the language of psychological science”. The researcher carried out this process on each interview. Lastly, Giorgi (1985, p. 83) advocates that “the researcher synthesizes and integrates the insights achieved into a consistent description of the structure of learning”. The researcher adhered to this specification. In short, Giorgi’s five guidelines were viewed as wise counsel and were abided by.

The reader will see demonstrations of how this was done in practice in Chapters 3, 4, 7, 9, 10 and 11, which all triangulated the primary research with relevant empirical literature in pursuit of the specific research objectives.

The first step in the phenomenological method was the so-called phenomenon of reduction, or ‘epoch’. Here, the mental acts that took place during the course of the negotiations as described by the respondents during the interviews were presented by the researcher in a manner that was free of theories and presuppositions. This pertained specifically to the primary data that emerged from the interviews with the respondents. The respondents related how they perceived that they had learned from hitherto enemies, with no guidance or influence from the researcher. This might have initially been stressful for the respondents, because they naturally would expect ‘structure’ from the researcher, only to discover during the course of the interview that they had to make that structure themselves. Once the respondents had created their own structure, they quickly became comfortable with it.

The second step involved the eidetic reduction, which is an important theory-building aspect of the phenomenological method. Here, the researcher reflected on a particular act or sets of actions that occurred during the negotiations. This laid the basis for the theory-creation chapters that are offered in this thesis.

The phenomenological essence of the data is termed its ‘eidos’, hence the terminology ‘eidetic reduction’. The process of eidetic reduction could not be rushed. Sometimes the researcher found that he was uncreative and ineffective, and then he had to wait for several days until he was able to regain his energy. This is because the eidetic reduction is a creative endeavour. The eidetic reduction had to follow its own pace. This involved a
careful assessment of each single word and sentence in each response, in the first instance.

As the researcher’s sample gradually accumulated, he would slowly discover that there were corroborations and convergences between the insight and knowledge that arose from the various interviews. The insight was gleaned from the respondents and the knowledge was created by the researcher using the process of eidetic phenomenological reduction. These convergences were all carefully noted. The first focus of the eidetic reduction was to conduct a vertical or *intra*-interviewee analysis of content of each respondent’s feedback. This was done with all of the 17 interviews. The researcher regarded this as a ‘vertical process’ of analysis, as he had to penetrate longitudinally into the respondents’ separate worlds. The second eidetic reduction was conducted between respondents. This was an *inter-interview* assessment. The researcher defined this for himself as the ‘horizontal process’ because it involved a cross-interview eidetic reduction. The latter exercise was intensely energy consuming and took from 1 November 2005 until 31 January 2006. It involved creating a disciplined understanding for himself of how all the respondents interrelated with one another.

It was only thereafter that the researcher conducted a focused process of secondary research with respect to the literature. Extensive triangulation between the primary and the secondary literature research is undertaken in Chapters 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12.

The researcher had obviously read very widely on the negotiated transition over the years, but it was only once the phenomenological reductions had been conducted that he could harness this literature and focus it upon the primary research. In other words, he purposefully held this knowledge about the literature in abeyance during this phase as it could intrude upon him meeting the research with an open mind. The data had to speak for itself.

Eidetic reduction can be understood as the qualitative equivalent to the quantitative technique of factor analysis. Eidetic reduction was used in this research in order to reveal
the qualitative richness of the data so that a substantive contribution to knowledge could be offered.

3.1.1 Reflections on the interrelationships between the insight offered by the various respondents who made up the research sample

The phenomenological method lays great emphasis on the importance of the primordial data that is collected during the interviews with the expert respondents on their lived experience. In this discussion about the research sample, each respondent from the study sample will be contextualized with each other. Situating the respondents in terms of their relationship insight with each other involved the researcher conducting an intensive longitudinal and horizontal phenomenological reduction of each interview and contextualising the contents of each response in the context of all the other interviews, as previously explained. Husserl (1931) refers to this exercise as being necessary in order to achieve ‘inter-subjective validity’ between the respondents. The framework for achieving inter-subjective validity was derived from two research interventions. Each interview was subjected to a lengthy longitudinal process of phenomenological reduction on its own, as a distinct and separate entity, and a process of horizontal integration.

3.2 Hermeneutics

The research required the interpretation of lived experience and the interpretation of the personal meaning that the respondents imputed to this lived experience. This meaning is encapsulated in the interviews with the respondents and the written transcriptions of these interviews.

The central question of the phenomenological method is ‘How is this meaning to be interpreted’? Hermeneutics is the art and science of the interpretation of meaning. The response to that central question is by “pursuing the process of hermeneutic understanding of the texts of the interviews with the 17 respondents”. The matter of hermeneutics is intricate and related to the theory of the interpretation of meaning that can be imputed or derived from the interviews.
The researcher’s intention with respect to the respondents’ interviews was to immerse himself entirely in the respondents’ worldviews and to try to see the world through their eyes. This immersion required addressing the respondents’ utterances with reverence and respect. The interviewees’ views needed to be taken completely seriously. The intention was to understand the respondents and how they experienced learning amongst hitherto enemies having occurred. The transition from ignorance about how the learning between hitherto enemies had occurred to insight and knowledge about how this learning amongst hitherto enemies had transpired was a ‘lived experience’, and the researcher gleaned their texts with great care in an endeavour to interpret their lived experience.

Van Manen (1990, pp. 179-180) asserts that “hermeneutics is the theory and practice of interpretation. The word derives from the Greek god Hermes, whose task it was to communicate messages from Zeus, and other gods, to ordinary mortals. Hermeneutics is necessary when there is a possibility of misunderstanding”.

Dilthey’s (1985) hermeneutic formula was the respondents’ lived experience. For Dilthey (1985) the starting point and focus of human science expression was the interview text, which he regarded as the artefact as objectification of lived experience and understanding. For Dilthey (1985), hermeneutic understanding is not a cognitive act; it is the moment when life understands itself. It is a creative moment. The researcher took Dilthey’s (1985) concerns seriously and was conscious of the challenge of compliance with this hermeneutic formulaic.

Heidegger (1962), according to Van Manen (1990, pp. 179-180), attempted to create a “more radically de-psychologised notion of understanding. Heidegger’s (1962) formulaic was not committed to re-experiencing another’s experience, but rather the power to grasp one’s own possibilities for being in the world in creative ways. To interpret a text is to come to understand the possibilities of being revealed in the text. Heidegger’s hermeneutics have been described as interpretative phenomenology”.

In essence the phenomenological reduction process in this research was hermeneutically interpretive and theory creating as well.
Van Manen (1990, pp. 179-180) contends that, “in interpreting a text, we cannot separate ourselves from the meaning of a text. The reader belongs to the text that he or she is reading. Understanding is always an interpretation, and an interpretation is always specific, an application”. Van Manen (1990, pp. 179-180) observes that “[f]or Gadamer the problem of understanding involves interpretative dialogue, which includes taking up the tradition in which one finds oneself. Texts that come to us from different traditions or conversational relations may read as possible answers to questions. To conduct a conversation, says Gadamer, means to allow oneself to be animated by the question or notion to which partners in the conversational relationship are directed”.

Without any further ado, the phenomenological reduction of respondents’ interviews will be offered, in order to clarify the interrelationships between the respondents.

3.2.1 Chester Crocker

Crocker was intensely involved in the phases of the independence of Namibia and military withdrawal from Angola. These regional settlements can be regarded as the significant ’scene setter’ for the South African negotiations. Learning amongst enemies took place in the context of the regional wars and conflicts.

A core learning point is that the key leadership elements in the South African military and intelligence services started coming to the view that a negotiated option was the only meaningful scenario in Angola, Mozambique and Namibia. The change of conversation amongst themselves was a more important initial signifier of learning than the change of conversation with respect to others.

Crocker proved through the policy of constructive engagement (that he had conceived of) that a negotiated solution to these regional conflicts was possible. It was a very ambitious policy and it actually worked despite the criticism that accompanied it. The SADF withdrew from Angola, Namibia was granted independence and the Mozambican war started edging towards peace.
For Crocker, there were two possibilities for South Africa in 1985: War could be displaced into South Africa “à la Angola”, or the South Africans could design their own tailor-made negotiation solutions for their internal constitutional settlement.

The Namibian negotiations in which Neil van Heerden was so deeply involved represented a ‘kind of model’ for South Africa. The military and intelligence establishments in South Africa were, prior to Crocker’s intervention, intent on following the ‘Hawk military option’. The Hawks were set on achieving an unequivocal military victory in Namibia and Angola and scorned a negotiated alternative. In fact, the Hawk military option was pursued from 1970 to 1986 with escalating intensity. In 1986, South Africa possessed six nuclear bombs, and had a highly advanced chemical and biological warfare capability. The industrial military establishment was very powerful.

During the period from 1970 to 1986 a negotiation option was stigmatised by the industrial military establishment as weakness and tantamount to capitulation.

Crocker and Van Heerden displayed a mutual respect for each other during the course of their respective interviews. They both recognised the importance of focused conversations within the military establishment itself as a potential contributor to a changed and more positive set of negotiation scenarios in South Africa. One could assert that the negotiated solution arose in its initial stages from the changed conversations within the military and security establishments.

Van Heerden revealed how he fought against the stigma that many members of the military leadership placed on conversations about negotiated solutions in South Africa. It took powerful military leaders, like General Jannie Geldenhuyse, and leadership within the Department of Foreign Affairs itself, like that offered by Neil van Heerden, to change the internal conversation around to a discussion about the viability of a negotiated option. Crocker related an apocryphal story about General Pieter van der Westhuizen saying with pique and indignation that “Mozambique is mine”. This ludicrous vanity and delusional thinking was ‘a type of mental model’ that existed within the SADF at that time and had
to be changed. This mental model complied with the pathological defective decision making syndrome of group think (Janis, 1971).

For Crocker, perhaps the most fundamental shift that occurred during the regional settlement was a shift in the prevailing mental models of the military and security leadership. In other words, there was a very important process of internal dialogue and discussion within the military which, although not apparent to many observers, indicated a switch to the negotiated option. The independence of Namibia and the South African military withdrawal from Angola made it clear that negotiation was on the ascendancy and was a more powerful paradigm than war. The importance of this observation was simply that this change in policy ultimately prevailed. Eventually a decisive balance within the military and intelligence establishments in South Africa largely supported the constitutional negotiations. Without that support for the constitutional negotiations from the military and security establishments they would not have succeeded. Those in the military and security establishments who dissented from pursuing a negotiated solution, although very powerful, eventually were eclipsed by those who sought a negotiated option. This switch in power dynamics within the armed forces was very complicated. Ultimately, military leadership had a choice of whether to support Van der Westhuizen and persons with similar inclinations towards the winning of a personal fiefdom or to support a negotiated settlement.

In South Africa during its time of troubles it was clear that the choice of a military career could also bring with it personal financial rewards. A military career can also become a personal commercial venture. Since time immemorial the military has provided soldiers who nurture personal commercial ambitions with ample opportunities to create their own wealth and fiefdoms, often, under the legitimating guise of patriotism. Angola, Namibia, Mozambique and, indeed, the regional conflicts were for many white South Africans fairly removed from their day-to-day existence, excepting when a member of the family or friend came home from the war on the border in a body bag. The true seriousness of the situation was not fully appreciated by many white South Africans. In the first instance, the military interventions in the region created a militaristic and siege mentality
and mindset within South Africa. Learning amongst enemies required making
‘negotiation space’ out of seemingly imperceptible and small events. The geopolitical
changes, particularly as they pertained to the end of the Cold War, were vast and required
the abandonment and casting out of former obsolete leaders.

Crocker undoubtedly set standards of strategic negotiation excellence, which were
emulated in the South African context. His contribution is that of a ‘scene setter’. He saw
that there was space for positive movement in a situation that was presenting as a
deadlocked stalemate. He identified the importance of understanding negotiation
scenarios as being an important theme for understanding how learning amongst enemies
occurred. Chapter 5, which is devoted to exploring negotiation scenarios, was inspired by
this logic.

3.2.2  Neil van Heerden

Neil van Heerden, like Dave Steward, was a career diplomat. He played a crucial role in
the independence of Namibia and in the withdrawal of the South African Defence Force
from Angola. He went on to play a role in CODESA itself. This role in CODESA was
less conspicuous than that associated with negotiating the independence of Namibia and
the SADF military withdrawal from Angola. He was part of FW de Klerk’s
‘Kombuiskabinet’ (‘Kitchen Cabinet’) that met every Saturday and discussed the
emerging themes during the national transition. The ‘Kitchen Cabinet’ was a type of
think-tank.

He was involved in internal discussions within the military establishment, where he
posed negotiation as an alternative scenario to war. This proposal was not well received
and was, indeed, categorically rejected in 1985 by the military establishment. Barnard
and Louw both refer to a “rampant military establishment”. Van Heerden was deployed
to the same negotiation sub-committee as Bridget Mabandla during CODESA. The
unusual aspect of his response is that, in contrast to many experts who ignore the ethical
and relationship aspect of international affairs, Van Heerden regarded grounded values,
humanity and ethics as crucial to negotiation effectiveness. These are his guiding values.
His viewpoint is that it is crucial to discover the humanity in the other and that strategy is best founded on excellent interpersonal relationships. This idea served as inspiration for Chapter 9, which is about learning amongst enemies as an ethic of reconciliation.

Maharaj reflected about Mandela’s empathy for ‘the other’ in his response. Randera, Villa-Vicencio, Esterhuysse, Van der Merwe, Meyer, Ramaphosa and Tutu also all independently emphasised the centrality of empathy for the other. This discovery of the richness of ‘the other’ was a vital aspect and common thread of how enemies learned from one another.

When Van Heerden reflected on his role in the Angolan military withdrawal he realised that each second that the negotiations continued was a double hell for the Angolans. The continuation of the negotiations meant that war continued. It was their men who were dying every minute of each day the war endured. Van Heerden realised too that that war in Angola could easily be transferred to South Africa and that that scenario had to be avoided.

He had empathy for the Cubans. Because of their African roots, they also had empathy for him and the South Africans. The same applied to the Russians. There were Afrikaners, who, like Afrikaners, are a peasant people. There was a natural chemistry that could easily emerge between the Russians and Afrikaners. The Americans sometimes struggled to understand the natural chemistry that existed between the Russians and Afrikaners, and Cubans and Afrikaners, and were somewhat bewildered by it.

General Jannie Geldenhuyse played a key role in coordinating South Africa’s interrelationships between the Russians, Cubans, Angolans and Americans. He set a benchmark of professionalism and humanity in these negotiations, which was appreciated by his negotiation counterparts. Geldenhuyse was professional in combat and did not want his men to die in pursuit of a ‘no-win’ war. Again we have the mantra “the war in Angola was a worst case scenario which could at that stage have been displaced into South Africa”. This also inspired Chapter 5, which explores negotiation scenarios.
Indeed, the need to prevent the Angolan war from spreading into South Africa was a recurrent excuse that the gross perpetrators of human rights abuse offered to the Commissioners on the TRC for their excesses. The gross perpetrators of human rights abuse offered a standard defence when they testified before the TRC. They claimed that they ‘understood’ from their South African political masters that the external war in Angolan had indeed been displaced into South Africa, and that therefore ‘no rules applied’ in how it might be counteracted and repulsed. (This subject is explored in Chapter 8, which is devoted to a consideration of the method and methodology used by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and its focus on learning and reconciliation amongst hitherto enemies.)

The coming to an end of the hostilities in Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique put an end to South Africa’s role in its policy of destabilising the Southern African region as a diversion from the imperative to derive a political solution in South Africa itself. The policy of constructive engagement that was conceived of by Crocker had an unintended consequence. It resulted in the South Africans realising that they needed to cultivate their own negotiation ability to achieve an internal settlement in South Africa from within. Barnard (2004) consciously reflected about this subject, which is explored in Chapter 4 on the falsification thesis.

Other matters energised this realisation, including the deterioration in South Africa’s internal security and PW Botha’s undertaking, offered in 1987, to release Mandela if he relinquished violence. This placed PW Botha into a trap, the implications of which are clarified by Van der Merwe later on in this research. Learning took place as a result of this fundamentally important trap.

Van Heerden made friends with a Cuban general who was killed, and he felt a partial implication in this death, a deep and profound sadness. Van Heerden, like Steward and Eloff, went through a tough period of initiation but this, for Van Heerden, was as South Africa’s ambassador to Bonn in West Germany. He gives testimony to what he experienced of being a pariah whilst being South Africa’s ambassador. Van Heerden (2003) posed this rhetorical question: “How can you defend bulldozers destroying homes
and brutal forced removals?” It was his duty to defend these indefensible matters as best he could and it made him physically very ill.

He speaks of the conflicts that he had with the military when he proposed a negotiated solution in Angola and Namibia in 1986. Van Heerden’s (1983) view was that the Americans were the most appropriate to broker the Namibian independence against what he termed as “the nemesis of a French or German involvement”, but that they were often very culturally naïve. “We sometimes bowled them over with our approach.” Whilst foreign intervention and third party involvement was acceptable in the conflicts in Angola and Namibia, it was not acceptable in South Africa because that conflict was regarded as domestic. This is a point also made by Barnard, Ramaphosa, Louw, Maharaj, Meyer, Van der Merwe and too an extent Tutu.

3.2.3 **Dave Steward**

Steward made the point that ad hoc ‘incrementalism’ could not work in a situation which was as degenerative and serious as that which confronted FW de Klerk when he assumed the Presidency in late 1989. This is linked to the negotiator’s ability to deal with complexity. The ability to learn from complexity inspired Chapter 7, which is a theory-creation chapter.

The essential choice was to decide when to use a ‘big bang’ approach and when to use ‘incrementalism’. Van der Merwe, most interestingly, shows that de Klerk’s famous speech of 2 February 1990 was known and discussed within the key ministries quite a long time prior to its presentation. It was indeed a mandated speech, and the key ministries supported it fully. Steward (2004) shows that the market research about the outcome of the first democratic election had already been accurately forecasted as far back as 1986. Steward, for example, presented the cabinet with research in 1986 which accurately predicated the outcome of the first democratic election in 1994 within minor percentage points. Negotiations of this type need to be properly prepared, and one aspect of that is to research the psychographics of the country scientifically. This Steward did.
Professional market research could be an accurate indicator of the prognosis for war and peace. In the case of the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians, for example, the conflict might indeed counter-intuitively revolve around the ‘enemies’” essential similarities, rather than reside in their differences. Market research could clarify this. Culture and negotiating therefore become important areas of either prohibiting or enhancing learning. Steward asserted that the psychographics of the Afrikaners had changed radically since 1948 and that South Africa was a new country. They were another people. This theme is explored in Chapter 11, which considers Cartesian logic and the argument idiom *Cogito ergo sum* versus the restorative ethos of *ubuntu*, *Estis ergo sum* – ‘I think, therefore I am’ versus ‘Because you are, I am’. The latter ethos is African.

Ultimately the way that this complex perceptual notion of ‘the other’ was dissolved down was in the credos that were developed between the negotiation counterparts and hitherto enemies. This was always done subtly and quietly in an almost unspoken way.

The basis for breaking the framing and stereotypes of the other was respect, knowledge and empathy, combined with carefully planned structures for national discourse. Chapter 6 explores the construct of the enemy and the need to counteract the inclination to embrace a stereotyping and simplifying perceptual reality if learning amongst hitherto enemies is to occur.

Steward (2004) contended that “[y]ou really do learn when you are threatened”. Threat and fear are important ‘teachers’, and if linked to wisely assessed scenario analysis can lead to conversations that open up new opportunities. Chapter 7 reflects on how learning takes place in situation of complexity, chaos and non-linearity.

Steward’s view was that South Africans only came to believe that they needed to negotiate once their core beliefs and indeed their very existence was violently threatened. Steward has unique insider knowledge about the entire negotiation process, from before the Namibian negotiations, because of his involvement as South Africa’s ambassador to the United Nations in New York. He speaks eloquently about the power of irrationality.
His actually quantified the damage caused by PW Botha’s infamous Rubicon speech. The Rubicon speech, according to Steward (2004), was arguably the biggest political public relations disaster in recent history. It was so embarrassing and such a fiasco that it galvanised the moderate Afrikaner leadership into creative dissent. The irrationality of this speech caused the currency to collapse and the political crisis and isolation of South Africa to escalate. The power of this irrationality was that no international chastising could have invoked the positive changes within the Afrikaner community without this sense of despair that the Rubicon speech released. It was clear something had to be done.

It opened up the desperate need for the hitherto enemies to talk to one another and create trust. This matter is investigated in Chapter 10, which is entitled “Learning amongst enemies as a search for meaning: the danger and necessity of developing trust in the other”.

Steward was involved in the context-setting process, together with Van Heerden, and assisted in negotiating the Namibian settlement. He explored the difficult matter of getting the negotiations started and making the move. His starting point for learning amongst enemies taking place was to work out how to overcome this inertia.

Steward assessed the leadership role of FW de Klerk and compared this against the leadership of PW Botha. This was encapsulated in Steward’s (2004) theory about the need for a big bang approach versus the sense of an imperative for incremental change. De Klerk felt that learning amongst enemies would only take place if the entire South African society were shocked and caught off guard by the decisiveness of totally courageous leadership. The Afrikaans community understand and respected courage. You get started and enemies learn from one another when they are shocked and feel that they have no choice. This will eventually cause them to reflect on the rules of engagement guiding their interaction with each other and the discovery of their intersecting interests and positions, which are considered in Chapter 12.

Botha felt that the change had to be carefully managed. Barnard’s view is that it was essential (with the knowledge of hindsight) that these two leaders succeeded one another. Botha did crucial ground work which made the transition possible, whilst De Klerk
ignited the transition. The leaders could not have co-existed. But because they appeared on the South African stage in succession they were able to perform complimentary roles. Their sequence of arrival and departure on the South African stage allowed hitherto enemies to learn from one another.

3.2.4 Neil Barnard

For Barnard (2004) there were times when the hitherto enemies had a greater or lesser control over the negotiation process. The degree of control over the transition created its own sets of tensions, within the parties and between the parties. This degree of control fluctuated for all parties in a metronome-like pattern. These patterns of control and lack of control over the negotiations need to be accepted if learning amongst enemies is to occur.

For the ANC, their degree of control at the beginning of the negotiations was very low. By the end it was very high. On the other hand, the National Party began the negotiations with a high degree of power and control. This converted into a very low degree of control and power by the end of the negotiations.

Barnard (2004) began his commentary by noting that there was a time when PW Botha, although in power and in control of the state apparatus, was in reality losing control of power and the state apparatus. PW Botha clung to the notion of partition. This disempowered him. He created the Tri-cameral Parliament that excluded blacks from the constitutional decision-making process. It had three chambers, one for whites, one for coloureds and one for Asians. The exclusion of blacks set the tone for massive internal conflict and gave rise to the United Democratic Front, the Mass Democratic Movement, and the policies of ungovernability and rolling mass action. The exclusion of blacks from the political process created the pre-conditions for their enfranchisement. The UDF became the nemesis of the tri-cameral system and indeed of white supremacy.

The various states of emergency indicated the shift in power away from the National Party. This distilled into two scenarios, whether to engage in war or to negotiate. The
middle ground had been destroyed, and there was no trust in compromise. The regional conflicts could easily be exported and imported to South Africa.

It was in this context that Barnard was delegated by PW Botha to be involved in the secret prison conversations with Nelson Mandela. These secret conversations were significant in setting out the subsequent pattern of negotiations.

3.2.4.1 Barnard’s depiction of the phases of conversation and negotiation

The first phase of the conversations can be described as information gathering. This occurred in the secret prison conversations with Mandela. The second phase was trust building. This also occurred in the prison conversations with Mandela, and there are clear indications of the growth of transference and counter-transference relationships in these prison conversations. The third phase involved an exploration of opportunities and options. This likewise occurred in the prison conversations but was also transferred into the next phase. Crucially, these conversations involved preparing Mandela for his release from prison, which also necessitated preparing him for the presidency of South Africa.

The fourth phase was the transferral of the private prison conversations to a larger audience of players, namely the secret conversations with the ANC in exile. These conversations took place in Switzerland. The fifth phase was to arrange the clandestine return of the exiles. This occurred in South Africa and was led by the NIS, together with certain leaders in the security establishment. The NIS was South Africa’s key secret service agency. The sixth phase revolved around the public meetings at Groote Schuur, the DF Malan Accord and the Pretoria Minute. This led directly to the multi-party talks and the formation of CODESA. Contrary to what might be expected, the multiparty talks at CODESA focused in the first instance on achieving a political settlement, prior to seeking the more obvious constitutional settlement.

One might think that the negotiated settlement took place in the wrong sequence, but this was right for South Africa. There were many technical matters that should be considered in terms of how these conversations were structured. The formation of the negotiation
‘channels’ was an important practical adaptation of negotiation method. It was actually in the channels that the real negotiations took place. The public display of CODESA can be seen as the public face of negotiations. But CODESA was not where the ‘real’ negotiations took place. The real negotiations took place in the private channel bi-laterals. There had to be a public face of the negotiations. The appropriate balance with respect to the public and private face of the negotiation interchange was subtly nuanced. The hitherto enemies understood these nuances and deliberately decided upon how to address them. The credos that were developed between the negotiators were helpful. The hitherto enemies agreed that no problem was unsolvable and that they would pitch in together for the long haul. It would be a tough ride.

The matter of managing the chaos in the socio-political environment (outside of the deliberations of CODESA) demanded the devotion of enormous amounts of energy, and could never be neglected or ignored for a minute.

Barnard was a close advisor to both President PW Botha, and FW de Klerk. The NIS was regarded with fear and trepidation by the ANC. It had a formidable reputation, having been born from the Bureau of State Security (BOSS). This fearsome reputation provided an important camouflage for the NIS. It allowed it to be an initiator of national change, whilst containing the white right wing, who thought that the NIS’s reputation was framed around protection of the minority regime. The NIS were able to make the necessary arrangements and fund safe-houses for the exile leadership of the ANC to return to South Africa. At the same time the left wing were fearful of the NIS, as it was perceptually equated with the legislation on internal security, and detention without trial. These two diametrically opposed poles opened up the space for flexibility, profound change and hitherto enemies to learn from one another.

Barnard was strategic in his thinking. Whilst never diminishing the importance of the human side of the negotiations and the conversation about understanding the other, he also suggested key negotiation principles that needed to be adhered to in order to make the negotiations successful. Barnard was a member of the inner sanctum of power. He experienced, at first hand, the extent and limitations of state power.
The NIS proved to be a key organisation in the success of South Africa’s transition to democracy. This could hardly have been anticipated by the public at large at the time of the transition. Very few people would have understood the centrality of the NIS to the process of achieving democracy. It is sometimes dangerous not to see the potential in organisations that are regarded negatively, and the dangers in organisations that are regarded positively.

For Barnard (2004) the inspiration to negotiate arose from South Africa being entrapped in an escalating Cold War conflict between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. The South African leadership, which was comprised of hitherto enemies, needed to develop conscious and deliberate negotiation stratagems to extricate itself from this imbroglio. Barnard was of the view that it was South Africa’s political isolation that advanced the prognosis for a negotiated political settlement. For him, this was why the hitherto enemies were able to learn from one another.

It meant very simply that the South African government had no one that it could run to request help. The South African government had to learn for itself from those with whom they waged war. South Africa was ‘totally isolated’ and therefore had to develop its own negotiation knowledge in order to survive. This is how learning took place amongst hitherto enemies.

There were many other countries and personalities who sought to become involved in South Africa’s negotiated transition, because of a perceived political benefit that they would accrue. Barnard and Mandela reached an agreement to disallow this from happening. They reached a compact between each other during the prison conversations that South Africans alone would assume sovereign ownership of the negotiations, and they both eschewed any international involvement. They upheld this compact throughout the entire national transition.

Barnard’s response is corroborated by Maharaj, Louw, Meyer, Ramaphosa and Van der Merwe.
Barnard developed an interesting case for the preservation of secrecy in these types of negotiations. The negotiation channels were created in order to preserve the sanctity of relationships between hitherto enemies. They were also created to prevent their undue exposure, where the media would naturally be inclined to portray it as a contest between good and bad.

The conflicts between the superpowers were intensifying, and South Africa was entrapped. It was fighting a proxy war against the Soviet Union and, at the same time, doing the USA’s bidding. A winnable outcome could not be derived from remaining enmeshed in the conflicts in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and indeed the Southern African region.

The NIS had a duty to monitor scenarios and offer options and recommendations to the president. Barnard called the monitoring of options “shadow boxing”. He emphasised the centrality of possessing an open mind.

Barnard is the first respondent to refer to the helpful, constructive and compassionate role played by Kobie Coetsee. His initial assessment is of South Africa in the context of the Cold War and in an escalating self-destruct scenario. Barnard operated according to his mandate, which was to provide strategic insight and information that would assist in informing appropriate guidelines to the state. In 1988 he was requested to secretly open up a channel of communication with Nelson Mandela. Neither the cabinet nor the ANC leader, Oliver Tambo, was aware of these conversations. They were conducted in absolute secrecy. These conversations were initiated on the advocacy of Kobie Coetsee.

Forty-eight secret meetings were held in prison. These meetings were intended to discover:

1. the ANC’s strategic constitutional outlook;
2. Mandela’s outlook on violence; and
3. the inclination of the ANC to either support communism or to become an African Nationalist movement.

The meetings were also intended to assess Mandela’s leadership potential and his consistency. They were therefore a personal test of his leadership potential. These interviews were conducted both alone with Mandela, and in small groups. Barnard played a pivotal role. Barnard was involved in grooming Mandela for the presidency.

3.2.5 Mike Louw

Mike Louw succeeded Neil Barnard as head of the National Intelligence Service. Barnard and other respondents regarded Louw as a central player.

Louw’s response was complementary to Barnard’s, but he was very different in his personality make-up from Barnard. Whilst the researcher experienced Barnard as being very ‘structured’ in his approach towards the negotiation settlement, Louw comes across as being highly intuitive. Barnard was able to function effectively in both small and large groups. Louw by his own admission only functioned well in small, private groups. The researcher experienced Louw’s intuition as offering a different form of structure from that provided by Barnard. There was clearly space for both types of personalities within the NIS, and they worked constructively together. The researcher experienced both as non-ideological thinkers. It was clear during the interview that Barnard was a keen scholar of South African history. Both were grounded in their love and passion for South Africa.

Mike Louw came across as an astute judge of personality and situation. He was clearly a very careful observer of personality. He has a personal psychological theory of the ‘elasticity of the mindset’. His idea is that once this has been stretched to capacity, a leader will never be able to lead again, and he will cling to the past and become obsolete. Learning amongst enemies is very difficult if the elasticity of the mindset of the leaders is stretched to capacity. Meyer (2004) asserted that one of the reasons for the recent historical failure of Israel and Palestine to reach a sustained peace accord is because of
the advanced age of the respective leaders, their often fragile state of health, and the absence of an elasticity of their mindsets. Louw’s view is that a leader will not be able to assimilate further profound learning, when the elasticity of his mindset is stretched to capacity.

The researcher’s interpretation of the notion of the elasticity of the mindset is that it seemed to relate to the Jungian notion of individuation as a construct for individual development. Was the learning process between hitherto enemies a process of individuation? This question is explored in Chapter 10, which considers learning amongst enemies as a search for meaning.

Louw came to the view that even though South Africa had six nuclear bombs, a military solution could never be an option. Negotiation was for him ultimately the only scenario that could possibly lead to a peaceful solution. All the intelligence reports that came across his desk on a daily basis seemed to indicate that the ANC was not interested in pursuing a negotiated solution. He therefore had to make decisions that, whilst considering the intelligence reports very seriously, also questioned them.

The researcher experienced Louw as an understated man. His power and his influence seemed to arise from his extraordinary ability to make astute and wise judgments. He came across as a quiet and reserved man who does not try to impress others. This would seem to be because he is confident of his own abilities, judgments and mind.

He and Barnard were both individualistic in the sense that they could both cut themselves off from the own group and make tough and lonely decisions. They were not conformity driven, and they were fiercely independent. They were not independent in a trivial dissident way. They were independent in a serious and far reaching way.

Louw’s ultimate view was that South Africa was compelled to enter these negotiations because it did not have a moral case. That was why he personally supported the changes. This reflection inspired the incorporation of Shriver’s (1995) notion that an ethic needs to
be created between enemies if a society is to learn. This matter is explored in Chapter 9, which is about learning amongst enemies and the creation of an ethic of reconciliation.

Louw was also involved in the secret prison conversations with Mandela up until and including the conversations with the exile wing of the ANC in Switzerland. He shared the same negative attitude towards the Dakar conversations as did Barnard. Louw offered an excellent statement of the negotiation status. His assessment was that the morality of the negotiation case was of fundamental importance. The reason why apartheid failed was because it had no moral justification whatsoever. But it could be upheld by violence and the security apparatus. In this sense he is in consensus with Tutu (2004) who said that “I believe that we live in a moral universe”. After a number of meetings with Mandela in prison, Louw slowly started coming to the opinion that there might be a possibility of developing a negotiated solution to the looming stalemate. It has already been mentioned that all the respondents addressed the issue of stalemate in considerable detail as an important negotiation scenario.

The result of the meeting with the ANC in exile in Switzerland was that the NIS opened up all channels of communication between Mandela and his own constituency. It also resulted in the return of the exiles. (The NIS had their own funds, which were considerable. Van der Merwe (2004) commented that these types of negotiation projects require substantial funding if they are to succeed.)

Louw’s view, like Barnard’s, was that it was imperative to go through this process alone as South Africans. This was not because of egotism or personal vanity; it was because ultimately South Africans themselves had to own the outcome of their negotiations, for better or for worse. This ownership and responsibility for what you do and have created is an essential product of learning amongst enemies.

Louw regards himself as a totally different type of personality to Barnard. Louw operated intuitively. He did not like working in large groups. That was not part of his nature. He preferred working in small groups. He felt that he was temperamentally suited to be involved in the secret prison conversations, but totally temperamentally unsuited for the
public CODESA multi-party negotiations. This is a similar view to that expressed by Esterhuysse. It would seem that a realistic understanding, and indeed critique, of self was fundamental to learning amongst enemies. This self-insight could be deemed a negotiation and leadership competence.

Louw, like Van der Merwe, Van Heerden and Steward, also alluded to the stabilising virtue of a good sense of humour as having contributed to the success of this venture. Louw provided an insightful critique of De Klerk and Mandela. He also reflected on the defining role played by Kobie Coetsee. He offered a considered assessment of PW Botha.

3.2.6 Willie Esterhuysse

Esterhuysse is a well known professor of Philosophy at Stellenbosch University. He regards philosophy in a practical way that requires taking personal risks. For Esterhuysse, philosophy is living what you believe. He is highly regarded within the Afrikaner community as a creative and independent thinker. He has published widely in the area of political philosophy. He was respected within the inner sanctum of Afrikaner leadership. His discretion was highly regarded.

Esterhuysse’s core personal interest is: ‘How do you cultivate trust?’ He is fascinated by the power of conversation, and the learning that focused conversations can invoke amongst enemies. This thesis is indeed about the power of deliberate conversation. Life can be seen as a sequence of different conversations, arranged with different protocols and ceremonials to deal with its different phases. A fundamental underlying theme of all these conversations is the matter of trust versus mistrust. The cultivation of trust was particularly necessary in the first, secret phase of the negotiating process, which Esterhuysse arranged by assuming the role of a trusted go-between between the NIS and ANC leadership in exile. Esterhuysse risked his credibility and possibly his life when he assumed the role of go-between. Life is characterised by secret conversations and public conversations.
He was also interested in the power of formal versus the power of informal meetings. His view was that informal meetings, if properly structured, can have more impact in inducing change than formal meetings. Formal meetings by their very nature can prevent informal relationships from developing. Once a formal meeting has achieved its purpose, the energy levels associated with the participants dissipate. Informal meetings are able to sustain the levels of energy because there is often no or only ill-defined closure. Informal relationships can be powerfully harnessed to achieve formal purpose. Esterhuysse is therefore similar in his disposition to Louw inasmuch as they both are much more comfortable with informal meetings than formal meetings.

The ceremonial purpose of the secret conversations between the NIS and ANC leadership in exile was to ultimately open up a public conversation that was healthy and healing. Its intention was to normalise discourse and political conversation in South Africa.

The backdrop of the human interaction during the national negotiations was often wild and unpredictable. This was a reflection of the volatility and tensions of the socio-political environment. For Esterhuysse (2004) the bond that enabled the hitherto enemies to transcend this tempestuousness was the gradual growth of trust. This trust depended on tests. The tests were of trust, honour, courage and discretion. These tests would emerge from the socio-politically environment with great frequency. Maybe it was a massacre, perhaps it was a riot, possibly it was another inflammatory speech, maybe it was an assassination that threatened the negotiations. These hurdles all had to be transcended. They were the tests of how learning could take place amongst hitherto enemies.

These tests, in Esterhuysse’s (2004), view could only be transcended on the basis of firm and viable relationships that were built on trust. It was in this context that the negotiation counterparts created their own structures, sometimes intentionally, sometimes by default, and sometimes they were created by others in civil society. They included the credos, which were agreements on privacy, the creation of the channels, the point of sufficient consensus, the agreement on sovereign ownership, and other similar matters. The National Peace Accord was a structure created by others in civil society. There was an
unspoken rule that seemed to have guided them: The impossible is possible and don’t lose heart. Another structure was always to plan the correct right next step.

Esterhuyse explored the virtues that are required for growing trust. He developed a valuable personal relationship with Thabo Mbeki, who was then ambassador extraordinaire and plenipotentiary for the ANC.

The NIS called on Esterhuyse to act as a go-between between them and the ANC in exile. His core duty was to set up a series of secret meetings in Switzerland aimed at exploring the possibility of achieving a peacefully negotiated settlement. The purpose was to paint the inner relationship that had been built up by Barnard, Louw, Van der Merwe and Willemse onto a larger national canvas. Esterhuyse was successful in performing his task.

3.2.7 Fanie van der Merwe

Van der Merwe was involved in the entire transitional process, from 1985 to 1998. He was involved from the outset of the research period to its conclusion.

During his career he was employed in three key government departments. The departments/ministries where he worked included the Department of Constitutional Development, the Department of Prisons, and the Department of Justice. He was employed in these departments, which coincidentally coincided with crucial phases in the gravitation towards the option of pursuing a negotiated outcome for South Africa.

Van der Merwe was involved in considering the formulation and re-formulation of various constitutional configurations from the mid-1980s. He was also involved in the secret prison conversations with Nelson Mandela. He attended the secret exile discussions in Switzerland with Mbeki and his colleagues. He participated in the Groote Schuur Minute, the DF Malan Accord, and the Pretoria Minute. Van der Merwe was present at the opening of CODESA and participated in CODESA I and CODESA II. He
was present at many crises meetings, including the one where Mandela attacked De Klerk. Van der Merwe formed the crucial negotiation channel with Mac Maharaj. He, together with Mac Maharaj, wrote the post-amble to the constitution that invoked the TRC.

Van der Merwe was supportive of this research because he holds the view that the ‘proccessmatics’ of the negotiations need to be understood, and they have not been understood to date.

Van der Merwe (2004) has an interesting theory about the ‘one move rule’. A politician can only make one really big move before he is hamstrung and immobilised. He or she cannot then make another significant move.

Van der Merwe (2004) reflected on De Klerk’s speech of 2 February 1990 and confirms that this speech had been discussed, explored and accepted at the departmental and ministerial levels of all the key departments. The only astonishing matter about the speech was that it was not leaked. There was ministerial and departmental consensus that this speech was an imperative. The leadership at that time were decidedly worried about violence ‘drowning out’ the possibility of a negotiated settlement.

Van der Merwe also briefly reflected on the importance of the secret meetings with the ANC leadership in exile in Switzerland, which he attended. He spoke about the Groote Schuur, DF Malan and Pretoria meetings and how interesting they were. He did not really elaborate on these meetings. They were part of the ice-breaking phase, which involved ‘getting to know you’.

Van der Merwe reached a private agreement with Mac Maharaj, (his negotiation counterpart) that every problem had a solution. They abided by this credo throughout the entire negotiation process. Van der Merwe (2004) was physically present with Mac Maharaj when the post-amble to the constitution was negotiated and he confirmed that this was written completely by Maharaj, except for him changing only one word. This set the TRC in motion.
The negotiated settlement was not a mistake, it was not a capitulation and it was not a miracle. It was deliberately and carefully planned. The falsification thesis is therefore wrong. This means that hitherto enemies did indeed learn from one another and contributed to the joint solution of a higher negotiation. The matter of the falsification thesis is critiqued in Chapter 4.

For Van der Merwe (2004), there were indeed moments of grace.

3.2.8 Mac Maharaj

Mac Maharaj was imprisoned for treason on Robben Island and played a central role in the constitutional negotiations. He represented the ANC. Maharaj’s contribution was original. He is man of substantial intellect. He speaks about the domain of ‘knowing the other’. He was in charge of Operation Vula, which was a contingency plan for war, if the posing of negotiations were a trap.

He reflected about ubuntu. It involves knowing the other, and seeing yourself in the other. It was Maharaj’s (2004) view that “ultimately you are the other. You are the very stranger and the enemy that you despise”. This coincides with Villa-Vicencio’s (2005) fundamental question, “What is a South African?” These matters are explored in Chapter 11, which relates to Cartesian logic and the argument idiom of Cogito ergo sum versus the restorative ethos of ubuntu, Estis ergo sum.

Maharaj (2004), like Fazel Randera, spoke about the construct of the enemy. Central to his understanding of learning amongst enemies is his notion of the other. He offered a rigorous criticism of the research question itself and posed the question of whether they were really enemies or not. He questioned its appropriateness, its veracity and its utility. Ultimately and after careful consideration he offered his support. Maharaj also alluded to the naïve role of some academics. This view was shared by Louw (2004), Ramaphosa (2005), Meyer (2004), Barnard (2004) and implicitly by Van der Merwe (2004), who mentioned that no academics were engaged in setting up the discourse between the IRA and the Loyalists. Maharaj’s concern about the role of academics was informed by his
South African experience. Academics of all types were attracted to apartheid South Africa like bees to honey. They were perceived as enjoying the privilege of being courted, and occupying an irreplaceable moral high-ground without having to make the odious decisions. They could afford to be dilettante. They were often egotistical and the negotiations themselves required humility and secrecy. It was the negotiators themselves who had to be creative. There were academics in the research sample but they had all broken with academia and were involved almost full time in the project. The exceptions were Professor Willie Esterhuyse and Professor Washington Okumo.

Maharaj (2004) spoke about the art of making the intangibles tangible. This was in his view a fundamental negotiation competence. “Your concerns are their concerns.” This concern about making the intangibles tangible inspired Chapter 12, which is devoted to an exploration of the rules of engagement and interests and positions. Enemies learn from one another by understanding each other’s deep-seated values and needs. This is a basic learning process.

He spoke about his stay with Mandela on Robben Island and how concerned Mandela was about knowing the other. Maharaj spoke about the Socratic game of ‘Baas and Neef’ (‘Master and young nephew’). He spoke about the basic importance of respect and dignity. For Maharaj (2004), learning cannot take place if there is not respect and dignity. The game of Baas and Neef was played in the lime quarry on Robben Island. Mandela would sit on a large stone and Maharaj would be seated on a smaller stone. Mandela would say to Maharaj: “You have to learn the beauty of the language Afrikaans so that you can understand the values of the enemy”. Maharaj would reply, “I do not wish to learn the language of the oppressor, my enemy”. Mandela would rejoin, “If you learn that language you will begin to understand the fundamental values and interests of the enemy, and in understanding that you will be able to move him and get your own way”.

He also offered a similar reflection to that which Barnard provided on the dangers and difficulties of transparency and openness versus the advantages of secrecy.
Maharaj (2004) also referred to the role that social chaos played as a teacher. Maharaj’s relationship with Nelson Mandela developed as a consequence of their incarceration on Robben Island. All the political prisoners were very disciplined and formed a teaching climate which led to the creation of a shadow learning system. This in fact formed the basis of a shadow cabinet in prison.

Maharaj is a subtle strategic thinker. He was vested with a high level of respect from the ANC leadership. His relationship with his negotiation counterpart, Fanie van der Merwe, was excellent and vitally important to the successful negotiation outcome.

3.2.9 Roelf Meyer

Roelf Meyer was the chief negotiator for the National Party. He is an attorney by profession and has held positions of leadership from his university days right through the entire constitutional negotiation process. He has exceptional interpersonal skills. He had good working relationships with both PW Botha during his regime, and then later with FW de Klerk. This assisted him to solidify his internal power position within the National Party. His excellent relationship with Cyril Ramaphosa, the ANC chief negotiator, provided a solid ground cover of ‘trust’ to deal with the many difficult trials and tribulations that were to confront them.

Meyer’s considerations related to a non-linear framework that included learning on the edge of chaos, the shadow system, and fitness profiles. It served as inspiration for Chapter 7, which relates to learning in situations of complexity, chaos and non-linearity.

Meyer explored his own shifts in consciousness, mindset and thinking paradigm. His mindset changed because of his determination to actively seek to be exposed to reality. He learned by being exposed to the harsh reality of his perceived enemies’ intense suffering and poverty.

He also offered substance to an important facet of negotiation scenarios. Meyer was positioned in the inner sanctum of state power.
Meyer (2004) spoke about the growth of personal trust and chemistry with Ramaphosa and reflected on how inspiring and encouraging this was. This personal relationship between the two chief negotiators would later be placed onto a larger canvas, that of the country.

Meyer (2004), like Barnard, reflected on the crucial role, importance and contribution of Joe Slovo that gave rise to the ‘Sunset Clause’.

When assessing Meyer’s reflections, one discovers that a central theme of his conversation is the exploration of how to put a successful deal together, and what the impediments to a successful deal are. In this regard he offered considered opinion on the conflicts in Israel and the Middle East, Iraq, Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland.

3.2.10 Cyril Ramaphosa

Ramaphosa entered the negotiations with a formidable reputation as one of the most effective and toughest negotiators in the country. He had been the General Secretary of the National Union of Mine Workers (NUM) and had led the largest and longest strike in South African history. He, like Meyer, is a lawyer by profession. Ramaphosa has a particular genius for managing large and difficult meetings and ceremonies. He played a prominent role in officiating when Chris Hani was assassinated. He also led the release committee when Mandela was released from prison. Ramaphosa enjoys the outdoors and fly fishing.

Ramaphosa (2005) reflected on the need to make a ‘negotiation move’ and dissolve the destructive stalemate. The concept of ‘the move’ needs to be unpacked. His response was very beautiful. He explored the matter of building up trust and the need for wise and courageous leaders. He touched on the crucial role played by Kobie Coetsee.

Ramaphosa (2005) was in a chance meeting with Roelf Meyer at Heathrow Airport in London. This chance meeting was converted into an opportunity. It resulted in Mandela giving his blessing and consent to their exploratory conversations. Ramaphosa reflected
on the design of a ‘credo’ with Roelf Meyer. The credo revolved around their reciprocal need to constantly adapt.

Ramaphosa offered important leadership and credibility to the negotiations. He had built up his credibility as a key trade union negotiator. Business leaders had considerable respect for his expertise. He therefore had the support of business, the trade unions and the ANC itself. He spoke about the faith that he had in his support and back up. He had an excellent relationship with Nelson Mandela. The ANC leadership, and the tripartite alliance, provided him with a solid internal power foundation.

3.2.11 Colin Coleman

Coleman is an architect by profession. He comes from a family of activists. His parents assisted in founding the Detainees Release Committee after his brother, who was a trade unionist, was detained under the Internal Security Act. He is the managing director of Goldman Sachs in South Africa at present. Coleman, together with Eloff, was on the secretariat of CODESA. They were thus involved in assisting to project manage the negotiated solution into existence.

Coleman, Eloff and Hall played an important role in aligning business towards the changes that needed to take place in the national transition. The alignment of business with the transition was a major dynamic, but was not overtly visible. Coleman played a key role in this regard. When one reads Coleman’s response in the context of the viewpoints espoused by Van Heerden, Crocker and Steward, one cannot help but to conclude that the pattern of changes in the mindset of the business community paralleled those that occurred in the mindset of the military. Both the business community and the military were initially unconvinced about the prospects of achieving a negotiated settlement, and both eventually became committed to it.

Business, the church, and the trade union movement created the National Peace Accord. This formed a national coalition of ordinary citizens who were united in their search for a peaceful solution. This unity was workable and transcended political, cultural, racial and