remained a highly sophisticated military power, with nuclear, biological and chemical warfare capability. The negotiated relinquishment of political power was not a surrender of core interests by the National Party. It was a positional compromise. The core interests of all citizens would remain intact, and be afforded greater protection than they had ever received from the new constitution itself.
Chapter 5: Negotiation Scenarios

5.1 Introduction

This chapter is devoted to theory creation on negotiation scenarios. It represents a distillation of how the hitherto enemies learned to make sense out of what was an enormously complex socio-political environment. The respondents quite frequently raised the issue of trying to understand the underlying negotiation scenarios (Barnard, 2004; Crocker, 2003; Floff, 2004; Louw, 2004; Meyer, 2004; Ramaphosa, 2005; Van Heerden, 2003). This questioning and trying to understand the prevailing negotiation scenarios permeated the entire research process. It is fairly obvious that this would be the case because these scenarios are sometimes the closest that one can get to locating and tracking the negotiations in a turbulent environment. Barnard (2004) referred to understanding scenarios as “shadow boxing”.

The counterparts’ understanding of a prevailing negotiation scenario at any one time would have a crucial impact on the decisions and choices that they made (Van Heerden, 2003). These decisions and choices would either be ‘better choices’ or ‘worse choices’. At any one time the decisions that were made regarding the negotiation choices that were followed could not be readily classified into right choices or wrong choices, because there was no arbiter of rectitude at the time of decision making. The negotiators had to manage this internal ambiguity and insecurity associated with locating where the negotiations were heading with wisdom. This chapter attempts to systematise their insight into a broad framework of negotiation scenario analysis. The analysis is intended to offer assistance to negotiators in other situations that will help them to better assess and understand where they might be located in terms of negotiation scenarios, and therefore to improve upon their decision-making processes. This analysis could be used in various different types of negotiations and at various organisational levels.

The falsification thesis involved conducting a careful ‘environment scan’ of the negotiation scenarios that prevailed in South Africa at the time of the national transition.
This chapter, which is devoted to understanding and creating theory on negotiation scenarios, represents a natural corollary to the chapter on the falsification thesis.

5.2 Two negotiation scenario typologies

The negotiation scenarios that have been created to inform this research can be understood as falling into broad two typologies, namely micro- and macro-political negotiation scenarios. An important inspiration for the depiction of these two negotiation scenarios arises from the classic research conducted by Schelling (1978) on Micromotives and Macrobehavior.

5.2.1 The macro-political negotiation scenarios

The first negotiation typology of scenarios that will be proposed pertained to the macro-political context. They are therefore referred to as the set of macro-political negotiation scenarios (see Figure 1). The set of macro-political negotiation scenarios comprises six sub-sets of negotiation scenarios. These include: 1) a disempowerment, self-destruct, social implosion scenario; 2) a revolutionary, popular revolt scenario; 3) a counter-revolutionary scenario; 4) a stasis or degenerative stalemate scenario; 5) a homeostasis or positive stalemate scenario; and 6) a developmental, negotiation scenario.

These macro-political negotiation scenarios pertain to the broad socio-political environment in which the individual negotiators lived. It was the often violent and almost always turbulent and unpredictable South African society that prevailed from 1985 to 1998. Elements of this turbulence will have become apparent to the reader in Chapter 3, which was devoted to presenting the inter-subjective validity of the respondents. It touched on some elements of the lived experience of the respondents and cited some of the major socio-political ordeals that they had to circumnavigate. These ordeals, which are depicted as macro-political scenarios of hypothetical futures, included the danger of the society self-destructing into anarchy and disempowering all citizens (Scenario 1). This self-destruct scenario could arise from the country burning out in a violent revolution and turning into a failed state (Scenario 2). It could also have turned into a
totalitarian military junta had the counter-revolutionary scenario prevailed (Scenario 3). Had the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary scenarios been in balance, with no definite victor emerging, the prevailing scenario would have inclined to a stalemate of the stasis variety, which would in turn have been degenerative and led back to a self-destruct social implosion scenario (Scenario 1). The decision that was made by the hitherto enemies to create their own future by conversation, dialogue, interactive planning, and carefully designed project management resulted in the negative stasis stalemate scenario, gradually switching into a positive or homeostasis stalemate (Scenario 5). Once the positive homeostasis stalemate had started prevailing for a significant time, the hitherto enemies were able to build up bridges of personal trust in each other. The longer this situation prevailed the more the negotiation point of positive irreversibility would prevail (Meyer, 2004; Ramaphosa, 2005). It would allow a development scenario to become embedded (Scenario 6).

Figure 1: Macro-political negotiation scenarios
5.2.2 **Explanation of Figure 1**

This commentary will offer a brief historical contextualisation of Figure 1. In the early 1960s, the South African government placed a banning order on the ANC and declared it an illegal organisation. The South African government sought to place the ANC into a self-destruct scenario. Both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary methods were engaged to achieve this objective, including harnessing the state's propaganda strength that included severe restrictions on the press and the freedom of speech. The Internal Security Act and detention without trial were some of the methods that were used in pursuit of the self-destruct scenario.

This resulted in the decision to form Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the military arm of the ANC, and to embark on the armed struggle, and inspired the revolutionary or popular revolt scenario (2 above). The revolutionary struggle was met by the full wrath of the state, in the form of the counter-revolutionary strategy (3 above). This was sometimes referred to as the ‘total onslaught’ by the National Party at that time. The revolutionary and counter-revolutionary scenarios reached their own patterns of equilibrium. The one pattern of equilibrium was a degenerative one (4 above). This is termed a ‘stasis’ type of stalemate, it in turn led into feeding the self-destruct and social implosion scenario, and created a general inclination towards South Africa becoming a failed state (1 above). This situation prevailed for decades.

The falsification thesis should make it clear that from the early 1980s, the leadership of the regime was indeed cognizant of the fact that South Africa was degenerating into a failed state. The leadership of the ANC, were likewise cognizant of this degenerative slide, which if allowed to continue would present them with a wasteland when they assumed political power. The NP leadership therefore started the ‘reform’ process. The reform process was paralleled within the ANC by discussions that explored the viability of negotiation as a tool for achieving radical societal transformation. These streams of changing conversations just happened to take place contiguously. They did not occur contiguously by conscious design. Of course, these streams of changing conversations did ultimately intersect, and manifested in the homeostasis scenario (5 above). This was
when the talks about talks occurred, together with the secret prison conversations and the
meetings in Switzerland. These meetings and changed conversations can be understood
as being indicative of the beginning of the homeostasis or positive stalemate scenario (5
above). It was of course not regarded as being positive at the time, because the entire
country seemed to be in a state of degenerative crisis. But the truth was that the country
was gradually being led and lifted away from a homeostasis stalemate scenario into a
developmental scenario (6 above). The positive scenarios could have slid into negative
scenarios and the negative scenarios could mutate into positive scenarios, depending
upon the quality of the relationships that existed between the hitherto enemies, the
content of the interchanges between them and the negotiation processes that they chose to
follow.

Figure 1 therefore attempts to represent the approximate flow of the macro-political
negotiation scenarios from one into another. From the positions of A’ to B’ it is quite
clear that the possibility of a positive negotiation scenario arising to break the cycle are
usually not good. But it is pointed out that, from a historical perspective, many countries
around the world have been able to lift themselves out of these degenerative sets of
interrelated scenarios. It has sometimes been achieved remarkably rapidly, particularly in
post-war and natural-disaster recoveries. To persons living in these situations, there
seems to be little or no possibility of a consensus being achieved. The A’ to B’ domains
are symptomatic of a society that is experiencing very high levels of deep-rooted conflict.

The B’ to A space is indicative of a situation that is on the edge of degeneration, that
might switch the other way. A country that finds itself located between points A and B
will find itself on a trajectory of growth and development.

(As an aside, the reader should note that the researcher is referring specifically to
constitutional negotiations in this case. The rules that underpin commercial negotiations
in these contexts would probably be contra-cyclical. Different rules would underpin
commercial negotiations in the A’ to B’ space. Commercial negotiations could follow
counter-cycles to political negotiations. They could, in fact, improve or degenerate
depending on the negotiation context and status in which they were conducted. This
means, for example, that a country could experience high or low economic growth in a counter-revolutionary scenario. Individuals could conclude lucrative transactions in a social implosion scenario.)

5.2.3 Discussion of the macro-political negotiation scenarios

South Africa, during the two-decade period following the Soweto Riots of 16 June 1976, teetered in the domain of A' to B', which congealed into a social implosion scenario. In the early 1980s, Botha embarked on his reform process. Although it was hardly perceptible at that time, the macro-political negotiation scenario switched into a stasis-homeostasis phase B' to A. This switch was identified by Van Zyl Slabbert (1991), Welsh (1994), Cloete (1990), Rantete and Swilling (1991) in the discussion of the falsification thesis in the previous chapter. The signing of the Interim Constitution placed South Africa on the macro-political negotiation scenarios between A and B. This represented a change of phase and what Meyer (2004) referred to as a "point of irreversibility", where the country was placed on a trajectory of growth and development. Upon reflection, it is clear that the term “the point of irreversibility” is a misnomer and that the situation could have reversed.

These macro-political negotiation scenarios can be seen to offer a general ‘rule of thumb’ guideline on the sovereign risk profile of a country.

In 2006, Zimbabwe would seem to fall quite clearly into the social implosion, failed state scenario (Scenario 1 in Figure 1). Schelling’s (1980, pp. 188-189) view on an implosion, self-destruct negotiation scenario is captured in his concept of an “inadvertent war”. This would fall under a negotiation scenario of self-destruct.

Somalia, Myanmar and North Korea would appear to fall into the same profile of potential or actual social implosion scenarios. Sri Lanka would appear to be at great risk of entering a social implosion at the time of writing, but it is arguably not in as degenerative a scenario as the former examples. This socio-political phenomenon could therefore be described as a ‘morphoestatic stalemate’.
In 2006, Israel and the Palestinians seemed to be locked into a revolt versus counter-revolution cycle that appears to have reached an equilibrium, and have stabilised into a stalemate type of macro-political negotiation scenario. Arguably, for the Palestinians, their lived experience would be felt as a stasis type of stalemate scenario, leading inexorably into a more degenerative scenario of self-destruct and social implosion. The Palestinians are living the experience of a failed state. Israel on the other hand would arguably experience this as a homeostasis type of stalemate, possibly leading to a developmental macro-political negotiation scenario. This is postulated because the Israeli’s have much more abundant material, intangible, and military resources than the Palestinians have at present. Northern Ireland would seem to have moved into a homeostatic negotiation scenario. Although there have been setbacks, there has been remarkable progress there over the past decade and the hitherto enemies in Ireland seem to be fast lifting themselves into a developmental scenario. The pattern of upliftment is almost always messy and irregular. Australia, Canada and New Zealand would have clearly entered the developmental scenario many generations ago. Singapore moved into a developmental scenario in the 1960s.

The macro-political negotiation scenarios will be experienced by the individual negotiator almost as an objective reality. The macro-political negotiation scenarios on the other hand, which are discussed below, will be experienced subjectively.

5.2.4 The micro-political negotiation scenarios

The second typology of scenarios discussed in this theory-creation chapter is the micro-political negotiation scenarios. These micro-political negotiation scenarios are depicted in Figure 2.

The respondents lived through the personal experience of navigating these scenarios. Barnard (2004) and Louw (2004) offered specific assessments of scenarios (i) and (j), the failure to seize the opportunity to negotiate and the decision not to negotiate. Meyer (2004) and Ramaphosa (2005) discussed scenarios (b), (c) and (d) in considerable depth. These are the stalemate types of scenarios and how they might be overcome. Coleman
(2004) and Eloff (2004) offered insightful commentaries on scenarios (e), (f) and (h). These scenarios included the danger of the deal self-destructing, the dangers associated with the IFP and the Far Right withdrawing from the negotiations, and assuming the BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement) scenario. Maharaj (2004), Meyer (2004), Ramaphosa (2005), Van der Merwe (2004) and Steward (2004) all discussed scenario (a), the decision to enter negotiations.

Figure 2: Micro-political negotiation scenarios

![Diagram](image)


5.2.5 **Explanation of Figure 2**

For decades the predominant negotiation scenario in South Africa according to the National Party leadership was the decision not to negotiate (Scenario j). The decision not to negotiate could also be regarded as a failure to seek the opportunity to negotiate a political settlement (Scenario i). The conjunction of scenarios (j) and (i) created a stalemate (Scenario b). This stalemate scenario consumed generations of time and wasted countless human lives. The decision to enter negotiations (Scenario a) was only
discovered after years of conflict and human suffering had occurred (Maharaj, 2004; Ramaphosa, 2004; Villa-Vicencio, 2005; Tutu, 2004).

Those unfamiliar with the internal machinations would argue wrongly that the decision that was made by President FW de Klerk in his famous 2 January 1990 speech inspired the process of learning amongst enemies. This would be a wrong deduction. The change process happened a long time before this famous speech. This is not to deny the significance of his speech; it was very important. The change process had started a long time before, by small pockets of leadership amongst the hitherto enemies.

Having mentioned that the interaction of these two scenarios (i and j) created a prolonged perceived stalemate (Scenario b) it is necessary to investigate the nature of stalemate. A stalemate will usually present itself as a lived experience that seems to be static, deadlocked, unchanging and seemingly unresponsive to change initiatives. The lived experience is a true experience, but it might not understand that a stalemate may possess underlying patterns of fluidity and motion. Significant opportunities might arise from the negotiations counterparts, and hitherto enemies, understanding the different types of stalemate scenarios that might impact on their decision making. It is very rare that a socio-political scenario is truly frozen into immobility, i.e. frozen absolutely into a stalemate scenario of the type I (Scenario c). It presents itself this way, but that is not how matters really are. Stalemates are rarely absolutely immobile because human interaction is so continuously dynamic. It is therefore probably more helpful to regard stalemates as being morphostatic. In other words, stalemate scenarios present themselves as being immobile, but they do change and morph in their nature. The morphostatic stalemate can switch into two distinct negotiation scenarios of the stalemate typology. Firstly, a genuine stasis type of stalemate scenario might occur. This is referred to as a stalemate Type I and is depicted in scenario (c). This stasis stalemate frequently leads to a self-destruct social implosion type of macro-political negotiation scenario. The second type of stalemate that emanates from a morphostatic stalemate is a homeostasis scenario, which is a stalemate Type II and is depicted as scenario (d). This homeostasis type of stalemate may present itself as a very negative negotiation scenario.
but this impression is deceptive. It is not negative. Indeed it is positive. A homeostasis stalemate negotiation scenario could result in a positive negotiation scenario and would lead to a deal being secured (Scenario g). The securing of a deal as depicted in scenario (g) is usually an intricate process in its own right.

The negotiation phase of securing a deal is often a very vulnerable and delicate negotiation scenario, because it is often at the time of deal closure that deals fail. This is because the period of deal closure is often a period of great stress and tension between the negotiation counterparts. It is at the point of deal closure that, the negotiation counterparts often get ‘withdrawal symptoms’, lose trust, lose the mandate of their constituency, and realise potential mistakes. The management of the perceptions about the deal at the time of closure is both an art and a science. If one of the negotiation counterparts come to assess the deal that is on the table as not being as favourable as their BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement) (Scenario f) the deal will collapse after almost being concluded. The deal can also fail after it has been secured for many reasons including the failure to project manage the agreement into existence (Scenario h).

There are two basic sets of pressures that the negotiator will experience under the deal closure scenarios. The first pressure that they will experience includes the set of pressures from his or her constituency and his or her counterpart’s constituencies, to discover a technical solution to the negotiation challenge. In the case of the South African transition, the challenge was to discover a new constitution (technical solution) that was sufficiently representative of the aspirations of all citizens regardless, of race, colour or creed. This was a difficult challenge in its own right. But there was an even more difficult challenge than this that needed to be project-managed. The second challenge related to managing the social fragmentation that often accompanies seeking a technical solution between the various political constituencies that comprised the negotiations. Many of these constituencies were at very deep odds with one another. Managing the social fragmentation would appear to be more difficult than discovering the technical solution to the problems (Coleman, 2004; Floff, 2004; Hall, 2005; Maharaj, 2004; Meyer, 2004;
Ramaphosa, 2005; Tutu, 2004; Van der Merwe, 2004). Indeed, the researcher has come
to the view that it can be regarded as being one of the most difficult challenges of all.

Essentially managing the social fragmentation required managing the natural tendencies
towards social fragmentation within one’s own constituency, and with (and within) the
negotiation counterpart’s constituencies. These can be very difficult matters. It was
surprising that it was often the internal negotiation within one’s own constituency that
was more difficult to manage than the dealings between hitherto enemies. Rules of
process therefore needed to be created to manage these dilemmas and difficulties. In
South Africa, the negotiators created the channel bi-laterals to manage the danger of
social fragmentation. Objective technical committees were constantly in operation to
correct and adapt the various drafts of the constitution as they were iteratively improved
upon (Barnard, 2004; Coleman, 2004; Eloff, 2004; Maharaj, 2004; Meyer, 2004;
Ramaphosa, 2005).

5.3 The intersection between the macro-political and micro-political
negotiation scenarios

The macro- and micro-political negotiation scenarios are interdependent, and can be
understood as forming an open system. The macro-political negotiation scenarios
determined how the state would deploy and focus its material and human resources. The
self-destruct, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary scenarios meant that the state
would invest enormous amounts of money on military spending and the police. The
homeostasis scenario meant that safe-houses had to be found and paid for
accommodating the returning leadership in exile. It also required that the state would
bank-role the entire negotiation process, and provide appropriate venues, a negotiation
secretariat and so on. Clearly the macro-political negotiation scenarios interact with the
micro-political negotiation scenarios in multidimensional ways. The micro-political
negotiation scenarios interacted and often determined the nature of the macro-political
negotiation scenarios. The secret prison conversations between Mandela and Barnard,
Louw and Van der Merwe, set the tone for the meetings in exile between the ANC
leadership and the NIS. These micro-political negotiations in turn created an energy and
momentum for the various initial minutes of understanding that were reached in terms of the DF Malan Accord, the Pretoria Minute and the Groote Schuur Minute. These micro-political negotiations later converted into the macro-political scenario on the country’s new constitutional framework.

In early 1992 De Klerk and Mandela had a very public and personal clash at CODESA I (Mandela, 1994, pp. 714-715). It could be understood as a clash that took place at the micro-political negotiation level but it had enormous ramifications on the macro-political negotiation scenarios (Schelling, 1978). The clash was about the location of arms caches. Strong language was used by both De Klerk and Mandela. In this instance the quality of interpersonal relationships at the micro-political negotiation level amongst the leadership of the hitherto enemies could determine the country’s macro-political scenarios, for better or for worse. Eloff (2004) asserted that in the instance of the clash between De Klerk and Mandela, the future of the country rested on the emotional intelligence of these leaders. Coleman (2004) put it thus: “The country’s future turned on a dime”. The personal conflict between these two leaders could easily have escalated out of control (Maharaj, 2004; Meyer, 2004; Van der Merwe, 2004).

Slovo’s idea of creating a ‘Sunset Clause’ was manifested at the micro-political negotiation level. Eloff (2004) and Meyer (2004) are of the view that this was such a wise idea as it forestalled a violent counter-revolution from emerging from the extreme right wing, as a macro-political scenario. The ‘Sunset Clause’ offered two key features: it offered the idea of creating a Government of National Unity, where the hitherto enemies would share in the leadership of South Africa, and it offered financial guarantees of pensions to white civil servants who felt very threatened by the transition and might have sabotaged the new government by invoking a counter-revolution.

The micro-political negotiation scenarios can determine the direction of the macro-political negotiations and vice versa.
5.4 A brief reflection on the value of scenarios as a planning instrument for negotiations

Scenario analysis is a useful method for engaging in a rational discourse about matters that are intensely threatening. They offer a framework for testing key negotiation assumptions, or "shadow boxing" (Barnard, 2004). Scenarios are useful because they provide a method for locating 'where you are' in a negotiation process. This location of where the negotiations are situated will always be approximate and there will always be errors. It is quite surprising how frequently leaders do not bother to locate where they are during negotiations. In South Africa, scenario analysis was used extensively and in a far ranging and practical fashion (Berger & Godsell, 1988; Nedcor, Old Mutual Scenarios, 1992).

When the negotiations are not properly located, carefully calculated and premeditated, the negotiator will be very vulnerable to experiencing debilitating levels of confusion and stress. He will also place his interests at risk. This research has indicated that negotiations might display clear patterns that might be identified, predicted and possibly controlled to an extent. Scenarios are intended to encourage clear comparisons between proposed options and alternative futures and the route being followed so that the decision makers might reach wise and rational decisions.

Rapoport (1997) offers an interesting assessment of the value of scenarios using a medical analogy of the state of health of a patient. He extended this metaphor to social behaviour and the state of nations. Rapoport (1997, p. 54) discusses Richardson's (1948) research on mood epidemics and offered various negotiation scenarios that emerge from this work. 'Richardson pictures the mood of an individual as a state to which, and out of which, the individual can be converted. There are of course gradations of moods as there are different severities of a disease. But it is possible to describe a mood epidemic (as it is to describe a disease epidemic) by enumerating a number of sharply distinguished states. In the case of a disease, for example we might distinguish the incubation state, the infected and infectious state, the infected but non-infectious state, the recovered state, the deceased state, etc. The larger the number of states assumed, the more complex we can
expect the theory to be.’ According to Rapoport (1997, p. 54) before “getting a theory started at all, we must make a commitment to some definitive description, and the choice of the description is often determined by the possibility of handling its implications.”

“For his theory of war moods, Richardson chooses the following ‘states’, related to the attitudes of one population towards another: friendly, hostile and war-weary. He assumes that the psychological state of any given individual always involves a pair of these, an overt one and a covert one. Sometimes the two moods are the same, but more often they are different. The idea is a drastic schematisation of the Freudian theory of the ‘unconscious’. Overtly, a man may be aware only of friendly feelings towards the other, but underlying these friendly feelings may be a covert hostility of which even the carrier of the hostility may be unaware. Such situations are so widely known, in so many fields, that one cannot but admit the plausibility of this idea. We know that certain diseases are dormant until some set of conditions makes for their sudden emergence. We know also that many heritable traits are carried for several generations without being overtly observed until a certain combination of genes in some particular individuals give these traits overt (‘phenotypic’) expression. We are aware of the eruption of a volcano but not of the gradual building up of pressures that produce it. And so, Richardson supposes, there is always a pair of such moods in an individual. There is no reason why there could not be more, but as we said a commitment must be made to some definitive picture.”

These medical scenarios have negotiation analogies, and the scenarios that have been offered in this chapter are in concord with Rapoport’s (1997) and Richardson’s (1948) thesis.

The purpose behind this chapter is to distil these negotiation scenarios into a form that is of heuristic and practical utility. Spies (1987, p. 15) cautions that “it is not necessary to use complex and sophisticated models to design these scenarios”. He is of the view that that the use of complicated methodologies could indeed destroy the most important contribution that scenarios might offer towards the shared development of a desired future. This contribution, Spies (1987, p. 15) maintains, is that scenarios “could be an instrument for learning about the possible events that can shape the future”. His view is
that scenarios can contribute towards creating the necessary set of judgments and sensibilities to allow negotiators to make better decisions about how to create a shared and desired future amongst hitherto enemies. They can enhance the clarity of thinking about alternative choices. Spies (1987, pp. 19-20) points out that "it is unlikely if not impossible that a single line forecast of events could succeed in capturing the complexity (and uncertainties) of the unfolding long term future".

5.5 Conclusion

There was a multidimensional intersection and interaction between the macro- and micro-political negotiation scenarios. The macro- and micro-political negotiation scenarios intersected on the points of self-destruction, the two forms of stalemate (stasis and homeostasis) and the dangers of the dead closure. Negotiation scenarios are useful in assisting the negotiation counterparts to better understand where they are located in an ambiguous process, where mistakes and misjudgements can be fatal and create untold suffering. Negotiation scenarios assist one in understanding the dynamic pattern of negotiations as they oscillate from the one scenario to the other, according to their own metronome-like rhythms.

The clarity which derives from a clear consideration of scenarios allows one to better manage the fundamental ambiguity and inclination towards chaos of major transitions of this nature. Virtually all the respondents testified to the importance of creating a clear set of negotiation scenarios. A serious and systematic scenario analysis can therefore be understood as a dynamic process that needs to be continuously updated in order to better understand the negotiation status of a transaction. An accurate negotiation scenario analysis is the negotiation equivalent of an accurate geographical map.
Chapter 6: The Construct of the Enemy: Embracing of a Stereotyping and Simplifying Perceptual Reality

6.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the nature of the construct of an enemy through the lens of Kelly’s (1963) classical research on construct theory. Kelly’s (1963) research is linked to the modern negotiation concept of framing in terms of enemy images, as articulated by Lewicki, Saunders and Barry (2006). The constructs of the enemy and framing are then related to repertoires of conflictive behaviours, designated by Mitchell (1989) as being unified by the pursuit of “cognitive consistency”. Mitchell (1989) shows that there are a formidable array of powerful behavioural impediments to learning taking place amongst hitherto enemies. The key issue is that the human disposition to simplify conflicts because of the stress associated with understanding their complexity might even exacerbate them. It would appear as if though the common sensical logical principle that simplistic conceptualization, and actioning about about complex matters creates further complexity, and very rarely leads to constructive solutions.

The research will show that, time and time again, the South African negotiation counterparts who led the negotiated transition resisted the temptation to slip into simplistic modes of thinking about the other and the construct of the enemy. On the contrary, they embraced this complexity, chaos, and non-linearity in an endeavour to manage it and control the negotiated transition. (This notion of ‘Learning in situations of complexity, chaos and non-linearity’ is explored in depth in Chapter 7.)

The concept of a ‘construct’ is important in this research. It relates to the negotiation notion of ‘framing’ and what Randera (2004) referred to as the “construct of the enemy”. It is worthwhile dwelling on the concept of the construct of the enemy in order to clarify its relevance to the research. Kelly (1963:105) points out that “a construct is a way in which some things are construed as being alike and yet different from others”. It is a mental model framed by cognition, emotion and perception. The construct is both an individual and collective phenomenon. An investigation into the collective construct of
an enemy is beyond the scope of this research, because its concern is the lived experience of how individual negotiators and hitherto enemies learned from one another.

Nevertheless, it is noted that the collective construct of the enemy was dealt with magnificently by Canetti (1987) in his masterpiece study of *Crowds and Power*. Le Bon (1895; 1995) and Rude’s (1959; 1995) also provided some of the classic and original research into collective behaviour. These authors discovered typologies of crowd behaviour, that lead to the formation of mass movements. Coleman (2004) commented that “mass movements make history”. The Mass Democratic Movement (MMDM), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the United Democratic Front (UDF), the Afrikaner Weerstandsbevging (AWB) and the Freedom Front (FF) were all examples of mass movements that influenced the negotiated outcome. Some of these mass movements were in a state of bitter enmity with each other, and they had to learn to forgo the enemy constructs that are presented in this chapter and discover ways in which they could all live together.

Mitchell (1989) showed that the individual cognitions and perception of ‘the enemy’ – ‘the other’ – are often distorted. This is often purposeful, but there are also unconscious motives for this distortion of the image of the other. He asserted that the central reason for enemy images being framed and distorted is that conflict situations themselves generate so much stress and ambiguity that a repertoire of simplifying behaviours manifest themselves in individuals and amongst groups as a powerful human drive or search for ‘cognitive consistency’ amongst the enemies. Essentially, the pursuit of cognitive consistency is a maladaptive psychological defence mechanism that seeks to alleviate stress by reducing the ambiguity and complexity of a conflict into more manageable and defensible, but simplistic, stereotypes. Mitchell (1989) confirmed that these repertoires of simplifying behaviours had long been identified and acknowledged in psychological and behavioural science research.

These stereotypical constructs of the enemy are termed ‘frames’ in the negotiation literature, and they represent how the ethos of the enemy is branded by the other (Lewicki, Saunders & Barry, 2006). They are often an enemy construct, but frames can
also be positive as well. The concept of a frame is dynamic inasmuch as they can change from positive to negative, negative to positive and into different typologies of framing as well. The continuously dynamic nature of framing is referred as “re-framing” (Aggestam, 1999, p. 7). Complicating matters further is the fact that framing may have a rational or irrational basis or a partially rational and irrational basis. Indeed, framing usually consists of ever-changing perceptual ingredients of both rationality and irrationality, depending on the underlying imperatives that govern interaction between adversaries at any one time.

The fact that framing might be rational or irrational does not detract from its reality. People who perceive themselves as being in enmity often live and die by this framing process. Framing can be semi-permanent and might even endure across many generations. Framing consists of a set of attitudes that can be bequeathed from family to family, group to group, community to community, clan to clan, tribe to tribe, and state to state. Frames can be identified and specified in terms of psychographic and attitudinal research. (Market research, for example, seeks to understand consumer behaviour, and effectively researches the framing of perceptions around products and brands. Because it is a perceptual and cognitive phenomenon, it can also be changed by choice. When framing changes by choice, or by changed micro- and macro-political negotiation scenarios, it is referred to as re-framing.

6.2 Kelly’s notion of a construct

Kelly’s (1963) concept of a construct is analogous to but not identical to the concept of a negotiation frame articulated by, among others, Lewicki, Saunders and Barry (2006). Lewicki, Saunders and Barry (2006) outline a set of typologies of framing which can be regarded as complementary to Kelly’s construct theory, the outlines of which will be offered here.

The manner in which an enemy is defined is significantly a matter of perceptual choice, justified by contextual and political circumstances. This means that the definition may be changed with empathy and insight. It also may change with experiences of anger and betrayal. It might change if learning takes place amongst enemies. Mitchell (1989)
explored various psychological and sociological inclinations which result in fairly predictable but maladaptive behavioural and interaction rituals that manifest themselves during conflictive episodes. These will be noted for the purposes of comprehensiveness. These psychological and sociological inclinations can be understood as emanating from the lived experience of framing under situations of enmity.

Kelly’s (1963, p. 156-157) categorisation of constructs is set out in the paragraphs that follow.

6.2.1 An impermeable construct

“An impermeable construct is one that is based upon a specified context and will accept no additional elements”. The construct of ‘the enemy’ in cases of extreme religious and deep-rooted conflict is often highly impermeable. In South Africa, the concept of racial exclusivity and impermeability was stringent during the the mid-1980s, when the prevailing government ideology was one of racial partition. The abrogation of apartheid legislation during the latter part of Botha’s regime saw a gradual reduction in the notion of cultural impermeability towards a hesitant notion of cultural permeability.

6.2.2 A permeable construct

Kelly (1963, p. 156-157) asserted that “[a] permeable construct is one which implies additional elements”. By the mid-1990s, the concept of race had become much more permeable. Miscegenation was no longer a statutory offence. The framing of the concept of being South African inverted from impermeability and exclusivity to permeability and an exploration of inclusiveness. The concept of being South African from being immutably racially cast was suddenly in a constant process of re-definition. The transition from impermeable constructs to permeable constructs could be indicative that learning was gradually taking place amongst enemies.
6.2.3 *A pre-emptive construct*

Kelly (1963, p. 156-157) showed that “[a] pre-emptive construct is one which pre-empts the elements for membership in its own realm exclusively”. A country’s leadership cabals therefore frequently falls into the typology of a pre-emptive construct. Membership of a country’s intelligence service or diplomatic service is quite exclusive and usually falls into the typology of a pre-emptive construct. Membership is typically restricted and controlled for the benefit of a privileged few.

6.2.4 *A constellatory construct*

Kelly (1963, p. 156-157) showed that “[a] constellatory construct is one which fixes the realm of membership of the elements, for example stereotypes”. ‘Framing’ as depicted by Lewicki, Saunders and Barry (2006) therefore falls into the constellatory construct typology.

6.2.5 *A propositional construct*

Finally, Kelly (1963, p. 156-157) contended that “[a] propositional construct is one which does not disturb the other realm membership of its elements – for example, philosophical attitudes.” A propositional construct can be understood and indeed measured by the changing political psychographics of a nation. The philosophical attitudes and values within Afrikanerdom have changed dramatically since 1948. The National Party changed from being a political party that focused on the aspirations of semi-skilled and skilled artisans in the early 1950s to a party that sought the allegiance of middle-class professionals in the late 1980s (Steward, 2004).

6.3 *The concept of framing*

The concept of framing relates to the construct of the enemy. It is a basic definitional concept in negotiation theory. As was the case in the discussion of Kelly’s (1963) notion of a construct discussed above, so too will the notion of framing be contextualised to the South African transition.
According to Lewicki, Saunders and Barry (2006, p. 135), “a key issue in perception and negotiation is framing. A frame is the subjective mechanism through which people evaluate and make sense out of situations, leading them to pursue or avoid subsequent actions. Framing is about focusing, shaping, and organising the world around us. It is about making sense of a complex reality, and defining it in terms that are meaningful to us. Frames define a person, event, or process and separate it from the complex world around it. Frames impart meaning and significance to elements within the frame and set it apart from what is outside the frame.” (Lewicki, Saunders and Barry (2006) are reliant on Buechler (2000, p. 41) for this definition of framing.)

Lewicki, Saunders and Barry (2006, p. 137) offered the typologies of framing mentioned below. The need for comprehensiveness requires that the frame constructs should be briefly outlined.

6.3.1 Identity frames

Identity frames relate to how the conflicting parties designate who they are. “Identity – how the parties define ‘who they are’. Parties are members of a number of different social groups – gender, religion, ethnic origin, place of birth, current place of residence, and the like. These are only a few of the categories people use to define themselves and distinguish themselves from others.”

In South Africa, identity framing images during the violent upheavals from 1985 to 1994 included terms like comrade, activist, freedom fighter, proponent of the forces of law and order, peace monitor. Africanist, Afrikaner Nationalist, terrorist, verligte (enlightened Afrikaner), verkrampte (arch conservative Afrikaner), bittereinder (‘never say die’ hardliner), to name but a few. Within the Afrikaans leadership community there were also significant internal identity criteria. These frames were frequently used pejoratively by the hitherto enemies, but very rarely if ever by the negotiation leaders.

Eloff (2004) mentioned in his response that FW de Klerk was a member of the ‘Dopper’ branch of the Dutch Reformed Church. Membership of the Broederbond was another
elitist identity criterion within the Afrikaans community. Identity was described in terms of whether one was in the inner circles or peripheral circles of power. Eloff's (2004) observation is offered as an example of an identity frame.

6.3.2 Characterisation frames

A characterisation frame pertains to how the parties defined each other. “A characterisation frame can clearly be shaped by experience with the other party, by information about the other party’s reputation, or by the way the other party comes across early in the negotiation experience. In conflict, identify frames of self tend to be positive, and characterisation frames of others tend to be negative.” In South Africa, the identity and characterisation types of framing were highly significant during the entire negotiated transition. Within the ANC there were the exiles and the ‘insiles’. The term ‘insile’ was coined to refer to those who had remained inside South Africa during the struggle. There were sometimes divisions between exiles and insiles, and they represented different coalitions of influence within the ANC.

Ramaphosa (2005) remained in South Africa as an insile, and led the biggest strike in South African history when he was general secretary of the National Union of Mines (NUM). Maharaj (2004) was involved in the internal struggle and was also compelled to go into exile. The ‘struggle credentials’ were a highly significant indicator of political status. Those persons who had been incarcerated on Robben island with Mandela were afforded particular deference for their sacrifices, and they eventually comprised a struggle elite.

The characterisation frames included slogans like: the forces of repression, one bullet one settler, kill the boer, kill the farmer, the illegitimate apartheid regime, the communist onslaught, the total onslaught, the murderous terrorists, workerists, populists, and other similar hostile images. The characterisation frames involved aggressive verbal images and included phrases like the ‘apartheid racist junta-regime’ and the ‘communist necklacing terrorist bombers’.

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Other forms of framing offered by Lewicki, Saunders and Barry (2006, p. 137) are described below.

6.3.3 **Substantive frames**

"Substantive frames – what the conflict is about. Parties taking a substantive frame have a particular disposition about the key issue or concern of the conflict."

The construct of substantive frames included the agenda for the secret discussions between Mandela and the task group whilst he was incarcerated in prison. Barnard (2004), Louw (2004) and Van der Merwe (2004) all indicated that the purpose of these discussions was to allow the hitherto enemies the necessary time and space to understand each other’s substantive frames in the conflict.

6.3.4 **Outcome frames**

According to Lewicki, Saunders and Barry (2006, p. 137), “[o]utcome frames [refer to] a party’s predisposition to achieving a specific result or outcome from the negotiation. To the degree that a negotiator has a specific preferred outcome he or she wants to achieve, the dominant frame may be to focus all strategy, tactics and communication towards getting that outcome. Parties who have a strong outcome frame are more likely to engage primarily in distributive (win-lose, or lose-lose) negotiations than in other types of negotiations”.

The outcome frames changed significantly over the period of the negotiations. In the beginning the outcome frame for the ANC was to secure victory by the pursuit of the armed guerrilla struggle. This position moderated as confidence grew in the perception of the viability of a negotiated outcome. Likewise, the National Party’s outcome frame ‘softened’ as the negotiation process gathered credibility and momentum. The outcome frames changed dramatically during the course of the negotiations. The extreme outcome frames were often ominous and almost apocalyptic in their imagery. (There were the
insurrectionists who held the view that the regime could only be toppled by mass action and a revolutionary seizure of power.) Their outcome frame was the creation of a communist state.

At the opposite pole, within the State Security Council itself, there were some who held the view that the insurrectionists could only be checked by counter-revolutionary warfare. The later outcome frame was probably influenced by a search for political and military power, where a military junta was perceived by some to be a viable scenario. It was also ominous and apocalyptic. The researcher’s contention is that the extremist outcome frames gradually dissipated over the course of the negotiations and converted into aspiration frames. Aspiration frames, from a negotiation perspective, are more conducive to a win-win value-sharing and interactive analytical problem-solving approach.

Negotiators with strong outcome frames would be inclined to negotiate on a win-lose and distributive basis. Arguably negotiators with strong outcome frames would themselves be framed as ‘hawks’. On the other hand, negotiators with strong aspirational frames would be inclined towards integrative or win-win negotiations.

6.3.5 Aspiration frames

Lewicki, Saunders and Barry (2006) submit that an “aspiration frame [involves] a predisposition towards satisfying a broader set of interests or needs in negotiation. Rather than focusing on a specific outcome, the negotiator tries to ensure that his or her basic interests, needs and concerns are met. Parties who have a strong aspiration frame are more likely to be engaged primarily in integrative [win-win] negotiations than other types”. Aspiration frames are more consistent with interest-based negotiations, rather than with positionally based negotiations.

The research indicated that the internal negotiation climate between the negotiation counterparts was strongly aspirational. The negotiation modus operandi between the negotiation counterparts was generally integrative in its nature. A significant indicator of
this integrative negotiation approach was the interesting credos that were developed amongst the negotiator counterparts to guide their association with one another.

6.3.6 Process frames

Lastly, Lewicki, Saunders and Barry (2006) type-cast the “process frame [as relating to] how the parties will go about resolving their dispute. Negotiators who have a strong process frame are less likely than others to be concerned about the specific negotiation issues but more concerned about how the deliberations proceed or how the dispute should be managed. When the major concerns are largely procedural rather than substantive, frames will be strong.”

6.4 Conflictive behaviour as anti-learning behaviour

This section of the thesis will be devoted to a theoretical discussion on the nature of learning and anti-learning behaviour in the context of deep-rooted conflict. These theories will be briefly set out in order to provide an informed conceptual framework to the primary research finding on how the respondents personally interpreted learning amongst hitherto enemies as having transpired. Their lived learning experience should be the arbiter on the veracity of the theoretical discussion.

Deep-rooted conflicts between individuals, groups, coalitions and nations are characterised by very high levels of personal and community stress. This stress, Mitchell (1989) suggested, engenders attitudes and neurotic ‘behavioural sets’ that are diametrically opposed to learning amongst enemies taking place. This is but one reason that conflict can be so entrapping. The most important stress reducing behavioural set, according to Mitchell (1989), is the search for cognitive consistency. This search for cognitive consistency, instead of reducing stress, ultimately increases it because of its anti-learning behavioural ramifications. The pursuit of cognitive consistency revolves around the natural human defensive attempt to make sense out of complex and ambiguous conflictive situations.
Mitchell (1989) identified a series of behavioural theories that showed that there are powerful inclinations that drive humans to simplify complex and ambiguous conflictive problems. Mitchell (1989) presented a cogent depiction of this repertoire of neurotic conflictive behaviours. These findings are encapsulated in a wide body of empirical psychological and sociological research. They involve powerful internal psychological behavioural inclinations for the individual who is involved in a conflict. They also represent a complex set of collective or group inclinations, for the crowd, the mass movement, the coalition and the political party. They frequently have ‘anti-learning’, destructive and conflictive outcomes. These powerful, naturally compelling, and destructive repertoires of behaviours need to be transcended and minimised if learning amongst hitherto enemies is to take place.

6.5 Mitchell's view on the pursuit of cognitive consistency

Mitchell (1989) suggested that deep-seated psychological and sociological processes are set into motion during conflictive situations, which are calculated to minimise and manage the resultant excessive degrees of personal and collective stress. This aspect of his research encapsulated how framing between enemies manifests itself as a lived experience of distorted perceptions. Mitchell (1989) asserted that humans often attempt to mitigate the risks, and sometimes mortal insecurity, that frequently accompanies any conflict situation by the pursuit of cognitive consistency.

Mitchell (1989, p. 77) introduced his case on the centrality of cognitive consistency to an understanding of conflict situations with the observation that “[t]he most basic, protective process for helping an individual involved in a conflict to reduce the level of environmentally imposed stress to an acceptable level involves reducing the complexity and contrariness of incoming information about the conflict, thus ensuring that the conflictual environment presents a consistent and orderly pattern to the receiver”.

Mitchell (1989, p. 81) observes that “[c]omplex situations are over-simplified judgments made upon caricatures of the opposing party, its acts and estimated intentions. Information that might complicate this simple, comfortable picture is ignored, rejected or
re-interpreted so that it does not damage existing beliefs”. Mitchell (1989) presented a complex repertoire of behaviour typologies, all aimed at achieving cognitive consistency, that are manifested by individuals whilst immersed in conflict. The common denominator with all of these behaviours is that they specifically suppress and distort the information interchange between enemies. Mitchell (1989, p. 80) showed how “[i]ndividual abilities to ignore non-conforming information on receipt, especially while in circumstances of stressful conflict, do not exhaust the participants’ capacity for self-delusion”.

Mitchell (1989, p. 80-81) maintained that the psychological processes associated with developing cognitive consistency included “[s]elective perception, selective recall, repression, suppression, Osgood’s notion of psychologic ‘evaluating polarity’, bolstering, separation, stereotyping, the lessening of participants’ ability to offer empathy, selective inattention, an increased tendency to universalise one’s own frame of reference, a likelihood of the development of tunnel vision, denial, a time-foreshortening factor, and an increased probability of perceived polarisation of the environment within which the conflict occurs, to mention but a few”.

There is a considerable body of literature and research that is available on these anti-learning syndromes. Mitchell (1989, p. 79) revealed that “these processes assist the adversaries in developing a consistent image of the environment. Individuals tend to seek out confirmatory information for reassurance, avoiding cognitive dissonance, or achieving cognitive consistency and thus minimising stress by efforts to achieve ‘balance’ in his perceptions and evaluations of the environment.” Mitchell (1989, p. 79) explicated that “[t]he key process by which individuals in conflicts achieve acceptable levels of psychological stress is by ignoring or by rejecting information about the environment which does not fit in with existing beliefs, and hence is disturbing. Different individuals possess a greater or lesser propensity to exclude non-conforming features of their environment or to re-interpret incoming information, so that it is easy to maintain intact their ‘image’ of the world.”

Mitchell (1989, p. 79) observed that “selective perception is a commonplace of psychology, and is found across political science, international relations, and conflict
research. Boulding (1956) and Holsti (1967) contended that cognitive consistency was an innate psychological process aimed at simplifying the understanding of what is usually a very complex matter. Because the pursuit of cognitive consistency is replicated by as many individuals as are involved in a conflict, it is not only a psychological phenomenon. It is also a collective or sociological phenomenon as well."

These conflictive psychological and sociological processes are by their very nature deeply opposed to learning amongst enemies taking place. This is one of the core reasons for so many conflicts being of such a protracted duration. The starting point in a conflict situation would therefore often typically be the simplification and distortion of truth and reality ... the obviation of learning. The drive to achieve consistency and an orderly pattern is greater than the drive for truth. This gives substance to the saying that 'in war, truth is the first casualty'.

Mitchell (1989, p. 80) characterised selective recall by way of the following synopsis: "It is equally common for individuals in conflict to indulge in selective recall and distort recollections of past events to fit in with current images of the conflict or adversary. Repression is the unconscious process by which non-conforming information that usually redounds to one's own party's discredit, or contradicts the simple, black and white cognitive structure developed to deal with a complex situation, is not remembered. At a more general level, it is a process helping an individual to exclude disturbing thoughts, feelings or events from the level of consciousness. A similar process, but one which occurs at the conscious level, and with the knowledge and intention of the individual concerned, is suppression. Suppression involves a conscious decision not to think about a disturbing matter." Mitchell (1989, pp. 80-81) showed that "[i]n a conflict situation, both suppression and repression can remove from immediate awareness, events; showing one's party in a bad light, or acting cruelly or unjustly, or behaving against its stated principles, or acting dishonestly or in bad faith. Success in repressing such information will, of course, make it all the more difficult for the members of one party to understand the way they are regarded by their opponents, and thus confirm the latter's essential malevolence. Underlying all these processes that select only the aspects of reality that
conform to already firmly held beliefs is the tendency to over-simplify a complex and contradictory reality. Unacceptable levels of psychological stress – brought about by ambiguity and uncertainty – are avoided by this tendency to employ overly simple categories when evaluating one's environment, or to force events, people and motivations into relatively few and grossly over-simplified cognitive categories. One way of labelling this process is to use the term 'black and white thinking', or to adopt Charles Osgood's concept of *psychologic* (Osgood, 1962).”

Mitchell (1989, p. 81) espoused that, “in essence, all of these terms stand for the process of taking the line of least resistance when confronted with contradictory, ‘cognitively inconsistent’ information, and avoiding stress by retaining a simple cognitive structure, based upon a few categories. According to Osgood, *psychologic* starts from an individual’s tendency to perceive a simple, black-and-white world, and to indulge in ‘evaluating polarity’ by constantly employing only two contrasting categories along simple dimensions. If his thesis is correct it would imply that each individual has a limited number of negotiation behavioural repertoires that are available. For example, as ‘our’ party is known to be good, fair and just, it follows that our enemy must be bad, unfair and greedy. This process of simple categorisation and evaluation operates on all incoming information in any intense conflict, affecting interpretation of the information. The process helps to set up a double standard of morality in evaluating one’s own (or one’s party’s) activities and those of the enemy, as well as excusing inexcusable actions: ‘we know that our own actions are motivated by good intentions and just objectives, hence theirs must be motivated by the exact opposite’. Osgood refers to such simplifying processes as being founded upon ‘psychologic’ because they reveal a curious consistency, but an emotional rather than a rational one. All positively evaluated acts and qualities are connected, as are all those that are negatively evaluated. However, the connecting link is ‘who acts or who possesses the quality?’ Apart from general processes of selective inattention and recall, and the operations of psychologic, psychologists have drawn attention to a number of other more limited processes that commonly operate in any conflict. They add complexity to the basic proposition that favourable information