

Perceptions of the Future of South Africa:

A 2009 Replication

BY

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Declaration of Originality

“A research thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MA
Research Psychology in the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand,
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“I declare that this research project is my own, unaided work. It has not been submitted before
for any other degree or examination at this or any other university.”

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Abstract

While socio-political instability and social change have marked effects on all members of society, youth appear to be particularly vulnerable to such instability. There is however, a dearth of research on how youth make sense of and orient themselves to such social change. Karl Mannheim (1936) argued that in times of social upheaval and instability individuals would engender “situationally transcendent ideas”, or ideologies, about the future of their society. In South Africa a tradition of research on future ideologies was begun in 1956 by Kurt Danziger (1963). Thereafter, Danziger’s original research was replicated in three subsequent South African studies. These studies were conducted during, and shortly after, the era of apartheid, which was a context characterized by extreme socio-political instability. After the abolishment of apartheid, the South African socio-political landscape seemed to have finally reached a plateau of stability; however, the recent political events in which prominent ANC members publicly severed their alliances with the longstanding leading political party and formed a rival political party, threatened to reconfigure the South African political landscape directly before the upcoming 2009 elections. This political vicissitude prompted South African citizens to reflect carefully on the future of the country, and this thus signified the ideal time at which to conduct an additional study on South Africans future ideologies and in so doing, continue Kurt Danziger’s line of research. The sample of the current study comprised 223 University of the Witwatersrand students. To garner their future ideologies participants were required to write brief essays on the history of South Africa projected into the future, as well as complete an optimism scale, a relative deprivation scale and a social group identification checklist. The essays were then analysed by means of quantitative thematic content analysis to identity the predominant future ideologies that are present amongst University of the Witwatersrand students. It emerged from the content of their essays that the sample most frequently foresaw futures of Liberalism, Deterioration and Catastrophe; however, these perceptions were not found to differ significantly in terms of race. An interesting finding was that a sizeable proportion of the sample used their essays as a way to vent about the current circumstances in the country and seemed to experience difficulty envisioning a possible future for the country. A generalized logistic regression revealed that optimism about the future and perceived relative deprivation are both significant predictors of whether one endorses Liberal, Deterioration or Catastrophic future ideologies. The limitations of the current study and recommendations for future research are discussed.

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Table of Contents

Title Page	I
Declaration	II
Abstract	III
Acknowledgements	IV
Table of Contents	V
List of Appendices	IX

<u>Chapter one: Introduction</u>	1
-----------------------------------------	----------

1.1. The political context during the apartheid era	1
1.2. The post-apartheid context and recent political events	2
1.3. The aims of the current study	4

<u>Chapter two: Literature Review</u>	5
----------------------------------------------	----------

2.1. Future orientation or ideology	5
2.1.1. A conceptual understanding	5
2.1.2. Pioneering work on future ideologies	5
2.2. Future orientation during adolescent development	6
2.3. Previous research on future orientation	8
2.3.1. Previous research on future ideologies conducted in the South African context	8
2.3.1.1. Kurt Danziger's 1956 study	8
2.3.1.2. Du Preez, Bhana, Broekman, Louw and Nel's 1981 study	9
2.3.1.3. Finchilescu and Dawes 1992 and 1996 studies	10
2.3.1.4. The Dinokeng Scenarios	11
2.3.1.5. Previous research on future ideologies conducted internationally	13
2.4. The current South African context	16
2.4.1. Population growth and the provision of basic services	16
2.4.2. Unemployment and poverty	16
2.4.3. Crime	17

2.4.4. Health and Welfare	17
2.4.5. Education	18
2.4.6. Xenophobia	19
2.4.7. Failures and corruption in government	19
2.4.8. Race relations	20
2.5. Potential determinants of future ideologies	20
2.5.1. Optimism to the future	21
2.5.2. Relative deprivation	23
2.5.3. South Africans social group identifications	26
2.5.3.1. The national 'South African' identity and the global 'African' identity	26
2.5.3.2. Racial/ethnic identity	28
2.6. The current study	29
<u>Chapter three: Methods</u>	30
3.1. Research Questions	30
3.2. Sample and Sampling	30
3.3. Research Design	32
3.4. Instruments	32
3.4.1. Demographic Section	32
3.4.2. Essay	32
3.4.3. Group Identification Check List	33
3.4.4. Optimism scale	33
3.4.5. Relative Deprivation-Gratification scale	34
3.5. Procedures	34
3.6. Data Analysis	35
3.6.1. Internal consistency and normality	35
3.6.2. Demographic characteristics of the sample	35
3.6.3. Predominant future ideologies	36
3.6.4. Perceptions of the present	38
3.6.5. Inter-rater reliability	39
3.6.6. Future ideologies and present perceptions by race	40
3.6.7. Social group identification	40
3.6.8. Optimism to the future	40

3.6.9. Relative deprivation	41
3.6.10. Primary social group identification, Optimism and Relative Deprivation	41
3.7. Ethical Considerations	41
<u>Chapter four: Results</u>	43
4.1. Internal consistency and normality	43
4.2. Re-conceptualisation of the original essay classification system	45
4.3. Examples of the future scenarios	46
4.4. Inter-rater reliability	52
4.5. What are the samples predominant future ideologies?	52
4.6. What are the samples perceptions of the present conditions in South Africa?	55
4.7. What are the samples future ideologies and future valences by race?	59
4.8. What are the samples present perceptions and present valences by race?	62
4.9. Comparison between the present study's findings and those of past studies (1963 – 1996)	66
4.10. What are the samples social group identities?	70
4.11. What are the samples primary social group identities?	73
4.12. To what extent are the participants optimistic towards the future of South Africa and are these levels of optimism associated with their predominant future ideologies?	76
4.13. What are the samples levels of relative deprivation and are these levels of relative deprivation associated with their predominant future ideologies?	77
4.14. Does a significant difference exist between one's primary social group identity and their levels of optimism to the future and perceived relative deprivation, and does optimism to the future, relative deprivation and primary social group identification predict one's future outlook?	80
<u>Chapter five: Discussion</u>	83
5.1. Predominant future ideologies	83
5.2. Future ideologies by race	89
5.3. Social group identifications	91

5.4.	Levels of optimism to the future	92
5.5.	Levels of perceived relative deprivation	94
5.6.	Linkages between future ideology, social group identification, optimism about the future and relative deprivation	96
<u>Chapter six: Conclusion</u>		98
6.1	Summary of Central Findings	98
6.2	Limitations	99
6.3	Recommendations for Future Research	100
6.4	Implications and Conclusion	101
Reference list		102

List of Appendices

<u>Appendix A:</u>	Letter of permission to course-coordinator to use Psychology I students	107
<u>Appendix B:</u>	Participant Information Sheet	108
<u>Appendix C:</u>	Ethics Clearance Certificate	109
<u>Appendix D:</u>	Demographic Questionnaire	110
<u>Appendix E:</u>	Essay	111
<u>Appendix F:</u>	Social Group Identification Checklist	115
<u>Appendix G:</u>	Optimism Scale	117
<u>Appendix H:</u>	Relative Deprivation Scale	117
<u>Appendix I:</u>	Table 4. Frequencies and percentages of the samples predominant future ideologies.	118
<u>Appendix J:</u>	Table 5. Frequencies and percentages of the valences of the future essays.	118
<u>Appendix K:</u>	Table 6. Frequencies and percentages of the future valences by each future ideology.	119
<u>Appendix L:</u>	Table 7. Frequencies and percentages of the samples present valences.	120
<u>Appendix M:</u>	Table 8. Frequencies and percentages of the samples positive, negative, and neutral perceptions of the present categories.	121
<u>Appendix N:</u>	Table 9. Frequencies and percentages of the future ideologies per race group.	122
<u>Appendix O:</u>	Table 10. Frequencies and percentages of the samples future valences by race group.	123
<u>Appendix P:</u>	Table 12. Frequencies and percentages of the samples positive, negative and neutral overall present valences per race group.	124
<u>Appendix Q:</u>	Table 13. Comparison of the percentages of the future ideologies appearing in 1963, 1981, 1992, 1996 and 2009	125
<u>Appendix R:</u>	Table 14. Frequencies and percentages of the samples social group identities.	126
<u>Appendix S:</u>	Table 15. Frequencies and percentages of the samples primary social group identifications.	128
<u>Appendix T:</u>	Table 16. Primary Social Group Identifications by the Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic Future Ideologies.	129

Chapter One

Introduction

Interest in future ideologies began with the work of Karl Mannheim (1936) who argued that in times of social upheaval and instability individuals would engender “situationally transcendent ideas”, or ideologies, about the future of their society (Finchilescu & Dawes, 1999a, 2001). Socio-political instability and social change have marked effects on all members of society, but children and adolescents’ are particularly vulnerable to this volatility (Finchilescu & Dawes, 1999a, 1999b, 2001). There is, however, a paucity of research on how adolescents’ make sense of and orient themselves to social change. Kurt Danziger (1963), in 1956, was the first to take an interest in identifying the range of future ideologies that existed amongst South African youths. Danziger’s original study was then replicated by Du Preez, Bhana, Broekman, Louw and Nel in 1981, and thereafter, by Finchilescu and Dawes in 1992, and again in 1996. These studies were conducted during, and shortly after, the era of apartheid, which was a context characterized by extreme socio-political instability.

1.1. The political context during the apartheid era

Apartheid was a system of legal racial segregation that was enforced by the South African Nationalist Party government following their rise to power in 1948, and that was finally abolished in 1994. Under this oppressive administration the rights of the black African inhabitants of South Africa, who comprised the majority of the South African population, were severely restricted and minority rule by whites was maintained. Shortly after the Nationalist Party’s election into power they began to actively establish the discriminatory structures that were at the core of the apartheid legislation. The year 1950 saw the passing of the Population Registration Act, which ensured that all South African citizens would be classified in accordance with the racial criteria that were imposed by the ruling party. The four main “races” that were identified and constructed by the apartheid system were black Africans, coloureds, Indians and whites. While the ‘white’ racial classification was used to refer to all people of European descent, the ‘black African’ racial category encompassed all individuals from the indigenous black population, the term ‘coloured’ was used to refer to people of mixed descent, and the ‘Indian’ race was comprised of all people who originated from the Indian subcontinent (Finchilescu & Dawes, 1999a). The Group Areas Act was

passed soon after. This policy categorically prevented the mixing of the South African race groups in most spheres of life. Thereafter several other legislations were passed that resulted in the complete disenfranchisement of all people of colour. Many anti-apartheid movements arose from this subjugation. However, the state strongly opposed these organisations efforts at liberation, and many political groups were banned and their leaders were arrested and tried in what was known as the Rivonia Trial of 1963-4. It was during this particular period of the 1960s, one of the most politically repressive era's the country has ever known, that Kurt Danziger initiated research on future ideologies in South Africa. Following the Rivonia Trial the situation in South Africa began to alter drastically as black African youths began to rally for radical change from the 1970s onwards. This mobilization culminated in the well-known Soweto uprising of 1976. Thereafter, black African youth began to actively challenge and engage the state, and increasing military actions against the state signalled the end of the peaceful passive-resistance movements that anti-apartheid activists were initially so eager to abide by. In response to this widespread civil disobedience and rebellion several states of emergency were declared in the 1980s. It was during this new upsurge of anti-apartheid resistance that Du Preez et al. (1981) decided to continue Danziger's tradition of research and replicate his original study. When Nelson Mandela was finally released from prison in 1990, the country remained deeply torn and racially divided. He began negotiations with the state for the abolishment of the apartheid regime and levels of political violence peaked in the period of 1992 - May 1994. It was during this violent, yet hopeful interlude, that Finchilescu and Dawes conducted the first of their two studies. Finally, in 1994, the apartheid legislation was legitimately eradicated and the African National Congress (ANC) was voted into power in the country's first democratic elections and thus replaced the Nationalist Party as the country's new political dispensation. Nelson Mandela, the president of the ANC, immediately began efforts to de-racialise the South African population and create a sense of national unity that replaced the intense racial segregation that was characteristic of the former apartheid government. It was in this new era, two years after the downfall of apartheid that Finchilescu and Dawes conducted the second of their two studies on South African youth's future ideologies.

1.2. The post-apartheid context and recent political events

South Africa has undoubtedly come along way since the apartheid era. The ANC has maintained its majority rule over the past 15 years and has taken great lengths to repair the

divided country. It seemed as if a plateau of political stability had finally been reached. However, recent political events threatened to strike at the foundations of this stability. The radical shifts that have recently occurred in the governmental configuration, in which various government officials have joined opposing political parties, “marks a decisive moment in the history of post-apartheid South Africa” (Plaut, 2008) and has thus raised controversy amongst the nation’s people. Two prominent ANC members, Mr. Mosiuoa Gerard Patrick Lekota, and Mr Sam Mbhazima Shilowa defected from the ANC and launched a rival political party known as COPE (Congress for the People) (South African Institute of Race Relations Fast Facts, January 2009). This is the first party to break away from the ANC since 1997 (South African Institute of Race Relations Fast Facts, March 2009), and this split therefore poses the first serious challenge to the ANC since it came to power 16 years ago (Plaut, 2008).

Things came to a head in December of 2007 when the country’s second democratic president, Thabo Mbeki, was unseated from his position as the leader of the ANC. Many South Africans however, objected to the manner in which Mbeki was forced to resign just months before the end of his term. Lekota, out of loyalty to Mbeki, was one of several cabinet ministers to resign from the ANC following Mbeki’s forced resignation. Lekota openly accused the ANC of betraying its democratic principles and threatened to form a breakaway party that could challenge the ANC in the upcoming 2009 elections (Bearak, 2008). This threat culminated in the immediate suspension of Lekota and his former deputy Mluleki George. Other provincial leaders who were found to be organising meetings for Lekota were also suspended for “undermining and betraying the organisation.” Lekota resigned his position as South African defence minister and shortly thereafter formed the rival political party COPE (News iafrica, 2008). This split from the ANC, it was said, “could reconfigure the South African political landscape before elections next year [2009]” (Bearak, 2008). This political instability coupled with the arguably tenuous state of the country at present has, in the light of the country’s fourth democratic elections, surely triggered insecurities amongst the South African population and prompted citizens to reflect carefully on the future of the country. This produced a feeling amongst South Africans that the upcoming election might lead to change in the country’s political structure, and after 16 years of ANC governance, Plaut (2008) says, “there is now a real wind of change in the air”.

The current researcher was interested to discover whether the feelings of South African citizens towards the current political volatility and the arguably precarious state of the nation

at present were strong enough to elicit such “situationally transcendent ideas” or future ideologies, as Mannheim (1936) proposes. The opportunity for continuing Kurt Danziger’s tradition of research thus arose.

1.3. The aims of the current study

The primary aim of the present study was to discover the predominant future ideologies that exist amongst students at the University of the Witwatersrand in the current social, economic and political South African context, and in so doing, continue a tradition of research on South Africans future ideologies that was begun by Kurt Danziger in 1956. In a racially stratified society, such as South Africa, the ideological responses of adolescents are unlikely to be homogenous (Finchilescu & Dawes, 1999b). In the past, the ways in which the former apartheid administration impacted uniquely on the various South African race groups would most certainly have played a determining role in the emergence of these ideologies per race group. Similarly, in today’s society, the ubiquitous after-effects of this oppressive dispensation still means that each of the country’s race groups is disproportionately affected, and as a result, this homogeneity of future ideologies should indeed remain widespread across the South African population groups. In accordance with the above, the researcher therefore wished to determine whether the predominant future ideologies that emerged from this study’s sample bore any association with race, as well as the participants’ primary social group identifications. It was further envisaged that one’s level of optimism towards the future and the discontent that arises from one’s experience of relative deprivation would affect the way in which one perceives the future and influence the future ideology that one constructs. As a result, the researcher set out to ascertain how optimistic the University’s students are to the future of South Africa, as well as to discover what their experiences of relative deprivation are in this context. Thereafter, it was determined whether optimism to the future and perceived relative deprivation influenced the samples construction of future ideologies.

Chapter Two

Literature Review

2.1. Future orientation or ideology

2.1.1. A conceptual understanding

An ideology is a set of beliefs or a way of understanding the world and every human being has his own ideology or ideologies that constitute his symbolic universe of which priority is usually given to one belief (Degenaar, 1983; Leatt, Kneifel & Nurnberger, 1986). It follows that a *future* ideology is therefore a set of beliefs concerning the future. Varying definitions of the concept of future orientation/ideology exist. While Nurmi (1991, 1993, as cited in Adamson, Ferrer-Wreder & Kerpelman, 2007, p.95) describes it as being the “extent to which people can imagine their futures in terms of goals, hopes, expectations and plans”, Grootboom (2007) considers it to be one’s preferred mode of thought and behaviour, or where one wants to go and how one ought to arrive there. Seginer (2009) defines it as being an individual’s tendency to engage in future thinking, while another one of her articles speaks of future orientation as being a “psychological future” (Seginer, 2008, p.272).

2.1.2. Pioneering work on future ideologies

Karl Mannheim (1936) was the first to assess the future ideologies of a society during times of socio-political instability. Mannheim argued that in such times individuals would generate situationally transcendent ideas about the future of their society. In a stable society, he said, there is no desire or need for change, because the ways of thinking of all members of a society converge and result in a singular, unified worldview. However, in a society where social and political instability are ubiquitous, where the values of different groups within this society differ greatly from one another, and where members of this society are dissatisfied with the existing order, the unified worldview of that society will disintegrate. Mannheim goes on to say that it is only in “a world of upheaval in which new values are being created and old ones destroyed” that individuals will attempt to “annihilate specific beliefs and attitudes as well as the intellectual foundations upon which they rest” (p.57), as it is only in rapidly and

profoundly changing societies that ideas/values that were once regarded as fixed and stable can be subjected to such systematic criticism. Therefore, when a social situation changes its system of norms, disharmony arises between the situation and its old norms. As a result, individuals or groups will develop ideas about the future of their society that transcend the immediate situation. Mannheim explains that this is because “when the imagination finds no satisfaction in existing reality, it seeks refuge in wishfully constructed places and periods” (p.184). These ideologies therefore serve to offer these individuals a much-desired change in their erratic society through a normative thought process. They thus become motivated to impose this particular ideology on their society both cognitively, and in action. Mannheim (1936) also put forward that during times of social instability the specific future ideologies that one constructs will be based on one’s particular relationship to the current social crisis. One’s future ideology will thus correspond with the particular position that one’s group occupies in their struggle for power (Mannheim, 1952).

2.2. Future orientation during adolescent development

Rapid social change inevitably has significant consequences for and psychological impacts on all members of a society, irrespective of whether this experience is viewed in a positive or negative light (Finchilescu & Dawes, 1999a). Children and youth however, seem to be particularly vulnerable to such situations, as they are affected in very specific ways. For example, Dawes (1994, as cited in Finchilescu & Dawes, 1999a) outlines how youths are most likely to be drawn into violent conflict either as members of the armed forces, or as participants in revolutionary political movements. While considerable attention has been directed at the effect of adversity on youth in South Africa, far less research has focused on how adolescents and young adults make sense of and orient themselves to socio-political change. Furthermore, only a few studies have concentrated on future ideologies as an important means of examining socio-political perspectives (Finchilescu & Dawes, 1999b).

Adolescence is a period during which future thinking becomes of vital importance. The term ‘adolescence’ is a derivation of a Greek term that essentially means “to grow” or “to grow to maturity” (Hurlock, 1980 as cited in Grootboom, 2007). As such, this important phase of the life-span coheres around development and is directed towards a position or stage in the future. Incidentally, development, Grootboom (2007) puts forth, means ‘moving forward’ from a position in the present to a position in the future, and it is therefore necessary for the

adolescent individual to begin making crucial decisions about his/her future during this developmental period. Adamson, Ferrer-Wreder and Kerpelman (2007) echo the abovementioned point. They confirm that “dreaming and reflecting upon one’s personal future have been found to be a salient issue for many young people” (p.95). They go on to say that the visions youths have for themselves in the future have implications for young adult development, as these beliefs modify the manner in which adolescents cope with developmental tasks and transitions (Adamson et al., 2007).

Nurmi (1991, as cited in Townsend, 2002) lists four fundamental reasons for why he believes that thinking and planning for the future are particularly important for youth. Adolescents, he says, face a multiplicity of normative tasks that are set for them by their significant others (parents, peers, teachers), and many of these tasks involve some form of orientation to the future, as they most often concern life-span developmental tasks that require one to think about and plan for the future. Secondly, he argues that much of adolescents thinking about the future will crucially affect their later adult lives, especially as it applies to career, lifestyle and future familial choices. His third justification is that the manner in which adolescents perceive their futures plays a fundamental role in the formation of their identity. Finally, he reports that an association has been found to exist between adolescents’ future outlooks and various problem behaviours. Several other studies confirm this. Robbins and Bryan’s (2004) study on the relationship between future orientations, impulsive sensation seeking and risk behaviour among adjudicated adolescents uncovered evidence that small, but reliable relationships do indeed exist between future orientation and risk behaviours. Conversely, in their 9-month prospective study of the predictors of future expectations of inner-city children, Dubow, Arnett, Smith and Ippolito’s (2001) findings revealed that high positive expectations to the future are related to low levels of problem behaviour, negative peer influences, high school involvement, internal resources (e.g. self-esteem, self-competence, etc) and social support. A possible explanation for these relationships is that experiencing confusion about who one is at the present moment and perceiving negative visions of the future may in fact contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy in which adolescents make life choices that are in line with these pictures of themselves (Adamson et al., 2007).

An increasing distinction is being drawn between one’s personal and private future orientations, and one’s public or societal future orientations. The literature predominantly emphasises the former mode of future thinking (Poole & Cooney, 1987). This more

personalized future orientation resembles an autobiography, as it tells a personal subjective life story that consists of those life domains that the individual deems are important and that give meaning to one's life. This personal 'model of the future' provides the foundation for the setting of goals, planning, exploring options and making commitments that guide one's behaviour and developmental course (Seginer, 2008). In contrast, the public/societal future orientation has been found to centre upon three specific domains, which include (1) major environmental problems (e.g. nuclear threat, resource depletion), (2) the future of the world in general (e.g. stability, change), and (3) the future of key social dimensions and institutions (e.g. peace, politics, development, education) (Poole & Cooney, 1987).

2.3. Previous research on future orientation

Only a handful of studies have concentrated on these latter less common societal/public future ideologies or orientations. They include research that was initiated in South Africa in 1956 by Kurt Danziger. Danziger's original study was then replicated in three subsequent studies. These four studies shall be discussed in the ensuing section. Hereafter, other international studies that have focused on perceptions of the future shall be considered.

2.3.1. Previous research on future ideologies conducted in the South African context

2.3.1.1. Kurt Danziger's 1956 study

In Danziger's research he collected essays written about the future of South Africa by high-school and university students from the black African, Indian, white-Afrikaans speaking and white-English speaking South African population groups between 1956 and 1962. Participants were told to write this essay as if they were historians in 2010 writing about the history of South Africa from the period 1960 to 2010. Danziger categorised a total of 439 essays as reflecting one of five dominant future ideologies: Conservative, Liberal, Technicist, Catastrophic and Revolutionary. His definition of the Conservative ideology took the past to serve as a model for the present and the future. The future thus consisted of the carrying out of traditionalist policies. At the core of the Technicist ideology was the notion that the present leads to the future not by means of social change, but rather by means of technological advancement. In a Catastrophic future ideology there is fatalistic acceptance of social violence and destruction. As a result, the present situation deteriorates to the point where catastrophe is

finally reached. In stark contrast, a Liberal ideology involves the gradual but continuous improvement of the existing order by means of peaceful reforms that are instituted by the government, while in a Revolutionary ideology complete change of the existing social order is desired; however, those who uphold this ideology believe that this change can only be brought about by violent means. Those essays which did not represent a definable future were categorised as Unclassifiable.

Danziger's findings revealed that the white Afrikaans-speaking group upheld mainly Technician and Conservative ideologies, while the white English-speaking respondents were predominantly Catastrophic and Conservative. The Indian/Asian sample was strongly Liberal in their outlooks to the future, followed by Revolutionary; while the ideologies of the black African group were the opposite. They upheld Revolutionary ideologies most strongly followed by Liberal outlooks.

2.3.1.2. Du Preez, Bhana, Broekman, Louw and Nel's 1981 study

Danziger's original study was then replicated by Du Preez, Bhana, Broekman, Louw and Nel in 1981. Their study's sample consisted of psychology university students from five South African universities. Participants were requested to write an essay that was titled identically to Danziger's original essay topic, with the appropriate modification of dates. Comparisons were once again made between the black African, Indian, white Afrikaans-speaking and white-English speaking population groups; however, participants from the coloured race group were included in this replication. The authors analyzed 1387 essays in accordance with Danziger's original ideology classification system.

Du Preez et al. (1981) found that significantly lower proportions of the white Afrikaans-speaking group, as reflected by their samples findings, now upheld Technician and Conservative ideologies. Instead, they had become predominantly Liberal and Catastrophic in their orientations to the future. The Catastrophic ideology had become even stronger amongst the white English-speaking group, while the Conservative ideology appeared less frequently. This group now upheld predominantly Catastrophic ideologies followed by Revolutionary ideologies. While the Indian/Asian group foresaw a predominantly Liberal future in 1963 followed by a Revolutionary future, in 1981 this order was found to have reversed. This group had become strongly Revolutionary and far less Liberal. Amongst the black African sample,

more Liberals emerged during the 1981 study putting this ideology as this groups most widely held future outlook. They had become less Revolutionary over the period from 1963 to 1981. The coloured sample that was included in this replication was found to be staunchly Revolutionary in their future perceptions.

2.3.1.3. Finchilescu and Dawes 1992 and 1996 studies

Thereafter, Finchilescu and Dawes (1999a, 1999b, 2001) conducted their own replication of the study in 1992 and again in 1996. Fourteen- and seventeen-year old high school students, from various schools in the Western Cape and Kwa-Zulu Natal provinces, were asked to write a simplified version of Danziger's original essay topic titled "My thoughts and feelings about the future of South Africa over the next 10 years". A total of 1516 essays were analyzed and categorised according to Danziger's original classification system. However, two additional ideology categories were added in 1996, namely the Socialist and the Social Democratic/Redress ideologies. While this former ideology is communist in content and depicts a future in which land and resources are redistributed amongst the population and poverty is eradicated as a result, the latter ideology represents a future in which the government attempts to eradicate poverty by implementing interventions that serve to promote groups that were formerly disadvantaged. Policies of redress (affirmative action, housing development, etc) are at the core of this future. While the Socialist ideology was in fact referred to by Mannheim (1936), it was not used by Danziger in his original study. Following on Du Preez et al.'s (1981) previous study, Finchilescu and Dawes (1999a) considered the same five South African population groups that these authors included in their replication.

In 1992 the white Afrikaans-speaking group and the white English-speaking group were found to be predominantly Catastrophic and Liberal in their outlooks to the future. In 1996 this had not changed. However, both the coloured and Indian/Asian groups had been mainly Liberal in 1992 followed by Catastrophic. In 1996 this order reversed for both groups. The black African group remained predominantly Liberal from 1992 to 1996 (Finchilescu & Dawes, 1999a, 1999b, 2001).

No studies on future ideologies have been conducted in South Africa since Finchilescu and Dawes most recent study.

2.3.1.4. The Dinokeng Scenarios

In 2009 however, a scenario team that called themselves the Dinokeng Scenarios was forged in an attempt *“To create a space and language for open, reflective and reasoned strategic conversation among South Africans, about possible futures for the country, and the opportunities, risks and choices these futures present”* (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009). In 1994, the birth of democracy in South Africa created a vision of unity and nationhood for all and elevated the citizens’ hope for improvements in the quality of life in South Africa. This task team acknowledges however, that “the realities of constructing a new nation have revealed themselves as an entirely grittier and more complex task than we had anticipated. Our legacy challenges us once more with the task of reconstruction. We have not yet vanquished our past; nor have we yet fully constructed our future” (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009). In response to the critical challenges currently facing the country, a group of 35 South Africans came together to openly discuss the current political, social and economic realities facing South Africa. These 35 individuals comprise leaders from civil society and government, political parties, business, public administration, trade unions, religious groups, academia and the media, and are thus representative of a wide range of South African society. Drawing upon the experience and expertise of each of these 35 individuals, as well as the input from experts in various other fields, the Scenario Team considered and discussed the country’s accomplishments and failures since 1994, as well as the critical challenges that lie ahead. From this discussion they developed various scenario stories on possible futures for South Africa, and these scenarios were found to point to three possible futures for the country. The Scenario Team called these three futures “Walk Together”, “Walk Behind” and “Walk Apart”. The Team intended these stories to stimulate action-oriented discussions amongst the country’s people as to their options and choices. In order to achieve this, the Scenario Team launched a media and engagement campaign in an attempt to extend the reach of the scenarios to the citizens of South Africa.

The three hypothetical future scenarios that emerged from the discussions that took place in the Dinokeng Scenarios undertaking shall be discussed below.

The 'Walk Together' future scenario

In the 'Walk Together' future it is by the efforts of South African citizens that the country is able to progress and prosper. This scenario is divided into four main stages: (1) 2009 to 2011 are described as the 'Bleak Years'. They begin with the current ruling party retaining its majority. Hereafter, the global economic crisis results in declining investment, growth and tax revenues. Service delivery deteriorates even further and as a result, various citizen groups become active in areas such as health, education and crime. (2) In 2012 to 2014 the citizens of South Africa are no longer content to simply sit back and accept the unacceptable conditions in the country. They begin demanding more and citizen associations begin to spread throughout the country. The government finally promises to take action against the incompetence that is so rife amongst managers and civil servants, and this becomes their election manifesto. Improvements in service delivery are noticed. (3) During 2015 to 2017 the government begins to realise that they cannot maintain the current levels of service delivery and infrastructure alone. They advocate a national social pact in an attempt to address the deep structural challenges facing the country, and a 'Citizens Charter' is born as a result. South African businesses assume greater responsibility in education, infrastructure and health, while trade unions work actively to combat unemployment, and citizens' work with the government to monitor education, health and crime. (4) 2018 to 2020 are the years during which true progress is evident in the country. Investment increases and employment rises; the citizens call for greater accountability from politicians and as a result, the voting system is officially changed so that politicians are required to be directly accountable to the voters.

The 'Walk Behind' future scenario

The 'Walk Behind' future scenario depicts a considerably less promising future than that of the former scenario; however, it is less futile than the scenario to follow. This scenario story can also be divided into four main stages: (1) During the years of 2009 to 2011 the ruling party, who has managed to retain their power, increase their efforts at developing the country. They invest considerably in large infrastructure projects and implement programmes to create more unskilled jobs. (2) However, from 2012 to 2014 due to the continuing global crisis unemployment increases and the government is forced to spend more on social grants. This results in a significant increase in the budget deficit and the country is forced to borrow. (3) 2015 to 2017 sees the government once again investing in large-scale infrastructure

programmes to boost development. Skills development is also promoted. (4) Finally, from 2018 to 2020 investment declines considerably, the economy stagnates, and unemployment begins to worsen even further. The government is forced to once again borrow more money on the international markets at high interest rates. Widespread discontent starts to become evident and civil unrest flares up. The government attempts to suppress these protests before they spread.

The ‘Walk Apart’ future scenario

The ‘Walk Apart’ future scenario depicts a future of severe and rapid deterioration that eventually culminates in a state of emergency. The four main stages of this scenario are as follows: (1) In 2009 to 2011 the global crisis puts the economy under strain as investment, growth and tax revenues decline. Unemployment rises and crime becomes more rampant. (2) 2012 to 2014 sees widespread deterioration in the country as corruption in the government intensifies, the education and healthcare sectors deteriorate, unemployment worsens even further, and poverty escalates. Many leave the country. (3) From 2015 to 2017 the ‘shadows lengthen’. Crime increases and the criminal justice system becomes increasingly inefficient, investment continues to decline, unemployment rises and service delivery fails. (4) Catastrophe begins to emerge during the years 2018 to 2020, as the budget deficit escalates and service delivery worsens even further. The government begins to clamp down on the media and suppress civil protests. They form a clandestine alliance with local warlords and militia and a reign of terror and fear is unleashed. South African citizens are threatened with violence and the withdrawal of services if they do not vote for the ruling party. Unbridled resistance and repression arise and a state of emergency is finally declared.

2.3.1.5. Previous research on future ideologies conducted internationally

Various studies on future perceptions have been conducted in other countries as well - some of which were carried out during earlier years and some of which were conducted more recently. Selected studies shall be discussed in the section to follow.

One such study, conducted by Kats (1982), attempted to tap into the patterning of Israeli citizens’ future concerns over time using data that was collected from two surveys that were conducted in 1962 and 1975 respectively. Both studies made use of open-ended questions in

which respondents were required to describe their own personal futures or the future of their country in positive and/or negative terms. Definite shifts in the concerns of Israelis from 1962 to 1975 were noticed; however, as the current study is interested in societal future perceptions rather than personal future perceptions, only the findings of Israelis societal future perceptions will be discussed. It was found that in the 1962 survey the *hopes* of the Israeli respondents cohered round two predominant areas: economic matters; and social, cultural and political concerns. In 1975 a predominant hope was for peace, which was found to intersect with hopes for economic stability, and an improved standard of living. Social, cultural and political issues remained an area of national hope for Israelis, while hope for the continuation of peace emerged as a third area. In terms of Israelis national *fears*, the fear of war became a more prominent issue over the 1962-1975 period. Fears of political and economic instability were rife amongst Israelis in 1962 and this continued to remain a concern in 1975. However, various concerns about nationhood also emerged as an area of fear during this later survey.

A further study that was conducted by Poole and Cooney (1987) examined the personal and societal future orientations of 15-year old individuals in two contrasting cultures: Singapore and Sydney, Australia. These authors found that major environmental concerns, such as war and destruction, featured prominently in their respondents' perceptions of the future. Furthermore, it was found that the adolescents listed the majority of future events under political. This was considered to be a surprising finding, as prior studies have found that adolescents have a tendency to be disengaged from politics. While Singapore adolescents saw the future mainly in relation to their own country, the opposite was true for Australian adolescents who appeared to have a broader perspective on society. Furthermore, while the samples personal futures were seen in pleasant terms, their societal future perceptions were more pessimistic and uncertain. Poole and Cooney (1987) propose that adolescents may in fact be choosing to keep these personal and societal aspects separate from one another in order to exercise some control over their lives, or as a way to shield themselves from the anxiety about the future.

An article written by Ono (2005) cites various other studies that have been conducted on future perceptions; however, the exact nature and contexts of these studies are absent and only the basic findings are reported. Studies conducted in Australia reflect that youths feel powerless about future happenings, and that they are concerned for the mounting uncertainty that advancements in technology will bring about (Eckersley, 1997 as cited in Ono, 2005). It

emerged in another study (Holden, 2002 as cited in Ono, 2005) that as children grow older they tend to become less optimistic about their futures, while a study conducted in Finland (Rubin, 1998 as cited in Ono, 2005) revealed that Finnish youths' images of society and the world are rather vague and seem to be influenced by the information that they derive from the mass media. Ono (2005) also refers to a number of surveys that were carried out in Japan by the Japan Youth Research Institute that focused on Japanese youths' images of the future. The first survey that is mentioned asked high school students to disclose their perceptions about Japanese society in the 21st century. It emerged from the participants' responses that there was an ardent desire for greater equality to be brought about between men and women, and for better living conditions in various suburbs. Other hopes cohered around technological advancements improving life satisfaction, a more hopeful and freer society, a more peaceful world, better living standards, greater trust amongst people, diminished economic inequality, less injustice and corruption, and reduced crime rates. The second survey which also made use of Japanese high school students uncovered that only 34% of the respondents possessed an optimistic view of the future, while 64% were conversely negative in their perceptions of the future. It is Ono's (2005) argument that the after-effects of World War II on Japanese society have resulted in Japanese citizens becoming detached from their local contexts, resulting in a move towards independent living and subsequent breakdown of social cohesion and integration. This has served to weaken Japanese youth's interest in society and an indifference to societal occurrences has arisen.

A more recent study conducted by Gudrun and Mathias (2008) wished to ascertain the possible shifts in attitudes of German youths towards European integration. This study was primarily based on the results of the 2006 Shell Youth Survey, which is a research endeavour that examines the living situation of 12- to 25-year-olds in Germany every four years. While the focus of Gudrun and Mathias' (2008) study was not entirely on future perceptions, this did nonetheless form a minor part of their research. They were interested in discovering what proportion of German youths supported the idea that the European Union should develop into a single state in the future. While 49% of their respondents supported this integration in 2002, in 2006 these attitudes were found to have altered dramatically, as only 32% remained in favour of this integration.

2.4. The current South African context

While the violent political upheaval and instability that were so characteristic of the past no longer permeate today's society, many would still argue that a great deal of instability and insecurity still exists. While South Africa has accomplished a great deal over the past few years, the country is still faced with numerous challenges that severely threaten the quality of life of its citizens: unemployment, crime, HIV/AIDS, public services, housing, education, health care, poverty, and corruption (Orkin & Jowell, 2006). Such stressful societal events unavoidably influence one's perceptions of the future (Grootboom, 2007), and it is thus important to consider the present circumstances in the country, both positive and negative, as they will certainly have influenced the participants' construction of future ideologies in the current study. Some of the abovementioned domains will now be discussed in an effort to paint as clear and comprehensive a picture of the situation in the current South African context.

2.4.1. Population growth and the provision of basic services

The South African population is expanding rapidly. In 1996 it averaged 40.6 million. In the eleven year period from 1996 to 2007 this figure grew by 19.5% and the population now averages approximately 48.5 million individuals. As a result, the number of South African households subsequently increased by an astonishing 51.1% during this same period. In light of this, it becomes evident why the governments task to provide basic services to South African households has become increasingly difficult. However, despite this challenge, the provision of basic services such as electricity and access to piped water was noted to have undergone improvement in all the South African provinces (South African Institute of Race Relations Fast Facts, January 2008).

2.4.2. Unemployment and poverty

Unemployment in South Africa remains unacceptably high, and as a result, many families live in extreme poverty. The statistics reflect that nearly a quarter of the working-age population is unable to find employment (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009). The government has of late enhanced their efforts to address and ultimately eradicate poverty. A particularly momentous intervention saw the introduction of social grants which are now being delivered to

approximately 13 million individuals. However, despite these serious efforts about 40% of South African households still live below the poverty line (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009). As a result, hunger and malnutrition are worsening (Roberts, 2006).

2.4.3. Crime

Crime and violence are particularly pervasive problems in South Africa, and all South African communities and sectors of society are threatened by it. When certain crime statistics are considered however, it appears as if there is cause for hope. In the past five years there seems to have been a decrease in the incidence of violent contact crimes (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009). Nevertheless, the struggle to combat crime in the country still seems to be far from over. Møller (2007) also agrees that while crime has indeed decreased, it still remains incredibly high when compared to international countries.

While there have been considerable recent efforts by the government to combat organised crime, South African citizens still face a police force that has been described as “under-resourced, under-trained, ill-equipped and demoralised” (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009). It is therefore not surprising that in 2007 a staggering 40 billion rand was spent on private security. This figure speaks to the limited faith that ordinary South African citizens have in the South African Police Service (SAPS). The numbers of private security officers in the country far outweigh those of active police personnel (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009; South African Institute of Race Relations Fast Facts, October 2008). South Africans residing in poorer communities who are unable to afford private security have given up hope that the police will protect them, and have resorted to vigilantism (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009).

Furthermore, the country’s failure to control crime and ensure the safety of its citizens has a negative impact on South Africa’s appeal as a tourist destination and as an investment opportunity (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009).

2.4.4. Health and Welfare

South Africa has the fourth highest rate of HIV/Aids infection in the world (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009). The pandemic has had truly devastating effects on the country. The disease has affected teachers, nurses, parents and young workers whose deaths have left their families

impoverished. Surviving grandparents are often left to care for their orphaned grandchildren on their inadequate pensions and social grants. In 2007, approximately 1.4 million children were left orphaned by the virus, and 11.6% of the South African population was estimated to be infected with the disease in 2008. By 2007 the disease was already responsible for causing the deaths of 2.16 million individuals, which accounted for 48% of all deaths in South Africa in 2007. As a result, the country's healthcare sector is under severe and mounting pressure (South African Institute of Race Relations Fast Facts, October 2008). Furthermore, the former government's belated response to the HIV/Aids pandemic saw the delayed provision of Anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs) and of testing and counselling sites (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009).

2.4.5. Education

The country's faltering education system is a serious cause for concern. South Africa ranks among the lowest in the world on basic literacy and numeracy skills. Furthermore, many teachers are under-qualified, demoralised and lack the commitment and professionalism necessary for their professions (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009).

Black South Africans appear to be the worst affected by the poor quality of the education system, and statistics seem to reflect that the failures in public education are now the most significant factor retarding the social and economic progress of black South Africans (South African Institute of Race Relations Fast Facts, December 2009). This "rotten public education", as some describe it as being (John Kane-Berman, South African Institute of Race Relations Fast Facts, December 2009), spells serious consequences for the future of the country, as the quality of public schooling is so poor in some areas that it is denying black African learners' any opportunities to improve their social and economic standings. Furthermore, if the quality of education does not undergo dramatic improvement social and economic inequalities between race groups will be maintained for decades to come (South African Institute of Race Relations Fast Facts, December 2009).

On a more positive note, the government's introduction of compulsory education has served to drastically increase school enrolment over the past 15 years; education has been integrated unlike in the past; there have been significant further budget allocations to higher education and the school nutrition scheme; and the proportion of black African students attending universities has increased (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009).

2.4.6. Xenophobia

South Africa has also been severely impacted by the instability of its failed neighbouring country, Zimbabwe. Due to the dire conditions in Zimbabwe its citizens are migrating to South Africa in their masses and as a result, South Africa is being forced to bear this country's social, economic and political burdens which inevitably put South Africa under increasing strain. This large-scale influx of Zimbabwean citizens creates fierce competition between these foreigners and local South Africans for scarce resources, such as employment and housing, etc (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009). Consequently, upsurges of sporadic violence broke out between these rival groups. The wave of xenophobic attacks that began on the 11th of May 2008 in Alexandria, an overcrowded slum located next to the affluent suburb of Sandton in Johannesburg, shocked South Africans and made headlines around the world (Kapp, 2008). Xenophobic violence included gunshot and stabbing wounds, broken limbs and burns. At least 62 individuals lost their lives, 670 were seriously injured and more than 1300 arrested (Kapp, 2008). As a result of these horrific incidents, scores of foreigners, many of whom had fled from their countries of origin to seek refuge in South Africa, were forced to return to their home lands, while thousands of others took up residence in churches, mosques, community centres, police stations and plots of land on the side of highways. It was estimated that 170 000 foreigners were displaced due to these events (South African Institute of Race Relations Fast Facts, August 2008).

2.4.7. Failures and corruption in government

Weak leadership is evident in all sectors of South African society (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009). Since 1994 the media has reported numerous stories concerning the inefficacy of the South African government. This coverage has featured tales of corruption, incompetence, and failures of and delays in delivery (Daniel, Southall & Dippenaar, 2006). Government leaders lack many vital skills that are necessary to occupy government positions and many of them display a lack of commitment to serving the public. It can be argued that these deficits are responsible for creating the "culture of mediocrity, incompetence, fraud, corruption, nepotism and entitlement" that is so evident in the South African government (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009). The recent allegations of corruption that were directed at the leader of the African National Congress (ANC), Jacob Zuma, brought matters of corruption to the fore and sparked acute disapproval amongst the country's citizens.

2.4.8. Race relations

South Africa's history has essentially revolved around race and 'colour'. Race relations were, and still are, ingrained in the fabric of South African society and in the minds of South African citizens. Apartheid has been described as the 'standard of racism around the world' until it was dismantled in 1994 (Jones, 2006). However, after Nelson Mandela's release from prison and his election as president of the country, he focused his efforts at reconciling the deeply divided country and creating a multiracial nation. The symbol of the rainbow was adopted to represent the strongly collectivist and inclusive nation that would hopefully come to define South Africa (Dickow & Møller, 2002). There is no doubt that South Africa has indeed come a long way in terms of race relations. Common concerns are beginning to emerge across racial barriers. These include shared concerns about crime, the lack of government leadership, and problems of poor service delivery (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009).

In recent years South Africa introduced two primary affirmative action laws: Affirmative Action (AA) and Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) (South African Institute of Race Relations Fast Facts, December 2009), in an attempt to reduce the inequality that still exists between the South African race groups. While these laws were created with the best intentions, some would nonetheless argue that they served to make South Africa more race-conscious (Dickow & Møller, 2002). Furthermore, instead of empowering citizens of 'colour' some contend that these laws have the opposite effect, and that they have led to a "culture of seeping entitlement" (Vusi Mavimbela – director general of the presidents office, South African Institute of Race Relations Fast Facts, December 2009), which ultimately implies victimhood.

2.5. Potential determinants of future ideologies

It was envisaged that three additional variables – optimism about the future, perceived relative deprivation and primary social group identification – would be important determinants in the construction of one's future ideology in the current study. While one's levels of optimism about the future and the specific future ideology that one endorses cannot be regarded as being completely analogous constructs, they share in common the fact that they are both *perceptions* of the future. The outlook that one has to the future, in terms of their optimism

about what is to come, is thus highly likely to influence the future ideology that one constructs.

It was mentioned above that the specific future ideology that one constructs will be based on one's relationship to the current social situation (Mannheim, 1936). This implies that future ideologies are to some extent extensions of the present, as they are determined partly by one's subjective relationship to the present circumstances of a particular society. One's current experience of relative deprivation in South Africa is therefore also likely to influence the future that one foresees.

Another variable that has been found to influence one's outlook to the future is that of identity. One's self identity has a direct influence on one's perception of the future (Grootboom, 2007). According to Social Identity Theory the social component of one's self-concept consists of one's membership to various social groups (Tajfel, 1981 as cited in Bornman, in press). It follows that the social and political position of one's own group in relation to other relevant out-groups thus becomes of psychological significance to an individual and this may indeed influence one's social and political attitudes and behaviour (Brown, 1986 as cited in Bornman, in press). One's primary social group identification is thus also imagined to play a role in the future ideology that one constructs.

These three variables shall be discussed in more detail in the sections to follow.

2.5.1. Optimism to the future

Directly after the first democratic elections of 1994 South Africans were overwhelmingly proud, happy and satisfied with life, and a decade later it seems as if little has changed. Møller (2007) reports that most South Africans are happy and optimistic about the future, and that they have seen improvements in their standards of living and quality of life. While she acknowledges that some are indeed still struggling and are growing impatient, these individuals are clearly the minority.

Hamel, Brodie and Morin's (2005) findings lend support to those above. Their results reflect that 70% of South Africans are optimistic about the future, with black Africans being the most optimistic, followed by Indian/Asians and coloureds. White South Africans were found to be

the least optimistic about the future. This pattern seems to be consistent across surveys and studies that measure South Africans levels of optimism to the future. Black Africans are consistently found to display the highest levels of optimism, while whites have a strong tendency to yield the lowest scores on this measure. Surprisingly, those living in the worst conditions are the most optimistic and hopeful. Furthermore, black Africans at every poverty level were found to be more optimistic than white South Africans. When questioned about their levels of optimism in five core domains in South Africa, 75% of the respondents from Hamel et al.'s (2005) study said that they expected improvements in education, 70% in race relations, 67% in the South African healthcare system, and 66% in the country's economy and the overall quality of life in South Africa.

The respondents of the *2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey* were asked whether they thought that the country was moving in the right direction. Their results revealed that 59% were of the opinion that the country was indeed moving in the right direction, while conversely 39% felt that the country was moving in the wrong direction, and 2% were unsure of how to answer this question. When the South African race groups were compared the black African group was clearly the most optimistic to the future as a disproportionate 65% of these respondents indicated that they felt the country was moving in the right direction. A low 36% of whites and 30% of Indian/Asians indicated as such, rendering these two groups the least optimistic of all the South African race groups in this instance. Forty-four percent of coloured respondents were of the opinion that the country was moving in the right direction (Daniel et al., 2006).

The respondents who participated in the *2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey* were then asked whether they felt that, in the next five years, life would improve for 'people like them'. Once again, black Africans were the most optimistic in this regard, as 48% of this group indicated that life would improve, while 22% felt that life would remain much the same, 18% foresaw worsening conditions, and 12% were unsure of how to answer. A low 15% of the white race group expected life to improve for them, 28% expected things to stay much as they were, 48% expected life to get worse, and 9% were uncertain of their sentiments in this regard. These results put this race group as the least optimistic. The coloured and Indian/Asian groups scored in between the black African and white groups (Daniel et al., 2006). These authors suggest that, when one considers the lives of black South Africans during apartheid, it is not surprising that this group is consistently the most optimistic about

the present and future, as their lives under this oppressive administration were considerably worse than they are today. White South Africans, on the other hand, receive a higher quality of education, experience more affluent economic conditions, and have a better standard of living; however, they consistently are the most discontented and least optimistic of all the South African race groups. The authors advocate that this dissatisfaction may be due to a subconscious resentment that they no longer 'run the show' as they did under the apartheid government.

In terms of South Africans attitudes to poverty and inequality, the *2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey* found that while black Africans were generally dissatisfied with their present conditions, they acknowledged nonetheless how their group's situation had improved significantly and their future outlook was positive. On the contrary, white South Africans were satisfied with their current situation, but said that their group's situation had worsened over time and these respondents perceived bleak future prospects for their group (Roberts, 2006).

2.5.2. Relative deprivation

South Africa remains one of the most inequitable societies in the world (Pillay, 2006) and the socio-economic gap that exists between the country's race groups is tremendous. Despite the rapid growth of the new black African middle class and the numerous strategies that government has implemented in order to alleviate poverty and enhance economic growth, the socio-economic discrepancies, between black and white South Africans in particular, are continuing, and even growing in some respects (Pillay, 2006). Large disparities exist in terms of employment, income and basic household facilities and as a result, South Africa remains a country of Haves (mainly white individuals) and Have-nots (mainly black individuals) (Hamel et al., 2005). This depiction of South Africa as being a country of 'two nations' was even confirmed by the former president, Thabo Mbeki, who believed that large social divides still exist in the country (Dickow & Møller, 2002).

The phenomenon of relative deprivation can be described as the discontent that arises from the subjective feeling of deprivation *relative to* another person or group (Sears, Freedman & Peplau, 1985). The emphasis on *relative to* is of great importance, because the deprivation that is experienced is not objective or absolute. Instead, it is a subjective and personal

experience that is highly dependent on how one *perceives* the discrepancy between one's lot and that of another's (Coser, 1967). Five preconditions must be met in order for the experience of relative deprivation to arise (Crosby as cited in Penrod, 1986):

- (1) the individual must see someone who possesses X;
- (2) the individual must then want X;
- (3) he/she must feel entitled to X;
- (4) he/she must feel that it is feasible to obtain X; and
- (5) he/she must not feel personally responsible for their lack of X.

The literature distinguishes between egoistical and fraternal relative deprivation. While egoistical relative deprivation involves interpersonal comparisons and is therefore felt by an individual who compares his/her personal situation to that of another individual, fraternal relative deprivation involves an intergroup comparison and is thus experienced when the position of one's own group is compared to those of other groups (De La Rey & Raju, 1996; Grant & Brown, 1995). Gurr (1970 as cited in Appelgryn, 1991) contends that general living conditions (e.g. political rights, employment opportunities) that most people in a society consider to be essential are the means most relevant to a theory of relative deprivation, rather than more personalised means. This latter form of relative deprivation is what is likely to lead to collective social action (DeRidder, Schrujjer & Tripathi, 1992). There is substantial evidence to support this assumption. Studies cited by DeRidder et al. (1992) (Caplan, 1970; Caplan & Paige, 1968) found fraternal deprivation to be predictive of negative intergroup behaviours, such as riots. Similarly, Dube and Guimond (1986 as cited by DeRidder et al., 1992) found that group discontent was related to protests on university campuses, while Grant and Brown (1995) also found support for their hypothesis that the higher one's perception of fraternal deprivation, the more likely one will be to engage in collective social action. Appelgryn (1991) however, cautions that relative deprivation is simply a motivating variable that may serve to predispose one to such behaviour and is not a direct cause of collective social action. While Crosby's above discussion of the preconditions of relative deprivation relates more to the egoistical measure of relative deprivation, the underlying principles would also be applicable to the phenomenon of fraternal relative deprivation. Coser's (1967) explanation of how feelings of fraternal relative deprivation lead to collective social action justifies this. He explains that when the distribution of resources in a society is not in complete accordance with what individuals and groups consider their right, they begin to feel deprived and subsequently frustrated. If society does not allow these individuals to express

their feelings of discontent, they may thus resort to displaying behaviours that deviate from the norm and “departures from institutional requirements are to be expected” (Coser, 1967, p.30). As a result, conflict ensues in an effort to increase their sense of gratification.

Mphuthing (1998) explains that, in South Africa, race is a prominent criterion for the distribution of wealth and resources, and this variable has therefore been the primary focus of studies that attempted to explore and measure relative deprivation, and there is in fact substantial evidence to point to the fact that black Africans experience considerably higher levels of relative deprivation than the rest of the South African race groups. Black Africans most often report ‘frequent shortages’ of their basic needs, while coloured, Indian/Asian and white South Africans most often report either ‘rare shortages’ or ‘complete satisfaction’ of their basic needs (Hamel et al., 2005). Nearly a third of black Africans consider themselves to be ‘poor’, while 47% said that they were just getting by, and 23% saw themselves as being ‘comfortable’ or ‘wealthy’. Forty percent of coloureds reported being comfortable or wealthy, while among Indian/Asians and whites, self-perceived poverty was virtually non-existent, with 60% and 77% of these respondents saying that they were comfortable or wealthy respectively (Roberts, 2006). Hamel et al. (2005) also confirm that the poverty levels of the coloured, Indian/Asian and white race groups are sharply reduced when compared to those of the black African group.

Black South Africans are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with their inferior conditions at present and are generally intolerant of the existing level of inequality in the country (Roberts, 2006). This is evident from the regular strikes and protest actions that have arisen out of their dissatisfaction with housing provisions, service delivery, nepotism and corruption in government (Møller, 2007), among other factors. After the downfall of apartheid, this group expected their lives to improve considerably and for their basic needs to be met. However, this clearly did not materialize as they were hoping and as a result, they are becoming progressively more impatient.

Mphuthing (1998), in her study of black South Africans’ experiences of relative deprivation, found that black Africans perceived their socio-economic position to have improved significantly over the past few years, but this was still far below the position they felt they rightfully deserved. Furthermore, black Africans perceived white English- and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans’ to occupy significantly higher positions than they themselves did;

however, the Afrikaans position was seen as being greatly above what they were entitled to, while the English position was seen as being marginally above what they were entitled to. These findings clearly reflect the racial socio-economic disparities that were brought about by apartheid and that still continue to exist in modern day society.

Socio-economic inequities and inter-racial relative deprivation are serious threats to a stable democracy (Mphuthing, 1998); however, the evidence suggests unfortunately that experiences of relative deprivation are rife in South Africa, particularly amongst the black African race group. It is highly likely therefore, that the discontent that arises from this experience will affect how one looks towards the future and the future ideology that one constructs.

2.5.3. South African's social group identifications

The identities of different race groups, particularly within the South African context, are not likely to have remained stable over the years. Identities are never static, but dynamic, and changes in identity often coincide with changes in the social and political environment (Bornman, in press). The political transformation which changed the social, economic, educational and personal landscapes for all South African citizens also changed the ways in which members of different race groups identified with various identity categories.

2.5.3.1. The national 'South African' identity and the global 'African' identity

During the apartheid era South African citizens were categorised according to the official system of racial classification which saw an individual as belonging to one of four population groups: black, coloured, Indian/Asian and white. Consequently, identity formation during this period was primarily determined by this racial stratification. However, language, cultural and/or ethnic differences also exist within these four main racial groups (Bornman, in press). Due to the exclusionary nature of apartheid whereby 'people of colour' were prohibited from being granted formal citizenship and were therefore not seen as being true South Africans, it is not surprising that the country's citizens failed to endorse a national South African identity. When democracy was brought about however, President Mandela attempted to promote such a national identity and in so doing bring about a sense of unity and nationhood (Bornman, in press). However, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Council (PAC) have historically endorsed an African identity rather than an exclusively South African

identity. During President Mbeki's leadership President Mandela's nation-building discourse was overlooked and support was instead given to embracing Africanism. However, a point of contention is whether this 'African' identity also applies to white South Africans. If one takes Gibson and Gouws' (2000, as cited in Bornman, in press) findings into account, it would appear as if white South Africans do not consider this identity to pertain to them. These authors found that black Africans had a tendency to endorse the 'African' identity, while white South Africans preferred to identify with the national 'South African' identity. Bornman's (in press) findings lend support to the above. She found that in 1994 black Africans identified strongly with racial and ethnic identities. At this point in time they endorsed the 'South African' identity more so than they did the 'African' identity. However, in 2001 this changed considerably. While they still upheld racial and ethnic identities, identification with the 'African' identity overtook that of the national identity and appeared to have become a primary identity for this race group. Bornman (in press) argues that the political transformation served not only to reunite black Africans with South Africa, but also with the rest of the world. They were once again able to freely embrace their African heritage and Africanism consequently became a primary identity. In 1994 white South Africans identified strongly with the national identity. In 2001 this had not changed.

This pattern of the endorsement of the national identity appears to be relatively consistent across studies. In Finchilescu and Dawes (1999a) 1992 study, the white English-speaking group was the greatest endorser of the national South African identity. Their endorsement was followed by the white Afrikaans-speaking group, the Indian/Asian group and the coloured group. The black African group once again identified with the national identity the least. However, when these researchers conducted their second study four years later in 1996, they found that these identity preferences had changed quite considerably. The black African group still identified the least with the national identity and did thus not vary significantly over time. The white Afrikaans-speaking group however, identified more strongly with the national identity in 1996 than they did in 1992, while the white English-speaking group's identification decreased slightly. The most change occurred for the coloured and Indian/Asian race groups. Both groups endorsement of the national identity rose significantly from 1992 to 1996. While the white English-speaking group identified more strongly with this identity than the black African group did, the importance that the former group placed on this identity was lower than that of the black African group. The researchers argue that the reason for the low identification of the black African group with the national identity is that they perhaps still

associate the label with the apartheid dispensation despite the change in government. While the black African group did not seem to identify strongly with the 'South African' identity, they did however seem to show more support for the identity of 'African'. The authors point out however, that it was not certain whether black Africans perceived this identity to represent a global and continental 'African' identity or whether they perceived it as a form of local ethnic identity.

According to the 2003 *South African Social Attitudes Survey*, the national 'South African' identity was found to have strengthened over the period of 1998 to 2000 (Grossber, Struwig & Pillay, 2006). Eighty-three percent of respondents said that they would rather be a citizen of South Africa than any other country in the world. The degree of identification with the national 'South African' identity however, also varied markedly across the South African race groups. In stark contrast to the findings above, in this instance black Africans were now found to have the strongest sense of national identity, while whites had the weakest, and the coloured and Indian/Asian groups fell in between (Roefs, 2006).

2.5.3.2. Racial/ethnic identity

There seems to be some variance in the endorsement of racial/ethnic identities across studies. In Finchilescu and Dawes (1999a) 1992 study they found that the Indian/Asian race group was the strongest endorser of a racial/ethnic identity. Their score was followed by the white English-speaking group, the coloured group, and the white Afrikaans-speaking group. Black Africans were the weakest endorsers of this identity. In 1996 the white Afrikaans-speaking group's racial identification decreased making this group the weakest endorsers of this identity. While the proportions of black Africans who identified with their racial identity increased significantly from 1992 to 1996, the strength of their identifications did not reach the levels that were evident amongst the white English-speaking, coloured and Indian/Asian groups. In contrast to the findings above, the 2003 *South African Social Attitudes Survey* racial identity was found to be strongest amongst black Africans and weakest amongst coloureds. Yet another study conducted by Grootboom (2007) reports slightly different findings. He found that overall his sample of adolescents most strongly endorsed the Christian religion, followed by the national South African identity and then their racial classification. However, when he looked for racial differences, he discovered that coloureds and whites were similar in their identifications, as both groups placed more emphasis on the South African and

Christian identities followed by race, while the black African group conversely placed more importance on being black or African than they did on being South African or Christian. This researcher postulated that the heightened sense of racial identity amongst the coloured race group could perhaps be attributed to the limitations placed on their identity options. For example, black Africans can derive their identities from the particular ethnicities that are unique to the black African culture (e.g. Zulu or Xhosa), and therefore this group has a range of identities to choose from. He argues however, that the coloured group's choices have already been made for them politically, socially and by ancestry.

The primary identities that characterise and have created tensions within South Africa are largely based on racial, ethnic, religious, gender and linguistic groupings (Grossber et al., 2006), and one would therefore expect these identities, among others, to influence the future ideology that one constructs in a South African context.

2.6. The current study

The country's current political volatility signified the ideal time at which to conduct a further study on South Africans future ideologies. How does this current social, economic and political climate influence South Africans' views on the future of the country? The present study aims to arrive at an answer to this question by replicating Danziger's (1963) original study on future ideologies in the current above-portrayed context. The researcher aims to identify the predominant future ideologies that are present amongst University of the Witwatersrand's students', and to discover how these future ideologies differ across the South African race groups, as well as in terms of the primary social group identification that one upholds. She also intends to measure the levels of optimism to the future and the experiences of relative deprivation that are present amongst this sample, and ascertain whether these two variables influence the predominant future ideologies that one constructs.

Chapter Three

Methods

3.1. Research Questions

- (1) What are the predominant future ideologies held by the University of the Witwatersrand students?
- (2) Are these predominant future ideologies associated with race?
- (3) Are these predominant future ideologies associated with primary social group identification?
- (4) What are the University of the Witwatersrand students' levels of optimism to the future of South Africa and are these levels of optimism associated with their predominant future ideologies?
- (5) What are the levels of relative deprivation experienced by the University of the Witwatersrand students and are these levels of relative deprivation associated with their predominant future ideologies?
- (6) Do the sample's primary social group identifications, levels of optimism to the future and levels of perceived relative deprivation predict the predominant future ideology that one constructs?

3.2. Sample and Sampling

Two hundred and twenty-three ($n = 223$) students at the University of the Witwatersrand who were registered for Psychology I comprised the sample of the present study. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 36 years and exhibited a mean age of 19.19 ($SD = 2.01$). The vast majority of the sample were first year Psychology students ($n = 184$; 82.51%); however, small proportions of second year ($n = 29$; 13.00%) and third year ($n = 10$; 4.48%) students were also completing the Psychology I module and they were therefore also included as part of the sample. The study's sample is however, neither representative of the Psychology I class nor the University.

Female participants, comprised 74.44% (n = 166) of the sample clearly outweighing the male participants, who only accounted for 25.56% (n = 57) of the current sample. The racial breakdown of the current sample was 50.67% (n = 113) black African participants, 7.62% (n = 17) coloured participants, 12.11% (n = 27) Indian/Asian participants and 29.6% (n = 66) white participants. According to a mid year 2009 population estimate conducted by *Statistics South Africa*, the study's proportions of the four main South African race groups are not consistent with national estimates, which puts black Africans at comprising 79.3% of the South African population, coloureds at 9.0%, Indian/Asians at 2.6% and whites at 9.1%. It is often questioned whether students from South African universities are indeed representative of the remainder of the South African population. From the demographic configuration of the current sample it would appear that this is not the case. Furthermore, the sample was neither representative of the University of the Witwatersrand population which, in 2009, put black Africans as comprising 55.3% of the university population, coloureds at 3.8%, Indians/Asians as 14% and whites as 27.5%. Each of the 11 official South African languages was reported as participants' first home languages, as well as Portuguese and Shona. English however, was the most commonly spoken home language with 51.57% (n = 115) of the sample speaking English at home. This was followed by isiZulu (n = 34; 15.25%), Setswana (n = 17; 7.62%), Sesotho (n = 13, 5.83%) and Sepedi (n = 12; 5.38%).

It was initially hoped that the sample would consist of a sufficient number of white first language Afrikaans-speakers, so that comparisons could be made between the black African, coloured, Indian/Asian, white Afrikaans and white English groups, as was done in previous studies of this nature. Unfortunately, it was found that only 2 participants were in fact white first language Afrikaans-speakers, and this ethno-linguistic distinction could therefore not be included. Comparisons were instead made between the black African, coloured, Indian/Asian and white groups alone.

The sampling method that was employed was that of convenience sampling. In sampling of this nature the researcher makes a limited attempt to ensure that the sample is an accurate representation of the target population and therefore he/she cannot reliably generalize the results of such a sample to the entire target population. As this form of sampling does not involve the random selection of individuals for inclusion in the study, it is by definition a form of non-probability sampling. While the obvious shortcoming of this strategy is that each individual in the population is not guaranteed an equal chance of being included in the sample

(Whitley, 2002), non-probability sampling is however, a convenient and economical form of sampling.

3.3. Research Design

Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected for analysis in the current study and the research endeavour therefore followed a mixed methods approach. As data was collected at one point in time, the study was cross-sectional in nature (Whitley, 2002). Furthermore, because the study did not involve the manipulation of the independent variable, the presence of a control group or the random assignment of participants to various study conditions, it adheres to a non-experimental design. The primary shortcoming of such a design is that none of the three criteria that are necessary to establish causality (i.e. temporal precedence, non-spuriousness, and covariation) are met, and therefore cause and effect relationships cannot be determined. However, non-experimental research is useful for descriptive purposes, and trends can be established if measures are repeated and replicated. Furthermore, non-experimental designs are relatively easy to carry out, and are time and cost efficient. While it follows that the results of this non-experimental research cannot be generalized to the entire South African population, as would be ideal, they are nonetheless still highly interesting and potentially significant, and should therefore be carefully considered and not underestimated.

3.4. Instruments

A questionnaire consisting of five sections was constructed.

3.4.1. Demographic Section

A set of demographic questions (Appendix D) were used to obtain information from the participants pertaining to their age, gender, race, home language and year of study.

3.4.2. Essay

Participants were required to write a brief essay, of no more than three pages, on the history of South Africa projected into the future (Appendix E). They were told to imagine that they were historians writing in the year 2060 and to outline what they thought the history of South

Africa would be during the period 2009 to 2060 and to give an account of things that they thought are likely to happen in this period. Participants were provided with four lined pages on which to complete their essays. The content of these essays was analyzed to identify the predominant future ideologies held by University of the Witwatersrand students.

3.4.3. Group Identification Check List

A simple group identification checklist (Appendix F) was used to discover how the sample defined themselves in terms of their identities. This scale consisted of a list of 32 possible identities which included: gender (female/male); race (black, coloured, Indian/Asian, white); home language (Afrikaans, English, isiNdebele, isiZulu, isiXhosa, Setswana, Xitsonga, Tshivenda, siSwati, Sesotho, Sepedi); ethnicity (Ndebele, Zulu, Xhosa, Tswana, Tsonga, Venda, Swati, Sotho); religious group (Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim), as well as a 'South African' identity option and an 'African' identity option. Participants were asked to mark off as many of these identities as applied to them. Thereafter, the scale consisted of an additional component where participants were asked to list their various identities in the order of their importance to the participant, where 1 is representative of their most important identity and 5 is representative of their least important identity. This identification scale closely resembles that used in a study by Finchilescu and Dawes (1999a), but has been slightly altered and expanded.

3.4.4. Optimism scale

A 7-item optimism scale (Appendix G) was used to assess the sample's level of optimism towards the future of South Africa. The first six items pertain to six broad areas in South Africa: education, crime, health care, race relations, quality of life and the economy. Participants were asked to indicate on a 5-point response scale whether they thought that conditions will get worse (1), stay the same (3) or improve (5) in each of these areas. Higher scores are indicative of greater optimism towards the future, whereas lower scores are indicative of low optimism towards the future. The seventh item required participants to indicate, on the same response scale, how they thought the financial situation of future generations will compare to their own financial situation today. The average score of these 7 items was obtained and utilized in the study. This optimism scale was created for use in a survey of South Africa ten years into the new democracy by Hamel et al. (2005) and

generated a very satisfactory Cronbach's Alpha score of 0.87. However, this original scale included only a 3-point rating scale, and for the purposes of the current study it was decided to expand these limited response options to 5 rating points.

3.4.5. Relative Deprivation-Gratification scale

This 8-item scale measures a general state of relative deprivation-gratification (Appendix H). Each item was responded to on a 5-point response scale. For items 1 and 3, the scale points ranged from 1 (very satisfied) to 5 (very dissatisfied). For items 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 the scale points ranged from 1 (much better) to 5 (much worse). Higher scores are indicative of greater perceived relative deprivation, while lower scores are indicative of greater perceived relative gratification. Once again the average score of these 8 items was obtained and utilized in the current study. This scale was constructed for use in a study conducted by Dambrun, Taylor, McDonald, Crush and Méot (2006) and yielded a satisfactory Cronbach's Alpha score of 0.76.

3.5. Procedures

The study's data was collected from students in first year Psychology tutorials at the University of the Witwatersrand. The first year Psychology course and tutorial coordinator granted permission to the researcher to use the tutorial students as participants for the study (Appendix A). On the day of administration the researcher introduced herself to the tutorial students and explained that she was conducting research on University of the Witwatersrand students' perceptions of the future of South Africa. The students were informed that participation in the study required them to write an essay, of no more than 3 pages, on the projected future history of South Africa, as well as to complete four simple scales. Thereafter, all ethical issues were conveyed to the students (right to withdraw, etc) and the students were then invited to participate in the study. They were told that their informed consent to participate would be assumed if they agreed to complete a questionnaire booklet. All the above information also appeared on the participant information sheet (Appendix B) which was attached to the top of the questionnaire booklets. Participants were allowed to keep this sheet. The questionnaire booklets were then administered to those students who wished to participate in the study and the entire 45-minute tutorial period was allowed for completion.

The researcher collected data from 6 tutorials in total. Furthermore, all data was collected before South Africa held its fourth democratic elections on the 22nd of April, 2009, as it was envisaged that, with all the hype and anticipation surrounding this important event, the results that emerged from the study would be more interesting.

3.6. Data Analysis

3.6.1. Internal consistency and normality

As published internal consistency is often considered when one selects an instrument for use in a study, calculating a Cronbach Alpha statistic is of great importance. Furthermore, the internal consistency of a measure is related to the chance that significant results will be found, and is also an indication of the internal validity of one's research (Devlin, 2006). Therefore, Cronbach Alpha's were calculated for the optimism and relative deprivation scales to determine the internal consistencies of these scales. This measure varies between zero and one and is indicative of the extent to which each item on a particular scale relates to every other item on that scale (Devlin, 2006).

Tests for normality allow one to obtain estimates of the characteristics of the population one is investigating (Devlin, 2006). Parametric tests assume that a sample is normally distributed and therefore, allows estimates pertaining to the population to be made. In non-parametric tests a normally distributed sample is not a necessary requirement, but if this requirement is not met then estimates pertaining to the characteristics of the population can therefore not be made. Distribution analyses were run for the optimism and relative deprivation scales, and the skewness and kurtosis coefficients were used to establish whether each scale was sufficiently close to a normal distribution.

3.6.2. Demographic characteristics of the sample

Simple frequency analyses were performed to determine the frequencies and proportions of each of the demographic variables of interest in the current study.

3.6.3. Predominant future ideologies

Quantitative thematic content analyses were used to identify the predominant future ideologies that emerged from the essays written by the study's participants. The essays' emerging themes were initially classified in accordance with Danziger's original 1956 classification system, which included the categories of *Conservative*, *Technicist*, *Catastrophic*, *Liberal* and *Revolutionary*. However, two additional categories, *Socialist* and *Social Democratic/Redress*, that were used by Finchilescu and Dawes (1999a) in their 1996 studies were also included. Those essays which did not present a definable future were categorised as *Unclassifiable*. The table below depicts the study's original classification system and provides definitions of the original future ideologies.

Table 1. Definitions of the predominant future ideologies.

Conservative	The existing political order should return to the separatist system of the Apartheid regime (for comparison sake this definition of Conservatism was kept to be the same as the pre-1994 definition and is not in actual fact the true definition of Conservatism).
Technicist	The existing political order will remain relatively unchanged. However, the main changes that society will undergo will be in the form of technological and material transformations. These technical advances and related economic development will lead to improved conditions of life.
Catastrophic	The existing political order is leading the country into a disastrous future characterized by economic decline, crime and disorder. Things will go from bad to worse and there is little that can be done to prevent this from happening. There is fatalistic acceptance of this inevitable deteriorating situation.
Liberal	The existing political order will be gradually and smoothly improved through peaceful transformation. Conflicts will be resolved amicably and conditions of life will improve for all. A more just political order will ensue.
Revolutionary	Irreconcilable differences exist between different groups in the existing political order and therefore change can only be brought about through

	violent means. The existing political order must be overthrown with violent force and a new social order must be created.
Socialist	The existing political order has failed to achieve economic justice and this has resulted in great discontent amongst the masses. A communist future is desired. Land and resources should be redistributed amongst South African citizens and in so doing, poverty can be eradicated.
Social Democratic/Redress	The existing political order will remain relatively unchanged. However, conditions in the country will improve by means of government interventions that aim to promote disadvantaged groups and eradicate poverty. Policies of redress (affirmative action, housing development, education) are central to this future.
Unclassifiable	No predominant future ideology emerged in the essay. The essay does not present a definable future.

The researcher began the analysis process by coding the essays into the above-specified categories, but intended to re-conceptualize this original classification system if it were to be found that particular categories in this system were not applicable in the current study. Furthermore, she planned to formulate definitions for any new categories that emerged beyond the original system.

In addition, each essay was also analyzed for a future valence: positive, negative, neutral, or mixed. Essays that portrayed an overall positive view of the future were assigned a positive valence, while those that portrayed an overall negative view of the future were conversely assigned a negative valence. A neutral valence was allocated to those essays which emerged as having an overall neutral perspective on the future, whereas a mixed valence was assigned to essays that were positive regarding some aspects of the future and equally negative about other aspects, and therefore displayed mixed feelings towards the future.

Simple frequency analyses were conducted to determine the frequencies of future ideologies and future valences that emerged from the essays. A Chi-squared cross tabulation was also run to determine the proportions of future valences to each future ideology.

3.6.4. Perceptions of the present

During the categorization process the researcher discovered that a surprisingly large proportion of the sample appeared to be fixated on the present conditions in South Africa and were using their essays as a way to vent about the present state of the nation. Those essays in which participants wrote *only* about the present were seen as not answering the essay question posed to participants in the questionnaire booklet and were therefore separated from the rest of the essays. These essays were however, still seen as being of interest, and were therefore included in a secondary analysis.

Those participants who discussed the present tended to do so by referring specifically to certain aspects or sectors of South Africa. Therefore, these essays were first read over and, by means of a qualitative thematic content analysis, common themes that emerged from the essay content were grouped together as ‘present categories’. A total of 21 thematic categories were uncovered: Black Economic Empowerment, corruption, crime, development, the economy, education, the 2009 elections, emigration, greed, healthcare, HIV/AIDS, the justice system, government leadership, living conditions, politics, poverty, race relations, skills, teenage pregnancy, unemployment, and Jacob Zuma. Once these categories had been established, further quantitative thematic content analyses were then performed, whereby each essay was assigned to the above categories, depending on what aspects of the present were discussed within it. Most essays discussed more than one of the above categories and were thus assigned to multiple categories.

Each one of this sample of essays was then analyzed for the perspective taken on each of the present categories (i.e. valence). If an essay made a positive reference to the present state of ‘development’ in South Africa, for example, it was given a positive valence for this particular category. If an essay mentioned ‘crime’ in a negative sense, this category was assigned a negative valence for that particular essay. Essays that were neutral in their perspectives on the current state of the ‘economy’, for example, were assigned neutral valences for this category; and if an essay made both positive and negative references to ‘education’, for example, this category was given a mixed valence. Naturally, if an essay failed to discuss a particular category it was not assigned a valence. Frequency analyses were then performed to discover how many participants discussed each of the present categories, and how many participants were positive, negative, neutral or mixed in their perceptions of the various present categories.

In addition, overall present valences were then calculated for those essays that made some mention of the present. These present valences were similarly positive, negative, neutral or mixed. Essays that portrayed an overall positive view of the present were assigned a positive valence, while those that portrayed an overall negative view of the present were conversely assigned a negative valence. A neutral valence was allocated to those essays which emerged as having an overall neutral perspective on the present, whereas a mixed valence was assigned to essays that were positive regarding some aspects of the present and equally negative about other aspects, and therefore displayed mixed feelings about the present conditions of the country.

3.6.5. Inter-rater reliability

While the coding of the demographic questionnaire, the identification scale, the optimism scale and the relative deprivation-gratification scale were expected to be relatively unproblematic, as the bulk of these questionnaires could be coded numerically and could thus be easily entered into an Excel spreadsheet, it was thought possible that the researcher's subjectivity might influence the manner in which the essays were categorized. Therefore, to ensure that the essays were coded in as an objective manner as possible, every tenth essay was independently cross-checked by the researcher's supervisor. This coding was double-blind, as the supervisor was initially unaware of the researcher's categorization of a particular essay.

The researcher's categorization of an essay and her supervisor's categorization of the same essay was then compared and checked for their levels of agreement. The inter-rater reliability of this categorisation process was then constructed. This form of reliability is the degree of agreement among raters and it gives a score of how much consensus there is in the ratings given by the various raters. The *joint-probability of agreement* was the measure of inter-rater reliability made use of in the current study. This is a simple measure that assumes the data is entirely nominal. It is the number of times that each rating is assigned by each rater divided by the total number of ratings, but does not take into account that agreement may happen entirely by chance (Uebersax, 1987).

3.6.6. Future ideologies and present perceptions by race

A number of Chi-Squared cross tabulations were run to determine which predominant future ideologies emerged among each of the four South African race groups, and which future valences were held by each of these groups. Similarly, the numbers of essays that discussed *only* the future, those that discussed the present *only*, and those essays that discussed both the future *and* the present, were calculated per race group by means of Chi-Squared cross tabulations. Present valences were also calculated in this manner. The frequencies of each race group who referred to each of the 21 present categories were also worked out by means of a Chi-Squared cross tabulation.

3.6.7. Social group identification

To determine how members of each race group identified themselves in terms of each of the 32 possible identities provided in the Identification Scale, Chi-Squared cross tabulations were computed. The level of importance that each race group placed on each of these 32 identities then needed to be ascertained. Again, this was determined by means of a Chi-Squared cross tabulation analysis.

The identities were then clustered into the following broad groups: South African, African, race, gender, religion, and ethno-linguistic, and the numbers of participants who identified one of these groups as of primary importance to their identity were calculated per race group. Chi-Squared cross tabulations were then conducted to determine whether any significant association existed between participants' future ideologies and their primary identification.

3.6.8. Optimism to the future

A two-independent sample t-test was run to determine whether those who expressed a positive future valence and those who expressed a negative future valence differed in their levels of optimism towards the future as reflected by their scores on the Optimism scale.

An additional two-independent sample t-test was conducted to establish whether differences existed between the black African and white race groups levels of optimism towards the future, while a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to ascertain whether

there existed a difference in the degree of optimism to the future for those who expressed Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic future ideologies.

3.6.9. Relative deprivation

Whether a significant difference exists between levels of perceived relative deprivation for the black African and white race groups was determined by means of a two-independent sample t-test. Hereafter, separate t-tests were run for each individual item of the relative deprivation scale by race, while a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) attempted to answer whether a difference exists in the degree of perceived relative deprivation for each scale item for those who expressed Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic future ideologies.

3.6.10. Primary social group identification, Optimism and Relative Deprivation

A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to establish whether a difference exists in the samples degree of optimism to the future and perceived relative deprivation based on their primary identifications of the national South African identity, the continental African identity, race, gender, religion, or ethno-linguistic identity.

Lastly, a generalized logistic regression was run to determine whether one's optimism towards the future, level of perceived relative deprivation or primary social group identity predicts which future ideology one holds. A logistic regression, sometimes called the logistic model or logit model, is used to predict the probability of an event occurring by fitting the data to a logistic curve. It is a generalized linear model used for binomial regression and it makes use of several predictor variables that are either numerical or categorical.

3.7. Ethical Considerations

The present study was granted ethical approval by means of an internal ethics panel committee (Ethics protocol number: MPSYC/09/005). Please see Appendix C for the Ethics Clearance Certificate.

Students were not pressured into participation in any way. The researcher made it clear to the tutorial students that participation in the study was completely voluntary and that no student would be advantaged or disadvantaged in any way for choosing to partake in the study or not partake in the study. There were a handful of students from each of the 6 tutorials who did in fact decline to participate and were then allowed the tutorial period to complete other work. The fact that these particular students did not feel pressured into participation likely reflects that those who did agree to participate in the study did not do so under pressure. As no identifying information was requested from participants and the collected questionnaire booklets were not specified by tutorial group, complete anonymity was guaranteed. Furthermore, participants' responses were kept absolutely confidential, as access to the questionnaire booklets was restricted to the researcher and her supervisor. Participants were informed that their informed consent to participate in the study would be assumed if they chose to complete a questionnaire booklet. However, should they wish to withdraw from the study after having given their informed consent they were under no obligation to continue completing the questionnaire booklet and could withdraw whenever they wished to do so. Deception did not constitute an ethical breach in the current study as participants were fully informed of the nature of the research. Furthermore, it was not envisaged that a study of this nature would put participants in danger or at risk of any kind. However, to err on the side of caution, the researcher made it known to the sample that if they felt that the content of the study had adversely affected them in any way they could visit the Careers and Counselling Development Unit (CCDU) on the University of the Witwatersrand campus for the necessary counselling. Those participants who personally requested to be debriefed on completion of the research were e-mailed a brief summary of the research findings. All the above information was communicated clearly to the participants and also appeared on the participant information sheet which students were told they could keep. The researchers e-mail address, as well as the e-mail address of her supervisor, appeared on this sheet. It was decided by the researcher and her supervisor that the data collected from the participants would not be destroyed immediately after it had been coded and analyzed. Instead, it shall be kept for the requisite five years after the research has been submitted as a thesis and destroyed only after this five year period.

Chapter Four

Results

4.1. Internal consistency and normality

The optimism scale yielded a satisfactory Cronbach Alpha score of 0.81, while that of the relative deprivation scale was far less pleasing at 0.58. However, excluding the relative deprivation items with low item-total correlations did nothing to improve this internal consistency coefficient, and all the original items were thus included.

Distribution analyses were then performed to determine the distribution of the summated scores of the two scales. Both the optimism and relative deprivation scales had skewness and kurtosis scores between -1.0 and +1.0 and were thus acceptably close to normality. However, due to the problem of low internal consistency associated with the latter scale, distribution analyses were run for the entire relative deprivation scale, as well as for *each* relative deprivation scale item to determine whether any of these items were skewed. The eighth item was found to be positively skewed, but a log transformation corrected this deviation.

Table 2 summarises the normality results for the two scales.

Table 2. Descriptive statistic results for the distribution analyses.

Scale	Mean	Standard deviation	Skewness	Kurtosis
Optimism scale	2.97	0.87	0.03	-0.53
Relative Deprivation Scale: overall	2.73	0.52	0.33	0.72
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 1 At the moment are you satisfied/dissatisfied with your personal economic conditions?	3.28	1.23	-0.23	-0.78
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 2 Do you expect that your personal economic conditions will get better/same/worse one year from now?	2.48	1.04	0.15	-0.77
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 3 At the moment are you satisfied/dissatisfied with economic conditions in South Africa?	3.86	0.94	-0.55	-0.10
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 4 Do you expect that economic conditions in South Africa will get better/same/worse one year from now?	3.05	1.08	-0.14	-0.64
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 5 Would you say that your overall personal conditions are better/same/worse than those of other South Africans?	2.13	0.97	0.67	0.22
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 6 Would you say that your overall personal conditions are better/same/worse as other members of your population group?	2.32	0.92	0.12	-0.67
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 7 Would you say that the overall conditions of people from your population group are better/same/worse than those of other groups in South Africa?	2.84	1.21	0.20	-0.98
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 8 Would you say that the overall conditions in South Africa are better/same/worse than those in other southern African countries?	1.88	0.89	1.18	1.51
Relative Deprivation Scale: transformed item 8	0.53	0.45	0.19	0.86

4.2. Re-conceptualisation of the original essay classification system

The classification system used by Finchilescu and Dawes was assessed in the light of the present essays to determine whether the categories were still applicable, or whether new categories were found to emerge. The Conservative ideology did not emerge at all in the current study and was thus removed. Moreover, the Social Democratic/Redress ideology proved to be a problematic category, as there was no real way of distinguishing the difference between this ideology and the Liberal ideology. It would appear as if the Social Democratic/Redress ideology has essentially become a standard for Liberalism. The Social Democratic/Redress ideology was therefore incorporated into the Liberal ideology. The Catastrophic outlook also proved to be slightly problematic, as many essays portrayed a negative view of general future deterioration, but did not satisfy the extreme perception of impending catastrophe. A less extreme form of the Catastrophic ideology was thus constructed and was named Deterioration. The table below provides the definitions of the two new future ideologies.

Table. 3. The definitions of the two new future ideologies.

Liberal/ Social Democratic-Redress	The existing political order will be gradually and smoothly improved through peaceful transformation. Conflicts will be resolved amicably, and conditions of life will improve for all by means of government interventions that aim to promote disadvantaged groups and eradicate poverty, and policies of redress (affirmative action, housing development, education). A more just political order will ensue.
Deterioration	The existing political order is causing conditions in the country to deteriorate. Things will go from bad to worse and there is little that can be done to prevent this from happening. There is fatalistic acceptance of this inevitable deteriorating situation.

It was found that essays often portrayed multiple ideologies (e.g. Technicist *and* Liberal), which rendered the coding process difficult at times. Furthermore, in numerous cases it was found that an entire essay was written in a Catastrophic sense, for example, but the very last sentence or paragraph, depicted an entirely opposite outlook (e.g. Liberal). Therefore, in order

to make the analysis process less complicated, the *dominant* future ideology was sought from each essay and coded in accordance with this prevailing outlook.

4.3. Examples of the future scenarios

Eight extracts taken from those essays that best epitomized the definitions of each of the seven future ideology categories are provided below. An extract from an essay which discussed *only* the present state of South Africa is also provided as an example of this separate sample of essays.

Liberal

Change in South Africa was a slow process, and did not pick up any quantifiable speed until the [late] 2010's or early 2020's. By this time, the older generations, who lived during the apartheid era, were either retired or passed away. This allowed the younger generations to step up into [positions] of power, and it was a time when racial [prejudice] was finally simmering down into non-[existence].

The economic climate of South Africa improved due to cancellation of [affirmative] action. South Africans of all ethnic groups were recognised for their ability alone and thus prompted a new era of productiveness. Furthermore, because ability was the deciding factor, the general [disposition] of South Africans increased, and fewer people complained about their lot in life.

Stronger currency eventually led to South Africa being recognised in 2030 as a developed nation. Proper government strategies regarding issues like housing, water and food led to lower poverty, and a movement towards recognising new and viable careers (eg Art/drama) resulted in higher employment rates. Birth restrictions in the 2020's and 2030's led to a more stable and sustainable population.

Because the era of 'transformation' had ended, more money was available for education and healthcare. New schools were built, as well as new hospitals. Increased budgets for universities and training hospitals meant more and better trained doctors, nurses and other healthcare workers. An increase in teacher's salaries also resulted in more motivated teachers. A final curriculum for schools was decided on in the 2010's, and this also [led] to a better education. Larger government subsidies towards

universities meant that more people could afford higher education, and other areas of importance, like engineering and science, improved dramatically.

A more competitive, capitalist business world resulted in increasing independent telecommunications companies and electricity companies. Besides creating additional employment, this also resulted in more of these services to be available to more people, at better prices.

Government employees started to be paid on a productivity-basis. This resulted in greater efficiency. The police, fire department and traffic officials were paid more, which lessened corruption, and encouraged more individuals to join. Crime was thus lessened.

Political parties in SA joined together to form 2 parties. Thus, SA became a true democracy, and one party was not able to dominate, as, if they were unable to meet their promises people voted for the other party.

Ultimately, the situation in SA improved from 2009 to 2060.

(white second year male)

Deterioration

During this 50 year period I believe things in South Africa will get worse than they already are.

I believe the crime rate will increase as the population is increasing rapidly in South Africa and eventually it will reach a point where not all south Africans will be able to be employed as there are only a certain amount of jobs available. This will lead to people resorting to other ways to survive such as robbery and theft etc.

I also believe the quality of education received in South Africa will decrease as there are a shortage of teachers so many [under-qualified] people are being employed as teachers thus decreasing the quality of education, because of this eventually the economy and other such things will be affected as people, leaders etc in the future will not be as educated as the people today and thus will not have enough knowledge to run the country as it should be run.

Another reason for believing South Africa will be worse in 50 years time is the government. If we do not have proper, fair, law abiding leaders how do we expect any country to move forward?

(Indian/Asian first year female)

Catastrophic

The 2009 elections in South Africa led to the onset of the decline of the country's economy, political stability and social standing. The rise in crime, racism, corruption and poor governance led to a slow fall of the South African economy as a whole, including their trade relations. Corruption and racist policies in government aided in this fall, as well as in the decline of international support of the country. Socially, the country was not dissimilar to a "reverse Apartheid" a few years after the election. This is why, in 2060, we find ourselves living in a country similar to that of Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe in 2009. But at least now, South African fits in better with its neighbours and the rest of Africa. The humorous prophecy of 2009 seems to have come true: "Last one out of the airport, please turn out the lights."

(white first year female)

Technicist

There may be positive changes in the future of South Africa, but that can only be possible if the Government makes its contribution. So a lot could happen we may not even have the ruling parties present today, we will have new parties. People would live in an age of technology that is so advanced that we would no longer have people to do labour but instead rely on Technology to go about your daily life.

Even though things may seem tough at the moment, there will be a positive change in the near future, People of the future don't even have to worry about things like recession, because such a thing wouldn't exist by that time.

Things will actually be so different that one cannot really predict how things will change in 2060. If you have a basic understanding of how the system works [a lot] can be said, because of such huge technological development and infrastructure change it could definitely be possible to erode poverty and give everybody an equal opportunity. Look we have already changed so much, You can only imagine what things would be like. South Africa could even be one of the most [wealthy] countries in the world if the make the correct choices in the Government and economy.

(Indian/Asian first year female)

Revolutionary

This is a list of things that shall happen from 2009 to 2060:

- 1) Jacob Zuma shall come into power.
- 2) Education will go down.
- 3) Piracy shall rise.
- 4) Crime will get slightly higher.
- 5) The economy will crash.
- 6) Prices for food & land shall go up.
- 7) AIDS virus will increase.
- 8) Poverty will rise.
- 9) Employment rates will go down.
- 10) Inexperienced people will get jobs over others.
- 11) Suicide rates will go up.
- 12) South Africa will [lose] its bid for the 2010 World Cup.
- 13) The rand shall lose it's value.
- 14) It will cost billions, perhaps trillions of rands to buy a newspaper, toilet paper.
- 15) Smoking shall increase.
- 16) Students will boycott schools, colleges or universities.
- 17) White farmers shall loose their farms.
- 18) Underprivileged black people will only get poorer.
- 19) Governmental officials will be assassinated.
- 20) Protests will break out involving young people.
- 21) People shall be divided & moved into different locations depending on their income & how they can help the country.
- 22) No one shall be allowed to enter or leave the country.
- 23) Importing & exporting shall stop.
- 24) Refugees will be murdered or forced out of our country.
- 25) Homosexuals will also be either locked up, executed or forced to leave & not allowed to vote.
- 26) The people will begin to starve & people will loose their right to vote.
- 27) Buildings will be bombed or destroyed by extremists.
- 28) People will plot to overthrow the government.
- 29) A revolution will break out, against the people that were divided in to the poor

areas and the people who were divided into the “richer” areas.

- 30) The ruling party shall leave the country or shall be murdered during the revolution.
- 31) Famine & disease will rise.
- 32) War shall break out during the revolution.
- 33) Many shall be murdered or executed.
- 34) Camps for prisoners shall be set up to lock up political prisoners.
- 35) Robben Island shall be bombed & destroyed.
- 36) The President @ the time shall finally be assassinated after his tyrannous reign.
- 37) A new political party will rise, in hopes of restoring the blistered country that was once beautiful.

(white second year male)

Socialist

South Africa as a nation has radically changed. The government, economy and society have all changed.

The democracy has been replaced for a communist state. Capital has been equally shared amongst the poor. People no longer work to earn and gratify their own well being but work towards a common good. The government is a combined unit made up of the DA, ANC and Cope, and tribalism has been diluted.

The economy is mostly generated by means of agriculture and mining, and foreign investment has ever more increased. South Africa has finally made its mark on the world, and is ranked as one of the world superpowers.

As for the working class, their money is re-invested into the country and poverty has been done away with.

Education has improved and high school and university standards have been levelled out. Pollution has decreased since the introduction of hydro-operating cars and traffic has been cut down by the increase in usage of public transport.

(black African first year female)

Unclassifiable

After the elections and the ANC winning them again, Jacob Zuma will become president of this country. ANC will probably win the elections because people vote out of loyalty instead of assessing the situation. Politically, most things will stay the same

because our parents' generation [doesn't] want to vote for a political party that has a white leader because they don't want a repeat of apartheid.

The world cup in 2010 will be attended mostly by people from outside South Africa because tickets prices cost almost as much as school fees. The hosting country, which is us, will watch from the wonderful seats of our own home.

Inflation is going to keep going up. People's economic standing will pretty much stay the same because that's how it has always been. The saying "the rich get richer and the poor get poorer" is very true.

With all the students in tertiary studying civil engineering we're going to have a great boom, then a shortage of work for those people.

(black African second year female)

Present

Starting with the political things or aspects of South Africa currently it is evident that there is [a lot] of political instability and socio-economic problems facing this country. South Africa is currently facing problems that might be a hindrance in the future. The few problems that South Africa is facing is the problem of corruption in the state government. There is [a lot] of mistrust going around because people around the country feel that the most powerful and dominant can actually get away with murder, for them if you are rich and powerful you are above the law or justice. A typical example is the one from the currently African National Party (ANC) president Jacob Zuma (JZ) (2009). He was suspected that he was part of a corruption scheme with his dear friend Shabir Shaik, and unfortunately for Shabir, he was found guilty while his acquaintance was freed. Such things really make people think about the future president of the country and how it is going to be [run]. Later during his arrest Shaik was later released due to his health problems. This was said to be the hardest thing one can obtain in South Africa. The same president again was a rape suspect earlier in his corruption year. The government is trying by all means to empower the less privileged and previously disadvantaged, the organisation or idea is called the BEE now BBEE. Though this has raised some questions about the new imbalances by the new government. People, particularly white males feel that the BEE or BBEE is another form of separation and division and that it threatens the working white class because jobs are given to the black males or black females with skills and experiences and the

first to be retrenched are the white males. Research has shown that people at university level do drop out of university because they are unable to cope with the workload and university life style. Thus people feel that education from high school is not as the way it should be. There are still so many socio-economic problems facing South Africa like poverty, lack of skills, unemployment, teenage pregnancy, crime, suicides, etc. That I would like to elaborate on later. One can therefore conclude by saying that the country is on the brink of collapse.

(black African first year female)

* A number of spelling mistakes were identified in the above extracts and were corrected accordingly. These words have been encased within square brackets to indicate their prior incorrectness.

4.4. Inter-rater reliability

Sixteen essays were independently cross-checked by the researcher's supervisor. Essays in which participants wrote *only* about the present conditions in the country were excluded from this analysis. At first the researcher and her supervisor disagreed about the categorization of four essays, putting the initial inter-rater reliability score at 75%. It was then decided that the essay categories needed to perhaps be re-conceptualized and reconstructed. After the removal of the Conservative ideology, the addition of the Deterioration ideology and the amalgamation of the Liberal and Social Democratic Redress categories, the same sample of essays was re-coded and the inter-rater reliability score was found to have improved to 93.75%, signifying that the categorization of only 1 essay was disagreed upon.


4.5. What are the samples predominant future ideologies?

Of the sample participants, 31.84% (n = 71) were liberal in their outlook to the future, while 19.73% (n = 44) held future ideologies of Deterioration and 11.66% (n = 26) were Catastrophic in their views of the future. However, when the future ideologies of Deterioration and Catastrophe are combined to constitute an overarching ideology of future deterioration and decline, it was found that 31.39% (n = 70) of the sample adopt this worsening future perception. A Revolutionary ideology was held by seven participants

(3.14%); a Technicist ideology by five participants (2.24%); and a Socialist ideology by three participants (1.35%). Thirty-three essays in total (14.80%) did not present a definable future, and could not be placed into any of the future categories, rendering them Unclassifiable.

While 101 essays (45.29%) effectively answered the essay question by discussing *only* the prospective future of South Africa, 34 essays (15.25%) discussed *only* the present conditions in the country and did therefore not present any *future* ideology as such. The remaining 88 essays (39.46%) discussed the future, but also referred in part, to the present state of the country. The graph below depicts the percentages of the respective future ideologies held by the sample and is based on all the analysed essays. A table of the abovementioned future ideology frequencies and percentages can be found in the appendices section as Appendix I (Table 4).


Figure 1. The percentages of the samples predominant future ideologies.



Ninety-two participants (41.26%) expressed positive future valences and were thus optimistic to the future. Slightly fewer participants ($n = 87$, 39.01%) conveyed negative future valences and were therefore pessimistic in their attitudes to the future. Three participants (1.35%) expressed neither optimism nor pessimism to the future, and thus took on a neutral stance to future happenings, while seven (3.14%) expressed both positive *and* negative future viewpoints and were therefore assigned mixed future valences. Naturally, those essays ($n =$

34) which wrote only about the present and did not refer at all to the future could not be assigned a future valence. This amounted to 15.25% of the essays, while the remaining 84.75% could be coded for a future valence. The proportions of the future valences that emerged from the samples essays are depicted in the graph below. A table representing these particular frequencies and percentages appears as [Appendix J](#) (Table 5).

Figure 2. The percentages of the valences of the future essays.




A cross tabulation analysis uncovered that *each* participant who was Liberal in their future outlook expressed a positive future valence ($n = 71$, 100.00%), while those who adopted ideologies of Deterioration ($n = 44$, 100.00%) and Catastrophe ($n = 26$, 100.00%) were all negative in their valences to the future. While the valences of the abovementioned future ideologies seem to flow out of the categories definitions (e.g. Liberalism encompasses a positive outlook to the future, while Deterioration and Catastrophe encompass negative outlooks), the remaining future ideologies conversely have the potential to be either positive *or* negative. Technician ideologies expressed consistently positive future views ($n = 5$, 100.00%). Three participants (42.86%) who expressed Revolutionary future ideologies did so in a positive manner, while the remaining four (57.14%) envisioned the prospective revolution as a negative outcome. Two of the participants (66.67%) who expressed a Socialist future ideology referred to this outcome in a negative sense, while the remaining one (33.33%) participant seemed to believe that this future would be a positive one. Twelve

(36.36%) unclassifiable essays expressed optimism to the future; 11 (33.33%) were pessimistic in their future valences; three (9.09%) were neutral; and seven (21.21%) expressed both optimism *and* pessimism to the future, and were therefore mixed in their future outlooks.

The graph below depicts the results of this cross tabulation analysis, while a table that portrays the precise frequencies and percentages of the future valences by each future ideology can be accessed as [Appendix K](#) (Table 6).

Figure 3. The percentages of the future valences by each future ideology.




4.6. What are the samples perceptions of the present conditions in South Africa?

A sizeable proportion of the participants (n=34; 15.25%) wrote *only* about the present state of the country without making any reference to prospective future conditions, while 88 (39.46%) participants discussed both the present *and* future in their essays. Just more than half (n = 122, 54.71%) of the sample therefore, discussed the present conditions in South Africa to some extent. As such, all of these essays were analyzed for *present* valences rather than future

valences. In addition, a content analysis of these essays produced 21 themes. These thematic categories will be discussed below.

The results reveal that this particular sample of essays was disproportionately negative in their perceptions on the current circumstances in South Africa, as only 9.42% ($n = 21$) of these essays expressed positive views on the current South African situation, while 36.77% ($n = 82$) were conversely negative in their perceptions. Ten essays (4.48%) discussed the present in a relatively neutral manner, while nine (4.04%) essays had both positive and negative things to say about the present state of affairs. The graph below illustrates the percentages of the present valences of those participants who discussed the present in their essays, while [Table 7](#) represents a more accurate depiction of these figures and appears as [Appendix L](#).

Figure 4. The percentages of the samples present valences.




The results depict that the sample is generally dissatisfied with the current *education* system, *healthcare* system, the *HIV/AIDS* pandemic, the *justice system*, *skills*, *unemployment* levels, *poverty*, current *living conditions* in the country, the receding *economy* and the ubiquitous problem of *crime*. Very few participants had positive things to say about each of the abovementioned aspects. Furthermore, the sample was negative in their overall opinions of *Black Economic Empowerment*; and *teenage pregnancy* and *emigration* were further sources of disgruntlement. There were mixed feelings regarding *development* in the country with five

participants expressing their dissatisfaction at the current standard of development, and five participants expressing the opposite sentiment. *Race relations* were another area on which varied opinions were conveyed. Eight participants felt that race relations had improved in the country, while 11 were of the view that there still remains a great deal of animosity between the South African race groups. A further finding was that participants used their essays to express their frustrations with the growing immorality that seems to be rife in the South African government, as *corruption* and *greed* were widely spoken of. It follows that South African *politics* and *leadership* were both topics that were not spoken of very highly. It is not surprising therefore, that the *2009 elections* were a source of excitement to some and pessimistic anticipation to others. Much negative talk also centred round the ANC president *Jacob Zuma*, with participants' referring to him mainly in connection with his corruption charges. A few participants did, however, speak favourably of Mr. Zuma.

The graph below illustrates the abovementioned findings. Table 8 in the appendix section (Appendix M) offers a more complete breakdown of the proportions of the sample who spoke positively, negatively, or neutrally with reference to each of the 21 present categories.

Figure 5. The percentages of the samples positive, negative and neutral perceptions of the present categories.



4.7. What are the samples future ideologies and future valences by race?

Thirty-eight (52.78%) black Africans were Liberal in their future outlooks, while 26.39% (n = 9) of this group foresaw deteriorating conditions in the country's future, and 11.11% (n = 8) felt that a Catastrophic future lay ahead. However, when the ideologies of Deterioration and Catastrophe were combined and considered as a singular ideology of future deterioration and decline, it was found that 37.50% (n = 27) of the black African race group foresaw such a future. The Technician, Revolutionary and Socialist ideologies emerged to a considerably lesser extent amongst this group, with two, three and two essays expressing these respective ideologies. Seventeen (15.04%) essays did not present any definable future and were thus Unclassifiable, and 24 (21.24%) black Africans discussed *only* the present in their essays.

Among the coloured participants, a future outlook of deterioration was most common (n = 8, 61.54%), followed by Liberal (n = 4, 30.77%). One participant perceived a Catastrophic future. However, when the categories of Deterioration and Catastrophe are once again combined, it would appear as if more than half of the coloured participants in the sample foresaw a future of general deterioration (n = 9, 69.23%). The Technician, Revolutionary, and Socialist ideologies did not emerge at all among this race group. A single essay was deemed Unclassifiable, and three coloured participants wrote *only* of the present in their essays.

Futures of Deterioration and Catastrophe were perceived for 26.32% (n = 5) and 22.22% (n = 6) of the Indian/Asian portion of the sample respectively. Considering the above two categories together, it is clear that the majority of this race group (n = 11, 57.9%) anticipate a future of general deterioration, while 37.58% (n = 6) are Liberal in their future outlooks. Furthermore, two Indian/Asian participants' expressed Technician ideologies. In total, five (18.52%) of the Indian/Asian essays were coded as Unclassifiable, and three (11.11%) referred *only* to the present.


Liberalism and Deterioration/Catastrophe were represented exactly equally among the samples white race group. Nearly 44.23% (n = 23) of this group predicted *each* of these categories. Considered separately, it appears as if white participants foresee Deterioration in the future (n = 12, 23.08%) more so than they do Catastrophe (n = 11, 21.15%), but this difference is only by one participant. Technician and Socialist ideologies were each expressed by one white participant, while four (7.69%) whites anticipated a Revolutionary future. Just

over 15% (n = 10) of this samples' essays were Unclassifiable, and four white participants (n = 6.06%) wrote *only* of the present conditions in the country.

A significant difference was not found to exist between race and the various future ideologies, χ^2 (21, N = 223) = 30.74, p= 0.0782.

The graph below is an illustration of these findings. For a more complete breakdown of the frequencies and percentages of the various future ideology categories per race group [Table 9](#) can be considered in the appendix section ([Appendix N](#)).

Figure 6. The percentages of the future ideologies per race group.



Taking future valences per race group into account, it would appear as if black Africans are predominantly optimistic towards the future, as 45.13% (n = 51) expressed positive future valences, and 31.86% (n = 36) expressed negative future valences. One black African participant each was neutral to the future, and mixed in their feelings towards the future.


Pessimism towards the future was found to be rife among the coloured race group, with 58.82% (n = 10) of coloured participants expressing negative future valences, and only four

(23.53%) expressing positive valences. Neutral and mixed attitudes to the future did not emerge among this group.

Similarly, Indian/Asian participants were also predominantly negative in their views of the future (n = 12, 44.44%). Thirty-three percent (n = 9) of this group did however, have optimistic outlooks. Three participants in total were neutral (n = 1) and mixed (n = 2) in their judgments. It must be noted however, that the coloured and Indian groups were too small to draw any definitive conclusions from.

The white race group within the current sample seem to be divided in their perspectives on the future, with 43.94% (n = 29) of this group expressing negative future valences and a slightly lower 42.42% (n = 28) expressing positive future valences. A single white participant took on a neutral stance to the future, while four conveyed mixed feelings about what is to come. The graph below demonstrates these results, while a table of these findings also appears as [Appendix O \(Table 10\)](#).

Figure 7. The percentages of the samples future valences by race group.



4.8. What are the samples' present perceptions and present valences by race?

The results depict that 58.41% (n = 66) of the black African race group used their essays as a way in which to divulge their responses and sentiments to various conditions in the country at present. Twenty-four (21.24%) of these individuals strayed completely from the essay topic writing *only* of the present, while 42 (37.17%) wrote of the present, but did also write of the future. Essentially, only 47 (41.59%) black African participants answered the essay question by anticipating the future alone.

The coloured and Indian/Asian race groups appear to be more fixated on the present conditions in the country than the black African and white races, as 76.47% (n = 13) of coloured participants and 62.96% (n = 17) of Indian/Asian participants discussed the present in their essays. Of these proportions, 17.65% (n = 3) of coloured individuals and 11.11% (n = 3) of Indian/Asian participants wrote *only* of the present, while 58.82% (n = 10) of the coloured group and 51.85% (n = 14) of the Indian/Asian sample discussed both the present *and* the future. A mere four coloured participants (23.53%) wrote *only* of the future as was specified by the essay topic. A slightly higher percentage of 37.04% (n = 10) Indian/Asians wrote *only* of the future.

The white race group appears to have understood the essay task requirements best, as 60.61% (n = 40) of white participants wrote *only* of the future. In total, 39.36% (n = 26) made some mention of the present in their essays, but of these, most (n = 22, 33.33%) discussed the future in conjunction with the present. Only four white participants (6.06%) wrote of the present alone.

The black African race group had more to say about each of the 21 present categories, except that of *Emigration* and *Race Relations*, when compared to the other three race groups. All four race groups had a lot to say about *corruption*, the receding *economy*, South African *leadership*, *politics*, and *Jacob Zuma*. Discussions of the *2009 elections* featured frequently among the coloured and Indian/Asian race groups, while *crime* and *race relations* seemed to be of more importance to the white race group.

A more comprehensive breakdown of the ways in which each of the present categories was spoken of per race group is available in the table below. The percentages represent the proportion of those who discussed each of the present categories out of all those participants who made some mention of the present in their essays.

Table 11. Frequencies of the samples positive, negative and neutral perceptions of the present categories by race group.


Present Category	Valence	Black African	Coloured	Indian/ Asian	White	Total
Black Economic Empowerment	<i>Positive</i>	2	-	-	-	2
	<i>Negative</i>	7	-	2	1	10
	<i>Neutral</i>	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	9 7.38%	-	2 1.64%	1 0.82%%	12 9.84%
Corruption	<i>Positive</i>	-	-	-	-	-
	<i>Negative</i>	21	5	5	9	40
	<i>Neutral</i>	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	21 17.21%	5 4.10%	5 4.10%	9 7.38%	40 32.79%
Crime	<i>Positive</i>	-	-	-	-	-
	<i>Negative</i>	11	3	4	7	25
	<i>Neutral</i>	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	11 9.02%	3 2.46%	4 3.28%	7 5.74%	25 20.49%
Development	<i>Positive</i>	4	-	1	-	5
	<i>Negative</i>	5	-	-	-	5
	<i>Neutral</i>	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	9 7.38%	-	1 0.82%	-	10 8.20%
Economy	<i>Positive</i>	3	-	1	2	6
	<i>Negative</i>	22	6	3	6	37
	<i>Neutral</i>	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	25 20.49%	6 5.90%	4 3.28%	8 6.56%	43 35.25%
Education	<i>Positive</i>	3	-	-	-	3
	<i>Negative</i>	7	1	4	5	17
	<i>Neutral</i>	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	10 8.20%	1 0.82%	4 3.28%	5 4.10%	20 16.39%
Elections	<i>Positive</i>	4	3	-	2	9
	<i>Negative</i>	5	5	3	1	14
	<i>Neutral</i>	1	-	2	1	4
	Total	10 8.20%	8 6.56%	5 4.10%	4 3.28%	27 22.13%

Emigration	<i>Positive</i>	-	-	-	-	-
	<i>Negative</i>	1	-	-	2	3
	<i>Neutral</i>	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	1 1.52%	-	-	2 1.64%	3 2.46%
Greed	<i>Positive</i>	-	-	-	-	-
	<i>Negative</i>	8	1	-	2	11
	<i>Neutral</i>	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	8 6.56%	1 0.82%	-	2 1.64%	11 9.02%
Healthcare	<i>Positive</i>	1	-	-	-	1
	<i>Negative</i>	5	1	-	1	7
	<i>Neutral</i>	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	6 5.90%	1 0.82%	-	1 0.82%	8 6.56%
HIV/AIDS	<i>Positive</i>	2	-	-	-	2
	<i>Negative</i>	5	-	-	3	8
	<i>Neutral</i>	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	7 5.74%	-	-	3 2.46%	10 8.20%
Justice System	<i>Positive</i>	-	-	-	-	-
	<i>Negative</i>	1	-	1	1	3
	<i>Neutral</i>	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	1 1.52%	-	1 0.82%	1 0.82%	3 2.46%
Leadership	<i>Positive</i>	1	-	-	-	1
	<i>Negative</i>	21	4	5	7	37
	<i>Neutral</i>	2	-	-	-	2
	Total	24 19.67%	4 3.28%	5 4.10%	7 5.74%	40 32.79%
Living Conditions	<i>Positive</i>	1	-	-	-	1
	<i>Negative</i>	5	1	1	2	9
	<i>Neutral</i>	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	6 5.90%	1 0.82%	1 0.82%	2 1.64%	10 8.20%
Politics	<i>Positive</i>	2	-	1	3	6
	<i>Negative</i>	20	4	3	4	31
	<i>Neutral</i>	1	-	-	1	2
	Total	23 18.85%	4 3.28%	4 3.28%	8 6.56%	39 31.97%
Poverty	<i>Positive</i>	-	-	-	-	-
	<i>Negative</i>	10	1	1	5	17
	<i>Neutral</i>	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	10 8.20%	1 0.82%	1 0.82%	5 4.10%	17 13.94%
Race Relations	<i>Positive</i>	4	1	-	3	8
	<i>Negative</i>	4	1	1	5	11
	<i>Neutral</i>	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	8	2	1	8	19

		6.56%	1.64%	0.82%	6.56%	15.57%
Skills	<i>Positive</i>	1	-	-	-	1
	<i>Negative</i>	3	1	1	-	5
	<i>Neutral</i>	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	4 3.28%	1 0.82%	1 0.82%	-	6 4.92%
Teenage Pregnancy	<i>Positive</i>	-	-	-	-	4
	<i>Negative</i>	4	-	-	-	-
	<i>Neutral</i>	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	4 3.28%	-	-	-	4 3.28%
Unemployment	<i>Positive</i>	-	-	1	-	1
	<i>Negative</i>	6	2	-	1	9
	<i>Neutral</i>	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	6 5.90%	2 1.64%	1 0.82%	1 0.82%	10 9.18%
Jacob Zuma	<i>Positive</i>	4	-	-	1	5
	<i>Negative</i>	13	5	4	9	31
	<i>Neutral</i>	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	17 13.94%	5 4.10%	4 3.28%	10 8.20%	36 29.51%

Those who discussed the present in their essays did so mainly in a negative manner, with 82 participants portraying negative present valences and only 21 portraying positive attitudes to the present conditions in the country. All the race groups were more negative in their overall opinions of the present than they were positive, with the coloured race group being the most negative of all the race groups (n = 12, 70.59%). When compared to the other three race groups, the black African participants were the most positive in their views of the present state of South Africa. The graph below is an illustration of these findings, while [Table 12 \(Appendix P\)](#) can be considered for a more accurate representation of these figures.

Figure 8. The percentages of the samples overall present valences per race group.



4.9. Comparison between the present study's findings and those of past studies (1963 – 1996)

The findings seem to convey that the black African race group generally uphold Liberal perceptions of the future. While most of these respondents (46.4%) were Revolutionary in their future outlooks in the 1963 study, followed by Liberal (22.6%), they endorsed the Liberal outlook most strongly in each subsequent study. This endorsement of the Liberal ideology seemed to rise steadily from the 1963 study onwards and it peaked in 1992 when 87.5% of the black African participants perceived the future in a Liberal manner. Acceptance of the Catastrophic future ideology varied quite considerably from study to study. A low 4.8% of black African respondents upheld this ideology in 1963. Belief in this ideology had become slightly stronger in 1981 and peaked in 1992 with 7.1% of black African respondents endorsing this outlook. 1996 saw the lowest proportion of black Africans (1.9%) upholding this perspective. However, the results of the current study seem to reflect that this ideology is on the increase among the black African race group, as the endorsement of this future orientation reached its peak in the 2009 study. When the Catastrophic ideology is coupled with the Deterioration ideology however, the results seem to reflect that a relatively high proportion of black Africans are indeed negative in their overall perceptions of the future at

present, as close to 38% of these respondents foresaw a future of general deterioration and decline. There was very little support for the Technicist ideology in 1963 (1.2%) and there remains little support for it today among the black African race group, as only 2.8% of this group's respondents endorsed this ideology in the current study. The endorsement of this ideology was at its highest in 1981 with 16% of black Africans upholding this view. The Technicist ideology did not appear at all in the 1992 and 1996 studies. Support for the Revolutionary ideology was at its highest in 1963 among black Africans and it was noticed to have dropped quite considerably in 1981 (25%). This ideology did not appear at all in the 1992 and 1996 studies, and in the current study very few black African respondents endorsed this view of the future (4.2%). Thirteen percent of the black African race group upheld Conservative outlooks in 1963. In 1981 this figure dropped by more than half (6%), and in all subsequent studies it did not emerge at all.

When the findings for the white¹ group are considered it emerges that this group has remained consistently Catastrophic in their future outlooks over the years, with the exception of the current study. From 1963 to 1996 white respondents upheld predominantly Catastrophic views on the future. In 1963, 31.8% of whites endorsed Catastrophic ideologies. This figure seemed to rise steadily over the years and peaked in 1992 with 44.1% of respondents upholding this belief. 1996 saw quite a considerable drop in numbers of supporters for this future orientation (18.7%), while the results of the current study show a slight increase. The Catastrophic ideology emerged as the third most commonly held future ideology amongst the white race group at the present time. However, when the Catastrophic and Deterioration ideologies are considered together, it becomes clear that 44.2% of whites foresee a future of overall deterioration and decline. However, an equal proportion of whites endorsed the Liberal ideology. Support for this ideology was fairly erratic over the years. In 1963, 19.1% of whites foresaw a Liberal future; in 1981 this figure dropped to 15% of whites; by 1992 it had more than doubled (30.8%); in 1996 it dropped to a low of 6.4% of respondents; and it was found to have reached its peak during the current study (44.2%). The white race group showed their highest levels of support for the Technicist ideology in 1963. Hereafter, their endorsement of this ideology waned significantly from year to year. At the present time only 1.9% of whites uphold this view of the future. Very few whites (2%) were Revolutionary in


¹ It is important to note that the white English-speaking and white Afrikaans-speaking groups in previous years were not amalgamated for comparison with the 2009 study. Only the white English-speaking groups are considered in this comparison.

1963 at the start of this research; however, by 1981 this had become their second most commonly held ideology, with 20% of white respondents holding this view of the future. Hereafter, belief in this future orientation dropped considerably and in 1996 it did not emerge at all. A small proportion of whites (7.7%) however, have adopted a Revolutionary perspective in present day South Africa. Conservatism declined steadily over the years among the white race group. Just more than a fifth of white respondents were Conservative in the 1963 study; by 1981 this figure had dropped to 13%; and by 1992 it had dropped even lower to 3.5% of respondents. This ideology did not emerge at all in the 1996 and current studies.

Comparisons of the future ideologies for the coloured and Indian/Asian race groups shall not be made due to the low sample sizes of these two groups.

The graph below conveys the abovementioned findings. The essays written by both the 14- and 17-year cohorts in Finchilescu and Dawes' (1999a) study were combined for the purposes of this comparison. Unclassifiable essays make up the difference between 100% and the top of the respective bars. A table of these exact percentages is available as [Appendix Q \(Table 13\)](#).

Figure 9. Comparison of the frequencies of the future ideologies appearing in 1963, 1981, 1992, 1996 and 2009.



4.10. What are the samples social group identities?

The first section of the social group identification checklist required participants to simply mark off as many of 32 possible identities as applied to them. From the analysis of this scale segment, it was found that the *African* identity was most strongly held by black African participants as 83.19% (n = 94) of this race group identified with this identity category. Only 36.36% (n = 24), 35.29% (n = 6) and 11.11% (n = 3) of white, coloured and Indian/Asian participants respectively identified with this identity.

Conversely, it would appear as if being *South African* is a widespread identity held among white participants, as 95.45% (n = 63) of these participants selected this identity option. It seems to be least identified by black Africans, as only 81.42% (n = 92) of this group identified as being South African. The coloured and Indian/Asian race groups fell in between the white and black groups with coloured participants identifying more strongly as South African than the Indian/Asian group. This difference for which race group identifies more as South African was found to be significant only between black Africans and whites, χ^2 (1, N = 179) = 7.07, p= .00522. The coloured and Indian/Asian groups could not be included in this analysis as there were too few people who comprised these two groups.

Racial identity is recognized strongly by each of the race groups, but seems to be strongest among the white race group (n = 62; 93.94%), followed by Indian/Asians (n = 25; 92.59%), coloureds (n = 15; 88.24%) and black Africans (n = 94; 83.19%).

Gender is also a strongly held identity among the four race groups. *All* white participants (n = 66; 100.00%) identified with gender, while only 96.30% (n = 26) of Indian/Asians, 95.57% (n = 108) of black Africans and 94.12% (n = 16) of coloureds identified with this category.

All coloured and Indian/Asian participants identified with a *religious group*. For coloureds, this religion was mainly Christianity (n = 11; 64.71%), while 48.15% (n = 13) of Indian/Asians identified as being Hindu and 29.63% (n = 8) identified as belonging to the Muslim faith. Nearly 77% (n = 87) of the black African sample identified with a religious group. The results reflect that most black Africans are Christians (n = 86; 76.11%). Whites were found to identify the least with a religious identity, with only 69.7% (n = 46) of white

participants selecting a religious identity option. Of these 46 white participants, 32 (48.48%) identified as being Christian, putting Christianity as the most affirmed white religion.


Language was a strongly held identity for the black African race group with *all* participants identifying that they spoke at least one of the 11 official South African languages. Nearly half (n = 54; 47.77%) of the black African sample however, spoke more than one language. English was identified as being spoken by 49.56% (n = 56) of black African participants. IsiZulu was the next most commonly spoken language (n = 23; 20.35%), followed by Sesotho (n = 19; 16.81%) and Setswana (n = 18; 15.93%). All coloured and white participants also identified with a particular language, with eight (47.06%) coloured participants and seven (10.61%) white participants speaking more than one language. Only 81.48% (n = 22) of Indian/Asians selected a language identity. The results show that this race group identifies only with speaking English, while coloureds and whites identified as speaking both Afrikaans and English.

An *ethnic/tribal* identity was acknowledged by *all* black Africans with 11 (9.71%) of these participants identifying as belonging to more than one of these ethnicities. The Zulu ethnicity was identified by 36.28% (n = 41) of the black African sample, followed by Sotho (n = 22; 19.47%) and Tswana (n = 17; 15.04%).

From the above results, it is clear that the most commonly held identities for black Africans are language, followed by ethnicity, gender, race/ African, nationality, and religion. For coloured participants language was also most important, but it was followed by religion, gender, race/nationality, and the African identity. Overall, Indian/Asians identified most strongly with their religious group, followed by their gender, race, nationality, language, and the African identity being of least importance to them, while the white race group acknowledged language as most important to their identities, pursued by gender, nationality, race, religion, and the African identity.

The graph below represents these results, while Table 14 (Appendix R) also summarises the abovementioned social group identification results.

Figure 10. The percentages of the samples social group identities by race.



4.11. What are the samples primary social group identities?

The second section of the social group identification checklist required participants to rank the identities that they selected in the first section of the scale in the order of their importance to the participant, where 1 was indicative of their most important identity and 5 was indicative of their least important identity. Only identities of primary importance were then considered. In total, 14 participants did not complete the second section of this scale, of which nine were black African, one was coloured, two were Indian/Asian and two were white.

Twenty-four (23.08%) black African participants selected an *African* identity as being their most important identity, while only three (18.75%) coloured participants and one (1.56%) white participant did so. No Indian/Asian participants specified this identity as important to them. It must be noted that some respondents could have regarded this identity as being a continental African identity, while others may have considered it as being analogous to the black African racial identity.

Being *South African* appeared to be a more important identity to each of the race groups, as 24 (23.08%) black Africans, five (31.25%) coloureds, five (20.00%) Indian/Asians and 19 (29.69%) whites identified the South African nationality as most important to their social group identification. These differences however, were not found to be significant between all four race groups, χ^2 (3, N = 209) = 1.59, $p=.66114$, or even between black Africans and whites only, χ^2 (1, N = 168) = 0.91, $p=.21947$.

When *race* was considered as an identity of primary importance, black Africans were found to place the most importance on this category as part of their identity, followed by coloureds, Indian/Asians and whites. This difference was found to be significant between the four race groups, χ^2 (3, N = 209) = 12.50, $p=.00585$; however, the expected frequencies were lower than five in two instances. Consequently, the same analysis was run again between the black African and white race groups only, and a significant difference was found once again, χ^2 (1, N = 168) = 10.68, $p=.00058$, indicating that race is of more importance to black Africans than it is to whites.


Conversely, *gender* appears to be of more significance to the primary identities of whites when all four race groups are compared, χ^2 (3, N = 209) = 11.80, $p=.00810$, and it becomes even more significant when only black Africans and whites are compared, χ^2 (1, N = 168) = 9.86, $p=.00188$. Nineteen (29.69%) white participants indicated their gender as of primary importance to them, while only 11 (10.58%) black African participants, one coloured participant, and four (16.00%) Indian/Asians did so.

Indian/Asians most often identified *religion* as of primary importance to their identities (n = 12; 48.00%), followed by black Africans (n = 29; 27.88%), coloureds (n = 4; 25.00%), and whites (n = 13; 20.31%), but this difference was not significant for all race groups, χ^2 (3, N = 209) = 6.94, $p=.07384$, as well as for black Africans and whites only, χ^2 (1, N = 168) = 1.21, $p=.17989$.

The expected frequencies for the coloured (n = 0) and Indian/Asian (n = 2; 8.00%) race groups in terms of *ethno-linguistic* identity were too low to allow for all race groups to be compared, and so only black African and white participants were compared in terms of ethno-linguistic primary identification. Eight (7.69%) black Africans and five (7.81%) whites selected a ethno-linguistic category as of primary importance to them, but this difference was not very large and naturally failed to be of significance, χ^2 (1, N = 168) = 0.001, $p=.59794$.

The graph below illustrates the abovementioned findings and [Table 15](#) in the appendix section ([Appendix S](#)) also presents the frequencies and percentage values of those participants from each race group who acknowledged one of the six identity categories as of primary importance to their identity.


Figure 11. The percentages of the samples primary social group identifications.



When the association between the primary identity categories and the Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic future ideologies was considered, it was found that those participants who expressed Liberal ideologies most commonly identified with being South African ($n = 19$; 31.15%) followed by their religious group ($n = 18$; 29.51%), while those who expressed future outlooks of Deterioration most often identified with their religion ($n = 10$; 29.41%) followed by their gender ($n = 8$; 23.53%). Participants who foresaw Catastrophic futures most commonly identified with their national South African identity, gender and religion.

Table 16 depicts the frequencies and percentages of the primary social identities of those participants who expressed Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic ideologies and can be found in the appendix section as [Appendix T](#). The graph below also illustrates these results.

Figure 12. The frequencies of the samples primary social group identifications by the Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic future ideologies.



4.12. To what extent are the participants optimistic towards the future of South Africa and are these levels of optimism associated with their predominant future ideologies?

An overall mean of 2.97 (SD = 0.87) was obtained for the Optimism scale. This scale ranged from a lowest response rating of 1, which was indicative of low optimism to the future, to a highest response rating of 5, which was indicative of high optimism to the future. This mean of 2.97 converges closely upon the mid-point of the Optimism scale which signifies that in general the sample anticipates that things will stay much the same in South Africa over the next five years, rather than improving or getting worse.

It was found furthermore, by means of a two-independent sample t-test, that those who expressed optimism towards the future in their essays, in the form of positive future valences, were significantly more optimistic in their scores on the Optimism scale, $t(173) = 8.47$, $p < .0001$. The mean score on the Optimism scale for those participants who expressed positive future valences in their essays was 3.42 (SD = 0.75), while the average for those who expressed negative future valences in their essays was 2.44 (SD = 0.08).

When the levels of optimism for the black African and white race groups were compared, it was revealed that the former group was significantly more optimistic ($M = 3.23$, $SD = 0.08$) towards the future of the country, as reflected by their scores on the Optimism scale, than was the white race group ($M = 2.66$, $SD = 0.09$), $t(173) = 4.81$, $p < .0001$.

A one-way analysis of variance then found that a significant difference does in fact exist in the degree of optimism to the future for those whose essays expressed Liberal, Deterioration, and Catastrophic future ideologies, $F(2, 136) = 69.38$, $p < .0001$. Those who portrayed Liberal ideologies were more optimistic towards the future of South Africa ($M = 3.52$, $SD = 0.74$) than were those who portrayed Deterioration ($M = 2.51$, $SD = 0.66$) and Catastrophic ideologies ($M = 1.85$, $SD = 0.44$). A Tukey's Studentized Range test further revealed that the differences between the optimism means for all the ideologies - Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic - were statistically significant.

4.13. What are the samples levels of relative deprivation and are these levels of relative deprivation associated with their predominant future ideologies?

An overall mean of 2.73 ($SD = 0.52$) was obtained for the Relative Deprivation scale. This scale ranges from a lowest response option of 1, which is indicative of low perceived relative deprivation, to a highest response option of 5, which is indicative of high perceived relative deprivation. This mean therefore denotes a relatively moderate level of relative deprivation for the sample overall.

An initial analysis was made comparing the black African and white race groups on the full relative deprivation scale. It was found that black Africans experienced greater perceived relative deprivation ($M = 2.75$, $SD = 0.05$) than their white counterparts ($M = 2.67$, $SD = 0.05$), but as can be seen from the minimal difference between their respective means this variation was not significant at 5%, $t(175) = 1.01$, $p = 0.3148$. As there were too few coloured and Indian/Asian participants these two race groups were not included in this comparison. However, due to the low score of internal consistency that was obtained previously for this particular scale, it was decided to consider each relative deprivation scale item separately by means of a multivariate analysis of variance. This test revealed that a significant difference does in fact exist between the black African and white race groups when each separate

relative deprivation scale item is considered, $F(8, 162) = 14.86, p < 0.0001$). This result refers to the conversion of the Wilks' Lambda from the MANOVA.

When levels of relative deprivation for each scale item were compared for these two race groups, it was found that black Africans feel significantly more dissatisfied with their personal economic conditions ($M = 3.52, SD = 0.1.13$) than whites at present ($M = 3, SD = 1.25$) ($t(123) = 2.75, p = 0.0069$), but that the black African group expects their personal economic conditions to get better in the future ($M = 2.18, SD = 1.03$) in comparison to whites ($M = 2.88, SD = 0.90$) ($t(146) = -4.68, p < 0.0001$). When it comes to overall economic conditions in South Africa, the results reveal that whites are more dissatisfied with the current economic situation in the country ($M = 4, SD = 0.81$) when compared to black Africans ($M = 3.71, SD = 0.97$) ($t(153) = -2.06, p = 0.0406$). Both race groups however, expect the overall economic conditions in South Africa to worsen in the near future, with whites expecting conditions to worsen to a greater extent ($M = 3.37, SD = 0.89$) than black Africans ($M = 2.84, SD = 1.15$) ($t(174) = -3.20, p = 0.0016$). The black African race group feels that their overall personal conditions are significantly worse ($M = 2.29, SD = 0.93$) than the white race group ($M = 1.88, SD = 0.90$) ($t(135) = 2.89, p = 0.0045$). No significant difference was uncovered between black Africans ($M = 2.22, SD = 0.86$) and whites ($M = 2.37, SD = 0.91$) for whether they thought that their overall personal conditions were better or worse than other members of their population group ($t(127) = -1.05, p = 0.2955$). Black Africans reported that they felt the overall conditions of their race group to be significantly worse than those of other South African race groups ($M = 3.40, SD = 1.13$). Conversely, whites reported that their groups overall conditions were better than those of other race groups ($M = 2.00, SD = 0.83$) ($t(175) = 8.75, p < 0.0001$). Both race groups felt that the overall conditions in South Africa are better than those in other southern African countries (Black African: $M = 1.85, SD = 0.97$ /White: $M = 1.88, SD = 0.68$) ($t(174) = -0.20, p = 0.8455$), although this difference was not found to be a significant one. The above results of the two-independent sample t-test are reflected in the table below.

Table 17. The means, standard deviations and p-values for the comparison of each relative deprivation item between the black African and white race groups.

Relative Deprivation scale item	Race	Mean	Standard deviation	p-value
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 1 At the moment are you satisfied/dissatisfied with your personal economic conditions?	B W	3.52 3	1.13 1.25	*0.0069
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 2 Do you expect that your personal economic conditions will get better/same/worse one year from now?	B W	2.18 2.88	1.03 0.90	*<.0001
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 3 At the moment are you satisfied/dissatisfied with economic conditions in South Africa?	B W	3.72 4	0.97 0.81	*0.0406
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 4 Do you expect that economic conditions in South Africa will get better/same/worse one year from now?	B W	2.84 3.37	1.15 0.89	*0.0016
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 5 Would you say that your overall personal conditions are better/same/worse than those of other South Africans?	B W	2.29 1.88	0.93 0.90	*0.0045
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 6 Would you say that your overall personal conditions are better/same/worse as other members of your population group?	B W	2.22 2.37	0.86 0.91	0.2955
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 7 Would you say that the overall conditions of people from your population group are better/same/worse than those of other groups in South Africa?	B W	3.40 2	1.13 0.83	*<.0001
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 8 Would you say that the overall conditions in South Africa are better/same/worse than those in other southern African countries?	B W	1.85 1.88	0.97 0.68	0.8455

A multivariate analysis of variance was then performed to discover whether a significant difference exists in the levels of relative deprivation for each scale item, for those whose essays expressed Liberal, Deterioration, and Catastrophic future ideologies. To reiterate, each item of the relative deprivation scale was assessed individually due to the low score of internal consistency that this scale yielded. Significant differences were found only to exist between the second, fourth, and eighth items. Those who expressed Liberal future ideologies were found to perceive lower levels of *personal economic relative deprivation* for the second scale item ($M = 2.19$, $SD = 0.97$) while those who expressed Deterioration ($M = 2.81$, $SD = 1.01$) and Catastrophic ideologies ($M = 2.75$, $SD = 0.94$) perceived higher levels of relative deprivation on this particular item, $F(2, 133) = 6.47$, $p=0.0021$). On closer examination however, a Tukey's Studentized Range test revealed that this significant difference only applied in fact to the Liberal and Deterioration ideologies ($p=0.008599$). Similarly, those who

described Liberal ideologies were found to report significantly lower levels of relative deprivation for the fourth scale item which measured *overall economic conditions* in South Africa ($M = 2.64$, $SD = 1.06$) than those who described Deterioration ($M = 3.47$, $SD = 0.93$) and Catastrophic ($M = 3.83$, $SD = 0.82$) future outlooks, $F(2, 133) = 17.34$, $p < .0001$). The results of a further Tukey's Studentized Range test found that this significant difference existed only between the Liberal and Deterioration categories ($p = 0.000286$), and the Liberal and Catastrophic categories ($p = 0.0001$). Significantly lower levels of *overall national relative deprivation* were uncovered for those who depicted Liberal ideologies in their essays ($M = 0.42$, $SD = 0.40$), while those who depicted Deterioration ($M = 0.71$, $SD = 0.44$) and Catastrophic ($M = 0.66$, $SD = 0.38$) ideologies once again yielded higher levels of relative deprivation for this eighth item, $F(2, 133) = 7.53$, $p = 0.000802$). This significant difference was found only to extend to the Liberal and Deterioration ideologies however (Tukey's: $p = 0.003200$).

4.14. Does a significant difference exist between one's primary social group identity and their levels of optimism to the future and perceived relative deprivation, and does optimism to the future, relative deprivation and primary social group identification predict one's future outlook?

A one-way analysis of variance was conducted to determine whether a significant difference exists between the samples primary social group identities and their levels of optimism to the future and perceived relative deprivation. This analysis revealed that no significant difference does in fact exist between one's primary identity and their perceived levels of relative deprivation, $F(5, 83) = 0.35$, $p = 0.8838$, and that no significant difference exists between one's primary identity and their level of optimism to the future, $F(5, 182) = 1.21$, $p = 0.3058$.

The relative deprivation means and standard deviations of each of the six primary identity categories are depicted in the table below.

Table 18. The means of the relative deprivation and optimism scales for each of the six primary social group identities.

Primary Identity Categories	Relative deprivation scale			Optimism scale		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
African	52	2.70	0.54	51	2.92	0.83
South African	27	2.76	0.40	27	3.04	0.99
Race	9	2.85	0.46	9	2.56	0.72
Gender	32	2.71	0.53	32	2.75	0.87
Religion	55	2.67	0.50	55	3.10	0.92
Ethno-linguistic	14	2.81	0.75	14	3.15	0.89

Lastly, a generalized logistic regression was run to determine whether optimism to the future, perceived relative deprivation and primary social group identification (African, nationality, race, gender, religion or ethno-linguistic identity) predicts whether one holds either a Liberal, Deterioration, or Catastrophic future ideology. The Newton-Raphson optimization technique was used to estimate the regression parameters. The convergence criterion was satisfied indicating that the maximum-likelihood algorithm had indeed converged. The GCONV relative gradient convergence criterion (default precision = 10^{-8}) was used to assess the convergence. When the global null hypothesis ($\beta = 0$) was tested the full model was found to be significant (Likelihood Ratio: χ^2 (14, N = 120) = 106.31, $p < .0001$) indicating that at least one of the predictors regression coefficients is not equal to zero in the model. However, when the three predictors are considered separately, only relative deprivation, χ^2 (2, N = 120) = 9.47, $p = 0.0088$, and optimism to the future, χ^2 (2, N = 120) = 32.10, $p < .0001$, significantly predict one's future ideology. Primary social group identification is not a significant predictor of one's outlook to the future, χ^2 (10, N = 120) = 5.73, $p = 0.8374$. While the overall relative deprivation model was found to be significant, it must be noted that the separate models (as indicated in the table below) were not. The results for relative deprivation as a predictor of Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic future ideologies therefore should be considered with caution. The negative estimated logistic regression coefficient for relative deprivation (-1.08) means that relative deprivation as a predictor decreases the probability of a Liberal outlook, but increases the probability of a future ideology of Deterioration (1.10) given that the other variables are held constant in the model. Optimism as a predictor increases the probability of both Liberal (4.99) and Deterioration (2.59) ideologies given that the other variables are held constant.

The complete results for the logistic regression are available in the table below.

Table 19. Results of the generalized logistic regression.

Parameter	Future Ideology	DF	Coeff- icient	Wald Chi- Square	Pr > Chi Square	Point Estimate	95% Wald Confidence Limits	
Intercept	Liberal	1	-8.99	6.95	0.0084			
Intercept	Deterioration	1	-8.47	7.90	0.0049			
RD	Liberal	1	-1.08	1.41	0.2352	0.340	0.06	2.02
RD	Deterioration	1	1.10	2.67	0.1025	2.995	0.80	11.17
OPT	Liberal	1	4.99	31.08	<.0001	146.285	25.35	844.16
OPT	Deterioration	1	2.59	12.82	0.0003	13.344	3.23	55.12

Chapter Five

Discussion

5.1. Predominant future ideologies

The most widespread future ideologies that were held by the sample were the Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic ideologies. Nearly a third of the sample was Liberal in their outlooks to the future. As per the current study's definition, these individuals therefore perceived gradual and smooth improvements in the existing social order through peaceful transformations whereby conflicts are resolved amicably and conditions of life ultimately improve for all South African citizens. Mannheim (1936) made reference to a Liberal ideology in his pioneering work on future ideologies. He foresaw this orientation as encompassing a 'positive acceptance of culture' and 'ethical values'. Leatt et al. (1986) contend that a Liberal tradition has in fact prevailed in South Africa historically. They describe Liberalism as an ideology that is strongly individualistic in nature and that is centred round individual freedom. Equality is also at the core of this belief. Liberals believe that every individual is equal to another, and therefore that the same basic human rights should be granted to everyone and equal opportunities should exist in all spheres of life. This ideology is a particularly positive one, as a Liberal individual is viewed in an optimistic light. He/she is seen as being naturally good, and capable of and responsible for shaping his/her own destiny. In Liberalism, it is by man's efforts that society will progress towards "greater social justice, economic prosperity and political stability" (p. 4) and that suffering will be minimised. Politically in Liberalism, people are seen as being superior to the government and political power is seen to exist and be exercised for the good of the public alone. This is based on the premise that a government cannot in fact be regarded as legitimate unless it is based on the consent of the governed (Degenaar, 1983). While Liberals are generally against progress by revolutionary means (Leatt et al., 1986), they do however justify this means when a government becomes authoritarian and begins to violate the natural rights of its people (Degenaar, 1983). Various critiques of Liberalism do however exist. As was mentioned above the individual is at the core of the Liberal ideology and is therefore the basic unit of social analysis. In a diverse and multiracial society such as South Africa however, some argue that this ideology fails to give the necessary attention to the interests and aspirations of groups in such a context and that it therefore fails to take the composite plural character of South

African society into account. Furthermore, while Liberals fight for individual freedom they eventually become conservative in the sense that they conservatively support the status quo when this freedom is eventually achieved. European liberals historically advocated the economic system of free enterprise otherwise known as capitalism, as they were convinced that private ownership of property guarantees individual freedom and that such a market economy will lead to greater prosperity for all. An additional critique is that Liberalism can thus be seen as being an excuse for capitalism (Leatt et al., 1986).

Nearly a fifth of the current sample foresaw futures of Deterioration. In accordance with the current study's constructed definition of this ideology category these individuals envisage that the government will be responsible for the deteriorating conditions in South Africa's future. The Catastrophic ideology, which represents a more extreme form of Deterioration, upholds that, in the future, the deteriorating conditions in the country will culminate into 'a disastrous future characterized by economic decline, crime and disorder', as per the current study's definition. Just more than a tenth of the sample respondents endorsed this future orientation. When these two ideologies are combined however, to represent an overarching ideology of general future deterioration and decline, nearly a third of the study participants were found to hold this fatalistic view. The proportions of respondents who endorsed the Liberal ideology, and who thus see progress in the country's future, are nearly identical to those who foresee impending deterioration and catastrophe.

The three hypothetical future scenarios that emerged from the discussions that took place in the *Dinokeng Scenarios* undertaking (referred to in Section 2.3.1.4 of the Literature Review) were named 'Walk Together', 'Walk Behind' and 'Walk Apart'. These future scenarios were found to closely resemble the Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic ideologies respectively.

In the 'Walk Together' future it is by the efforts of South African citizens (the 'Citizens Charter') that the country is able to progress and prosper - a characteristic which is also at the core of the Liberal ideology. Furthermore, the definition of Liberalism in the current study understands change to be gradual. This characteristic seems to also be common to the 'Walk Together' future scenario, as progress also occurs gradually. It is only after the first two years of this scenario which are known as the 'Bleak Years' that positive change finally begins to occur in the country. The scenario seems to conclude with the ultimate improvement of life for all South African individuals.

Certain similarities exist between the Deterioration ideology and that of the 'Walk Behind' future scenario. Despite the government's best attempts to develop the country, the economic crisis serves to exacerbate the already fragile economic conditions. The result is that the South African government accumulates a great deal of debt and overall conditions begin to worsen. This causes widespread discontent amongst the South African population. These circumstances resemble those of the Deterioration future ideology in which conditions in the country begin to deteriorate and little can be done to prevent this from happening. It is evident in the 'Walk Behind' future scenario that the global economic crisis is largely responsible for the deteriorating conditions in the country, and there is indeed little that can be done to counteract such a large-scale crisis such as an economic one. A characteristic of the Deterioration ideology however, is that there is fatalistic acceptance of the inevitable deteriorating situation, and this does not appear to be common to the 'Walk Behind' scenario, in which the South African people actively express their intense discontent with the country's state of affairs through protest action.

The 'Walk Apart' future scenario is clearly more representative of the Catastrophic future ideology as it depicts a future of severe and rapid deterioration that eventually culminates in a state of emergency. In the Catastrophic future ideology the existing political order is responsible for leading the country into a disastrous future that is characterized by economic decline, crime and disorder. Things go from bad to worse and South Africans once again fatalistically accept this deteriorating situation. In the 'Walk Apart' scenario it is evident that circumstances in the country do indeed go from bad to worse. The global economic crisis once again has a hugely decisive role to play in this future, as it serves to exacerbate unemployment, which subsequently results in crime becoming more rampant. The education and healthcare sectors deteriorate, poverty escalates, skilled minorities leave the country, and service delivery fails possibly as a result of the widespread corruption in the South African government. Upsurges of civil protests arise, but civilians are threatened with violence by the local warlords and militia with whom the government has formed surreptitious alliances. Terror and fear spread throughout the country, and complete disorder is unleashed, and when a state of emergency is finally declared ultimate catastrophe seems to have been reached.

The Technician, Revolutionary and Socialist ideologies do not appear to be commonly held ideologies in today's society as far as the results of the current study demonstrate. While the Revolutionary ideology was supported most strongly out of the three, followed by the

Technicist outlook and Socialist ideology, only a handful of individuals were interpreted as endorsing each of these outlooks. Mannheim (1936) referred to a Socialist-Communist ideology in his early work. This ideology represents a newly created order in which capitalism is abolished, freedom and equality are brought about, and the focus is concentrated on the economic and social structure of society. The nature of communism before the fall of the Soviet Union however, is likely to be very different to communism that prevails in the modern age. Furthermore, African communism or socialism also departs somewhat from communism in the traditionalist sense. Leatt et al. (1986) contend that many consider socialism to be the only morally acceptable type of government in South Africa given the country's past economic and political injustices. At the core of African socialism therefore is the desire to abolish the exploitation of man by man, and instead represent the interests of all citizens. This political ideology however, is unique in the sense that it is built on the traditional values of African collectivism and therefore claims to act on behalf and in the interests of the people as one nation. It is possible that the low acceptance of the Socialist ideology amongst the current sample is reflective of a desire for the preservation of capitalism in South Africa.

The Conservative ideology did not emerge at all in the current study. When one considers the findings of the past studies this is not surprising. From 1992 onwards this ideology began to slowly disappear. As this outlook depicts a desire for the existing order to return to the separatist system of apartheid, it is possible that certain individuals are no longer comfortable identifying with this racist and socially unacceptable ideology. A further possibility is that South Africans simply reject the oppressive and discriminatory Conservative ideology as it harks back to the 'old South Africa' and stands in stark contrast to the ideals of the 'new South Africa'.

A moderate proportion of essays were classified as Unclassifiable in the current study. These figures however, do not compare to those found by Finchilescu and Dawes (199b, 2001) in their 1996 study. These authors reported that there was a significant drop in the number of classifiable essays after their 1992 study. The proportion of essays coded as Unclassifiable stood at 16% in 1992 and increased tremendously to 83% of all essays in 1996. The authors are of the opinion that this substantial shift was reflective of the change that the political transformation brought about in which the formerly divided and oppressed South Africa emerged as a liberal democracy. They argue that the "crisis prompted by apartheid, which

gave clear shape to the future ideologies of the earlier period, was no longer present” (Finchilescu & Dawes, 2001, p.144) and as a result, the future became blurred and difficult to define. Only 14.8% of the current study’s essays failed to present a definable future. It follows that the present ‘crises’ that currently shape the South African context (i.e. the high incidence of crime, corruption in government, increasing unemployment, the Eskom crisis, the threat of the HIV/Aids pandemic, etc) make it easier for South Africans to identify with a particular future hence the lower proportion of Unclassifiable essays in the current study.

A surprising finding was that a relatively high proportion of the sample failed to discuss the future of the country at all. Instead, their essays referred only to the present conditions in South Africa. While a number of other essays spoke of the future as was specified by the essay question, they also in part discussed the present. This finding seems to reflect a fixed preoccupation with the current state of the nation amongst the study participants, and it seems as if the respondents used their essays as a way to vent about the current circumstances in the country. The fact that most participants who discussed the present in their essays did so in a negative manner lends support to this argument. In Adamson et al’s. (2007) study they found that many of their adolescent participants were particularly neutral in their views of the future. They put forth that this neutrality could very well have been due to a lack of clarity of what will unfold in the future, and they suggest that it is perhaps easier to envision a future in a more proximal future period. The current study asked its participants to imagine a possible future 51 years ahead of the present time. Certain respondents may have found it difficult to look so far forward into the future and this may have accounted for why some participants could not envision a particular future at all. A further possibility is that these participants simply do not see the future as being markedly different from the present. The findings of Grootboom’s (2007) study however; seem to suggest that many South Africans fail to give the future much thought. Nineteen percent of his study’s participants were indifferent to the future or had failed to give it much thought. When asked how often they thought about the future of South Africa 55% of his respondents said that they gave serious thought to the future, while 30% acknowledged that they gave the future no thought whatsoever. In his study of Finnish youth’s future images of society, Rubin (1998, as cited in Ono, 2005) found that his study participants were also exceedingly vague about the future of their country. This provides evidence to suggest that it is not only South African adolescents who appear to lack clarity about what will happen in the future. All societies have their own conceptions of the Past, the Present and the Future, but they differ in terms of how they rank these dimensions of

time (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961). Certain societies, for example, place the most emphasis on the Present and therefore pay little attention to the Past or the Future, while others have a strong respect for tradition and the Past is therefore of great importance. Americans conversely have strong leanings to the future which is anticipated to be 'bigger and better'. Black African society however, is traditionally acknowledged to be one that is most oriented to the Past (Mkhize, 2004). The difficulties in thinking about the future that are reflected in the high number of essays that discussed only the present, could possibly have been due to this actuality. Racial differences in the number of 'present' essays shall be considered in the following section (5.2) in an attempt to confirm or disconfirm this likelihood.

It emerged from the essays of those who discussed the present conditions in the country that participants are most preoccupied with 21 particular spheres within present-day South African society. General dissatisfaction was expressed with regards to the current *education* system, *healthcare* system, the *HIV/AIDS* pandemic, the *justice system*, *skills*, *unemployment* levels, *poverty*, current *living conditions* in the country, the receding *economy* and the widespread problem of *crime*. Furthermore, the sample was generally negative in their opinions of *Black Economic Empowerment*; and *teenage pregnancy* and *emigration* were further sources of disgruntlement. There were mixed feelings regarding *development* and *race relations* in the country. The prevalence of *corruption* in the South African government and the *greed* that seems to be rife amongst the country's leaders were further sources of frustration. A great deal was said about *Jacob Zuma*, the current ANC president. While some participants spoke of him with respect and admiration, most others made reference to the recent allegations of corruption and rape that were directed at him. Unsurprisingly, South African *politics* and *leadership* were both topics that were not held in high esteem. In Poole and Cooney's (1987) study it was mentioned how the findings of other research seem to suggest that adolescents tend to be largely disengaged from the political process. Poole and Cooney (1987) however, found evidence to contradict this finding, as their adolescent participants' perceptions of the future cohered largely around politics. The fact that the current study's participants' also had a great deal to say about the current South African political process also seems to stand in contradiction to this assumption. The recent political controversies in South Africa are likely to have brought about a preoccupation with the political process that may very well account for this inconsistency. Due to the poor standing of the government some participants spoke of the *2009 elections* with a sense of pessimistic anticipation and dread, while others conveyed

more optimism and were clearly excited by this important event. The abovementioned findings confirm that many of the crises that the country currently faces and that were discussed in Section 2.4 of the Literature Review are indeed pertinent matters in today's society.

5.2. Future ideologies by race

The black African race group was predominantly Liberal in their outlooks to the future with more than half of these participants endorsing this ideology. This seems to have been an almost consistent finding from study to study, with the exception of the 1963 study in which it was found that black Africans expressed predominantly Revolutionary ideologies, followed by Liberal ideologies. This group's second most widely held future orientation was the Deterioration ideology. They supported a Catastrophic future to a far less extent. These findings reflect that while some of the black African group perceive deteriorating future conditions in the country, very few of them believe that the country is heading towards catastrophe.

The white race group also appears to be predominantly Liberal in their future ideologies, as nearly half of these participants endorsed this future orientation. However, white participants' second most widely held future ideology was the Deterioration outlook and they supported this orientation to a greater extent than the black African race group. They were also fairly supportive of a Catastrophic future and belief in this future far outweighed that of the black African race group. At first glance whites appear to be predominantly Liberal in their outlooks to the future. However, when the Deterioration and Catastrophic ideologies are considered as one overarching ideology of general deterioration and decline, it becomes apparent that the figures of white participants who endorsed a Liberal ideology are identical to the figures of whites who endorsed an outlook of general deterioration and decline. The fact that white South Africans are significantly more Catastrophic than black South Africans seems to validate the literatures consistent findings that the white race group is historically less optimistic than the black African race group. The differences in the two groups' levels of optimism about the future shall be discussed in Section 5.4 to follow.

Perceptions of the future did not appear to differ significantly from one race group to the next. It is possible that socio-economic status is perhaps a better predictor of future outlooks.

When comparisons are made between the black African race groups future ideologies over the 1963 – 2009 study period, it emerges that black Africans have maintained predominantly Liberal outlooks to the future. While in 1963 this group's modal future ideology was Revolutionary with nearly half of black African participants endorsing this orientation, their second most widely held belief was that of a Liberal future. In 1981 this order was found to have reversed: black Africans were now more Liberal than they were Revolutionary. In 1992 a Revolutionary future outlook disappeared completely amongst black Africans. They now held a predominantly Liberal belief in the future, and their endorsement of Liberalism was found to reach its peak during this year when compared to the other studies. Their second most common ideology was that of Catastrophe. This pattern was repeated during 1996; however, figures of Liberalism plummeted to an all-time low. This was the year in which an exceptionally high proportion of essays were unable to be classified due to their failure to depict a definable future. It seems as if the dissolution of the 'apartheid crisis' that was previously spoken of and the advent of a democratic society had a curtailing effect on all the ideologies that emerged during this period. The findings of the current study reveal that while black Africans are predominantly Liberal yet again, quite a high proportion foresee futures of Deterioration, while slightly lower numbers perceive impending Catastrophe.

The pattern of the white race group's future ideologies over the 1963-2009 period differs quite markedly from that of the black African group. In stark contrast, this group seems to uphold consistently Catastrophic views of the future. In 1963 it emerged that most whites were Catastrophic followed by Conservative, while in 1981 they maintained a predominantly Catastrophic outlook to the future; however, a Technicist view replaced Conservatism as their second most widely held belief. In 1992 and 1996 this groups ideologies began to alter fairly drastically. While this group remained predominantly Catastrophic, strong levels of Liberalism began to emerge. Levels of Conservatism were at an all-time high in 1963, but began to decline over the years until they disappeared completely in 1996. The current study is the first in which white participants endorse a Liberal future as their most common ideology. Deterioration has replaced Catastrophe as their second most predominant view of the future, rendering Catastrophe as third.

When the samples present perceptions of the country are considered in terms of race it becomes apparent that the black African race group is the most preoccupied with the present,

as more than half of the study's black African participants used their essays to vent about the present state of the nation, while white participants did so to a far less extent. The fact that the black African culture places more emphasis on the Past than it does the Future may perhaps account for the difficulty that black African individuals seem to experience envisaging the future. Of the 21 areas of society that were spoken of in the samples essays *corruption* in government, *crime*, the receding *economy*, the *2009 elections*, governmental *leadership*, South African *politics* and the ANC president, *Jacob Zuma* were referred to most often. It was previously acknowledged how common concerns are beginning to emerge across racial barriers (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009), and the samples perceptions of South Africa at present substantiate this actuality. They share in common a growing intolerance with the tenuous circumstances in the country. Black Africans seem to be the most disgruntled with regards to each of the 21 thematic areas however. This seems to reflect a mounting dissatisfaction with their group's position in South Africa.

5.3. Social group identifications

In line with the literature (Gibson & Gouws, 2000 as cited in Bornman, in press) black Africans were found to endorse the African identity to a stronger degree than they did the national South African identity, while the opposite was true of white South Africans. Surprisingly however, more than a third of whites endorsed the African identity. It was argued in the Literature Review section that white South Africans do not seem to consider the African identity as applicable to them. The findings of the current study partly support this assumption. While the majority of white participants seem to perceive the African identity as being synonymous with the black African racial identity, a third of white respondents perceive it to represent a more continental African identity and thus as partly applicable to them. White South Africans identify most strongly with a national South African identity of all the South African race groups, while black Africans identify the least with this identity option. These results therefore lend support to those of Gibson and Gouws (2000, as cited in Bornman, in press) and Finchilescu and Dawes (1999a) who reported that black Africans tend to endorse the African identity while whites identify more with the national South African identity. The current study seems to provide support for the fact that black Africans perceive the African identity to be synonymous with a black African racial identity, as identical proportions of black African participants identified with their racial identity and the African identity, suggesting that they perceive these identities to be one and the same.

When the *importance* that the participants placed on their various identities is considered significant differences were found only to exist between black Africans and whites in terms of race and gender. Black Africans placed far more importance on their racial identity than did whites, while whites conversely placed greater importance on gender as an identity category than did black Africans. When one considers that as a group black Africans shared the experience of being oppressed under the former apartheid administration it can be argued that this experience served to unite them together as a racial group. It is possible that this sense of unity can account for the importance that they attach to their race as a part of their self identity. Whites, in contrast, did not share such an experience and can therefore be considered to lack this sense of unity that seems to be present amongst black Africans. It follows that they therefore place greater emphasis on more personalised identity categories such as gender.

5.4. Levels of optimism to the future

When the participants future valences that emerged from their essay content was considered, overall the sample was found to be more positive to the future of the country than they were negative; however, this difference was not very great. Forty-one percent were positive, while 39% were conversely negative in their outlooks. When the findings of other studies are taken into consideration it becomes apparent that, in general, South African citizens are more optimistic towards the future than they are pessimistic. Hamel et al. (2005) report that 70% of their study's South African participants conveyed optimism about the future, while the findings of the 2003 *South African Social Attitudes Survey* revealed that 59% of South Africans were optimistic that the country was indeed moving in the right direction (Daniel et al., 2006). Furthermore, while Møller (2007) fails to provide exact figures of optimism she nonetheless contends that *most* South Africans are happy and optimistic about the future. These abovementioned findings seem to stand in stark contrast to those of other international studies in which youths were predominantly negative in their societal perceptions of the future. Poole and Cooney (1987) reported that the Australian and Singapore adolescents in their study were largely pessimistic towards the future of their society, while a survey that Ono (2005) cites found 64% of their Japanese respondents to be negative to the future. Based on the results of these international studies South African youths appear to be more optimistic in their outlooks to the future. When the optimism scores from the Optimism scale are taken into consideration it becomes evident that, in general, the sample anticipates that things will

remain much the same in South Africa over the next five years. In their essay participants were required to write about the projected history of South Africa as if they were historians writing in the year 2060. Their future valences therefore reflect their levels of optimism/pessimism to a future that lies 51 years ahead. As the current study was interested in perceptions of the future over a longer time span it is perhaps best to consider this measure when attempting to tap into the samples levels of future optimism rather than that of the Optimism scale which only considers the future five years in advance. However, the reliability of the coding process for the essays future valences is perhaps not as dependable when compared to the reliability of the Optimism scale. However, the fact that those individuals who expressed optimism towards the future in their essays, in the form of positive future valences, were significantly more optimistic in their scores on the Optimism scale reflects that these two independent measures are indeed strongly related.

As has been consistently found in the literature (Daniel et al., 2006; Hamel et al., 2005), black Africans are significantly more optimistic about the future than are whites. However, the black African race group is significantly more disadvantaged than the remaining South African race groups overall. As a group black Africans however, have overcome a great deal in the past and still continue to withstand greater adversities than the other race groups. It is probable that being forced to overcome these daily hardships has served to foster a sense of resilience and hardiness within black African individuals, which may indeed account for their optimistic attitudes. Pessimism may be seen as adding to these hardships and serving to exacerbate an already difficult situation. In contrast, white South Africans, relatively speaking, have not had to conquer the challenges that black Africans were and are faced with, and it can be argued that this group is thus not as resilient as black Africans. They may therefore adopt an attitude of defeatism more readily than black African individuals. It is a further possibility that black African participants display greater optimism to the future as they consider any future to be preferable to the one they lived under apartheid (Daniel et al., 2006; Finchilescu & Dawes, 1999b). However, this sample was comprised of relatively young participants, most of whom would have been very young children during the final years of apartheid, and who were therefore not officially a part of the 'apartheid generation'. It is a possibility that the samples black African participants, who were not as severely affected by apartheid as were elder black African individuals, are nonetheless very aware of their group's historical disadvantage and plight, and therefore perceive any future to be better to that of apartheid. White South Africans, on the other hand, receive a higher quality of education,

experience more affluent economic conditions, and have a better standard of living; however, they consistently are the most discontented and least optimistic of all the South African race groups. Daniel et al. (2006) contend that this dissatisfaction may be due to a subconscious resentment that they no longer ‘run the show’ as they did under the apartheid government and therefore perceive themselves to have lost their former power.

A significant difference was also found to exist between one’s degree of optimism to the future for those individuals whose essays expressed Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic ideologies. Those who perceived Liberal futures were found to be more optimistic to the future than were those who perceived futures of Deterioration. Furthermore, those who foresaw futures of Deterioration were more optimistic to the future than were those who were Catastrophic in their outlooks. It was a finding of the current study that all those participants who displayed Liberal ideologies expressed positive future valences, and that all those participants who displayed Deterioration and Catastrophic ideologies expressed negative future valences. Therefore, the Liberal future perception seems to ultimately have an optimistic outlook at its core, while perceptions of Deterioration and Catastrophe are conversely based on negative outlooks to the future.

5.6. Levels of perceived relative deprivation

Overall, the current sample seems to experience a moderate level of relative deprivation; however, when comparisons are made between black Africans and whites the former group was found to experience significantly greater levels of relative deprivation than the latter group. When one considers that in comparison to the other South African race groups black Africans were found to most often report ‘frequent shortages’ of their basic needs, and that nearly a third of black Africans considered themselves to be ‘poor’, while self-perceived poverty was virtually non-existent amongst Indian/Asians and whites (Hamel et al., 2005; Roberts, 2006), this outcome was to be expected.

Support for this finding is provided when the individual items of the relative deprivation are considered. It emerged that black Africans are significantly more dissatisfied with their *personal economic conditions* than whites are with their personal economic conditions. This finding points to a relatively high experience of egoistical relative deprivation amongst black

Africans. Black Africans however, expect their personal economic conditions to improve in the future. The fact that black Africans are consistently more optimistic towards the future than whites are, as was discussed in the section above, seems to manifest in this finding, as the expectation that such personal economic conditions will improve reflects an optimistic outlook to the future. In terms of the *overall economic conditions in South Africa* at present, white South Africans are significantly more dissatisfied than are black Africans. Furthermore, whites expect these conditions to deteriorate even further. Similarly, these findings seem to provide confirmation for the consistent finding that whites are more pessimistic than are black Africans. The results depict that whites are aware of and acknowledge their privileged position in relation to the other South African race groups, as they rated their *overall personal conditions* as being considerably better than those of other South Africans. Conversely, black Africans feel that their overall personal conditions are significantly worse than those of other South Africans. The fraternal measure of relative deprivation that tapped into the samples perceptions of their groups overall conditions relative to those of other South African race groups revealed that black Africans consider the overall conditions of their group to be considerably worse than those of other South African race groups. The opposite was found for whites. Mphuthing (1998) reports a similar finding. She uncovered that while black Africans were more satisfied with their group's position than they had been in the past, they felt nonetheless that their position was below that of what they rightfully deserved, and they perceived other groups' positions to be better than their own. This fraternal relative deprivation seems to be what is responsible for the regular strikes and protest actions that black Africans are becoming frequently involved in (Møller, 2007).

It was then found that those who expressed Liberal future ideologies expected their personal economic conditions and the overall economic conditions in South Africa to improve in the near future. Those who expressed future ideologies of Deterioration and Catastrophe held these expectations to a lesser degree. While these two items were essentially measures of relative deprivation, they required participants to disclose their *expectations* of whether they felt that their personal economic conditions/overall economic conditions in South Africa would get better or worse in the near future. Asked in this way, these measures can also be seen as tapping into the participants levels of optimism towards the future. Therefore, an individual who experiences lower levels of relative deprivation, in the sense that they expect their personal economic conditions/overall South African conditions to improve, seems to also be an individual who is more optimistic towards the future. It follows that such an

individual is likely to endorse a more optimistic Liberal ideology. Conversely, an individual who expects these conditions to worsen and therefore experiences higher levels of relative deprivation, seems to be an individual who is less optimistic towards the future and is thus more likely to endorse the more negative future ideologies of Deterioration and Catastrophe. These assumptions suggest that some sort of relationship exists between relative deprivation and optimism towards the future. It was a further finding that those who expressed Liberal ideologies perceived significantly lower levels of overall national relative deprivation than did those who expressed Deterioration and Catastrophic ideologies. This particular measure of relative deprivation requires one to make an international comparison between overall conditions in South Africa and those of other southern African countries. The abovementioned findings seem to suggest that overall conditions (i.e. overall personal conditions and overall national conditions), rather than the relative conditions of other groups, seem to play a role in determining whether one predicts a Liberal, Deterioration or Catastrophic future ideology.

5.7. Linkages between future ideology, social group identification, optimism about the future and relative deprivation

The current study was also interested in discovering whether any connections existed between the study's four main variables: future ideology, primary social group identification, optimism about the future and perceived relative deprivation. A generalised logistic regression was therefore conducted in an attempt to ascertain whether one's primary social group identification, optimism about the future and perceived relative deprivation *predict* whether one endorses a Liberal, Deterioration or Catastrophic future ideology. It emerged from this procedure that one's primary social group identification did not significantly predict these particular outlooks to the future. It was put forward during section 2.5.3 of the Literature Review that identity formations are dynamic social structures that change with changes in one's environment (Bornman, in press). One's social group identifications therefore seem to be fairly irregular and inconstant parts of one's self-concept. It follows that such a fluctuating variable would likely have relatively low predictive control over one's outlook to the future. In contrast however, one's levels of optimism about the future and their degree of perceived relative deprivation were found to both be significant predictors of the endorsement of Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic future ideologies. When comparisons are made

between the predictive powers of these two variables, it is evident that optimism about the future is a stronger predictor of Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic future ideologies than is perceived relative deprivation. It is likely that the problems associated with the relative deprivation scale in terms of its low internal consistency may have served to reduce this variable's predictive influence. However, it is also possible that relative deprivation as a variable is simply not as strong in predicting Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic future ideologies as is optimism about the future. The assumption was made in section 5.4 above that a Liberal future ideology seems to encompass an optimistic view about the future and that Deterioration and Catastrophic future ideologies conversely seem to encompass pessimistic stances to the future. This supposes that Liberalism and an optimistic outlook are in fact synonymous, while the same is true for Deterioration and Catastrophic ideologies and a pessimistic outlook. If this assumption is indeed correct then it follows that optimism about the future would indeed be strongly predictive of whether one endorses a Liberal, Deterioration or Catastrophic future ideology.

Chapter Six

Conclusion

6.1 Summary of Central Findings

The primary aim of the current research was to identify the future ideologies that are held by University of the Witwatersrand students in the current South African context. This study essentially comprises the fifth study of a line of research on future ideologies that was initiated by Kurt Danziger in South Africa in 1956. While Danziger's original study and its three successive replications were conducted during and shortly after the acute socio-political instability of the apartheid era, the current study was prompted by the recent political vicissitudes that have occurred within the South African political arena of late. The nationwide controversy that arose from the rift that occurred within the ANC and the subsequent formation of a breakaway political party served to threaten the stability of the South African political structure. However, while this event did not in fact emerge as a destabilising force as was envisaged, this momentous change nonetheless stimulated a great deal of careful reflection on the future of the country by South African citizens.

This research found that the most widespread future ideologies that are held by University of the Witwatersrand students are the Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic ideologies. Technicist, Socialist and Revolutionary orientations to the future are rarely endorsed. These perceptions however, were not found to differ significantly in terms of race. A relatively large proportion of participants' essays failed to present a definable future and were thus unable to be categorised. This indecisiveness with regards to imagining a probable future for the country may in fact be an indicator of the stability of current day South African society. An interesting finding was that a sizeable proportion of the current sample used their essays as a way to vent about the current circumstances in the country and seemed to experience difficulty envisioning a possible future for South Africa. Black Africans in particular seemed to be the most preoccupied with the present. While a number of themes emerged from the essay content that dealt with the samples present perceptions, aspects of the South African political landscape featured most prominently. Corruption in government was widely spoken of, as was governmental leadership, the 2009 elections, South African politics in general, and

the current ANC president, Jacob Zuma. When the findings of the previous studies on future ideologies that were conducted in South Africa are considered it appears as if black Africans remain consistently Liberal in their outlooks to the future. Whites, conversely, appear to be predominantly Catastrophic, although figures of those who endorse such a future ideology seem to be receding.

Little could be ascertained about the samples social group identifications, as very few significant differences were uncovered. What was revealed was that whites identify more strongly with the national South African identity than do black Africans. Furthermore, while black Africans place more importance on race as an identity construct, gender is more important to the identities of whites. Although the black African race group was found to experience greater perceived relative deprivation when compared to white South Africans, they were also found to experience greater levels of optimism about the future. In particular, items of relative deprivation that measured one's personal economic conditions and one's perception of the overall economic conditions of South Africa were found to have a significant bearing on whether one foresees a Liberal, Deterioration or Catastrophic future. Furthermore, while optimism about the future and perceived relative deprivation were found to significantly predict whether one holds Liberal, Deterioration or Catastrophic future ideologies, one's primary social group identity did not have such predictive power.

6.2 Limitations

The limitations of the current study cohered predominantly around the characteristics and size of the sample. While the sample sizes of the black African and white race groups were adequate, those of the coloured and Indian/Asian race groups were exceptionally small in comparison. As a result of this inadequacy, these latter two race groups were often unable to be included in many of the statistical analyses. Accessing a larger sample overall may have served to correct this. Furthermore, the demographic characteristics of university students, which comprised the participants in the current sample, are not entirely representative of those of the South African population. It follows that the findings of the current study are unfortunately not able to be generalized to the remainder of the South African population. It can also be argued that university students augmented education and exposure to various ideologies renders them an even less representative sample. As many of these students are likely to reside in and around the city of Johannesburg it is possible that they are exposed to

and experience more westernised ideologies. However, two of the past studies which dealt with future ideologies in the South African context (Danziger, 1963; Du Preez et al., 1981) made use of university students and a similar sample was thus selected for purposes of replication. As Wits University is a predominantly English-speaking university there were very few white Afrikaans-speaking students in the current sample. Consequently, this group, which formed one of the comparison groups in each of the prior South African studies was not able to be included in the current study. An additional methodological limitation concerned the problem of low internal consistency that was associated with the relative deprivation scale. The consequence of this is that all findings with regard to the measure of relative deprivation should be regarded with extreme caution. A different version of this scale would have been preferable. A wealth of information emerged from the essays that were written by the current study's participants. However, as the essays were analysed by means of a quantitative thematic content analysis rather than a qualitative thematic content analysis the qualitative substance of this content went largely unacknowledged. It is believed that considering this content would have added even greater value to the current study; however this was beyond the scope of this research endeavour.

6.3 Recommendations for Future Research

It is important that Kurt Danziger's tradition of research on future ideologies be continued in the South African context. Orkin and Jowell (2006) argue that a country's attitudinal profile is as much a part of its social reality as are its demographic composition, its culture, and its social patterns. Furthermore, in a democratic society, such as South Africa, "...knowledge about citizen's perceptions is crucial not only to inform government officials about what the citizenry thinks of their performance and policies, but... it enables researchers and scholars to make continuous assessments of citizens' attitudes which constitutes one of the structural conditions of democratic sustainability" (Pillay, 2006). Regular data of this kind therefore allows a country to measure the progress it is making in terms of achieving its intended economic, social and political goals (Orkin & Jowell, 2006). Future South African researchers who have an interest in future ideologies are therefore called upon to conduct further replications of Danziger's original study at opportune times during the future. It is recommended however, that the limitations of the current study are taken into consideration by such future researchers. Future research could also employ different measures, such as

focus groups or the combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches in order to obtain a more holistic understanding.

If the findings of the current study are indeed an accurate reflection of the general attitudes of South African citizens it seems as if resentment and dissatisfaction towards the current circumstances in the country are rife amongst the South African population at present. This assumption is based on the finding that a large proportion of the participants in the current study used their essays as a way to vent about the current state of the nation. As the samples present perceptions of the country were not the focus of the current research this content went largely unacknowledged. However, these participants' perceptions were of great interest. Future researchers may wish to delve more into why it is that certain South African adolescents experience difficulty envisaging a possible future for the country and are instead so preoccupied with the present.

The participants' future ideologies in the current study were not found to differ significantly across racial barriers. It was suggested in the Discussion section that South Africans future ideologies could instead differ in terms of socio-economic differences. This possibility requires exploration.

6.4 Implications and Conclusion

The fact that the black African and white race groups were not found to differ significantly in terms of the future ideologies that they endorsed perhaps serves as reason to hope that the rifts that have existed between these two groups historically are being gradually repaired, and that younger generations of black Africans and whites are becoming more similar in terms of their perceptions of the future. However, the samples pervasive negativity concerning the present conditions in the country seems to have a curtailing effect on their abilities to envisage a possible future for the country. This may pose as a threat to their smooth transition from adolescence to adulthood. On the contrary however, it can also be argued that the current conditions in the country, when compared to conditions in the past, are considerably more stable and that it is this stability that makes it difficult for certain individuals to envisage a future for the country. The paucity of research into the societal future ideologies of South African citizens highlights the need for studies of this nature to be conducted.

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
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**Appendix A: Letter of permission to use
Psychology I students**

Psychology
School of Human & Community Development
University of the Witwatersrand
Private Bag 3, WITS, 2050
Tel: (011) 717 4500 Fax: (011) 717 4559



Dear Ms. Enid Schutte

I am currently conducting research on University of the Witwatersrand's students' perceptions of the future of South Africa to obtain my Masters in Research Psychology from the University of the Witwatersrand.

I would very much like to make use of the Psychology I students' as participants for my study and request permission to do so. I would particularly like to use Psychology students as my sample, as I feel that if they are planning to continue their studies in Psychology and will possibly be completing psychological research of their own one day, it will most certainly be beneficial to them to partake in a psychological study and begin gaining experience and knowledge as to what it entails.


I would also like to request permission from you to administer my questionnaire booklets to the Psychology students during weekly tutorial times. This would truly be an ideal method of collecting my data, as I feel that in this way my response rate will be much higher than if participants were to take the questionnaire booklets home, complete them there and return them to me. Participants shall be required to write an essay, of no more than 3 pages, on the projected future history of South Africa, as well as to complete 3 simple questionnaires. Participants will require *at least 30 minutes* to complete the entire questionnaire booklet, but I would be most grateful if you would consider allowing me the entire 45-minute tutorial period.

I feel that this study is especially relevant to South Africa and that it may have important implications for the future of the country, as well as to generally contribute to knowledge in this area.

I would be eternally grateful if you would be so kind as to grant me this permission.

Yours sincerely,
Tarryn Leslie

I hereby grant permission for the Psychology I students' to be used as the sample in this study and for questionnaire booklets to be administered to them during tutorial times.


Ms. Enid Schutte

107

5 May 2009
Date



Appendix B: Participant Information Sheet Psychology

School of Human & Community Development
University of the Witwatersrand
Private Bag 3, WITS, 2050
Tel: (011) 717 4500 Fax: (011) 717 4559



Dear Participant

My name is Tarryn Leslie. I am conducting research for the purposes of obtaining my Masters degree from the University of the Witwatersrand. My research is focusing on South African university students' perceptions of the future of South Africa.

I would like to invite you to take part in this study. Participation will require you to write an essay, of no more than 3 pages, on the projected future history of South Africa, as well as to complete 3 simple questionnaires. You will be allowed the entire 45-minute tutorial period in which to complete this questionnaire booklet.

Participation in this study is voluntary and no student will be advantaged or disadvantaged in any way for choosing to complete or not complete the essay and questionnaires. You are free to withdraw from the study at any time should you wish to do so. Demographic questions are asked about your personal circumstances, but no identifying information, such as your name or student number is asked for ensuring that you remain completely anonymous. Furthermore, the contents of your completed questionnaire booklet will remain strictly confidential, as the questionnaire booklets will not be seen by anyone other than me, and my supervisor. If you feel that the content of the study has adversely affected you in any way, please feel free to consult the Careers and Counselling Development Unit (CCDU) on campus for counselling. If you should wish to view the results of the study, on completion of the research, you may contact me on the e-mail address provided below and I shall forward you a brief summary of the research findings.

If you do choose to partake in this study, please do so as honestly and accurately as possible. Your informed consent to participate in this study will be assumed if you choose to complete a questionnaire booklet. I would greatly appreciate your time and effort in participating in the study and your participation could help contribute to knowledge in this area in South Africa. Thank you for your time and cooperation. For queries or further information you may feel free to contact me, or my supervisor, on the e-mail addresses provided below.

Tarryn Leslie
Researcher
Tarryn.Leslie@students.wits.ac.za

Professor Gillian Finchilescu
Research supervisor
Gillian.Finchilescu@wits.ac.za

APPENDIX C

UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, JOHANNESBURG

HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (SCHOOL OF HUMAN & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT)

CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE

PROTOCOL NUMBER: MPSTC/05/005 III

PROJECT TITLE:

University of the Witwatersrand's Students' Perceptions of the Future of South Africa: A 2009 Replication

INVESTIGATORS

Tarryn Leslie

DEPARTMENT

Psychology

DATE CONSIDERED


15/04/09

DECISION OF COMMITTEE:

Approved

This ethical clearance is valid for 2 years and may be renewed upon application

DATE: 01 June 2009

CHAIRPERSON 
(Professor K. Cockcroft)

cc Supervisor:

Prof Gillian Finchilescu
Psychology

DECLARATION OF INVESTIGATOR (S)

To be completed in duplicate and one copy returned to the Secretary, Room 100615, 10th floor, Senate House, University.

I/we fully understand the conditions under which I am/we are authorized to carry out the abovementioned research and I/we guarantee to ensure compliance with these conditions. Should any departure be contemplated from the research procedures, as approved, I/we undertake to submit a revised protocol to the Committee.

This ethical clearance will expire on 31 December 2010

PLEASE QUOTE THE PROTOCOL NUMBER IN ALL ENQUIRIES

Appendix D

Demographic Questionnaire

Please cross (X) the appropriate boxes.

1. **Age:** _____

2. **Gender:**

Female ☐

Male ☐

3. **Race:**

Black ☐

Coloured ☐

Indian/Asian ☐

White ☐

4. **Home language:**

Afrikaans ☐

English ☐

isiNdebele ☐

isiXhosa ☐

isiZulu ☐

Sepedi ☐

Sesotho ☐

Setswana ☐

siSwati ☐

Tshivenda ☐

Xitsonga ☐

Other ☐ Please specify: _____

5. **Year of study:** _____

These questions are asked to ensure that a representative sample is obtained for this study.

Appendix E: Essay

Please write a short essay of no more than 3 pages on the history of South Africa projected into the future. Imagine you are a historian writing in 2060. Outline what you think the history of South Africa will be during the period: 2009 (starting today) to 2060. Do not simply describe what South Africa might be like in 2060, but give an account of things that are likely to happen in this 50 year period.

This image shows a full page of white paper with horizontal dashed lines, typical of primary school handwriting practice paper. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the entire width of the page. There are no margins, text, or other markings present.

Appendix F: Social Group Identification Checklist

Each of us has a number of identities. They are part of how we describe ourselves. For example, we are males or females and we can also have an identity as a member of a sports team or a religious group. The list below contains some identities. Mark as many of them as apply to you with a cross (X).

African	<input type="checkbox"/>	Zulu	<input type="checkbox"/>	Sesotho	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sotho	<input type="checkbox"/>	Female	<input type="checkbox"/>	White	<input type="checkbox"/>
South African	<input type="checkbox"/>	isiXhosa	<input type="checkbox"/>	Sepedi	<input type="checkbox"/>
isiNdebele	<input type="checkbox"/>	Muslim	<input type="checkbox"/>	Male	<input type="checkbox"/>
Afrikaans-speaking	<input type="checkbox"/>	Xitsonga	<input type="checkbox"/>	Christian	<input type="checkbox"/>
siSwati	<input type="checkbox"/>	Coloured	<input type="checkbox"/>	Swati	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tshivenda	<input type="checkbox"/>	English-speaking	<input type="checkbox"/>	Black	<input type="checkbox"/>
Indian/Asian	<input type="checkbox"/>	Setswana	<input type="checkbox"/>	isiZulu	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ndebele	<input type="checkbox"/>	Buddhist	<input type="checkbox"/>	Tsonga	<input type="checkbox"/>
Hindu	<input type="checkbox"/>	Tswana	<input type="checkbox"/>	Jewish	<input type="checkbox"/>
Venda	<input type="checkbox"/>	Xhosa	<input type="checkbox"/>		

Other (please specify): _____

Below, list your identities in order of importance. You do not have to use all 5 slots. For example, suppose you see yourself as being English and South African. If being South African is more important to you than being English, then you would write South African in slot “1” and English in slot “2”.

RANK	IDENTITY
Most Important 1	
2	
3	
4	
Least important 5	

Appendix G: Optimism Scale

Below are some aspects of life in South Africa. Please indicate whether you think, in the next five years, these things will improve, stay the same, or get worse. Please cross (X) the appropriate box.

(1) Education

Get worse	Stay the same			Improve
1	2	3	4	5

(2) Crime

Get worse	Stay the same			Improve
1	2	3	4	5

(3) Health care

Get worse	Stay the same			Improve
1	2	3	4	5

(4) Race relations

Get worse	Stay the same			Improve
1	2	3	4	5

(5) Quality of life

Get worse	Stay the same			Improve
1	2	3	4	5

(6) The economy

Get worse	Stay the same			Improve
1	2	3	4	5

(7) Do you think the financial situation of future generations will be better, worse, or about the same as your own financial situation is today?

Get worse	Stay the same			Improve
1	2	3	4	5

Appendix H: Relative Deprivation Scale

1. At the moment are you (satisfied/dissatisfied) with your personal economic conditions?

Very satisfied

Very dissatisfied

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

2. Do you expect that your personal economic conditions will get (better/same/worse) one year from now?

Much better

Same

Much worse

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

3. At the moment are you (satisfied/dissatisfied) with economic conditions in South Africa?

Very satisfied

Very dissatisfied

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

4. Do you expect that economic conditions in South Africa will get (better/same/worse) one year from now?

Much better

Same

Much worse

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

5. Would you say that your overall personal conditions are (better/same/worse) than those of other South Africans?

Much better

Much worse

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

6. Would you say that your overall personal conditions are (better/same/worse) as other members of your population group?

Much better

Same

Much worse

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

7. Would you say that the overall conditions of people from your population group are (better/same/worse) than those of other groups in South Africa?

Much better

Same

Much worse

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

8. Would you say that the overall conditions of South Africa are (better/same/worse) than those in other Southern African countries?

Much better

Same

Much worse

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Appendix I

Table 4. Frequencies and percentages of the samples predominant future ideologies.

Future Ideology	Frequency	Percent (%)
No future ideology	34	15.25
Liberal	71	31.84
Deterioration	44	19.73
Catastrophic	26	11.66
Technicist	5	2.24
Revolutionary	7	3.14
Socialist	3	1.35
Unclassifiable	33	14.80

Appendix J

Table 5. Frequencies and percentages of the samples future valences.

Future Valence	Frequency	Percent (%)
No future valence	34	15.25
Positive	92	41.26
Negative	87	39.01
Neutral	3	1.35
Mixed	7	3.14

Appendix K

Table 6. Frequencies and percentages of the future valences by each future ideology.

Future Ideology	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Mixed	No future valence	Total
Liberal A B	71 100.00% 77.17%	-	-	-	-	71
Deterioration A B	-	44 100.00% 50.57%	-	-	-	44
Catastrophic A B	-	26 100.00% 29.89%	-	-	-	26
Technicist A B	5 100.00% 5.43%	-	-	-	-	5
Revolutionary A B	3 42.86% 3.26%	4 57.14% 4.60%	-	-	-	7
Socialist A B	1 33.33% 1.09%	2 66.67% 2.30%	-	-	-	3
Unclassifiable A B	12 36.36% 13.04%	11 33.33% 12.64%	3 9.09% 100.00%	7 21.21% 100.00%	-	33
No Future Ideology A B	-	-	-	-	34 100.00% 100.00%	34
Total	92	87	3	7	34	223

A = percentage of respondents who were positive/negative/neutral of those whose essays expressed Liberal/Deterioration/Catastrophic future ideologies

B = percentage of respondents whose essays expressed Liberal/Deterioration/Catastrophic future ideologies of those who were positive/negative/neutral to the future

Appendix L

Table 7. Frequencies and percentages of the samples present valences.

Present Valence	Frequency	Percent (%)
No present valence	101	45.29
Positive	21	9.42
Negative	82	36.77
Neutral	10	4.48
Mixed	9	4.04

Appendix M

Table 8. Frequencies and percentages of the samples positive, negative, and neutral perceptions of the present categories.

Present Category	Frequency			
	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Total
Black Economic Empowerment	N = 2	N = 10	-	N = 12 9.84%
Corruption	-	N = 40	-	N = 40 32.79%
Crime	-	N = 25	-	N = 25 20.49%
Development	N = 5	N = 5	-	N = 10 8.20%
Economy	N = 6	N = 37	-	N = 43 35.25%
Education	N = 3	N = 17	-	N = 20 16.39%
Elections	N = 9	N = 14	N = 4	N = 27 22.13%
Emigration	-	N = 3	-	N = 3 2.46%
Greed	-	N = 11	-	N = 11 9.02%
Healthcare	N = 1	N = 7	-	N = 8 6.56%
HIV/AIDS	N = 2	N = 8	-	N = 10 8.20%
Justice System	-	N = 3	-	N = 3 2.46%
Leadership	N = 1	N = 37	N = 2	N = 40 32.79%
Living Conditions	N = 1	N = 9	-	N = 10 8.20%
Politics	N = 6	N = 31	N = 2	N = 39 23.77%
Poverty	-	N = 17	-	N = 17 13.93%
Race Relations	N = 8	N = 11	-	N = 19 15.57%
Skills	N = 1	N = 5	-	N = 6 4.92%
Teenage Pregnancy	-	N = 4	-	N = 4 3.28%
Unemployment	N = 1	N = 9	-	N = 10 8.20%
Jacob Zuma	N = 5	N = 31	-	N = 36 29.51%

Appendix N

Table 9. Frequencies and percentages of the future ideologies per race group.

Future Ideology	Black African	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White	Total
Liberal	38	4	6	23	<i>71</i>
A	53.52%	5.63%	8.45%	32.39%	
B	52.78%	30.77%	31.58%	44.23%	
Deterioration	19	8	5	12	<i>44</i>
A	43.18%	18.18%	11.36%	27.27%	
B	26.39%	61.54%	26.32%	23.08%	
Catastrophic	8	1	6	11	<i>26</i>
A	30.77%	3.85%	23.08%	42.31%	
B	11.11%	7.69%	31.58%	21.15%	
Technicist	2	-	2	1	<i>5</i>
A	40.00%		40.00%	20.00%	
B	2.78%		10.53%	1.92%	
Revolutionary	3	-	-	4	<i>7</i>
A	42.86%			57.14%	
B	4.17%			7.69%	
Socialist	2	-	-	1	<i>3</i>
A	66.67%			33.33%	
B	2.78%			1.92%	
Total	<i>72</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>52</i>	<i>156</i>

A = percentage of respondents whose essays fell in this category

B = percentage of the race group whose essays fell in this category

Appendix O

Table 10. Frequencies and percentages of the samples future valences by race group.

Future valence	Black African	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White	Total
Positive	51	4	9	28	92
A	55.43%	4.35%	9.78%	30.43%	
B	45.16.3%	23.53%	33.33%	42.42%	
Negative	36	10	12	29	87
A	41.38%	11.49%	13.79%	33.33%	
B	31.86%	58.82%	44.44%	43.94%	
Neutral	1	-	1	1	3
A	33.33%		33.33%	33.33%	
B	0.88%		3.70%	1.52%	
Mixed	1	-	2	4	7
A	14.29%		28.57%	57.14%	
B	0.88%		7.41%	6.06%	

A = percentage of respondents whose essays fell in this category

B = percentage of the race group whose essays fell in this category

Appendix P

Table 12. Frequencies and percentages of the samples positive, negative and neutral overall present valences

Present Valence	Black African	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White	Total
Positive	15	1	2	3	<i>21</i>
A	71.43%	4.76%	9.52%	14.29%	
B	13.27%	5.88%	7.41%	4.55%	
Negative	41	12	12	17	<i>82</i>
A	50.00%	14.63%	14.63%	20.73%	
B	36.28%	70.59%	44.44%	25.76%	
Neutral	5	-	2	3	<i>10</i>
A	50.00%		20.00%	30.00%	
B	4.42%		7.41%	4.55%	
Mixed	5	-	1	3	<i>9</i>
A	55.56%		11.11%	33.33%	
B	4.42%		3.70%	4.55%	
No present valence	47	4	10	40	<i>101</i>
A	46.53%	3.96%	9.90%	39.60%	
B	41.59%	23.53%	37.04%	60.61%	
Total	<i>113</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>66</i>	<i>223</i>

A = percentage of respondents whose essays fell in this category

B = percentage of the race group whose essays fell in this category

Appendix Q

Table 13. Comparison of the percentages of the future ideologies appearing in 1963, 1981, 1992, 1996 and 2009

Future Ideology	Year	Black African	White
Liberal	1963	22.6	19.1
	1981	34.0	15.0
	1992	87.5	30.8
	1996	6.4	6.4
	2009	52.8	44.2
Deterioration	1963	-	-
	1981	-	-
	1992	-	-
	1996	-	-
	2009	26.4	23.1
Catastrophic	1963	4.8	31.8
	1981	7	40.0
	1992	7.1	44.1
	1996	1.9	18.7
	2009	11.1	21.2
Technicist	1963	1.2	13.1
	1981	16	4.0
	1992	-	0.7
	1996	-	1.2
	2009	2.8	1.9
Revolutionary	1963	46.4	2.0
	1981	25	20
	1992	-	1.4
	1996	-	-
	2009	4.2	7.7
Conservative	1963	13.1	20.2
	1981	6.1	13
	1992	-	3.5
	1996	-	-
	2009	-	-

Appendix R

Table 14. Frequencies and percentages of the samples social group identities.

Identity categories	Identity	Black African	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White
<u>Continental</u>	<i>African</i>	N = 94 83.19%	N = 6 35.29%	N = 3 11.11%	N = 24 36.36%
<u>Nationality</u>	<i>South African</i>	N = 92 81.42%	N = 15 88.24%	N = 23 85.19%	N = 63 95.45%
<u>Race</u>	<i>Black</i>	N = 94 83.19%	-	-	-
	<i>Coloured</i>	N = 1 0.88%	N = 15 88.24%	N = 1 3.70%	N = 1 1.52%
	<i>Indian/Asian</i>	-	N = 2 11.76%	N = 25 92.59%	-
	<i>White</i>	N = 1 0.88%	N = 2 11.76%	-	N = 62 93.94%
<u>Gender</u>	<i>Female</i>	N = 85 75.22%	N = 13 76.47%	N = 19 70.37%	N = 44 66.67%
	<i>Male</i>	N = 23 20.35%	N = 3 17.65%	N = 7 25.93%	N = 22 33.33%
<u>Religion</u>	<i>Buddhist</i>	N = 1 0.88%	N = 1 5.88%	N = 1 3.70%	N = 3 4.55%
	<i>Christian</i>	N = 86 76.11%	N = 11 64.71%	N = 5 18.52%	N = 32 48.48%
	<i>Hindu</i>	-	N = 1 5.88%	N = 13 48.15%	-
	<i>Jewish</i>	-	N = 1 5.88%	-	N = 9 13.64%
	<i>Muslim</i>	-	N = 3 17.65%	N = 8 29.63%	N = 2 3.03%
<u>Language</u>	<i>Afrikaans-speaking</i>	N = 8 7.08%	N = 10 58.82%	-	N = 12 18.18%
	<i>English-speaking</i>	N = 56 49.56%	N = 15 88.24%	N = 22 81.48%	N = 56 84.85%
	<i>isiNdebele</i>	N = 4 3.54%	-	-	-
	<i>isiXhosa</i>	N = 9 7.96%	-	-	N = 1 1.52%
	<i>isiZulu</i>	N = 23 20.35%	-	-	N = 4 6.06%
	<i>Sepedi</i>	N = 15 13.27%	-	-	-
	<i>Sesotho</i>	N = 19 16.81%	-	-	-
	<i>Setswana</i>	N = 18 15.93%	-	-	-

	<i>siSwati</i>	N = 10 8.85%	-	-	-
	<i>Tshivenda</i>	N = 2 1.77%	-	-	-
	<i>Xitsonga</i>	N = 3 2.65%	-	-	-
<u>Ethnic group</u>	<i>Ndebele</i>	N = 4 3.54%	-	-	-
	<i>Sepedi</i>	N = 15 13.27%	-	-	-
	<i>Sotho</i>	N = 22 19.47%	-	-	-
	<i>Swati</i>	N = 13 11.50%	-	-	-
	<i>Tsonga</i>	N = 5 4.42%	-	-	-
	<i>Tswana</i>	N = 17 15.04%	-	-	-
	<i>Venda</i>	N = 3 2.65%	-	-	-
	<i>Xhosa</i>	N = 4 3.54%	-	-	-
	<i>Zulu</i>	N = 41 36.28%	-	-	-

Appendix S

Table 15. Frequencies and percentages of the samples primary social group identifications.

Primary Identity Categories	Black African	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White	Total
African	24	3		1	
A	85.71%	10.71%	-	3.57%	28
B	23.08%	18.75%		1.56%	
South African	24	5	5	19	
A	45.28%	9.43%	9.43%	35.85%	53
B	23.08%	31.25%	20.00%	29.69%	
Race	25	3	2	3	
A	75.76%	9.09%	6.06%	9.09%	33
B	24.04%	18.25%	8.00%	4.69%	
Gender	11	1	4	19	
A	31.43%	2.86%	11.43%	54.29%	35
B	10.58%	6.25%	16.00%	29.69%	
Religion	29	4	12	13	
A	50.00%	6.90%	20.69%	22.41%	58
B	27.88%	25.00%	48.00%	20.31%	
Ethno-linguistic	8		2	5	
A	53.33%	-	13.33%	33.33%	15
B	7.69%		8.00%	7.81%	
Total	<i>104</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>64</i>	<i>209</i>

A = percentage of respondents who identified primarily with this identity category

B = percentage of the race group who identified primarily with this identity category

Appendix T

Table 16. Primary Social Group Identifications by the Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic Future Ideologies.

Primary Identity Categories	Liberal	Deterioration	Catastrophic	Total
African	7	5	4	<i>16</i>
A	43.75%	31.25%	25.00%	
B	11.48%	14.71%	16.00%	
South African	19	7	6	<i>32</i>
A	59.38%	21.88%	18.75%	
B	31.15%	20.59%	24.00%	
Race	2	2	1	<i>5</i>
A	40.00%	40.00%	20.00%	
B	3.28%	5.88%	4.00%	
Gender	9	8	6	<i>23</i>
A	39.13%	34.78%	26.09%	
B	14.75%	23.53%	24.00%	
Religion	18	10	6	<i>34</i>
A	52.94%	29.41%	17.65%	
B	29.51%	29.41%	24.00%	
Ethno-linguistic	6	2	2	<i>10</i>
A	60.00%	20.00%	20.00%	
B	9.84%	5.88%	8.00%	
Total	<i>61</i>	<i>34</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>120</i>

A = percentage of respondents who identified primarily with this identity category of those whose essays expressed either Liberal, Deterioration or Catastrophic future ideologies

B = percentage of respondents whose essays expressed either Liberal, Deterioration or Catastrophic future ideologies of those who identified primarily with this identity category