Thesis for the Masters of Arts in Forced Migration

PEACEBUILDING FOR THE URBAN DISPLACED:
Understanding Participation and Community in South African Social Cohesion Interventions

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DECLARATION

I, Jessica Luffman Anderson, declare that this thesis is an original document that I produced for the Master of Arts degree in Forced Migration. I am aware of the consequences of plagiarising, and I declare that no parts of this thesis were plagiarised in any way. All contents of this thesis were produced by me. Credit is provided to the relevant sources and individuals throughout this thesis, and all writing was independently done by me as well. I understand the University of the Witwatersrand’s policies on plagiarism and original work, and I promise that this thesis meets these standards.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores whether the body of literature on peacebuilding—in both operational tools and theoretical research—is relevant in a context of urban displacement. It particularly focuses on ‘community’ and participation as critical constructs that are affected by the invisibility, mobility, diversity, and insecurity that characterize urban displacement environments. For this thesis, I conducted field research with twelve social cohesion interventions that responded to the 2008 xenophobic violence in South Africa. In light of recent experiences with xenophobic violence, and the subsequent civil society response of social cohesion interventions, urban South Africa represents a unique case study that marries peacebuilding issues with an urban displacement context. This thesis argues that the urban displacement characteristics of mobility, diversity, insecurity, and invisibility ultimately challenge peacebuilding ideas of participation and ‘community’.

The first section of this thesis summarizes the history of peacebuilding and urban displacement literature. Then, the concept of ‘friction’ is discussed as a way to understand the effects of carrying out ‘traditional’ peacebuilding interventions in a context of urban displacement. ‘Friction’ is further used to interrogate and understand the assumptions embedded in concepts of community and participation. The second section of this thesis focuses on my fieldwork with social cohesion intervention staff, and how concepts of community and participation manifest themselves in these interventions. These findings ultimately demonstrate the complexity of operating in a context of urban displacement, and the need to question the uncontested categories and assumptions of both practical tools and academic literature in peacebuilding.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Understanding Participation and Community in South African Social Cohesion Interventions

**ACRONYMS**

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<th>ACMS</th>
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<td>ADF</td>
<td>African Diaspora Forum</td>
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<td>APF</td>
<td>Anti-Privatisation Forum</td>
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<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
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<td>DMPSP</td>
<td>Displaced and Migrant Persons Support Programme</td>
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<td>ACMS</td>
<td>Forced Migration Studies Programme</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>Integrated Development Plan</td>
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<td>JRS</td>
<td>Jesuit Refugee Service</td>
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<td>Local Government</td>
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<td>MHD</td>
<td>Migrant Help Desk</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NMF</td>
<td>Nelson Mandela Foundation</td>
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<td>SANAC</td>
<td>South African National AIDS Council</td>
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<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

More than half of the world’s refugees are found in urban environments (UNHCR 2009). In addition to the urbanisation of refugees, other forms of migration (forced and voluntary), civil wars, and conflict dynamics increasingly affect urban spaces. Understanding urban dynamics in relation to conflict and displacement is crucial, and yet extremely challenging for organisations. Significant obstacles specifically pertain to understanding the realities of internal and foreign migrants in urban areas: displaced men and women are often highly mobile and difficult to access, targeted by other residents as outsiders, and with insecure housing and livelihood options (Landau 2004). As a consequence of targeted discrimination and violence by host ‘communities’, many displaced persons choose to become “invisible” and deny their foreigner identity (Davies and Jacobsen 2010, 13; Montemurro and Walicki 2001, 11; Landau 2004; Pavanello, Elhawary, and Pantuliano 2010; Zetter and Deikun 2010). Humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding organisations, accustomed to the more straightforward delineation between host and refugee in a camp setting, have a difficult time grappling with urban realities, and the often hidden ways in which displaced people navigate the cities they live in (Reftie, Dolan and Okello 2010, 33; Vearey 2009). The context of urban South Africa is highlighted by these key characteristics of urban displacement: diversity, mobility, insecurity, and invisibility.

Momentum has steadily grown since the 1990s to promote peacebuilding actors’ sensitivity to conflict dynamics in their interventions (Meharg 2009; International Alert et al. 2004; Chigas and Woodrow 2008). However, the conflict-sensitive theories and tools used for peacebuilding interventions are almost entirely devoted to international interventions in a civil
war or political crisis. At the time this thesis was written, no case studies were found of peacebuilding interventions operating in a context of urban displacement. Furthermore, peacebuilding toolkits were not designed with urban spaces in mind.

In this thesis I address the union of the two themes of peacebuilding and urban displacement in conflict-related assistance: I explore whether the body of literature on peacebuilding—in both operational tools and theoretical research—is appropriate for a context of urban displacement. I particularly focus on community and participation as critical constructs that are affected by the urban contextual characteristics of invisibility, mobility, diversity, and insecurity described above.

I explore the intersection between urban displacement and peacebuilding through field research with a series of social cohesion interventions in urban South Africa. Social cohesion, described in greater depth in chapter four, is a way of understanding the types and nature of ties between people in a social network. Social cohesion activities are an aspect of peacebuilding interventions overall. Social cohesion is also seen as a primary response to the challenges of urban displacement and ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ relationships in general. This study is partly interested in xenophobic violence, because xenophobic violence is a particular kind of violence that is rooted in strong ideas about who belongs and who is ‘outside’. Furthermore, xenophobic violence can be a consequence of urban displacement that demands efforts to build peace.

As a result, both urban displacement and peacebuilding fields address social cohesion in

1 Urban displacement is defined as: refugees and other forced migrants who are displaced into urban areas.
2 The field research for this study consisted of twenty qualitative interviews with twelve institutions operating in South Africa to promote social cohesion. The field research aimed to understand the nature of their social cohesion interventions, its appropriateness to a context of urban displacement, and how it engaged with concepts of community and participation. The fieldwork is discussed at length in the methods section of this thesis.
3 ‘Insider’ and ‘outsider’ relationships refer to those who are considered legitimate and ‘belong’ in a space. This idea will be discussed in depth further in this thesis.
4 Xenophobic violence is understood as violence perpetrated against foreign nationals and other ‘outsider’ groups. Xenophobic violence is described in greater depth in chapter five.
their own ways, but they do not speak to each other. Social cohesion interventions are thus a highly relevant case study for exploring the nexus between peacebuilding and urban displacement. This study analyses ‘community’ and participation as key constructs that evolve when attempts at social cohesion are carried out in a context of urban displacement.

**Roadmap**

This thesis is divided into two major sections: In the first section I will focus on the history of peacebuilding and urban displacement literature, as well as the theoretical basis for interpreting the effects of peacebuilding interventions in South Africa. Chapter one consists of the introduction, rationale, and methodology used for this thesis. Chapter two situates this thesis within the literature on urban displacement and peacebuilding. Chapter three then explains the concept of ‘friction’ as a way to understand the effects of carrying out ‘traditional’ peacebuilding interventions in a context of urban displacement.

The aim of chapter three is to question the assumptions embedded in concepts of ‘community’ and participation, by focusing on both the discourse of operational tools and theoretical literature in peacebuilding. In doing so, I will rely on Tsing’s concept of ‘friction’ to explain these assumptions and how they relate to the realities of urban displacement. Tsing’s ‘friction’ is helpful for understanding how the urban displaced create new, awkward realities that do not fit into traditional peacebuilding categories, and how these categories and constructs in peacebuilding take on different meanings and realities in practice.

The second section of this thesis will focus on my fieldwork with organisations conducting interventions aimed at creating social cohesion in urban South Africa. It then focuses on how concepts of community and participation manifest themselves in these interventions. In

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5 ‘Friction’ can be summarized as the creation of new realities when international forces and local realities interact. Friction is a metaphor for a give-and-take relationship that transforms both the local landscape, and the universal/international norm (Tsing 2004). This concept will be discussed in more detail in chapter three.
light of South Africa’s recent experiences with xenophobic violence, and the subsequent civil society response of social cohesion interventions, urban South Africa represents a unique case study that marries peacebuilding issues with an urban displacement context.

Chapter four will focus on the background literature to social cohesion, an element of peacebuilding, and how it has been measured and evaluated in the past. Chapter five will then describe xenophobic violence in South Africa since 2008 and the subsequent civil society response to these attacks. Chapter six explores issues of ‘community’ in these interventions and the ‘friction’ around how peacebuilding interventions understand these concepts. Chapter seven similarly explores issues of participation and how this concept has been interpreted and practiced in peacebuilding interventions. Chapter 8 summarizes the conclusions of this thesis.

This thesis thus analyses the relevance of peacebuilding literature to a context of urban displacement through an analysis of the frictions between theory and practice. These frictions are analysed through constructions of ‘community’ and participation in peacebuilding, and how they relate with the realities of peacebuilding practice in urban South Africa. Ultimately, this paper seeks to bridge peacebuilding and forced migration fields in questioning the uncontested categories and assumptions of both practical tools and academic literature in peacebuilding.

**Rationale**

This study addresses a crucial gap in the literature on peacebuilding. Literature and case studies in this field almost exclusively focus on international organisations entering a host country experiencing, or susceptible to, large-scale violent conflict. The dominant discourse on peacebuilding interventions has revolved around the dynamic of internationals entering a developing country and operating in a relatively immobile environment, in which the host population often lives in camps or rural villages. In this context, peacebuilding literature
includes a series of implicit and explicit assumptions about the nature of local actors, ‘community’, and participation in peacebuilding interventions.

This study particularly calls into question assumptions around issues of ‘community’ and participation that are frequently used in peacebuilding rhetoric, and the extent to which these assumptions apply in urban displacement contexts. Many peacebuilding organisations claim to promote participation and community cohesion, even though these processes might look very different in diverse and mobile urban spaces than they do in an IDP camp or rural village. As a result, critical research is needed to address the underlying assumptions of peacebuilding approaches and their relevance to a context of urban displacement. Research on these assumptions can shed light on how to carry out more effective interventions in the future, and how the norms of peacebuilding should be re-evaluated for a context of urban displacement. As a result, this study’s audience is both domestic and international institutions that conduct peacebuilding interventions, so that local/international engagement in a context of urban displacement can be better understood by all organisations.

Finally, theories and tools that address the challenges of peacebuilding in urban spaces will only become more necessary in an increasingly urbanised world. Attention has been drawn to this need more broadly through emerging literature on “critical peace research” to address peacebuilding practice (Fischer 2009). Miall claims that peacebuilding lacks dynamic theories that adequately capture the nature of conflict, including the formation of new actors and new issues (Miall 2004, 17). Riemann further argues that most assumed realities in peacebuilding theory and practice are imposed by an implicit theoretical framework of conflict that has not been exposed or interrogated (Riemann 2004, 14). In response to these gaps, Fischer calls for "critical peace research” to carefully reflect on peacebuilding practice, suggesting that action-
oriented research should accompany participatory evaluation processes to “accumulate knowledge and enhance understanding” (Fischer 2009, 93). This study thus responds to these calls for more critical peace research by interrogating notions of ‘community’ and participation in urban contexts. It aims to develop an understanding of how these constructs function in urban South African social cohesion interventions, and, as a result, how these constructs take on different meanings and realities in practice.

**Methodology**

As described above, this study seeks to contribute to the emerging field of “critical peace research”. Critical peace research addresses the lack of dynamic theories in understanding conflict or critiques to existing assumptions in peacebuilding (Miall 2004). Critical peace research also straddles participatory research and critical theory research paradigms. As a result, this paradigm is action-oriented, but critiques existing practice through the structures, theories, and assumptions underlying it. Miall suggests that interventions should be accompanied by critical peace research as often as is feasible, in order to avoid evaluation processes that become simply “technical peacebuilding” instead of an opportunity to critically engage with, and learn from, interventions (Fischer 2009).

This research was conducted using qualitative techniques. In light of the case study approach that I employed—in which I sought the most in-depth analysis possible from a small, select group of people—qualitative methods are most appropriate for my research design.

The fieldwork for this thesis draws on research undertaken by the African Centre for Migration and Society’s social cohesion project. The purpose of this project is to, “understand the factors, both systemic and short-term, which allow diverse communities to deal with their tensions and conflicts in ways which do not result in violence” (Polzer 2010, 1). I became

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6 The social cohesion project is funded by Oxfam and the European Commission.
involved in the study in year one of a two-year project, in which the first year specifically focused on social cohesion in Gauteng province. As a researcher for the team beginning in May 2010, I co-designed research instruments for residents, local leadership, and institutions addressing social cohesion in six case study locations. The team jointly developed the research framework and background literature as well. The team then compiled a list of known institutions carrying out social cohesion activities, and researched additional institutions. The social cohesion activities all began in response to the 2008 xenophobic violence in South Africa. These activities are of importance to the ACMS study because, as described above, the ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ that social cohesion seeks to bring together currently manifest themselves as foreigners and the urban displaced in South Africa. As a result, attempts to address xenophobic violence in turn seek to address the challenges of urban displacement and how to bring people together in this context.

From this initial list, I carried out qualitative, semi-structured interviews with twelve institutions between August and November 2010. A summary of each participating institution can be found in Appendix A. I ensured that the participating institutions reflected a range of organisational structures, histories in South Africa, and approaches to xenophobic violence. The three case studies in this thesis, The Nelson Mandela Foundation (NMF), Caritas International, and the Migrant Help Desk (MHD), were also chosen purposefully. The NMF is a domestic organisation that used international peacebuilding tools in its intervention; Caritas is an international organisation that carried out its intervention with a domestic partner; and, the MHD is a city of Johannesburg (i.e. local government) organisation. Each represents a very different

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7 In South Africa, ‘foreigners’ refer to non-nationals from a range of countries: Zimbabwe, Mozambique, India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Somalia, Uganda, DR Congo, among others. The nature of local dynamics, and therefore how foreigners are treated and understood, and the type and number of foreigners varies considerably throughout South Africa. Furthermore, someone married to a foreigner, or someone who does not speak the ‘right’ language can be labelled a ‘foreigner’, even if they are a South African citizen. ‘Foreigner’ is therefore a broad term that has more to do with grounds for exclusion rather than nationality.
institutional background and a unique local/international institutional culture. I also collected documents from each of the organisations I interviewed, and attended organisation events or reviewed their advocacy material when available. I ultimately triangulated the interviews and secondary documents, and responses from participants, when available.

I also analysed the discourse used in the intervention’s secondary materials. These materials include monitoring and evaluation tools, annual reports, program literature for advocacy purposes, and various other types of internal documents. These materials allowed me to understand the language the organisation uses, as well as the practical implications of this language. Parker defines discourse analysis as the study of “the way texts are constructed, the functions they serve in different contexts, and the contradictions that run through them” (Parker 2004, 149). Accordingly, my goal was to gain an understanding of the organisations’ discourse and theories around constructs of community and participation. I then analysed the functions of community and participation in the literature and the ‘frictions’ in their usage.

Next, I sought to understand how interventions operationalise their secondary literature. I achieved this through twenty individual interviews with the staff members at the institutions leading twelve different social cohesion interventions. Appendix B and C of this proposal include the open-ended, semi-structured research guides that I relied on for my study. An open-ended, semi-structured approach gave me both the grounds for substantive triangulation (discussed at length further in this section), as well as the flexibility to follow interesting lines of inquiry during the field research.

Finally, I triangulated the discourse analysis of the participating organisations’ program material, the individual interviews with organisation staffs, and the data on community perceptions gathered by other researchers in the social cohesion project team. According to
Babour, triangulation “addresses the issue of internal validity by using more than one method of data collection to answer a research question” (Barbour 2001, 1117). Patton specifically refers to the type of triangulation I will undertake as “‘triangulation of sources’” (Patton 1999, 1193). Greene and Caracelli further describe issues that triangulation of sources can address, such as inquirer bias, bias of substantive theory, and biases of inquiry context, which are all relevant for my field research (Caracelli and Greene 1989, 259). I sought to understand the divergences and convergences of how institutions discussed community and participation with me, to a public audience, and to their participants.

None of the participants in this study requested confidentiality. However, I will continue to engage with participants while I write any external publications based on this thesis, and I will use pseudonyms for quotations from participants who request it, although none have to date. I gained verbal informed consent from all participants in my study before each interview took place. Each participant was contacted via email with information about the study, and they then received a “Participant Information Sheet” before our interview, which provides details about the study, ways to contact me, and the verbal consent script for the study. I had a casual discussion with each participant about the study, and answered any questions the participant had. I began most interviews in a private, quiet space and took hand-written notes, which were then kept in a secure location. Several interviews were conducted over the phone in a private, quiet space, and I typed my notes as I spoke with the participant.

**Limitations**

There are several limitations to this study. First, the amount of time I had to undertake the field research for this thesis was less than ideal. I was involved in the social cohesion project for six months, and actively conducted field research for four months. Without a strong and
trusting relationship with intervention staff, it is possible that there was a “social desirability” bias in responses to me, in which participants provided me with the responses they thought I wanted to hear. Furthermore, a particular concern among non-governmental organisations is the institutional rhetoric they use to discuss their interventions. This has the potential to skew the results of my field research. While I interpreted participants’ responses to me in light of these issues, any social desirability bias would ultimately be unhelpful in understanding the nature of their interventions.

Second, the case study approach of my research design is limited in its ability to speak about social cohesion interventions beyond Gauteng province, as well as more broadly about peacebuilding interventions with the urban displaced. While I can extrapolate my findings based on the key themes and trends in my fieldwork, the diversity of the peacebuilding field renders it important for further research in other aspects of social cohesion and peacebuilding practice, in light of the small sample size of my study.
CHAPTER II: REVIEWING URBAN DISPLACEMENT AND PEACEBUILDING

This thesis draws on two major bodies of literature: Urban displacement and peacebuilding. The purpose of the peacebuilding literature review is to explore the relevance of these approaches to an environment of wide-scale urban displacement. The urban displacement overview similarly provides context for the discussion of social cohesion interventions, and it situates South Africa’s urban dynamics within the broader phenomenon of urban displacement.

Urban Displacement

This section briefly presents an overview of urban displacement, and the particular dynamic between hosts and migrants in this context. It then describes the key characteristics, as understood in this thesis, of urban displacement: mobility, diversity, invisibility, and insecurity. Finally, a discussion of these characteristics is placed in the South African context. These four characteristics ultimately challenge the peacebuilding ideals of participation and ‘community’, and will be discussed at length further in this thesis.

A body of literature on urban displacement is emerging in response to the fact that Sub-Saharan Africa has the fastest urbanisation rate in the world (Sommers 2009, 9). UNHCR’s latest statistics reveal that only one third of refugees live in camps, and approximately 50% now reside in cities and towns (UNHCR 2009). The spike in urban displacement has presented a significant challenge to those addressing the needs of IDPs, refugees, and other displaced persons (Tibajjuka 2010, 4). However, to date the international community has been slow to evolve their programming, and remains focused on the “traditional” camp setting instead.

Sommers eloquently summarizes this phenomenon:

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8 Chigas and Woodrow define peacebuilding as measures designed to consolidate peaceful relations and strengthen viable political, socio-economic, and cultural institutions capable of handling conflict, and to strengthen other mechanisms that will either create or support the necessary conditions for sustained peace (Chigas and Woodrow 2009, 10). Peace and social cohesion will be defined in depth in Chapter four.
It is small wonder that many international agencies focus their attentions on Africa’s villages instead of its cities. Rural areas, after all, appear to be linked to tradition and stability, and they seem to be viable, familiar and perhaps even logical places to develop communities and countries. Yet this broad institutional tendency contains a potent irony: international agency investments are largely flowing into rural Africa while ever more of its residents are heading in the opposite direction: towards cities (Sommers 2010, 5).

Refstie, Dolan and Okello refer to this as ‘institutional convenience syndrome’, in which UNHCR and other humanitarian actors remain focused on the camps where they have historically provided assistance (Refstie, Dolan and Okello 2010, 33). Even though there is mounting attention toward the need for NGOs to confront urban displacement, actionable steps to address urban issues are rare (Refstie, Dolan and Okello 2010, 33; Tibajuka, 2010, 4).

A key challenge facing organisations is how to address displacement amidst the conditions and insecurity of African cities: like refugee camps, urban displacement is characterized by overcrowding, lack of access to clean water and adequate sanitation, precarious living conditions, and insecure access to food and income (Zetter and Deikun 2010, 5; Pavanello, Elhawary, and Pantuliano 2010, 7). However, Sandercock argues that migration has a further, and particularly destabilizing, effect on urban environments (Sandercock 1998, 165). Tibajuka describes these conditions as “a drain and a burden” on the city’s ability to improve its residents’ lives (Tibajuka 2010, 4). Tension between migrants and the host community develop from the perception that migrants are a burden on the city, which often causes local attitudes to shift towards heightened xenophobia (Landau 2004).

Insecurity is a key feature of urban displacement. Davies and Jacobsen describe how the security and well-being of the urban displaced are inherently tied to their relationship with the host community (Davies and Jacobsen 2010, 14). Therefore, local xenophobic attitudes can (and often do) lead to discrimination, harassment, hostility, detention, and eviction against migrants (Pavanello, Elhawary, and Pantuliano 2010, 27; Zetter and Deikun 2010, 7). Several studies have
highlighted the necessity of invisibility for urban IDPs, and by extension, other displaced groups, as a security strategy against these threats (Davies and Jacobsen 2010, 13; Montemurro and Walicki 2001, 11; Landau 2007, 14; Pavanello, Elhawary, and Pantuliano 2010; Zetter and Deikun 2010).

Invisibility—a critical feature of urban displacement— is in part because of, and a catalyst for, mobility. Invisibility can manifest as an attempt to hide from state and local governance structures, other non-migrant residents, the police, or all of the above. In light of their desire for invisibility, the urban displaced are highly mobile and often inaccessible (Zetter and Deikun 2010, 7). Their mobility also has implications for how they understand the spaces they live in and locate themselves in the city, and many do not see their city of residence as a “home” (Landau 2007, 11). According to Landau, “In many instances, residents do not stay put long enough to develop, articulate, and respond to some form of collective imagination and aspiration” (Landau 2007, 11). Their invisibility and mobility thus has implications for their understanding of community and their investment in the city. The ‘contested community’ is evident, and it calls into question the meaning of social cohesion and it applicability to this context.

Diversity, the last key characteristic of urban displacement, is often a feature of urban spaces. Diversity in an urban displacement context (as in other urban spaces) is characterized by a range of different ethnic groups, nationalities, religions, and languages. However, the ways in which diversity functions in a context of urban displacement is unique, and this diversity also has particular ramifications for how conflicts take place among the urban displaced. For instance,

9 In the context of urban South Africa, these conflicts refer to threats, looting and burning of shops and shacks, forced evictions, beatings, rape, and murder.
10 Urban conflicts, which have been acknowledged by a range of forums (Cities in Transition 2010; Conflict in Cities 2010) are often between ethnic and religious divisions that divide a society into two (or perhaps more) groups.
Fauvelle-Aymar and Kabwe-Segatti found that language heterogeneity is a significant determinant for xenophobic violence in a given South African ward (Fauvelle-Aymar and Kabwe-Segatti in Landau 2010, 72). In this setting foreigners are only somewhat identifiable though, leading residents to attack both South Africans and foreign nationals alike who speak the ‘wrong’ language, or have a certain shade of skin colour. In South Africa, the idea of an ‘outsider’—a concept discussed in depth in chapter five—is rooted in the image of a foreign national, but, as evidenced above, extends far beyond that as well. Diversity in this space is thus reduced to insiders and outsiders, whereby outsiders are often outside the bounds of redress: insecure and invisible foreign nationals have few opportunities to air their grievances or seek justice. In this displacement context, diversity ultimately leads to a complex justification of who belongs in urban spaces, which often exacerbates the precarious lives of the urban displaced.

**Urban South Africa**

The literature on displacement in urban South Africa exemplifies the themes of mobility, diversity, insecurity, and invisibility, identified in broader urban displacement research. However, these themes are situated within the unique context of a post-Apartheid South Africa struggling for a shared identity, with a massive influx of migrants over the past decade (Harrison 2002). As a result, a discourse of nativism “shaped and legitimized by politicians, bureaucrats, and others” has crept into South Africa, followed by systematic marginalization and mass deportation [of foreigners]” (Landau 2006, 131; Landau 2008, 3) This legacy and recent history has resulted in a highly fractured urban South Africa, and a series of xenophobic attacks against foreigners (Hassim, Kupe, and Worby 2008; Landau 2008; Misago et al. 2010). In order to better

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These groups typically have a legitimate claim to the space over which there is conflict. Such cities include Belfast, Kosovo or Jerusalem; all major cities plagued with conflict but without very much diversity. However, even highly diverse urban spaces differ from a context of urban displacement, as described below.
understand the context of these xenophobic attacks, and potential peacebuilding approaches to the attacks, it is important to realize the nature of ‘community’ and participation in the city spaces of South Africa.

The city space of Johannesburg is often characterized by its chaotic, evolving landscape; its mobility and diversity. Vearey argues that Johannesburg is, “a fluid concept, where spaces can be converted and recycled to suit the needs of different urban residents” (Vearey 2010, 44). Landau describes this fluid space as “nowhereville” for those, “permanently passing through the city” (Landau 2006, 125). In a case study of Yeoville, Harrison finds that “Yeoville has a highly diverse, and in many cases, transient population that exhibits few historical ties. It is characterized by disparate groups of residents, most of whom have no relationship with each other or government” (Harrison 2002, 69). In line with Landau’s discussion on “the absence of collective imagination and aspiration”, Harrison argues that Yeoville residents feel isolated and have a limited sense of community, where, “many residents see Yeoville as a temporary stop and feel little need to get involved in the community life” (Harrison 2002, 75). Landau summarizes this setting as a “community of strangers. . .living together in a place that is no one’s “home” (Landau 2006, 130). This reality breaks down the false dichotomy between migrants and the allegedly homogenous hosts. The current meaning of ‘host’, and especially ‘community’ in a context like this is ambiguous: Nothing appears to bind the “strangers” of Johannesburg together other than their shared space.

In light of the fractured and diverse nature of Johannesburg, strategies of invisibility are often used by the displaced to navigate the city and compensate for the insecure livelihoods (Vearey 2009; Landau 2006). Vearey describes a “survival mode” attitude for migrants in Johannesburg, in which migrants often opt to remain hidden in order to avoid harassment,
violence, deportation, and other forms of discrimination (Vearey 2010, 37-38). While Vearey suggests that migrants head to “hidden spaces” from fear of harassment, Landau argues that, “Johannesburg’s aliens are shaping their own idiom of transience with which they actively resist transplantation” (Vearey 2010, 39; Landau 2006; 127). That is, the displaced proactively choose to remain hidden and transient: they have agency over their decision to “hover above the soil and its native population” (Landau 2006, 127). Thus, the agency of the displaced often includes (dis) ownership and (non) participation: proactive decisions to remain outside of society and hidden within the city. Such forms of livelihood and identity, as I will now discuss, contradict the conventional wisdom of international peacebuilding and its construction of participation.

**Peacebuilding: A Brief Background**

Following this discussion of urban displacement in Johannesburg, I will now address peacebuilding literature and assumptions in this literature about the nature of ‘community’ and participation. To date, these constructs have been inadequately problematised, and the diverse, mobile, insecure, and invisible nature of urban displacement has not been addressed in peacebuilding literature. Critical evaluation of constructs of ‘community’ and participation is helpful for any peacebuilding intervention, but particularly for the unique circumstances that urban displacement presents.

Since the end of the cold war there has been a surge of international involvement in “complex humanitarian emergencies”, which are characterized by humanitarian crisis in a space with weak or nonexistent authority structures resulting from conflict (IASC 1994). Development and humanitarian institutions responded to these challenges by often applying “business as usual” approaches to new dynamics in the field. Humanitarian and development workers soon realized their work had unintended consequences: their initiatives sometimes
worked against peace, possibly supporting warlords or spoiler networks (Anderson 1999). Out of this realization, Mary Anderson’s *Do No Harm* movement was born to ensure that aid providers critically analyse the context within which they provide assistance (Anderson 1999). Meanwhile, the peacebuilding field grew rapidly and “traditional” humanitarian and development organisations increasingly adopted peacebuilding mandates in their work. Peacebuilding activities and components are now integrated into many international actors’ activities in contexts of war and violence.

Anderson initiated the conversation on how international interventions need to be more sensitive to conflict dynamics. Anderson argues that since aid inevitably influences conflict, “aid workers cannot avoid the responsibility of trying to shape their impact” (Anderson 1999, 146). Since the 1990s many international organisations have adopted the *Do No Harm* framework for conflict analysis, while others have adapted and modified the approach into their institutional culture (IFRC 1998; O’Brien 2001). *Do No Harm* was then followed by a movement of “Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments” (PCIA), which evaluate project effects on the structures and processes that promote sustainable peace (Bush 1998, 7). While Anderson’s work focused specifically on the project level, PCIA are intended for project, sector, and country-level analyses of policies and initiatives.\(^\text{11}\) However, these mechanisms are primarily tools to assess conflict and rarely describe a theory of conflict that is operationalised for policies and interventions.

Conflict-sensitivity is the concept adopted by many peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian actors to elaborate on, and mainstream, the theories behind PCIA and *Do No Harm*

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(International Alert et al. 2004). Similar to PCIA, the process is relevant to all types of programs, sectors, and stages of conflict (International Alert et al. 2004; Chigas and Woodrow 2009). Unlike PCIA and Do No Harm, conflict-sensitivity literature does not provide a specific tool for international actors to work with. Instead, conflict-sensitivity is a process to be mainstreamed into existing programs and institutions. It is based on a theory of how institutions can avoid unintended consequences (Chigas and Woodrow 2009) as well as a series of values that are important for conflict-sensitive practice. The ‘Conflict Sensitivity Resource Pack’, a reference widely adopted in the international assistance community, argues that “participatory process, inclusiveness of actors, impartiality in relation to actors and issues, transparency, respect for people’s ownership of the conflicts and their suffering, accountability for one’s own actions, partnership and co-ordination; complementarity and coherence, and timeliness [emphasis added]” are principles of conflict-sensitive practice (International Alert et al. 2004, 3). However, the Resource Pack does not elaborate further on the scope of these goals or how to achieve them.

Do No Harm, PCIA, and conflict-sensitivity seek to address root causes, carefully assess context, and promote sustainable peace in their approaches to interventions. For the purposes of this paper, these different concepts and fields are collectively referred to as part of peacebuilding practice. This literature provides practical guidance on how to design and assess interventions, as well as academic literature theorizing why conflict and change occur, how to make

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12 International Alert et al. define conflict sensitivity as: “the ability of your organisation to: understand the context in which you operate; understand the interaction between your intervention and the context; and act upon the understanding of this interaction, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts” (International Alert at al. 2004, 1).
13 Even though this might be a reductivist interpretation of disparate approaches to conflict interventions, the term is used in order to simplify the process of explaining my study of peacebuilding interventions in urban South Africa, with the knowledge that this review refers to the bodies of literature described above.
14 There is academic literature, often in the field of “conflict transformation”, or simply peacebuilding writ large that seeks to understand why conflict and change occur. Conflict transformation is: “a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses, and very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict” (Miall 2004, 4).
interventions more responsive, and the values that peacebuilding should promote. However, many underlying assumptions in this field have not been interrogated. The critical and academic literature behind operational tools and resources use mainstream and policy key terms and categories, even though: “the role of academic research should be to reflect critically on the taken-for-granted assumptions of policy makers rather than simply confirming or legitimizing them: to make them visible and open to inspection” (Bakewell 2008, 437-438). I now seek to “inspect” some of the key assumptions in peacebuilding literature, and analyse how these assumptions relate to a context of urban displacement.

**Drawing from Development**

In order to inspect the field of peacebuilding practice more closely, I will first draw from development literature for insights on the nature of ‘community’ and participation. The peacebuilding field is relatively young, but the development field has a longer history and a body of critical texts that are relevant to this study.

Since Robert Chambers introduced “participatory rural appraisals” (PRA) in the 1970s, the development field has pioneered the study of participation in program interventions. Donor governments have widely adopted participatory approaches, although Rahnema argues that they often pay lip services to the idea of participation (Rahnema in Sachs 1992, 120). PRA theorists suggest that participation is the only way to save development from “degenerating into a bureaucratic, top-down and dependency-creating institution” (Rahnema in Sachs 1992, 12). However, participation is a slippery term that can look like many different things (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Hickey and Mohan 2004). Rahnema describes the importance of differentiating between what she terms “teleguided” participation and spontaneous participation: “More often than not, people are asked or dragged into partaking in operations of no interest to them, in the
very name of participation (Rahnema in Sachs 1992, 116).

The development discourse often focuses on the extent to which participatory processes are manipulated or not: “There is a big difference between the ideals of participation and the proliferation of a development orthodoxy” (Harrison 2002, 588; see also Stirrat, 1997; Tsing 2006; Chambers 1997; Cooke and Kothari 2001; Hickey and Mohan 2004). Chambers’ *Whose Reality Counts?* discusses the ways in which urban (and rural) people are analytical and articulate about the diverse and complicated realities of the places in which they live, the realities of which are often at odds with the theories behind development programming. Rahnema expands on this idea and claims that development interpretations of participation needs can actually “disvalue traditional and vernacular forms of power” (Rahnema in Sachs 1992, 123). Thus, participatory interventions can still be packaged in a top-down manner, and altogether miss the function of such approaches.

Rahnema also describes the ultimate paradox of ‘participation’: true participation requires “free and un-biased human beings”, and yet our own social structures have constructed un-free and biased persons with which to “participate”: Therefore, there is not zero-sum situation of either participating or not, but rather a spectrum along which individual agency is constrained by the social structures and the environment within which participants live and function (Rahnema in Sachs 1992). Harrison’s *The Problem with the Locals* describes this spectrum as well in her critique of development discourse around participation (Harrison 2002).

However, a key issue that the development discourse does not address is the inter-relationship of those participating. Participating with *whom*?: the nature of who participates is tied into a simplistic understanding of local spaces, and who lives and operates within them. A romanticized and relatively monolithic interpretation of local contexts is embraced, instead of
recognising that, “traditional or local knowledge systems suffer, too, from. . . inhibitive
prejudices” (Rahnema in Sachs 1992, 122). In development discourse, communities are often
considered homogeneous, regardless of the social and political realities on the ground (Guijt and
Shah 1998 in Harrison 2002, 588). Golooba-Mutebi describes this as “social homogeneity”, and
describes the often false assumption that a population “has the ‘structured capacity’ to
cooperate with those designing and implementing a project” (Eyben and Ladbury 1995, 194 in
Golooba-Mutebi 2005). Harrison suggests, “the relationship between policy and implementation
needs to be rooted in a more detailed under- standing of the political context than is often the
case” (Harrison 2002, 588). ‘Communities’ themselves are complicated, and the local context
will accordingly render the meaning of a given “universal” term different in each setting as well
(Tsing 2006). “Context determines the feasibility of collective action”: Participation can only be
understood within the context of who is participating, and how these different participants relate
with one another (Golooba-Mutebi 2005, 955). These insights on ‘community’ and participation
led to the theoretical frame for this thesis, which seeks to provide a way to acknowledge and
make sense of the ‘friction’ between theory and practice in peacebuilding. Next, understanding
when this friction can be helpful or harmful is ultimately the goal of this thesis’ fieldwork with
social cohesion interventions.
CHAPTER III: ‘FRICTION’ AND THEORY

I hope to contribute to Fischer’s call for “critical peace research”, and Bakewell’s notion of “oblique research”, which strives to step outside common policy categories and “get a sideways look at policy and practice from a new angle” (Bakewell 2008, 449). Bakewell and Fischer represent the two discourses this thesis seeks to meld together: peacebuilding and displacement. In this thesis I respond to these calls for “critical” and “oblique” research by interrogating the assumptions embedded in peacebuilding literature, and analysing how notions of community and participation relate to urban displacement.

Furthermore, and in line with Bakewell’s criticisms of the policy categories used in forced migration, I argue that operational tools do not question these assumptions because academic peacebuilding literature has not done so either: Academic literature often does not complicate these constructs and instead adopts operational language in the quest for policy/practical relevance. I seek to step outside these categories and highlight the ‘friction’ between traditional approaches to peacebuilding and the realities of urban displacement.

The Local/International Narrative

In order to understand how friction is created between traditional approaches to peacebuilding, it is important to understand the common narrative from which most peacebuilding interventions are designed, and the assumptions about people and places that are embedded in these common narratives. Specifically, there is a particular context narrative that peacebuilding actors operate within: This narrative is about international organisations entering a host country experiencing, or susceptible to, conflict. This narrative, as I will describe in the

15 The operational tools I refer to include models, manuals, and guidelines of major national donor agencies (in particular, the US, UK, France, and Germany) and institutions, such as Caritas International, Search for Common Ground, International Rescue Committee, Save the Children, War Child, among others. These operational tools are synonymous with the “peacebuilding toolkit” I refer to later in this thesis.
following chapters, has implications for how peacebuilding approaches ‘community’ and participation. In this setting, there are internationals, and then there is everyone else. “Everyone else” is often deemed ‘local’ (Swisspeace 2010; FEWER 2001; Dziedzic et al. 2008; USAID 2005). The term ‘local’ is frequently used in peacebuilding literature, and has adopted a variety of meanings depending on the institution or program. However, it is not only operational tools and programs that use ‘local’ without clarity: The academic literature on peacebuilding similarly refers to ‘localness’ indiscriminately, and without further reflection (Lederach 2003; Fischer 2004; Miall 2004; Reich 2006; Woodrow and Chigas 2009; Anderson 1999; Bush 2004; Gsanger and Feyen 2004; Reimann 2004). In discussing forced migrants, Bakewell suggests that this phenomenon arises when:

The search for policy relevance has encouraged researchers to take the categories, concepts and priorities of policy makers and practitioners as their initial frame of reference for identifying their areas of study and formulating research questions. This privileges the worldview of the policy makers in constructing the research, constraining the questions asked, the objects of study and the methodologies and analysis adopted (Bakewell 2008, 432).

As a result, local has slowly become meaningless as both academic and operational literature ascribe localness to any actors and features of the host country that are not international. Indeed, local simply stands in relief from international, and is not otherwise problematised. ‘Local’ especially does not refer to the invisibility, diversity, mobility, and insecurity that characterize urban displacement (and which can characterize rural and camp-based settings as well).

Often, the host country context is monolithically construed as ‘local’ (Swisspeace 2010; FEWER 2001; Dziedzic et al. 2008; USAID 2005). FEWER discusses the importance of “locally led and managed” processes (FEWER 2001); USAID discusses the importance of “local efforts” (USAID 2005); the Measuring Peace in Conflict Environments (MPICE) framework focuses on building “local capacity” (Dziedzic et al. 2008); and, Church and Rogers discuss “local language skills” and the “local context” (Church and Rogers 2006, 4). In each of these examples, locals are simply national-level actors. Meanwhile, CARE describes “consultation with local individuals” in its projects, and Church and Chigas refer to a local “peace constituency”, which focuses on community-level civil society (O’Brien 2001; Church and Chigas 2006, xiii). In these settings, “localness” more specifically refers to community-level actors. These are just a few examples: Stakeholders, leaders, organisations, processes, communities, grassroots, and ownership, among other things, can all be ‘local’ as well. However, as more and more people and objects are ascribed “localness”, the meaning of the term becomes increasingly diluted.
In addition to the use of “localness”, the nature of localness has not been interrogated either. The dominant discourse in peacebuilding has revolved around the dynamic of internationals operating in a relatively immobile environment, in which the host population often lives in camps or rural villages. The context narrative used in peacebuilding literature does not include an environment of urban displacement (or any dynamic and differentiated urban space), or the actions of domestic peacebuilding actors. In these spaces, the implicit and explicit assumptions about the nature of local actors become starkly apparent. Understandings of ‘community’ and participation are constructed from the local/international peacebuilding narrative as well. And yet, who is local in cosmopolitan Johannesburg and other similar cities? Where is ‘the community’, and who determines if it is a meaningful one? Who should be participating in interventions, and how is ownership understood in such a diverse space? These constructions are uncontested in peacebuilding literature, even though their relevance to a context of urban displacement is questionable.\textsuperscript{17}

**Challenging “Localness”**

In order to understand the implications of the local/international dichotomy for concepts of community and participation, I will use Tsing’s concept of ‘friction’ to unpack localness as it is portrayed in peacebuilding literature.

‘Friction’ helps to explain how internationals practically engage with localness: “Rubbing two sticks together produces heat and light; one stick alone is just a stick”, Tsing suggests. “As a metaphorical image, friction reminds us that heterogeneous and unequal encounters can lead to new arrangements of culture and power” (Tsing 2004, 5). Tsing discounts scholarship that suggests international forces (capitalism, human rights, international justice, 

\textsuperscript{17} Constructs of “localness”, community, participation, and ownership should be problematised for any peacebuilding intervention, but the extent to which these allegedly universal concepts strays from the reality of urban displacement is especially stark.
among others) transform local environments in a one-way street of sorts. Tsing argues that this relationship is actually push-pull, creating entirely new realities for both local landscapes and international concepts (just as two sticks end up creating fire). In the context of this paper, international peacebuilding, “can only be charged and enacted in the sticky materiality of practical encounters” (Tsing 2004, 2). As a result, the “sticky” reality of imposing an international peacebuilding toolkit in a city like Johannesburg will not look like the international model: something new will emerge through the friction of international and local engagement.

‘Friction’ can be applied to the various international actors in the local landscape of a city such as Johannesburg as well. A range of actors from many nationalities rub against each other, and their friction creates new spaces, cultures, and livelihoods (which often defies traditional understandings of ‘community’). These actors also range vertically, from national level politicians and elites, to community organizers, “invisible” migrants, sex workers, and shop-owners. However, current peacebuilding literature does not recognise two key features of this landscape: 1) The diversity of localness as described above, and the ways in which this diversity creates new concepts of power, space, and culture, and 2) How “stepping outside policy categories can cast new light on the situation of ‘invisible’ populations of forced migrants and those among whom they live” (Bakewell 2008, 448).

These gaps in peacebuilding literature do not necessarily indicate that international concepts of peacebuilding cannot be applied in urban South Africa. It simply suggests that they will likely be transformed in the process of doing so; that there will be a fair amount of “stickiness” with their practical engagement with the city’s realities. As Tsing suggests:

*Universals are effective within particular historical conjunctures that give them content and force. We might specify this conjunctural feature of universals in practice by speaking of engagement. Engaged universals travel across difference and are charged and changed by their travels. Through friction, universals become practically effective. Yet they can never fulfill their promises of universality. Even in transcending localities, they don’t take over the world (Tsing 2004, 8).*
Thus in some cases the peacebuilding toolkit might fit relatively well, and in others, it might not be suitable at all. The reality is simply that the process of engaging with localness is much messier than the international peacebuilding toolkit expects. The friction that Tsing describes is not taken into account in peacebuilding literature; the idea that “localness” and the “international” are actually in constant confrontation, and transformation, with each other. Instead, the literature constructs a dichotomy between those doing the intervening, and those for whom the intervention is designed that is not necessarily helpful for understanding the “sticky” realities of where and how peacebuilding takes place.

The ways in which peacebuilding literature currently navigates this relationship has implications for many other constructs in peacebuilding interventions. I particularly focus on ‘community’ and participation as important constructs that might experience considerable ‘friction’ in a context of urban displacement.

**Community in Question**

As described above, peacebuilding literature often constructs a monolithic ‘local’ landscape, and an image of homogenous, self-enclosed ‘communities’ within which interventions take place. Peacebuilding literature consistently refers to the ‘community’, and carries out interventions at the ‘community-level’ (Chigas and Woodrow 2009; Anderson 2005; Bush 2004; Dziedzic, Sotirin, and Agoglia 2008). Peacebuilding scholars similarly use ‘community’ without a clear explanation of what the term entails—falling into the trap of constraining language and categories for the sake of policy/practice relevance. Bakewell suggests, “Holding too closely to policy categories not only makes some outside the category invisible, but it also tends to privilege category membership as an explanatory variable for differences between people (Bakewell 2008, 439). As a result, language that describes
communities in urban South Africa might miss the actual ways in which people interact and relate with one another, in a space where resident’s themselves do not perceive a “sense of community” (Harrison 2002). Concepts of community in existing literature are also construed as relatively static, which does not account for the dynamic and fluid nature of city space in South Africa. Many conflict assessment frameworks today do not expect the people, communities, and general demographics of the space they operate in to change very much, and accordingly create linear tools for nonlinear dynamics and movements (Meharg 2009). Bakewell suggests that this is similarly a consequence of policy blinders: “policy categories are likely be fairly invariant over time (they mean the same today as yesterday). . . If they are subject to constant revision, it is likely to cause confusion and potentially the collapse of the policy” (Bakewell 2008, 436-437). As a result, invariant categories are often perpetuated even when their relevance is not apparent.

The discourses around ‘community’ in peacebuilding literature illustrate several of these categories. For instance, existing peacebuilding literature frequently discusses segregated communities and divided societies (Church and Rogers 2006). The underlying assumption is that a single ‘community’ is currently split into two (or more) pieces. It is assumed that there is a ‘community’ with which to engage, and the nature of this community is relatively monolithic. Accordingly, the discourse on divided societies and segregated communities is not necessarily helpful given the realities of urban displacement. The nature of diversity, and the subsequent creation of insiders and outsiders, in South Africa’s urban displacement context demonstrates this unhelpfulness clearly.

For instance, Alexandra is a township in South Africa with a long historical legacy of created insiders and outsiders, categories that evolve over time and transcend nationality or ethnic group. ‘Outsiders’ can be determined because of someone’s mother tongue, political
affiliation, when they arrived in the township, or whether or not they are newly urbanised (Landau 2011). Subsequently, ideas about who is ‘local’ are contested. Furthermore, the space commonly referred to as “Alexandra” consists of several major areas (Beirut, Seswetla) that are distinctly isolated, and at the same time the outsiders are “effectively impossible to spatially exclude” (Landau 2011, 8). Alexandra does not fit neatly into the peacebuilding literature’s assumption that there is a community to divide, and no space is created for the possibility that a community is absent altogether. Each of these realities has practical implications on the ‘community’ that interventions target, and the meaning attached to involving ‘local’ actors.

Reich begins to provide clarity on ‘localness’ by suggesting that people within the conflict region itself are outsiders if they are not directly affected by physical or structural violence (Reich 2006, 21). Leonhardt also debunks the idea of a ‘community’ perspective by acknowledging that ‘communities’ are diverse, with many different stakeholders and interest groups. However, these clarifications do not address the dilemma of how to target a ‘community’ when people living in the targeted space do not believe such a community exists.

As the Alexandra example demonstrates, the reality of “community” in a context of urban displacement does not fit neatly into invariant categories. Instead, “cultures [and ‘communities’] are continually co-produced” in the friction of various interactions (Tsing 2004, 4). Every interaction creates ‘friction’, and the volume of constant interaction in the cities of South Africa means that ‘community’ and culture are perpetually being co-produced. This reality, “raise[s] the question of what belonging may mean among newly urbanised populations or in a country where almost everyone has been geographically and socially displaced”(Landau 2011, 22). The engagement of a peacebuilding intervention’s notion of ‘community’ in this context of wide-scale urban displacement leads to a considerable amount of the ‘stickiness’ described earlier.
To summarize, the key assumptions in current peacebuilding literature are that: there is a community with which to engage; the community is relatively monolithic; and the community will not change drastically over time. Friction is a useful concept for re-interpreting what ‘community’ means in a city like Johannesburg: people, both migrants and South Africans, often in “hidden spaces” do a variety of things that fall outside the view of a community-based approach to analysis and intervention. Furthermore, they often function like this purposefully, as Landau describes: the displaced in urban South Africa are, “an uprooted people determined to avoid establishing sustained connections with the new terrain” (Landau 2006, 138). Displaced persons are highly diverse, with a wide range of lived experiences, backgrounds and daily realities. They are constantly shifting and redefining their space, sometimes visibly, and other times not. Each of these realities has practical implications on the international construct of ‘community’ as understood and operationalised by peacebuilding, and in particular, social cohesion interventions.

**Participation: By whom and how?**

Peacebuilding tools and literature often reference the importance of participation hand in hand with community (Lederach 2003; Lederach 2007; Neufeldt and Culbertson 2007; Bush 2004; Church and Rogers 2006; International Alert et al. 2004). However, similar to the discussion of ‘community’, few attempts have been made to problematise participation and describe the challenges to a participatory process in peacebuilding. Church and Rogers admit that participation is not always straightforward: “In a war zone, for example, many programs assume there will be sufficient security to safely access the people or certain areas” (Church and Rogers 2006, 34). Church and Rogers suggest the “ideal modes and levels of participation” in an
intervention simply are not possible in certain contexts: the sticky engagement of “ideal modes and levels of participation” with a war-zone effectively changes the meaning of the term.

However, the recognition of barriers to participation does not address how to identify and target the appropriate actors. For instance, a ‘community’-based approach, or a peacebuilding approach that focuses on locals, but only addresses local elites, might very possibly miss the most important, but perhaps hidden participants. Bakewell suggests that through such approaches, “we immediately cast into the shadows the agency of the individuals and households who have no easily observable institutional form. As a result, many of the messy informal interactions of different communities as they move, settle and establish new places and make their way in the world (or fail to make their way) remain invisible to many researchers” (Bakewell 2008, 441). In this environment, will the targeted project participants contribute to “peace writ large”, or were they simply the most convenient (Anderson 2003)? This question is particularly relevant for South Africa, whose urban social cohesion interventions often focus on ward councillors and other weak government forums for mobilization. This is often described as “doing things right”, instead of “doing the right things” when measuring effectiveness (Meharg 2009). The discussion of participation focuses on empowering intervention participants through participatory methods, but who is participating and the nature of participation remains under-addressed.

The rhetoric of “local ownership”, an element of participation, has gained considerable attention in the international donor community as well. And yet, paralleling the discourse on participation and ‘community’, peacebuilding actors frequently reference ownership without elaborating on the concept (Reich 2006; Campbell 2008; Chigas and Woodrow 2009; Fischer and Wils 2003; Gsanger and Feyen 2003). For some, local ownership is simply a glorified way
of discussing local participation: minimalist accounts of local ownership focus on local actors carrying out activities that might have been designed and funded by internationals.\textsuperscript{18} However, the significant prescriptive (minimalist versus maximalist approaches) debate on local ownership fails to address the meanings and practices of local ownership in peacebuilding contexts (Donais 2008).

Donais outlines several of the key dilemmas with operationalising local ownership: “Local ownership offers little concrete guidance in determining whose voices should be prioritized among the cacophony of local owners or in how to address situations in which the priorities of significant local actors run counter to the interests of the broader post-conflict society” (Donais 2009, 12). Donais argues that in order to give the term meaning, ‘outsiders’ must address the meanings of ‘ownership’ and the characteristics of the ‘locals’ (Donais 2009, 11). This is particularly complex amidst the nature of ‘community’, the diversity of actors, and the characteristics of conflict in a context like Johannesburg. For instance, Landau suggests that, “rather than claiming ownership, many foreigners are claiming usufruct rights” (Landau 2006, 136). Groups can use their agency to not own their piece of the local landscape, and are instead content with their state of “permanent mobility” (Landau 2006).

This section does not seek to suggest that local ownership is unattainable in urban South Africa. Tsing suggests that it is important to understand international concepts, “not as truths or lies but as sticky engagements”: What is the “sticky” reality of participation or ownership in these contexts? The question is not simply, “Is there participation and ownership or not?” Instead, the necessary question is: how can peacebuilding actors and literature recognise the

\textsuperscript{18} Donais argues that local ownership is essentially about agency: who decides, who controls, who implements, and who evaluates a project (Donais 2008, 3). Nathan describes local ownership as a democratic process shaped and driven by local actors (Nathan 2007, 9). Wilson and Martin go further and argue that local ownership is more about developing critical thinking skills and reflection on local needs (Wilson and Martin 2008, 282). Each definition attempts to create sustainable structures run by ‘local’ people, but the robustness of local participation and the activities involved are contested.
sticky reality of operationalising these ideals? Peacebuilding literature does not engage with the constraints on participation and the nature of ownership in these settings. The field research for this thesis reveals some of these sticky engagements, as well as practitioners’ reflections on how and why they fall short of the participation and ownership ideals.

**Putting Friction into Practice**

In this thesis I seek to critique current assumptions in the peacebuilding field about the nature of ‘community’ and participation. I suggest that these uncontested assumptions exist because peacebuilding language and discourse is adopted from policy and practice frameworks, “with limited reflection on any ‘deeper academic meaning or explanatory power’” (Bakewell 2008, 437).

As it currently stands, operational tools do not question these assumptions because academic peacebuilding literature has not done so either: academic literature does not complicate these constructs and instead adopts operational language in the quest for ‘policy/practical relevance’. Bakewell suggests that research, “designed without regard to policy relevance may offer a more powerful critique and ironically help to bring about more profound changes than many studies that focus on policy issues from the outset” (Bakewell 2008, 433). Peacebuilding literature demands policy irrelevant research in order to critique existing categories and assumptions, or else it will, as Fischer fears, “revert to technical peacebuilding” (Fischer 2009, 93).

The reality of these constructs in a context of urban displacement is a “sticky” and messier version of the peacebuilding ideal. In fact, in any context where traditional peacebuilding tools and ideas are used, there will be ‘friction’ between the model and how it is
Put into practice. Urban displacement is not necessarily exceptional in and of itself: The elements of invisibility, insecurity, diversity, and mobility that characterize urban displacement could appear in a variety of other post-conflict settings as well. However, the extent to which a context of urban displacement deviates from the traditional peacebuilding narrative is significant. The aim of this thesis in the following chapters is to examine these divergences through field research with a range of peacebuilding practitioners operating around Johannesburg and Pretoria. Through these practitioners, this study examines how these institutions address social cohesion, how their programs were conceived and designed, and how they approach issues of ‘community’ and ‘participation’. Through these interviews, this study will analyse the ‘frictions’ between social cohesion ideas and practice, and think critically about how interventions most successfully negotiate this friction.

This is not to suggest that all interventions neatly represent ‘international’ ideas, and that such ideas invariably will not work in an urban displacement context. Some interventions represent models developed by local government organisations themselves, such as the city of Johannesburg’s Migrant Help Desk. Other interventions are a partnership between local and international institutions, such as Caritas International and the Damietta Peace Initiative. Still others, such as the Nelson Mandela Foundation, are a South African institute that uses international tools for its dialogue sessions. Additional organisations are not quite sure where the initial impetus for their interventions came from, such as the Anti-Privatisation Forum, and several organisations added an anti-xenophobia element to existing domestic programs, such as StreetNet International, in the wake of the 2008 xenophobic attacks. This spectrum demonstrates that ‘friction’ between international/local ideas also needs to be thought about carefully. The goal of discussing ‘friction’ is to break down notions of ‘international’ and ‘local’, and to think
critically about what will work best in a given context. Unless the friction between context and toolkit is recognised, the peacebuilding field will miss important opportunities to better understand the nature of conflict and the needs of the urban displacement environment. International peacebuilding can embrace, "the possibilities of friction" if it is willing to engage in a more reflexive and context-specific approach (Tsing 2004, 18). Friction between international concepts and local realities will persist regardless, but “the effects of encounters across difference can be compromising or empowering” (Tsing 2004, 6). Thus, friction can be acknowledged and harnessed to inform more relevant tools and literature, or ignored.

Tsing argues that, “Global forces are themselves congeries of local/global interaction” (Tsing 2004, 3). However, in the case of peacebuilding theories and toolkits, the field might not recognise the ways in which ‘friction’ impacts it—The consequence of “congeries of local/global interaction” could just be failed programming. More attention is needed to how the peacebuilding toolkit manifest itself in a context of urban displacement. What is the outcome of using reductivist concepts of ‘community’ and ideas of participation? How does the local landscape recast the peacebuilding toolkit in the ‘stickiness’ of practical encounters? The following chapters will provide examples of the different ways this interaction has taken place in Gauteng province, following the 2008 xenophobic attacks in South Africa. Through these examples, this thesis seeks to analyse these sticky interactions, render explicit the assumptions of key constructs in peacebuilding, and critically evaluate the frictions of these interactions in a context of urban displacement.
CHAPTER IV: SOCIAL COHESION: AN OVERVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the most significant theories and aspects of social cohesion, and then to propose a working definition of social cohesion that will be used for the remainder of this thesis. This chapter also seeks to position social cohesion as an increasingly important element of peacebuilding practice, and to discuss the current state of the field in terms of measuring the success of social cohesion cohesion interventions.

Social cohesion has become a staple of peacebuilding and development practice since the 1995 Copenhagen Declaration. King and Samii summarize the range of definitions that typify social cohesion: “the ‘affective bonds between citizens’ (Chipkin and Ngqulunga 2008), ‘local patterns of cooperation’ (Fearon et al. 2009) and ‘the glue that bonds society together, promoting harmony, a sense of community, and a degree of commitment to promoting the common good’ (Colletta et al. 2001)” (King and Samii 2009, 2). The founder of the concept of social cohesion, sociologist Emile Durkheim, defined it as “the ties that bind people to one another” (Durkheim 1958). For Forest and Kearns, the most basic aspect of social cohesion is if groups in a given area can come together to promote a common interest (Forrest and Kearns 2000, 8). The Nelson Mandela Foundation, a participating institution in this thesis, defines social cohesion as, “that which galvanizes a collective or a group of people around a common set of values, based on mutual respect, tolerance, freedom from fear, social solidarity and respect for human dignity” (Nelson Mandela Foundation 2010, 4). Each definition varies in interpretation and prerequisites for cohesion, but the core concept revolves around the strength of social ties and peaceful coexistence between groups.

19 The 1995 Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development recognised a commitment to enhance social development through such social issues as gender equality, employment, reducing poverty, and increased funding and integration of social development into existing structures.
Social Networks, Capital, and Cohesion

Social cohesion is often discussed alongside concepts of social network and social capital. I will briefly discuss the literature of these two fields, place social cohesion within this discussion, and move forward with the focus on social cohesion. The literature on social networks emerged in the 1950s when a group of British anthropologists found it difficult to analyse the social ties that fall outside tribe or village categories (Berkman et al. 2000). The goal of network analysis is to understand the effects of social structures on individual behaviour through what Hall and Wellman describe as, “the characteristic patterns of ties between actors in a social system rather than on characteristics of the individual actors themselves” (Hall and Wellman 1985, 26). Social network analysis initiated the study of social ties, which soon expanded to social capital and other patterns of connection within a social structure (Moody & Paxton 2009, 1493).

Just as the definitions for social cohesion are contested, there are competing definitions for social capital as well. According to Putnam, social capital includes: “features of social life-networks, norms and trust- that enable participants to act together more effectively” (Putnam 1995, 664). Meanwhile, Jacobs understands social capital as social ties that create a foundation for trust, cooperation, and safety (Jacobs 1960). According to Moody and Paxton, the concept of social capital, focuses on “socially meaningful feelings, values, or connections” (Moody & Paxton 2009, 1495). While each understanding of the term varies, the core ingredients of social capital most commonly relate to collective action and trust, with social networks playing a critical role in analysing these elements.

Within the field of social capital, there are different forms and emphases of analysis. Portes (1998) differentiates between the sources and consequences of social capital, whereas
Woolcock (1998) distinguishes between embedded and autonomous forms of social capital. Hawe and Shiell describe how social capital analysis can focus on the macro-level, represented by the definitions put forward by Putnam and Jacobs, or the micro-level, and the extent to which individuals are integrated into their networks, as described by Portes and Woolcock (Hawe & Shiell 2000, 872-873).

While the initial literature on social networks focused on social structures, the literature on social capital and ties emphasizes the content and complexity of social relations. By interpreting social structure and social content together, socially meaningful structural connections can be analysed within a network of actors. The overlap of these two literatures can develop the best explanations for social action (Moody & Paxton 2009, 1497). Social cohesion should be understood as a concept emerging from, and at the intersection of, these two fields: Marrying the study of social networks and how people are connected with analysis of the content and meaning of these ties.

**Types and Forms of Social Cohesion**

Social cohesion is a multifaceted concept composed of various different types of cohesion and bonding (Chan et al. 2006; Reeskens 2007, 7). Durkheim initially discussed the different types of solidarity that fall under social cohesion: these initial concepts of solidarity focused on trust among people who are in contact with, and often similar to, each other. Reeskens describes: “more homogenous societies are seen as more trusting and thus more cohesive, due to the natural tendency of people to associate with people similar to them” (Reeskens 2007, 11). Durkheim’s concept of *mechanical solidarity* illustrates this kind of cohesion, which emphasizes the similarities between people. Bonding ties, or bonding networks, resemble most closely the embedded family network, where relationships are strong and close
and the different parties know each other well (Sabatini 2009, 430). This most closely resembles Durkheim’s ‘mechanical solidarity’, and what Cattell terms a ‘homogenous network’ (Cattell 2001, 1507). The social capital generated by bonding ties includes strong mutual trust and reciprocity within the building blocks of social networks.

However, today mechanical solidarity has been regarded as “an unimportant source of cohesion in highly differentiated societies” (Carter 2000: 5). Instead, trust is often gained through categorization, such as membership in a group or nationality (Hardin 2006; Reeskens 2007:15). Durkheim also coined the term ‘organic solidarity’ to describe forms of cohesion that arise from interdependence instead of similarity among people. In such societies, cohesion is developed though systems of exchange (Giddens in Reeskins 2007). In order for ‘organic solidarity’ to function, individuals must trust others to meet the expectations of the larger group, and believe that negative consequences will happen to those who violate these expectations (Reeskens 2007, 16). Examples of social cohesion that are typified as organic solidarity are generally considered to be ‘thinner’ and riskier forms of cohesion (Rosenberg 1956; Reeskens 2007, 21). ‘Organic solidarity’ is analogous with ‘bridging ties’, which are the social ties that connect different bonding networks, and at the community scale these are important as the “ties shaping heterogeneous groups of people with different backgrounds” (Sabatini 2009, 430). Cattell calls this the ‘heterogeneous network’: “an open network consisting of a relatively large number of membership groups. It included dissimilar people in terms of age, ethnicity, interests, employment status, or occupation, and place of residence” (Cattell 2001, 1507). The social capital that accrues from these ties is the “diffusion of information and trust” across different sectors of a community that might not otherwise have contact with one another (Sabatini 2009, 430). Bridging social ties are believed to be an asset to negotiated coexistence: they are “more
effective sources of local informal social control” because they can assist in the development of social norms without creating a disincentive to punish transgressors (Browning 2009: 1573).

It is critical to acknowledge, particularly in the South African context, that ‘cohesion’ does not necessarily lead to positive outcomes. At the neighbourhood or community scale, bonding capital can lead to, “the pursuit of narrow sectarian interests or to “lobbying against the interest of other groups” (Sabatini 2009, 430). It can also lead to a disinclination to sanction offenders (Browning 2009, 1573). According to the South African Department of Social Development: “social cohesion may manifest both positive and negative qualities: it may unite or divide, include and exclude” (Cloete & Kotze 2009, 9). For instance, strengthened identities around Zulu culture and language can serve to ‘other’ non-nationals in a township. Bonding ties can directly correlate with reduced chances for bridging ties. King and Samii similarly note that, “the literature on social capital includes many commentaries on how bonding social capital may undermine bridging social capital by reinforcing social divisions (King and Samii 2009, 2).

From the discussion above it should be clear that social cohesion is a complex and multidimensional concept (Berkman et al. 2000; Hawe and Shiell 2001; Menjivar 2002), which “incorporates diverse phenomena such as culture, institutions, social norms, and networks of interpersonal relationships” (Coleman in Sabatini 2009, 429). Although social capital is defined by some as “social networks, informed by trust, that enable people to participate in reciprocal exchanges, mutual support and collective action to achieve shared goals” (Chidester, Dexter & James 2003, 323), it is important to recognise that social ties are not necessarily supportive, and “there is variation in the type, frequency, intensity, and extent of support provided” (Berkman et al. 2000, 847). Such realities reveal the importance of micro-level analysis of social cohesion, and the complexities of group relationships. According to Coleman, a “given form of social
capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be useless or even harmful for others” (Coleman in Sabatini 2009, 429): social networks have a “repressive side” that “may also be used to constrain opportunities to non-network members” (Hawe and Shiell 2000, 872).

**Measuring Social Cohesion and their Interventions**

In light of the complex nature of social cohesion, its potential for unintended consequences, and the volatility of social relations in general, it is difficult to both measure social cohesion, and understand the success of social cohesion interventions. This section will briefly discuss social cohesion interventions today and some of the unintended consequences of their implementation. It will then discuss the process of evaluating social cohesion, common indicators, and the challenges of such a measurement process.

Samii and King describe the recent surge in programming by major organisations such as the World Bank’s Social Development Department, the International Rescue Committee, and CHF International. (King and Samii 2009, 3). Social cohesion interventions often include the construction of local institutions to promote reconciliation, education or media programs to build trust between community members, and social activities such as sports leagues (Cyrus and King 2009, 4). And yet, these interventions have often had unintended consequences that actually further divisions in a community (Meharg 2009; Uvin; 1998; Anderson 1999). King and Samii outline some of the challenges that have plagued social cohesion interventions in the past:

Resources introduced through interventions may be susceptible to elite capture (see examples in Mansuri and Rao 2004). Some interventions to promote social cohesion may call for a return to a “golden age” (Jenson 1998), but fail to examine important inequalities and power relations lurking in communities’ pasts (Grischow and McKnight 2008; Grischow 2008). Interventions aimed to promote community participation may induce certain community members to become more involved, and others to be increasingly marginalized (Gugerty and Kremer 2008; Richards et al. 2005). Some interventions may focus exclusively on unity, to the detriment of all else and hide injustice and inequality (Bernard 1999; Colletta et al. 2000; Jenson 1998; Joshee 2004) (King and Samii 2009, 4).

The challenges and unintended consequences to promoting social cohesion are
understandable. Firstly, and as described above, understanding social cohesion demands analysis at multiple levels. Social cohesion at the level of say, shopkeepers, may not correspond to social cohesion within the community writ large. Secondly, the type of social cohesion may change over time, such as from bonds created by process of exchanged goods, to one of familiarity and homogeneity. Finally, the relevance of different measures for social cohesion may not translate across cultures, or even maintain meaning in one given place over time (King and Samii 2009, 4). Each of these obstacles makes the implementation of social cohesion activities increasingly difficult in any space, and especially in a context of urban displacement.

These challenges to the implementation of social cohesion interventions similarly render them difficult to assess and measure for their effectiveness. To date assessment tools and literature often look at the presence or lack of social capital, or the strength/weakness of social networks on a scale of sorts. The function of these tools is often to understand social capital and networks at the macro-level (how people interact and how much trust there is between them) instead of a micro-level analysis of what that trust looks like and how it affects others within the same space. For instance, the World Bank assigns a numeric outcome for its social capital assessment tool (SOCAT) surveys, but admits: “the most comprehensive definitions of social capital are multidimensional, incorporating different levels and units of analysis . . . any attempt to measure the properties of inherently ambiguous concepts such as ‘community’, ‘network’ and ‘organisation’ is correspondingly problematic” (World Bank 2010). Berkman et al. have similarly criticized early social capital assessments for not properly measuring social ties (Berkman et al. 2000: 846). The complexity of social cohesion is ultimately often beyond the means or scope of different measurement tools, and it remains unclear which aspects of social capital are most valuable, and how they are valuable.
The social capital and social cohesion research has tended to rely on attitudinal measures rather than behavioural measures. But evidence suggests that attitudinal and behavioural measures of trust, for example, do not always correlate (King and Samii 2009, 4). This is particularly important for this thesis, as the ACMS social cohesion project’s focus is on behavioural outcomes of social cohesion and communities’ abilities to effectively manage conflict. Fearon, Humphreys and Weinstein have led the way in measuring behavioural aspects of social cohesion in a peacebuilding intervention. Fearon et al.’s conducted game exercises in war-affected Liberia in order to focus on behavioural measures of social cohesion, such as people’s willingness to contribute community public goods, or survey questions to report whether there have been community initiatives to rebuild a school, clinic, repair roads, etc. (Fearon et al. 2009, 23). Fearon et al.’s measurement of social cohesion has focused on the community’s ability to act collectively. This measure is one of many measures used to understand the presence of social cohesion. At a more robust level of involvement, a range of authors use the management of diversity as a key indicator (Jensen 1998; Brown et al 2005; De wit in Cloete & Kotze 2009, 12), and others look at positive social cohesion developing between diverse groups (Brown et al. 2005). Active involvement in a civic culture and democratic processes was the focus of Putnam’s influential *Bowling Alone* (Putnam 2000). For the purposes of this study, I use the management of diversity and the presence of legitimate institutions as the most salient indicators for the South African context, described and justified further below.

**Social Cohesion and the South African Context**

In the ACMS social cohesion study through which the field research for this thesis was undertaken, a ‘community’ is defined as a social network through which numerous sub-networks are joined through various kinds of ties (Monson 2010, 7). Despite the range of definitions
provided in this chapter to describe social cohesion, this thesis seeks to meld together two key definitions.

King and Samii describe social cohesion as a “complex of behavioural and attitudinal attributes of a community, by which we mean a geographically-based entity” (King and Samii 2009, 2). This definition is important in how it specifically disaggregates behavioural and attitudinal attributes. In the South African context, this thesis focuses on how ‘communities’ manage tensions and co-exist peacefully. Understanding attitudes and levels of trust is also important, but valued less than eliminating physical and structural forms of violence against certain groups. King and Samii also clarify a ‘community’ as a geographically based entity, which is relevant for my fieldwork in urban South Africa. I am reluctant to term the sites of social cohesion interventions included in this thesis as communities in its more robust sense, and instead adopt the idea of a geographically-based social network with various kinds of ties, as outlined above. This allows for a relatively loose type of social network that is not necessarily acknowledged by all members, or meaningful to them.

Brown et al. define social cohesion as a community’s ability to function peacefully rather than in conflict (Brown et al. in Monson 2010, 7). This loose definition similarly provides leeway for various kinds of solidarity, social ties, and levels of meaning attached to the community. It is valuable for this study because it also allows for a minimalist interpretation of social cohesion, which the ACMS social cohesion project has adopted for the purposes of its study.

The ACMS team defines a community with a minimum threshold of social cohesion as: “one that is able to function peacefully in the presence of numerous social sub-groups, free from debilitating chronic tensions or acute, violent conflicts” (Monson 2010, 7). This definition has
been adopted upon reflection that the more robust indicators for social cohesion are not realistic, nor necessarily relevant in a context of urban displacement such as South Africa. Instead, we focus on the aforementioned indicators of managing diversity and the need for legitimate institutions in order to maintain a minimally cohesive society. Furthermore, our definition is process-based, and it focuses on behavioural rather than attitudinal indicators for social cohesion. Fearon et al. note that attitudinal forms of social cohesion do not necessarily correlate to behavioural forms of social cohesion (Fearon et al. 2009). As a result, the long-term and slow process of changing xenophobic attitudes, a significantly more robust type of change, might have less bearing on the prevalence of xenophobic violence that would be expected. Consequently, a meaningful way of addressing xenophobic violence in the shorter term should strive to stop physical and structural violence, rather than to eradicate xenophobic sentiments from every South African. At the end of the day, and with the challenges of building ‘community’ in the urban spaces of South Africa, all that can reasonably be expected is legitimate institutions and mechanisms for managing diversity that will allow for spaces free from chronic and serious forms of physical and structural violence.

The following chapter will provide more context for the onset of South Africa’s series of social cohesion interventions. The progression of the attacks, and then the government response following the attacks, will be outlined in detail. By understanding the nature of the attacks, and how actors responded to the attacks, it will be easier to understand how the friction between ideas about social cohesion and local realities developed.
CHAPTER V: THE 2008 XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE AND ITS AFTERMATH

Alexandra township erupted in violence on 11 May 2008. From Alex, the violence soon spread throughout Gauteng province, and then across South Africa. Within weeks, South Africans murdered 60 people, wounding hundreds more, and displacing over one hundred thousand (Polzer and Igglesden 2009). Beyond death and injuries, perpetrators destroyed thousands of homes and stole from countless South Africans and non-South Africans alike. While foreigners were targeted in the May violence, a third of the victims were South Africans who either did not speak Zulu, were married to foreigners or for some reason or another were deemed ‘outsiders’.

Xenophobia in South Africa is often discussed in the past tense, as something that happened in May of 2008 and then stopped altogether. However, in reality attacks have persisted on a regular basis both before May 2008, and ever since. Since the aftermath of the 2008 attacks, dozens have been murdered under the cloud of xenophobia, largely unnoticed by the South African public (CoRMSA 2009). Moreover, the police, employers, and neighbours routinely harass foreign nationals. Shops are looted, people injured, and others flee their homes in fear of attack (Landau 2011, 20). Indeed, media coverage of xenophobia in South Africa continues to make it seem like something that happened in 2008, but is thankfully no longer an issue (Landau 2011). Even though the attacks are often referred to as a past event, the civil society responses of social cohesion interventions seek to both stop the ongoing forms of structural and physical violence against ‘outsiders’, and ensure that a large-scale crisis like the 2008 attacks never happens again.

This section provides context for the social cohesion interventions in urban South Africa today. It will first briefly describe the progression of attacks in 2008 and several key theories for
why they took place. Then, this section discusses the government response to provide further context for the state dynamics that civil society interventions were and are engaging with. It concludes by describing the nature of insider/outsider dynamics that are central to understanding the 2008 attacks and subsequent violence against ‘outsiders’.

The Progression of Attacks

As mentioned above, the xenophobic attacks began on Sunday, May 11th 2008 in Alexandra township. According to Monson and Arian, unidentified groups with weapons looked for foreigners, “in their homes and informal workplaces, harassing and assaulting them, evicting them from their homes, and looting, destroying or appropriating their property” (Monson and Arian in Landau 2010, 36). By the second day of violence, an estimated 1,000 people were seeking refuge at the Alexandra police station, over a hundred people were injured and several dead (Monson and Arian in Landau 2010, 36). The violence began with support and purposeful organizing from informal leadership in the ‘Beirut’ area of Alex, and did not spread far from this area of the township.

In the next several days, the similar attacks spread to Diepsloot (where the reason for attack appeared to be looting in an opportunist reaction to the Alex attacks) and included evictions, looting, rape, assault, and harassment (Monson and Arian in Landau 2010, 42). From there, attacks continued in Tembisa, Thokoza, Katlehong, KwaThema, Duduza, Reiger Park, and Ramaphosa, among other sites in Gauteng province, and then throughout South Africa. Physical attacks subsided by the end of May, while threats and the consequences of mass eviction persisted. According to Monson and Arian: “The ‘final’ statistics on the violence were 1,384 suspects arrested, 342 shops looted and 213 burnt down. 62 people were reported dead, 21 of them South African citizens” (Monson and Arian in Landau 2010, 59). These attacks, initially
incomprehensible to the South African public, appear to have taken place deliberately, and upon further reflection and research, not surprisingly.

Misago highlights how the May violence was organized by local leaders to further their own interests (Misago in Landau 2010). Far from some sort of contagious disease or ‘third force’, the attacks were often purposeful and orchestrated by local elites for their own personal gain. Furthermore, the attacks are highly context-specific: each location of the attacks is the product of a unique setting with particular leadership dynamics. As Misago notes, “While broad structural, historical and attitudinal factors are important enabling factors, they cannot account for the timing and location of violence. Rather, these generalised conditions interplay in complex and often confusing ways with local dynamics and politics. When environment and institutions conspire, they provide both the opportunities and incentives for violence” (Misago in Landau 2010, 108). Thus, the “structural, historical, and attitudinal factors” that are described further in this section do not cause xenophobic violence on their own. Instead, highly context-specific dynamics ultimately determine when and where xenophobic violence takes place.

Misago’s focus on micro-politics is especially relevant for this thesis’ focus on context and the diversity, mobility, insecurity, and invisibility of urban South Africa. Furthermore, Misago suggested that the key triggers for the May 2008 violence were: “political and leadership vacuums, lack of conflict resolution mechanism, and culture of impunity” (Misago in Landau 2010, 108). Such realities are particularly important for social cohesion interventions in urban South Africa. A lack of legitimate institutions and the weakness of local leadership, rather than xenophobic attitudes writ large, feature as the most prominent reasons why violence took place in certain places over others.
The Government Response

The South African Government’s initial response to the 2008 xenophobic attack was to deny that a crisis was plaguing the nation (Pretoria News, 14 May 2008). Once the gravity of attacks were acknowledged, they were deemed criminal instead of xenophobic, and a ‘third force’ was often described in the media as responsible for the attacks (‘It was the third force in Alex’, Sowetan, 13 May 2008). Such rationales served to elide state responsibility by searching for exceptional justifications for the violence, instead of admitting that the perpetrators were typical South Africans. Meanwhile, perpetrators were often proud of the violence they committed, and understood their actions as a rational response to government inaction. For many South Africans, the perception is that foreigners are taking their land, homes, and job opportunities—especially small businesses in the townships— and that they are responsible for crime and violence. According to Mr. Mbatha, an Inkatha Freedom party leader from Alexandra, “there is too much of them now. If the government does not do something people will see what to do to solve the problem because it means it’s not the government problem it is our problem” (Mbatha in Landau 2010, 21). The perpetrators of xenophobic violence often saw attacks as a practical means of excluding foreigners for good, in light of government inaction and no other legitimate channels to address their grievances. With encouragement from local leadership and other ‘community’ elites, the attacks were often internalized as a civic duty.

Insiders and Outsiders

The South African Government’s slow response to the xenophobic violence is not unexpected. After all, South Africa has a long and painful history of creating insiders and outsiders. The Apartheid regime spatially excluded non-white South Africans and rendered them ‘foreigners’ within their own country. Through pass laws and Bantustans, black South Africans
were controlled in their daily lives, and similar concepts and patterns of exclusion manifest today through xenophobic violence (both physical and structural). Unfamiliar ethnic backgrounds and status as a new arrival are used to rouse suspicion of anyone who is not a clear ‘insider’, criteria for which seem to be flexible and context-specific. As Landau notes, “The. . .enemy within [is] an amorphously delimited group of outsiders that is inherently threatening, often indistinguishable from others, and is effectively impossible to spatially exclude” (Landau 2010, 9).

Within the broader group of ‘outsiders’ however, foreigners are easier to exclude through other means. It is “bureaucratically institutionalized and socially legitimate” (Landau 2010, 14) to do so, and as a result foreigners are particularly targeted for harassment, denied services, eviction, and exploitation in the workplace in light of their limited avenues for redress. Throughout the country, foreigners are regularly arrested and detained based only on their physical appearance, their inability to speak the right language or for simply fitting an undocumented-migrant ‘profile’, realities that have been described earlier in this thesis (Algotsson 2000). The social legitimacy of their exclusion allows for these forms of structural violence to cascade into physical forms of violence, as seen in the 2008 attacks.

Alexandra township, where the xenophobic attacks commenced, is a case study that demonstrates the long-seeded history of insider/outsider dynamics in urban South Africa. The process of defining ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ has featured in local politics for decades, and Alexandra has a history of trying to spatially exclude ‘outsiders’. According to Nieftagodien, in Alexandra, long-term residents consider themselves ‘bona fide’ – the ultimate insider identity—to assert their status as a true ‘community member’. The ‘bona fide’ identity of today illustrates “the salient continuities in exclusionary politics” (Nieftagodien in Landau 2010, 136). This
longstanding history of exclusion helps to explain the perpetuation of the insider/outsider dichotomy in Alexandra.

Alexandra represents just one case study of how insider/outsider dynamics have been negotiated and evolve over time. Rooted in a historical legacy of similar forms of exclusion and alienation throughout the Apartheid era, themes of exclusion and alienation continue today with a new face. The concept of insiders and outsiders is central to South African ‘communities’ today, and the featured outsider in recent history is a foreign national. As Landau explains, “outsiders have come to be understood as a threatening obstacle to achieving justice and retribution for decades of discrimination and indignity. When state institutions evidently failed to deliver on their promises to protect and promote a politically entitled but materially deprived citizenry, the population (or parts of it) took on the obligation to alienate and exclude those standing in its way” (Landau 2010, 9).

A combination of poor leadership, a lack of legitimate institutions, a history of insider/outsider dynamics, and the socially legitimate scapegoat of foreigners (and other outsiders) in part led to the May 2008 xenophobic attacks. These dynamics remain at play, and confront social cohesion interventions as they try to ensure that physical and structural forms of violence do not continue in the future. The implications of these dynamics for concepts of ‘community’ and participation in social cohesion interventions will now be discussed at length.
CHAPTER VI: COMMUNITY IN SOCIAL COHESION INTERVENTIONS

This chapter seeks to explain the construction of ‘community’ in social cohesion interventions implemented in Gauteng province in the aftermath of the May 2008 xenophobic attacks. It uses the xenophobic attacks of 2008 as the backdrop from which to discuss the nature of community in social cohesion interventions. This chapter focuses on the process of how interventions attempt to create social cohesion, and their appropriateness given the contextual features of urban displacement (insecurity, mobility, invisibility, and diversity). Since most of the participating interventions are ongoing, or did not undergo formal evaluation processes, this thesis cannot speak to other dimensions of their success. The OECD-DAC criteria, widely adopted by international peacebuilders, for assessing peacebuilding interventions focuses on relevance, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, coherence, and efficiency as the key dimensions from which intervention success should be determined (OECD-DAC 2008). This thesis is only concerned with relevance, and the processes by which interventions understand and engage with the context they operate within.

First, this chapter analyses my fieldwork with social cohesion interventions in urban South Africa, and how concepts of community manifest themselves in these interventions. It explores the ‘friction’ around how participating social cohesion interventions understand these concepts. It then proceeds with a case study analysis of the Migrant Help Desk (MHD), the Nelson Mandela Foundation (NMF), and Caritas International. It concludes with a discussion of the factors influencing the success of these interventions.

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20 The OECD-DAC criteria, created in 2008, looks at effectiveness (the extent to which a program fulfills the objectives it stated it would fulfill), impact (the effects on participants and their environment, as understood through various evaluation processes, informal and formal), sustainability (the likelihood that the impacts will carry into the future, and any created structures can continue without external support), coherence (the extent to which efforts are coordinated with, and synchronize with, the efforts of other actors, and efficiency (the ratio of funds and effort expended for the impact of the intervention).
about what these case studies tell us about peacebuilding practices more generally, and the extent to which these assumptions apply in South Africa.

The invisibility, insecurity, mobility, and diversity of urban displacement in South Africa emerged into two key themes in the fieldwork for this thesis. First, the contested nature of ‘community’ and the insider/outsider dynamics greatly affected all of the social cohesion interventions. Second, in light of the contested nature of ‘community’, ‘local’ knowledge must be quite detailed and specific in order to understand the various pieces of a given space. For these reasons, simple ideas of ‘community’ are unhelpful, and led to three significant forms of ‘friction’ between theory and context in the social cohesion interventions.

These forms of ‘friction’ each demonstrate something ‘new’ and unintentional that was produced from the application of a given model, international idea, or peacebuilding activity in a ‘community’ of the urban displaced.\(^{21}\) First, ‘friction’ was discovered between ‘business as usual’ approaches to interventions that were confronted with the invisibility of foreigners and outsiders, and the nature of the contested community in general. This is similar to the convenience syndrome described earlier for international actors operating in contexts of urban displacement. Second, ‘friction’ often occurred when organisations undervalued the specificity of local knowledge that a contested ‘community’ demands. ‘Local’ refers to a place, but does not ascribe legitimacy. In a contested ‘community’ with complex insider/outsider dynamics, legitimacy is critical but misunderstood. Finally, ‘friction’ occurs when official forums for migrants are absent, and the role of state structures, boundaries, and actors are not taken into account when interventions try to build social cohesion. This type of friction lies at the nexus of the first two types: The role of the state, and in particular local governance, affects how ‘local’

\(^{21}\) The ‘given model’ I refer to is part of a larger project to build a ‘liberal peace’, and the international peacebuilding toolkit seeks to further these aims. For more information on these peacebuilding tools, see Paris 2004; Richmond 2006.
knowledge is understood and who is perceived as a legitimate actor; it also affects the boundaries of ‘communities’, and perpetuates a convenience syndrome when interventions use these boundaries and local structures without questioning them.

**Social Cohesion Interventions and Community**

The social cohesion interventions included in this study represent a wide range of approaches and philosophies to address the xenophobic attacks of May 2008, and subsequent xenophobic attacks and attitudes. Some institutions are international aid agencies, such as the International Organisation for Migration, Jesuit Refugee Service, Caritas International, StreetNet International and the UN Refugee Agency. Others represent domestic civil society and political organisations (Anti-Privatisation Forum; Afuraka; Displaced and Migrant Persons Support Programme; CoSATU; Africa Diaspora Forum; Scalabrini; Nelson Mandela Foundation) or local government programmes (Migrant Help Desk).

Almost all organisations became involved in xenophobia and social cohesion as a consequence of the May 2008 attacks. However, each organisations’ approach to social cohesion is markedly different. Several institutions focus on humanitarian assistance and preventing future attacks from happening through police networks, mediation, and rapid response to threats (DMPSP; UNHCR). Others only target their own constituency in their interventions, seeking to address xenophobia within the workplace (CoSATU, StreetNet International). Still others have little relationship with the ‘hot spot’ communities, and must grapple with how to gain access and legitimacy in these spaces (IOM; Caritas International; MHD; Afuraka; Scalabrini; NMF; JRS). These interventions are the most common, and are particularly relevant for this thesis. How do interventions address an emerging, complex issue in such fragmented spaces? This thesis now discusses the three major forms of friction described
above and how they were experienced by interventions attempting to bring cohesion to urban South Africa’s communities.

**Insiders, Outsiders, and the Contested Community**

‘Business as usual’ approaches to social cohesion amidst the insider/outside dynamics of urban South Africa was the most dominant form of friction for social cohesion interventions confronted with addressing a ‘community’. The issue of foreigner invisibility discussed in chapter two of this thesis particularly resonated with social cohesion practitioners. This is both a self-identified issue on behalf of both insiders and outsiders, as well as an issue perpetuated by local government and other outside structures (another type of friction, as described above). The following section details how interventions acknowledge this type of friction in the contested ‘community’, and how it informs their approaches to social cohesion.

The key difference between urban South Africa and other peacebuilding settings is the high levels of mobility, diversity, insecurity, and invisibility. Landau summarizes this phenomenon as: “The simultaneous demonization of mobility and the practical impossibility of controlling it have elevated migration (and migrants) to an official and popular obsession” (Landau 2011, 17). Further, the nature of displacement in urban South Africa is such that the outsider groups involved are not necessarily legitimately there, and easily become a scapegoat.

Mr. Buntu of Afuraka summarizes the political situation as follows:

> A lot of the violence is indicative of a political structure that marginalizes a whole lot of people fighting to survive on a daily basis. . .If you leave a whole lot of people marginalized in a crazy setup, obviously you need a scapegoat—foreigners are a much easier target than the government. Police, legal, and justice services seem to favor sentiments against foreigners, it’s the perfect situation to bully and intimidate” (Buntu 2010).

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22 Peacebuilding usually refers to two or more sides emerging from war, which would not apply in the South African context. However, peacebuilding skills and strategies are increasingly used for other types of conflict as well. When peacebuilding is applied to a broader set of conflicts, mobility, diversity, insecurity and invisibility become the key differences.

23 For more information on Afuraka, see Appendix A.
Since outsiders are often foreigners with limited forms of redress, they are easy targets for insiders, and accordingly adopt strategies of invisibility to stay below the ‘community’ radar.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANISATION</th>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-Privatisation Forum/ CAx</td>
<td>Domestic political organisation</td>
<td>This intervention seeks to prevent xenophobia and promote inclusivity and discuss residents’ needs and service delivery</td>
<td>Workshops, public meetings, focus groups, and radio announcements with both migrants and South Africans to address the role of migrants and xenophobia, as well as to discuss the core problems of service delivery</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFURAKA</td>
<td>Domestic organisation, partner with the City of Johannesburg (CaJ)</td>
<td>The intervention is a platform for awareness, exposure, and critical reflection on African history and culture as a practical means of preventing/exacerbating hostile attitudes and violent acts</td>
<td>Africa alam, a friendly competition in poetry and debating with schools and youth structures; a movie screening and discussion; three symposiums in Braamfontein, Yeoville, and Newtown on African unity, youth empowerment, and awareness around xenophobia; and, a train-the-trainer program for professionals addressing xenophobia and social exclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caritas</td>
<td>International peacebuilding organisation with a domestic partner institution</td>
<td>The intervention seeks to build peace and promote the philosophy, spirituality, and practice of non-violence</td>
<td>An initial stakeholder meeting (initiated by churches, NGOs, or other groups) begins discussion on the program. Small groups are formed organically to build peace, pursue activities of their choice, &amp; receive training in conflict resolution skills</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoSATU</td>
<td>Domestic trade union federation</td>
<td>The intervention includes discussions of xenophobia at meetings/workshops to promote inclusivity &amp; understanding among shop stewards</td>
<td>Meetings and workshops to address xenophobia amongst shop stewards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displaced and Migrant Persons Support Group</td>
<td>Domestic organisation</td>
<td>The intervention seeks to prevent xenophobic violence and mass displacement</td>
<td>Conflict mediation, workshops with the community police forums, provision of humanitarian assistance, monitoring of ‘hot spot’ areas, continued engagement with community policing structures</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
<td>International organisation</td>
<td>The intervention is a social change project that seeks to change negative attitudes and behaviours that perpetuate discriminatory practices related to xenophobia, racism, and tribalism within South Africa and other societies</td>
<td>The ‘One Movement Campaign’ distributed posters, T-shirts, bumper stickers, and other awareness media; its second phase will target key stakeholders and conduct trainings through 100 focal point coordinators, and continue with the awareness materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jesuit Relief Services</td>
<td>International humanitarian organisation</td>
<td>This intervention seeks to prevent xenophobia and to serve and advocate on behalf of refugees and forcibly displaced persons</td>
<td>Workshops on understanding xenophobia and developing action plans in the event of xenophobic attacks, a major March against xenophobia, and income generating activities for refugees and forced migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Help Desk</td>
<td>Domestic, City of Johannesburg (CaJ) organisation</td>
<td>The intervention seeks to manage migrants in the city, and encourage people to live peacefully</td>
<td>Facilitates workshops, dialogues, ‘Africa Week’, and various events in communities, such as marches and parades, soccer tournaments, and opportunities to tell migrants about their rights in the city of Johannesburg</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nelson Mandela Foundation</td>
<td>Domestic organisation, seeks to build a just society</td>
<td>The dialogue program promotes and facilitates dialogue around critical social issues within communities and focuses on building capacity at a grassroots level</td>
<td>Facilitate 30 community conversations using UNDP’s CCE methodology to promote constructive dialogue between migrants and South Africans, promote social cohesion and community ownership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scalabrini</td>
<td>Domestic organisation</td>
<td>The intervention aims to create a positive message that will counteract the prevalence of hate crimes against migrants</td>
<td>A pledge to ‘write as one’ was read at a range of meetings, public events, and other civil society interventions’ activities over four months</td>
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<tr>
<td>Streetnet International</td>
<td>International Union for Street Vendors</td>
<td>The intervention targets the policy level, as well as for street vendors more broadly: StreetNet aimed to change governmental policy on addressing xenophobia while organizing and securing rights for street vendors (South Africans and foreign nationals).</td>
<td>Press statements, media awareness, posters, and other tools for public awareness and advocacy aimed at promoting street vendors’ rights and attention against xenophobia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN Refugee Agency</td>
<td>International UN agency that provides humanitarian and protection assistance</td>
<td>The intervention is an ad-hoc response system aimed at preventing xenophobic attacks, and relationship building with police to facilitate rapid response</td>
<td>UNHCR has provided conflict mediation to prevent attacks, humanitarian assistance following attacks, and rapid response to violent threats in: Atteridgeville, Diepsloot, Mamelodi, Soweto, Iiterelaang, Khutsong, Waterkloof, Cape Town</td>
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Social cohesion interventions ultimately try to enlist foreigners’ involvement in a procedural manner, without fully acknowledging the fractured ‘community’, the agency of outsiders to maintain their exclusion, and the anger of insiders. Mr. Munyaneza of the UN Refugee Agency\textsuperscript{24} (UNHCR) in particular has reflected on this reality, and arrived at a conclusion that contradicts conventional intervention wisdom:

We had to recognise that foreigners are part of the problem. Behaviour change is needed with South Africans, but also with foreigners. “Don’t come in as a victim, come in as part of the community”, I tell them (Munyaneza 2010)

Munyaneza acknowledges the need for foreigners to identify as part of the community as a prerequisite for any cohesion to take place. Similarly, Mariano of IOM suggests, “part of the problem is that foreign nationals are unaware of cultural practices and traditions, and as a result, they remain on the fringes of societies” (Nelson Mandela Foundation 2010, 13).\textsuperscript{25} In different ways, Munyaneza and Mariano both acknowledge the agency of ‘outsiders’ and the necessity of their participation in communities. Several organisations (MHD; UNHCR; IOM; DMPSP) lamented the challenge of foreign nationals that have no interest in being involved in dialogues and interventions (discussed further in the next chapter). Such lack of involvement often perpetuates complaints that foreigners are, “‘job stealers’, ‘house stealers’, ‘wife stealers’ and finally and more simply ‘thieves’” (Vigneswaran 2011, 168). According Mr. Tseki of COSATU: “When [union workers] say these things [angry statements against foreigners] you can tell it’s coming from the heart. You could feel the frustration. Its our responsibility to show them how to be more useful rather than angry” (Tseki 2010). Without such mediation though, a dangerous cycle ensues in which foreigners continue their invisibility in fear of harassment and violence.

\textsuperscript{24} For more information on UNHCR, see Appendix A.

\textsuperscript{25} For more information on IOM, see Appendix A. This quote comes from a stakeholder workshop on social cohesion sponsored by the Nelson Mandela Foundation. Mariano suggests ‘outsiders’ need to be taught ‘local practices’. However, more clarity would be helpful on whose practices are considered local, and who determines what practices an ‘outsider’ should adopt.
and insiders become increasingly frustrated. For instance, at a recent Jesuit Refugee Service workshop, “The first question the facilitator asked was: are there any people from other countries in this workshop? No one acknowledged. It seemed that people were too scared to disclose their identity” (JRS 2010c, 2). Institutions are thus increasingly aware of the contested ‘communities’ they operated within, and are reflective about the need to see foreigners and other ‘outsiders’ as agents and members of the community. However, there were no clear strategies for promoting this agency. The dilemma of getting the right people to participate will be discussed at length in the next chapter.

‘Local’ Knowledge and Legitimacy in Communities

Several organisations, as discussed above, initially undervalued the fragmented nature of urban ‘communities’ (IOM; Afuraka; MHD; NMF; APF; JRS). This fragmentation particularly calls into the question the second form of friction discovered in the fieldwork for this thesis: Institutions often discuss ‘locals’, but it is not clear how localness intersects with ‘community’ legitimacy. A new, diluted meaning for ‘local’ is therefore created when understandings of localness are operationalised. For instance, Ms. Maimela of the Migrant Help Desk (MHD) was unpleasantly surprised when mobilization was left to the last minute for a public event in Alexandra: Maimela, a ‘local’ from Alexandra, still could not mobilize residents quickly, and the event turnout was weak (Maimela 2010). The networking and legitimacy needed to garner support in these fragmented spaces, and the difficulty of capturing this support as an outside institution, is where many institutions hit a stumbling block (NMF; MHD; Afuraka). In this context, labelling someone a ‘local’ provides little clarity: localness ascribes place to something, but it does not denote legitimacy or meaning: After all, every resident of Alex is physically there, and as a result, is local. However, certain groups and individuals are deemed legitimate in a

26 For more information about the Migrant Help Desk, see Appendix A.
‘community’, and their voices can determine who is ‘outside’ the community. Buntu of Afuraka admits: “We didn’t appreciate fully the extent to which those stories [of xenophobic attitudes perpetuated by key leaders, and the ‘community’ in general] were alive in communities. How dominant that voice was in certain communities, we didn’t really understand” (Buntu 2010). Thus, certain individuals and key leaders determine who is a legitimate insider in these contested communities, and the strength of these insider/outsider identities was often misunderstood by interventions at first. ‘Local’ ultimately has little to do with legitimacy in this context.

Localness is appropriately used when referring to ‘local’ structures and power dynamics: That is, the structures and dynamics present in a given space. Nieftagodien believes analysing the xenophobic attacks demands analysing “the fluid and fragmented nature of their politics and their histories” (Nieftagodien 2011, 112). In its analysis of the 2008 attacks, IOM found that the attacks were, “rooted in the micro-politics of the country’s townships” (Misago et al. 2009, 2). The complexity of local histories and dynamics is especially apparent in Alexandra, which is frequently brought up as a ‘community’ of strong resistance to including outsiders. Buntu concludes: “The sentiments against foreigners were defiant there [in Alex]. They did not really want to learn or listen. . . We’ll say we must come together, we’re all the same, they’ll just say no this cannot happen for the next twenty years” (Buntu 2010). As a result, insider/outsider dynamics are complex and evolving, and status as a ‘local’ has little bearing on legitimacy in the space, or the ability to effectively mobilize and engage with the ‘community’.

The State and ‘Community’

The third kind of friction, discussed above, occurs when the role of the state is either ignored as a barrier to social cohesion, or the boundaries, actors, and processes of local governance are accepted and used without question.
The Displaced and Migrant Persons Support Program (DMPSP) demonstrates a positive form of friction, and it has particularly thought about how to break the cycle of foreigners’ invisibility and make outsiders become insiders. According to Mr. De Costa, “People always say, ‘we don’t know who they are[the foreigners]’. Well, make them take responsibility. . .You’re going to accept them, and then get them involved. In the short-term we have this exclusion, and we need inclusion. Better give them a system they can work within.” (De Costa 2010). De Costa acknowledges that the current system does not work, and seeks an approach in which both foreigners and South Africans can have agency in changing how they relate with one another. De Costa seeks the transformation of local government policing structures, and envisions the community police forums (CPFs) as an essential community-level structure with which to engage foreigners:

We talk about how to motivate the CPFs, how to get the street committees involved, how to make everything more local . . .The power is in your hands to exclude/include, we say. It gives people motivation. They feel helpless at the moment. This provides them with control in their little space. . .It makes them feel confident, like they can manage the situation themselves (De Costa 2010).

De Costa emphasizes the need for highly local structures—on a street by street basis—as opposed to other structures that are too unwieldy to allow for meaningful engagement with foreign nationals. In this context, more ‘local’ means more specific: By making action more local, it is also more likely that foreigners will become involved, and can meaningfully engage in community forums.

De Costa’s ideas for the way forward illustrate one of the ways in which official forums for migrants are currently absent in local government structures. Munyaneza claims, “These crises aren’t handled properly. They [local municipality] reconciled themselves with the community – at the expense of the foreigners. The government would go to a community, the

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27 For more information on DMPSP, see Appendix A.
28 A CPF is . . .
people demand resources, they engage with the South Africans. They’ll demand for certain people who were arrested to be released, but then the foreigners have nowhere to go” (Munya neza 2010). The failings of local government are in part due to their limited capacity overall (Fauvelle-Aymar and Kabwe-Segatti 2011, 61). Local government has been chastised for not engaging with ‘communities’, providing adequate service delivery, or effectively addressing xenophobic violence (Misago 2011, 102). This vacuum of formal political mechanisms to channel frustrations ensures the likelihood of conflict and instability. As a result, the young and under-capacitated local government perpetuates the invisibility of foreigners, inhibiting their agency to become more engaged themselves.

Official structures, and institutions addressing xenophobia, often rely on local government demarcations of ‘community’ that often miss the ways in which power structures actually operate in a local area. Fittingly, these parallel power structures typically exist due to the lack of effective formal mechanisms. For instance, Afuraka and the Migrant Help Desk’s activities’ are based on regional areas determined by the city of Johannesburg, and these boundaries are used for ward committees and councillors, as well as the placement of field offices and program funding. Other institutions go through local government structures to reach the community, often with an initially vague understanding of the informal and formal local leadership dynamics in that space. In IOM’s new phase of the One Movement campaign, 100 community focal points will be established through local government structures: “local government, community police forums, ward councillors” (Ali 2010). When asked about the relevance of local government leaders in relation to who holds power in an area, Ms. Lifongo of IOM responded: “It depends, some definitely trust their leaders. . .When we go to the community, it is tricky. There’s a lack of trust between government and community, when you

29 For more information on IOM’s One Movement, see Appendix A.
Understanding Participation and Community in South African Social Cohesion Interventions

go there, they’re kind of scared. It’s still a very sensitive subject, you can tell when they start talking” (Lifongo 2010). The Nelson Mandela Foundation similarly found a lack of trust in local leadership structures, which inhibited their effectiveness and ability to mobilize properly (Nelson Mandela Foundation 2010, 22). Without an in-depth knowledge of local power dynamics, certain institutions were increasingly frustrated by their ability to meaningfully engage with the ‘community’ (NMF; MHD; APF). On one hand, the weakness and fragmented nature of local governance further engrains insider/outsider dynamics between South Africans and foreigners, and renders it more difficult for interventions to reach ‘the community’. On the other hand, initial confidence in their ability to enter a community often sets social cohesion interventions back when they are confronted with the complexity of local power relations and the process of gaining legitimacy in that space. Social cohesion intervention ultimately must grapple with a range of friction related to the role of the state in their work; the reality of uncooperative state structures for promoting social cohesion, ‘community’ boundaries that do not reflect real power dynamics, and ‘local’ leaders that often are not supported by the ‘community’.

A Case Study: MHD, Caritas International, and NMF

This section focuses on three institutions whose social cohesion interventions strongly represent the friction between traditional approaches to peacebuilding and the new challenges brought on by addressing xenophobia in a context of urban displacement. The Migrant Help

30 For other institutions, a close connection with the community was not needed for the nature of their intervention. For instance, some interventions, such as Scalabrini’s Unite as One campaign, do not necessarily have a relationship with the communities they target and instead rely on media campaigns or pledges. Madikane of the Unite as One Campaign admits that her institution is not very engaged with the communities. Instead, they have a pledge that is read at “workers meetings, sports programs. The sports field is a place where people seem to embrace it very easily. There’s a lot of unity marches, cultural and arts activities are amazing, churches are really cool” (Madikane 2010). Madikane admits, “I think the language is not in the correct voice for our target. It requires mediation. . .Then it does have an impact.” Madikane admit that her campaign demands friction in order to be effective: On face value the pledge has little meaning, but the right pastor, community leader, or worker can translate it in a way that is meaningful for the audience. Other institutions, such as StreetNet and Cosatu, have added social cohesion and against xenophobia messaging to their existing structures and communities. StreetNet’s own involvement came in response to how the government was not doing anything to address xenophobia leading up to the World Cup.
Peacebuilding for the Urban Displaced

Desk, Caritas International, and the Nelson Mandela Foundation each represent very different institutions. Their engagement with xenophobia similarly demonstrates a diverse range of approaches and understandings of how to promote cohesion and work with foreigners and South Africans.

**Caritas International**

Caritas International is a case study that demonstrates positive friction, and a successful negotiation of the three types of friction describes earlier. This case study, and all following case studies, will briefly explain the organisation and its intervention before discussing how the social cohesion intervention has addressed ‘community’ and the friction between intervention theory and practice in urban South Africa.

Caritas International began their social cohesion intervention in the wake of the 2008 xenophobic attacks. The intervention is a joint initiative between Caritas and the Damietta Peace Initiative (DPI). According to Sister Hughes of Caritas, “We needed to respond creatively and effectively to the attacks. Caritas has the peacebuilding training manual and toolkits, whereas the [Damietta] has an interesting model” (Hughes 2010). The program combines Caritas’ internationally used peacebuilding manual, written by leading scholars in peacebuilding theory, with a local approach of group-based conflict resolution training and promotion. Hughes explains the process by which the program enters communities: “Someone identifies a problem and invites us. Church leaders, organisations, an individual, a local chief. Then there’s a general meeting with the community outlining the process, the vision” (Hughes 2010). Even though the impetus for this intervention was the 2008 attacks, the program’s objective is to broadly create strong ‘communities’ and relationships that can manage tensions effectively. According to Hughes, “The key is for the group to be diverse. We encourage a range of diversities. Somalis,
South Africans, men, women. Everyone is included. The only prescription is a range of diversity” (Hughes 2010).

The Caritas program currently operates in 70 locations. After initially entering an area, interested individuals are trained to become ‘enablers’ in the groups that they will go on to form. The groups are trained in non-violence, meet regularly, and pursue activities of their choice. The activities can range from making a film, producing crafts, setting up a restaurant, or simply meeting to talk regularly. ‘Community’ in this program is a more flexible term: it depends on who invites Caritas to enter their space, and who is interested in establishing a group. In this manner, the program is flexible and reflexive, and focused on providing tangible outcomes to participants.

This intervention relies on the Caritas peacebuilding manual, a key text in international peacebuilding. The Caritas manual defines peacebuilding as, “the long-term project of building peaceful and sustainable communities and societies” (Caritas International 2002, 84): a lofty and universal goal for everyone. However, section 1.2 of the manual is entitled, “Danger! This Manual is not a Recipe” (Caritas International 2002, iii). Caritas’ peacebuilding manual, used worldwide, is mindful of the range of contexts in which peace must be built, and in this sense, acknowledges the realities of friction.

The Caritas intervention successfully navigates the ‘business as usual’ friction that confronts many organisations trying to address the contested ‘community’. The intervention promotes ‘bridging capital’, which finds a common reason for a diverse range of people to come together and trust one another. By creating groups united under a common goal, foreigners and South Africans have a reason to engage that is meaningful and practical. Instead of trying to
transform the entire contested ‘community’, Caritas focuses on small pockets of individuals who can then become role models in their ‘community’, and ideally turn ‘outsiders’ into ‘insiders’.

Caritas also acknowledges the need for ‘local’ knowledge and legitimacy, another key type of friction, through its small group-based intervention. Mr. Wani, a group leader, referenced different principles and ideas in the peacebuilding manual with me throughout our conversation, but the form of his groups’ work was unique to their interests. Despite the international influence of conflict resolution skills and trainings, the group was very local (a combination of insiders and outsiders, foreigners and South Africans that live in the same space), coming together of their own volition on a regular basis to discuss conflict resolution issues in their ‘community’, and their own group activities. In this case, the group created a film about migrants that was received positively across South Africa. Wani describes how his group talks about peacebuilding: “We should respect one another and help each other despite our differences. Then, we go deeper and talk about politics, how the challenges today are shaped by a few people (Wani 2010). Wani demonstrated a meaningful engagement with peacebuilding and social cohesion issues in our conversation, and translated broader peacebuilding rhetoric to the ‘local’ challenges confronting him and his fellow group members. Through the intervention he has gained legitimacy himself, and Wani increasingly feels as though he belongs in this ‘community’ in light of his positive contributions.

Caritas has found ways to manage the three types of ‘community’ friction highlighted in this thesis: it avoids state boundaries and actors, looks for innovative ways to address the contested ‘community’, and prizes ‘local’ knowledge and legitimacy at the micro-level. However, the realities of operating in urban South Africa still present obstacles for the intervention. The success of Caritas’ intervention is still pitted against the difficulty of reaching
and engaging with certain groups. In South Africa, Caritas had to adapt from its typical focus on rural areas, where the peacebuilding manual would most commonly be put into practice, to urban spaces. Hughes admits, “Urban communities are a challenge. It is different in creating community. Suspicion. Fear in urban centres, there’s more suspicion than in a rural area” (Hughes 2010). This often means that a group simply does not take off in certain spaces. For instance, several leaders have been trained in Alexandra, but no groups have developed: “We haven’t managed to get a group in Alex. We respect the knowledge and insight of the locals. If they say don’t go there, we don’t go there. If they come and say they can’t get a group now, we support them until they are ready. We are there” (Hughes 2010).

The ‘thickness’ of this type of intervention—the necessity of active engagement and constant communication and involvement by the members—demands a certain level of trust among members that might not exist in certain spaces, as seen in the above example of Alex. On the one hand, Caritas’ approach embraces the complexity of social ties and creates a more flexible model that marries Damietta’s local knowledge and group-focused activities with Caritas’ long history with peacebuilding tools and trainings. This is a positive acceptance of friction, and recognition of the need to adapt with the context. On the other hand, the intervention cannot reach the most difficult cases, the spaces in which future xenophobic attacks are most likely. In these spaces, conflict mediation skills and training are critical, and yet will not be put into practice without the levels of trust and interest needed to sustain one of the Caritas groups. The Caritas program can thus promote certain kinds of social cohesion, but perhaps not the most important kinds. Positive friction is produced in the intersection of local and international skills and knowledge, and meaningful, flexible engagement among locals. As a fellow practitioner put it, “they do wonderful work. In their unique way, it works very well. .
they don’t force anything down your throat” (De Costa 2010). However, it is not clear how the intervention can engage with the most difficult ‘communities’ plagued by the insecurity, mobility, diversity, and invisibility of an urban displacement context. Certain limitations still exist in how to address the most contested ‘communities’, since intervention standards seem to exceed what is feasible in many urban communities vulnerable to future violence. Caritas’ model, based on requests for their involvement, does not leave room for engagement in these highly fractured spaces, and the program ultimately cannot engage with the least cohesive communities. Its high standards for authentic participation, organic, local groups, and meaningful engagement, all ideals of international peacebuilding and effective interventions, reveal a limitation to reaching the contested ‘community’ as well.

The Migrant Help Desk

The Migrant Help Desk (MHD), mandated to manage migrants in Johannesburg, is a city government initiative that began in 2007. Initially, the MHD’s goal was to provide information and resources to undocumented migrants in the city. According to Dawood, “The original policy document said it was to provide information to the people with pamphlets ideally in different languages. At first we had 30 people in one office in the inner city with staff seconded from Human Development” (Dawood 2010). However, the 2008 attacks quickly changed the direction of the help desk:

Dialogues31 started after the attacks. More staff were recruited after the attacks too. Very haphazardly in 2008 after the attacks, we piloted how this will work. We were totally derailed from what we were doing before. Our objective was to hear from communities what it is we should be doing. At that time all regions were to conduct dialogues. Community development and social workers, child care officers not trained in conflict management and dialogues at all. (Dawood 2010).

31 In the Migrant Help Desk dialogues, groups of ‘community’ members are mobilized through local government and key leadership to discuss the xenophobic violence and grievances in the area.
Dawood is very reflective about the unintended consequences of this introduction into volatile spaces. The staff did not necessarily have a relationship with leaders in the areas they conducted dialogues, nor did they have the skills in dialogue facilitation needed to handle this setting well. There was little understanding of context, in spite of the fact that municipal social workers would be considered very ‘local’ by international peacebuilding standards.

The Migrant Help Desk illustrates the negative friction that occurs when ‘business as usual’ approaches are applied to new, complex dilemmas in a context of urban displacement. The MHD did not understand the ‘community’ context they were operating in, or the impacts of the insecurity, invisibility, mobility, and diversity that characterized the spaces in which they attempted to conduct dialogues. According to Ms. Maimela, a MHD fieldworker, “South Africans complain that the foreigners don’t care about the environment or the country. They say they’re using South Africa. They don’t come to meetings of the CPFs. ‘They hide in the back, when you’ve got a burning issue for a foreigner, they don’t listen to you’, they’ll say. They do show interest, but people label them.” (Maimela 2010). Maimela illustrates the dilemmas facing foreigners and ‘outsiders’ who try become involved. The contested community is evident, and Maimela quickly summarizes the key issues perpetuating insider/outsider relationships: A cycle exists in which outsiders do not seek public forums for fear of alienation and harassment, and their invisibility in these spaces fuels insider anger and frustration (Maimela 2010). According to Maimela, the major challenge facing her work in Alex is the fact that the community does not want to hear about migrant issues, and wants migrants out of their space (Maimela 2010). This reality creates negative friction against the MHD’s continued use of dialogues and other ‘business as usual’ activities in that space.
The MHD has also acknowledged the schism between ‘local’ and legitimacy in its social cohesion interventions, another critical form of friction. Maimela, a ‘local’ resident of Alexandra, says: “I know the dynamics, the attacks, I experienced them indirectly from where I live” (Maimela 2010). And yet, as described earlier, a ‘local’ resident is not necessarily an ‘insider’. Maimela explains some of the challenges and social dynamics in her work:

I work in the whole of Alex. Beirut has issues of their own. Beirut women, they rebel when you talk about migrants. You got to have a tactic when you go there. The Ndunas will explain your proposal to the people, they’ll listen to them. Being a resident of Alex makes it easier. It matters who you sell the idea to. Business people use migrants. When you go to your early childhood development centre, the migrants are the employees. Certain stakeholders have migrants’ back. In River Park, elders don’t want them there. The work we do is confusing, interesting, frustrating. As much as I want to leave, I know it’s where I’m from.

Maimela’s thoughts call into question the meaning of ‘local’, and the benefits to having a ‘local’ on staff. There are varying forms of local knowledge and access within any institution, but in-depth research and understandings of ‘local’ power dynamics, as well as a breadth of ‘local’ leaders and actors with which to collaborate, are essential for meaningful engagement with a ‘community’. Having a ‘local’ on ones’ staff might contribute meaningfully, but the locals’ relevance will most likely change temporally and contextually, given the type, scale, and nature of an intervention. As a result, prizing localness must be done cautiously, and as Maimela explained in our interview, a deep and long-term understanding of ‘local’ legitimacy should be emphasized instead.

The MHD also exemplifies the third key type of friction, in which local government forums use structures and boundaries in their work that do not represent the most meaningful ways of addressing insiders and outsiders, foreigners and South Africans. Dawood doubts whether or not they truly understand the communities they work in: “Part of the plan is engaging with relevant stakeholders, understanding them is a key part of the process. But do we understand the community?” (Dawood 2010). The MHD’s activities seek to promote bonding
capital through broad consensus dialogues, meetings, and events, which focus on attitudes and creating a collective identity, as opposed to finding practical, common grounds for interaction and transaction and interaction (as in bridging capital). However, bonding capital is extremely difficult to create in a fractured space, with short-term interventions and staff who do not have local ‘legitimacy’ or the necessary ‘local’ knowledge and networks. For, as Dawood explains, Johannesburg residents who go into other parts of Johannesburg are no more ‘local’ there than a foreigner: they do not know who to talk to, how to talk to them, and what the repercussions of their conversation will be. Dawood further laments the limited scope of their workshops, dialogues, and events: “This is our downfall. We get into something, start to sustain it, then say no this is fine. Then it falls apart” (Dawood 2010). Even a local who appears for a one-off intervention will not have meaningfully engaged with the ‘community’.

Unlike Caritas’ model of sustained involvement, the MHD interventions represent a lack of local legitimacy, limited contact with its communities, and a vague understanding of informal and formal local power dynamics. These frictions foment unintended consequences and irrelevant programming in the long-term. The merits of localness were called into question amidst the complexities of urban Johannesburg and the need for sustainable and meaningful engagement. The MHD is highly reflective of its shortcomings and initial, failed ‘business as usual’ approaches, as well as what happens when a ‘local’ institution actually isn’t local enough.

While cognizant of the limits to short-term interventions that seek to transform attitudes and create bonding capital, and the previously discussed frictions in this approach, few strategies have been developed to harness this friction and find meaningful ways to engage with the contested ‘community’.
The Nelson Mandela Foundation

The Nelson Mandela Foundation (NMF), a South African civil society organisation, has conducted “community-based dialogues” in South Africa since 2005 on HIV/AIDS issues. In the aftermath of the 2008 attacks, NMF felt compelled to act, and accordingly revised their dialogue approach to address social cohesion. In February 2009 NMF began their social cohesion program, to “identify root causes of violence and build relationships between host and migrants communities” (Diaho 2010).

The dialogue process is adapted from UNDP’s Community Capacity Enhancement (CCE) methodology, tailored by NMF in recognition of the friction between the original model and South African needs for addressing social cohesion. The pilot program, which ended in April 2010, had 22 operational partners from which it seconded facilitators across South Africa.

The NMF staff recognise the realities of insecurity, invisibility, mobility, and diversity in urban South Africa, and the subsequent friction in conducting dialogues in this context. NMF chose the ‘community’-based dialogue approach in order to address the complexity of xenophobia and social cohesion in South Africa: “with so many layers, players, dimensions, dynamics, it is designed to deal with those complexities” (Abrahams 2010). According to the NMF:

The CCE process envisages transformation through a cycle of six steps—Relationship building, identification of concerns, exploration of concerns, decision prioritization, implementation and constant reflection during each phase of this cycle. Underpinning this is a set of governing principles that includes inclusiveness (everyone who is part of the problem is involved), joint ownership (everyone is involved and engaged), learning (maintaining openness in conversation), humanity (the quality of empathy) and long-term perspective (understanding there are no quick fixes)” (Nelson Mandela Foundation 2010, 78).
In this spirit of embracing friction, The Nelson Mandela Foundation claims, “such challenges cannot successfully be addressed by applying ‘best practice’ solutions from the past, but by growing new solutions” (Nelson Mandela Foundation 2010, 2).

The ‘new solutions’ grown by the NMF dialogues are characterized by a deep understanding of the meta-narratives in urban South African communities, as well as an appreciation for local dynamics. Diaho explains, “locals say it’s lack of participation by foreigners. The insider/outsider concept determines who is part of the community. Even South Africans from different areas feel excluded. Those fears of insider/outsider relationships are entrenched” (Diaho 2010). ‘Locals’ is synonymous with ‘insiders’ in this context, and NMF has reflected carefully on the psychology of the insider in these dialogues:

Historically, apartheid did this. There’s the sense that I was denied something, had lost opportunities that now you are taking from me. Refugees come, thousands of kilometres with a sense of hope, and they’re met with violence and brutality. It’s a wakeup call for all of us. People have baggage, they’re hurting and need to heal, deal with a lot of strangers. South Africans are struggling to live just as much as migrants. They’ve rejected one another, and there’s no trust. How do we reclaim our dignity as human beings, migrants and locals? It’s beyond xenophobia. There’s a strong sense of who belongs and who doesn’t (Diaho 2010).

And yet, this historical and reflective understanding of the current state of affairs in South African communities often does not manifest itself in programming. A participant in a November 2009 community conversation in Atteridgeville wrote, “There were less than ten migrants in the group of fifty; some could not speak English and those that could quickly felt alienated when the facilitators and the community switched to Sotho (which was often)” (Jinnah 2009, 1). This dynamic exacerbated understandings of who belongs and who does not, instead of ameliorating them. Later, the participant noted, “With limited time and parts of the group unhappy, the process deteriorated into local politics and in-fighting” (Jinnah 2009, 1). The realities of the contested ‘community’, and attempts at creating bonding capital through short-term, limited interventions, are apparent. Despite wide consultations with migrants groups,
foreigner invisibility continued, with some groups claiming that the conversations did not benefit them, or they did not trust the proceedings (Jinnah 2009, 1). While this only represents one dialogue out of many, the Atteridgeville example demonstrates how a creative model could not bridge the gaps in addressing insider/outsider realities appropriately, and a certain degree of ‘business as usual’ practice was perpetuated in the dialogue.

NMF staff are also acutely aware of the need for ‘local’ legitimacy in their work, and reflect on the limitations to doing this. Despite operating with partner organisations and spending several days in each ‘community conversation’ location, friction in terms of engaging with ‘localness’ and legitimate actors persisted. Diaho admitted, “One time, there was a thug that wielded enormous power in an informal settlement in a new area. We couldn’t get people, we couldn’t work around him” (Diaho 2010). The reality of local power dynamics has presented challenges for the NMF dialogues. According to Diaho:

The first step is issues of hierarchy. There are issues of formal and informal authority that need to be negotiated. You fail if you go through the ward councilor but they have absolutely no power. It takes different levels of different power structures. The complexity of informal/formal power structures is significant. They’re competing for access to services, local leadership. We had to mobilize within this. In traditionally settled communities this was easier, but in unstructured communities, there is a vacuum of power. This is where the facilitation process takes place (Diaho 2010).

And yet, the short-term nature of the pilot intervention renders it difficult to put these insights on local power dynamics into practice. The limited timeframe of the dialogues led to frustration by some ‘community’ members as to why they should become involved, or how tangible outcomes could stem from the conversations (Tladi 2010; JRS 2010c). In this case, and as discussed with the MHD, ‘local’ understanding seems to demand a combination of local knowledge and insights, which the NMF demonstrates, alongside a sustained and long-term engagement with a meaningful and invested network of ‘local’ actors.
The NMF has similarly learned critical lessons on how to interact with, or avoid, state structures, another critical kind of friction. In the November 2009 Atteridgeville community conversation, “the tensions and politics in the community between the mayor’s office, the speaker’s office, the South African National AIDS Council (SANAC), and the community members who were aligned to each” dominated the meeting (Jinnah 2009, 2). By the end of the conversation, some community members were angry and felt that “the speaker’s office would hijack the project and use it for its own political interests and sideline people who they did not like in the process” (Jinnah 2009, 1). In light of challenges like this, Diaho mobilizes using other local networks and existing structures aside from local government. Diaho suggests that local shopkeepers are the most helpful for mobilization, but they also look to the Red Cross, schools, and other community structures, often stepping well outside the bounds of local government. These learned lessons demonstrate an awareness of friction and the realities of formal and informal leadership structures.

The Nelson Mandela Foundation uniquely addresses the friction of adapting international tools for the local context. The community conversations attempt to mitigate the harms of local power dynamics, and it embrace the friction of contextual realities. The NMF also found ways of mobilizing more effectively over time, and sidestepping difficult local power dynamics. However, the timeline of the pilot program did not seem to build the relationships and trust needed to meaningfully engage with ‘communities’, and both insiders and outsiders. The contested ‘community’, while understood by the NMF, was still difficult to reach and meaningfully engage with. It seems as if staff insights are ultimately undermined by program orthodoxy, and international peacebuilding norms trump the more creative and meaningful ways in which the dialogues could take place.
Conclusions

Each social cohesion intervention had to confront ‘community’ as it really exists in urban South Africa. Social cohesion, after all, demands something with which to cohere. There are two logical options for this: Either new and different social networks can be found from which to create cohesion, as demonstrated by the Caritas intervention, or the ‘community’ must become meaningful to its residents, as ideas suggested by DMPSP suggest. Regardless, engaging with the contested ‘community’ is difficult, and it makes sense for interventions, almost all of which sought to respond rapidly in the aftermath of the 2008 xenophobic violence, to apply familiar approaches to the challenge of promoting social cohesion in urban South Africa. The institutions included in this thesis were forced to engage with the key types of friction identified in this fieldwork, and several important insights, lessons, and ideas emerged from their engagement with this friction.

One approach to harnessing friction and addressing urban realities is to break down ‘communities’ into manageable pieces of people and groups who actually engage with one another on a regular basis. ‘Community’ might need to be defined more specifically in this context. For instance, NMF focused on shopkeepers and churches. Caritas and Afuraka have focused on youth, and institutions like COSATU and StreetNet seem to easily mobilize their worker and street trader constituencies. Instead of trying to mobilize a highly fractured ‘community’, these micro-communities are relatively manageable, conceivable groups of people who can respond with tangible action within their group (as opposed to broad rhetoric to reconcile insiders with outsiders).

Several practitioners (UNHCR; DMPSP) addressed the friction of ‘localness’ by highlighting the need to create action-oriented interventions among specific groups of people. For instance,
working with a group of shopkeepers in a given space who have a common purpose and reason to engage with one another. This refers to bridging capital, which brings together a diverse range of people under a common goal. Afuraka’s Buntu summarized this concept nicely:

It’s not about getting to know about Zimbabwe or Senegal. The level doesn’t have to be Senegalese, Zimbabwean, etc. The levels can be shopkeepers, entrepreneurs, and a cleaning service, mending our roads, things that we’re all concerned about. Maybe you find out the guy from Senegal has wonderful ideas. He is good at what he’s doing. If we can get more of those natural spaces, just engaging with each other. It doesn’t necessarily come natural. We’re so used to look at our differences people with a particular angle, victimization (Buntu 2010).

The other option is to address systemic and structural factors that currently stand in the way of an effective community, the third type of friction discussed here. This sort of work, as described by DMSP and UNHCR, is about changing how outsiders and insiders interface, and where community policing and civic structures sit in this relationship. According to Munyaneza, local governance structures need to be strengthened, and equipped to include and address migrants and mobility (Munyaneza 2010). The rhetoric of localness has become vague at a time when in-depth understanding of local leadership and power structures is essential. Actors, citizens and foreigners, cannot be thought about indiscriminately since many state structures, in addition to South Africans themselves, do not perceive them as legitimate. Civil society needs to acknowledge and work around that dynamic and the systemic factors inhibiting migrants. Finally, in order to promote meaningful engagement and build social cohesion, it is critical to understand how state and other actors recognise the outsiders with which an intervention tries to cohere.
CHAPTER VII: PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL COHESION INTERVENTIONS

This chapter seeks to explain the nature of participation in social cohesion interventions implemented in Gauteng province in the aftermath of the May 2008 xenophobic attacks. It similarly uses the xenophobic attacks of 2008 as the backdrop from which to discuss the nature of participation in social cohesion interventions. Like the previous chapter, this chapter focuses on the process of how interventions attempt to create social cohesion, and their appropriateness given the contextual features of urban displacement (insecurity, mobility, invisibility, and diversity).

First, this chapter analyses my fieldwork with social cohesion interventions in urban South Africa, and how concepts of participation manifest themselves in these interventions. It explores the ‘friction’ around how participating social cohesion interventions understand these concepts. It then proceeds with a case study analysis of the Migrant Help Desk (MHD), the Nelson Mandela Foundation (NMF), and Caritas International, as in the previous chapter. It concludes with a discussion about what these case studies tell us about peacebuilding practices more generally, and the extent to which assumptions about participation apply in South Africa.

The invisibility, insecurity, mobility, and diversity of urban displacement in South Africa emerged into two key themes in the fieldwork for this thesis. First, the contested nature of ‘community’ and the insider/outsider dynamics greatly affected all of the social cohesion interventions. Second, in light of the contested nature of ‘community’, ‘local’ knowledge must be quite detailed, and the involvement of ‘locals’ must be thought about carefully. For these reasons, simple ideas about participation are unhelpful, and led to two significant forms of ‘friction’ between theory and context in the social cohesion interventions.
These two forms of ‘friction’ each demonstrate something new and unintentional that was produced from the application of a given model, international idea, or peacebuilding activity to gaining the meaningful participation of the urban displaced. First, and paralleling the previous discussion on ‘community’, ‘friction’ occurred between ‘business as usual’ approaches to interventions that were confronted with the invisibility of outsiders, and the nature of the contested ‘community’ in general. In this setting, interventions often target easy-to-reach people, instead of the ‘right’ people for the objective of their intervention. This type of friction ties in with the second most significant form of friction: when confronted with the new challenge of addressing xenophobic violence in a context of urban displacement, interventions often have a difficult time understanding the root problem, and who needs to be involved to address this problem. Instead, interventions pursue an approach to social cohesion that is similar and easier to address than the root causes of xenophobic violence.

**Social Cohesion Interventions and Participation**

The nature of participation with each organisation is as varied as the nature of the interventions themselves. While some organisations intervened within their existing institutions (CoSATU; StreetNet), others only slightly adapted existing interventions to also address xenophobia (APF; Afuraka). Almost all institutions (MHD; IOM; NMF; Caritas; UNHCR; Afuraka) had never approached xenophobia or social cohesion until after the 2008 attacks. As a result, the idea of who to target and how seems to be evolving and becoming more clear over time. The two most common dilemmas and sources of friction (described above) are: 1) understanding the root problem, and who needs to be involved to address that problem, and 2) getting over the ‘convenience syndrome’ of involving certain stakeholders, and targeting participants in the same fashion as other activities. This section will discuss several different
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types of interventions and the nature of participation in each of these contexts, and then it will
discuss the assumptions and frictions embedded in these approaches.

**Participation and the ‘Right' People**

A key source of friction is a ‘business as usual’ approach to targeting the easiest people
for participation, instead of the ‘right’ people needed to create the kind of change that will
promote social cohesion. One way that was discovered to target the ‘right people’ is to operate
in a smaller, more specific group of people that includes foreigners (and other outsiders) and
South Africans, as described in the previous chapter. For instance, Cosatu and StreetNet operate
within their membership base to speak with the shop stewards and union members, respectively.
Cosatu holds meetings and workshops where members can air their grievances, and they also
deliver messaging on a regular basis against xenophobia. The meetings are targeted at the
provincial level and local structures to educate shop stewards, both foreigners and South
Africans (Tseki 2010). Similarly, StreetNet focuses on issues of non-recognition, urban policies,
and marginalization for street vendors, and included issues of xenophobia into its latest
campaigns (Horn 2010). Neither institution specifically establishes programming for social
cohesion or xenophobia, but xenophobia is seen as a relevant and necessary issue to discuss that
is in line with their own work. In this context, participation operates within “vernacular forms of
power” that already exist, and command legitimacy for a given community (Rahnema in Sachs
1992, 123). These vernacular forms of power, as described earlier, operate amidst more
manageable and tangible communities than the broad and complex “Alexandra” or
“Atteridgeville”. By addressing xenophobia and social cohesion through existing structures, they
are more likely to build bridging capital through the commonalities that develop from their
workplace (Rahnema 1992).
However, other organisations, which often voiced the need to “do something” following the attacks, did not appear to carefully analyse what should be done and with whom in their interventions. Other institutions seem to target various segments of society based on their understanding of the root problem. For instance, IOM decided that one of their goals is to target employers in their large-scale intervention, under the theory of change that South African employers can more easily exploit, and often develop tensions with, migrant workers (Ali 2010).

Meanwhile, for other interventions that simply want a high turnout at a workshop or event, the institution targets those who can mobilize the largest number of people. For the MHD this was often the ndunas in Alexandra, and for the NMF, churches and shopkeepers were most effective for mobilization. These tactics will undoubtedly draw certain kinds of people, but it will not reach the ‘everyone’ these interventions seek to include, and it does not address how to get at the invisible outsiders who avoid involvement in such interventions. Instead of new strategies, familiar mobilizing techniques are used, and these approaches do not ensure that interventions can target the right participants.

**Root Causes and Meaningful Participation**

Understanding the root problem as understood by social cohesion interventions is essential for understanding their methods and approaches to participation. Two key issues arise when discussing the friction of root causes: first, understandings of the root cause are often approximate and hasty, as described above with the need to “do something” after the 2008 attacks; second, interventions’ understanding of the problem does not necessarily correlate with their target participants. For instance, IOM’s *One Movement* often targeted youth, in light of their networks and past experiences working in schools, despite its focus on ‘everyone’; the MHD is supposed to help manage migrants in Johannesburg, and yet it often could not get migrants to participate in its events (Maimela 2010); Scalabrini’s campaign sought to address the
problem of violent threats against migrants, even though its campaign aimed to change attitudes (through bonding capital) and targeted “those who are not naturally bloody-minded” (Madikane 2010). The problem does not match its solution, and it appears as if Scalabrini was in the camp of actors who felt compelled “to do something”, without experience in the field of social cohesion. As a result, these interventions, when confronted with the new challenge of xenophobic violence in urban spaces, sought approximate program objectives and targets for participation.

Institutions also target individuals and groups based on what they have previously done, illustrating another example of the convenience syndrome discussed in the previous chapter. For example, IOM, “has an emphasis on human trafficking, we do education in the schools, and we do it well. This is something we’ll learn from and adapt for the xenophobia activities. A lot of it will stay the same, those networks and connections that we’ve built. And there’s definitely a learning curve we’ve experienced from doing that work” (Ali 2010). This attitude reveals the ‘convenience syndrome’ Refstie et al. describe when institutions apply old solutions to the emerging challenges of urban displacement. Unlike NMF, who called for new solutions to complex and emerging dilemmas of xenophobia, IOM maintains a ‘business as usual’ approach to its programming. According to Ali,

Our counter-trafficking work has been very helpful for this upcoming initiative. We are going to expand our capacity-building with this new program. We can use the counter-trafficking program and the way we engaged with children. We cannot just use the mainstream awareness raising work though. We need a message that’s specially designed for them. We will have to test the messages and find out what works (Ali 2010).

This approach, instead of looking at the friction between urban displacement characteristics and the ‘right people’ that should be targeted, continues with a next-best solution that relies on old procedures and peacebuilding ideas.
Teleguided participation, discussed earlier in this thesis, represents negative friction that moves beyond who to involve, and addresses how (not) to involve them. Teleguided participation was evident in the most common type of social cohesion intervention interviewed for this study (APF; MHD; NMF; Afuraka), which was some sort of ‘community’ dialogue or workshop to discuss xenophobia. These interventions strived to gain community-wide participation and ownership, despite the inherent difficulties to doing this in such fragmented spaces. Tladi describes APF’s approach to doing this:

What we do is we go to each section in a place like Alex. We call a meeting. We are with someone they trust. If they know the person, we put them in front. It’s key to find stakeholders. Then, we have a public meeting with all the different sides. We make sure that all will understand. Someone from Alex introduces you. We say, we’re here from X. We’re dealing with X, Y, and Z. We’re here to help you, we’ll say. Always allow space to ask, what do you want? Community leaders can help you respond. Can you respond to this one? We’ll ask a local leader. That approach has him working with us. Speaking their language is key. Building ties with community leaders that are there. . .Engage one by one, understand the issues. Make sure the group is mixed (Tladi 2010).

APF’s approach is sensitive and strives to be inclusive. On face value, it seems as if it should be a meaningful way to engage with the community. And yet, it is a classic example of teleguided participation, in which locals are told why and how they should participate in a top-down manner. For many dialogues (APF; NMF; Afuraka; MHD), residents have complained that such institutions come in and out, and do not offer tangible next steps or ways to implement what was discussed, which is what they are truly interested in (JRS 2010c, 6). Munyaneza of UNHCR reflects on this dynamic: “We need to consult with the people. Getting in front and shouting “don’t do this!” doesn’t work. Don’t preach. Talk with not to people. People don’t want to be lectured to” (Munyaneza 2010). Such forms of negative friction work against the spirit of participation and meaningful attempts to build social cohesion. These social cohesion interventions reveal the variations in content and form of participation, and the extent to which ‘teleguided’ participation often enters interventions. The immediate, “do something” impulse
seems to have allowed institutions to move forward with convenient methods and participant targets, but without genuine participation and engagement in ‘communities’.

An example of positive friction is demonstrated in the ideas of DMPSP and UNHCR staff on how to think about participation in a transformational sense. These institutions focus on the behavioural aspects of social cohesion instead of attitudes. For instance, DMPSP and UNHCR focus on maintaining non-violent responses to conflict via prevention activities, building relationships with police and developing monitoring structures. The participation component in these components thus looks differently than other attitude-based interventions. As discussed in the last chapter, these institutions are also more focused on transforming insider/outsider dynamics in communities through more localized street committees, community police forums, and local government structures that involve, and are responsive to, migrant needs (De Costa 2010). However, on a day-to-day basis, this also means that these interventions do not mobilize participants in the same manner that traditional peacebuilding activities do. UNHCR and DMPSP seek participation in a larger, transformational sense that depends on the participation and involvement of police and local leadership rather than local residents. DMPSP in particular acknowledges that in order to get people to behave differently (in this case, not to commit xenophobic violence), structural changes might be the critical root problem to address. The reasons that people are not cohesive and commit xenophobic violence might have more to do with a lack of legitimate institutions than xenophobic attitudes (Misago 2009). Efforts to create forums for migrant participation, and other transformational and structural changes that demand the participation of key figures, and eventually the ‘community’ as a whole, takes a careful look at the root causes of xenophobic violence and responds in a meaningful way.
Teleguided participation, business as usual approaches, and ‘easy’ participant targets ultimately represent the negative aspects of friction. However, efforts to look carefully at root causes and to find creative ways of addressing social cohesion demonstrate the potential of friction to recast participation in a new light for social cohesion interventions in a context of urban displacement.

**A Case Study: MHD, Caritas International, and NMF**

**MHD**

The Migrant Help Desk’s dialogues, workshops, and other activities represent the friction of ‘business as usual’ practices that indiscriminately target people for the sake of reporting a high number of participants. In theory, the MHD’s entire approach to interventions is a participatory process done in consultation with city residents. Intervention activities are determined following a road show by city officials to various communities in Johannesburg. The officials then provide feedback and ‘scorecards’ are developed to establish activities, indicators, and targets for the years’ interventions. Similar to a logistical framework in peacebuilding and development practice, the scorecards establish participation targets and indicators for success that the MHD staff are expected to achieve. The convenience of scorecard benchmarks for participation ensures that the interventions are a ‘success’ by these standards. Redundant efforts to target ‘everyone’ continue to capture the same people. With the performance scorecard, the emphasis is on output: “We need more in-depth reporting. Right now it’s superficial. It’s how many people you trained in three months” (Dawood 2010). The lack of detailed reporting structures hampers the ability to create more qualitative and meaningful measures of success. According to Dawood, “The director said to me, we needs thousand of people. It becomes meaningless. It’s not about the depth of what we’re doing” (Dawood 2010). The scorecard system perpetuates its own form
of a convenience syndrome, in which the format of activity targets is both simple and achievable, albeit irrelevant to building social cohesion.

Despite its quantitative benchmarks for success, the MHD is reflective on the friction between their approaches and targeting the ‘right’ people. Maimela explains how the scorecard targets are often markedly different from reality. Despite often meeting the quantitative targets established by city officials, the challenges to participation are constant. Maimela focuses on key leaders to help her mobilize, but there are certain leaders she avoids: “The dialogues have political tensions. . . It’s brewing and there is bigger violence coming. That’s where we reach a stumbling block. The people we need are not attending these workshops. . . When you go back, what do you say? It’s not working” (Maimela 2010). Maimela candidly voices an issue that other institutions did not want to admit. The very people they are most interested in targeting—those who might create conflicts, or even physical violence against outsiders and foreign nationals, will most likely not attend a dialogue or community event.

According to Dawood, they initially identify the ‘community’ stakeholders in a space, such as the churches, NGOs, and schools. Dawood says, “We hope the representation is 50/50 migrants and South Africans. Regions where migrants live, that’s where the target was, but more local people end up coming” (Dawood 2010). Despite meeting their scorecard quotes for participants, the MHD lacks meaningful engagement with its participants. The ‘teleguided’ nature of participation is evident: “Women responded better. There’s more women in the dialogues and workshops. There’s not really anything to get to the men. They tell us they’re not interested” (Maimela 2010). Even the women, who are much more amenable to the interventions, are skeptical and want solutions: “‘what are you really doing?’, they’ll

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32 One MHD workshop had over 900 attendees—a significant success by scorecard standards, but not a meaningful way to create dialogue among ‘community’ members.
ask” (Maimela 2010). The sceptical nature of participants and their disinterest in discussing xenophobia prompts teleguided participation instead of creative alternatives, or attempts to address the structural issues that inhibit meaningful participation.

**CARITAS**

Caritas’ intervention with Damietta demonstrates meaningful participation that reconciles international peacebuilding ideas with urban realities. This successful harnessing of friction is largely due to the creativity of the Caritas and Damietta teams.

The Caritas peacebuilding manual strongly emphasizes the importance of open participation in peacebuilding, and the need for a relationship-centered approach in order to maintain positive participation (Caritas 2002). However, the manual’s remaining guidance on participation focuses on the micro-level of group participation and dynamics. It does not address issues of targeting the ‘right’ people, and ensuring that the forms of participation are meaningful and tied to the program’s objective. Such details are left to the discretion of the implementing practitioners. Caritas’ model follows the manual’s prescriptions for relationship-centred and open participation, and furthers these characteristics through a process that is centred on conflict resolution and mediation skills for participants. For Hughes, meaningful relationships are at the core of the program, as taught through non-violence philosophy and practice (Hughes 2010). Peacebuilding groups are formed organically, and the nature of participation in this intervention is open, robust, and committed.

Participation, and indicators for success in this intervention, occur on two levels in the Caritas intervention: first, open and meaningful participation in a well-established group; and second, the involvement of the wider ‘community’ in the group’s activities or influence. According to Wani, “What we tell people in the group is, wherever you are, by a peacemaker.
Wherever you work, you can build peace with a colleague” (Wani 2010). Participants are encouraged to identify other potential enablers and to seek opportunities to share their work and ideas. According to Hughes, “Everyone grows together. It’s a long process. The foundational process is very slow. It’s a mind-shift, which is very slow” (Hughes 2010). As a result, the ‘thick’ nature of participation in this intervention is a long-term, sustainable approach to building better relationships and promoting conflict mediation skills. Far from the ‘teleguided’ approach, Caritas builds on the principles of its manual, waits for individuals and institutions to seek its assistance, and embraces the locally-owned, slow pace of its intervention.

**NMF**

The Nelson Mandela Foundation’s dialogue approach demanded substantive involvement from participants. The dialogues aim to mobilize ‘community’ knowledge by bringing together as many stakeholders as possible. In order to do this, the NMF undertook a brief assessment of the dialogue sites for 2-4 days, speaking with stakeholders, local government, CPFs, police, community and political leaders (Abrahams 2010). The goal of doing so was to, “get buy-in in order to implement” (Abrahams 2010). Paralleling the previous discussion of NMF’s work in relation to ‘community’, there appears to be a contradiction between the NMF’s awareness of local complexities, and the breadth of scope and short time frame of the social cohesion pilot intervention.

The first significant type of friction, ‘business as usual’ approaches that target ‘easy’ participation, appears in a November 2009 community conversation in Atteridgeville. At the session, fewer than ten of the fifty participants were migrants (Jinnah 2009, 1). Although the NMF consulted widely with migrants groups, this was not sufficient to gain their involvement, in light of such a long history of exclusion and harassment, and mistrust in formal institutions (Jinnah 2009, 1). The assumption that you can easily get the ‘right’ participants, even with a
well-intentioned consultation phase in the ‘community’ is thus contested. Friction ultimately persists between fast-paced NGO timelines and the urban realities as understood by intervention staff.

The second type of friction, addressing the root problem and gaining participants appropriately, also created a dilemma for the NMF’s community conversations. According to NMF, “regardless of the level at which dialogue is exercised or the level of the participants, the participatory nature of the process is central to the method’s success” (Nelson Mandela Foundation 2010, 18). And yet, a meaningfully participatory process is difficult to achieve. At the Atteridgeville community conversation, the conversation centred on service delivery and the ‘community’ was uninterested in discussing migrants. Furthermore, according to a participant, “the few migrants who did attend did not get a platform to speak to the group” (Jinnah 2009, 2). The conversation ultimately focused on service delivery and eclipsed migrant involvement, excluding them from the process (Jinnah 2009, 2). According to Jinnah, “NMF and other organizers clearly consulted widely to ensure a participative process but it will take time and trust to bring migrant groups into processes such as these” (Jinnah 2009, 2). The most recent publication on the dialogues claims, “the community conversations had provided communities with the tools necessary to take ownership of their problems and work at creating their own solutions” (Nelson Mandela Foundation 2010, 18). However, this ownership is difficult to gain in the short-term, and will most likely demands more sustainable efforts that address the friction of root causes and meaningful participation.

Conclusions

Overall, it is difficult for interventions to determine how participation ties in with their program objectives, and what the nature of participation needs to be in order to promote social
cohesion. These two forms of friction often manifest negatively through the phenomenon of ‘teleguided’ participation, in which participants are often preached to instead of dialogued with. Several participants mentioned that dialogues and town meetings often do this, and then fail to provide tangible next steps for the community (APF; JRS; UNHCR).

Furthermore, there is often difficulty getting the “right” people involved in interventions. Certain foreigner groups will avoid public venues because they fear being harassed, which perpetuates ‘insider’ frustration with these outsiders. Organisations often mentioned that they are targeting “everyone”, without plans for how to get “everyone” to become involved (IOM; United as One; NMF; MHD). Inevitably certain groups and individuals, and often invisible foreigners, are excluded. This ultimately leads to ‘cheap’ participation in which interventions target the more convenient participants. However, bodies at an event will not fulfil the objective of participation in its more meaningful sense for social cohesion interventions.

Relevant forms of participation seek to promote ‘vernacular’ power structures, instead of creating what are often redundant structures for interventions that can misinterpret local power structures and dynamics. Another positive form of friction is transformational forms of participation that seek to create meaningful and sustainable forums for migrants and other outsiders to participate in their ‘communities’. Such efforts will eventually become the ‘vernacular forms of power’ themselves, and thus ensure that the ‘right’ participants are involved.
CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSIONS

This thesis sought to understand whether and how the body of literature on peacebuilding—in both operational tools and theoretical research—is appropriate for a context of urban displacement. It particularly focused on ‘community’ and participation as critical constructs that are affected by the contextual characteristics of invisibility, mobility, diversity, and insecurity. This thesis explored the intersection between urban displacement and peacebuilding through field research with a series of social cohesion interventions in urban South Africa. Urban displacement and peacebuilding fields address social cohesion in their own ways, but they do not speak to each other: this thesis therefore strove to fill this gap, analysing the relevance of peacebuilding literature to a context of urban displacement through the ‘frictions’ between theory and practice. These frictions were analysed through constructions of ‘community’ and participation in peacebuilding and social cohesion literature, and how they relate with the realities of social cohesion practice in urban South Africa. This thesis ultimately shed light on major themes in how the urban displacement characteristics of mobility, diversity, insecurity, and invisibility ultimately challenge peacebuilding ideas of participation and ‘community’.

Social cohesion interventions in the aftermath of the 2008 xenophobic attacks in South Africa began at a turning point in civil society action. ‘Compelled to act’, many institutions have, and continue to, fumble with how to build peace and promote cohesion in complicated urban spaces. Without precedents and skills to build from these institutions are operating in new terrain that melds together the traditional needs of peacebuilding with a context of highly fragmented urban displacement.
A key learning from this thesis is that friction is inevitable, and the extent to which it is negative should be balanced over time. The creation of new realities when two existing concepts, peacebuilding and urban displacement, rub against each other can be an opportunity for innovation. In such a new and emerging space that challenges conventional orthodoxies, even negative friction should be understood as something that is to be expected in the short-term of quick responses to the 2008 xenophobic attacks, and that can rapidly evolve as well.

Through these frictions, both negative and positive, certain key lessons were realized about the construction of ‘community’ in urban South Africa. First, ‘friction’ was discovered between ‘business as usual’ approaches to interventions that were confronted with the invisibility of foreigners and outsiders, and the nature of the contested community in general. This is similar to the convenience syndrome described earlier for international actors operating in contexts of urban displacement. Second, ‘friction’ often occurred when organisations undervalued the specificity of local knowledge that a contested ‘community’ demands. ‘Local’ refers to a place, but does not ascribe legitimacy: In a contested ‘community’ with complex insider/outside dynamics, legitimacy is thus critical but misunderstood. Finally, ‘friction’ occurs when official forums for migrants are absent, and the role of state structures, boundaries, and actors are not taken into account when interventions try to build social cohesion. This type of friction lies at the nexus of the first two types: the role of the state, and in particular local governance, affects how ‘local’ knowledge is understood and who is perceived as a legitimate actor; it also affects the boundaries of ‘communities’, and perpetuates a convenience syndrome when interventions use these boundaries and local structures without questioning them.

The concept of ‘friction’ also revealed several key findings about the construction of participation in urban South Africa. First, and paralleling the previous discussion on
‘community’, ‘friction’ was discovered between ‘business as usual’ approaches to interventions that were confronted with the invisibility of foreigners and outsiders, and the nature of the contested ‘community’ in general. In this setting, interventions often target easy-to-reach people, instead of the ‘right’ people for the objective of their intervention. This type of friction ties in with the second most significant form of friction: when confronted with the new challenge of addressing xenophobic violence in a context of urban displacement, interventions often have a difficult time understanding the root problem, and who needs to be involved to address this problem. Instead, interventions pursue an approach to social cohesion that is similar and easier to address than the root causes of xenophobic violence. Without a community with which to engage, and in this context, very little interest on behalf of insiders to discuss xenophobia in the first place, a certain degree of teleguided participation is inevitable. Participation exists along a spectrum: the weaker communities are, the more difficult it is for genuine participation and meaningful engagement to take place. Overall, it is difficult for interventions to determine how participation ties in with their program objectives and how to effectively promote social cohesion. Furthermore, there is often difficulty getting the “right” people involved, which often means that interventions target the most convenient participants. A meaningful level and type of participation is needed alongside ‘vernacular’ power structures that understand, and can operate within, local leadership and power dynamics.

Each social cohesion intervention had to confront ‘community’ and participation as they really exist in urban South Africa. More relevant ways of addressing ‘community’ focused on transformational approaches that sought to change the structures currently impeding outsiders’ involvement, or small scale initiatives with specific groups of insiders and outsiders that have a common reason to engage with each other. Instead of trying to mobilize a fractured community,
these micro-communities are relatively manageable, conceivable groups of people who can respond with tangible action within their group. Meanwhile, systemic and structural factors can be addressed through long-term initiatives. While ‘community’-wide consensus has its role, the fact that this was the most common social cohesion intervention illustrates the extent to which business as usual approaches dominated the response to the 2008 attacks. Finally, the participating organisations illustrate the extent to which a certain degree of humility is essential when analysing the layers of legitimacy and power in each ‘community’.

The challenge today is to find creative ideas and approaches to the issues of ‘community’ and participation discussed in this thesis. There are a range of assumption about ‘community’ and participation that were revealed in the “stickiness of practical engagement” with social cohesion interventions. Confronted with an emerging, complex issue in such fragmented spaces, interventions have learned from these initial attempts at bringing cohesion to urban South Africa’s communities. Acknowledging the friction between how ‘community’ and participation are understood and handled in these spaces allows for creativity and flexibility in responses that can evolve into more specific concepts and theories on how urban interventions need to function. With this acknowledgement and consequent action, the friction between urban displacement realities and peacebuilding can be harnessed, and allow for a reflexive peacebuilding practice that ties the difficulty of urban space with the possibilities of how to meaningfully engage with others and build peace.
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APPENDIX A

The interventions included in this study under the auspices of “social cohesion” represent a wide range of approaches and philosophies to address the xenophobic attacks of May 2008, and subsequent xenophobic attacks and attitudes. Some institutions are international aid agencies, such as the International Organisation for Migration, Jesuit Refugee Service, Caritas International, StreetNet International and the UN Refugee Agency. Others represent domestic civil society and political organisations (Anti-Privatisation Forum; Afuraka; Displaced and Migrant Persons Support Programme; CoSATU; Africa Diaspora Forum; Scalabrini; Nelson Mandela Foundation) or local government programmes (Migrant Help Desk).

Almost all organisations became involved in xenophobia and social cohesion as a consequence of the May 2008 attacks. However, each organisations’ approach to social cohesion is markedly different. Several institutions focus on humanitarian assistance and preventing future attacks from happening through police networks and attempts at rapid response to threats (DMPSP; UNHCR). Others only target their own constituency in their interventions, seeking to address xenophobia within the workplace (CoSATU, StreetNet International). Still others have little relationship with the ‘hot spot’ communities, and must grapple with how to gain access and legitimacy in these spaces (IOM; Caritas International; MHD; Afuraka; Scalabrini; NMF). These interventions are the most common, and are particularly relevant for this thesis. How do interventions address an emerging, complex issue in such fragmented spaces? How do we learn from these initial attempts at bringing cohesion to urban South Africa’s communities? In particular, what lessons have been learned about how community and participation are understood and handled in these spaces?

The following section provides information about each organisations’ mandate, understanding of the problem, intervention design, approach to community and participation, monitoring and evaluation plans, current challenges, and next steps.

Afuraka

Afuraka identifies the key problems it addresses as xenophobia and social exclusion. In their view, the South African political structure marginalizes people, and foreigners are a good scapegoat. The main objective of Afuraka’s programming has been to create a platform for awareness, exposure, and critical reflection on – and about – African history and culture, as a practical means of preventing and eradicating hostile attitudes and violent acts against African migrants. Their activities have sought to bring together members of communities and stakeholders to challenge stereotypes, provide forums for interaction, and develop an appreciation for the cultural diversity of the African continent.

With a strong emphasis on youth, target groups have also included community leaders, organisations, and professionals. Afuraka’s programming has included: Africa slam, a friendly competition in poetry and debating with schools and youth structures from Alexandra, Diepsloot, Soweto, and Inner City; a movie screening and discussion; three symposiums in Braamfontein, Yeoville, and Soweto on African unity, youth empowerment, and awareness around xenophobia; and, a train-the-trainer program for professionals addressing xenophobia and social exclusion.
Four target areas within the Johannesburg area were identified for Afuraka activities: Diepsloot (Region A), Soweto (Region D) Alexandra (Region E) and Inner City (Region F). These areas were chosen as they all have been affected, in different ways, by xenophobic violence, hostile attitudes, and a sense of social exclusion. Afuraka specifically targeted high schools and youth to be recipients of their programming. While they did not specifically target foreigners, it is recognised that foreigners are participants in Afuraka’s programming. Afuraka’s programs are advertised using posters, flyers, and Facebook.

**StreetNet International**

StreetNet identified a lack of governmental response to threats of xenophobic attacks leading up to the 2010 FIFA World Cup as a trigger for their anti-xenophobia interventions. According to Pat Horn, StreetNet’s Coordinator, "The focus on xenophobia came at a particular time because of the [2008] attacks. What we do is respond to what's happening in a specific country." Their efforts were encapsulated in a campaign called *World Class Cities for All*. The campaign has taken place in Korea, India, and now Brasil. The campaign ended in South Africa shortly after the World Cup. It involved press statements, media awareness, posters, and other tools for public awareness and advocacy. The target of the intervention was at the policy level, as well as for street vendors more broadly: StreetNet aimed to change governmental policy while organizing and securing rights for street vendors. The street vendors and the government were therefore StreetNet’s primary audiences. *World Class Cities for All* was implemented in several provinces, including: the Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Free State, North West, Mpumalanga, Gauteng, and Eastern Cape. The campaign focused on coordinating with partners and getting the government to listen. StreetNet considers the campaign to be highly successful. Horn claims, "Because of our campaign, we raised the xenophobia issue. After that the government responded." As a policy-level tool, that campaign was considered a success by the StreetNet team.

**CoSATU**

CoSATU is a trade union federation formed in 1985. More than 2 million South African and migrant workers are under CoSATU. CoSATU has recognised xenophobia amongst, and experienced by, its workers. As a response, CoSATU has incorporated issues of xenophobia into its meeting agendas and workshops. In July 2010, the federation held a workshop on xenophobia with 150 people, mainly shop stewards. The workshop was directed from the national level. CoSATU routinely denounces xenophobia. The primary target audience of the workshop was shop stewards. At a meeting, stewards will say, "Take note of foreign nationals,"—raising their issues with foreign nationals on their own. Some workers see foreign nationals as taking their jobs but the federation’s stance is to say "let's see each other,"—aiming to promote unity and understanding among the shop stewards. CoSATU’s main effort is thus to create unity amongst its workers. Distracted by strikes, meetings dedicated to xenophobia are often pushed aside. Future workshops and more dialogue are planned, although their approach to xenophobia is not a particular ‘program’ of CoSATU’s along the lines of the other participating organisations.
**Nelson Mandela Foundation**

The mandate of the Nelson Mandela Foundation (NMF) is to “contribute to the making of a just society by promoting the values, vision, and work of our founder.” The Dialogue Program promotes and facilitates dialogue around critical social issues within communities and focuses on building capacity at a grassroots level. The Program consists of a series of conversations that focus on creating social cohesion in communities where xenophobic violence is a problem.

The Dialogue Project’s aims are to: facilitate 30 community conversations, using the CCE methodology, in selected sites to enable South African and migrant communities to contribute to the creation of a culture of tolerance, respect for human dignity and social justice; Enhance the capacity of 30 facilitators to implement community conversations, using the CCE methodology, to promote constructive dialogue within and between South Africans and migrants to build socially cohesive communities; and, conduct research to document community-based initiatives aimed towards building tolerance, respect for human dignity and social justice and to celebrate the resilience of communities that have overcome adversity (Nelson Mandela Foundation 2010). By taking ownership of the social change process that they want to achieve, communities and the structures that support them are enabled to build the required degree of trust, solidarity, and social relationships. The local implementation sites are: Western Cape: Khayelitsha, Nyanga and Philippi; Gauteng: Atteridgeville, Diepsloot, Thembisa and Ramaphosa; KwaZulu-Natal: Albert Park and Cato Manor; Mpumalanga: Delmas, Leandra and Nkomazi; and, Eastern Cape: Port Elizabeth (Motherwell, Walmer), Uitenhage (Kwanobuhle), and Jeffrey’s Bay (Tokyo Sexwale, Ocean View) (Nelson Mandela Foundation 2010).

A baseline survey was conducted in selected sites before the community conversations began. The study aimed to create a profile of socio-economic, political, and cultural conditions in these communities and deepen our understanding of how these conditions affect relationships between migrants and South African communities. The researchers from NMF reviewed the available literature and surveyed 526 participants through a mainly quantitative questionnaire. The survey results, which are available on request, will be used to monitor the programme’s impact after the pilot phase of the implementation (Nelson Mandela Foundation 2010).

**UN Refugee Agency**

According to its website, UNHCR’s mandate is to: “provide direct material and legal assistance to the most vulnerable people of concern in the country, supporting them with food, shelter, education, health, community services, skills training and self-reliance projects” (UNHCR 2010). According to Munyaneza, the key problem of xenophobic violence is the relationships between insiders and outsiders: He tells foreigners, "don't come in as a victim. Come in as part of the community." For Munyaneza, foreign nationals need to see themselves as part of the community.

UNHCR’s current work is an ad-hoc response system in which a network of individuals have Munyaneza’s phone number. Relationships are developed with local police, and UNHCR attends meetings, attempts to mediate conflicts, and provides humanitarian assistance following attacks. According to Munyaneza, "We have food and blankets but no long-term vision." In terms of who is targeted, vulnerable persons by UNHCR standards are unemployed youth: "These are the perpetrators so these are our targets. We need to make them buy in."
In terms of how to get the general public involved, Munyaneza said: "Talk with them, don't preach to them. Have they eaten? Do they have a job?" "With a fragmented society it needs to be massive." He discusses the importance of meaningful participation and how to create meetings that are about dialogue, not preaching. The local municipality goes to where violence took place and only engages with the South Africans. They meet the South African's needs to the detriment of the foreigners.

UNHCR has been present in: Atteridgeville, Diepsloot, Mamelodi, Balfour, Iterelang, Khutsong, Waterkloof, Cape Town. In terms of future plans, “We need an overarching system, so far it is an ad-hoc response with no long-term ideas. We would like to see six-month long activities, more engagement with unemployed youth, and initiatives that put South African's together with foreigners. Also, satellite offices, field offices, and more coordination with documentation”.

**International Organisation for Migration**

The IOM’s One Movement Campaign is a social change project that seeks to change negative attitudes and behaviours that perpetuate discriminatory practices related to xenophobia, racism, and tribalism within South Africa and other societies (IOM 2010). IOM sees a general breakdown in social cohesion in South African as the primary factor that has resulted in increasing xenophobic sentiments, racism, and tribalism. The One Movement Campaign has grown from an initial Research-Baseline Study, followed by radio, tv, and newspaper campaigns, to awareness campaigns with youth, to media trainings on the rights of migrants, and a pilot soccer township challenge with eight townships in Gauteng province.

The Campaign sees everyone as its target audience, although the national campaign is primarily focused on youth communities. To further its goals, the IOM has partnered with UN agencies, METRO FM, the City of Johannesburg, Migrant Help Desk, Constitution Hill, the South African Human Rights Commission, and the Nelson Mandela Foundation.

According to Ali, “Racial and ethnic tensions lead to xenophobia. We have no history of addressing xenophobia but it couldn't go unnoticed after the attacks.” "Everybody" is the target of the intervention, and they are targeted through: “Local government, Community Police Forums, Ward Councillors, migrants and South Africans”, according to Ali.

“We address the issues that will affect the situation of migrants. We have developed a new program to follow the One Movement Campaign. It involves community focal points, capacity building on a large scale, and engagement with local structures. The new program will be focused on hot spots with 100 focal points, focal point coordinators who will mediate and use One Movement literature”, said Lifongo. IOM intends to create a more long-term and sustainable program with the local coordinators following the first phase of the One Movement Campaign. “We recognise that the One Movement Campaign wasn't grass-rootsy enough. It was ‘fluff’ and we wanted to distance ourselves from that. We will build off of our experience with counter-trafficking. A lot of the networks and capacity building skills will be the same. We want to focus on targeting employers and community leadership”, said Ali. “We did not do M&E for the One Movement Campaign but it will be very important in this new phase. Activities for the new phase will gear-up in February 2011. It is hard to track success. We did not monitor and evaluate, but donors really want to see that”, according to Lifongo.
**Scalabrini: Unite as One Campaign**

Scalabrini seeks to address hate crimes experienced by migrant clients through their Unite As One Campaign. In 2009, they conducted a survey to understand the nature of hate crimes. This was followed, in the short term, by a questionnaire designed to understand who had made these threats. The questionnaire revealed that 68% of surveyed migrants experienced threats. Scalabrini brought together civil society actors to gain support for the idea of a pledge. They called it the *Unite as One Campaign*. The campaign ran from July to October 2010. At events and meetings held by partner civil society actors during that timeframe, the pledge was read. The people who will benefit from the pledge are not bloody-minded. Scalabrini believes there are only a few who would perpetrate violence. The idea of the pledge was to strengthen the resolve of those who would oppose it. According to Madikane, "We needed something positive."

The campaign does not target a specific geographic region but rather is dependant upon where implementing partners are located. The campaign pledge was read at sports events, public events and activities, other social cohesion and anti-xenophobia interventions, and the activities of other civil society organisations with which Scalabrini partnered. Scalabrini is not actually involved in the communities so it depends on these partners. Currently, there is no funding for M&E activities.

Coordination and tension amongst the civil society organisations is difficult. Reflecting on the campaign, Madikane indicated, “I wouldn’t do a campaign like this again.”

**Anti-Privatisation Forum**

For the Anti-Privatisation Forum, xenophobia is a critical problem, that is in part a result of frustration with service delivery. Their intervention uses workshops, public meetings, focus groups, and radio announcements with both migrants and South Africans as target audiences. According to Tladi, their process for engaging with community members is straightforward: if they are going to have a meeting in a community on the Sunday, starting on Thursday they will drive around and make announcements, put up posters, and make a call on the radio. The day of, they try to round up as many people as possible. Tladi seeks to create forums that are inclusive with as many ‘community’ members as possible participating. Tladi often discusses service delivery needs in the community as a means of shifting the blame from migrants to the ‘root cause’.

APF operates under the idea that it is important to call a meeting with someone the people trust. To increase interaction, they tried to have people translate for each other at meetings to get them involved, to engage everyone. APF does not have an M&E process.

**Migrant Help Desk**

The Migrant Help Desk’s mandate is to manage migrants in the City of Johannesburg. Opened in 2007 as a small office, things became major after the attacks. South Africans believe that foreigners don't care about South Africa and that they don't want to listen. Police exacerbate the problem. We are trying to encourage people to live together peacefully. They held Africa Day, a celebration of culture in Alex; had a campaign with UNHCR at Alex Plaza to talk about migrant rights; and have organized marches. Their activities are based on recommendations from the...
Mayor after he does a roadshow to get feedback from the community. Their activities are focused where attacks took place.

The Migrant Help Desk facilitates workshops, dialogues, Africa Week, and various events in communities. Getting people to participate is very difficult, however it helps when employees are residents within the communities the MHD is operating in. A major challenge is that the people they need are not attending the workshops. The workshops that run well are with the NGOs themselves (i.e. staff members) and target both migrants and South Africans.

Prior to initiating interventions, the Migrant Help Desk staff identifies stakeholders, churches, schools, and other institutions where they are working. The goal for participation is 50/50 South Africans and migrants. Maimela noted, "The community doesn't want social cohesion. You find you are working against the community." The majority of interventions have taken place in Inner City, Soweto, Mid-Rand, and Alexandra.

The major obstacle identified is that the community doesn't want to hear about migrants. When they first started doing workshops after the attacks, the workshops opened old wounds. MHD recognises that it did not know how to facilitate the discussion. They used the scorecard system the government uses to monitor success. On the front-end, activities were determined following a Mayoral roadshow to the community. Dawood recognises that this system is not sustainable: “We desperately need an M&E system. The quality of the dialogue isn't clear but there is pressure to do things quickly. By the time I get reports the next phase has already started. Our work is unstructured and we don't know if we understand the community. Also, when there is no follow-up, things fall apart.”

**Caritas**

Caritas identifies social exclusion and violence as the main problems it seeks to address. To address these issues, Caritas developed a program with the Damietta Peace Initiative. According to Hughes, Damietta has the experience on the ground and Caritas has the peacebuilding manual and toolkit. Together, they seek to build peace and promote the philosophy, spirituality, and practice of non-violence. Small groups are formed organically to build peace and pursue activities of their choice. Churches, NGOs, and other groups invite Caritas to enter a community. There is an initial stakeholder meeting and the ideas of the group are discussed. Every group needs a focal point. People can be trained but choose not to, or cannot, develop a group. The groups meet regularly and can seek different training or capacity building. The focal points are given additional training in non-violence. There are specific groups located in Soweto, Atteridgeville, Pretoria, and Balfour, and approximately 65 other locations across South Africa. Hughes has found that “these types of groups are normally done in rural areas; urban is hard, there is less trust. If that trust is not there in a community, either it isn't the right time for the intervention or a focal point can bring together their friends and try to diversify the group from there.”

In an effort to ensure sustainability, Caritas is trying to evaluate their programming more rigorously in collaboration with the University of Stellenbosch.

**Displaced and Migrant Persons Support Group**

DMPSG sees xenophobia and displacement as the major problems it seeks to address. Their primary focus is on monitoring, a process they want to go further into in about a year. De Costa expressed DMPSG’s intent to branch out into advocacy. “I’m very active in the Johannesburg
Migration Advisory Panel (JMAP). I’m sitting on the JMAP we have the working group meetings. We want to mobilize for building methods for rapid response. This is critical. There are gaps in the whole system.” The Displaced and Migrant Persons Support Group has is involved with HANSA, a group of organisations, and has conducted workshops with, and received funding from, UNHCR. De Costa summarizes some of the work DMPSP conducts: ”Now we’re going to CPFs, we do patrols with the police, we’re part of the CPFs in other communities. We talk about how CPFs are restructured in workshops. We talk about how to motivate the CPFs, how to get the street committees involved, how to make everything more local”.

DMPSP also wants to take on a more robust monitoring role, which it already does on a limited, internal basis. De Costa says, “We do have limited staff, we don’t have the qualifications to do monitoring. But for me, monitoring and acquiring intelligence is the same thing. I have an intelligence officer background, and I’m known well in the area. I have contacts, an old boys network”.

“What effect have we had? We’ve established street committees. We’ve developed strong CPFs and street committees. We would like to see more migrants in the ward committees. We would like to see a designated person of DHA at a very local level that addresses foreigners and keeps records. The issue of illegal migrants won’t stop. So, Something has to be done”(De Costa).

Jesuit Refugee Service

“The mission of Jesuit Refugee Service is to serve, accompany, and defend the rights of refugees and other forcibly displaced persons, witnessing to God’s presence the vulnerable and often forgotten people driven from their homes by conflict, natural disaster, economic injustice, or violation of their human rights” (Jesuit Relief Service 2010). JRS, “provides assistance to: refugees in camps and cities, individuals displaced within their own countries, asylum seekers in cities, and those held in detention centres. The main areas of work are in the field of education, emergency assistance, healthcare, livelihood activities, and social services” (Jesuit Relief Service 2010a).

JRS addresses local integration in South Africa through income generating activities (IGA), such as giving groups or individuals provisions upon receipt of a business proposal, vocational skills training, and assistance with receiving accreditation of existing qualifications (JRS 2010b). JRS also held a major march on July 17th, 2010 to raise awareness against xenophobia. Finally, JRS had a range of workshops that aim to: understand why we have non-nationals in RSA; to understand the different categories of non-nationals; to understand why non-nationals have rights; to understand what is xenophobia; to plan together how to respond to xenophobia threats in our community what are we going to do to prevent attacks in our areas. These workshops have been conducted in a range of locations throughout South Africa.

“JRS will continue spreading the message of anti-xenophobia by continuing to engage local communities especially in the townships in dialogue on refugee issues and work with these communities to build an anti-xenophobic community that will embrace all African nationals residing in South Africa” (JRS 2010c). In the future JRS will focus on anti-xenophobia training and debates with ward councillors in advance of the upcoming (February 2011) elections. (Personal communication 2010).
APPENDIX B

**Interview Schedule for Intervention Staff**

The interview schedule below will serve as guiding questions for this research study. However, this is a semi-structured questionnaire and unscripted questions will be asked repeatedly in order to elicit responses about community, participation, and ownership in the most neutral way possible during the interviews. Whenever respondents mention community, participation and ownership I will pursue their reference by asking for clarification on how they understand these issues. The core questions themselves might evolve depending on the type of organisations used in the study and the nature of their interventions.

**Design**
- Can you describe the process for designing this project?
  - Who came up with the objectives? How were they determined?
  - Do you think the outputs are achievable? Why or why not?
  - What do you expect to come from this intervention?
  - Have you ever been part of a project like this in the past? If so, can you describe that/those project(s) to me?

**Program**
- Who are you targeting in this intervention? Why?
  - How do you ensure that you target those people?
  - How do you think the intervention participants correspond with those you want to target?

**Monitoring**
- How will you determine if the intervention has been successful?
  - Do you have indicators for success? If so, what are they?
  - Do you think that the indicators represent the problem accurately?
  - Have you witnessed any positive changes as a result of your intervention?
  - Have you witnessed any negative changes as a result of your intervention?
  - How do you determine if your intervention was the cause for change?
APPENDIX C

Interview Schedule for Intervention Participants

The interview schedule below will serve as guiding questions for this research study. However, this is a semi-structured questionnaire and unscripted questions will be asked repeatedly in order to elicit responses about community, participation, and ownership in the most neutral way possible during the interviews. The core questions themselves might evolve depending on the nature of the interventions and participants interviewed.

Involvement
- How did you become involved in this program?
- Why do you think you were involved in this project?
- Can you describe your experience so far?

Community
- What kind of people are part of this project?
- Do you know why this intervention is taking place?
- Do others around here want projects like this to take place?

Program
- How have you participated in the program?
- How do you believe your participation will affect xenophobia here?
- Have you witnessed any positive changes as a result of the intervention?
- What do you expect to come out of this intervention?

Xenophobia
- Why do you think xenophobia takes place?
- How do you think this project will work against xenophobia?
- How does this program address that?

33 The intervention might not specifically reference xenophobia in its programming, instead focusing on social cohesion, or other terminology. The language used in the interviews will be adapted accordingly.
APPENDIX D

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET

Peacebuilding for the Urban Displaced

Principal Investigator:
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Introduction
I am Jessica Anderson, the investigator for this study. I am a student at the University of the Witwatersrand’s Forced Migration Studies Programme in Gauteng province. My advisor is Tara Polzer, a professor at the University of the Witwatersrand. I am conducting a study that will explore the design, monitoring, and evaluation of social cohesion interventions. I will seek to understand how interventions in South Africa design, monitor, and evaluate their interventions. To do this, I would like to conduct interviews to discuss personal and/or professional experiences and opinions. You will be asked to spend approximately one hour in an interview. You will be one of approximately fifty people to take part in the study.

Risks
These questions allow you to share as much or as little information as you want. If at any point during the interview you feel uncomfortable, you can stop the interview. You may choose to join the research project or you may choose not to join the project. Your participation is voluntary. You do not have to answer any questions that you do not want to. There is no penalty if you choose not to join the research project. There are no costs to participation in this research project, nor is there any financial compensation.

Privacy and Confidentiality
I will keep your name or other information confidential, if you request it. If there are certain parts of the interview that you would like to remain confidential, this is possible as well. We can negotiate a process of how I will use such “confidential” information, and you will receive a draft of the report for your approval, before it is submitted to others. Any documents you sign where you can be identified by name will be kept safely in offices at the Forced Migration Studies Programme.

Available Support
It is unlikely that you will experience any emotional discomfort while participating in the study. However, if distress or discomfort is felt, please tell me. If this happens when I am not available, you should contact me at one of the above addresses and phone numbers. I will also arrange for
a follow-up visit from your priest, pastor, or if necessary, an organisation that provides counselling services.

If you have questions about the research study or your rights and welfare as a volunteer in the research study, please contact me (Jessica Anderson) at the addresses or telephone number listed on the first page of this document.

**Verbal Consent Script**

I am a student at the University of the Witwatersrand’s Forced Migration Studies Programme. I am conducting a study on the design, monitoring, and evaluation of social cohesion interventions. If you agree to participate in the project, this interview will last for approximately one hour. If you would like your participation to remain confidential, please make up a name for yourself to be used in my notes so that your identity will not be revealed. I will not tape record this interview, but will take notes by hand. Please understand that you may refuse to participate before the interview, you may stop the interview, or you may skip an interview question at any time. You may ask questions at any time during the interview. You will not receive financial compensation for your time.

I hope that my questions will not upset or distress you in any way. They are not intended to do so. But if they do upset or distress you, please tell me. If this happens when I have gone, you can contact me at the phone number listed above. I will also arrange for a follow-up visit from a counsellor, local organisation or religious figure to assist you.

If you have any further questions or concerns about the project or this consent form, please feel free to contact me (Jessica Anderson) at the addresses or telephone numbers above.