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Geoffrey Ronald Heald
Estis Ergo Sum
Abstract

South Africa’s negotiated settlement, which changed it from a racially exclusive oligarchy into a country with one of the most enlightened constitutions in the world, is without precedent anywhere else in the world. It is widely regarded as an exemplar. This research applies the method and methodology of phenomenology to endeavour to understand how it came about that hitherto enemies were able to learn from one another during the negotiations. The answer to this question will assist in understanding why the transition in South Africa was successful. The research itself consists of a single case study.

The researcher was able to interview a unique expert sample of seventeen persons who played major roles in this successful transition, and he gained their views on the research question. These interviews were all subjected to an eidetic reduction in accordance with the method and methodology of phenomenology. This was done in order to create new negotiation theory and knowledge about how hitherto enemies were able to learn from one another. The research found that the falsification thesis, which asserted that the transition resulted from a simple submission to superior power, could be repudiated. It offered a theory on negotiation scenarios that might be transferable to other negotiations elsewhere in the world. It revealed that the hitherto enemies built up credos and an ethic of trust between one another. It considered the dichotomy between the Western ethic of retribution, embraced in the notion of Cogito ergo sum, versus the African, restorative ethos of ubuntu encapsulated in the notion of Estis ergo sum. ‘I think, therefore I am’ was therefore juxtaposed against ‘Because you are, I am.’

The research explored how chaos, complexity and non-linearity in the environment can create the context for learning amongst enemies, if the counterparts assimilate this complexity rather than reject it. The research showed that the hitherto enemies assimilated complexity during the course of the South Africa transition and resulted in the creation of the National Peace Accord and the ‘Sunset Clause’, which arguably saved
thousands if not millions of lives, had a civil war been ignited. The indications were clear that a civil war was incipient during the mid-1980s. The research also explored how learning took place through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. All of the research was supported by the lived experience of the respondents. It offered an addition to the theory on the rules of engagement and interests and positions in negotiations. An unintended contribution of this research is that it offers a unique historical view of this extraordinary transition.
Declaration

I declare that this doctorate is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, at the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before, for any other degree or examination at this or any other university.

______________

Geoffrey Ronald Heald

4 July 2006
Dedication

This doctorate is dedicated to the remarkable respondents to this research. Without their contribution, it is quite possible that South Africa would have degenerated into a prolonged civil war. These respondents can be regarded as the constitutional founding fathers of South Africa.

I am honoured that you shared your knowledge and insight with me. My prayer is that it should be shared with others who might need your counsel and wisdom. This research is a way of codifying your council and wisdom for the benefit of others. I cite the fundamental principle of *ubuntu* – *Esse ergo sum ... because you are, I am* – in your names.

I dedicate this research to:

Professor Chester Crocker, a brilliant mind who conceived of the policy of ‘constructive engagement’ and, through his success in establishing the Namibian, Angolan and Mozambican settlements, created the germ of an idea that “it might just perhaps be possible to negotiate a peaceful settlement in South Africa”.

Neil van Heerden, who represented South Africa in the negotiations in Namibia’s independence, in South Africa’s military withdrawal from Angola and in CODESA itself. Neil’s wisdom, humaneness, fairness and call for a negotiated settlement were effective.

Dave Steward, who is President F.W. de Klerk’s spokesman, and who has been involved in the inner circles of so many crucial conversations. The country owes you a special debt. A man with a formidable intellect, wide experience and a wicked sense of humour.

Dr Neil Barnard, who as Director of the National Intelligence Service played an indispensable role in the secret prison talks with President Mandela. A man of incredible brilliance. So much rested on his judgment. Those that know have said that “without Neil Barnard, there would have been no settlement”.

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Mike Louw, who was Barnard’s successor as Director of the National Intelligence Service. All the respondents spoke so highly of Mike, and with such great respect for his wisdom and discretion. Mike displays superb human understanding.

Professor Willie Esterhuysse, who, at great personal risk to himself, arranged for the first set of secret talks between the NIS and the ANC’s leadership in exile. This deputation was led by Neil Barnard of the NIS and by President Thabo Mbeki, who was the leader of the ANC’s delegation, and took place in Switzerland. His belief in the power of conversation and the test of trust was an inspiration. Willie speaks such beautiful Afrikaans that it made it very difficult for the researcher to be objective about his subjective view.

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Mac Maharaj, a man of great brilliance, eloquence and courage, who wrote the pre-amble to the Constitution and brought into effect the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and then submitted himself to be assessed and to testify before this Commission by virtue of the very legislation that he himself wrote. Mac is a wonderful conversationalist.

Roelf Meyer, an unpretentious man of superb human skills, great toughness, courage and wisdom. Roelf values relationships, and the relationship that he and Cyril Ramaphosa developed was one that bonded the nation.

Cyril Ramaphosa was absolutely crucial to the successful negotiated outcome. He is a genius in managing large and difficult meetings, like the funeral of Chris Hani after Hani’s assassination. This involved thousands upon thousands of very angry and sad people. Cyril was Nelson Mandela’s protégé. Can there be a greater accolade?
Colin Coleman was able to provide a safe secretariat which allowed the negotiation process to be project-managed into existence. Colin has a brilliant and practical mind. His energy and practical intelligence is formidable and provided a foundation on which the negotiations could be predicated.

Professor Theuns Eloff, who designed the concept of the National Peace Accord. Theuns is a brave and sincere man who challenged authority when it was evil. Without the National Peace Accord, the country would have probably spiralled off into civil war. The intelligence assessments at that time were that an estimated million people’s lives could have been lost if the mini-civil war in Natal had escalated into a proper civil war.

Professor Washington Ukuma, who entered the process when the mediation process led by Dr Henry Kissinger broke down, was able to assist in bringing the IFP back into the fold and to participate in South Africa’s first democratic election.

Archbishop Emeritus and Nobel Prize Laureate Desmond Tutu, whose contribution was so positive and pervasive throughout the desperate years of apartheid, right through to his definitive role as chairman of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. South Africa owes you such an enormous and unquantifiable debt.

Professor Charles Villa-Vicencio, who originally co-edited Apartheid is a Heresy. This book had a major impact on the theological repudiation of any justification for apartheid in South Africa. He assumed a vital role in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and has been actively involved in assisting in many peace processes on the African continent. It is Charles who inspired the discourse and meditation on Estis ergo sum versus Cogito ergo sum.

Dr Fazel Randera served as a commissioner on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and encouraged the researcher to introspect on the ‘construct of an enemy’. The realization that it is ultimately a mental model and a matter of perceptual choice has important implications on the art and science of negotiation.
John Hall acted as chairman of the National Peace Commission and proved that business, the church and labour could unite and make peace work. His leadership here saved thousands upon thousands of lives, by preventing the country from degenerating into a civil war.

This research is also dedicated to the gift of hope, wisdom, human understanding and justice that President Nelson Mandela and President FW de Klerk gave to the world. You have enriched the lives of so many others. You are owed a debt of gratitude. May this debt be honoured and respected with wisdom, appreciation, empathy and compassion by the generations to come.

I salute these brave, intelligent, practical and wise men!

g.r.h.

Johannesburg

4 July, 2006
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g.r.h

Johannesburg

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Acronyms and abbreviations

ANC: African National Congress
AZAPO: Azanian Peoples' Organization
BATNA: Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement
BOSS: Bureau of State Security
CBM: Consultative Business Movement
CODESA: Convention for a Democratic South Africa
COSAG: Concerned South African Group
DRC: Dutch Reformed Church
EIQ: Emotional Intelligence Quotient
EPG: Eminent Persons' Group
FF: Freedom Front
FW: President De Klerk's initials. He is often referred to as 'FW'.
FRELIMO: Mozambique Liberation Front
GNU: Government of National Unity
IFP: Inkatha Freedom Party
Insiles: Opposite of exiles - those persons who participated in the struggle whilst remaining in South Africa
IRA: Irish Republican Army
Madiba: Royal clan name of President Nelson Mandela. He is referred to as 'Madiba'.
MDM: Mass Democratic Movement
MI: Military Intelligence
MK: Umkhonto we Sizwe, the military arm of the ANC
NEC: National Executive Committee
NGO: Non-Government Organization
NIS: National Intelligence Service
NP: National Party
NSM's: National Security Management Systems
OAU: Organization of African Unity
NPA: National Peace Accord
PAC: Pan African Congress
FW: President Botha’s initials. He is often referred to as ‘P.W.’
RDP: Reconstruction and Development Programme
RSA: Republic of South Africa
SACC: South African Council of Churches
SACOB: South African Chamber of Business
SACP: South African Communist Party
SADF: South African Defence Force
SANDF: South African National Defence Force
SAP: South African Police
SSC: State Security Council
TBVC states: Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei
TRC: Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UDF: United Democratic Front
ZOPA: Zone of Possible Agreement
Chapter 1: Introduction and Outline of Research

1.1 Introduction

This research takes the form of a single case study of the learning that took place amongst negotiators who, in the 1980s and 1990s, took part in the different phases of the non-racial, constitutional settlement in South Africa. The core and only preconceived research question that was posed to each respondent was: “How did it come about that hitherto enemies were able to learn from one another during the national negotiation process?”

The research endeavoured to understand how this negotiation process acted as an inspiration for learning among people who had been previously, and often taught to viciously, hate one another and the constituencies that the other represented.

1.2 A substantial and original contribution to knowledge

The aim of this study is to use a single case study of the South African negotiations, and to use phenomenology to build theory about these negotiations, as no such theory exists. To date there is no comprehensive primary research on how hitherto enemies learned from one another during the transitional negotiations in South Africa. More specifically, no research to date has included a participant sample of hitherto adversarial negotiators and subjected their responses to phenomenological reduction. The theory and the new knowledge created from this study could be of assistance in understanding how to negotiate solutions to seemingly intractable multi-racial and multi-ethnic deep-rooted conflicts in other parts of the world. South African negotiators like Nelson Mandela, Desmond Tutu (2004), Alec Borrairne, Mac Maharaj (2004), Fink Haysom, Fanie van der Merwe (2004), Charles Villa-Vicencio (2005), FW de Klerk, Cyril Ramaphosa (2005), Richard Goldstone, Roelf Meyer (2004), Thabo Mbeki, Brian Curren, Charles Nupenl and many others have all been called upon on numerous occasions to offer advice in dissolving very serious deep-rooted conflicts happening elsewhere across the world. This fact indicates that there is an appreciation amongst political leaders, practitioners from

---

1 The researcher is aware that this list of names is long and perhaps difficult to read. The truth is that excluding any of these negotiators from the list and inserting their names in a footnote like this one instead would have meant distinguishing greater from lesser negotiators – an impossible task.
civil society and scholars alike in the field of negotiations, of the value of South Africa’s negotiation experience and knowledge.

The theory generated from this study is an original contribution to the knowledge base of negotiation theory. It is intended that the new knowledge uncovered by the research will be applicable to negotiators dealing with challenges elsewhere that are similar to those South Africa experienced. This knowledge is also aimed at being of assistance to negotiators who are involved in international business, political negotiations, and to individuals involved in interpersonal negotiations as well. Entwistle (1984, pp. 8-9) shows that Rogers’s understanding of the best learning environment was not to “rely, either on controlled and contrived learning settings, or on learning material deprived of links with previous knowledge”. Rogers’s view was that the optimal learning environment was a lived learning experience. In other words, the learning process itself had to be inherently meaningful. According to Entwistle (1984, pp. 8-9), Rogers “condemned didactic or expository” methods of learning. In accordance with Rogers’s view then, this research is devoted to understanding how the negotiators who were central to South Africa’s national transition were able to learn in situ.

1.3 Justification for the time period of the research

It was originally intended that the research would span the period from 1985 up until 10 December 1996, when the new Constitution was finally adopted. It was subsequently decided to extend the research period by two years in order to include consideration of certain aspects of the learning amongst enemies that arose as a result of the feedback from three of the respondents to the research who had had a direct involvement in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). As the final report of the TRC was presented in 1998, the period covered in the research was extended to 1998.

1.4 Phases of the negotiation conversation in the primary research

South Africa’s ‘pre-negotiation phase’ began in the mid-1980s and constitutes the first ‘conversation’ that was examined in this thesis. Crocker (2003) was the United States’
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. He conceived of the policy of constructive engagement which resulted in the linkage of the South African Defence Force to the Cuban withdrawals from Angola. Also, the adoption and implementation of Resolution 435, which secured Namibia's independence, suddenly became a 'dress rehearsal' for the achievement of an internally negotiated settlement in South Africa (Crocker, 1992; 2003).

These two negotiated settlements in the Southern African region were important because they set a benchmark of technical standards of negotiation excellence, that had to be exceeded during the South African internal negotiations. Although it is generally recognised, with the knowledge of hindsight, that the Southern African regional peace negotiations in Angola and Namibia (and Mozambique) were a 'curtain raiser' for the South African political transition, they were unacknowledged for their crucial significance at that time. These implications were acknowledged only later.

The second phase of conversation was the secret prison-cell conversations. These conversations were between Mandela and an inner circle of senior government officials and included Barnard (2004), Van der Merwe (2004), Willemse, and Louw (2004). Dr Neil Barnard was the former Director of the National Intelligence Service (South Africa's equivalent of the CIA), Van der Merwe was a key government negotiator, Willemse was a commissioner, and Louw was Barnard's successor and subsequently became director of the NIS. Absolute secrecy was imperative during this second phase. These prison conversations involved scoping the possible future negotiations with Mandela (Mandela, 1995; De Klerk, 1998). More will be written about these respondents in a later part of the thesis.

The third phase of the negotiation conversion was also secret, and involved the exploratory dialogue between the NIS and the ANC leadership in exile, led by Thabo Mbeki. These conversations took place in Switzerland (Barnard, 2004; Louw, 2004; Mandela, 1995; Van der Merwe, 2004). It was Barnard's effort (and the government group mentioned above) to place the secret prison pre-negotiation conversations onto a larger national and subsequently international canvas. The levels of trust between
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. He conceived of the policy of constructive engagement which resulted in the linkage of the South African Defence Force to the Cuban withdrawals from Angola. Also, the adoption and implementation of Resolution 435, which secured Namibia's independence, suddenly became a 'dress rehearsal' for the achievement of an internally negotiated settlement in South Africa (Crocker, 1992; 2003).

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Mandela and the group were very low at that time; Mandela in fact opposed the secret talks in Switzerland, as he thought that these might be used to drive a wedge between him and the ANC.

The fourth phase of the conversation was to open up the discourse into a transparent public interchange and to change the entire rules of the game of political interaction in South Africa. This conversation was encapsulated and released into the world by De Klerk’s 2 February 1990 speech (Adam & Moodley, 1993; De Klerk, 1998; Friedman, 1993; Friedman & Atkinson, 1994; Giliomee, Schlemmer & Hauptfleisch, 1994; Sparks, 1995; Waldmeir, 1997).

The fifth phase of the conversation were the public ceremonials that included the Groote Schuur Minute, the Pretoria Minute, and the DF Malan Accord. These meetings served an important ceremonial purpose signifying to South Africa and the world at large that an extraordinary conversation between hitherto enemies was beginning. It related to the achieving of agreement on the return to South Africa of the many exiles, the containment of the violence, and the granting of political amnesty. These early conversation were not aimed at achieving a consensus on the constitution. They were aimed at achieving a basic political consensus between hitherto enemies on which the constitutional negotiations could later be predicated. Meyer (2004) makes the observation that this sequence of starting the conversation in pursuit of achieving a political accord might be regarded as an inversion or reversal of what might be regarded by some as the more logical sequence, starting off with the glaring constitutional crisis. The point is that the sequence of the scheduled conversations and meetings made political sense at the time. These ceremonial meetings also included setting out the very schedules and itineraries of what needed to be done for political consensus to be achieved.

The sixth phase of conversation was the CODESA I plenary, which nearly broke down because of the clash between Mandela and De Klerk (Ebrahim, 1998). It was here that the constitutional alternatives were first deliberated. The seventh phase of conversation was the opening up of the confidential negotiation channels between the hitherto enemies after the formal plenary structure of CODESA I had collapsed. This phase lasted until
CODESA was later resuscitated in the form of CODESA II (Ebrahim, 1998). The private bilateral negotiation channels subsequently served as a ‘safety valve’ when the plenary negotiation became troubled, which happened quite regularly. The negotiations and interchange between hitherto enemies continued quietly, unabatedly and unobtrusively away from the public eye (Coleman, 2004; Eloff, 2004; Maharaj, 2004; Meyer, 2004; Ramaphosa, 2005; Van der Merwe, 2004).

The eighth phase of the negotiations comprised the meetings between the Anglican, Methodist and Catholic Churches and the South African business community, during which the National Peace Accord was deliberated and formulated. Although violence never completely abated, and often escalated, the National Peace Accord was sufficiently resilient to keep the violence in South Africa at manageable levels and allow the constitutional talks to proceed (Coleman, 2004; Eloff, 2004; Gastrow, 1995; Hall, 2005; Meyer, 2004; Tutu, 2004; Van der Merwe, 2004).

The ninth phase of the negotiation conversation was the CODESA II plenary (Ebrahim, 1998), which led to the tenth phase of negotiations that culminated in the signing of the interim Constitution. The negotiations assumed a legal-technical perspective, and the parties had travelled so far together that this phase was not characterised by contentiousness. An eleventh phase of negotiations related to the crisis resulting from the IFP’s request for a delay in the election date, which included the intervention of the mediation entourage, led by Dr Henry Kissinger. Mediation is a process that is intended to invoke focused problem solving conversations between parties that perceive themselves to be in enmity. When this first mediation intervention failed, a second informal mediation, led by Professor Washington Okumo of Kenya, was enacted. This second attempt was successful. An almost contiguous eleventh phase of crisis conversations arose because of the rebellion in Bophuthatswana and the re-incorporation of the homelands back into South Africa (Coleman, 2004; Okumo, 2004).

All of the hitherto mentioned negotiations and conversations oscillated between public and private, depending on what the hitherto enemies ascertained were the wise negotiation rules of engagement. The TRC was the public ceremonial of national healing
that was enacted by the post-amble to the Interim Constitution (Borraine, 2000; Maharaj, 2004; Meyer, 2004; Randera, 2005; Tutu, 2004; TRC, 1998; Van der Merwe, 2004; Villa-Vicencio, 2005).

The twelfth phase of the negotiations was the very public ceremonial of the famous first non-racial democratic election. The thirteenth phase of the negotiations was the creation of a Government of National Unity after the first democratic election (De Klerk, 1998; Mandela, 1995). The fourteenth phase of the negotiations was the adoption of the final Constitution (De Klerk, 1998; Mandela, 1995). A fifteenth phase can be regarded as that contiguous process of learning that occurred during the course of the TRC hearings (Borraine, 2000; Maharaj, 2004; Meyer, 2004; Randera, 2005; Tutu, 2004; TRC, 1998; Villa-Vicencio, 2005; Van der Merwe, 2004).

1.5 The choice of respondents to this research

The respondents constituted an expert sample, and were important actual architects of the multi-faceted aspects of the negotiation solution in South Africa. There were other people, of course, who were not including in the expert sample because of the limitations of time and their inaccessibility. The absence of these people from the list of respondents can be viewed as a limitation of the research. Nevertheless, the respondents whose testimonies were gathered can be viewed as a highly credible expert sample and could all vividly recall their respective contribution to this transition.

It was imperative to select a sample of respondents who had been directly involved and had had ‘hands-on’ experience in designing, negotiating and project managing the negotiated process into reality. When the negotiations began in 1985, they began in an atmosphere of hopelessness and despair. Barnard (2004), Van Heerden (2003), Steward (2004) and Louw (2004) discussed how difficult it was to build a pre-negotiation momentum of consensus in this time when South Africa had acquired pariah status in its foreign relations, and the country itself was facing an incipient civil war, because of the apartheid policy. The already mentioned secret prison-cell conversations proved to be an important starting point in the pre-negotiation process.
Crocker (2003) offered insight into the negotiation challenges that tested him at this early stage. Esterhuyse (2004) acted as the go-between of the secret prison-cell discussions that took place between Mandela and the government group. His role was to transfer the conversation from its focus on the persona of Mandela onto the liberation movement of the ANC at large. The odds seemed formidably opposed to a successful and peaceful outcome. This negativity was overcome by the conscious efforts of the respondents who are cited in this thesis. Coleman (2004) and Eloff (2004) were involved in managing the country’s negotiation secretariat on a day-to-day basis. Hall (2005) and Tutu (2004), together with Coleman (2004) and Eloff (2004), contributed importantly to the learning process that took place between hitherto enemies, through the creation of the National Peace Accord.

Coleman (2004), Eloff (2004) and Hall (2005) played an important role in gaining the involvement and support of the business community, through the involvement of the Consultative Business Community, who supported the entire negotiation process. Their understanding of how this outcome transpired coalesces around the central theme of how former enemies were able to learn from one another. The relationships of trust that were cultivated between the hitherto enemies were vital to bridging these difficulties.

Okumo (2004) acted as a mediator when the negotiations reached an impasse around the date of the first democratic election. Ramaphosa (2005) and Meyer (2004), the chief negotiators for ANC and NP respectively, developed private credos between themselves that they would approach all the problems positively and endeavour to continuously and appropriately adapt. Maharaj (2004) and Van der Merwe (2004) developed a similar agreement.

Maharaj (2004), Randera (2005), Tutu (2004) and Villa-Vicencio (2005) were intimately involved in the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was regarded as a vitally important ceremonial for learning amongst hitherto enemies to take place. The period covered by the research saw a tectonic shift in the nature of South African society, from an apartheid-inspired racial oligarchy to a non-racial constitutional democracy. The research will show that there was a revolutionary re-framing of the
nature of South African society in the minds of the chief negotiators. This reframing, led by the respective leaders, gradually seeped through to their constituencies as a type of learning culture.

1.6 Justification for the structure of this thesis

Chapter 1 of the thesis offers an outline of the research question ‘How did it come about that hitherto enemies were able to learn from one another during the national negotiation process?’ It also outlines the broad aims of the research.

Chapter 2 explores the methodology and method of phenomenology, as it pertains to the research question. Caelli (2001, p. 275) shows that these are viewed separately from each other. “Methodology refers to the philosophical framework that must be assimilated so that the researcher is clear about the assumptions of the particular approach, whereas method refers to the research technique and the procedure for carrying out the research. As with all qualitative research, the way of proceeding or method that is chosen must be defensible from the philosophical and epistemological positions that guide the study.”

It is asserted that phenomenology was the most appropriate methodological base on which to predicate the research of the lived experience of some of the key individuals who successfully led the negotiated transition. Phenomenology was, therefore, woven into the research question, and revealed its form in both the method and methodology. Relevant secondary literature on phenomenology and the case study method were triangulated with the research aims and objectives.

Chapter 3 was the first chapter that was completely devoted to reporting data from the primary research. The observant reader will notice that it was written in a very different style from the first two chapters, which were reliant on an orthodox secondary research format, as per scholastic tradition.

The third chapter provides a distilled and readable representation of the entire research project, and is the first synthesised enactment that combines the aims of the research and
the research method and methodology, which are eidetically reduced. This chapter required the application of holistic eidetic phenomenological reduction to all the data gathered during the interviews with the respondents. The lived experience of each respondent can be regarded as their subjective, lived experience. This lived subjective experience, as articulated by the respondents in each interview, was phenomenologically reduced in order to identify the emerging research themes. The collective subjectivity of their lived experience was processed by phenomenological reduction. The ensuing data was manipulated according to the methodology of phenomenology leading to the development of inter subjective validity. The combined data from all the interviews that was phenomenologically reduced objectifies the research data. There is much discussion about inter subjective validity in the literature. Welton (1999, p. 62) cites Husserl in his discourse on Phenomenology as Transcendental Philosophy as espousing that “all that which holds for me myself holds, as I know, for all other human beings whom I find present in my surrounding world. Experiencing them as human beings, I understand and accept each of them as an Ego-subject just as I myself am one, and as related to his natural surrounding world. But I do this in such a way that I take their surrounding world and mine objectively as one and the same world of which we are all conscious, only in different modes”. Van Manen (1990, p. 11) observes that phenomenology is “inter subjective in that the human science researcher needs the other in order to develop a dialogic relationship with the phenomenon, and thus validate the phenomenon as described. Phenomenology is a human science (rather than a natural science) since the subject matter of phenomenological research is always the structures of meaning of the lived world”. The manipulation of the data from each single interview, and then all interviews, was conducted both vertically and horizontally. Eidetic phenomenological reduction is a specified requirement of the method and methodology of phenomenology and is frequently used for research intended for theory creation. The themes that arose from this reduction process are set out in this chapter, and refined in the subsequent chapters. In other words, they inspired the general direction of the research as an entirety and are subsequently distilled into the key chapters of the thesis.