors and authors of their micro-enterprises plan. However, ex-combatants should avoid being granted micro-finance as these programmes are volatile (Bennett, 2006; UN, 2006).
Infrastructure renovation regenerates sustainable employment opportunities. Ex-combatants who cannot be involved in agricultural production or small businesses can work as manual labours or in road maintenance. However, the regeneration processes are mostly overseen by Chinese companies using Chinese labour force, while the projects were supposed to be catalysts in reincorporating ex-combatants.

Public Works Projects through agriculture and small businesses projects will address not only the ex-combatants’ economic reintegration but also LED. Far ahead, Kivu’s economic infrastructure being disrupted during the unrest period, Public Work Projects creates sustainable jobs for ex-combatants and economically paves the way for LED. Providing economic reintegration support for Kivu’s ex-combatants is critical in order to help develop alternatives to violence-based livelihoods. For this to be effective, CONADER, MONUSCO/MONUC, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and Kivu’s local entrepreneurs and other developmental agencies like United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), USAID, UNICEF need to sit together and analyse the feasibility of Kivu’s reintegration programme through Public Works Projects. CONADER, as the government representative, has to provide with arable land wherein training pilot centers should be settled. MONUSCO/MONUSCO needs to advocate for financial assistance to the United Nations partners for the programme to be sustained. FAO should amass agricultural expertise and equipments, enhance innovation within their speciality. Influential organizations and leaders should advocate and convince the local communities to welcome the programme. Input from international organizations, local entrepreneurs and other stakeholders should be given a platform to state their view about the programme as this contribute to LED.

6.5. Reintegration: A Local and National Issue

Though reintegration process is an international concern, its planning and implementation, however, should be a national issue. A national reintegration programme should not utterly rely on the international financial assistance. International support being assorted of many conditions depends on the will of state contributors. In such a case, the national government should draw its own financial budget for reintegration programme to undertake its
reintegration programme whether the promised money is delayed by stakeholders (Takhur, 2008).

The analysis of labour market needs to be regularly updated during the implementation of the reintegration programmes and should include analysis of training, vocational education and provision of business development services (UN, 2006; 2008; UNHCR, 2007). This would entail a special re-skilling curriculum that would specifically be tailored to ex-combatants that aims to see “ex-combatants as a workforce” for their own LED (Colletta, et al., 1996). Training should be tailored to fit the profile of ex-combatants. Trainers have to bear in mind that most jobs will be in the informal sector. Therefore, the contents and methodologies of training should respond to basic needs of trainees making them feel confident (Mashike, 2000). Ex-combatants’ training and education can become a part of a national vocational programme, not only provided to people having taken up arms but also to those who missed the opportunity to attend formal classes during their schooling age (UN, 2006). However, training should not be confused with formal education that should be provided to younger ex-combatants, on the one hand, and on the other, the use of training should not overlook vocational education which is a type of informal education suitable to ex-combatants.

Training will include not only non-violent conflict resolution, civilian social assessment, and career planning, but also understanding what employers expect in terms of assessment package, focus on youth, girls and women, limitations of training, practical application as well as cultural considerations (Colletta, et al., 1996; 1997; Bennett, 2002; Harsch, 2005).

Kivu’s ex-combatants reintegration planning needs to focus on the overall systems framework, whereby all the segments play a crucial and equal role and whereby all the issues of LED and Public Works Projects are regarded as dynamic and treated as interconnected. This means that the reintegration programme should draw attention on the importance of innovation (jobs creation), skills developments or knowledge creation and proactive strategies for achieving a competitive post-conflict society (Chigunta, 2006).

6.6. Kivu’s Reintegration: A Learning Experience

What emerges from this research is that achieving a Kivu’s ex-combatants reintegration is very difficult without a holistic approach to LED planning through Public Works Projects
and, systemic and strategic thinking. Hence, Kivu’s reintegration planning should be seen as an ongoing process, which involves learning by reflecting and acting. It is important to take time to stand back, think and learn from other African reintegration experiences. A successful Kivu’s ex-combatants reintegration shall involve a capacity assessment based on human, social, natural, physical economic and spiritual assets. The strength of reintegration programme must come out of what ex-combatants say, want and not from assumptions that stakeholders make sometimes, for the needs are not immediately clear or cannot be easily understood. By interacting with one another, ex-combatants and reintegration programme leaders and stakeholders will be able to understand how problems affect people differently, circumstances change, and needs assessment give people an opportunity to prioritize their needs, which lead to a more sustainable development project.

6.7. Planning for Ex-combatants’ Reintegration: A Way Forward

Planning is a scheme, programme or method worked out beforehand for the accomplishment of a socio-economic objective (Faludi, 1973; Healey, 1991; Archibugi, 2003; Morino, 2005; Hillier and Healey, 2008). This means that to be consistent and effective a planning system must refer not only to the socio-economic purpose of its reason being, but also to the vision of a developmental idea of the local community that it is for (Morino, 2005). This entails the approach of public participation in a planning system. Since local communities are no longer spoon-fed their needs but become part of the process of making sure that their needs are met.

The reintegration planning is influenced by post conflict reconstruction policies and planning process. The principal systemic and strategic planning instrument which guides and informs all planning, budgeting, management and decision-making processes in Kivu is to be a local and national vision. Therefore, it will supersede all other plans that did not fit in Kivu’s reintegration programme. The new Kivu’s reintegration programme must introduce measures to prevent and resolve a series of complex socio-economic problems, not only affecting the demobilized soldiers but also their families. Opportunities for income generation and employment should be offered to the demobilized soldiers with the same conditions as those applying to the receiving community, in order to avoid segregation. To materialize this
vision, some best practices are critical to the success of the LED and economic reintegration of ex-combatant in Kivu:

- A good understanding of the prevailing local economic conditions
- Initiating and expending Public Works Projects as a vehicle of LED
- Conducting a socio-economic profile of ex-combatants
- Carrying out a needs assessment of ex-combatants
- Basing job creation schemes on the local situation
- Providing skills training relevant to the local situation,
- Transforming the militarist mentality of ex-combatants
- Carefully designed credit schemes
- Focusing on broader community empowerment, and
- Undertaking wider efforts aimed at economic recovery and political reconciliation.

As discussed earlier, planning for ex-combatants’ reintegration through Public Works Projects shall enhance Kivu’s LED and will have two comparative advantages:

- Its capacity to contextualize labour markets and employment issues within local economies
- Its use of area-based, participatory planning methods, which encourage dialogue and participation, as well as ensure the relevance of intervention.

Kivu’s LED process and its planning modalities will involve the application of a set of assessments aimed at profiling the territorial capital and detecting challenges and opportunities for economic recovery. These assessments will be designed to inform the identification of measures targeting both the demand and the supply side of labour market. This will make LED approach particularly suitable to achieve a sustainable reintegration in Kivu. Effectively, measures on the supply side alone do not produce lasting results and have to be combined with initiatives aimed at expanding business opportunities and creating jobs. Kivu’s LED stakeholder groups and forums will be useful platforms to decrease tension and promote reconciliation among antagonistic groups. LED stakeholders will apply structures for decision making, where contribution and consensus-building will be facilitated by neutral

83
actors. Decisions taken jointly and projects identified and implemented in a collaborative way will be tangible outcomes. These outcomes will provide a dialogue that is valuable, constructive and an alternative to violence. Therefore, there will be two different modalities of applying LED in combination with reintegration programmes for ex-combatants in Kivu depending on these scenarios:

- LED will be envisaged in a setting when a reintegration programme is already running (This is the current case in Kivu)
- An LED programme pre-exists to the establishment of ex-combatants’ reintegration programmes.

To conclude, we can argue that strategic and systemic partnerships forged between government, private sector and civil society is critical to successful planning for the reintegration of ex-combatants and LED in Kivu. Government has to take the lead in providing the framework plan for reintegration programme and post-conflict’s LED reconstruction. Private sector leadership is the key to economic growth and development. It is important that the reconstruction effort, being as vast as it is politically complex, takes into account the input of key private sector institutions as well as the participation of indigenous businesses. Because post-conflict government in Kivu lacks the financial and skill bases for a dominant role in the economy, its role in reconstruction must be small and selective. Kivu’s domestic private sector is inherently weak and fragile and so contributes only marginally to reconstruction efforts. Kivu’s provincial government has to embark on economic reforms that would attract foreign direct investment.

Reintegration is more than a process through which ex-combatants are demilitarized by severing ties with their combatant lives. Rather, it is a process of strengthening links between ex-combatants and their communities. Several strategies have been recommended, however it should be borne in mind that their implementation is no substitute for a comprehensive and well planned DDR process: reintegration has not succeeded within a flawed economic context. There is much more to research that needs to be undertaken on this topic.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


- Chigunta, F., 2006. The Creation of Job/Work Opportunities and Income Generating for youth in Post-conflict Countries: Paper presented at an expert group meeting on
Youth in Africa: participation of Youth as Partners in peace development in Post-conflict countries, Windhoek, Namibia.


• Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit German (GTZ), 2005. Reintegration of Child Soldiers in the East of the DRC.


• Hillier, J. and Healey, P., 2008. Critical Essays in Planning Theory, University of New Castle Upon Type, UK.


• Initiative pour l’Afrique Centrale (INICA) and Laboratoire d’analyse régionale et d’expertise sociale (LARES), 2006. Dynamiques Transfrontalières dans la Région des Grands Lacs: Burundi, RDC, Ouganda et Rwanda, Paris, OCDE.


• Kapitsa, L., 2002, Youth Entrepreneurship Policies and Programmes in the UNECE member states. Coordinating Unit for Operational Activities, UNECE, September.


• Kingma, K., 1997. Demobilization of Combatants after Civil Wars in Africa and Their Reintegration into Civilian Life. International Center for Conversion (BICC), Bonn Germany.


Africa: A Survey of the Literature. Project on Peace and Security at the Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town, South Africa.


• Speaker, L., 2008. The R-phase of DDR Processes an Overview of key Lessons Learned and Practical Experiences. Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Clingendael Conflict Research Unit.


